Paved with Good Intentions PENGUIN BOOKS PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS Barry Rubin is a specialist on American foreign policy and on Middle East politics. He is a Fellow at George­ town University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS The American Experience and Iran BARRY RUBIN PENGUIN BOOKS PENGUIN BOOKS Published by the Penguin Group Viking Penguin Inc., 40 West 23rd Street, New York, New York 10010, U.S.A. Penguin Books Ltd, 27 Wrights Lane, London W8 5TZ, England Penguin Books Australia Ltd, Ringwood, Victoria, Australia Penguin Books Canada Ltd, 2801 John Street, Markham, Ontario, Canada L3R 1B4 Penguin Books (N.Z.) Ltd, 182­190 Wairau Road, Auckland 10, New Zealand Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England First published in Great Britain and the United States by Oxford University Press, Inc., 1980 Published in Penguin Books 1981 10 9 8 7 6 5 Copyright © Oxford University Press, Inc., 1980 All rights reserved LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA Rubin, Barry M. Paved with good intentions. Originally published: New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. United States—Foreign relations—Iran. 2. Iran— Foreign relations—United States. I. Title. E183.8.I55R83 1981 327.73055 81­4634 ISBN 0 14 00.5964 4 AACR2 Printed in the United States of America Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re­sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser Artificial sprites As by the strength of their illusion Shall draw him on to his confusion He shall spurn fate, scorn death and bear: His hopes ‘bove wisdom, grace and fear: And you all know security Is mortal’s chiefest enemy. —Macbeth Preface Responding to a press­conference question in February, 1980 about the United States role in the 1953 return to power of the shah, President Carter replied that the events were not worth going into because they were “ancient history.” Clearly this was a tactical response—there was no sense adding fuel to the fire while fifty-three Americans were still being held hostage. Yet there was no lack of interest within the American public in the angry charges coming daily out of Iran or in the debate within the United States between those who sup­ ported these allegations of American perfidy and those who did not. On the contrary, there was a strong and widespread interest in calm evaluation and better understanding. But first the public wanted the facts. What exactly had the nation done to cause the current leaders of Iran to hold the United States in such utter contempt, to charge it with such rank imperialism, and to lay at the doorstep of the White House all the sins of its own former monarch? The temptation to see the history of United States­Iranian relations as a story of heroes and villains, of a few missed opportunities, of colorful incidents and obvious lessons should be avoided. Before reading conclusions into this story, one ought to examine all the evidence—what happened in Iran in 1978 is unintelligible to those who know nothing of what oc­ curred in 1953. Similarly, it is just as impossible to evaluate the events of 1953 without reference to the special relation ship between the United States and Iran that had preceded them. A country’s behavior, as the Iranian crisis so vividly de­ monstrates, is not merely a product of a rational pursuit of objective national interests. Rather, it is the result of the in­ teraction of the collective historical experience of the nation with the individual life experiences of its citizens. The former creates a nation’s political course, the latter shapes its politi­ cal consciousness. Whether or not the interaction contributes to the effective fulfillment of a nation’s objective interests is an important question, though not always the controlling question. There is also a rather common occurrence in politics that might be called the vector principle. A boat sets off for the opposite shore of a river but because of various unconsidered currents ends up several miles downstream. American policies often seemed in theory, if not in execution, directed toward reasonably obtainable, rational goals but failed nonetheless because they did not take fully into account the currents of Iranian and Middle East politics. In part, United States error may be traced to the triumph of a single­minded strategy over political realities. It involved overdependence on seemingly changeless factors, unwarranted reliance on the strength of the status quo, and an excessively cynical view of considerations presented as moralistic. Cer­ tainly, some dictatorships prosper—not all decay—and some are replaced by worse alternatives. Nevertheless, the compe­ tence and popularity of foreign governments with whom the United States must deal are factors contributing to or threaten­ ing the realization of American foreign policy goals. Blindness toward these realities was heightened by bureaucratic factors within the United States government— the discouragement of internal debate and honest reporting in the Nixon­Ford administrations and the breakdown of coordina tion and discipline during the Carter years. These often­neglected considerations played a central role in American misperceptions. Especially remarkable is the extent to which years of American­Iranian relations were built on mutual ignorance and misperceptions. American strategists saw Iran as a chess piece on the international political game board: capable of making potent military and diplomatic moves in support of the grand strategy without reference to its own internal ten sions. The shah’s regime and its enemies shared many serious errors about the nature of the United States and its foreign policy. To them, Washington had either to be savior or satan. The road to the hell of the hostage crisis was often paved for the United States with good intentions, coupled with exceed ingly bad judgment. How was the United States transformed in Iranian eyes from their nation’s savior, in the 1940s, to the world­devouring satan of the Khomeinist era? An answer to this question, it seems, will tell much about the triumphs and tragedies of American foreign policy toward the Third World over the past thirty-five years. This book was generated by my research as a historian in the evolution of Middle East politics and United States policy on the one hand and from my work as a political analyst of contemporary developments on the other. In addition to the use of archival material—much of it only recently declassified—and of other primary sources, I have in terviewed well over one hundred people involved with this story. These include past and present American officials from the Defense Department, State Department, National Security Council, the United States Embassy in Tehran, and the CIA, as well as many Iranians, both those who served under the shah, as soldiers or diplomats, and those now part of the new Is lamic Iranian government. Since these were mostly off­the­ record talks, they cannot be footnoted. Naturally, however, personal descriptions and interpretations of events were cited only with caution and with cor roboration from other sources. I wish to thank all of those who gave generously of their time and candidly and cou rageously of their thoughts on this subject. I especially want to thank Jay La Monica, Devon Gaffney, and Marc Goodman for their moral support and material assis tance. Susan Meisel helped on research and Bonnie Koenig compiled the chronology. My editor, Susan Rabiner, also labored above and beyond the call of duty. To avoid overwhelming the reader with footnotes, I have generally attributed only direct quotes. In most cases, the bib liography should serve as a guide for those wishing to do further study. Again, for clarity I have generally used the transliterations of Iranian names most commonly employed by the Western media. Washington, D.C. B.R. July, 1980 Note to the Penguin Edition The publication of the paperback edition has given me the opportunity to make a number of corrections and to update the Chronology to reflect the most recent events. I wish to thank those scholars who suggested changes. The develop­ ments leading to the release of the American hostages demon­ strated the book’s analysis of political forces within Iran and those affecting U.S.­Iran relations. The Gulf region’s growing importance further enhances the need to understand past and present American involvement in the Middle East, and with Iran in particular. Washington, D.C. B.R. September, 1981 Contents thor’s Note ……………………………………xvi riendship is Born………………………………3 ountry Is Saved 1945­50 ………………… 29 evolution Is Overthrown 1951­53………… 54 lliance Is Made 1954­68 ………………… 91 mperial Dream 1969­74……………………124 ms and the Shah 1975­76 ……………………158 Author’s Note ……………………………………xvi e Pillar Crumbles 1977­78 …………………190 1. A Friendship is Born ………………………………3 ys of Reckoning 1978­79 ……………………217 2. A Country Is Saved 1945­50 ………………… 29 arismatic Disorder 1979 ……………………252 3. A Revolution Is Overthrown 1951­53 ………… 54 n’s Second Revolution 1979­80 ……………300 4. An Alliance Is Made 1954­68 ………………… 91 PENDIX A: The Role of the Media ………337 5. An Imperial Dream 1969­74 ……………………124 PENDIX B: Chronology of Events 1978-81 365 6. Arms and the Shah 1975­76 ……………………158 tes ……………………………………………381 7. The Pillar Crumbles 1977­78 …………………190 8. Days of Reckoning 1978­79 ……………………217 9.