Australian National University THESES SIS/LIBRARY TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2 FACSIMILE: +61 2 6125 4063 THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY EMAIL: [email protected] CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA USE OF THESES This copy is supplied for purposes of private study and research only. Passages from the thesis may not be copied or closely paraphrased without the written consent of the author. IRAN AS A REGIONAL MILITARY POWER (1970-78) Maqsud ul Hasan Nuri Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of International Relati The Australian National University September 1979 This thesis is my own original work. Maqsud Ail Hasan Nuri CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 1 IRAN'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS UNDER THE SHAH 6 THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES - MAJOR DEFENCE AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMME 41 IRAN'S OCCUPATION OF THE GULF ISLANDS AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN OMAN 67 IRAN-UNITED STATES MILITARY RELATIONSHIP 89 IRAN'S ARMAMENT PROGRAMME: A CRITIQUE 138 THE REVOLUTION OF 19 7 8-79: A CHANGE IN PERCEPTIONS 173 CONCLUSIONS 231 APPENDIX 1 238 APPENDIX 2 241 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 243 MAPS INTRODUCTION After 1970, Iran under the Shah started acquiring most of the attributes of a major regional power in the Persian Gulf region. As compared with its neighbours, it had a relatively larger population, a better developed techno-industrial base and a higher oil production rate (second only to Saudi Arabia). After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the excess of oil revenues as a result of the oil price increase was used to convert the Iranian oil wealth into a sizable military machine. This was mainly carried out through a rapid weapons acquisitions programme. Earlier, the strategic factors i.e. the announcement of Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in January 196 8 and the actual withdrawal in December 19 71 gave Iran an opportunity to fill the military vacuum by increasing its military strength. Thus by 1978 Iran had achieved an almost unchallenged status as the principal power in the Persian Gulf. This was mainly because: (1) It possessed armed forces (army, navy and air­ force) which were both quantitatively and qualitatively superior to those of most countries in the Persian Gulf. (2) No country in the Persian Gulf (or even the Middle East except Israel) since World War II had developed and maintained such deep-rooted political, economic and strategic links with the United States. (3) It made itself responsible for the overall protection and security of the Gulf region, particularly in safe-guarding the free passage of oil 2 through the Persian Gulf to Western Europe, Japan, South Africa and Israel. On this unimpeded flow of oil depended the economic and ultimately the political health of these countries. (4) It took a leading role in the forging of regional security moves in the Persian Gulf and on few occasions employed its armed forces as protector of the regional status quo and a counterpoise to emerging radical regimes. (5) On the economic front, it embarked on financial aid giving programmes to countries in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and even the Indian sub-continent; politically it exerted an invisible but a palpable presence behind the governments that favoured a moderate solution to Middle East problems. (6) As the monarch of an oil rich state, the Shah's pronouncements were heeded by world statesmen. These pronouncements ranged from an international scheme for the price-indexing of developing countries' primary commodities, to support for proposals of regional economic cooperation, Third World demands for a new international economic order, and the future pricing of oil. The purpose of this study is to examine the growth and development of Iran as a regional military power from 19 70 till the end of 19 78. Although the main focus are these eight years, the study is carried forward into the first quarter of 19 79 due to the momentous development in Iran, 3 i.e. the Islamic Revolution which led to the overthrow of the monarchy. The emphasis is exclusively on 'the military aspect rather than the economic, though the development in the former could not have been possible without the latter. Before going into the summary of different chapters, an explanation of certain key terms frequently used in the study may be useful. The region to which Iran is viewed as belonging is the (Persian) Gulf sub-system. The 'boundaries of the Persian Gulf sub-system are demarcated by the outer limits of all those states that border the Persian Gulf: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Dubai. The 'elements' of this sub-system are those which result from the interactions of the states mentioned, and the global or trans-national inter-actions of actors who exert considerable influence in the region, e.g. the superpowers, multinational oil companies, revolut­ ionary movements such as the Omani rebels, and nations- without-states such as the Kurds, Palestinians and Baluchis. 'Power' in the Persian Gulf region is viewed as primarily 'military power' although it assumes the presence of an economic base from which this 'military power' is ultimately derived. The thesis is divided into the following six chapters: Chapter I deals with the sources and types of threat perceptions which Iran experienced under the Shah. Chapter II describes the rapid growth and modernization undertaken by the Shah for the Iranian armed forces (army, 4 navy and airforce). A section also discusses the nuclear programme. The chapter also takes into account the military capability desired and ultimately achieved. Chapter III analyses the projection of military strength of Iran across its borders: the forcible occupation of three islands in the Persian Gulf and sustained military inter­ vention in Oman. Finally, the main motivations behind these military moves and the reasons for success are considered. Chapter IV explores the Iran-U.S. military relationship and the evolution of U.S. military programmes in Iran; the U.S. military presence; and the diverse political, economic and strategic interests that brought both of them together. Chapter V attempts a critique of the Shah's threat perceptions and his huge armament programme. In addition, other arguments justifying the Shah's military buildup are brought under scrutiny. Chapter VI reviews in detail the events in Iran (1978-79) when Iran faced the Revolution leading to the overthrow of the monarchy. The chapter brings into focus the main sources of 'internal threat' to the Shah; the role and conduct of the military during the mass upsurge; the new perceptions regarding security by post-revolutionary Iran, and the politico-strategic implications of the Revolution in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. In brief this study attempts to describe how the Shah goaded by geo-political incentives, encouraged by vast financial resources, and inspired by a vision of launching Iran into an age of 'Great Civilization', set upon 5 an ambitious course to see its greatness reflected as a regional power in the area. In this quest for 'greatness' he seemed to approve of the sentiments once expressed by another self-confident monarch, Frederick the Great of Prussia: 'Do not forget the great guns that are the most respectable argument of the rights of Kings'. CHAPTER I IRAN'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS UNDER THE SHAH 6 Introduction After the 197 3 Arab-Israeli war, Iran under the Shah embarked upon a hectic military buildup programme. The sheer size and rapidity of this massive buildup seemed to suggest that Iran was primarily motivated by grave threats to its national security. This theme of national insecurity becomes apparent from the various speeches and statements of the Shah. In these he frequently referred to 'different threats' posed to Iran from across the borders. In this chapter an attempt is made to identify the various sources and types of threats to Iran as perceived by the Shah. Threat to the Oil Till 1978 Iran had the world's fourth biggest oil reserves (approximately 60 billion barrels) after Saudi Arabia, U.S.S.R. and Kuwait and was the fourth biggest producer after the U.S.S.R., Saudi Arabia and U.S.A. It was the second biggest exporter and in normal times nearly six million barrels of oil daily left the Persian Gulf’*' terminals. Iran then obtained over eighty per cent ^ The term 'Persian Gulf' is controversial. While some of the Arab countries have tried to rename it as the 'Arabian Gulf', it is used here as the 'Persian Gulf' for historical reasons. For the purpose of this study it is used to include Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. (cont' d) 7 of her foreign exchange reserves from oil exports. The total Gulf oil approximating 30 million barrels a day passed through the Straits of Hormuz, supplying 70 per cent of Western Europe's and 90 per cent of Japan's requirements. The most tangible threat to Iran concerned the vulnerability 3 of her oil economy. According to the Shah, the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz in truth constitute Iran's life line. If this area were in any way ^ threatened our very life would be endangered. 1 (cont'd) The Persian Gulf extends from the Hormuz Straits sweeping in a north-westerly direction, all the way to Iraq. It is about 800 kilometres long from the Hormuz Straits to the Karun River; about 180-250 kilometres wide and has an approximate area of 250,000 square kilometres. Its depth is about 100 metres, at its deepest near the Straits, but due to the Karun River which deposits about 725 million cubic metres of alluvial silt every year, the north-western tip of the Gulf is becoming shallower every year, and the area of the Gulf is shrinking.