Narratives Constitutional Law II

Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005

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Salonga vs. Hermoso [GR L-53622, 25 April 1980] … 1 Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-62100, 30 May 1986] … 1 Marcos vs. Manglapus [GR 88211, 15 September 1989] … 2 Silverio vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94284, 8 April 1991] … 4 Lorenzo vs. Director of Health [GR 27484, 1 September 1927] … 5

This collection contains five (5) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September 2012.

Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007). berneguerrero.wordpress.com Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

476 Salonga vs. Hermoso [GR L-53622, 25 April 1980] En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 9 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 1 on leave

Facts: This is not the first time Jovito R. Salonga came to the Supreme Court by way of a mandamus proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first case, Salonga v. Madella (GR L-49130), the case became moot and academic as the Office of the Solicitor General, in its answer to the petition, stated that the travel eligibility certificate was not denied and, as a matter of fact, had been granted. Herein, in the motion to dismiss of the Solicitor General dated 21 April 1980, it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted Salonga. A xeroxed copy was enclosed.

Held: The Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. In the address of President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos before the American Newspaper Publishers Association on 22 April 1980, he emphasized anew the respect accorded constitutional rights. The freedom to travel is certainly one of the most cherished. He cited with approval the ringing affirmation of Willoughby, who, as he noted was "partial to the claims of liberty." Burdick and Willis, both of whom were equally convinced that there be no erosion to human rights even in times of martial law, likewise received from President Marcos the accolade of his approval. It would appear, therefore, that in case of doubt of the Officer-in-Charge of the Travel Processing Center, the view of General should immediately be sought. It goes without saying that the petition for such certificate of eligibility to travel be filed at the earliest opportunity to facilitate the granting thereof and preclude any disclaimer as to the person desiring to travel being in any way responsible for any delay.

477 Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851 (1940)

478 Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-62100, 30 May 1986] En Banc, Fernan (J): 9 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said business, but acts as president of the former corporation. Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction, Manotoc, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his co- stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc. (SEC Case 001826, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners"), was granted and a management committee was organized and appointed. Pending disposition of SEC Case 001826, the SEC requested the then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear Manotoc for departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on 4 February 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division. When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake, 6 of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against Manotoc and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Criminal Cases 45399 and 45400, assigned to Judge Camilon; Criminal Cases 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove). In all cases, Manotoc has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Insurance Corporation as surety. On 1 March 1982, Manotoc filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country", stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both Judge Camilon and Judge Pronove in their orders dated 9 March 1982, and 26 March 1982, respetively,

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) denied the same. It appears that Manotoc likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated 4 February 1980, but said request was also denied in a letter dated 27 May 1982. anotoc thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. On 5 October 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, Manotoc filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Pending resolution of the petition, Manotoc filed on 15 August 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. On 20 September 1984, the Supreme Court in a resolution en banc denied Manotoc's motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite.

Issue: Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon Manotoc to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As held in People v. Uy Tuising (61 Phil. 404 [1935]), "the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise. The constitutional right to travel being invoked by Manotoc is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states that "the liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health." The order of the trial court releasing Manotoc on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the constitutional provision.

479 Marcos vs. Manglapus [GR 88211, 15 September 1989] En Banc, Cortes (J): 6 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 5 dissent in separate opinions, 1 on leave

Facts: In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On 28 August 1987, Col. , one of the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same — a split in the ranks of the military establishment that threatened civilian supremacy over the military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military. But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements in the military establishment and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There were also the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own in the areas they effectively control while the separatists are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up in these groups' determination to wrest power from the government. Not only through resort to arms but also through the use of propaganda have they been successful in creating chaos and destabilizing the country. Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, Marcos' petition for mandamus and prohibition, asking the court to order Raul Manglapus as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Catalino Macaraig as Executive Secretary, Sedfrey Ordonez as Secretary of Justice, as Immigration Commissioner, Fidel Ramos as Secretary of National Defense, and Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff, to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issue: Whether Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode, in light of the attendant circumstances in the present case.

Held: The individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights and freedoms of others." as distinguished from the "right to enter his own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof. On the other hand, the Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "the prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. Since the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered, the constitutional guarantees must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests, as such are neither absolute nor inflexible. The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, the Court cannot argue with that determination.

480 Silverio vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94284, 8 April 1991] Second Division, Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 14 October 1985, Ricardo C. Silverio was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. On 26 January 1988, or more than 2 years after the filing of the Information, the People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold- departure Order against Silverio on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings. Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Silverio's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Silverio from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court." Silverio's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988. Silverio's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, the Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.

Issue: Whether the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."

Held: Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text. Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer. Herein, Silverio is facing a criminal charge.

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He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.

481 Lorenzo vs. Director of Health [GR 27484, 1 September 1927] First Division, Malcolm (J): 6 concur

Facts: Angel Lorenzo was a leper. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that his confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital in the City of Manila was in violation of his constitutional rights. Lorenzo was confined in said hospital in conformity with the provisions of section 1058 of the Administrative Code. The trial court sustained the law authorizing the segregation of lepers, and denied the petition for habeas corpus, by requiring the trial court to receive evidence to determine if leprosy is or is not a contagious disease. Lorenzo appealed.

Issue: Whether the Administrative Code provision on the confinement of lepers violative of the latter’s constitutional rights on freedom of travel.

Held: The Philippine law pertaining to the segregation of lepers is found in article XV of chapter 37 of the Administrative Code. Codal section 1058 empowers the Director of Health and his authorized agents "to cause to be apprehended, and detained, isolated, or confined, all leprous persons in the Philippine Islands." In amplification of this portion of the law are found provisions relating to arrest of suspected lepers, medical inspection and diagnostic procedure, confirmation of diagnosis by bacteriological methods, establishment of hospitals, detention camps, and a leper colony, etc. Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by the legislative body in the legitimate exercise of the police power which extends to the preservation of the public health. It was placed on the statute books in recognition of leprosy as a grave health problem. The methods provided for the control of leprosy plainly constitute due process of law. Judicial notice will be taken of the fact that leprosy is commonly believed to be an infectious disease tending to cause one afflicted with it to be shunned and excluded from society, and that compulsory segregation of lepers as a means of preventing the spread of the disease is supported by high scientific authority. Upon this view, laws for the segregation of lepers have been provided the world over. Similarly, the local Legislature has regarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has authorized measures to control the dread scourge. It would require a much stronger case than the present case for the Court to sanction admitting the testimony of expert or other witnesses to show that a law of this character may possibly violate some constitutional provision.

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