Reviews of Concepts in Knowledge Organization

Knowl. Org. 44(2017)No.5 349 Reviews of Concepts in Knowledge Organization

Series Editor: Birger Hjørland

Integrative Levels†

Michael Kleineberg

Berlin School of Library and Information Science, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany,

Michael Kleineberg is Research Librarian at the University Library of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and teaches library management at the University of Applied Sciences Potsdam. He is a member of the ISKO Sci- entific Advisory Council and the editorial board of Knowledge Organization. His research interest involves the intersection between knowledge organization, cognitive psychology, sociology of knowledge, and cultural anthropology. Currently, he is working on a dissertation project on the organizing principle of integrative levels of knowing.

Kleineberg, Michael. 2017. “Integrative Levels.” Knowledge Organization 44(5): 349-379. 199 references.

Abstract: This article provides a historical overview and conceptual clarification of the idea of integrative levels as an organizing principle. It will be demonstrated that this concept has found different articulations (e.g., levels of integration, levels of organization, levels of complexity, levels of granularity, nested hierarchy, specification hierarchy, hierarchical integration, progressive integration, holarchy, superformation, self-organization cycles) and widespread applications based on various, often unrelated theoretical and disciplinary backgrounds. In order to determine its role in the field of knowledge organization, some common misconceptions and major criticisms will be reconsidered in light of a broader multidisciplinary context. In particular, it will be shown how this organizing principle has been fruitfully applied to human-related research areas such as psychology, social sciences, or humanities in terms of integrative levels of knowing.

Received: 4 April 2017; Accepted: 7 April 2017

Keywords: integrative levels, order, idea, knowledge organization, hierarchy, sequence, human knowledge, relations, classification

† Derived from the article of similar title in the ISKO Encyclopedia of Knowledge Organization, version 1.1; published 2017-04-06. Ar- ticle category: methods, approaches & philosophies. The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and the editor, Bir- ger Hjørland, for constructive criticism and helpful suggestions, Ann Graf for a careful proof-reading and feedback on the manuscript, and Claudio Gnoli for intensive discussions and inspiration.

1.0 Introduction ses for a general classification scheme, Douglas Foskett (1961, 139) expressed the idea as follows: “The theory of In the field of knowledge organization, the organizing integrative levels is that the world of things evolves from principle of integrative levels has a substantial though not the simple towards the complex by an accumulation of uncontested tradition. The term “integrative levels” was properties, and that, at a succession of levels, these ag- first introduced in the late 1950s by the Classification Re- gregations reach new degrees of complexity and become search Group (CRG) referring particularly to biochemist new wholes, with individual and unique identities.” Ac- and sinologist Joseph Needham (1937), who invented this cordingly, integrative levels can be defined as a develop- term, and philosopher James Feibleman (1954), who pro- mental sequence in which entities at each new level inte- vided some generalizations or laws of the levels (Vickery grate the essential properties and structures of the enti- 1958; Foskett 1961; 1962). Concerned with the determi- ties at the older levels, while they exhibit some emergent nation of a scientifically justified sequence of main clas- qualities and, therefore, more complexity than their pre-

https://doi.org/10.5771/0943-7444-2017-5-349 Generiert durch IP '170.106.40.219', am 30.09.2021, 06:41:59. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. 350 Knowl. Org. 44(2017)No.5 Reviews of Concepts in Knowledge Organization decessors. A typical example of such a hierarchical order cal approaches (Fenzl et al. 1996; Brier 2003; Wilson 2003; is presented by the sequence atoms—molecules—cells— Bates 2005; Gnoli and Ridi 2014); or by the same token, as organisms (Feibleman 1954, 62). a comparative tool for cross-cultural studies and the organ- In more recent knowledge organization discourse, ization of the epistemological dimension of human other authors emphasize other authorities who offer knowledge (Kleineberg 2014). more or less independently developed but quite similar On the other hand, the idea of integrative levels is level conceptions. For example, Ingetraut Dahlberg challenged by internal and external criticisms. Internal (1974; 2008) as well as Claudio Gnoli and Roberto Poli criticisms are sympathetic with the level concept but (2004) rely on Nicolai Hartmann’s concept of levels of point to some inconsistencies in proposed hierarchy reality that is based on two different kinds of hierarchical models such as branchings and dead ends that seem to relations, namely, integrative levels called superformation violate the linearity of the level sequence, as noted since and non-integrative levels called superposition, the latter early discussions (Feibleman 1954; Foskett 1961; Austin without an accumulation of properties at each higher lev- 1969c; Kyle 1969; Tomlinson 1969b). For example, Tom- el. Furthermore, Søren Brier (2003) proposes the concept linson (1969b) notes that the development from the level of levels of existence based on the co-evolution of mat- of molecules seems to branch into non-living phenome- ter and qualia inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s evolutionary na (e.g., minerals, rocks) and living phenomena (e.g., cells, semiotics; Michael Kleineberg (2013) introduces Ken tissues). Moreover, there is some doubt that the organiz- Wilber’s concept of levels of being and knowing; and ing principle of integrative levels, which might work well María López-Huertas (2013) discusses Basarab Nicoles- for a hierarchical order of phenomena investigated in the cu’s concept of levels of reality and perception. natural sciences, can be fruitfully applied to those in the The history of the organizing principle of integrative social sciences or humanities (Huckaby 1972; Langridge levels, avant la lettre, can be traced back at least to the clas- 1976; Spiteri 1995; Poli 2001; Dousa 2009). External crit- sifications of sciences by Herbert Spencer or Auguste icisms, however, tend to reject the idea of integrative lev- Comte, which have influenced the work of many nine- els as such, for example, due to the presumptions of a teenth and early twentieth century classificationists or reductionist logical class formation and oppressive hier- thesaurus constructors including, among others, Charles archical relations, an underlying picture theory of mean- A. Cutter’s Expansive Classification, Ernest C. Richardson’s ing and universal claims of validity, or a hidden teleology Order of the Sciences, James D. Brown’s Subject Classification, and an implicit value ranking (Olson 1999; Svenonius Henry E. Bliss’s Bliss Bibliographic Classification, and Peter 2004; García Gutiérrez 2011). M. Roget’s Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases (Dousa The following sections are concerned with a historical 2009; Gnoli 2005; 2017). Since the time of the CRG, the overview of the idea of integrative levels, its utilization as concept of integrative levels has been discussed exten- an organizing principle for knowledge organization sys- sively and in the course of a profound critique of disci- tems, a reconsideration of common criticisms, and an pline-centered approaches explicitly applied in knowledge outline of major fields of application in knowledge or- organization systems (KOSs) that are primarily oriented ganization research. on phenomena or objects of being such as Kyle Classifica- tion (Kyle 1969), Information Coding Classification (Dahlberg 2.0 A short history of an idea 2008), Integrative Levels Classification (Gnoli 2008), or Basic Concepts Classification (Szostak 2012). 2.1 The great chain of being The strength of the idea of integrative levels is seen in its synthesizing force that enables a non-reductionist or- The idea of integrative levels has a long history. Its ori- ganization of the diversity of world phenomena based on gins are described in Arthur Lovejoy’s (1936) The Great logically coherent principles and a universal scope of cov- Chain of Being, a study that once established the discipline erage. As suggested by Foskett (1961), it provides a helpful known as the history of ideas by telling the story of one framework for both the specialists systematizing their own of the most influential ideas in Western history: the hier- subjects and the generalists identifying the interrelations of archical order of reality. The genesis of this idea based different research areas. Therefore, it is recommended as a on the principles of plenitude, continuity, and linear gra- theoretical foundation for interdisciplinary knowledge or- dation, is traced back to ancient Greek philosophy, par- ganization (ISKO Italy 2007; Szostak, Gnoli, and López- ticularly to Plato’s (1929, 2013) Timaeus and Republic, and Huertas 2016). Additionally, the idea is proposed as a dis- its first full expression in the work of Aristotle. In Genera- ambiguation tool for different meanings of core concepts tion of Animals, Aristotle (1942) classifies animals accord- like “information,” “knowledge,” “cognition,” or “coming to their degree of perfection in eleven general grades munication” and their related theoretical and methodologi- from human beings at the top to so-called zoophytes at

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Even more signifi- of continuity stating that all properties attributed to a given cant, Aristotle’s (1935) On the Soul presents a hierarchical level are integrated by each higher level in both physical order of all living beings according to their powers of and psychical terms, that is, as levels of being as well as souls ranging from plants with nutritive power to human “levels of consciousness” (Lovejoy 1936, 144). beings with rational power to possibly another even supe- rior kind, with “each higher order possessing all the pow- 2.2 Evolutionary order ers of those below it in the scale and an additional differ- entiating one of its own” (Lovejoy 1936, 58-9). In other During the eighteenth century, a “temporalizing of the words, this hierarchical order presents a historical precur- Chain of Being” (Lovejoy 1936, 244) takes place as a reac- sor to the idea of integrative levels since each higher level tion of paleontological findings and early evolutionary hy- integrates the essential properties of the lower levels, potheses that are questioning the idea of nature as a static while adding something new. order where every being finds its fixed and final God-given According to Lovejoy (1936), the conception of the place. While the traditional order of emanationism de- universe as a great chain of being, exemplified in classical scending from the most complex to the most simple is still antiquity by Plotinus’s (1992) Enneads and the Neoplatonist to some extent echoed in the work of naturalists like Carl tradition taking the form of a hierarchical order from the Linnaeus’ (1758) Systema Naturae with its kingdoms of an- supreme being of a godlike ens perfectissimum down to the imals (e.g., mammals—birds—amphibians—fishes—in- most meager kind of existent, was accepted by most phi- sects—worms), plants and minerals, or Charles Bonnet’s losophers and scientists without question during medieval The Contemplation of Nature (Anderson 1976), the new tem- times and until the late eighteenth century. Even in non- poralized chain of being or scala naturae follows the evolu- Western cultures, particularly in the wisdom traditions of tionary order ascending from the most simple to the most Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Taoism, or Islam, ideas complex, as stressed, among others, by Jean-Baptiste de quite similar to the great chain of being have been articu- Lamarck ([1809] 1914, 128): “I do not hesitate to say, how- lated (Smith [1976] 1992; Wilber 1993). ever, that our general classifications of animals up to the Influential representatives are, for example, Augustine present have been in the inverse order from that followed of Hippo and Pseudo-Dionysius the Aeropagite who both by nature when bringing her living productions successive- are seeking to combine Neoplatonist and Christian ly into existence.” Therefore, in his Zoological Philosophy, thought. Pseudo-Dionysius is known for inventing the Lamarck (131) proposes six “stages of organization” ac- term hierarchia “hierarchy”—a neologism from Greek hieros cording to what he considers as natural order and its pro- “sacred” and arkhia “rule”—denoting an order set out by gress of complexity (e.g., polyps—worms—insects— God as the expression of divine law and will (Pseudo- mollusks—fishes and reptiles—birds and mammals). Dionysius 1987, 153): “In my opinion, a hierarchy is a sa- This kind of inversion and dynamization of the hier- cred order, a state of understanding and an activity approx- archy reflects the Zeitgeist at the end of the eighteenth imating as closely as possible to the divine.” He distin- century in which various classification schemes in the guishes a celestial (intelligible) and an ecclesiastical (sensi- natural sciences and also in academic libraries move hu- ble) hierarchy, each divided into a series of triads where the man beings from the beginning to the end of the se- first member “contains the power of the lower two, and so quence (Šamurin [1955] 1977). Among philosophers, this on” (Wear and Dillon 2007, 57). In this way, the hierar- turn becomes obvious if one compares, for example, Ni- chical order of the universe reflects the distinctions of colas de Condorcet’s essay Example des méthodes techniques powers from different ranks of angels down to rational that is concerned with classification theory and still rep- souls to irrational souls to plants, and to soulless matter. resents more or less the old “reverse order” (Whitrow Within the Christian tradition represented, among oth- 1985, 92), with the new progressive order articulated in ers, by Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, or Baruch Spi- Johann G. Herder’s Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of noza, the most determinative and pervasive version of the Man (1800, 108 emphasis original): “The more elaborate great chain of being, according to Lovejoy (1936), is to be the organization of a creature is, the more its structure is found in Gottfried W. Leibniz’s ([1720] 2014) Monadology, in compounded from the inferiour kingdoms. This complexedness which he presents a hierarchical order from the divine at begins underneath the earth, and grows up through the top to human beings with rational souls to animals plants and animals to the most complicated of all crea- with non-rational souls down to simple substances or tures, man.” In German idealism, the idea of a hierar- monads with lower perceptions. In order to solve the chical order of reality is further elaborated, again in terms mind-body problem, Leibniz relies on the metaphysics of of both levels of being in the philosophy of nature as

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Based on the same dialectics of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the idea of inte- In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the grative levels is foreshadowed in Georg F. Hegel’s ([1830] idea of integrative levels finds widespread application in 1970, 20 emphasis original) Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical various research fields and is often discussed under the Sciences: “Nature is to be regarded as a system of stages, one label “levels of reality,” for example, within the discourse arising necessarily from the other and being the proxi- on emergent evolution among scholars like Conwy Lloyd mate truth of the stage from which it results: but it is not Morgan, Samuel Alexander, C. D. Broad, William M. generated naturally out of the other but only in the inner Wheeler, or Roy W. Sellars (Blitz 1992). According to Da- Idea which constitutes the ground of Nature.” This kind vid Blitz, most approaches agree about at least three main of speculative thought is overcome by more empirical levels of reality that can be summarized as matter—life— explanations, particularly in evolutionary biology during mind, whereas some argue for a preceding level of space- the nineteenth century, a period known for celebrating time and some for a succeeding level of society or even the notions of evolution, development, and progress deity. (Blitz 1992). Arguably the most comprehensive and most detailed One of the most influential approaches is presented by analysis of levels of reality is offered by Nicolai Hart- Auguste Comte’s ([1830-42] 1974) Course in Positive Philoso- mann’s (1940) Der Aufbau der realen Welt (The Structure of phy, in which he offers a two-sided strategy for the classifi- the Real World) in which he introduces the hierarchical se- cation of human knowledge based on the idea of both quence of matter—life—psyche—spirit, the latter as the levels of being as well as levels of knowing. Comte rejects tripartite but inextricable unity of personal (individual), the Baconian tradition of encyclopedic ladders of objective (collective), and objectivated (materialized in ar- knowledge that is oriented on the faculties of human mind tifacts) spirit. Hartmann rejects the principle of continui- like memory, reason, or imagination because human under- ty and restricts the scope of the idea of integrative levels, standing, for him, employs all of them more or less simul- which he calls superformation (Überformung), to the levels taneously. Instead, he proposes a hierarchy of fundamental of matter and life, while introducing the idea of superpo- sciences (e.g., astronomy—physics—chemistry—physiol- sition (Überbauung) where the higher level depends on the ogy—sociology) corresponding to the investigated objects lower level but without integrating its essential properties. or phenomena that are arranged according to their affilia- Most importantly, in his analysis two fundamental border tion (53): “The order is determined by the degree of sim- lines between categorically orthogonal domains are iden- plicity, or what amounts to the same thing, of generality in tified, namely, a psychophysical border line between exte- the phenomena, resulting in successive dependencies and rior life and interior psyche, and a border line between consequently greater or less difficulty in study.” Additional- the individual personal spirit and the collective objective ly, Comte’s famous law of three stages regarding the devel- spirit (Kleineberg 2016). opment of the human mind states that each branch of Nevertheless, some authors defend the principle of knowledge develops through a necessary order of three continuity and, therefore, the integrative character of levels phases from a theological state to a metaphysical state up of reality by interpreting these border lines as boundaries to a positive state, even though these developments do not between co-evolutionary correlates rather than emergent need to take place synchronously and allow the coexistence levels. For example, Lloyd Morgan (1923, 26) maintains the of different states at the same time within a society. More- view that through all levels of reality from matter to life to over, Comte (21) claims that since the starting point for mind both exterior physical and interior psychical dimen- both individual and collective education is necessarily the sions develop simultaneously: “This means, for me, that same “the principal phases of the individual represent the there are no physical systems, of integral status, that are epochs of the species.” not also psychical systems; and no psychical systems that Inspired by Comte’s work and contemporary Darwini- are not also physical systems. All systems of events are in an thought, Herbert Spencer’s ([1862] 1915, 246) First their degree psycho-physical.” Corresponding to such a Principles presents an all-inclusive concept of evolution panpsychism, Wheeler (1928, 39) proposes a kind of covering astronomical, geological, biological, psychologi- pansociality assuming different degrees of the social along cal, and sociological phenomena in terms of a “progres- all levels of reality in the sense of a co-evolution of the in-

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A disturbance introduced into an organisation at any which he compares the natural order investigated by the one level reverberates at all the levels it covers. sciences with a reconstructed historical order studied by 7. The time required for a change in organisation the humanities with the goal to defend a nomothetic ap- shortens as we ascend the levels. proach to the latter. Inspired by Hegel while rejecting his 8. The higher the level, the smaller its population of in- metaphysics, Dilthey (351, 184) is concerned with a cri- stances. tique of historical reason by analyzing the structure and 9. It is impossible to reduce the higher level to the low- development of human thought, for example, in terms er. of universal “stages of consciousness” or “stages of his- 10. An organisation at any level is a distortion of the torical intelligibility.” The importance of such an idea of level below. integrative levels of knowing for human-related research 11. Events at any given level affect organisations at other fields is also emphasized, among others, by James M. levels. Baldwin’s (1906) Thought and Things, Wilhelm Wundt’s 12. Whatever is affected as an organisation has some ef- ([1912] 1916) Elements of Folk Psychology, Ernst Cassirer’s fect as an organisation. ([1923] 1955) Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Max Scheler’s ([1924] 1980) Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge, Norbert At the same time, Feibleman argues for a revision of the Elias’s ([1939] 1994) The Civilizing Process, and Gaston linearity of the level sequence due to occurring branchings Bachelard’s ([1940] 1968) The Philosophy of No. and dead ends. For example, the development from the level of molecules seems to branch into both biological 2.4 Integrative levels phenomena with increase of complexity as well as astronomical phenomena without increase of complexity. To some extent independent from the sketched history, Jo- As already mentioned, alternatives to strict linear se- seph Needham invents the term “integrative levels” for an quences of integrative levels are also proposed by ap- idea that is outlined in his famous Herbert Spencer lecture proaches that emphasize the notion of co-evolution of dif- Integrative Levels: A Revaluation of the Idea of Progress in the ferent categorically orthogonal domains. Some theorists sense of “successive forms of order in a scale of complex- argue for a co-evolution of the physical and the psychical ity and organization” (Needham 1937, 3-4) that cover the in the broadest sense (Lloyd Morgan 1923; Brier 2003), whole known universe and the way in which it has come some others for a simultaneous emergence of the psychical into being from the inorganic to the biological to the so- and the social from the physical including the biological cial. What is a whole at the lower and older level becomes a (Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt 1997; Poli 2001), again part at the next higher and newer level (e.g., protein crys- others even for interrelated developments of the physical, tals—cells—metazoan organisms—social units). In this the psychical, and the social (Wheeler 1928; Wilber [1995] way and with reference to Karl Marx‘s and Frederick En- 2000; Kleineberg 2016). In particular, there are good rea- gels‘s materialist version of Hegelian dialectic, he also sug- sons to assume a multi-leveled co-evolution of brain, cog- gests different levels of integration within the social order nition, and culture (Deacon 1997; Greenberg et al. 1999; in terms of both productive forces (basis) as well as cultur- Donald 2001), of material society and immaterial culture al and cognitive aspects (superstructure). (Habermas 1979; Dux [2000] 2011), or of microsystems A major contribution is achieved by James Feibleman’s (e.g., atom—molecule—cell—complex organism) and (1954) essay “Theory of Integrative Levels” in which macrosystems (e.g., star—planet—ecosystem—population) thoughts by Joseph Needham, Ludwig Bertalanffy, or (Jantsch [1979] 1980; Wilber [1995] 2000). Alex Novikoff are systemized into a dozen laws of the After all, there seems to be no consensus on the idea levels (excerpted from 1954, 59-63): of integrative levels, neither on the conceptual definition and theoretical foundation nor on the sequence and ar- 1. Each level organises the level or levels below it plus chitecture of level models (Wheeler 1928; Greenberg and one emergent quality. Kenyon 1987; Poli 2001). As a matter of fact, its utiliza- 2. Complexity of the levels increases upward. tion as organizing principle often reveals inconsistencies 3. In any organisation the higher level depends upon or exceptions for practical reasons (Spiteri 1995; Dousa the lower. 2009). Nevertheless, the theoretical interest in the idea of

https://doi.org/10.5771/0943-7444-2017-5-349 Generiert durch IP '170.106.40.219', am 30.09.2021, 06:41:59. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. 354 Knowl. Org. 44(2017)No.5 Reviews of Concepts in Knowledge Organization integrative levels continues until today, even though many vice versa, a relation that could be labeled in Comtean domain-specific discourses appear to be isolated from terms as the principle of successive dependence (cp. each other using different terminologies within different Gnoli, Bosch, and Mazzocchi 2007). Furthermore, more or less restricted fields of research (Yao 2009). Feibleman’s eighth law stating that the population of in- These include, without claiming comprehensiveness, bi- stances decreases with each higher level (e.g., there exist ology (Kummer 1987; Lobo 2008), ecology (Rowe 1961; fewer molecules than atoms, and fewer cells than mole- Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman 2009), comparative cules) could be termed the principle of decreasing span psychology (Tobach 1987; Campbell 1990; Pisula 2009; in correspondence with the principle of increasing depth, Tomasello 2014), developmental psychology (Campbell adopting Arthur Koestler’s (1967, 342) terminology of and Bickhard 1986; Overton 2006; Commons 2008; Lou- “depth” (here a synonym for height or altitude) as the renço 2016), neuropsychology (Feinberg 2011), neuroan- number of levels that an entity comprises and “span” as thropology (Deacon 1997; Donald 2001), social anthro- the number of entities at a given level. Since levels of in- pology (Hallpike 2008), cognitive archaeology (Mithen tegration are supposed to constitute evolutionary or de- 1996; Trigger 2003), macrosociology (Steward 1972; No- velopmental stages (Needham 1937; Feibleman 1954; Ar- lan and Lenski 2015), sociocultural evolution (Sahlins and onson 1987; Salthe 1991), it follows that they are also in Service [1960] 1988; Habermas 1979; Dux [2000] 2011), line with Ranganathan’s principle of later-in-evolution general systems theory (Bertalanffy 1968), self-organiza- which in turn implies the principle of later-in-time, also tion (Jantsch [1979] 1980; Fenzl et al. 1996), emergentism expressed by Austin’s (1969b, 114) “principle of consecu- (Blitz 1992; Pettersson 1996; Bunge 2003), and hierarchy tiveness.” theory (Koestler 1967; Salthe 2009). Note that the two main principles of increasing complexity and later-in-evolution seem not to be reducible to 3.0 Integrative levels as organizing principle each other. On one hand, not every order of complexity presents an evolutionary or diachronic sequence of enti- 3.1 Principles of organization ties but sometimes a rather synchronic one (e.g., tissue— organ—organism) that comes into being concurrently. Knowledge organization systems require organizing prin- For that reason, Austin (1969c, 88) rephrases Feibleman’s ciples. Mathematician and library scientist Shiyali R. fifth law: “For an organisation at any given sublevel [for Ranganathan (1967, 83) specifies the following eight Austin a “sublevel” means a part of a whole but not it- principles of organization for helpful sequences: later-in- self a whole, M.K.], its mechanism lies at the level below time, later-in-evolution, spatial contiguity, quantitative the whole of which it is a part, and its purpose is defined measure, increasing complexity, canonical sequence, liter- by a need of the whole of which it is a part.” On the ary warrant, and alphabetical sequence. One advantage of other hand, not every evolutionary or developmental the idea of integrative levels might be seen in its ability to change means a change toward increasing complexity combine several of these principles, namely, the relations (e.g., a new species of bacteria). This is why Wilber (2000, of later-in-time, later-in-evolution, and increasing com- 66) emphasizes the distinction between “translation” and plexity (cf. Gnoli 2017). “transformation” echoed by Overton’s (2006, 25) distinc- The principle of increasing complexity is reflected by tion between “variational change” and “transformational Feibleman’s (1954) first and second laws of the levels change,” according to which only the latter leads to an stating that integrative levels are cumulative upward in emergence of novelty and increasing complexity. terms of both properties and structures, while adding an There might be other principles of organization that emergent quality at each higher level. In the case of cu- are compatible with the idea of integrative levels but one mulative properties, this principle is compatible, as sug- should carefully analyze to what extent these are constitu- gested by Broughton (2008, 49), with Bliss’s principle of tive. For example, Jolley (1973, 72) speaks of a “dimen- gradation by specialty that following Comte describes a sional fallacy” for the tendency to consider aggregates sequence from the most general to the most specific, also like gross material bodies with an increase in the spatial known as genus-species relation. In cases of cumulative dimension as increasingly higher levels of integration. structures, however, one might speak of the principle of Not to mention that the spatial dimension applies exclu- successive parthood that describes an “organisation as it- sively to material structures but not at all to mental struc- self a part of some higher and more complex organisa- tures (Richmond 1965; Kyle 1969). Another popular can- tion” (Feibleman 1954, 61), also known as part-whole re- didate is a sequence of increasing value (cf. Gnoli 2015), lation. A corollary of the principle of increasing com- as exemplified by the historical idea of the great chain of plexity is expressed in Feibleman’s third law stating that being in terms of an approximation to God stating that each higher level depends upon the lower level(s) but not an increasing height of levels reflects an increasing god-

Figure 1. Metaphors for integrative levels as nest, pyramid, and chain.

Stock 2013; Frické 2016; Gnoli 2017). Most importantly, that a given set (e.g., a class, a concept, a term, a level) hierarchical relations, in opposition to equivalence rela- would include itself as its own subset (e.g., a subclass, a tions or association relations, are able to represent an or- subordinate concept, a narrower term, a lower level). Ac- der in the mathematical sense (Stock and Stock 2013). cording to the idea of integrative levels this seems not to Order theory is the branch of mathematics that is be the case since a given level integrates a lower level concerned with the formalization of the intuitive notion while adding something new (Feibleman’s first law). This of ranking using binary relations for a comparison of process is often described in terms of differentiation and pairs of objects. Order relations rest on the properties of integration, or transcendence and inclusion (Spencer transitivity and antisymmetry, while they can be strict or [1862] 1915; Salthe 1991; Wilber [1995] 2000; Lourenço non-strict (Davey and Priestley 2008). A non-strict order 2016). Hence a level and its next lower level cannot be (or non-strict partial order) on a set is a binary relation 0 identical and their relation of inclusion is an irreflexive on this set such that, for all its elements x, y, z: one. This leads to the conclusion that the hierarchical relation of integrative levels is a strict linear order exhibit- (a) x x (reflexivity), ing the properties of irreflexivity, asymmetry, and transi- (b) x y and y x imply x = y (antisymmetry), tivity. (c) x y and y z imply x z (transitivity). 3.3 The problem of transitivity Every relation induces a relation < of strict inequality in the way that x < y if and only if x y and x y. While it appears to be quite obvious that the modeling of Therefore, it is possible to restate the conditions (a) – (c) integrative levels requires an asymmetric relation, because in terms of a strict order (or strict partial order) on a set if one level is integrated by another, then the opposite which is a binary relation < on this set such that, for all cannot be true (e.g., atoms are integrated by molecules, but its elements x, y, z: molecules are not integrated by atoms), it seems to be much more difficult to meet the condition of a transitive (i) x < x does not hold (irreflexivity), relation. It goes without saying that the principles of or- (ii) if x < y then y < x does not hold (asymmetry), ganization identified above as being constitutive for inte- (iii) x < y and y < z imply x < z (transitivity). grative levels (i.e., increasing complexity, gradation by specialty, successive parthood, successive dependence, de- Note that irreflexivity and transitivity combined already creasing span, increasing depth, later-in-evolution, later-in- imply asymmetry which in turn is defined by antisym- time) are supposed to be transitive relations. But as often metry and irreflexivity. noted, transitivity requires a homogeneous way of subdivi- While mathematicians usually allow equality as it is sion along the hierarchy, a requirement that seems to be implicit in the non-strict order relation less-than-or-equal- frequently violated at the price of inconsistent relations of to or its opposite greater-than-or-equal-to, outside math- inclusion (Beghtol 2000; Svenonius 2000; Guizzardi 2009; ematics the strict order relation less-than or its opposite Stock and Stock 2013; Almeida and Baracho 2014). There- greater-than is much more common and can be regarded fore, it is of utmost importance for the idea of integrative as equally fundamental (Davey and Priestley 2008). In levels to qualify different types of subdivisions. knowledge organization literature, hierarchical relations In this regard, a first basic distinction is usually made are described in terms of both non-strict orders (Jolley between genus-species relations based on logical division 1973; Svenonius 2000) and strict orders (Jolley 1973; and part-whole relations based on structural or partitive Stock and Stock 2013; Gnoli 2017), depending on the in- division (Frické 2016), also known by the following ter- terpretation of the condition of reflexivity or irreflexivity. minological distinctions: is-a-kind-of relation vs. is-a- However, this distinction becomes crucial for the con- part-of relation (Stock and Stock 2013, 554, 555), generic cept of levels of integration that is based on two main relation vs. partitive relation (Broughton et al. 2005, 144), assumptions. First, there are qualitatively distinct levels class inclusion vs. merological inclusion (Winston, Chaf- that can be ranked in a linear developmental sequence fin, and Herrmann 1987, 435), hyponym-hyperonym rela- from the less complex to the more complex. Second, tion vs. meronym-holonym relation (Stock and there are hierarchical integrations in the way that each Stock2013, 552, 555), specification hierarchy vs. scale hi- more complex level includes the essential structures and erarchy (Salthe 1991, 260), subsumptive hierarchy vs. properties of its predecessors. In connection with con- compositional hierarchy (Salthe 2009, 88), or taxonomy ceptual ordering systems like knowledge organization sys- vs. partonomy (Beghtol 2000, 315). On one hand, a ge- tems, the question arises whether or not hierarchical rela- nus-species relation can be defined by a concept and its tions are non-strict orders that hold reflexivity, meaning subordinated concept that inherits all properties attribut-

https://doi.org/10.5771/0943-7444-2017-5-349 Generiert durch IP '170.106.40.219', am 30.09.2021, 06:41:59. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. Knowl. Org. 44(2017)No.5 357 Reviews of Concepts in Knowledge Organization ed to its superordinated concept. On the other hand, a On the other hand, the part-whole relation can be part-whole relation can be defined by an item and its su- qualified as follows (based on Winston, Chaffin, and perordinated item that integrates the structure or organi- Herrmann 1987, 420; see also Stock and Stock 2013; Al- zation of its subordinated item as an integral part (Stock meida and Baracho 2014): and Stock 2013; Frické 2016). As stressed by Beghtol (2000), both types of subdivision are often combined Component—integral object (e.g., pedal—bike) within the same KOS and the failure to distinguish them Member—collection (e.g., ship—fleet) encourages ambiguity since the same set of foci (e.g., Portion—mass (e.g., slice—pie) heart, liver, lungs) can be interpreted in terms of both a Stuff—object (e.g., steel—car) genus-species facet (e.g., kind of organs) or a part-whole Feature—activity (e.g., paying—shopping) facet (e.g., parts of bodies). Place—area (e.g., Everglades—Florida). Since for the idea of integrative levels both genus- species relations and part-whole relations are constitutive, Again, the problem of transitivity occurs if different it follows that both types of hierarchical subdivision need types of subdivision are combined within the same hier- to be applied simultaneously and each one of them must archical sequence or stated in the premises of a syllogism exhibit transitivity. For example, the sequence atom— (Cruse 1979; Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann 1987; molecule—cell can be interpreted at the same time as Guizzardi 2009; Almeida and Baracho 2014). This seems both a genus-species hierarchy (e.g., kinds of matter) and to be of particular importance for KOSs like formal on- a part-whole hierarchy (e.g., parts of organisms). tologies that enable automated reasoning in order to en- Moreover, there exist different types of subdivisions hance information retrieval. The following example pre- within each of these two main hierarchical relations. On sents an intransitive part-whole relation and, therefore, an one hand, the genus-species relation can be qualified in invalid conclusion (based on Winston, Chaffin, and the following way (based on Chaffin and Hermann cited Herrmann 1987, 431-32): in Beghtol 2000, 314): Premises: Perceptual subordination (e.g., animal—horse) Simpson’s arm is part (component) of Simpson. Functional subordination (e.g., furniture—chair) Simpson is part (member) of the Philosophy de- State subordination (e.g., disease—polio) partment. Activity subordination (e.g., game—chess) Conclusion: Geographic subordination (e.g., state—New Jersey). Simpson’s arm is part (?) of the Philosophy depart- ment. As noted by Stock and Stock (2013), it is important for an is-a-kind-of relation that the subordinated concept In other words, for modeling integrative levels the condi- (hyponym) and the superordinated concept (hyperonym) tion of transitivity is by far the most important challenge are regarded from the same perspective and that not eve- and, at the same time, the most important evaluation cri- ry is-a relation (simple hyponomy) is necessarily an is-a- terion for the consistency of proposed hierarchical se- kind-of relation (taxonomy) which per definitionem entails a quences. transitive sequence. For example, it appears to be inap- propriate to say that a stallion is-a-kind-of instead of is-a 3.4 Evaluation of level sequences horse because a stallion is regarded from the perspective of gender and a horse is not (Cruse 2002). In this section, some exemplary sequences based on the From a logical point of view, it must also be empha- idea of integrative levels will be reconsidered in light of sized that even if nearly all definitions in natural-language the transitivity condition in order to identify typical cases dictionaries refer to a genus-species relation (Svenonius of inconsistency (see also Appendix): 2000), the order-theoretical property of transitivity does not necessarily apply in ordinary language contexts that (I) Atoms—molecules—cells—organisms—human rely on less formal principles, like Ludwig Wittgenstein’s beings—human societies (Coates 1969, 21). family resemblance stating that not all but only a few properties attributed to a class need to be inherited by its As noted by Austin (1969c, 88), some authors add an subclass, or Eleanor Rosch’s prototype theory stating that “aggregative or societal level” beyond man, ignoring the categorization is graded and some subclasses are more fact that this violates the principle of later-in-evolution central than others (Stock and Stock 2013; Frické 2016; since collective human societies emerge concurrently with Hjørland 2017). individual human beings. Furthermore, different part-

https://doi.org/10.5771/0943-7444-2017-5-349 Generiert durch IP '170.106.40.219', am 30.09.2021, 06:41:59. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. 358 Knowl. Org. 44(2017)No.5 Reviews of Concepts in Knowledge Organization whole relations seem to be confused since atoms, mole- ing entities since they depend on the emergence of hu- cules, and cells are components of organisms, whereas man beings, as stressed by Austin (1969b) or Dahlberg human beings are members of human societies, just as all (1974) relying on Feibleman’s (1954, 64) rule that the individual life-forms are members of their collective “reference of any organisation must be to the highest population or species. In general, Austin (1969c) con- level which its explanation requires.” cludes that such collective phenomena spring from that individual entity along the integrative levels sequence that (IV) Physical—chemical—biological— forms the parts of the aggregate. Therefore, such alleged psychological—cultural (Feibleman 1954, 63). branchings are derived from the confusion of integration and aggregation leading to what one might call the indi- This level sequence seems to be challenged by Hart- vidual/collective inconsistency. mann’s (1940) psychophysical border line between the biological and the psychological that violates both the prin- (II) Atom—molecule—molecular assemblage—physical ciple of gradation by specialty and the principle of suc- structure—planet—collection of planets—universe cessive parthood since biological properties or structures (Tomlinson 1969b, 30). (e.g., spatial exteriority, cellular structure) are not integrated by the psychological level (e.g., non-spatial interiority, This level sequence presents a further version of the in- cognitive structure). dividual/collective inconsistency at the inorganic level. In One way to avoid such a categorical mistake, which contrast to the integrative relation between atom and one might call the exterior/interior inconsistency, is to molecule, the aggregative relations between molecule and adopt a pure materialist approach, as preferred by Austin molecular assemblage or between planet and a collection (1969c, 88) who restricts the number of levels to not of planets do not present an increase in complexity but more than four “truly integrative” ones: fundamental par- rather what Jolley (1973, 72) calls the spatial version of ticles—elements—compounds—living compounds. In the “dimensional fallacy” (cf. Jantsch [1979] 1980; Wilber fact, there is a long tradition of materialism which ap- [1995] 2000). pears to be strongly reductionist in that it does not take Note that the entity “universe” at the end of the se- psychical or cultural phenomena into account (Novikoff quence in example (II) also violates the principle of later- 1945; Rowe 1961; Jolley 1973; Pettersson 1996; Bunge in-evolution and should be replaced to the beginning 2003; Vickery 2005). since the existence of the universe starts from the Big Any non-reductionist approach, however, needs to Bang and does not depend on the emergence of the oth- consider some categorically orthogonal domains that er mentioned entities. The same misconception, which cannot be arranged linearly as a transitive sequence due one might call the consecutiveness inconsistency, holds if to the lack of hierarchical inclusions, as indicated by ecosystems or the biosphere are considered to be the Poli’s (2001) three domains of the material, the mental, highest and most complex level of living entities, as sug- and the social; or Wilber’s ([1995] 2000) four domains of gested by Rowe (1961) or Lobo (2008). Instead, it should the objective, the subjective, the intersubjective, and the be recognized that the biosphere comes into being con- interobjective (Kleineberg 2016). In principle, there seem currently with the first forms of life. to be two different strategies to deal with that challenge: For the same reason, the anthroposphere or either the linearity of the level sequence will be defended noosphere referring to human-related phenomena should at the price of hierarchical inclusions or the hierarchical not be considered to be integrated by a spatially greater inclusions of the level sequence will be defended at the biosphere but quite the opposite: the noosphere is a spec- price of linearity. ification of the biosphere, while the biosphere is an inte- The first strategy is adopted, to some extent, by gral part of the noosphere (Wilber [1995] 2000; Esbjörn- Hartmann’s (1940) conception of levels of reality. In this Hargens and Zimmerman 2009). tradition, the idea of levels of integration is replaced by the more general notion of “level of organization” (III) Physical entities—chemical entities—heterogenous (Gnoli 2017, 40) stating that each higher level depends non-living entities—artefacts—biological entities— historically and logically on the next lower level but with- man—mentefacts (CRG quoted in Austin 1969b, 112- out a mandatory integration of its essential structures 13). and properties. In other words, while the principle of later-in-evolution still holds, the principles of successive Another version of the consecutiveness inconsistency parthood and gradation by specialty do not. occurs if non-living human artifacts are placed before liv-

Integrative Correlates Examples levels Exterior-individual Interior-individual Exterior-collective Interior-collective (objective) (subjective) (interobjective) (intersubjective) 1. Matter ? ? ? Atom 2. Complex matter ? ? ? Molecule 3. Life ? ? ? Cell 4. Complex life Proto-mind Proto-society Proto-culture Organism 5. Most complex life Mind Society Culture Human being Table 1. Emergent integrative levels and co-evolutionary correlates.

Order relation Integrative levels Non-integrative levels Correlates (superformation) (superposition) (co-evolution) Increasing complexity Yes ? ? Gradation by specialty Yes No No Successive parthood Yes No No Successive dependence Yes Yes Interdependence Decreasing span Yes Yes No Increasing depth Yes Yes No Later-in-time Yes Yes No Later-in-evolution Yes Yes No Table 2. Principles of organization.

The second strategy is mostly elaborated by Wilber’s become more evident to what extent relations between ([1995] 2000) conception of co-evolutionary holons. In entities or concepts constitute integrative levels or super- this school of thought, the idea of integrative levels is formation within a column (e.g., matter—life), non- maintained but the linear sequence is modified in the way integrative levels or superposition across columns (e.g., that categorically orthogonal domains are related as inter- life—mind), or co-evolutionary correlates within a row dependent and co-evolutionary correlates (see Table 1). (e.g., mind—society—culture) (see also Table 2). In order to compare and evaluate proposed sequences of integrative levels, Table 1 presents a framework that 4.0 Common criticisms avoids both the individual/collective and the exteri- or/interior inconsistencies by distinguishing emergent in- 4.1 Hierarchy and formal logic tegrative levels and co-evolutionary correlates with regard to a widely agreed-upon example sequence. Transitivity The idea of integrative levels as an organizing principle is of integrative levels applies within each column, even criticized on many grounds and is still a matter of con- though the origins of the evolutionary proto-forms for troversial debates. Most importantly, the limitations and the anthropocentric phenomena of mind, society, and shortcomings of the notion of hierarchy for conceptual culture might be located differently and must, for the ordering systems are emphasized, no matter whether hi- time being, remain open questions (Kleineberg 2016). erarchical relations are taking generic, partitive, or devel- From that perspective, a last level sequence that is opmental forms (Olson 1999; García Gutiérrez 2011; Mai quite typical for the field of knowledge organization, tak- 2011; De Beer 2015). According to Olson (1999), the en from the research project Integrative Levels Classifica- predominant classificatory thought and practice is based tion, will be reconsidered: on classical formal logic rooting in the Aristotelean tradition with the underlying and interrelated presumptions of (V) Forms—matter—life—mind—society—culture disjoint class formation (exclusivity), a linear progression (Gnoli 2017, 46). towards a goal (teleology), and a rigid subordination through logical division and the dominance of some clas- Although inspired by the idea of integrative levels, this ses over others (hierarchy). It is argued that this kind of hierarchical sequence relies much more on Hartmann’s classification presents a culture-specific construction and notion of superposition without mandatory hierarchical tends to oppress and marginalize alternative kinds of or- inclusions. Leaving aside the domain of forms whose on- ganizing knowledge (Olson 1999; Jacob 2000; García tological status seems to be controversial, as the author Gutiérrez 2011). admits, this linear sequence can easily be mapped onto Therefore, the idea of a hierarchical order of reality is the emergent-correlate framework. In this way, it might questioned with regard to its theoretical and metatheoreti-

https://doi.org/10.5771/0943-7444-2017-5-349 Generiert durch IP '170.106.40.219', am 30.09.2021, 06:41:59. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. 360 Knowl. Org. 44(2017)No.5 Reviews of Concepts in Knowledge Organization cal assumptions, while often a change in metaphors is pro- reality (Jacob 2000; Svenonius 2004; Mai 2011; Hjørland posed from tree-like hierarchies to rhizome-like webs, that 2017). is, a shift in emphasis from hierarchical relations to associa- However, several approaches demonstrate that an tive relations (Robinson and Maguire 2010; López-Huertas acknowledgement of the context-dependent nature of 2013; De Beer 2015). In this regard, the traditional classifi- human knowledge does not necessarily mean to give up cation based on formal logic is often contrasted with con- the possibility of universal validity claims (for example, the ceptual ordering systems that are more in line with Witt- claim that all human knowledge is context-dependent), and genstein’s notion of family resemblance or Rosch’s proto- even less that a rejection of the picture theory of meaning type theory, which allow overlapping classes without essen- implies a rejection of the idea of integrative levels (Ber- tial properties and, therefore, the formation of intransitive talanffy 1968; Habermas 1979; Wilber [1995] 2000; Fenzl hierarchical relations (Jacob 2004; Hjørland 2017). Some et al. 1996; Brier 2003; Overton 2006; Kleineberg 2013). authors consider these approaches as “two complementary forms of representation” (Priss 2001, 53) and argue to 4.3 Teleology and value ranking overcome the reductionism of formal logic by means of a “wider and inclusive cognitive matrix” (García Gutiérrez According to Olson’s (1999) critique, teleology within clas- 2011, 9) that does not deny the formal-logical way of sification is illustrated by a linear progression of main clas- thinking but seeks to integrate it into a logical pluralism. ses from basic to more developed phenomena that is ori- From a developmental perspective, however, it should ented toward a goal and implies a value ranking, as exem- be noted that such a logical pluralism can itself be orga- plified by Aristotle’s hierarchical order of animals with nized according to the principle of integrative levels in human beings at the top level. Indeed, historical ideas like terms of “levels of knowing” (Wilber 1999, 451), “levels the great chain of being clearly present hierarchies of value of consciousness” (Overton 2006, 53), “stages of and many progress theories since the eighteenth century thought” (Commons 2008, 305), or “levels of perception” tend to make unjustified teleological assumptions, as prom- (Nicolescu 2010, 25), while offering a clearer distinction inently presented in the work of Teilhard de Chardin between dominator hierarchies and growth hierarchies. For (1959). But while recent theories of evolution commonly example, the Model of Hierarchical Complexity proposed reject the idea of a “scala naturae,” some authors argue for by cognitive psychologist Michael Commons (1998, 2008) a modified version that avoids both teleology and value presents an invariant sequence of task performances un- ranking (Greenberg 1995; Donald 2001). derstood as the activity of organizing information in which As stressed by theories of self-organization, transfor- actions at a higher level coordinate and transform the low- mational change in evolution or development presents di- er-level actions. According to that framework, the use of rectionality without a telos, that is, increasing complexity classical formal logic is represented by four distinct levels without a final goal (Jantsch [1979] 1980; Aronson 1987; from simple deductions to a full-fledged system of formal Wilber [1995] 2000; Brier 2003). Therefore, an adequate operations including Boolean operators, while seven pre- explanation requires a reconstruction after the fact and a ceding preformal levels and four succeeding postformal clearer distinction between the dynamics and the logic of levels are distinguished. The latter metasystematic or meta- development (Habermas 1990). logical kind of reasoning that integrates its precursors is al- With regard to integrative levels of knowing, there is a so reflected, for example, by Wilber’s ([1995] 2000, 266) strong emphasis on the dialectics of progress that includes “vision-logic,” Overton’s (2006, 32) “relational metatheo- both a growth of learning abilities but also new problem ry,” and Nicolescu’s (2010) “logic of the included middle.” situations and possible pathologies (Habermas 1979; Wil- ber 1999). Furthermore, it is underlined that normative 4.2 Picture theory of meaning and universality claim approaches claiming a hierarchy of justification are able to avoid the naturalistic fallacy by taking recourse to philo- Another criticism is concerned with the underlying episte- sophical arguments (Kohlberg and Hersh 1977; Habermas mology of the classical theory of integrative levels. As 1990; King and Kitchener 1994). Svenonius (2004) points out, Feibleman’s approach seems to be based on a correspondence theory of truth in the way that his description of the level sequence is supposed 5.0 Fields of application to mirror the actual structure of external reality. This kind of a picture theory of meaning is criticized by context- 5.1 Interdisciplinary knowledge organization sensitive instrumental or use theories of meaning for being objectivist, positivistic, and reductionist, while claiming Since at least Comte’s and Spencer’s classifications of the universal validity regardless of alternative constructions of sciences, the main motivation for the elaboration on the

https://doi.org/10.5771/0943-7444-2017-5-349 Generiert durch IP '170.106.40.219', am 30.09.2021, 06:41:59. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. Knowl. Org. 44(2017)No.5 361 Reviews of Concepts in Knowledge Organization idea of integrative levels is to interrelate different do- In particular, the monograph Interdisciplinary Knowledge Or- mains of human knowledge according to a hierarchical ganization (Szostak, Gnoli, and López-Huertas 2016) order in terms of either discipline-centered fields of re- summarizes its potential benefits and expands the scope search or phenomena-centered objects under investiga- from classification to further types of KOSs like thesauri tion, or even a combination of both within the same or formal ontologies. KOS such as the Bliss Bibliographic Classification, Second Edi- tion (Gnoli 2005). According to Needham (1937), such a 5.3 Semantic information retrieval big picture is important as soon as researchers take the broader context of their special fields into account, while Knowledge organization systems serve information re- Feibleman (1954, 59) even speaks of a kind of “super- trieval of relevant documents and in cases where docu- science” that is particularly concerned with the interrela- mentary languages are machine-readable vocabularies, such tions among disciplines like physics, chemistry, biology, as XML (Extensible Markup Language) based on RDF psychology, and anthropology. Some theorists consider (Resource Description Framework) and formal ontologies the idea of integrative levels promising for a defense of (e.g., Suggested Upper Merged Ontology, General Formal the unity of science (Oppenheimer and Putnam 1958; Ontology), one is concerned with semantic information re- Reiser 1958; Bertalanffy 1968), while others argue for a trieval (Rajasurya et al. 2012). An advantage of such se- transdisciplinary approach beyond disciplinary borders mantic web technologies is to enable automated reasoning since “levels of organization offer the possibility of a based on a structured database of facts or RDF statements new taxonomy of the more than 8000 academic disci- combined with documentary languages exhibiting transi- plines existing today” (Nicolescu 2010, 27). tive semantic relations (Guizzardi 2009; Herre 2013; Al- In the field of knowledge organization, this synthesizing meida and Baracho 2014; Santis and Gnoli 2016). As ar- aspect of the idea of integrative levels is recognized by the gued by D. Grant Campbell (2002), the framework of inte- CRG and exploited for the development of a basic scheme grative levels could play a significant role in the integration of a new general classification that is based directly on of RDF statements into formal ontologies. Furthermore, phenomena maintaining a universal scope of coverage information retrieval often uses automated query expan- (Classification Research Group 1969; Foskett 1978). As sion by moving upwards in transitive concept ladders noted by Austin (1969a), due to academic overspecializa- (Gnoli, Santis, and Pusterla 2015), for example, from the tion discipline-centered knowledge organization systems smallest geographical unit to larger ones in order to detect are challenged by the problems of keeping the scheme up the nearest location of interest (Stock and Stock 2013). In to date (currency), inserting new subjects (hospitality), or this regard, sequences of integrative levels due to their in- avoiding multiple entries (cross-classification). In order to herent multiple transitive order relations appear to be meet James E. Farradane’s condition of a “place of unique promising informationally rich tools. definition” (Austin 1969b, 111), the CRG’s new general classification adopts the organizing principle of integrative 5.3 Comparative method levels as a non-arbitrary linear order of phenomena or main classes which in turn can be combined by using the The idea of integrative levels offers a framework that al- analytico-synthetic technique of faceted classification with lows comparison of different degrees of complexity fundamental categories or facets that indicate different within a given developmental sequence. In the broader kinds of relationships or particular semantic contexts inter- or transdisciplinary field of information research, (Gnoli 2008). Although the CRG’s proposal never reached the comparative method has been applied to disambigu- the status of practical application, similar approaches elab- ate some basic concepts like “information,” “knowledge,” orated further such an interdisciplinary approach to “cognition,” or “communication” in order to interrelate knowledge organization. For example, Dahlberg’s (2008) different theoretical and methodological approaches Information Coding Classification, developed in the 1970s, (Fenzl et al. 1996; Hjørland 2002; Brier 2003; Wilson seeks to combine nine integrative levels of objects of be- 2003; Bates 2005; Yao 2009; Gnoli and Ridi 2014). For ing with nine facets in order to define a comprehensive example, Fenzl et al. (1996) propose a multi-level model matrix of discrete fields of knowledge or subject groups. of information based on a combined layer-theoretical During the last decade, theorizing about phenomena- (dialectic of whole and part) and phase-theoretical (dia- centered faceted classifications based on the organizing lectic of old and new) concept expressed as a hierarchical principle of integrative levels has been intensified and sequence from physico-chemical systems (dissipation) to practically applied in KOSs like Basic Concepts Classifi- biotic systems (autopoiesis) to socio-cultural systems (re- cation or Integrative Levels Classification (ISKO Italy creation). Aiming toward a unified information theory, 2007; Gnoli 2008; 2017; Szostak 2012; Kleineberg 2013). their hierarchy of cognition and communication is able to

https://doi.org/10.5771/0943-7444-2017-5-349 Generiert durch IP '170.106.40.219', am 30.09.2021, 06:41:59. Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig. 362 Knowl. Org. 44(2017)No.5 Reviews of Concepts in Knowledge Organization identify and delimitate the particular ontological level a groups and the development of user-centered indexing given approach (e.g., Claude Shannon’s theory of com- languages. munication) is actually concerned with. One of the most In many other human-related research areas, the idea of comprehensive comparative frameworks, the model of integrative levels of knowing serves also as an organizing hierarchical complexity developed by Commons (2008) principle for a classification of the epistemological dimen- within the intersection of information science and devel- sion in order to describe the “conceptual profiles” (Morti- opmental psychology, presents integrative levels of be- mer et al. 2014) that are embedded in artifacts or docu- havioral tasks accounting for both performances of ma- ments of the cultural and scientific heritage (Thompson chines and human action. 1996; Haaften, Korthals, and Wren 1997; Barnes 2000; As noted by Wilson (2003), the idea of integrative levels Bammé 2011). This includes various domain-specific lines is today widely employed in fields like biology, biochemis- of cognitive development such as spatial representation in try, comparative psychology, and environmental science, pictorial art (Gablik 1979), Paleolithic stone tool technolo- and these already existing hierarchical sequences might gy (Wynn 1985), narrative structures in English literature provide useful semantic relations for the development of (LePan 1989), ethics in classical Chinese literature (Roetz domain-specific KOSs (see Appendix). In this regard, a 1993), symbolization in ancient Egyptian artifacts (Brun- major contribution is made by “incorporating the levels of ner-Traut 1992), arithmetic in ancient Sumerian-Babylonian consciousness into the framework of the integrative levels texts (Damerow 1996), and religious systems in mythologi- theory” (Pisula 2016, 51) since it offers comparative tools cal and theological writings (Bellah 2011). with regard to the evolution and development of human consciousness and the cognitive aspects of cultural arti- 6.0 Conclusion facts and documents (Werner and Kaplan 1956; Haaften, Korthals, and Wren 1997; Greenberg et al. 1999; Quilley Although not uncontested, the idea of integrative levels 2010; Oesterdiekhoff 2013). This seems to be of particular presents one of the most informationally rich organizing importance since in knowledge organization discourse, the principles for conceptual ordering systems that combines concept of “mentefacts” (Kyle 1969, 14), that is, intellectu- several order relations, most importantly, gradation by spe- al concepts and systems, appears to be theoretically under- cialty (genus-species hierarchy), successive parthood (part- developed and, therefore, fails in applying the organizing whole hierarchy) and later-in-evolution (developmental hi- principle of integrative levels for the social sciences and erarchy), even though these order relations are rarely made humanities (Huckaby 1972; Langridge 1976; Spiteri 1995; explicit but rather remain implicit assumptions. Poli 2001; Dousa 2009). In the field of knowledge organization, the idea of integrative levels has been applied either discipline-centered 5.4 Viewpoint analysis and indexing or phenomena-centered in both domain-specific and interdisciplinary knowledge organization systems including As argued by Kleineberg (2013; 2014), the application of formal ontologies for semantic information retrieval. In the idea of integrative levels to the epistemological dimen- this regard, the most important challenge is the condition sion of human knowledge offers an organizing principle of transitivity for its hierarchical relations that seems to for the plurality of different perspectives or viewpoints in be frequently violated not least due to a lack of concep- terms of integrative levels of knowing. According to de- tual consensus. Indeed, it would appear misleading to velopmental psychologist Orlando M. Lorenço (2016, 123 speak of “the” theory of integrative levels since there are emphases orignal), this concept can be characterized by the various and often unrelated approaches grounded in dif- following main criteria: “(a) Hierarchy: stages appear in an ferent paradigms or disciplinary contexts. Knowledge or- invariant, hierarchical order; (b) integration: a given stage in- ganization research, however, might benefit from classifi- tegrates, albeit overcomes or transcends its predecessor.” cation schemes based on the idea of integrative levels In the field of knowledge organization, this principle has that already exist in other fields, in particular, from largely been utilized for classifying the epistemic outlook of both neglected developmental sequences reconstructed by psy- creators and users of documents. On one hand, Jason Far- chology, social sciences and humanities. radane’s (1963) relational indexing is an early attempt to in- References corporate cognitive-developmental aspects, as analyzed by Jean Piaget and others, in order to indicate the degree of Almeida, Mauricio B., and Renata A. Baracho. 2014. “A conceptual clarity that is represented in documents (see al- Theoretical Investigation about the Notion of Parts so Foskett 1980). On the other hand, Jihee Beak’s (2014) and Wholes: Mereological and Meronymic Relations.” child-driven metadata scheme uses such developmental Brazilian Journal of Information Science: Research Trends 8. level models of cognition for the analysis of particular user doi:10.22566/brajis.v8i1/2.4247

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Appendix: 3. Life Sample of Sequences Based on the Idea 4. Mind of Integrative Levels 5. Deity

(Excerpts are in chronological order of original publication. Num- Lloyd Morgan, Conwy (1923, 27): bering is added, M.K.) Events 1. Matter (with psychical correlates) Comte, Auguste ([1830-42] 1974, 55): 2. Life (with psychical correlates) Phenomena 3. Mind (with physical correlates) 1. Physical 2. Chemical Conger, George P. (1925, 312–113): 3. Physiological Material realm 4. Social 1. Energies 2. Electrons Comte, Auguste ([1830-42] 1974, 20): 3. Atoms Human mind 4. Molecules 1. Theological or fictitious 5. Astronomical masses, or bodies 2. Metaphysical or abstract 6. Solar systems 3. Scientific or positive 7. Star clusters 8. Galaxies Spencer, Herbert (1883, 3): 9. Universes Phenomena 1. Inorganic Conger, George P. (1925, 313): 2. Organic Biological realm 3. Super-organic 1. Organic compounds 2. Infra-cellular organisms Hobhouse, Leonard T. (1901, 359–68): 3. Unicellular organisms Human mind 4. Multicellular organisms 1. Pre-intelligence 5. Plant-and-animal groups 2. Unconscious readjustment 6. Families or tribes 3. Concrete experience and the practical judgment 7. Nations 4. Conceptual thinking and will 8. “The Great Society” 5. Rational system Conger, George P. (1925, 313): Richardson, Ernest C. (1901, 30): Neuropsychological realm Things 1. Specialized cells 1. Lifeless 2. Nervous areas 2. Living 3. Reflex arcs 3. Human 4. Complex reflexes 4. Superhuman 5. Instinctive emotional complexes 6. Sentiments Baldwin, James M. (1906, 33): 7. Values Cognition 8. Personalities 1. Pre-logical 2. Quasi-logical Wheeler, William M. (1928, 74): 3. Logical Phenomena 4. Hyper-logical 1. Physical 5. Extra-logical 2. Chemical 3. Psychological Alexander, Samuel ([1920] 1950, Vol. II: 52, 345): 4. Social Entities 1. Space-time 2. Matter

Vygotsky, Lev S. ([1934] 1986, 140): 4. Mental Concept formation 5. Integral 1. Syncretic 2. Complex (pseudoconcept) Neumann, Erich ([1949] 1975, 264): 3. Potential concept Collective consciousness (mythology) 4. True concept 1. Uroboros 2. Great Mother Needham, Joseph (1937, 6): 3. Dragon fight Phenomena 1. Inorganic Piaget, Jean ([1952] 1977, 456–61): 2. Biological Cognition 3. Social 1. Sensorimotor 2. Preoperational Bachelard, Gaston ([1940] 1968, 15): 3. Concrete operational Philosophical explanation 4. Formal operational 1. Animism 2. Realism Feibleman, James K. (1954, 60–62): 3. Positivism Organizations 4. Rationalism 1. Electrons, protons, neutrons 5. Complex rationalism 2. Atoms 6. Dialectical rationalism 3. Molecules 4. Cells Hartmann, Nicolai (1940, 498): 5. Organisms Nature 6. Human cultures 1. Matter 2. Life Feibleman, James K. (1954, 63): Properties (behavior) Hartmann, Nicolai ([1942] 1953, 46): 1. Physical (cause-and-effect) Consciousness 2. Chemical (combination-rearrangement) 1. Spiritless (psyche) 3. Biological (sensitivity-reactivity) 2. Spiritual (personal spirit) 4. Psychological (stimulus-response) 5. Cultural (contact-adaptation) Novikoff, Alex B. (1945, 209): Matter Steward, Julian H. ([1955] 1972, 190): 1. Physical Societies 2. Chemical 1. Hunting and gathering 3. Biological 2. Incipient agriculture 4. Sociological 3. Formative 4. Regional florescent Novikoff, Alex B. (1945, 211): 5. Initial empire Biological matter 1. Cells Oppenheim, Paul and Putnam, Hilary (1958, 9): 2. Tissues Things 3. Organs 1. Elementary particles 4. Organ-systems 2. Atoms 5. Organisms 3. Molecules 6. Populations 4. Cells 5. Multicellular living things Gebser, Jean ([1949] 1985, 42): 6. Social groups Consciousness 1. Archaic 2. Magical 3. Mythical

Sahlin, Marshall D. and Service, Elman R. ([1960] 1988, Bertalanffy, Ludwig (1968, 87): 37): Systems Social systems 1. Physical 1. Unsegmented and chiefless bands (preagricultural) 2. Chemical 2. Segmented and chiefless tribes (agricultural) 3. Biological 3. Segmented chiefdoms 4. Sociological 4. Archaic civilizations 5. Nation states (industrial technology) Bertalanffy, Ludwig (1968, 214): Mental systems Rowe, J. Stan (1961, 422): 1. Instincts, drives, emotions Objects 2. Perception, voluntary action 1. Cell 3. Symbolic activities 2. Organ 3. Organism Perry, William G. (1968 [folded chart]): 4. Ecosystem (single organism-habitat) Intelligence and ethics 5. Local Ecosystem 1. Simple dualism 6. Regional Ecosystem 2. Complex dualism 7. Ecosphere 3. Relativism 8. Universe 4. Commitment in relativism

Forsche, Joachim (1965, 124; my translation, M.K.): Austin, Derek (1969c, 88): Material structures Entities 1. Elementary particles 1. Fundamental particles 2. Atoms 2. Elements 3. Molecules 3. Compounds 4. Polymeres 4. Living Compounds 5. Macromolecules 6. Viruses Kyle, Barabara (1969, 14): 7. Cells Entities 8. Organisms 1. Inorganic 9. Organisms with central nervous system 2. Vegetable 10. Specific human structure 3. Animal 4. Man Richmond, Phyllis (1965, 43): 5. Groups Mentefacts 6. Formal groups 1. An observation 7. Government local 2. A group of observations 8. Government central 3. 1st level generalization 9. Intergovernmental 4. 2nd level generalization 5. A law Coates, Edwards J. (1969, 21): Organized wholes Bertalanffy, Ludwig (1968, 27): 1. Fundamental particles Organized entities 2. Nuclei 1. Elementary particles 3. Atoms 2. Atomic nuclei 4. Molecules 3. Atoms 5. Molecular assemblages (natural objects and artifacts) 4. Molecules 6. Cells 5. High-molecular compounds 7. Organisms 6. Structures between molecules and cells 8. Human beings 7. Cells 9. Human societies 8. Organisms 9. Supra-individual organizations

Tomlinson, Helen (1969b, 30): 4. Complete work Physical entities 1. Fundamental particle Jolley, John L. (1973, 30): 2. Atom Ideas 3. Molecule 1. Set-theoretic (e.g., members of sets, full sets) 4. Molecule assemblage 2. Spatial (e.g., points, lines and linear spaces) 5. Physical structure 3. Subatomic (e.g., photons, electrons) 6. Physiographic feature 4. Molecular (e.g., atoms, molecules) 7. Planet 5. Cytomechanic (e.g., organelles, cells) 8. Collection of Planets 6. Biomorphic (e.g., organs, plants and animals, machines) 9. Universe 7. Communal (e.g., departments, organizations) 8. National (e.g., local goverments, nations) Tomlinson, Helen (1969b, 30): Chemical entities Smith, Huston ([1976] 1992, 62): 1. Element Selfhood (traditional great chain of being) 2. Radical 1. Body 3. Compound 2. Mind 4. Complex 3. Soul 5. Aggregate 4. Spirit

Tomlinson, Helen (1969b, 30): Kohlberg, Lawrence and Hersh, Richard H. (1977, 54– Artefacts 55): 1. Raw material Moral judgment 2. Worked substance 1. Punishment-and-obedience (preconventional) 3. Compound 2. Instrumental-relativist 4. Assemblage of compounds 3. Interpersonal concordance (conventional) 5. Finished complex article 4. Law and order 5. Social-contract, legalistic (postconventional) Tomlinson, Helen (1969b, 30): 6. Universal-ethical-principle Biological entities 1. Crystal complex Apel, Karl-Otto (1978, 9): 2. Organelle Paradigms of First Philosophy 3. Cell 1. General metaphysics (ontology) 4. Tissue 2. Transcendental philosophy (consciousness) 5. Organ 3. Transcendental semiotics (language) 6. Organ system 7. Whole organism Habermas, Jürgen (1979, 83): 8. Community Communicative action 1. Incomplete interaction (natural identity, consequences Tomlinson, Helen (1969b, 33): of actions) Man 2. Complete interaction (role identity, systems of norms) 1. Individual 3. Communicative action and discourse (ego identity, 2. Families principles) 3. Urban communities 4. Groups of towns Habermas, Jürgen (1979, 100–101): 5. States Ego identity 6. Intergovernmental units 1. Symbiotic 2. Egocentric Tomlinson, Helen (1969a, 79): 3. Sociocentric-objectivistic Mentefacts 4. Universalistic 1. Word 2. Sentence 3. Paragraph

Habermas, Jürgen (1979, 104–5): 4. System of sensory-motor systems (single representa- Worldview tional sets) 1. Magical-animistic 5. Representational mappings 2. Early mythological 6. Representational systems 3. Late mythological 7. Systems of representational systems (single abstract 4. Rationalized sets) 5. Reflexive 8. Abstract mappings 9. Abstract systems Habermas, Jürgen (1979, 157–58): 10. Systems of abstract systems Social integration 1. Neolithic societies Selman, Robert L. (1980, 37–40): 2. Early civilizations Interpersonal understanding 3. Developed civilizations 1. Undifferentiated, egocentric 4. The modern age 2. Differentiated, subjective 3. Self-reflective, second-person, reciprocal Jantsch, Erich ([1979] 1980, 132): 4. Third-person, mutual Self-organizing microsystems 5. In-depth, societal-symbolic 1. Dissipative structures 2. Prokaryotes Fowler, James W. (1981, 113): 3. Eukaryotes Faith 4. Multicellular organisms 1. Undifferentiated 5. Complex animals 2. Intuitive-projective 3. Mythic-literal Jantsch, Erich ([1979] 1980, 132): 4. Synthetic-conventional Self-organizing macrosystems 5. Individualistic-reflective 1. Planetary chemodynamics 6. Conjunctive 2. Gaia system 7. Universalizing 3. Heterotrophic ecosystems 4. Societies with division of labor Leontiev, Alexei N. ([1981] quoted in Tolman 1987, 199): 5. Groups, families Activity 1. Irritability Jantsch, Erich ([1979] 1980, 240): 2. Sensitivity Self-organizing mind (mentation) 3. Perceptivity 1. Dissipative structures (intracellular processes) 4. Animal intellect 2. Organelles (prokaryotes) 5. Human consciousness 3. Cells (eukaryotes) 4. Organism/organismic mentation Turiel, Elliot (1983, 106–11): 5. Reflexive mentation (gestalt perception) Social-conventional concepts 6. Self-reflexive mentation (sociocultural dimension) 1. Descriptive of uniformity 7. Self-image 2. Related to rule and authority system 3. Mediated by societal standards Schluchter, Wolfgang ([1979] 1981, 102): 4. Functional Ethics and law 1. Magic ethics and revealed law Stern, Daniel N. ([1985] 1998, 32): 2. Law ethics and traditional law Sense of self 3. Ethics of conviction and deduced law 1. Emergent 4. Ethics of responsibility and positive law 2. Core 3. Subjective Fischer, Kurt (1980, 522): 4. Verbal Skills 1. Single sensory-motor sets Parsons, Michel J. (1987, 22–25): 2. Sensory-motor mappings Aesthetic experience 3. Sensory-motor systems 1. Favoritism

2. Beauty and realism 4. Multi-celled organisms (e.g., fungi, plants animals) 3. Expressiveness 4. Style and form Blitz, David (1992, 182): 5. Autonomy Social or populational entities 1. Social insects (fixed) Damon, William and Hart, Daniel (1988, 56): 2. Higher primates (greater variability) Self-understanding 3. Humans (greatest variability) 1. Categorical identifications 2. Comparative assessments Blitz, David (1992, 182): 3. Inter-personal implications Mental or perceptual-conceptual entities 4. Systematic beliefs and plans 1. Sensation 2. Perception Kramer, Deidre A. (1989, 153): 3. Cognition Social cognition 4. Intelligence 1. Undifferentiation 5. Consciousness 2. Pre-formism 3. Formism, mechanism Blitz, David (1992, 183): 4. Static relativism Entities 5. Static systems 1. Matter 6. Dynamic relativism 2. Life 7. Dynamic dialecticism 3. Society 4. Mind Atran, Scott (1990, 79): Human cognition Wilber, Ken (1993, 53): 1. First-order concepts (common-sense) Being and knowing (traditional Great Chain of Being) 2. Second-order concepts (science) 1. Matter 2. Body Campbell, Donald T. (1990, 11): 3. Mind Knowledge processes 4. Soul 1. Nonmnemonic problem solving 5. Spirit 2. Vicarious locomotor devices (distance receptors) 3. Habit Kegan, Robert (1994, 314–15): 4. Instinct Consciousness 5. Visually supported thought 1. Immediate, atomistic 6. Mnemonically supported thought (including computer 2. Durable category problem solving) 3. Cross-categorical, trans-categorical (e.g., traditionalism) 7. Social vicarious exploration 4. System, complex (e.g., modernism) 8. Language 5. Trans-system, trans-complex (e.g., post-modernism) 9. Cultural cumulation 10. Science King, Patricia M. and Kitchener, Karen S. (1994, 14–15): Reflective judgment Blitz, David (1992, 181): 1. Pre-reflective Material or physical-chemical entities 2. Quasi-reflective 1. Subatomic particles 3. Reflective 2. Atoms 3. Molecules Wilber, Ken ([1995] 2000, 15): 4. Macromolecules Phenomena 1. Physiosphere Blitz, David (1992, 181–82): 2. Biosphere Biological or cellular-organismic entities 3. Noosphere 1. Cell-components 2. Prokaryotic cells 3. Eukaryotic cells

Wilber, Ken ([1995] 2000, 198): 11. Centauric Exterior-individual holons (behavioral) 1. Atoms Fenzl, Norbert et al. (1996, 275): 2. Molecules Systems 3. Prokaryotes 1. Physical and chemical (dissipative) 4. Eukaryotes 2. Biotic (autopoietic) 5. Neural organisms 3. Socio-cultural (re-creational) 6. Neural cord organisms 7. Reptilian brain stem organisms Mithen, Steven (1996, 69): 8. Limbic system organisms Mind 9. Neo-cortex organisms 1. General intelligence 10. Complex neo-cortex organisms 2. General intelligence supplemented by isolated multiple specialized intelligences Wilber, Ken ([1995] 2000, 198): 3. General intelligence supplemented by connected mul- Exterior-collective holons (social) tiple specialized intelligences 1. Galaxies 2. Planets Parker, Sue T. and Russon, Anne E. (1996, 438): 3. Gaia system Culture and cognition 4. Heterotrophic ecosystems 1. Preculture (e.g., social mammals, monkeys) 5. Societies with division of labor 2. Protoculture (e.g., chimpaneezes) 6. Groups/families 3. Ur-culture (e.g., Middle Pleistocene hominids) 7. Tribes (foraging) 4. Eu-culture (modern humans) 8. Tribal/village (horticultural) 9. Early state/empire (agrarian) Pettersson, Max (Pettersson 1996, 91): 10. Nation/state (industrial) Entities 11. Planetary (informational) 1. Fundamental particles 2. Atoms Wilber, Ken ([1995] 2000, 198): 3. Molecules Interior-individual holons (intentional) 4. One-chromosome cells, and other intermediate entities 1. Prehension 5. Cells with nuclei 2. Irritability 6. Multicellular organisms 3. Sensation 7. One-mother family societies, etc. 4. Perception 8. Multifamily society 5. Impulse 9. Society of sovereign states 6. Emotion 7. Symbols Deacon, Terrance (1997, 449): 8. Concepts Consciousness 9. Concrete operations 1. Iconic representation 10. Formal operations 2. Indexical representation 11. Vision-logic 3. Symbolic representation

Wilber, Ken ([1995] 2000, 198): Emmeche, Claus; Køppe, Simo and Frederick Stjernfelt Interior-collective holons (cultural) (1997, 112–13): 1. Physical-pleromatic Phenomena 2. Protoplasmic 1. Physical 3. Vegetative 2. Biological 4. Locomotive 3. Psycho-social 5. Uroboic 6. Typhonic Damerow, Peter (1998, 10): 7. Archaic Prehistoric cognition 8. Magic 1. Sensorimotor or practical intelligence 9. Mythic 2. Preoperational or symbolic intelligence (Middle to Up- 10. Rational per Paleolithic transition)

3. Operational or reflective intelligence (e.g., urban revo- Donald, Merlin (2001, 325): lution) Conscious capacity 1. Pre-conscious (very simple perceptual objects, auto- Commons, Michael L. et al. (1998, 247): matically bound, transient) Tasks 2. Level-1 basic (simple perceptual events, integrated 1. Computory across time but ephemeral) 2. Sensory and motor 3. Level-2 basic (complex events that can be held in 3. Circular sensory-motor short-term memory briefly) 4. Sensory-motor 4. Level-3 basic (complex social world-models held in ex- 5. Nominal tended working memory) 6. Sentential 5. 1st-order hybrid (shared mimetic world-models that in- 7. Preoperational corporate the physical self) 8. Primary 6. 2nd-order hybrid (shared narrative world-models, au- 9. Concrete tobiographical self-awareness) 10. Abstract 7. 3rd-order hybrid (shared theoretical world-models, ex- 11. Formal ternal symbolic networks) 12. Systematic 13. Metasystematic Brier, Søren (2003, 88, 96): 14. Paradigmatic Matter and qualia 15. Cross-prardigmatic 1. Quantum vacuum fields (Peirce’s Firstness) 2. Physical (Peirce’s Secondness) Cook-Greuter, Susanne R. ([1999] 2010, 197–203): 3. Informational-chemical (Peirce’s Thirdness) Ego 4. Biological-semiotic (sign games) 1. Symbiotic 5. Social-linguistic (language games) 2. Impulsive 3. Self-protective Bunge, Mario (2003, 147): 4. Rule-oriented Material things 5. Conformist 1. Physical 6. Self-aware 2. Chemical 7. Conscientious 3. Biological 8. Individualist 4. Social 9. Autonomous 5. Technical 10. Construct-aware 11. Unitive Torbert, William R. (2003, 126–27): Action-logics Greenberg, Gary et al. (1999, 177): 1. Impulsive (conception) Language and culture 2. Opportunist (investment) 1. Simple communication (monkey social group, low neo- 3. Diplomat (incorporation) cortical ratio) 4. Expert (experiment) 2. Proto-language use (ape social group, intermediate ne- 5. Achiever (systematic) ocortical ratio) 6. Individualist (social network) 3. Language use (human culture, high neocortical ratio) 7. Strategist (collaborative inquiry) 8. Alchemist (foundational community of inquiry) Donald, Merlin (2001, 260): Cognition and culture Bates, Marcia J. (2005, 13): 1. Episodic (primate) Information 2. Mimetic (early hominids, peaking in Homo erectus) 1. Physical (information 1) 3. Mythic (sapient humans, peaking in Homo sapiens sapi- 2. Biological (information 2) ens) 3. Anthropological (knowledge) 4. Theoretic (modern culture) Vickery, Brian (2005, no paging): Material organization 1. Elementary particles

2. Atoms 6. Cognitive curiosity 3. Molecules 4. Cells Salthe, Stanley (2009, 89): 5. Animals Physical world 6. Humans 1. Physical dynamics 2. Material connectivity Overton, Willis F. (2006, 20): 3. Biological form Discourse 4. Social organization 1. Observational (common sense) 2. Theoretical (reflective) Salthe, Stanley (2009, 97): 3. Metatheoretical (metatheories) Physical entropy 4. Metatheoretical (ontological-epistemological ground- 1. Entropy production ings) 2. Free energy expenditure 3. Metabolism Overton, Willis F. (2006, 23): 4. Cognition Psychological subject 1. Practical (action systems) Yao, Yiyu (2009, 1): 2. Symbolic (representational action systems) Information-processing 3. Reflective (2nd order representational action systems) 1. Numeric 4. Trans-reflective (3rd order representational systems) 2. Larger information granules 3. Symbol-based Dahlberg, Ingetraut (2008, 163): Objects Feinberg, Todd (2011, 4): 1. General forms and structures Neural self system 2. Matter and energy 1. Interoself 3. Aggregated matter (cosmos and earth) 2. Integrative 4. Biological objects (micro-organisms, plants, animals) 3. Exterosensorimotor 5. Human beings 6. Societal beings Feinberg, Todd (2011, 14): 7. Material products of mankind (products of economy Consciousness and technology) 1. Consciousness 8. Intellectual products (scientific, information and com- 2. Self munication products) 3. Self awareness 9. Spiritual products (language, literature, music, arts, etc.) Tomasello, Michael (2014, 140): Lobo, Ingrid (2008, 141): Thinking Biological matter 1. Individual intentionality (nonhuman great apes) 1. Macromolecule 2. Joint intentionality (genus Homo, culminating in Homo 2. Cell heidelbergensis) 3. Tissue 3. Collective intentionality (modern humans) 4. Organ and organ systems 5. Organism Nolan, Patrick and Lenski, Gerhard (2015, 6): 6. Population Things 7. Communities and ecosystems 1. Subatomic particles 8. Biosphere 2. Atoms 3. Molecules Pisula, Wojciech (2009, 123): 4. Cells Exploratory behavior 5. Multicellular organisms 1. Taxis 6. Societies 2. Orienting response 7. Species 3. Locomotor exploration 8. Ecological communities 4. Perceptual exploration 9. The global ecosystem 5. Investigatory responses

Nolan, Patrick and Lenski, Gerhard (2015, 64): Gnoli, Claudio (2017, 46): Societies Phenomena 1. Hunting and gathering 1. Forms 2. Horticultural 2. Matter 3. Agrarian 3. Life 4. Industrial 4. Mind 5. Society 6. Culture

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