Science, Social Change, and the History of Feminist Psychology

Psychology of Women Quarterly, 34 (2010), 460–473. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Printed in the USA. Copyright C 2010 Division 35, American Psychological Association. 0361-6843/10 RESPONSIBLE OPPOSITION, DISRUPTIVE VOICES: SCIENCE, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND THE HISTORY OF FEMINIST PSYCHOLOGY Alexandra Rutherford, Kelli Vaughn-Blount, and Laura C. Ball York University Feminist psychology began as an avowedly political project with an explicit social change agenda. However, over the last two decades, a number of critics have argued that feminist psychology has become mired in an epistemological impasse where positivist commitments effectively mute its political project, rendering the field acceptable to mainstream psychology yet shorn of its transformative vision. In this article, we explore the complexity of allying positivism with a transformative project using two illustrative examples from feminist psychology’s history. Both Naomi Weisstein, whose work was catalytic in the creation of feminist psychology in the 1970s, and Ethel Tobach, who has consistently fought against sexism, racism, and other forms of injustice as both scientist and citizen, have remained committed to the scientific ideal without losing sight of their political projects. An examination of their efforts reveals the vital necessity, but ultimate insufficiency, of this position for creating large scale social change as well as a need for constant vigilance to the politics of knowledge in which science—and feminism—are embedded. The relationship between feminism and psychology However, as the above quotes suggest, it has not been an seems less a marriage than a furtive, clandestine af- easy relationship. Despite the feminist efforts of many psy- fair, with psychology defining the limits of the re- chologists over the course of its history (e.g., Hollingworth, lationship and keeping feminism firmly in its place 1914; Seward, 1946; Thompson, 1903; see also Morawski & (Crawford, 1998, p. 62). Agronick, 1991; Johnson & Johnston, 2010; Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987; Shields, 1975b), American psychology has Although the psychology of women began with (and more often reinscribed and reinstantiated existing social be- to some extent still retains) the lofty goal of changing liefs about women and gender than disrupted or displaced society so that women are empowered, we believe them (see Lewin, 1984; Morawski, 1984, 1985; Shields, it not only has failed to meet that goal, but may no 1975a, 1982, 1984, 2007). With the advent of feminist psy- longer be striving toward it (Kahn & Yoder, 1989, chology as an institutionalized field in the early 1970s, the p. 419). promise of a truly transformative and generative psychol- The relationship between feminism and psychology over ogy of/for women seemed bright. However, by the 1990s (if the course of the late 19th and 20th centuries has been not earlier), many critical feminist scholars argued that the close and complex, tightly bound up with shifting concep- promise of feminist psychology had not delivered. Squire tualizations of gender, gender roles, and gender relations. (1989) remarked, “[S]haring the insights of feminism and psychology could be helpful to both. But they have yet to establish a productive relationship” (p. 2). Only 20 years Alexandra Rutherford, Kelli Vaughn-Blount, and Laura C. Ball, into the institutional project, others argued that feminist Department of Psychology, York University. psychology had failed to generate the kind of “emancipa- The research for this article was supported by a Social Sciences tory alternatives” (Kitzinger, 1991, p. 49) that would trans- and Humanities Research Council of Canada Standard Research form disciplinary practices and, in turn, women’s lives. As Grant to the first author. We thank Rose Capdevila, Eileen Zur- Morawski (1990) put it: “In the face of the tremendous per- briggen, Rhoda Unger, Michael Pettit, Wade Pickren, and three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments and sonal and intellectual challenges of feminism, the psycho- suggestions. logical perspective on and analysis of gender have remained Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Alexandra unchanged” (p. 150). Rutherford, Department of Psychology, York University, 4700 Part of the problem, according to these critics, was that Keele St., Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3. E-mail: [email protected] feminist psychology (or Psychology of Women) had quickly 460 Responsible Opposition, Disruptive Voices 461 become beholden to the depoliticized, value-neutral stance The historiography of feminist psychology has revealed that generally characterized mainstream psychology. Thus the highly contested and continuously changing nature of co-opted, it had come to reflect the widespread and largely psychology’s and psychologists’ ongoing relationship with conservative fascination with sex differences and the ethos feminism (e.g., Morawski, 1994; Rosenberg, 1982; Squire, of individualism that continues to pervade much of psychol- 1989). Although efforts to bring explicitly feminist values to ogy and Western society (see Bem, 1993; Crawford, 1998; bear on psychological research have existed since the dis- Kahn & Yoder, 1989; Kitzinger, 1990; Llombart, 1998; cipline’s beginnings, these engagements have taken many Marecek, 1995; Mednick, 1989; Wilkinson, 1991, 1997). forms; have been continuously questioned from within and In response, some feminist psychologists have offered con- without; and have been shaped by their institutional, in- structive suggestions for how to reclaim the power of fem- tellectual, social, and political contexts (Johnson & John- inist research and politics to transform society and disrupt ston, 2009, 2010; Johnston, 2007; Johnston & Johnson, the status quo (e.g., Fine, 1985, 1992). In many cases these 2008; Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987; Unger, Sheese, & prescriptions have involved abandoning, or at least disen- Main, 2010). Kitzinger (1991), invoking the examples of gaging from, institutional psychology to look elsewhere for early American psychologists Helen Thompson Woolley sources of transformative inspiration. As Kitzinger (1991) and Leta Hollingworth, has proposed that “we can learn wrote in the inaugural issue of the journal Feminism & from the feminist pioneers in our discipline and avoid rein- Psychology, “We need to consider whether, in our strenu- venting the wheel” (p. 50), noting that feminist empiricist ous efforts to change psychology, we run the risk of losing efforts to debunk claims about female inadequacy served sight of the broader feminist vision. Is our engagement only to escalate the empiricist project, not to dislodge the with psychology really the most effective form our femi- beliefs themselves. According to historian Rosalind Rosen- nism can take?” (p. 50). Additionally, as Marecek (1995) berg (1982), however, “[t]he work of these women [includ- wrote a few years later, “Is it possible that feminist psychol- ing Hollingworth and Woolley] altered American thinking ogists have expended enough energy on getting accepted about the nature of women and men, but also affected the by mainstream psychology? Maybe the time has come to whole course of American social science” (p. xiii). look elsewhere, to play the field” (p. 126). We continue the reconstruction of the history of feminist How has feminist psychology arrived at this state of psychology begun by others in the hopes that it can help us affairs? Why have so many feminist psychologists con- contextualize and understand the current divisions among cluded that the goal of transforming mainstream psychol- feminist psychologists as well as understand the challenges ogy is unattainable and that efforts to date have primarily inherent to the scientist-activist stance. We undertake this served to distract feminist psychologists from their political reconstruction by invoking two case examples of feminist pi- project?1 Many of the psychologists cited above have come oneers who have adhered consistently to an activist agenda to the conclusion that using the master’s tools to dismantle without abandoning their faith in the empiricist project. We the master’s house (Lorde, 1984) is an inescapably futile en- first examine the life, politics, and science of the psycholo- terprise. They reject feminist empiricism, the position that gist whose seminal critique has often been heralded as cat- there is an objective know-able world that can be uncovered alyzing the formation of feminist psychology: Naomi Weis- by methods designed to minimize the incursion of personal stein (b. 1939). Next we examine the life and career of Ethel and social biases into the research process. Whereas fem- Tobach (b. 1921), an avowed scientist-activist. Specifically, inist empiricists argue that sexist and androcentric biases we focus on her work with the Genes and Gender Collec- have invaded this research process and that feminists are tive, a multidisciplinary group established in the wake of the in a good position to recognize these biases and to work to 1975 publication of E.O. Wilson’s controversial book So- eliminate them, critics argue that this is a fundamentally ciobiology: A New Synthesis. The overarching goals of the flawed premise on which to build a transformative feminist Collective were to combat the use of genetic determinism psychology. Although feminist empiricists remain commit- to justify sexism and racism and to reveal the scientific and ted to doing better positivist science in the belief that better logical flaws in the position itself.

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