Psychology of Women Quarterly, 34 (2010), 460–473. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Printed in the USA. Copyright C 2010 Division 35, American Psychological Association. 0361-6843/10

RESPONSIBLE OPPOSITION, DISRUPTIVE VOICES: SCIENCE, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND THE HISTORY OF FEMINIST

Alexandra Rutherford, Kelli Vaughn-Blount, and Laura C. Ball York University

Feminist psychology began as an avowedly political project with an explicit social change agenda. However, over the last two decades, a number of critics have argued that feminist psychology has become mired in an epistemological impasse where positivist commitments effectively mute its political project, rendering the field acceptable to mainstream psychology yet shorn of its transformative vision. In this article, we explore the complexity of allying positivism with a transformative project using two illustrative examples from feminist psychology’s history. Both Naomi Weisstein, whose work was catalytic in the creation of feminist psychology in the 1970s, and Ethel Tobach, who has consistently fought against sexism, racism, and other forms of injustice as both scientist and citizen, have remained committed to the scientific ideal without losing sight of their political projects. An examination of their efforts reveals the vital necessity, but ultimate insufficiency, of this position for creating large scale social change as well as a need for constant vigilance to the politics of knowledge in which science—and feminism—are embedded.

The relationship between feminism and psychology However, as the above quotes suggest, it has not been an seems less a marriage than a furtive, clandestine af- easy relationship. Despite the feminist efforts of many psy- fair, with psychology defining the limits of the re- chologists over the course of its history (e.g., Hollingworth, lationship and keeping feminism firmly in its place 1914; Seward, 1946; Thompson, 1903; see also Morawski & (Crawford, 1998, p. 62). Agronick, 1991; Johnson & Johnston, 2010; Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987; Shields, 1975b), American psychology has Although the psychology of women began with (and more often reinscribed and reinstantiated existing social be- to some extent still retains) the lofty goal of changing liefs about women and gender than disrupted or displaced society so that women are empowered, we believe them (see Lewin, 1984; Morawski, 1984, 1985; Shields, it not only has failed to meet that goal, but may no 1975a, 1982, 1984, 2007). With the advent of feminist psy- longer be striving toward it (Kahn & Yoder, 1989, chology as an institutionalized field in the early 1970s, the p. 419). promise of a truly transformative and generative psychol- The relationship between feminism and psychology over ogy of/for women seemed bright. However, by the 1990s (if the course of the late 19th and 20th centuries has been not earlier), many critical feminist scholars argued that the close and complex, tightly bound up with shifting concep- promise of feminist psychology had not delivered. Squire tualizations of gender, gender roles, and gender relations. (1989) remarked, “[S]haring the insights of feminism and psychology could be helpful to both. But they have yet to establish a productive relationship” (p. 2). Only 20 years Alexandra Rutherford, Kelli Vaughn-Blount, and Laura C. Ball, into the institutional project, others argued that feminist Department of Psychology, York University. psychology had failed to generate the kind of “emancipa- The research for this article was supported by a Social Sciences tory alternatives” (Kitzinger, 1991, p. 49) that would trans- and Humanities Research Council of Canada Standard Research form disciplinary practices and, in turn, women’s lives. As Grant to the first author. We thank Rose Capdevila, Eileen Zur- Morawski (1990) put it: “In the face of the tremendous per- briggen, Rhoda Unger, Michael Pettit, Wade Pickren, and three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments and sonal and intellectual challenges of feminism, the psycho- suggestions. logical perspective on and analysis of gender have remained Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Alexandra unchanged” (p. 150). Rutherford, Department of Psychology, York University, 4700 Part of the problem, according to these critics, was that Keele St., Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3. E-mail: [email protected] feminist psychology (or Psychology of Women) had quickly

460 Responsible Opposition, Disruptive Voices 461 become beholden to the depoliticized, value-neutral stance The historiography of feminist psychology has revealed that generally characterized mainstream psychology. Thus the highly contested and continuously changing nature of co-opted, it had come to reflect the widespread and largely psychology’s and ’ ongoing relationship with conservative fascination with sex differences and the ethos feminism (e.g., Morawski, 1994; Rosenberg, 1982; Squire, of individualism that continues to pervade much of psychol- 1989). Although efforts to bring explicitly feminist values to ogy and Western society (see Bem, 1993; Crawford, 1998; bear on psychological research have existed since the dis- Kahn & Yoder, 1989; Kitzinger, 1990; Llombart, 1998; cipline’s beginnings, these engagements have taken many Marecek, 1995; Mednick, 1989; Wilkinson, 1991, 1997). forms; have been continuously questioned from within and In response, some feminist psychologists have offered con- without; and have been shaped by their institutional, in- structive suggestions for how to reclaim the power of fem- tellectual, social, and political contexts (Johnson & John- inist research and politics to transform society and disrupt ston, 2009, 2010; Johnston, 2007; Johnston & Johnson, the status quo (e.g., Fine, 1985, 1992). In many cases these 2008; Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987; Unger, Sheese, & prescriptions have involved abandoning, or at least disen- Main, 2010). Kitzinger (1991), invoking the examples of gaging from, institutional psychology to look elsewhere for early American psychologists Helen Thompson Woolley sources of transformative inspiration. As Kitzinger (1991) and Leta Hollingworth, has proposed that “we can learn wrote in the inaugural issue of the journal Feminism & from the feminist pioneers in our discipline and avoid rein- Psychology, “We need to consider whether, in our strenu- venting the wheel” (p. 50), noting that feminist empiricist ous efforts to change psychology, we run the risk of losing efforts to debunk claims about female inadequacy served sight of the broader feminist vision. Is our engagement only to escalate the empiricist project, not to dislodge the with psychology really the most effective form our femi- beliefs themselves. According to historian Rosalind Rosen- nism can take?” (p. 50). Additionally, as Marecek (1995) berg (1982), however, “[t]he work of these women [includ- wrote a few years later, “Is it possible that feminist psychol- ing Hollingworth and Woolley] altered American thinking ogists have expended enough energy on getting accepted about the nature of women and men, but also affected the by mainstream psychology? Maybe the time has come to whole course of American social science” (p. xiii). look elsewhere, to play the field” (p. 126). We continue the reconstruction of the history of feminist How has feminist psychology arrived at this state of psychology begun by others in the hopes that it can help us affairs? Why have so many feminist psychologists con- contextualize and understand the current divisions among cluded that the goal of transforming mainstream psychol- feminist psychologists as well as understand the challenges ogy is unattainable and that efforts to date have primarily inherent to the scientist-activist stance. We undertake this served to distract feminist psychologists from their political reconstruction by invoking two case examples of feminist pi- project?1 Many of the psychologists cited above have come oneers who have adhered consistently to an activist agenda to the conclusion that using the master’s tools to dismantle without abandoning their faith in the empiricist project. We the master’s house (Lorde, 1984) is an inescapably futile en- first examine the life, politics, and science of the psycholo- terprise. They reject feminist empiricism, the position that gist whose seminal critique has often been heralded as cat- there is an objective know-able world that can be uncovered alyzing the formation of feminist psychology: Naomi Weis- by methods designed to minimize the incursion of personal stein (b. 1939). Next we examine the life and career of Ethel and social biases into the research process. Whereas fem- Tobach (b. 1921), an avowed scientist-activist. Specifically, inist empiricists argue that sexist and androcentric biases we focus on her work with the Genes and Gender Collec- have invaded this research process and that feminists are tive, a multidisciplinary group established in the wake of the in a good position to recognize these biases and to work to 1975 publication of E.O. Wilson’s controversial book So- eliminate them, critics argue that this is a fundamentally ciobiology: A New Synthesis. The overarching goals of the flawed premise on which to build a transformative feminist Collective were to combat the use of genetic determinism psychology. Although feminist empiricists remain commit- to justify sexism and racism and to reveal the scientific and ted to doing better positivist science in the belief that better logical flaws in the position itself. An examination of their science will reveal truths that can be deployed to improve efforts is particularly relevant given the recent resurgence women’s lives and create a more equitable society, crit- of interest in and attention to evolutionary psychology, a ics argue that science itself is an androcentric enterprise perspective that purports to divorce supposedly value-free that cannot adjudicate among truths that are themselves science from its social implications. historically contingent and socially constructed (see Riger, 1992). However, as several critical scholars surveying the RECONSTRUCTING NAOMI WEISSTEIN field have noted, despite serious challenges and viable al- ternatives to the feminist empiricist position, it remains the Naomi Weisstein’s life and career stand as a particularly most widespread approach in women’s psychology, at least interesting and complex representation of how to marry when one surveys mainstream outlets (see Crawford, 1998; feminism and science and how to operate as a radical both Teo, 2005; Unger, 1998). For this reason alone, it deserves inside and outside the academy. Although her scientific close historical scrutiny. work appears at first glance quite distinct from her work 462 RUTHERFORD ET AL. as a feminist, she has articulated the relationship between that would have enabled her to pursue a full-time career. them: how her feminism both infuses her science (Weis- As Weisstein noted, “[t]he legacy of feminism from earlier stein, 1977; see also Unger, 1993) and makes it possible for times had not yet questioned marriage and the family to her to be a scientist at all (Weisstein, 1979). She has main- such an extent that someone who thought she was a fem- tained her support of the scientific ideal at the same time inist like my mother could shake herself free from what that she has critiqued “science as practiced” (see Weis- was clearly the worst move in her life” (Weisstein, Novem- stein, Blaisdell, & Lemisch, 1975) and has characterized ber, 1987, p. 1). Conflicts between her mother and father postmodern feminist critiques of science as an “essentially about her mother’s autonomy were frequent. In this con- conservative” obsession that diverts the field from its social text, Weisstein was indoctrinated, as she put it, into a “maze change agenda (Weisstein, 1993a, p. 240). As a radical of of feminism” (p. 2). the 1960s, Weisstein protested the structural inequities that After 2 years in an all-girls East Side Manhattan junior oppressed women and people of color. As a , high school, where she formed a “girl gang,” Weisstein she could not help but recognize psychology as part of the attended the prestigious Bronx High School for Science, problem. where, as she described it, “my world collapsed.” All my power, all my standing, all my popularity that I Radical Roots enjoyed in the first fourteen years of my life vanished In her unpublished memoir, Naomi Weisstein has writ- in a day, as it became clear that the only thing that ten poignantly and personally of the importance—indeed girls were judged on was their ability to negotiate imperativeness—of the women’s liberation movement for the world of heterosexuality.... I can still feel my her life and career. resentment, rage, and despondency at this state of affairs, especially because it seemed as if my future This book is an account of my life as a female and was closing down on me (Weisstein, November, 1987, as a scientist, before, during, and after the women’s p. 3). liberation movement of 1966 through 1972. The story is about how women’s liberation transformed my Determined to leave this demoralizing environment be- life from the alienation and desperation of a fifties hind, Weisstein chose to study at a women’s college. With a teenager into the visionary euphoria and hope of a scholarship and the extra money her mother earned taking sixties radical (Weisstein, January 17, 1989, p. 2). a job as a home-visit teacher for the City public schools, she was admitted to Wellesley College in 1957. Without the movement, she has written, “none of my ac- Although her first year was an adjustment to the culture tions would have brought about change” (Weisstein, 1977, shock of the “land of the WASPs” who had “an entirely p. 250). Weisstein was, however, an integral part of creating different way of relating to each other ...which I couldn’t that movement. Raised a political animal, she has reported for the life of me copy” (Weisstein, November, 1987, p. 4), that she “grew up in the church of socialism ..., knew that Weisstein gradually came into her own, composing music all my life politics would be a part of what I did” (Weisstein, and performing in the junior show, doing stand-up com- November, 1987, p. 2). Weisstein has traced her political edy, and writing for the newspaper. Moreover, she was and activist roots back to her grandparents, describing her- accepted for her intellect and her ability in an atmosphere self as the product of the “Jewish radical tradition.” In a of mutual respect and encouragement. At Wellesley she 1987 self-interview for Peg Strobel of the Chicago Women’s experienced “intense respectful relationships with women, Liberation Union, she began: the privilege of expressing ourselves in class, and perhaps So, I start with my grandparents, my maternal grand- the even greater privilege of ... not having to give a shit parents, one of whom was a Bolshevik, my maternal about the space I took up and what that space looked like” grandmother, and the other, a carpenter who was a (p. 5). Although she described the younger faculty and Menshevik, my grandfather. I think that I am infused most of the students as “thoroughly indoctrinated into the with the Jewish radical tradition. I grew up with my feminine mystique,” the older faculty and leadership were grandfather’s labor struggles, with the picture of the “heroic, glorious feminists” (p. 5). Although these “glorious czars and in Russia, with the idea of resis- feminists” forewarned her that the masculine (and indeed tance and the idea that one’s mission in life was to male) world of graduate school would be very different from fight collectively for a transformed world (Weisstein, the sheltered environment of Wellesley, Weisstein was per- November, 1987, p. 1). haps unprepared for just how challenging this world would be—and how formative. Weisstein’s parents, especially her mother, imbued her with an anti-authoritarian streak, and with an inchoate fem- Feminist Consciousness inism. Despite attaining a very high beginner’s standing as a concert pianist and self-identifying as a feminist, her Weisstein’s choice for graduate education was Harvard Uni- mother was not supported by a social or economic structure versity, where she entered the clinical psychology graduate Responsible Opposition, Disruptive Voices 463 program in 1961. She reported in her 1977 article, “‘How the universities were dripping jobs. They were offer- Can a Little Girl Like You Teach a Great Big Class of Men?’ ing three-year olds professorships at MIT.... Where the Chairman Said, and Other Adventures of a Woman in I went, chairmen would say things like, “How can a Science,” on her first day, one of the star professors in the little girl like you teach a great big class of men?” or psychology department announced over lunch that women “You ought to get married” (p. 6). did not belong in graduate school because it violated their natural roles as wives and mothers. In addition to this in- By 1964, Weisstein’s inchoate feminism fully erupted; auspicious welcome, Weisstein reported a number of ex- she became intensely politically engaged with the New periences at Harvard that profoundly shaped her future Left and with women’s issues. She decided to solve her feminism. First, she promptly switched from the clinical job difficulties by taking a challenging postdoctoral fellow- psychology program ship in mathematical biology at the University of Chicago. Once there, she joined the Chicago branch of the Student ...on the day that a woman who had had a Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (1964), the Univer- schizophrenic episode ...was told by the head psy- sity of Chicago Students for a Democratic Society (1965– chiatrist that her prognosis was incurable and she 1970), and the New University Conference (1969). Al- would be going to a state mental institution. And though thrilled and invigorated to be connected with the as far as I could tell, this was on the basis of an New Left, a “Left that was open, generous, and at that interview ..., where the chief psychiatrist kept say- time infused with a spirit of beloved community and vi- ing, “Are you aroused? Do I arouse you?” And the sion” (Weisstein, November, 1987, p. 9), Weisstein also woman, a Catholic, unmarried secretary from South noted that women occupied a distinctly marginalized posi- Boston, just didn’t know how to answer the ques- tion in the movement. In the fall of 1967, she banded to- tion and wouldn’t answer it. I myself would have had gether with other women in the New Left and formed the a schizophrenic episode right there on the spot ...I Chicago Westside Group.2 In 1969, she became a founding understood the classism. I didn’t yet understand the member of the Chicago Women’s Liberation Union, and sexism. But I got out of the room and walked out of she subsequently formed and led the Chicago Women’s the program (Weisstein, November, 1987, pp. 5–6). Liberation Rock Band. As a musician, stand-up comedian, humorist, and cartoonist, she disseminated her own brand A second experience involved prominent Harvard fac- of feminist satire through performances, essays, and books ulty members Timothy Leary and Richard Alpert, who (see, e.g., Levine, 1973). Simultaneously, Weisstein earned were experimenting with psilocybin, a hallucinogenic drug, her credentials as a psychologist, becoming a highly prolific in the Harvard Psilocybin Project. Weisstein joined one researcher and an expert on the neural bases of visual per- of their groups, took the drug, and reported being para- ception. In 1966, she was hired as an assistant professor at lyzed for a week. When she regained her senses, one of Loyola University in Chicago, becoming an associate pro- Leary’s research assistants invited her to a private session fessor in 1970. In 1973, at the age of 33, she was hired as a with Leary so that she could, as she was told, work through full professor of psychology at the State University of New her “paranoia, neurosis, and general uptight Jewish female- York at Buffalo. She was a feminist, and she was a scientist. ness” (Weisstein, November, 1987, p. 6). Needless to say, She was about to combine both in an important critique of she refused the invitation. She has reported that this ex- the reigning “truths.” perience contributed to her later view that much of the counterculture was set up to brutalize women. Psychology Constructs the Female Then, as she was preparing to conduct her disserta- tion research, she was denied access to the equipment she needed on the grounds that, as a woman, she would no In 1968, Naomi Weisstein boldly declared that “psy- doubt break it: “This I realized was sexist and I pointed chology constructs the female.” This was not a com- out that the male graduate students used the equipment pliment. Hers was the opening salvo in a battle that all the time, and broke it all the time, and that I didn’t pitted the accumulated wisdom of psychological ex- expect to be any different” (Weisstein, November, 1987, perts against the growing number of young women p. 6). Fortunately, Weisstein was able to get access to equip- who took up the banner of women’s liberation (Her- ment at Yale University, so she moved to New Haven to man, 1995, p. 280). finish her research. There she met her future (and current) husband, New Left historian Jesse Lemisch, as well as close In 1968, what we now call feminist psychology did friend and collaborator Virginia Blaisdell. In New Haven, not exist. There had been occasional publications about she also joined the Congress on Racial Equality. Finally, as women, or about sex differences, or about women’s issues Weisstein (November, 1987) wrote: before this time, but as Stewart and Dottolo (2006) have written, “The invention of feminist psychology began in The fourth significant thing was that when I gradu- the 1970s” (p. 493). Much of the contemporaneous psy- 1 ated in 2 2 years I couldn’t get a job. This was in ’64; chological literature about women, in fact, provided rich 464 RUTHERFORD ET AL. material for feminist critique, as Weisstein was about to and Schachter and Singer’s (1962) emotional labeling stud- highlight.3 ies as powerful examples of the impact of situational cues on Central, if not catalytic, to the invention of feminist psy- behavior. In the last sections of her classic article, Weisstein chology was Weisstein’s article, “Kinder, Kuche,¨ Kirche took biological reductionism to task, and she also disman- as Scientific Law: Psychology Constructs the Female,” tled the notion that we could leap unproblematically from published in 1968 by the New England Free Press and the results of primate studies to conclusions about human reprinted in expanded form in 1971 as “Psychology Con- behavior. Throughout, she exposed bad science as science structs the Female; or, The Fantasy Life of the Male Psy- that ignored evidence or counter-evidence in the service of chologist (With Some Attention to the Fantasies of His making particular, often ideological, claims. Friends, the Male Biologist and the Male Anthropologist)” The impact of Weisstein’s article on the feminist move- (Weisstein, 1971). In this article, originally intended for ment, on psychology, and in academia was widespread. It feminist activists, Weisstein began by vividly reporting the was reprinted in over 30 different readers in fields as di- sexist assumptions about women held by prominent psy- verse as philosophy of science, political science, sociology, chologists and psychiatrists of the time, such as Bruno Bet- social education, and abnormal psychology. Although ush- telheim, Erik Erikson, and Joseph Rheingold. She then ering in a body of work on the Psychology of Women, proposed that psychology (specifically academic personal- much of which has focused on sex differences in internal ity psychology, clinical psychology, and psychiatry) offered traits and psychological characteristics, Weisstein’s argu- no meaningful understanding of women (or men, for that ment actually supported a social change, not an individual matter) because (a) they typically looked to inner traits as differences, agenda. In a 1987 letter to a colleague, Weis- explanations of behavior, rather than at social context, and stein reiterated the relevance of her arguments in “Kinder, (b) clinicians have rarely felt it necessary to gather evidence Kuche,¨ Kirche” to the project of radical social reform. She to support their theories. wrote: Weisstein’s indictment of theory without evidence em- My argument leads directly to prescriptions for anated from her firm conviction that the only way to un- bottom-up social change, that is, insurgency that can cover reality and to fight social myths masquerading as then gain the collective power and momentum to science was to seek and evaluate evidence at all times. The change the institutions that contrive to enforce the problem with Freudian theory, she argued, was not that sexual status quo.... [C]hange the structure of power Freud had relied on clinical case observations to build his and authority and you can change people’s behavior theory but that he did not engage in the subsequent steps of overnight, permanently. My interpretation of Mil- testing that would either confirm or refute his theory. Fur- gram’s brilliant experiments made the point that a ther, without reliance on scientific methods, any supposed simple change in social dynamics and in expectation evidence gathering was biased from the outset: Without can turn sadists into refuseniks.... Milgram exam- the appropriate checks and balances, it is relatively easy to ined class, sex, race, personality, nationality and ed- gather evidence that supports what you already believe to ucational level to see if any of these predicted who be true (see also Weisstein et al., 1975). As an example of would obey and who wouldn’t. None of these made a insurgent science based on sound method, she described difference. The only reliable predictor was the stooge the work of Evelyn Hooker, who, in the 1950s, tested the who said: “Stop this buddy. This is wrong. (Naomi commonly held belief in the deviance of male homosex- Weisstein Papers, Weisstein to H. Eisenstein, De- uality by asking a set of seasoned clinicians to distinguish cember 23, 1987). between the masked assessment protocols of heterosexual and homosexual men. The clinicians were unable to do Thus, the legacy of Weisstein’s “Psychology Constructs so at levels higher than chance. Other similar studies of the Female” is twofold. First, it drew valuable attention to clinicians’ judgment also revealed retest inconsistencies— the ways in which social context, including expectations and when asked to judge the same protocols a second time, authority, functioned to predict and control behavior and many clinicians came up with different judgments of the to structure experience. This demonstration was a powerful same protocols. feminist critique of psychological theory and practice in the Weisstein’s second argument, that social context is key 1970s, and it remains vitally important for the field today. to understanding human behavior—especially women’s Weisstein did not, however, question the value of science behavior—was drawn from a growing body of social psycho- itself to produce “a model of reality that works and predicts” logical research that showed the powerful effects of social and that has “some reasonable relation to other things we expectations on both human and animal behavior, even un- know to be true about the subject under study, that is, to der highly controlled conditions. She reviewed Rosenthal’s objective reality” (Weisstein, 1993a, p. 243). studies of experimenter effects to show that researchers’ ex- The second aspect of her legacy was that she insisted that pectations can exert a heavy influence on how people, and feminist empiricist approaches could lead to social change even animals, actually behave (Rosenthal, 1963). She also in ways that other feminist epistemologies could not: “Sci- drew on Milgram’s obedience studies (e.g., Milgram, 1965) ence ...can give actual recipes for social change, providing Responsible Opposition, Disruptive Voices 465 us feminists with a kind of countervailing power” (Weis- objects. In a series of studies investigating context effects stein, 1993a, p. 243). She has contrasted feminist empiri- in visual discrimination using figure-ground reversal, Weis- cism with poststructuralist feminism which, in her words, stein (1970, 1973) proposed that the nerve cells involved in creates paralysis: “Once knowledge is reduced to insur- visual perception are not passive, but active, and perhaps mountable personal subjectivity, there is no place to go; we even purposive. She was able to show that without direct are in a swamp of self-referential passivity” (pp. 243–244). physical stimulation, nerve cells will fire to inform the brain Thus, Weisstein saw the scientific method as a powerful cul- about a relationship (e.g., A is in back of B). In a humorous turally sanctioned tool that could generate uniquely useful but substantive talk delivered to scientists and nonscientists knowledge to construct a more just world. alike, Weisstein explained these experiments, and she used them as a vehicle for expressing her deep sense of wonder Science, Feminism, and Wonderland in the power of science to uncover how we experience the world. How does science play into this saga of emergence Here is a brain that searches out meaning, a creative, from the fifties? Again, the parallel: I became a scien- generative, constructive brain. Here are the elements tist just as American culture entered a stepped-up sci- of that brain, the hardware, involved in the creation entific age. The space program, the new frontier, the and construction. Here they are, running berserk all nuclear age, the technologization of our lives—under over wonderland. And I’m there with them, watching the imperative of what kind of science? A scientific what they do. That’s my wonderland (Weisstein, May nation without a social conscience poses a dilemma 16, 1979, p. 27). that could undo us; unless we come to our senses and develop our humanity too (Weisstein, May 16, 1979, In this same talk, Weisstein then articulated both a p. 13). question, “What does scientific wonderland have to do with feminism?” (Weisstein, May 16, 1979, p. 28) and a provoca- Weisstein was developing her career as a neuroscien- tion, “We understand you want women to be able to enter tist during the 1960s and 1970s, an era marked by intense science; you want all people to have access to their human critique of the existing structure and values of American so- inheritance. That’s clear. But the science itself? How can ciety. As Weisstein has noted of her experiences at this time, that be feminist if it’s not about women?” (p. 28). She re- “We were creating an alternative social context which, in sponded to her own provocation with direct reference to turn, redefined who we were” (Weisstein, 1993a, p. 239). the critique of “science as practiced” that she had made ear- The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s resulted in the lier in analyzing science as a protection society, adding that passing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and paved the ways although the politics of science may serve to exclude, the for the women’s liberation movement and the gay rights spirit of science respects and requires diversity, difference, movement later in the decade. Anti-Vietnam war senti- and deviance. Then, as she went on to explain: ments ran high among university students, and, eventually, much of the general public. Additionally, as Weisstein has But there’s an even closer connection between my indicated, Cold War politics brought ever more attention feminism and my science: the idea of human agency. to science, technology, and social responsibility—a histori- A humanist assumption about humans is that they cally uneasy trio. In the wake of the bombing of Hiroshima attempt to shape and control their world, that they and Nagasaki at the end of WWII, and the Cuban Missile actively search, cope, battle, strive, look, hope, see. Crisis of 1962, it was clear that science and politics were The connection between this and my science isn’t ... a lethal combination. The level of technological enthusi- straightforward but it’s clearly there Neither nerve ... asm previously endorsed by the American public was on cells nor people just sit around and wait .So the wane (Hughes, 1989). It was in this thickly politicized the idea of active nerve cells is one way my femi- ... atmosphere that Weisstein merged her science and her nism influences my science. There’s another way ” 4 feminism. (Weisstein, May 16, 1979, p. 29). At first glance, Weisstein’s science does not appear Weisstein then described how her own and other scientists’ overtly feminist. She devoted her scientific career to un- assumptions that nerve cells were passive had influenced derstanding the way the brain works to process and make their approach to studying the brain, and how feminism had sense of visual stimuli. Weisstein was adamant, however, reminded her to challenge that assumption, to question the that her feminism and her science were intertwined. Cen- reigning truths: tral to both were her beliefs in purpose and meaning. In her scientific work, she generated evidence for the theory that If I didn’t assume intelligence in an intelligent, active, nerve cells, specifically the nerve cells that help us make system, I wouldn’t find out anything useful about that sense of incoming visual stimuli, respond not only to di- system. I would only insult the system: I wouldn’t rect physical stimulation, but also to relationships between learn what it could do. How can a little nerve cell 466 RUTHERFORD ET AL.

like you teach a great big class of men? I had to ETHEL TOBACH AND GENES AND GENDER: ask ...better questions than that (p. 29). FIGHTING SCIENCE WITH SCIENCE Finally, Weisstein has also clearly articulated her stance that testable theory is essential for both feminism and It is often the case in power struggles that the success science. According to Weisstein, without theory that of a radical or liberating group is met with a backlash can be tested, both feminism and science descend into of conservative or traditional activism.... The emer- pure politics—pure ideology—perhaps the “insurmount- gence of evolutionary psychology ...coincided with able personal subjectivity” of the poststructuralist position the increasing impact of feminism on psychology and she would later critique. Although the feminist movement other academic disciplines (Chrisler & Smith, 2004, had opened the door to careers in science for many women, p. 285). Weisstein noted with regret the movement’s ambivalence toward, and distrust of, science and intellectual debate “be- In 1975, when the women’s liberation movement was cause males had arrogated that territory to themselves” in full swing, entomologist E. O. Wilson published Socio- (Weisstein, November, 1987, p. 18). She felt that this re- biology: A New Synthesis, which presented a forceful re- fusal to engage in scientific debate was a mistake and had iteration of the controversial argument that all behavior, resulted in feminism becoming atheoretical, making “an including human behavior, is largely determined by ge- exemplary moral stance our only badge of authenticity” netic inheritance bound by evolutionary laws. Sociobiology (p. 18). Instead, she argued that feminism needed to de- claimed (and claims) to provide a scientific study of the bi- velop the political theory that would sustain a long-term ological basis of social behavior, and it is implicitly based on commitment to social change. genetic determinism. In the wake of the popularity of Wil- Thus, for Weisstein, feminism was key to practicing sci- son’s book, a group of concerned female scientists came ence. It enabled her to question her assumptions and ask together to decide how they could fight back against the better questions. In turn, science and its methods allowed use of genetic determinism to justify sexism and racism and her to practice better feminism. Science could reveal the to expose the pseudo-science that underlay genetic deter- importance of social context in people’s lives, thus providing minism itself. The group was spearheaded by comparative the evidence and the information needed to direct social psychologist Ethel Tobach of the American Museum of change. In her call for a return to a social change agenda, Natural History, and Betty Rosoff, an endocrinologist and Weisstein (1993b) reiterated her convictions with her ex- professor of biology at . It became known hortation: “Let us return to an activist, challenging, badass as the “Genes and Gender Collective.” Tobach wrote in an feminist psychology” (p. 244). informal unpublished history of the Collective: The publication of Edward Wilson’s Sociobiology in Weisstein’s Legacy 1975 gave new fuel to the old, controversial position Weisstein’s deep commitment to feminism and avowed that genetic endowment (for species and individual) commitment to the positivist ideal of science contribute is, in final analysis, responsible for social behavior. to the ambiguity of her legacy for some of today’s feminist Wilson’s arguments, based on his investigations of psychologists. Her work is often heralded as one of the first the social behavior of insects, gave those looking for disciplinary-based attacks on the essentialist views of male- a link between genes and behavior the scientific ba- ness and femaleness that pervaded psychology, offering a sis they had been searching for. Others rejected this ground-breaking formulation of the social construction of “new science” because they saw how it was being used gender (Crawford & Marecek, 1989, p. 148; Unger, 1993, as justification for discrimination. It became clear to p. 212). She forcefully articulated that psychology’s neglect those who were following this issue closely that so- of social context rendered it unable to generate meaningful ciobiology could not be debated as the poor science accounts of women’s lives and experiences. She pointed out that it was unless its opponents offered some sound that none of her actions would have brought about change scientific arguments against it. The first G & G con- ... without the support of the women’s liberation movement. ference was one result of efforts in this direction She recognized that the actual practice of science was heav- (Tobach, March 8, 1985, p. 1). ily imbued with the politics of knowledge. Nonetheless, she Tobach was well positioned to coordinate such an effort. proposed that careful science was the only way to disman- As a comparative psychologist with a scientific knowledge tle the reigning truths and the only sure recipe for social of genetics and a long-time social radical, Tobach had both change. Her enthusiasm for, and loyalty to, the scientific the knowledge and the motivation to enter this debate. method are outright rejected by many who otherwise em- brace her social constructionist message. In exploring her Early Influences position more deeply, we come to appreciate the complexity of the relationship between epistemological commitments Born in 1921 to Labor Zionist parents, Tobach was exposed and social change. early on to a strong political orientation. When her parents Responsible Opposition, Disruptive Voices 467 left the Ukraine to escape a by the Russian White symposium. As Tobach and Rosoff (1978) wrote of their Army, they made their way to Haifa where, they founded expectations for that first meeting, “We were sure that or- a socialist kibbutz (Gold Medal Award, 2003). After the dering coffee for 50 people would be sufficient. More than untimely death of her father, Tobach and her mother 350 people showed up: parents with children, gray-heads, moved to , and then to New York, where her working women, people of many ethnic backgrounds, aca- mother worked as a finisher in a garment factory. Of her demics, and students” (p. 7). early education, Tobach remarked: Although the papers focused on the scientific back- ground of the relationship between genes and behavior, My mother raised me in a very left orientation. Very the goal was to make the symposium understandable for early I went to a Yiddish school which was not reli- ... nonscientists. Its purpose was to challenge genetic deter- gious, it was a secular school . We were very labor- minism on a scientific level and then to expose its effects organized and left-organized. And so I always grew ... in discrimination against women, children, and ethnic mi- up with things that my mother acted and said first norities. Tobach and Rosoff also hoped that conference of all, you were very concerned about people who attendees would take away a commitment to “participate were poor and who didn’t have the same possibilities ... actively in trying to redress these wrongs that were being that you had . And that there were all kinds of dif- excused and maintained as scientifically justified” and that ferent people that you should be friendly with. And the conference itself was, in fact, just such an act of “re- that Labor was an important thing; that you had to sponsible opposition” (Tobach, March 8, 1985, p. 1). Lee support Labor (Tobach, November 13, 2006, p. 11). Ehrman, a behavioral geneticist, gave a presentation on This upbringing created a strong sense of social respon- the meaning of genetics. Anne Briscoe, a biochemist and sibility in Tobach. As she entered her early 20s during past president of the Association for Women in Science, WWII, her outrage at Nazi atrocities impelled her to join delivered a paper on hormones and gender. Dorothy Burn- the Women’s Army Corps. After basic training in Georgia, ham, an African American feminist and biologist, spoke on she was stationed in a psychiatric hospital on Long Island biology and gender. Eleanor Leacock presented on society (McKay, Roe, & Wessells, 2008). When the and gender, and Helen Block Lewis, a clinical psychologist, dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, To- contributed remarks on psychology and gender. After the bach began to appreciate the viciousness of U.S. policy, presentation of the papers, the participants and presenters and she has since worked tirelessly as a peace activist. In broke into small group discussions, and the day concluded 1946, she returned to New York, where she completed her with a summary session. A lunchtime conversation with the bachelor’s degree at and worked nights speakers was recorded by a local radio station and broad- for a labor union. She then pursued a Ph.D. in psychol- cast several times. There were so many attendees that the ogy at , where she was introduced to conveners stopped collecting the $3 registration fee from the controversy over Konrad Lorenz’s instinctivist ideology. those who could not afford it, and they still had a $300 nest This exposure, in part, cemented her interests in compara- egg left after covering expenses. Participants voted to allow tive psychology. During her training, she chose role models the conveners to use the profits to publish the proceedings (e.g., Bernard Riess and T. C. Schneirla) who integrated of the conference. social responsibility and science. As a comparative psychol- Clearly, the first meeting was a remarkable, and some- ogist, Tobach has positioned herself as a scientist whose what unexpected, success. As Tobach (2006) remarked ret- work includes human beings. She maintains that the high- rospectively, “We had this wonderful meeting. And Betty, est standards of scientific scholarship must include concern who was a very clever woman, said ‘We can’t let this die, for human welfare (Gold Medal Award, 2003). we have to continue with this.’ So we decided to do the first Although Tobach had always been heavily involved in issue of Genes and Gender. And then we decided to go on the labor movement, her gender consciousness was raised with it” (p. 19). when she met anthropologist and Marxist feminist Eleanor In 1978, what would be the first volume in a remark- Leacock. Tobach then became involved with the New York able seven-volume series was published by Gordian Press. Association for Women in Science, where she met Betty Entitled simply Genes and Gender, it contained all of the Rosoff. Leacock and Rosoff were both involved in the de- talks from the conference, as well as commentaries and velopment of the Genes and Gender Collective. an epilogue by Tobach and Rosoff. In their epilogue, they reemphasized the pseudo-scientific premise of sociobiol- ogy, and they reiterated the complex relationship between Genes and Gender: Science as a Force for Women’s genes and behavior (see also Tobach, 1976): Liberation On January 29, 1977, on a day “when the temperature was Many scientists are exposing the pseudoscience on close to zero” (Tobach, 2006, p. 19), almost 400 women ar- which Wilson’s theories are built. Genes are bio- rived at the American Museum of Natural History in New chemical systems and are expressed in the develop- York City to participate in a day-long, multidisciplinary ment of other biochemical systems.... Between the 468 RUTHERFORD ET AL.

functional level of these molecules, enzymes, and served as Commissioner of Mental Health, Mental Retar- other minute biochemical living systems, and behav- dation, and Alcoholism Services for the City of New York ior and society, there are many factors that determine between 1972 and 1980 as well as established and directed how these genes will act. It is not that genes deter- the Harlem Rehabilitation Center. In her paper on sexism mine us, but that we, through our societal behavior, and racism in health policy, Christmas argued that we need determine how genes will function (Tobach & Rosoff, to examine the intersections of sex and race on health care 1978, p. 90). access and provision in order to fully understand the experi- ences of women of color. She also called upon all women to As an example of the role of societal behavior in de- unite in efforts to influence health policy, stating, “Unless termining how genes function, Tobach and Rosoff (1978) we begin to make sure that we do not separate ourselves pointed out that social forces influence whether one woman into issues of women and sexism as separate from issues of or another will become pregnant and by whom. Social race and racism ...we will find that not only will we have forces (e.g., nutrition and medical care) also affect the con- less effect on health policy, but we will be leading towards a ditions of her pregnancy, whether the child will be born, fragmented people, and an unhealthier nation” (Christmas, how the child will develop, and what the child will do in 1983, p. 214). life. They pointed out that understanding and appreciating In planning for the fifth conference to focus on women this complex relationship will lead to interventions aimed and work, concerns were raised about the trickle-down ef- at improving the conditions in which people are born and fects of Reaganomics, which, as Tobach noted, illustrated subsequently either thrive or struggle. Thus, the wheels “all too well the old saying that the rich get richer and the were set in motion for a 17-year sustained effort, involving poor get poorer” (Tobach, March 8, 1985, p. 3). The effects six more conferences or sessions and a total of seven pub- of federal budget cuts on women and minorities served lished volumes to “explore the ways in which women can as one impetus for the choice of topic—as did the desires turn science into a force for their liberation” (Tobach & to explore whether genetic determinism was continuing to Rosoff, 1978, p. 90). limit women’s work choices and what role new technolo- gies (e.g., computers) were playing in changing gendered Genes and Gender Continues work patterns. Finally, the collective continued to chal- The next Genes and Gender symposium took place in 1978 lenge the widely held essentialist belief in the differences at the annual meeting of the American Association for the between male and female brains. Carolyn Payton, a coun- Advancement of Science. It continued the group’s two- seling psychologist as well as the first African American and pronged attack on genetic determinism, especially as it af- first woman to serve as director of the United States Peace fected beliefs about women’s inferiority. Ruth Hubbard, Corps (see Keita, Cameron, & Clune, 2002), gave a pa- a prominent biologist (and the first woman to be granted per on the use of gender and race to justify pay inequities. a tenured professorship in Harvard’s Department of Bi- Payton had recently published a provocative article in the ology), and Marian Lowe, a chemist and environmentalist, American Psychologist berating psychology for refusing to participated and took responsibility for editing the resulting take stands on social issues. She documented some of the volume, Genes and Gender II (Hubbard & Lowe, 1979). history of the profession’s ambivalence towards social ad- Thereafter, it was decided that conference themes would vocacy, and she outlined several strategies for overcoming be decided on the basis of what scientific or social issues this ambivalence—arguing that inaction was itself a posi- appeared specifically urgent or timely during the planning tion: “In essence, those psychologists who argue against process. Because 1979 was designated the International the APA’s getting involved in social issues are really sug- Year of the Child, the third Genes and Gender conference, gesting that the status quo be maintained” (Payton, 1984, held that year, was organized around genetic determinism p. 395). and children. Specifically, the aims of the conference were Genes and Gender VI focused on the societal origins of to explore the effects of genetic determinism on the ways peace and war, challenging the genetic determinist view of children are educated, their access to health care, and their the causes of militarism and offering evidence for three in- opportunities for self-fulfillment (Tobach & Rosoff, 1980). terrelated arguments: (a) warfare is not universal among hu- In 1981, the fourth Genes and Gender conference fo- mans; (b) women and men have equal potential for making cused on women’s health, especially the ways in which the war and peace; and (c) making peace and making war can- double jeopardy of gender and race/ethnicity worked to dis- not be explained by a simple, linear, reductive formula that advantage women of color. As Tobach (1985) wrote, “It was women are genetically programmed peacemakers and men clear to us that there was an urgent need to expose and chal- are genetically programmed war makers. Instead, “peace lenge the genetic determinism at the root of these discrim- and war arise out of a complicated interplay among genes, inatory practices” (p. 3). The proceedings were published biology, society, and culture” (Hunter, 1991, p. xii) in which as the fourth volume in the Genes and Gender series, The human beings continuously transform and are transformed Second X & Women’s Health (Fooden, Gordon, & Hughley, by their environments. 1983). Among the presenters and authors was prominent The final volume of the Genes and Gender series ended African American psychiatrist June Jackson Christmas, who this remarkably sustained scientific-activist effort on a Responsible Opposition, Disruptive Voices 469 somewhat somber note. In 1989, J. Philippe Rushton pre- There is no contradiction between being a feminist sented, yet again, the position that genes determine the and being a scientist. The best scientist is societally differences among Asians, Europeans, and Africans in re- and scientifically responsible for the work done in the gard to a number of variables (including intelligence). After name of science. Being societally responsible com- delivering his paper at the annual meeting of the American mits the scientist to a consciousness about equity for Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the all humans” (p. 132). media once again presented his arguments as though there was consensus in the scientific community, giving them sig- Clearly, the debate between feminist empiricists and nificant airplay and offering little exposure to the science evolutionary psychologists continues. Evolutionary psy- that refuted the validity of his statements. Accordingly, the chologists repeatedly assert that feminists are committing Genes and Gender Collective decided to organize a session the naturalistic fallacy when they criticize evolutionary psy- at the following year’s AAAS meeting to present alternative chology as a position that justifies sexism (Thornhill & analyses and explanations in an effort to loosen the hold of Palmer, 2000). What is, they argue, is not to be conflated sociobiology on scientific and popular imaginations. with what should be, and no sensible person (or compe- Although it had been 13 years since the founding of the tent evolutionary psychologist), they state, would suggest Collective on that inauspiciously cold January day in 1977, that because rape is produced by evolved mechanisms we in many ways this last meeting marked a return to the same should accept its occurrence. They overlook the alternative issue that had inspired the group’s founding: how to com- body of scientific data, generated in large part by feminist bat the pseudoscience and politics of genetic determinism. scientists, that refutes their version of what is (i.e., that Again, representatives from a wide range of disciplines, rape is produced by evolved mechanisms). What they leave as well as activists and artists, gathered to present their unelaborated is how their science might actually lead to arguments. The result was the 1994 volume, Challenging effective interventions that prevent rape. Divorced from Racism and Sexism: Alternatives to Genetic Explanations their position is any critical examination of the social re- (Tobach & Rosoff, 1994). In the preface to the volume, the sponsibility of the scientist, beyond repeatedly asserting a Collective’s statement of resolve seems tinged with a telling moral opposition to rape. Tellingly, one group of evolution- note of weariness: ary psychologists has recently justified their project this way: “Researching rape from an evolutionary psychological The events of the past two years have unfortu- perspective does not justify this heinous act. Our goal is a nately shown that in scientific and academic cir- greater understanding of the causes of rape, which may help cles sociobiology is now the dominant theory in all others [emphasis added] prevent its occurrence” (McKib- ... disciplines The ideologies of racism and sexism bin, Shackelford, Goetz, & Starratt, 2008, p. 87). However, continue to be justified by this pseudoscience as Carolyn Payton (1984) once asked, “Who must do the throughout the world. Racist and sexist policies and hard things?” (p. 391). She concluded, of course (and like incidents are on the increase. The Genes and Gender Tobach), that psychological scientists cannot shirk respon- Collective, together with other anti-racist and anti- sibility for the social implications and uses of their find- sexist organizations, will continue to fight and expose ings. these dangerous policies” (Tobach & Rosoff, 1994, p. viii). CONCLUSION Epilogue The critique of feminist psychology, which began in the In 2000, evolutionary biologist Randy Thornhill and cul- late 1980s and continues today, lays part of the blame for tural anthropologist Craig Palmer joined forces to write A the depoliticization of feminist psychology on the femi- Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coer- nist empiricist project itself—claiming that adherents have cion, providing an evolutionary account of rape that ignored failed to question the value-neutrality of scientific meth- the extensive scientific and feminist critiques of evolution- ods, the validity of the sex differences paradigm, or the ary psychology and that catapulted issues of male–female “framework of values within which it [this paradigm] de- difference and genetic determinism once again into the na- veloped” (Wilkinson, 1991, pp. 199–200). Thus, much of tional spotlight. In response, feminist psychologist Cheryl feminist psychology, they argue, has been co-opted into Brown Travis edited a multidisciplinary collection of arti- mainstream psychology’s conservative agenda. These crit- cles to challenge Thornhill and Palmer’s position (Travis, ics argue that for feminism to effectively impact psychology, 2003). Ethel Tobach was among the contributors to that “the discipline will need to become politicized to an extent volume. In her chapter with Rachel Reed, entitled “Un- that would probably render it unrecognizable to most of its derstanding Rape,” she wrote: “A key thesis of this chapter present practitioners” (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 201). Although is that science and social responsibility should be critically we are in general agreement with this critique, our intent linked and integrated” (Tobach & Reed, 2003, p. 106). in describing the feminism and science of Naomi Weisstein Later in the chapter they noted: and the social and scientific activism of Ethel Tobach and 470 RUTHERFORD ET AL. the Genes and Gender Collective has been to complicate lenge disciplinary norms. As Unger (2007) has remarked of the position that psychology and politics are incompatible as feminist psychology: “At its best, it can change the world as well as to highlight the conditions in which such a marriage well as inform our scholarly communities” (p. 4). might occur. Although many feminists have concluded that it is less Weisstein and Tobach, although different in many re- important for feminism to transform psychology than for spects, share some interesting similarities. Developmen- feminist psychology to change society, we see these as in- tally, both were infused with the Jewish radical tradition, separable endeavors. For one, psychology’s own resistance invoking a deep sense of responsibility to fight collectively to feminism is itself an extension of the broader resistance for a better world. Both were inculcated with socialist poli- to feminism in the society of which psychology forms a part. tics, priming them to see the power of social categories like To ignore feminism’s inability to transform psychology is to class, race, and gender in structuring both society and per- ignore the elephant in the room: Psychology itself is deeply sonal experience. Despite these shared backgrounds and implicated in creating the society that feminism seeks to interests, neither chose an area of psychology with direct change. To fail to transform psychology is to fail to trans- relevance to social issues for her career. Both, however, form society in a deep and fundamental way. As women’s recognized that mainstream psychology played a signifi- representation in psychology continues to grow, yet psy- cant role in maintaining and perpetuating the status quo. chology becomes more entrenched in essentializing differ- Both closely identified with science and upheld scientific ence and maintaining a veneer of value neutrality, feminist ideals as consistent with their feminist agendas, using sci- psychologists need to revitalize and extend the reach of ence to exercise “countervailing power” and “responsible feminism, embrace its political project, exploit its opposi- opposition” when they felt that it was being misused or tional and generative potential, and amplify the disruptive misapplied by others. Their efforts, and those of others, voices of feminist researchers—past, present, and future. were (and remain) vitally important in “calling out” the use Only then will psychology contribute to a “vision which of science to maintain inequities and reinforce the status could truly liberate—men as well as women” (Weisstein, quo. However, the question remains: Has the empiricist 1993b, p. 167). project succeeded (as Weisstein has maintained it can) in Initial submission: May 18, 2009 generating the evidence and information needed to trans- Initial acceptance: November 25, 2009 form society? Final acceptance: February 28, 2010 Both Naomi Weisstein and the Genes and Gender Col- NOTES lective acknowledged the value-laden nature of the pro- duction of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, they main- 1. It should be noted that there are, of course, many ways that tained that science—practiced responsibly, critically, and feminism has transformed psychology, and many of the critics rigorously—could be, and indeed must be, used for pos- mentioned would be the first to acknowledge these changes. itive social change. A historical reassessment of their ef- Examples include increases in the proportions of women par- forts in light of our current state of affairs highlights the ticipating at almost every level of the discipline, the vast amount challenge of carrying this epistemic position through to a of psychological literature that now exists on women’s experi- truly transformative conclusion. Although it may always be ences, and the greater attention that psychology now pays, not necessary to implement responsible opposition using the only to gender, but to how race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, rules of the science game, this strategy may not be suf- and to some extent class combine to structure experience. The ficient to generate new or alternative feminist visions. As focus here is on transformation at the level of epistemology. 2. The original members of the Chicago Westside Group were Morawski (2005) has noted, “The achievements of feminist Heather Booth, Amy Kesselman, Fran Rominski, Jo Freeman, psychology are laudable indeed, yet the resurgence of ex- Shulamith Firestone, and Leah Firestone (Weisstein, Novem- tremist biological determinism laden with mythic gender ber, 1987, p. 10). For a history of Westside and other radical assumptions warrants new strategies of scientific practice” feminist groups, see Echols (1989). (p. 411). 3. Although the androcentrism and sexism that pervaded much The successes and failures of the efforts of feminist em- of psychological theory served as a catalyst for feminist critique piricists to disrupt the status quo offer important object (e.g., Chesler, 1972), several cultural historians have argued lessons about how to navigate the volatile space between that psychology also facilitated the discourse of women’s lib- objectivity and advocacy, between science and activism. At eration. Psychological, and specifically therapeutic, discourse the very least, this history tells us that this terrain has been was drawn upon by feminists to further the cause of women’s well traversed and that we are not alone in grappling with emancipation, even as psychological expertise simultaneously served as the target for trenchant feminist critique (see Her- its complexity (see Furner, 1975; Smith, 1994). It is terrain man, 1995; Ilouz, 2008; Moskowitz, 2001). that, although rugged with “responsible opposition” (To- 4. As one anonymous reviewer of this article pointed out, this de- bach, March 8, 1985), may also need to be “fertilized by scription is quite close to Evelyn Fox Keller’s characterization promising actions of disobedience” (Morawski, 1994, p. 2) of geneticist Barbara McClintock’s “feeling for the organism” to produce a socially transformative feminist psychology—a (Keller, 1983). Weisstein, however, has remained generally un- psychology that does as much to change society as to chal- convinced that there is a distinctly female or feminine way of Responsible Opposition, Disruptive Voices 471

thinking. As she has put it, she entertains the hypothesis “on Johnson, A., & Johnston, E. (2009). Great expectations and double alternate Wednesdays, just barely” (Weisstein, 1993a, p. 243). standards: Memory and feminist framing in women psy- chologists’ oral history interviews. Paper presented at the 2009 meeting of Cheiron: The International Society for the REFERENCES History of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, College Park, PA. Bem, S. L. (1993). Is there a place in psychology for a feminist Johnson, A., & Johnston, E. (2010). Unfamiliar feminisms: Revis- analysis of the social context? Feminism & Psychology, 3, iting the National Council of Women Psychologists. Psy- 230–234. chology of Women Quarterly, 34, 311–327. Chesler, P. (1972). Women and madness. Garden City, NY: Dou- Johnston, E. (2007). Unfamiliar feminisms: Women psychologists bleday. of Columbia’s “Golden Age.” Paper presented at the meet- Chrisler, J. C., & Smith, C. A. (2004). Feminism and psychology. ing of the American Psychological Association, San Fran- In M. A. Paludi (Ed.), Praeger guide to the psychology of cisco. gender (pp. 271–291). Westport, CT: Praeger. Johnston, E., & Johnson, A. (2008). Searching for the second Christmas, J. J. (1983). Sexism and racism in health policy. In generation of American women psychologists. History of M. Fooden, S. Gordon, & B. Hughley (Eds.), Genes and Psychology, 11, 40–69. gender IV: The second X and women’s health (pp. 205–214). Kahn, A. S., & Yoder, J. D. (1989). The psychology of women and New York: Gordian Press. conservatism: Rediscovering social change. Psychology of Crawford, M. (1998). The reciprocity of psychology and popu- Women Quarterly, 13, 417–432. lar culture. In E. Burman (Ed.), Deconstructing feminist Keita, G., Cameron, L. A., & Clune, G. S. (2002). “If we do not psychology (pp. 61–89). London: Sage. do it, then who will?” An interview with Carolyn Robertson Crawford, M., & Marecek, J. (1989). Psychology reconstructs the Payton. The Counseling Psychologist, 30, 891–912. female, 1968–1988. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 13, Keller, E. F. (1983). A feeling for the organism: The life and work 147–165. of Barbara McClintock. New York: W. H. Freeman and Echols, A. (1989). Daring to be bad: Radical feminism in Amer- Company. ica, 1967–1975. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Kitzinger, C. (1990). Resisting the discipline. In E. Burman (Ed.), Press. Feminists and psychological practice (pp. 119–139). Lon- Fine, M. (1985). Reflections on a feminist Psychology of Women: don: Sage. Paradoxes and prospects. Psychology of Women Quarterly, Kitzinger, C. (1991). Politicizing psychology. Feminism & Psy- 9, 167–183. chology, 1, 49–54. Fine, M. (1992). Disruptive voices: The possibilities of feminist Levine, E. (1973). All she needs. New York: Quadrangle. research. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Lewin, M. (1984). “Rather worse than folly?” Psychology measures Fooden, M., Gordon, S., & Hughley, B. (Eds.). (1983). Genes and femininity and masculinity, 1: From Terman and Miles to gender IV: The second X and women’s health.NewYork: the Guilfords. In M. Lewin (Ed.), In the shadow of the Gordian Press. past: Psychology portrays the sexes (pp. 155–178). New Furner, M. (1975). Advocacy and objectivity: A crisis in the profes- York: Columbia University Press. sionalization of American social science, 1865–1905.Lex- Llombart, M. P. I. (1998). Feminist psychology or the history of a ington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky. non-feminist practice. In E. Burman (Ed.), Deconstructing Gold Medal Award for Life Achievement in Psychology in the feminist psychology (pp. 31–46). London: Sage. Public Interest. (2003). Ethel Tobach. American Psycholo- Lorde, A. (1984). Sister outsider: Essays and speeches by Audre gist, 58, 551–553. Lorde. Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press. Herman, E. (1995). The curious courtship of psychology and Marecek, J. (1995). Psychology and feminism: Can this relation- women’s liberation. In E. Herman (Ed.), The romance of ship be saved? In D. C. Stanton & A. J. Stewart (Eds.), American psychology: Political culture in the age of ex- Feminisms in the academy (pp. 101–132). Ann Arbor, MI: perts (pp. 276–303). Berkeley, CA: University of California University of Michigan Press. Press. McKay, S. A., Roe, M. D., & Wessells, M. G. (2008). Pioneers in Hollingworth, L. S. (1914). Functional periodicity: An experimen- U.S. peace psychology: Ethel Tobach. Peace and Conflict, tal study of the mental and motor abilities of women dur- 14, 1–14. ing menstruation. New York: Teachers College, Columbia McKibbin, W. F., Shackelford, T. K., Goetz, A. T., & Starratt, V. University. G. (2008). Why do men rape? An evolutionary psychological Hubbard, R., & Lowe, M. (Eds.). (1979). Genes and gender II: perspective. Review of General Psychology, 12, 86–97. Pitfalls in research on sex and gender. New York: Gordian Mednick, M. T. (1989). On the politics of psychological constructs: Press. Stop the bandwagon, I want to get off. American Psychol- Hughes, T. P. (1989). American genesis: A century of invention ogist, 44, 1118–1123. and technological enthusiasm. New York: Viking. Milgram, S. (1965). Some conditions of obedience and disobedi- Hunter, A. E. (Ed.). (1991). On peace, war, and gender: A chal- ence to authority. Human Relations, 18, 57–76. lenge to genetic explanations. Genes and gender VI.New Morawski, J. G. (1984). Not quite new worlds: Psychologists’ con- York: The Feminist Press. ceptions of the ideal family in the twenties. In M. Lewin Ilouz, E. (2008). Saving the modern soul: Therapy, emotions, and (Ed.), In the shadow of the past: Psychology portrays the culture of self-help. Berkeley, CA: University of Cali- the sexes (pp. 97–125). New York: Columbia University fornia Press. Press. 472 RUTHERFORD ET AL.

Morawski, J. G. (1985). The measurement of masculinity and fem- Stewart, A. J., & Dottolo, A. L. (2006). Feminist psychology. Signs, ininity: Engendering categorical realities. Journal of Per- 31, 493–509. sonality, 53, 196–223. Teo, T. (2005). The critique of psychology: From Kant to post- Morawski, J. G. (1990). Toward the unimagined: Feminism and colonial theory. New York: Springer. epistemology in psychology. In R. T. Hare-Mustin & J. Thompson, H. B. (1903). The mental traits of sex: An empiri- Marecek (Eds.), Making a difference: Psychology and the cal investigation of the normal mind in men and women. construction of gender (pp. 150–183). New Haven, CT: Yale Chicago: University of Chicago Press. University Press. Thornhill, R., & Palmer, C. T. (2000). A natural history of rape: Morawski, J. G. (1994). Practicing feminisms, reconstructing psy- Biological bases of sexual coercion. Cambridge, MA: MIT chology: Notes on a liminal science. Ann Arbor, MI: Uni- Press. versity of Michigan Press. Tobach, E. (1976). Evolution of behavior and the comparative Morawski, J. (2005). Moving gender, positivism and feminist pos- method. International Journal of Psychology, 11, 185–201. sibilities. Feminism & Psychology, 15, 408–414. Tobach, E. (1985, March 8). G & G Collective history (AWP Morawski, J. G., & Agronick, G. (1991). A restive legacy: The meeting, 3/8/85). Genes & Gender Collective Records (MC history of feminist work in experimental and cognitive 526, Box 3). Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library for psychology. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 15, 567– the History of Women in America, Harvard University, 579. Cambridge, MA. Moskowitz, E. (2001). In therapy we trust: America’s obsession Tobach, E. (2006, November 13). Interview by A. Rutherford with self-fulfillment. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Uni- [Video recording]. Feminist Voices Oral History and Online versity Press. Archive Project, New York. Payton, C. R. (1984). Who must do the hard things? American Tobach, E., & Reed, R. (2003). Understanding rape. In C. B. Psychologist, 39, 391–397. Travis (Ed.), Evolution, gender, and rape (pp. 105–138). Riger, S. (1992). Epistemological debates, feminist voices: Sci- Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ence, social values, and the study of women. American Psy- Tobach, E., & Rosoff, B. (Eds.). (1978). Genes & gender.New chologist, 47, 730–740. York: Gordian Press. Rosenberg, R. (1982). Beyond separate spheres: The intellectual Tobach, E., & Rosoff, B. (Eds.). (1980). Genes & gender III.New roots of modern feminism. New Haven, CT: Yale University York: Gordian Press. Press. Tobach, E., & Rosoff, B. (Eds.). (1994). Challenging racism & sex- Rosenthal, R. (1963). On the social psychology of the psychological ism: Alternatives to genetic explanations. Genes & gender experiment: The experimenter’s hypothesis as unintended VII. New York: The Feminist Press. determinant of experimental results. American Scientist, Travis, C. B. (Ed.). (2003). Evolution, gender, and rape.Cam- 51, 268–283. bridge, MA: MIT Press. Scarborough, E., & Furumoto, L. (1987). Untold lives: The first Unger, R. K. (1993). The personal is paradoxical: Feminists con- generation of American women psychologists.NewYork: struct psychology. Feminism & Psychology, 3, 211–218. Columbia University Press. Unger, R. K. (1998). Resisting gender: Twenty-five years of femi- Seward, G. H. (1946). Sex and the social order.NewYork: nist psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. McGraw-Hill. Unger, R. K. (2007). Afterword: From inside and out: Reflecting Schachter, S., & Singer, J. E. (1962). Cognitive, social and physi- on a feminist politics of gender in psychology. Feminism & ological determinants of emotional state. Psychological Re- Psychology, 17, 487–494. view, 69, 379–399. Unger, R. K., Sheese, K., & Main, A. S. (2010). Feminism and Shields, S. A. (1975a). Functionalism, Darwinism, and the psy- women leaders in SPSSI: Social networks, ideology, and chology of women: A study in social myth. American Psy- generational change. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 34, chologist, 30, 739–754. 474–485. Shields, S. A. (1975b). Ms. Pilgrim’s progress: The contributions Weisstein, N. (1970). Neural symbolic activity: A psychophysical of Leta Stetter Hollingworth to the psychology of women. measure. Science, 168, 1489–1491. American Psychologist, 30, 852–857. Weisstein, N. (1971). Psychology constructs the female. Journal Shields, S. A. (1982). The variability hypothesis: The history of a of Social Education, 35, 362–373. biological model of sex differences in intelligence. Signs, 7, Weisstein, N. (1973). Beyond the yellow Volkswagen detector and 769–797. the grandmother cell: A general strategy for the exploration Shields, S. A. (1984). “To pet, coddle, and ‘do for’”: Caretaking of operations in human pattern recognition. In R. Solso and the concept of maternal instinct. In M. Lewin (Ed.), (Ed.), Contemporary issues in cognitive psychology: The In the shadow of the past: Psychology portrays the sexes Loyola symposium (pp. 17–51). Washington, DC: W. H. (pp. 256–273). New York: Columbia University Press. Winston & Sons. Shields, S. A. (2007). Passionate men, emotional women: Psychol- Weisstein, N. (1977). “How can a little girl like you teach a great ogy constructs gender difference in the late 19th century. big class of men?” the chairman said, and other adventures History of Psychology, 10, 92–110. of a woman in science. In S. Ruddick & P. Daniels (Eds.), Smith, M. (1994). Social science in the crucible: The American Working it out (pp. 241–250). New York: Pantheon Books. debate over objectivity and purpose. Durham, NC: Duke Weisstein, N. (1979, May 16). Feminism, science, and the reigning University Press. truths: “How can a little girl like you teach a great big class of Squire, C. (1989). Significant differences: Feminism in psychol- men?” the chairman said, and other adventures of a woman ogy. London: Routledge. in science. Naomi Weissiten Papers (2000-M43, Box 6). Responsible Opposition, Disruptive Voices 473

Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library on the History of Weisstein, N. (1993b). Psychology constructs the female; or the Women in America, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. fantasy life of the male psychologist (with some attention Weisstein, N. (1987, November). Chicago Women’s Liberation to the fantasies of his friends, the male biologist and the self-interview. Naomi Weisstein Papers (2000-M43, Box 3). male anthropologist). Feminism & Psychology, 3, 195–210. Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library on the History of (Reprinted version of Weisstein, N. (1968). Kinder, Kuche, Women in America, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Kirche as scientific law, psychology constructs the female. Weisstein, N. (1987, December 23). [Letter to H. Eisenstein]. Boston: Free Press). Naomi Weisstein Papers (2000-M43, Box 3). Arthur and Weisstein, N., Blaisdell, V., & Lemisch, J. (1975). The God- Elizabeth Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in fathers: Freudians, Marxists, and the scientific and po- America, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. litical protection societies. New Haven, CT: Belladonna Weisstein, N. (1989, January 17). Long intro/prospectus [Book Publishing. proposal]. Naomi Weisstein Papers (2000-M43, Carton 3, Wilkinson, S. (1991). Why psychology (badly) needs feminism. In Folder: N). Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library on J. Aaron & S. Walby (Eds.), Out of the margins: Women’s the History of Women in America, Harvard University, studies in the nineties (pp. 191–203). London: The Falmer Cambridge, MA. Press. Weisstein, N. (1993a). Power, resistance, and science: A call for Wilkinson, S. (1997). Feminist psychology. In D. Fox & I. Pril- a revitalized feminist psychology. Feminism & Psychology, leltensky (Eds.), Critical psychology: An introduction (pp. 3, 239–245. 247–264). London: Sage.