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Who Was to Blame for the Cold War? Why Did the USA-USSR Alliance

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Who Was to Blame for the Cold War? Why Did the USA-USSR Alliance Who was to blame for the Cold War? Focus Points Specified Content • Why did the USA–USSR alliance begin to • The origins of the Cold War: break down in 1945? – the 1945 summit conferences and the • How had the USSR gained control of breakdown of the USA–USSR alliance in Eastern Europe by 1948? 1945–46 • How did the USA react to Soviet – Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe to expansionism? 1948, and American reactions to it • What were the consequences of the Berlin – the occupation of Germany and the Berlin Blockade? Blockade • Who was the more to blame for starting – NATO and the Warsaw Pact the Cold War: the USA or the USSR? Why did the USA-USSR alliance begin to break down in 1945? WIRENA 1. Wartime tension ​ ​ During the war, there had been growing tensions: ● Stalin refused to join UN ● Stalin did not share battle plans with Britain and the USA ● Churchill wouldn't share knowledge of the enigma code with the USSR ● Stalin was angry that Britain and America kept delaying D-Day, believing it was a plot to allow Germany to weaken the Soviet Union; ● At the Tehran Conference (1943) Stalin and Churchill clashed over how much control Stalin would have over the countries of eastern Europe. 2. Ideologies ​ ​ ● America was ideologically opposed to the USSR as they were a democratic capitalist county whereas the USSR was a communist dictatorship. Both countries thought their system was the best and tried to spread their ideologies to the rest of the world. 3. Resentment about History ​ ​ ● The Soviet Union could not forget that in 1918 Britain and the USA had tried to destroy the Russian Revolution. ● Britain and the USA could not forget that Stalin had signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact with Germany in 1939. ● They were still suspicious of each other 4. Events ​ ​ Against this background of underlying differences in ideologies, and aims, and historical resentments, there were a series of events which bit-by-bit broke down the alliance and turned the allies of the war into enemies. Neither side trusted the other. Because they were so different, each side saw each event differently, and believed they were in the right ... and that the other side was in the wrong. So every action they took made them hate each other more: John D Clare: http://www.johndclare.net/cold_war3.htm ​ 5. No common enemy ​ ​ The USA and USSR’s common enemy - Japan and Germany were no longer a threat. Their common goal had already been achieved nothing uniting them. 6. After the war: ​ ​ Both superpowers emerged victorious- another cause for tension Main reasons the USA-USSR alliance began to break down ● Personalities ● Actions by the USA ● Actions by the USSR ● Misunderstandings Tehran, 1943 Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt. Major Agreements Major Disagreements ● USA and Britain would open a ● Churchill wanted to begin an second front to split the German invasion of the Balkans to stop the ​ ​ defences and take some pressure Soviet’s advance in Eastern Europe off of the USSR and the spread of communism. ● USSR would declare war on Japan Roosevelt and Stalin disagreed. once Germany was defeated This was because it would have ● Poland should be given more land weakened the Allied forces by from Germany but lose some to splitting them up too much. Russia Yalta, Feb 1945 Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt. Major Agreements Major Disagreements What to do with Germany after its defeat Poland ● Only unconditional surrender ● Stalin wanted Poland’s border to accepted move west into Germany so USSR’s ● Germany and Berlin would be border could move west into Poland divided into 4 temporary zones ● Churchill did not approve, but ● Eastern border be moved Stalin’s Red Army was in control of westwards Poland and eastern Germany ● Reparations would total $20 billion ● Roosevelt was persuaded by half going to the USSR Churchill to accept, as long as ● Demilitarized USSR stayed out of Greece as the Getting the USSR in the war against Japan British were trying to stop ● Stalin agreed to enter the war after communism taking over. Stalin Germany was defeated agreed. ● In return, Soviet was given territory Japan took in the 1904-5 Russo Japanese war and Outer Mongolia and Manchuria would become Soviet spheres of influence Elections ● Once countries were liberated from Germany, free elections would be held to choose the government they wanted Eastern Europe ● Easter Europe should be seen as a Soviet sphere of influence as the USSR had suffered 20 million casualties in the war and were afraid of another invasion however were to be allowed to run on a ‘broader democratic basis’ Poland ● Free and fair multi party elections held ASAP ● Temporary government - members of the pro Soviet “Lublin” government and exiled “London Poles”. ● However dominated by socialists and refused to acknowledge the authority of the exiled Polish government based in London Establishing the United Nations (replacing LON) Nazi Party would be banned and war criminals tried A number of changes had taken place since Yalta that would affect the Potsdam Conference: ● Stalin’s armies were occupying most of Eastern Europe and had set up a communist government in Poland saying it was a defensive measure. Also no free elections had been held anywhere. ● Roosevelt had died in April, replaced by his Vice-President, Harry Truman. He was inexperienced in dealing with international affairs and was more anti communist than Roosevelt. He was also suspicious of Stalin and his actions in Eastern Europe. ● July 1945 the Americans successfully tested an atomic bomb and Truman informed Stalin at Potsdam. ● Churchill was defeated in the election in Britain, and so in the middle of the conference was replaced by a new Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. ● Potsdam did not go as smoothly as Yalta, mostly because of the new people causing suspicion and rivalry for example between Truman and Stalin. Potsdam, July 1945 Churchill/Attlee, Stalin and Truman. Major Agreements Major Disagreements ● The Polish/German border was to ● The Allies didn't agree over the be settled at the Oder-Neisse Line future government of Poland. Soviet and the size of Germany reduced. controlled government at Lublin still ● Germany to denazify and war crime in charge. trials to be held in Germany and Japan. ● Disagreed over the future of ● Germany governed by an Allied Control Council in Berlin - decisions Germany. Stalin wanted to prevent it unanimous developing its own industry and wanted access to Germany's rich ● Council of Foreign Ministers set up industry in the Ruhr. Also Stalin to deal with defeated European wanted Germany to pay countries reparations.This was rejected. Truman didn't want to repeat TOV. ● Each country allowed to take reparations from its zone in ● Stalin also wanted to gain a foothold Germany. USSR could have a quarter of industrial equipment from in Japan which Truman denied. other 3 zones in Germany as it's zone was the least developed. 1947 British and USA zones merged to be Bizonia, then Trizonia with France in 1949. Iron Curtain: Border between USSR controlled countries and the west. THE COLD WAR HAS BEGUN Clarifications: Why would Stalin be reluctant to move his army out of Eastern Europe? Stalin wanted to create the buffer zone to defend his nation. The USSR had a history of being invaded - Germany in WW1 and 2 as well as with Napoleon. After WW2, the USSR’s population was severely affected as they had lost at least 20 million soldiers. Obtaining the Eastern Bloc to form a buffer zone would replenish his population, allow him to spread communism and gain armies to defend himself against Germany and the Allied Powers if they attacked. He also wanted to spread communism and use the resources of others to help his war-damaged country. Why was Stalin untrustworthy? ● Communist ● Large Country ● Dictator ● Large army ● Allied with Germany (Nazi-Soviet Pact) ● Loss a large portion of his population ● Revenge ● Killed 20 million Russian people ● Had a poor background unlike Churchill and Roosevelt Why was Churchill untrustworthy to Stalin? ● Rich background unlike Stalin who was poor and had to work his way up ● Anti Communist (Hated communists) ● Difference in political views Why would Roosevelt and Churchill be frightened that Stalin’s army was now stationed throughout Eastern Europe? It was a large army that could attack the Allies and made it difficult to invade Russia. It also expanded Communist views and ideals. The bufferzone looked like expansionism and came across as aggressive. Why are the USA in such an advantageous position to spread democracy throughout the post-war world? ● The USA were extremely rich. By 1944, GDP in America had doubled. This suggests that democracy and capitalism worked. ● Provided a good image that they were powerful and strong which allowed people to have faith in them ● Many were scared of the communist ideology ● Did not want dictatorships ● Russia lost more than 20 million people whilst the USA lost 400,000 ● Did not lose many resources ● Far from Europe ● Stalin killed 20 million people Aftermath of the conferences: Telegram to USA - A telegram that entailed Stalin delivering a speech calling for destruction of capitalism and the armament of the Soviet Union. Novikov’s Telegram (To USSR) - A telegram entailing how America desired to dominate the world, and that they no longer wanted to cooperate with the USSR - Preparing for war against them The Truman Doctrine - In 1947, this doctrine was published that stated that the world had a choice between communist tyranny or democratic freedom. It also stated that the USA had a responsibility to fight for liberty wherever it was threatened and that the USA would send troops and economic resources to help governments that were threatened by communists and communism shouldn’t be allowed to grow.
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