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The Origins and Development of the Truman Doctrine A Reluctant Call to Arms: The Origins and Development of the Truman Doctrine By: Samuel C. LaSala A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY University of Central Oklahoma Spring 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………i Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………..ii Chapter One Historiography and Methodology…………..………………………..………1 Chapter Two From Allies to Adversaries: The Origins of the Cold War………………….22 Chapter Three A Failure to Communicate: Truman’s Public Statements and American Foreign Policy in 1946…….………………………………………………...59 Chapter Four Overstating His Case: Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine……………………86 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………120 Appendix……………………………………………………………………………………...127 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………….136 Acknowledgements No endeavor worth taking could be achieved without the support of one’s family, friends, and mentors. With this in mind, I want to thank the University of Central Oklahoma’s faculty for helping me become a better student. Their classes have deepened my fascination and love for history. I especially want to thank Dr. Xiaobing Li, Dr. Patricia Loughlin, and Dr. Jeffrey Plaks for their guidance, insights, and valuable feedback. Their participation on my thesis committee is greatly appreciated. I also want to thank my friends, who not only tolerated my many musings and rants, but also provided much needed morale boosts along the way. I want to express my gratitude to my family without whom none of this would be possible. To my Mom, Dad, and brother: thank you for sparking my love of history so very long ago. To my children: thank you for being patient with your Dad and just, in general, being awesome kids. A father could not be prouder. Finally, to my wonderful wife Julie: thank you for always being there for me. Without a doubt, you are the foundation upon which everything good and worthwhile in my life is built upon. I definitely would not be where I am today without you. i Abstract Name: Samuel C. LaSala Title of Thesis: A Reluctant Call to Arms: The Origins and Development of the Truman Doctrine Thesis Director: Dr. Xiaobing Li For nearly seventy years, historians have scrutinized the origins of the Cold War and debated the Truman Doctrine’s significance to this international conflict. These sometimes emotional deliberations produced three distinct narratives, which sought to justify, assail, or simply explain the thirty-third president’s impact on US-Soviet relations between 1945 and 1947. Not surprisingly, all of these interpretations accept the premise that the chief executive’s appeal for the Greek-Turkish aid package constituted a fundamental change in Washington’s foreign policy towards Moscow. This thesis, however, posits that Truman never intended to establish an open-ended universal policy designed to govern America’s international agenda for the Cold War’s entire duration. On the contrary, an analysis of government documents, personal memoirs, oral histories, and contemporary periodicals reveal the commander-in-chief as an inexperienced world leader whose ambivalence towards the USSR created an initial reluctance on his part to publicly criticize the Kremlin’s leadership. Evidence suggests that negative domestic factors in late 1946 prompted the chief executive to openly embrace a confrontational policy towards the Soviet Union. Determined to revitalize his beleaguered administration, Truman readily co-opted the Republican’s anti-communist position when he decided to safeguard Athens’ government from Greece’s ongoing insurgency. Consequently, he countered Moscow’s perceived aggression in the Balkans with an extreme rhetorical stance calculated to ii gain immediate support from a hostile Congress and indifferent American public. Truman’s zealous pursuit of this short term goal, however, inadvertently altered the public’s long-term conception of US-Soviet relations. Though he never meant to establish a new doctrine, the president’s speech ultimately resulted in a major paradigm shift in world affairs. iii Chapter One On March 12, 1947, the president of the United States addressed a special joint session of Congress to request $400 million dollars in aid for Greece and Turkey. Standing at the podium before a hushed chamber of anxious lawmakers and dignitaries, Harry S. Truman carefully explained why these two reactionary governments in the Balkans and Near East deserved to receive immediate economic assistance from the American People. Communist subversion, he argued, threatened to undermine Athens and Ankara’s sovereignty, which hindered the development of democracy in these nations. Furthermore, the chief executive warned that a Marxist victory in this region endangered the political stability of Europe and the Middle East. US national security, he observed, required Washington to adopt a more proactive strategy in the post-war world.1 Consequently, the commander-in-chief announced the following tenets of the White House’s foreign policy: I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political process.2 Stunned by the sweeping breath of the president’s statement, legislators and citizens alike contemplated the implications of America’s apparent new role in world affairs. Within two 1 “New Policy Set Up: President Blunt in Plea to Combat ‘Coercion as World Peril,” New York Times, March 13, 1947, 1. 2 “Text on President Truman’s Speech on New Foreign Policy,” New York Times, March 13, 1947, 2. 1 months, skeptical lawmakers begrudgingly gave the administration authorization to assist both Greece and Turkey.3 Since 1947, politicians, historians, and the public have reasonably viewed the Truman Doctrine Speech as an open-ended global commitment to contain the Soviet Union. Its precepts provided the rationale for America’s military intervention in Korea, Vietnam, and numerous smaller conflicts throughout Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. However, a reevaluation of the primary sources associated with Washington’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1947 suggest a different conclusion. Despite his speech having the obvious hallmarks of a major doctrine, Truman never intended to establish a universal policy designed to govern America’s international agenda for the Cold War’s entire duration.4 On the contrary, an analysis of the president’s first two years in office portray him as an inexperienced world leader whose ambivalence towards the USSR created an initial reluctance on his part to publicly criticize the Kremlin’s leadership. Only when domestic factors threatened to undermine his presidency in late 1946, did the chief executive openly embrace a confrontational policy towards the Soviet Union. Determined to revitalize his beleaguered administration, the commander-in-chief readily co- opted the Republicans’ anti-communist position when he decided to safeguard Athens’ government from Greece’s ongoing insurgency. Consequently, he countered Moscow’s perceived aggression in the Balkans with an extreme rhetorical stance calculated to gain immediate support from a hostile Congress intent on cutting the Federal Budget. In his zealous pursuit of this short term goal, Truman inadvertently altered the public’s long-term conception of 3 "PASS GREEK-TURK AID BILL: House Shouts Down Foes of US Crusade Action, Called ‘War against Russia’s Bullets for Greece.’" Chicago Daily Tribune, May 10, 1; “Truman signs bill for Near East Aid,” New York Times, May 23, 1947, 1. 4 Webster’s Dictionary defines doctrine as “an official statement of a nation’s policy, especial toward other nations.” Victoria Neufeldt, ed., Webster’s New World College Dictionary (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 402. 2 US-Soviet relations. Though he never meant to establish a new doctrine, the president’s speech ultimately resulted in a major paradigm shift in world affairs. Historiography A surprisingly small number of book-length monographs exist regarding the background and drafting of the Truman Doctrine Speech. Most Cold War scholarship, therefore, incorporates this event within larger studies concerning the origins of America and Russia’s post-war conflict. Divided into three main schools of thought, the historiography of this subject occasionally defies clear chronological divisions, which create interesting anomalies for researchers of this era. Some orthodox historians, for example, published their books during decades already dominated by revisionist works. Likewise, there are instances where post-revisionist literature appeared before important orthodox and revisionist text entered the academic discourse. Consequently, the thematic divisions in the following historiographical review are divided into categories, which reflect the occasional non-linear nature of this scholarship. Orthodox The Orthodox, or Traditionalist, historical interpretation of the Cold War’s origins emerged immediately after Truman proclaimed his doctrine in 1947. Lacking access to classified primary sources and writing in an oppressive political climate that discouraged dissent, historians during the 1950s naturally produced works that reflected Washington’s official
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