Jack Snyder

Empire: a blunt tool for democratization

On its face, using military occupation this bandwagon. Historian Niall Fergu- as a tool to promote democratization is son, in a colorful collection of stories about as intuitive as forcing people to that ends with a paean to empire, con- take a self-improvement class to learn tends that “without the influence of how to be more spontaneous. And yet British imperial rule, it is hard to believe the two most recent U.S. administra- that the institutions of parliamentary tions, though on opposite ends of the democracy would have been adopted by political spectrum, have used America’s the majority of states in the world, as might to try to advance the cause of de- they are today.”2 Indeed, most of the mocracy in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and, at postcolonial states that have remained least nominally, Afghanistan. The Bush almost continuously democratic since administration’s major statement of its independence, such as India and some strategic policy, known mainly for its West Indian island states, are former justi½cation of preventive war, dwells British possessions. Still, as Ferguson on the need to “shift the balance of pow- acknowledges, many former British col- er in favor of freedom.”1 onies have failed to achieve democratic Scholars and public intellectuals have stability: Pakistan and Nigeria oscillate played a prominent role as drummers on between chaotic elected regimes and military dictatorships; Sri Lanka has held elections that stoked the ½res of Jack Snyder is the Robert and Renée Belfer Profes- ethnic conflict; Malaysia has averted sor of International Relations in the political sci- ethnic conflict only by limiting democ- ence department and the Institute of War and racy; Singapore is stuck in a pattern of Peace Studies at Columbia University. His books stable but noncompetitive electoral poli- include “The Ideology of the Offensive: Mili- tics; Kenya is emerging from a long in- tary Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914” terlude of one-party rule; and Iraq in the (1984), “Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and late 1940s flirted with electoral politics International Ambition” (1991), and “From Vot- that played into the hands of violent rad- ing to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict” (2000). He has been a Fellow of the 1 Of½ce of the President, “National Security Strategy of the United States,” September 2002, American Academy since 1999. .

© 2005 by the American Academy of Arts 2 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the & Sciences Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 358.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 icals. The list continues with even more tion: a competent civil service; impartial Empire: a blunt parlous cases, from Burma to Zimbabwe. courts and police that can implement tool for Despite this mixed track record, it is the rule of law; independent, profession- democra- worth looking back on imperial Brit- alized news media; and the rest. Even tization ain’s strategies, successes, and failures when these institutions are well estab- in attempting to prepare its far-flung lished, outcomes may not conform to possessions for democratic self-govern- the empire’s wishes, because the self- ment. From the 1920s onward, the Brit- determining people may have their own ish undertook systematic efforts to write ideas and interests that diverge from the transitional democratic constitutions for empire’s. they expected would soon be When democratic institutions are on- self-governing. At the same time, they ly partially formed, as is commonly the devised political, economic, administra- case at the moment of decolonization, tive, and cultural strategies to facilitate the problem is much worse. Transition- this transition. al regimes typically face a gap between In other words, they attempted rough- high demand for mass political partici- ly what the United States and the United pation and weak institutions to integrate have been trying to accomplish society’s conflicting needs.3 The imperi- on a shorter timetable in Iraq, Bosnia, al power may have put in place some of Kosovo, and East Timor. What problems the institutional window dressing of de- and trade-offs they faced in this enter- mocracy, but daily political maneuver- prise help illuminate, at least in a general ing, energized by the devolution of pow- way, the kind of troubles that the democ- er, is shaped more by ties of patronage racy-promoting empire still confronts and ethnicity, and by unregulated oppor- today. tunism, than by democratic processes. To illustrate these processes, I draw on This situation is ripe for the turbulent several examples, particularly those of politics of ethnic particularism, coups, Iraq in the late 1940s, India in the 1930s and rebellions. through the 1940s, Sri Lanka in the 1930s The imperial ruler sometimes imag- through the 1950s, and Malaysia in the ines that politics will take a holiday 1940s through the 1960s. while the democratic system is being es- tablished–that groups contending for Democratization by imperial ½at power will not exploit the weakness of sounds paradoxical, and it is. The impe- transitional arrangements. In Malaya rial power insists not only that the so- shortly after World War II, for example, ciety it rules should become democratic, the British hoped that a battery of social but also that the outcome of democrati- and economic reforms inspired by Fabi- zation should be one that it approves: an socialism would depoliticize class and namely, that the new democracy should ethnic conflicts during democratization. continue to abide by the rules laid down When it turned out that reform inten- by the departing imperial power, should si½ed the expression of competing de- be stable and peaceful, and should main- mands, the British temporarily reverted tain good relations with the former over- to their earlier reliance on indirect rule lord. This is dif½cult enough when the through undemocratic traditional elites empire has actually succeeded in install- 3 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in ing the full set of tools the postcolonial Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale will need to make democracy func- University Press, 1968).

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 Jack Snyder of the Malay . “Colonial in British colonial policy, “one cheerful on 7 imperialism policy,” says historian T. N. Harper, thing in a depressing world.” “The fun- “lurched between authoritarianism and damental objectives [for 1948] in Africa a missionary adherence to the rule of are to foster the emergence of large-scale law.”4 societies, integrated for self-government Imperial strategists of the democratic by effective and democratic political and transition often thought of this simply as economic institutions both national a problem of the speed of reform. A 1960 and local, inspired by a common faith Foreign Of½ce memorandum, for exam- in progress and Western values and ple, stated that the task in East Africa equipped with ef½cient techniques of was “to regulate the pace of political de- production and betterment.”8 The velopment so that it was fast enough to problem, at least at this stage of impe- satisfy the African desire for self-govern- rial stewardship, was not primarily bad ment but not so fast as to jeopardize eco- intentions. Rather, it was the paradox of nomic progress or the security situa- promoting democracy by ½at, which tion.”5 Actually, the problem is far more often required the adoption of politically complex than this. Temporarily putting expedient methods of rule that undercut on the brake, as in the Malayan example, the achievement of the ultimate objec- often involved ruling undemocratically tive of democratic consolidation. through traditional elites or minority ethnic groups in the classic strategy of Attempted democratic transitions are divide and rule. This was not simply a likely to turn violent and to stall short of matter of “freezing colonial societies.”6 democratic consolidation when they are Rather, this process actively created new undertaken in a society that lacks the divisions, altered the political meaning institutions needed to make democracy of traditional identities, and distributed work. Such societies face a gap between power in ways that would complicate rising demands for broad participation subsequent efforts to install a sense of in politics and inadequate institutions to national unity. manage those popular demands. All of Both in public and private, of½cials of this happens at a time when new institu- the Colonial Of½ce sounded well mean- tions of democratic accountability have ing: “the present time [1947] is one of not yet been constructed to replace the unprecedented vigour and imagination” old, divested institutions of imperial authority or traditional rule. 4 T. N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Mak- ing of Malaya (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- In the absence of routine institutional sity Press, 1999), 378; for other points, see 58, authority, political leaders ½nd they need 75, 82–83. to rule through ideological or charismat- ic appeals. Rallying popular support by 5 Ronald Hyam, “Bureaucracy and ‘Trustee- invoking threats from rival nations or ship’ in Colonial Empire,” in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., The Oxford History ethnic groups is an attractive expedient of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century, vol. 7 Speech by A. Hilton Poynton at the United 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 278, Nations, October 3, 1947, quoted in Hyam, quoting a Foreign Of½ce memorandum by Wil- “Bureaucracy and ‘Trusteeship’ in Colonial liam Gorell Barnes. Empire,” 277.

6 John W. Cell, “Colonial Rule,” in Brown and 8 Colonial Of½ce paper, quoted in Hyam, Louis, eds., The Oxford History of the British Em- “Bureaucracy and ‘Trusteeship’ in Colonial pire: The Twentieth Century. Empire,” 277.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 for hard-pressed leaders who desperately egies that will prevent their fall, while Empire: need to shore up their legitimacy.9 The rising elites try to muscle in. Both sets a blunt tool for institutional weaknesses of early democ- of elites scramble for allies among the democra- ratization create both the motive to use newly aroused masses. tization this strategy of rule and the opportunity –the doctrine that a dis- to dodge accountability for its costs. tinctive people deserve to rule them- A common side effect of state weak- selves in a state that protects and ad- ness during early democratization is a vances their distinctive cultural or politi- poorly de½ned sense of the . De- cal interests–often emerges as an appar- mocracy requires national self-determi- ently attractive solution to these political nation, but people in weak states who dilemmas. It helps rally mass support on are just emerging into political con- the basis of sentiment in lieu of institu- sciousness often lack a clear, agreed tional accountability, and helps de½ne answer to the question, who are we? the people who are exercising self-deter- Notwithstanding the typical view mination. It thus clari½es the lines be- among nationalists that the identity of tween the people and their external foes, nations is ½xed by immutable nature or who become available as scapegoats in a culture, it is normally the common ex- self-ful½lling strategy that rallies support perience of a people sharing a fate in a in protection against external threats. strong state that solidi½es and demar- Civil or international war may some- cates a sense of nationality. Even in times result from this potent political France, a with a long and ven- brew as a direct result of nationalist po- erable history, it was only the late-nine- litical objectives, such as the aim of re- teenth-century experience of common gaining a lost piece of national territory. military service, national railways, stan- However, war may also be an indirect dardized education, and mass democra- result of the complex politics of transi- cy that completed the process of forging tional states. Political leaders may be- a culturally diverse peasantry into self- come trapped in reckless policies when conscious Frenchmen.10 In the absence uncompromising nationalism becomes of strong state institutions to knit to- the indispensable common denominator gether the nation, leaders must struggle that keeps their heterogeneous political for legitimacy in an ill-de½ned, contest- coalitions together. ed political arena. These problems are likely to face any In weakly institutionalized, newly society that tries to democratize before democratizing states, this contestation building the requisite institutions. This over national self-determination takes is no less the case when a democracy- place amid the shifting fortunes of elites promoting empire is overseeing the and mass groups. Elites left over from process. If the empire understands this the old regime look desperately for strat- problem, it may try to maintain its posi- tion of domination longer to buy time 9 Edward D. Mans½eld and Jack Snyder, Elect- ing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War to put the needed institutions in place. (Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press, 2005); Snyder, When considerations of rising cost and From Voting to Violence: Democratization and waning legitimacy ½nally compel decol- Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton, 2000). onization, the empire may attempt an awkward compromise between authori- 10 Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, tarian order keeping and democratic 1976). legitimacy, leaving in place a hybrid

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 Jack Snyder political system based on both tradition- Iraqi prime minister told a British diplo- on imperialism al and elected authority. This expedient mat that his government had “decided acknowledges the problem but does not to allow political parties in order that it necessarily solve it. should become clear how harmful they The chaotic democratic processes that are and their abolition be demanded.”14 followed Britain’s imperial departure Reflecting traditions of patronage poli- from Iraq provide a telling example of tics in a still largely rural society, local such dilemmas. notables dominated the parliament cho- sen in the election of 1946.15 Iraq in the 1920s and 1930s was a coun- Middle-class nationalists, though try undergoing the strains of socioeco- thinly represented in parliament, re- nomic modernization and decoloniza- mained loud voices in public debate. tion with no coherent identity, tradition, Important in government service, in the or political institutions.11 Under a Brit- military, in the economy, and potentially ish mandate, Iraq’s 1924 constitution in the streets, these educated urbanites divided powers between the king and an could not be ignored. To appease such indirectly elected parliament chosen by critics, Iraqi diplomats took the most universal manhood suffrage. After gain- radical stance on the Palestine issue at ing independence in 1932, Iraq suffered a the June 1946 meeting of the Arab series of tribal rebellions and leadership League, gratuitously calling for a boy- struggles. These culminated in a coup by cott of British and American trade that nationalist military of½cers, which trig- they knew the Saudis and Egyptians gered British reoccupation of the coun- would have to veto.16 try from 1941 to 1945.12 Such public relations tactics became Following World War II, the British increasingly entrenched in 1947, as the encouraged the regent Abd al-Ilah, who new Iraqi prime minister Salih Jabr was ruling on behalf of the young King groped to ½nd a rhetorical stance that Faysal II, to liberalize the regime to would reconcile Iraq’s diverse con- enhance its popular legitimacy in the stituencies to his weakly institutional- eyes of the alienated urban middle class. ized regime. Jabr faced a general eco- Press restrictions were removed, opposi- nomic crisis, severe food shortages, and tion parties were licensed, and electoral a shortfall of money for salaries of civil districts were redrawn to reflect popula- servants, a prime constituency for Arab tion shifts to urban areas. However, the nationalist groups.17 The regent and plan for political liberalization provoked the traditional ruling elites hoped that resistance from established elites.13 The 14 Elliot, “Independent Iraq,” 26. 11 Reeva Simon, Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Implementation of a Na- 15 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 101; Mi- tionalist Ideology (New York: Columbia Univer- chael Eppel, The Palestine Conflict in the History sity Press, 1986), 3–4. of Modern Iraq (London: Frank Cass, 1994), 139.

12 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq 16 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, The Crystallization (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 55–93. of the Arab State System, 1945–1954 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 36. 13 Ibid., 96–100; Matthew Elliot, “Independent Iraq”: The and British Influence, 1941 17 Eppel, The Palestine Conflict in the History of –1958 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, Modern Iraq, 167; Marr, The Modern History of 1996), 25. Iraq, 103.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 British economic and military aid would is not slow to challenge them to make Empire: help them weather the crisis and fend off good.”20 In a vicious cycle of outbid- a blunt tool for burgeoning urban radicalism. In pursuit ding, the regent, the parliamentary no- democra- of that strategy, Jabr hoped to renegoti- tables, and the socialist parties now all tization ate Iraq’s treaty with Britain in order to competed with the nationalist opposi- eliminate the embarrassing presence of tion to adopt the most militant position British air bases on Iraqi soil and to cre- on Palestine. Since Iraq was not a front- ate a ½rmer basis for economic and polit- line state, the costs of undermining the ical cooperation.18 chances of compromise in Palestine For the nationalists, however, even an were low compared to the domestic po- improved agreement with the former litical costs of being outbid on the Arab colonial overlord was anathema. Thus, nationalism issue. This rhetoric rever- to immunize himself from nationalist berated not just within Iraq, but also objections, Jabr relied on demagogy on throughout the Arab world. Jabr’s mili- the Palestine issue. In August of 1947, he tant stance on Palestine at the October broke precedent in calling for the use of and November 1947 meetings of the Ar- the regular armies of Arab states, not ab League helped to set off a spiral of just volunteers, to ½ght against the Jews increasingly vehement anti-Israeli rhet- in Palestine. Nonetheless, amid a wors- oric in other Arab states. In the echo ening of the economy and a shortfall of chamber of popular Arab politics, Iraq’s expected British aid, the strategy of na- incompletely democratized regime led tionalist demagogy on this issue failed to the way in adopting a demagogic strate- reconcile Iraqi nationalists to the renew- gy that increasingly tied the hands of less al of the treaty with Britain. The signing democratic Arab states that otherwise of the treaty in January of 1948 provoked might have been able to resist such pop- a wave of student strikes, demonstra- ular pressures.21 tions, and denunciations from political It would be an exaggeration to say parties, leading to Jabr’s replacement by that Britain’s inadequate effort to install a politician who was untainted by asso- partially democratic institutions in Iraq ciation with the treaty.19 was the sole cause of these outcomes; While Jabr’s rhetoric on Palestine politics in modernizing Iraq might have failed to achieve its intended conse- been fraught with turmoil under any sce- quences, its unintended consequences nario. Nonetheless, this serves as a cau- were profound. A British diplomat re- tionary tale, demonstrating how a de- ported that “the Iraqi Government is mocracy-promoting empire can unleash now to some extent the victim of their illiberal forces in societies with weak po- own brave words, which the opposition litical institutions.

20 Eppel, The Palestine Conflict in the History of 18 Eppel, The Palestine Conflict in the History of Modern Iraq, 169. Modern Iraq, 159, 162–163; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 101–102. 21 Ibid., 141–142, 158, 181, 193; Marr, The Mod- ern History of Iraq, 102; Maddy-Weitzman, The 19 Maddy-Weitzman, The Crystallization of the Crystallization of the Arab State System, 49. For Arab State System, 49; Eppel, The Palestine Con- a related argument, see Michael Barnett, Dia- flict in the History of Modern Iraq, 143, 164–166, logues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional 174–175; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 101– Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 105. 1998), 87–91.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 Jack Snyder ne of the most common charges laid universal-suffrage democracy that em- on O imperialism against the British Empire is that it un- powered the majority. The generation scrupulously played the game of divide of British-trained politicians that took and rule. In order to maintain its author- power immediately after independence ity over millions of colonial subjects kept up this balancing game for a time, with a minimum of expense and British but in the long run the system’s opposed manpower, the British built up elites of principles turned out to be incompati- local ethnic groups or tribes who served ble. In Malaysia, the problem was solved as Britain’s agents of indirect rule. The when the state curtailed the democratic British also armed local ethnic minori- process and civil rights in 1969; in Sri ties who kept order effectively at rock- Lanka, democracy spiraled into ever- bottom prices. Scholars have argued that worsening ethnic warfare. These exam- these tactics contributed to the politici- ples illustrate a widespread pattern in zation of ethnicity, which loaded the imperial attempts to democratize multi- dice in favor of bloody ethnic conflicts ethnic societies. once the empire retreated. Even when the British were trying to prepare a col- Democratic transitions are most suc- ony for peaceful, democratic self-gov- cessful and peaceful when undertaken in ernment, such tactics as institutional- a context of bureaucratic ef½ciency, rule ized power sharing or minority repre- of law, mature political parties, and es- sentation among ethnic groups tended tablished free press. One of the reasons to politicize earlier ethnic divisions. that India has remained a fairly stable These latent ½ssures tended to crack democracy is that all these elements open with the move to independence were put in place, largely as a result of and true universal-suffrage democracy. British efforts, before its independence India is often invoked as an example in 1947. However, to buy the time to ac- of the divisive legacy of British tactics complish this (both for Britain’s own of divide and rule, but it is by no means strategic reasons and arguably to prepare unique. In Ceylon (later Sri Lanka), for India better for the transition), the em- example, the British relied dispropor- pire needed to shore up local allies who tionately on English-speaking civil ser- supported the continuation of the colo- vants from Tamil and other minority nial regime. In India in the 1920s and groups. In Malaya, the British encour- 1930s, these included traditional Muslim aged immigration of Chinese and Indian elites who welcomed British rule as a workers to man the rubber plantations protection against the feared tyranny of and other enterprises needed to sustain the Hindu majority. (A consequence of the broader imperial economy and mili- this policy, many have argued, was the tary machine. These measures laid the bloody partition of the British Raj into groundwork in both of these colonies India and Pakistan in 1947, in which it for the envy of the rural ethnic majority has been estimated that nearly a million groups, the Sinhalese and Malays, that people died.22) To strengthen these al- sought af½rmative action and language- lies while gradually introducing demo- use privileges to correct perceived injus- cratic reforms in preparation for eventu- tices. The British dealt with these problems 22 Radha Kumar, “The Troubled History of by oscillating between power-sharing Partition,” Foreign Affairs 76 (1) (January/Feb- schemes that protected minorities and ruary 1997): 26.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 al independence, the British established partition of the extensively intermingled Empire: a system of separate electorates and religious communities. a blunt tool for guaranteed numbers of seats in provin- On the one hand, the British legacy democra- cial parliaments for Muslims and Hin- of liberal institutions facilitated India’s tization dus. As the political system began to de- transition to a fairly stable democracy. mocratize, this system of ethnic repre- On the other hand, the legacy of insti- sentation helped to channel mass loyal- tutionalized ethnicity, an expedient to ties along ethnic lines.23 sustain British rule while awaiting the British policy promoted the politiciza- transfer of power to the local majority, tion of Muslim identity still further dur- increased the likelihood that cultural ing World War II. When Britain commit- cleavages would become the basis for ted India to the war effort against Ger- divisive politics in the transitional state. many without consultation, Congress Party members in the Indian govern- In Sri Lanka, the British fostered the ment resigned en masse. Congress lead- development of a small, English-educat- ers were jailed. The Muslim League, ed, cosmopolitan political and bureau- however, continued to see Britain as cratic elite who tended to favor the their protector against the Hindu major- inclusive civic identity of ‘Ceylonese,’ ity, and so supported the British war ef- based on loyalty to the governmental fort. Enjoying a clear ½eld for political system that Britain had established in organizing with no opposition from the the colony of Ceylon, rather than the Congress, the League emerged from the exclusive ethnic identities of Sinhalese war with a strengthened hold over the or Tamil.25 Because of the success of Muslim electorate. Christian missionary activities in the In the postwar 1946 elections, the Tamil-populated Jaffna region, Tamils League gained 76 percent of the Mus- constituted a disproportionate share lim vote through its irresistible call for of that elite. Fewer Sinhalese learned the creation of the state of Pakistan.24 English because the powerful Buddhist When in 1947 the League euphemistical- priesthood blocked British inroads in- ly called for “direct action” in the streets to the traditional monopoly of temple to press the Congress for concessions on schools over the education of lay chil- Muslim autonomy, the new electorate, dren.26 its loyalties channeled by the system of High-level British-trained native of½- representation separated by ethnicity, cials never sunk deep roots into local responded by rioting in Calcutta and in communities and thus failed to attract other major cities. Looking to extricate a popular following. During the 1920s, themselves through a policy that critics Ceylon’s main representative body, the have labeled ‘divide and quit,’ the British State Council, was elected under a pow- abandoned India to a chaotic, bloody er-sharing system that restricted suf- 23 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition 25 K. N. O. Dharmadasa, Language, Religion, of India, 1936–1947 (Delhi: Oxford University and Ethnic Assertiveness: The Growth of Sinhalese Press, 1987), 237; Peter Hardy, The Muslims of Nationalism in Sri Lanka (Ann Arbor: University British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University of Michigan Press, 1992), 225–226, 254. Press, 1972), chap. 8; H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide (London: Hutchison, 1969), 14–15, 48. 26 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy 24 Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 243. 65–66, 79, 155.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 Jack Snyder frage and reserved a proportion of the lar, cosmopolitan, Oxford-educated pol- on imperialism seats for Tamils. This system buffered itician such as Solomon Bandaranaike indigenous of½cials from full accounta- found it expedient to tap into this popu- bility to mass constituencies. In 1931, lar movement. Perceiving an opportuni- however, the British Donoughmore ty to gain power in the 1956 elections, Commission, in an attempt to prepare the Buddhist political organization of- Ceylon for independence and full de- fered to support Bandaranaike’s chal- mocracy, stripped away this buffer by lenge to the ruling United National Par- eliminating separate minority represen- ty, on the condition that he campaign tation and introducing universal suf- on the platform of making Sinhala the frage.27 of½cial state language. This marriage Despite growing populist ferment, the of convenience consolidated the ideo- old cosmopolitan elite managed to pre- logical shift of Ceylon’s Buddhist move- vail in elections to form the ½rst two ment from socialism to ethnonational- postindependence governments in 1947 ism. Through word of mouth, by playing and 1952. Soon, however, the Sinhalese a central role at local political meetings, rebellion against pro½ciency in the Eng- and by distributing election leaflets, lo- lish language as a requirement for gov- cal monks delivered ‘vote banks’ on be- ernment employment began to gather half of Bandaranaike and the ethnically force. Sinhalese teachers and Buddhist divisive language policy.29 monks also wanted to exclude Tamil as Although Bandaranaike owed his elec- an of½cial language, arguing that lan- toral victory to the support of militant guage parity would somehow allow the Buddhists, once in power he negotiated large Tamil population of South India to a pact with Tamil leaders to establish swamp Sinhalese culture. Radical monks Tamil as the language of administra- in the less wealthy temples resented the tion in Tamil-majority provinces in the influence of Western culture and admin- northeast of the country and to allow istrative practices, which deprived them local authorities to block Sinhalese im- of their traditional role as the link be- migration into their regions. These con- tween the state and the villages.28 These cessions triggered anti-Tamil rioting in monks experimented with socialist rhet- the capital city of Colombo. Bandara- oric in the late 1940s, but by the mid- naike gave up his plan to gain legislative 1950s they found that nationalist pop- approval of the pact, declared an emer- ulist themes were a more effective vehi- gency, and implemented the main fea- cle for expressing their demands. tures of the agreement by decree. Bud- Given the competitive incentives of dhists, claiming the pact would “lead to universal-suffrage elections, even a secu- the total annihilation of the Sinhalese race,” only intensi½ed their resistance.30 27 Urmila Phadnis, Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Manohar, 1976), 159; Chel- 29 Phadnis, Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka, vadurai Manogaran, Ethnic Conflict and Reconcil- 73–74, 160, 164–165, 183–187; Manor, “The iation in Sri Lanka (Honolulu: University of Ha- Failure of Political Integration in Sri Lanka waii Press, 1987), 8; James Manor, “The Failure (Ceylon),” 21–22; Dharmadasa, Language, Reli- of Political Integration in Sri Lanka (Ceylon),” gion, and Ethnic Assertiveness, 296–297, 300, 314. Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Poli- tics 17 (1) (March 1979): 23. 30 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Buddhism Be- trayed?: Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri 28 Tambiah, Sri Lanka, 8, 20; Phadnis, Religion Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, and Politics in Sri Lanka, 74. 1992), 50.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 A monk assassinated Bandaranaike in Lanka. In many respects, the two started Empire: 1959. out on similar trajectories. In a process a blunt tool for From this point on, the pattern of elec- that closely resembled Sri Lanka’s tran- democra- toral outbidding among Sinhalese par- sition to independence, the British in tization ties was ½rmly established. Even Junius Malaysia brokered an agreement for a Jayawardene’s hitherto moderate Sin- democratic constitution, which was un- halese United National Party attacked derpinned by a power-sharing accord Bandaranaike’s power-sharing agree- between cosmopolitan, English-speak- ment with the Tamils. On several subse- ing elites from the Malayan and Chinese quent occasions, the Sinhalese party in communities. Having brought Chinese power sought an agreement with the and Indian immigrants to Malaya to sus- Tamil minority to achieve a majority tain the imperial economy, the British coalition in parliament, and the Sin- hoped that democratic power sharing halese opposition party responded with could overcome the political divisions demagogic attacks to wreck the agree- this had brought about. But that expec- ment. Revamping the electoral system in tation was too optimistic. As in Sri Lan- 1977 to reward candidates who appealed ka over the course of the ½rst decade across ethnic lines also failed to break after independence, the logic of mass the spiral of conflict.31 By that time, electoral competition began to under- groups had developed the habit of riot- mine the power-sharing accord, as na- ing in the streets against policies they tionalist parties in both major ethnic disliked, so conflict was fueled regard- groups began to draw votes away from less of electoral incentives. the centrist, cross-ethnic alliance. Inter- The legacy of British imperialism ethnic harmony was restored only after exacerbated the problems of the demo- democracy was truncated through a sus- cratic transition in Sri Lanka’s multieth- pension of the liberal constitution fol- nic society. In Sri Lanka as elsewhere, lowing the 1969 postelectoral riots.32 this legacy included the contradictory During the early years of the Cold elements of a divide-and-rule preference War, an armed rebellion mounted by the for ethnic minorities and the subsequent Chinese-dominated Malaysian Commu- move to universal-suffrage democracy. nist Party had left all Chinese politically In this setting, even the Donoughmore suspect. As a result, the Chinese business Commission’s well-intentioned plan elite faced dif½culties in organizing po- turned out to be fraught with unintend- litically on its own. Moreover, wealthy ed consequences. Chinese found that their interests often coincided more closely with those of Malaysia achieved independence Malayan bureaucratic elites than with from Britain in 1957, a decade after Sri those of working-class Chinese. As a result, the main Chinese party, the Ma- 31 Donald Horowitz, “Making Moderation laysian Chinese Association, combined Pay,” in Joseph Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (New York: with the Malayan elite party, the United Lexington Books, 1991), 463. On the more re- cent period, see Amita Shatri, “Government 32 Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Sec- Policy and the Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka,” in ond Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly, eds., Press, 1991), chap. 1; Muthiah Alagappa, “Con- Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia testation and Crisis,” in Alagappa, ed., Political and the Paci½c (Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press, Legitimacy in Southeast Asia (Stanford, Calif.: 1997), 129–164. Stanford University Press, 1995), 63–64.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 Jack Snyder Malays National Organization, to form a civic-, not Ma- on 35 imperialism coalition, known as the Alliance, for the layan . purpose of contesting the Kuala Lumpur This reasonable-seeming formula be- city elections in 1952. The British rein- gan to wear thin, however, in the trou- forced this arrangement and made eth- bled economic context of 1969. Both the nic cooperation a precondition of even- Malays and the Chinese had grounds for tual independence.33 complaint against the elitist Alliance, The cross-ethnic coalition agreement whose supporters came disproportion- held ½rm for the ½rst two postindepen- ately from the upper-income groups of dence elections: In 1959, the Alliance both ethnicities. By 1969, Malays’ per won 52 percent of the vote in free and capita income remained less than half fair elections and, because of the magni- that of non-Malays. Opposition parties fying effects of single-member districts, catering to Malay constituencies be- 74 out of 104 seats in parliament. In 1964, lieved the solution should be a massive the Alliance bene½ted from the rallying program of employing Malays in new, effect induced by military threats from state-sector industries. Yet they saw that Indonesia and increased its margin of the Malay political power needed to ac- victory.34 complish this was receding, because the By 1969, however, the Alliance’s pow- Alliance’s liberal citizenship policies er-sharing formula was coming under were swelling the ranks of Chinese na- intense challenge by a second generation tionalist voters. “Racial harmony is only of political elites that was more ethnical- skin deep,” the manifesto of the Malay ly oriented and less cosmopolitan than opposition party concluded. “Ninety the founders of the independent Malay- percent of the nation’s wealth is still in sian state. The Alliance continued to the hands of non-Malays.”36 campaign on what in retrospect sounds At the same time, Chinese economic like an extraordinarily reasonable plat- grievances were rising. A devaluation of form: Alliance politicians offered pro- the British pound sterling harmed Chi- grams to rectify the economic disadvan- nese business interests. Because the Alli- tages of impoverished, poorly educated ance was hard-pressed by the Malay op- Malayans, and they justi½ed these pro- position in the hard-fought 1969 parlia- grams in terms of the need to develop mentary election campaign, it refused to agriculture, not of ethnic favoritism. compensate those who suffered ½nancial Malay was to become the sole of½cial losses as a result of the devaluation. This language, but other languages could be gave added ammunition to the Chinese used for of½cial business as needed. The opposition parties. In a perverse form Chinese would continue to bene½t from of interethnic elite collusion, the Malay a liberal policy on citizenship. The Al- nationalist and Chinese nationalist par- liance’s ideology was one of Malaysian ties had agreed not to divide the opposi- tion vote and so refrained from running 33 Stanley S. Bedlington, Malaysia and Singa- opposing candidates in districts where pore: The Building of New States (Ithaca, N.Y.: one of the two parties held the majority. Cornell University Press, 1978), 85–87. The Alliance had gained only 49 percent

34 Karl von Vorys, Democracy Without Consen- sus: Communalism and Political Stability in Ma- 35 Ibid., 268. laysia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 249, 297. 36 Ibid., 271.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 of the popular vote, though it retained a ties had been co-opted into the ruling Empire: majority of the seats in parliament. De- Alliance, which now controlled 80 per- a blunt tool for spite this ‘victory,’ the Alliance govern- cent of the seats in parliament. Under democra- ment eventually succumbed to tactics of this system of sharp limitations on free tization ethnic polarization and suffered ultimate speech and truncated democratic rights, electoral defeat at the hands of the eth- Malaysia enjoyed three decades of extra- nic opposition parties. When riots broke ordinary economic growth without seri- out in Kuala Lumpur between Chinese ous ethnic violence, with the Alliance and Malays in the ethnically polarized unassailably in power.39 atmosphere after this tense election, the A key factor in this success was the government declared an emergency and power of Malaysian state administra- suspended the constitution. tors over society. British Malaya had be- The government then began to pursue queathed an effective central bureaucra- a two-pronged strategy of truncating cy, a powerful tool that Alliance politi- democracy while implementing a tech- cians could use to coerce or buy off op- nocratic policy designed to maximize ponents under the Second Malaysia economic growth and increase educa- Plan.40 The powers held by the state un- tional and employment opportunities der the revised 1971 constitution includ- for ethnic Malays. Heavy government ed the ability to distribute patronage to investments would modernize rural ar- cooperative opposition politicians, to eas where Malays were the majority. Ac- distribute central tax revenues to coop- cording to this formula, which was codi- erative localities, and to parcel out eco- ½ed in the Second Malaysia Plan of 1971, nomic development projects. The loyalty Chinese businesses could continue to and ef½ciency of the Malay-dominated enrich themselves, but national symbol- military and police immediately made it ism and government-backed af½rmative possible to repress rioting. Sarawak ran- action would strongly favor Malays. In- ger units, composed of Iban tribesmen flammatory ethnic appeals were made brought in from the Malaysian part of illegal. Political coalitions were arranged Borneo, proved equally ruthless in re- through backroom bargaining and pa- pressing unruly gangs.41 tronage deals rather than through open Finally, the state had strong powers to contestation.37 In the jargon of social bar ethnonationalist messages from the science, the Alliance instituted an “eth- nic control regime” based on a combina- 39 Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore, 152; Wil- liam Case, “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of tion of repression and side payments to 38 Legitimacy,” in Alagappa, ed., Political Legitima- some of the losers. cy in Southeast Asia, 75–76, 79–80, 106; Sumit This strategy was so successful that by Ganguly, “Ethnic Politics and Political Quies- 1973 even the nationalist opposition par- cence in Malaysia and Singapore,” in Brown and Ganguly, eds., Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Paci½c, 233–272. 37 Ibid., 394–412; Means, Malaysian Politics, 439; Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore, 116. 40 Milton Esman, Administration and Develop- ment in Malaysia: Institution Building and Reform 38 D. Rumley, “Political Geography of Control in a Plural Society (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer- of Minorities,” Tijdschrift voor Economische in sity Press, 1972). Sociale Geographie 84 (1) (1993); Ian Lustick, “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consoci- 41 Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore, 166– ationalism Versus Control,” World Politics 31 (3) 167; von Vorys, Democracy Without Consensus, (April 1979): 325–344. 348.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 Jack Snyder media. A 1971 constitutional amendment a higher risk of civil or international war. on imperialism made it a crime even for legislators to Nonetheless, when a democratic power discuss ethnically sensitive questions militarily occupies a country, it is likely about Malay language dominance, citi- to promote democracy there as part of zenship, or the constitutionally mandat- its strategy of withdrawal. This prefer- ed special rights of Malays as the coun- ence reflects the democratic power’s try’s indigenous group. Ownership and self-image and values, its expectation staff of the mass media were ‘Malaysian- that democratization will create a coop- ized’ in the 1970s. This assertion of state erative partner after the withdrawal, and authority over the press was legitimized its desire to legitimate the military inter- in part by a policy begun under the Brit- vention as consistent with the target ish, who had required newspapers to ap- state’s presumed right to national self- ply for annual licenses and had threat- determination. ened seditious newspapers with closure. Normally, the imperial state seeks to Even as recently as 1987, the main Chi- organize the basic institutional precon- nese newspaper was closed down for a ditions for democracy before handing year after it protested the policy of hav- power back to the occupied nation. ing Malay principals administer Chinese However, while this effort is being un- schools.42 dertaken, the empire usually must gov- The paired cases of Sri Lanka and Ma- ern through local elites whose legitima- laysia show that democratization risks cy or political support is typically based the exacerbation of ethnic tensions, es- on traditional authority or ethnic sectar- pecially when imperial policies have fos- ianism. tered envy and promoted politicization Unfortunately, such short-run expedi- along ethnic lines. Ironically, some of ents may hinder the long-run transition the measures that became ethnically to democracy by increasing ethnic polar- divisive were originally adopted as expe- ization. Even if the empire does not take dients to sustain imperial rule while try- active steps to politicize ethnicity, the ing to prepare the ground for democracy. mere act of unleashing premature de- Whereas British-style institutions of rep- mands for mass political participation resentative democracy were a dubious before democratic institutions are ready blessing in both cases, the most valuable will increase the risk of a polarized, vio- legacy of empire in Malaysia turned out lent, unsuccessful transition. British to be an effective administrative appa- imperialists fell prey to these dilemmas ratus capable of managing ethnic divi- between the 1920s and 1960s, notwith- sions while overseeing coherent eco- standing their frequently benign inten- nomic policies that bene½ted all groups. tions. The United States risks falling into the same trap as it tries to promote de- In countries with weak political institu- mocracy in the wake of military inter- tions the transition to democracy carries ventions. Elections under the U.S. occupation of 42 Means, Malaysian Politics, 137–140; Bedling- Iraq in January of 2005 reflected the typ- ton, Malaysia and Singapore, 150; Jon Vanden ical pattern of ethnic and religious polar- Heuvel, The Unfolding Lotus: East Asia’s Changing ization in culturally divided societies Media (New York: Columbia University, Free- that attempt democracy before coherent dom Forum Media Studies Center, 1993), 146– 162; von Vorys, Democracy Without Consensus, state institutions have been constructed. 429. The United States was not consciously

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0011526053887356 by guest on 03 October 2021 playing the game of divide and rule, but Empire: the elections it sponsored inadvertently a blunt tool for complicated efforts to overcome divi- democra- sions among Kurds, Shia Arabs, and tization Sunni Arabs. With the Sunni refraining from voting out of fear or protest, and the Kurds and Shia voting strictly along group lines, the assembly elected to write the country’s constitution turned out to be less comprehensive in its repre- sentation and more culturally polarized than a nondemocratic process would have devised. After the elections, Sunni insurgents increasingly directed their attacks against Shia civilian targets rath- er than only against U.S. and Iraqi gov- ernment targets. If the United States continues to try to impose democracy on ill-prepared societies, it can expect more uphill struggles such as this one.

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