Military Operations on the North Front of Mount Taurus Author(S): W
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Military Operations on the North Front of Mount Taurus Author(s): W. M. Ramsay Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 40, Part 1 (1920), pp. 89-112 Published by: The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/625432 . Accessed: 15/07/2012 04:29 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Hellenic Studies. http://www.jstor.org MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE NORTH FRONT OF MOUNT TAURUS. [PLATE IV.] I.-THE MARCH OF XERXES ACROSSASIA MINOR. THE route by which the army of Xerxes marched across the plateau of Anatolia has never been determined with certainty. On general considera- tions it may be stated with perfect confidence that the army crossed the Taurus by the pass of the Cilician Gates. The reasons are conclusive; there was, in fact, no other way, and the matter is so generally admitted as to need no discussion.' Thereafter the great army gathered on the north side of Taurus at a place called Kritala in Cappadocia (Herodotus, vii. 26). Whether Kritala was a town or a locality (such as a plain with a river) is not stated; but, taking into consideration all the conditions, one can say with certainty that it was situated either in the fertile plain of Tyana or in the equally fertile and well-watered plain that lies between Kybistra and the lake called in modern times Ak-Gyol. The next point stated exactly by Herodotus in the route of the army is Kelainai at the source of the Maeander. The question is how the journey was performed between those points, the Cilician Pass on the east and Kelainai on the west. Herodotus says that the Persian troops crossed the Halys into Phrygia and traversed that country until they reached Kelainai. In discussing this route in H.G.A.M., pp. 36-41, I accepted that statement after a good deal of hesitation, stating the doubt, on account of the great detour involved, whether it was not a mere error introduced by Herodotus in the lack of exact knowledge. In the end, however, I accepted the statement, which would imply that Xerxes marched along the famous and ancient Royal Road; but years of consideration, and growing experience of the conditions governing the possibilities of marching across Anatolia, force me to the conclusion that Herodotus inserts the reference to the Halys without definite authority, merely because the Halys was the river of boundary between Phrygia and 1 The construction and importance of the Amphilochos, are described in The Cities of road through the Gates, as a determining St. Paul, pp. 113 if., and the course and factor in very early history, and its conrexion the mediaeval history of the road are treated with the 'Sons of Javan' (the Old Ionians), in a paper in the Geographical Journal, 1903, marked especially by the names Mopsos and pp. 357-413. 90 W. M. RAMSAY Cappadocia.2 This statement is an ornamental touch designed to give liveliness and detail to a narrative of march, which (except at Kelainai) was singularly bare and devoid of such lively details as Herodotus loves: much of the value of his narrative lies in those personal details of human character and conduct, which usually throw a brilliant light on the life of the times and surroundings of the central facts. It must seem to anyone who reads the passage that Herodotus had practically no information with regard to the route traversed between Kritala and Kelainai. It would not be easy to explain why the army marched by a route which increased so greatly the distance, the time required, and the difficulty of finding provisions and water. In H.G.A.M., pp. 36-41, I sought an expla- nation in the compelling influence of the old and familiar 'Royal Road'; but better knowledge has forced me to abandon this view. If the army crossed the Halys, it would have had no possible path except to march round the northern side of the great salt lake and of the dry region which extends around that lake for a great distance in almost every direction (i.e. to follow the line of the 'Royal Road'). The region on the west side of the lake was called in Kiepert's older maps the 'salt desert,' and was there described as waterless, though it really is easily traversed in every direction by small parties, because there is sufficient water even at the present day for a small population and for a few travellers; but in order that an army should find sufficient water it would have, so far as possible, to keep away outside and north of the dry region; and while it could march through the region after- wards called Galatia, especially through the Haiman6,3 where there are flowing streams and sufficient supply of water, yet it would be very far from easy to cross Cappadocia from Tyana to the Halys, and it is also a quite inacceptible theory that the army deserted the 'Royal Road' somewhere in north Phrygia and turned south again to Kelainai (see below). Moreover Herodotus speaks about Xerxes as simply crossing the Halys. If Xerxes followed this northern route, either he must have crossed the Halys twice, or he did not cross it at all: the best way for the march after the army reached the Halys was to keep along the left bank as far as the line of the Royal Road where it crossed the river, and then keep west through Galatia, where rivers would supply water. The idea therefore that Xerxes crossed the Halys at all must be dismissed. Whatever road he took he did not require to, and would not, cross the river. I have traversed almost every mile of the ways on various journeys and speak from personal experience in reference to the natural and inevitable line of march for an army from Tyana into Galatia, or (as it was then) north-eastern Phrygia. Another consideration must be taken into account. The 'Royal Road' in its western section, passing through north-west Phrygia and reaching the 2 Herod. i. 72. others) make the Byzantine Road pass right do not take s Both the Byzantine Military Road and across the dry region; but they the very ancient 'Royal Road' used the note of the practical facts' that determined Haiman6 route (H.G.A.M. ch. G and p. 31). marching possibilities. It is true that Gelzer (and following him MILITARY OPERATIONS ON MOUNT TAURUS 91 IHermos valley, presents considerable difficulty to the march of an army; and formerly I resorted to the supposition that in order to avoid this difficult section of the Royal Road Xerxes diverged far to the south so as to reach the sources of the Maeander at Kelainai (H.G.A.M. pp. 39-41). It would be necessary on this supposition for the army to make not merely a second very long detour, but also to traverse rather waterless country. The route, however, would not be wholly impossible; for there is moderate but not abundant water along the route: this part of Phrygia was doubtless well cultivated, and could supply food, grown within moderate distance of the march. It is assumed that considerations of water supply determined the exact route: food could be carried, but not water in sufficient quantity. The detour is enormous, however, and considerations of distance and marching possibilities show that this supposition of a northern route cannot be seriously entertained. The army did not cross the Halys or go through .northern Phrygia. Another route then suggests itself. Did the army march through -central Lycaonia, south of the salt lake Tatta, following the line which was so important in later history and which may for convenience be called the 'Central Trade Route'? This supposition also must be dismissed with brief remark. The line of the central Trade Route is far from the shortest way from the Cilician Gates to Kelainai, though it is much shorter than ,the northern route. Moreover, in certain sections, and especially in that which separates Tyana or Kybistra from the eastern part of the Trade Route, the water supply is scanty and the country unproductive; and this line would be chosen only if there were no other possible. This point need not be worked out at length and in detail. We have been over the whole way and the opinion here expressed is forced on me by our experience. It is a route for travellers and trading parties, not for armies. The shortest line may be called the 'Syrian Route,'4 from the Gates to the best point of junction with the Central Route. The 'Anabasis' with its strange zig- zags, illustrates the unsuitability of the Central Route. There was, however, a route which is the shortest, and which leads almost continually through fertile and highly cultivated country, furnishing abundant water supply at very frequent intervals. This is the southern route, or Pisidian road, although (to be more accurate) it leads through Lycaonia and Phrygia to a greater extent than through Pisidia; but it may be called the Pisidian road on the same principle as Antioch was termed the Pisidian city, because it was situated in Phrygia-towards-Pisidia and was intended to defend the Phrygian country against the Pisidian raiders (see J.R.S., 1917, p.