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The Role of the Clinical Laboratory in Managing Chemical Or Biological Terrorism

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The Role of the Clinical Laboratory in Managing Chemical Or Biological Terrorism Clinical Chemistry 46:12 1883–1893 (2000) Review The Role of the Clinical Laboratory in Managing Chemical or Biological Terrorism Saeed A. Jortani,1 James W. Snyder,1 and Roland Valdes, Jr.1,2* Background: Domestic and international acts of terror- to respond to such attacks. Accurate assessment of ism using chemicals and pathogens as weapons have resources in clinical laboratories is important because it recently attracted much attention because of several will provide local authorities with an alternative re- hoaxes and real incidents. Clinical laboratories, espe- source for immediate diagnostic analysis. It is, therefore, cially those affiliated with major trauma centers, should recommended that clinical laboratories identify their be prepared to respond rapidly by providing diagnostic current resources and the extent of support they can tests for the detection and identification of specific provide, and inform the authorities of their state of agents, so that specific therapy and victim management readiness. can be initiated in a timely manner. As first-line re- © 2000 American Association for Clinical Chemistry sponders, clinical laboratory personnel should become familiar with the various chemical or biological agents Release of chemical and biological warfare agents threat- and be active participants in their local defense pro- ens civilian populations throughout the world. Potential grams. sources of exposure include accidental release from mili- Approach: We review the selected agents previously tary factories and stockpiles, direct military attacks, in- considered or used in chemical and biological warfare, dustrial accidents, and intentional release as an act of outline their poisonous and pathogenic effects, describe terrorism (1). Chemical warfare has been used by the techniques used in their identification, address some of military, such as the mustard gas attack by the Iraqi the logistical and technical difficulties in maintaining government on civilians in Iraq and Iran in 1986 (2), and such tests in clinical laboratories, and comment on some by terrorist organizations, such as the release of sarin by of the analytical issues, such as specimen handling and the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Matsumoto City (Japan) in 1994 personal protective equipment. (3). Both of these incidents caused high morbidity and Content: The chemical agents discussed include nerve, mortality. The use of biological agents as weapons has blistering, and pulmonary agents and cyanides. Biolog- been limited. Major incidents have included the acciden- ical agents, including anthrax and smallpox, are also tal release of anthrax from a military testing facility in the discussed as examples for organisms with potential use former Soviet Union in 1979 (4) and the intentional in bioterrorism. Available therapies for each agent are contamination of restaurant salad bars with Salmonella by outlined to assist clinical laboratory personnel in mak- a religious cult in Oregon in 1984 (5). ing intelligent decisions regarding implementation of Many of the attacks involving disease-producing or- diagnostic tests as a part of a comprehensive defense ganisms, or in some cases chemical agents, are first program. identified by local medical institutions. Rapid response to Summary: As the civilian medical community prepares such attacks involves the timely administration of anti- for biological and chemical terrorist attacks, improve- dotes, especially for cyanides and nerve agents, or vac- ment in the capabilities of clinical laboratories is essen- cines and antibiotics for smallpox and anthrax, respec- tial in supporting counterterrorism programs designed tively. Therefore, there might not be sufficient time for advanced analytical procedures to be performed in highly equipped government or military laboratories. The local Departments of 1 Pathology and Laboratory Medicine and 2 Biochemistry laboratory will play an important role in providing rapid and Molecular Biology, University of Louisville School of Medicine, Louisville, identification of the agent involved, which will influence KY 40292. the administration of an antidote or vaccine to the affected *Address correspondence to this author at: Department of Pathology and victims. Laboratory Medicine, University of Louisville School of Medicine, Louisville, KY 40292. Fax 502-852-1771; e-mail [email protected]. We will review selected agents that have previously Received March 16, 2000; accepted September 25, 2000. been considered or used in chemical and biological war- 1883 1884 Jortani et al.: Managing Chemical or Biological Terrorism fare, discuss the mechanisms by which these agents act, programs before the 1970s were Francisella tularensis, and outline the techniques used for their identification. staphylococcal enterotoxin B, Brucella suis, and Coxiella We will also discuss current antidotal, antimicrobial, and burnetii. The Soviet Union had focused on smallpox, vaccination treatment strategies and address specific an- plague, Q-fever, Marburg hemorrhagic fever, melioidosis, alytical issues, such as specimen handling and the use of and typhus (4). Table 2 lists the various bacteria and laboratory testing for the diagnosis and management of viruses that should be considered as possible agents in a victims exposed to chemical or biological agents. Labora- bioterrorism attack. Because of their lethality and propen- tory personnel should obtain funding from local author- sity for mass destruction, anthrax and smallpox will be ities to defray the costs of specialized equipment, re- highlighted in this review. agents, and personnel (6). Regardless of the type of agent used in an attack (i.e., Chemical Agents chemical or biological), it is important to provide suffi- Measurement of various chemical warfare agents, and cient protection for laboratory personnel who will analyze perhaps their degradation products, in victims can be suspicious environmental materials, air samples, and useful for triaging patients, confirming exposure, and specimens collected from humans. Most hazardous-mate- identifying the particular substances involved and the rial-response teams are currently equipped with level A possible treatments available, including antidotal therapy. personnel protective equipment (1). It is intuitive that The role of the clinical laboratory is to provide rapid local laboratory personnel who will be dealing with these analysis of biological samples in situations for which attacks in support of the defense structure should be timely results can affect patient treatment. Clinical labo- equipped with appropriate personnel protective equip- ratories should also collect, handle, and ship specimens in ment to prevent exposure to chemicals or organisms. a manner appropriate for government and reference lab- Chemical weapons are classified into four major cate- oratories to conduct further analysis and confirmatory gories based on their mode of action: nerve agents, testing. Providing information on each chemical agent to blistering (vesicant) agents, pulmonary agents, and cya- the physicians treating potentially exposed individuals is nides. We will review representative agents from each also an important role for the clinical laboratory. class of these chemicals (Table 1). The use of poisons as weapons dates back to 431 BC, With regard to biological agents, the biological warfare when sulfur was burned beneath the walls of the cities of programs of both the United States and the former Soviet Plataea and Belium in the Athenian and Spartan Wars (7). Union had Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), botulinus toxin, Other notable incidents before the 20th century include and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus in their the use of picric acid and sulfur by the British during the respective biological weapons arsenals. Additional agents Boer and Crimean Wars. The most extensive use of used by the United States for biological weapons research chemical warfare occurred during World War I, when the Table 1. Chemical warfare agents. Name Code Chemical name Site of action Nerve agents Tabun GA Ethyl-N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate AchE Sarin GB Isopropylmethylphosphonofluoridate AchE Soman GD Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate AchE VX VX O-Ethyl S-[2-(diisopropylamino)ethyl] AchE methylphosphonothiate Vesicants Sulfur mustard HD 2,2Ј-Dichlorodiethyl sulfide Blistering agent; strong alkylating properties, affecting eyes, skin, and lungs Nitrogen mustard HN-1 2,2Ј-Dichloro-N-methyldiethylamine Blistering agent; strong alkylating properties, causing systemic toxicity Lewisite I L1 Dichloro(2-chlorovinyl)arsine Blistering agent, irritating to eyes and lungs Pulmonary agents Phosgene CG Lung Chlorine CL Lung Cyanides HCN AC Hydrogen cyanide Cytochrome oxidase CK CK Cyanogen chloride Cytochrome oxidase Clinical Chemistry 46, No. 12, 2000 1885 Table 2. Biological warfare agents.a Acute toxic manifestations of cholinergic crisis caused by nerve agents are similar to those caused by organophos- Disease caused or common Biothreatb Organism/Agent name level phates, which include increased sweating and bronchial, Variola major Small pox A salivary, ocular, and intestinal secretions; “pinpoint” pu- B. anthracis Anthrax A pils (miosis); intestinal hypermotility; bronchospasms; Yersinia pestis Plague A and bradycardia (11–13). Muscular fasciculation, weak- Clostridium botulinum Botulism A ness, and paralysis also can be observed because of toxin nicotinic effects on the synapse. Other health effects from F. tularensis Tularemia
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