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Supplement to All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol

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Supplement to All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol EPA/600/R-10/155 December 2010 Supplement to All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol SCIENCE Office of Research and Development National Homeland Security Research Center Supplement to All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol December 2010 Office of Research and Development National Homeland Security Research Center Acknowledgments This document is intended to be supplementary to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) September 2008 All Hazards Receipt Facility Protocol (AHRF Protocol), and attempts to address considerations raised by stakeholders since publication of the protocol. Development of this document was funded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC), and includes information provided by EPA Regions 1, 6, and 10; EPA Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA), the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL): State Public Health Laboratories of Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia; and New York City; and the Canadian Defence Research and Development Laboratory. This document was prepared by CSC under Contract EP-W-06- 046. Disclaimer This document is intended to be supplementary to the guidance provided in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) September 2008 All Hazards Receipt Facility Protocol (AHRF Protocol), and attempts to address considerations raised by stakeholders since publication of the protocol. This supplement assumes that: • The September 2008 AHRF Protocol was developed and provided as a guide; implementation of the protocol and the screening equipment included in the protocol may vary among locations, depending on the goals and capabilities of the laboratory to which the facility is attached. • Retrofitting existing facilities to contain an AHRF-type area requires site-specific engineering considerations that will not be addressed by this document. This is a draft document and is currently under review. Information provided does not constitute nor should it be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology. Questions concerning this document or its application should be addressed to: Erin Silvestri, MPH U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Homeland Security Research Center Office of Research and Development (NG16) 26 West Martin Luther King Drive Cincinnati, OH 45268 (513) 569-7619 [email protected] Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement i December 2010 Foreword Following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) mission was expanded to account for critical needs related to homeland security. Presidential directives identified EPA as the primary federal agency responsible for the country’s water supplies and for decontamination following a chemical, biological, and/or radiological (CBR) attack. To provide scientific and technical support to help EPA meet this expanded role, EPA’s National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) was established. The NHSRC research program is focused on conducting research and delivering products that improve the capability of the Agency to carry out its homeland security responsibilities. As a part of this mission, NHSRC provides support to the Environmental Response Laboratory Network (ERLN), a nationwide network of federal and state laboratories responsible for the analysis of environmental samples. The goal of NHSRC’s research in this area is to support the technical capabilities of these laboratories in their ability to provide an effective response. In September 2008, EPA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) co-published an All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol, recommending a step-by-step approach to use when screening samples that have been presented to an AHRF. Since publication of the AHRF Screening Protocol, EPA received requests for additional information regarding screening equipment, operational controls, and general policies from stakeholder implementing or interested in installing and implementing an AHRF. This document is intended to address stakeholder requests since publication of the AHRF Screening Protocol, by providing summary information on lessons learned, general engineering considerations, results of equipment testing, and general policy recommendations. The process of developing this supplement included participation across EPA and state public health laboratories. Gregory D. Sayles, Ph.D., Acting Director National Homeland Security Research Center Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement ii December 2010 Abbreviations and Acronyms AC Hydrogen cyanide ABS Alpha, beta scintillators AEGL Acute exposure guide levels AHRF All hazards receipt facility APHL Association of Public Health Laboratories BSL Biosafety level CAFA Celite® analytical filter aid CBR Chemical, biological, and radiological CEES 2-Chloroethyl ethylsulfide CGI Combustible gas indicator CG Phosgene µCi Microcurie CK Cyanogen chloride cpm Counts per minute CWA Chemical warfare agent DB-3 4-(4’-Nitrobenzyl)pyridine DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security DMMP Dimethyl methylphosphonate DOT U.S. Department of Transportation DoD U.S. Department of Defense DOE U.S. Department of Energy ECBC Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency FBI U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations FID Flame ionization detector FSP Flame spectrophotometer FTIR Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy GA Tabun GB Sarin GC Gas chromatography GD Soman GM Geiger–Müller H Mustard agent HD Sulfur mustard HEPA High efficiency particulate air HN Nitrogen mustard HP(Ge) High purity Germanium HT Sulfur mustard with agent T (bis[2-(2-chloroethylthio)ethyl]ether) IC Ion Chamber IMS Ion mobility spectrometer IPA Isopropyl alcohol IR Infrared spectroscopy ITMS Ion trap mobility spectrometry keV Kiloelectron volt L1 Lewisite 1 L2 Lewisite 2 L3 Lewisite 3 meV Millielectron volt mg/g Milligram per gram Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement iii December 2010 mR/h Milliroentgen per hour NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center NO3 Nitrate NYSDOH New York State Department of Health ORIA Office of Radiation and Indoor Air OSC On-scene coordinator OX Oxidizers PCR Polymerase chain reaction PID Photoionization detector PMT Photomultiplier tube POC Point of contact PT Proficiency testing QA/QC Quality assurance/quality control QMP Quality management plan RIID Radioisotope identifier RDTE Research, development, test and evaluation SAM Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events TIC Toxic industrial compound TTEP EPA National Homeland Security Research Center’s Technology Testing and Evaluation Program VOC Volatile organic compound VX Nerve agent, S-2-(Diisopropylamino) ethyl O-ethyl methylphosphonothioate WMD Weapons of mass destruction Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement iv December 2010 Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement v December 2010 Table of Contents Attachments ................................................................................................................................. vii List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... vii List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. vii 1.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Background of the All Hazards Receipt Facilities (AHRFs) and Screening Protocol .................. 1 1.2 Intended Purpose of the AHRF Protocol ...................................................................................... 1 2.0 Lessons Learned ............................................................................................................. 2 2.1 AHRF Protocol Assessments ........................................................................................................ 2 2.2 Lessons from Existing All Hazard Receipt Facilities ................................................................... 3 2.3 Additional Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 4 3.0 Adapting AHRFs to Meet Lab-Specific Needs – General Considerations ............... 5 3.1 AHRF Design Options .................................................................................................................. 5 3.2 General Considerations regarding Engineering Designs and Controls ......................................... 7 4.0 Screening Equipment..................................................................................................... 8 4.1 Equipment Included in September 2008 AHRF Protocol ............................................................. 8 4.1.1 AHRF Assessments –Screening Equipment Results ............................................................ 10 4.1.2 Independent Laboratory Testing of AHRF Chemical Screening Equipment ..................... 15 4.2 Considerations in Equipment Selection ...................................................................................... 16 4.3 Alternative and/or Additional Equipment Currently Being Used or Considered in AHRF ........ 17 4.3.1 Chemical 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