EPA/600/R-10/155 December 2010
Supplement to All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol
SCIENCE
Office of Research and Development National Homeland Security Research Center
Supplement to All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol
December 2010
Office of Research and Development National Homeland Security Research Center
Acknowledgments
This document is intended to be supplementary to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) September 2008 All Hazards Receipt Facility Protocol (AHRF Protocol), and attempts to address considerations raised by stakeholders since publication of the protocol. Development of this document was funded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC), and includes information provided by EPA Regions 1, 6, and 10; EPA Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA), the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL): State Public Health Laboratories of Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia; and New York City; and the Canadian Defence Research and Development Laboratory. This document was prepared by CSC under Contract EP-W-06- 046.
Disclaimer
This document is intended to be supplementary to the guidance provided in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) September 2008 All Hazards Receipt Facility Protocol (AHRF Protocol), and attempts to address considerations raised by stakeholders since publication of the protocol. This supplement assumes that:
• The September 2008 AHRF Protocol was developed and provided as a guide; implementation of the protocol and the screening equipment included in the protocol may vary among locations, depending on the goals and capabilities of the laboratory to which the facility is attached. • Retrofitting existing facilities to contain an AHRF-type area requires site-specific engineering considerations that will not be addressed by this document.
This is a draft document and is currently under review. Information provided does not constitute nor should it be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology.
Questions concerning this document or its application should be addressed to:
Erin Silvestri, MPH U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Homeland Security Research Center Office of Research and Development (NG16) 26 West Martin Luther King Drive Cincinnati, OH 45268 (513) 569-7619 [email protected]
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Foreword
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) mission was expanded to account for critical needs related to homeland security. Presidential directives identified EPA as the primary federal agency responsible for the country’s water supplies and for decontamination following a chemical, biological, and/or radiological (CBR) attack. To provide scientific and technical support to help EPA meet this expanded role, EPA’s National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) was established. The NHSRC research program is focused on conducting research and delivering products that improve the capability of the Agency to carry out its homeland security responsibilities.
As a part of this mission, NHSRC provides support to the Environmental Response Laboratory Network (ERLN), a nationwide network of federal and state laboratories responsible for the analysis of environmental samples. The goal of NHSRC’s research in this area is to support the technical capabilities of these laboratories in their ability to provide an effective response. In September 2008, EPA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) co-published an All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol, recommending a step-by-step approach to use when screening samples that have been presented to an AHRF. Since publication of the AHRF Screening Protocol, EPA received requests for additional information regarding screening equipment, operational controls, and general policies from stakeholder implementing or interested in installing and implementing an AHRF. This document is intended to address stakeholder requests since publication of the AHRF Screening Protocol, by providing summary information on lessons learned, general engineering considerations, results of equipment testing, and general policy recommendations. The process of developing this supplement included participation across EPA and state public health laboratories.
Gregory D. Sayles, Ph.D., Acting Director National Homeland Security Research Center
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
AC Hydrogen cyanide ABS Alpha, beta scintillators AEGL Acute exposure guide levels AHRF All hazards receipt facility APHL Association of Public Health Laboratories BSL Biosafety level CAFA Celite® analytical filter aid CBR Chemical, biological, and radiological CEES 2-Chloroethyl ethylsulfide CGI Combustible gas indicator CG Phosgene µCi Microcurie CK Cyanogen chloride cpm Counts per minute CWA Chemical warfare agent DB-3 4-(4’-Nitrobenzyl)pyridine DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security DMMP Dimethyl methylphosphonate DOT U.S. Department of Transportation DoD U.S. Department of Defense DOE U.S. Department of Energy ECBC Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency FBI U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations FID Flame ionization detector FSP Flame spectrophotometer FTIR Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy GA Tabun GB Sarin GC Gas chromatography GD Soman GM Geiger–Müller H Mustard agent HD Sulfur mustard HEPA High efficiency particulate air HN Nitrogen mustard HP(Ge) High purity Germanium HT Sulfur mustard with agent T (bis[2-(2-chloroethylthio)ethyl]ether) IC Ion Chamber IMS Ion mobility spectrometer IPA Isopropyl alcohol IR Infrared spectroscopy ITMS Ion trap mobility spectrometry keV Kiloelectron volt L1 Lewisite 1 L2 Lewisite 2 L3 Lewisite 3 meV Millielectron volt mg/g Milligram per gram
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mR/h Milliroentgen per hour NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center NO3 Nitrate NYSDOH New York State Department of Health ORIA Office of Radiation and Indoor Air OSC On-scene coordinator OX Oxidizers PCR Polymerase chain reaction PID Photoionization detector PMT Photomultiplier tube POC Point of contact PT Proficiency testing QA/QC Quality assurance/quality control QMP Quality management plan RIID Radioisotope identifier RDTE Research, development, test and evaluation SAM Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events TIC Toxic industrial compound TTEP EPA National Homeland Security Research Center’s Technology Testing and Evaluation Program VOC Volatile organic compound VX Nerve agent, S-2-(Diisopropylamino) ethyl O-ethyl methylphosphonothioate WMD Weapons of mass destruction
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Table of Contents
Attachments ...... vii List of Tables ...... vii List of Figures ...... vii 1.0 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Background of the All Hazards Receipt Facilities (AHRFs) and Screening Protocol ...... 1 1.2 Intended Purpose of the AHRF Protocol ...... 1 2.0 Lessons Learned ...... 2 2.1 AHRF Protocol Assessments ...... 2 2.2 Lessons from Existing All Hazard Receipt Facilities ...... 3 2.3 Additional Recommendations ...... 4 3.0 Adapting AHRFs to Meet Lab-Specific Needs – General Considerations ...... 5 3.1 AHRF Design Options ...... 5 3.2 General Considerations regarding Engineering Designs and Controls ...... 7 4.0 Screening Equipment...... 8 4.1 Equipment Included in September 2008 AHRF Protocol ...... 8 4.1.1 AHRF Assessments –Screening Equipment Results ...... 10 4.1.2 Independent Laboratory Testing of AHRF Chemical Screening Equipment ...... 15 4.2 Considerations in Equipment Selection ...... 16 4.3 Alternative and/or Additional Equipment Currently Being Used or Considered in AHRF ...... 17 4.3.1 Chemical ...... 22 4.3.2 Explosives ...... 24 4.3.3 Radiological ...... 25 4.3.4 Biological ...... 28 5.0 Quality Control ...... 28 5.1 Quality Assurance and Quality Control Procedures ...... 28 5.2 Quality Assurance/Quality Control included in AHRF Protocol ...... 28 5.3 Equipment Maintenance ...... 29 5.4 Additional Quality Assurance/Quality Control Considerations ...... 29 5.5 Training ...... 29 5.6 Proficiency Testing ...... 30 5.6.1 Selection of Chemical Warfare Agent Simulants for AHRF Assessments ...... 32 5.6.2 Selection of Explosive Simulant ...... 32 5.6.3 Selection of Oxidizer Simulant ...... 32 5.6.4 Selection of Radiological Simulants...... 32 6.0 References ...... 33
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Attachments
ATTACHMENT 1: Information Regarding Currently Available Screening Equipment for Use in All Hazards Receipt Facilities ATTACHMENT 1a: Radiochemistry Detection Equipment ATTACHMENT 1b: Colorimetric Tests ATTACHMENT 1c: Ion Spectrometry ATTACHMENT 1d: Enzyme/Immunoassay Detection ATTACHMENT 1e: Flame Spectrophotometry ATTACHMENT 1f: Photo and Flame Ionization Detectors ATTACHMENT 1g: Spectroscopy and Spectrophotometry ATTACHMENT 1h: Gas Chromatography ATTACHMENT 1i: Mercury Detection ATTACHMENT 1j: X-Ray Devices
ATTACHMENT 2: AHRF Laboratory Contacts ATTACHMENT 3: Technology Performance Summary for Chemical Detection Instruments
List of Tables
Table 1. AHRF Screening Equipment Types ...... 9 Table 2. Comparison of Sample Screening Results at U.S. EPA Region 1 AHRF ...... 11 Table 3. Comparison of Sample Screening Results at NYSDOH Health Center AHRF ...... 13 Table 4. Threat Categories and Sample Screening Equipment ...... 18 Table 5. Samples Used during AHRF Protocol Assessments ...... 31
List of Figures
Figure 1. Sample Screening Equipment ...... 21
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 Background of the All Hazards Receipt Facilities (AHRFs) and Screening Protocol
The All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol was developed in response to requests from state and federal agencies, particularly public health and environmental laboratories, to help protect laboratory facilities and staff from potential hazards in unknown samples. The four-year, multi-agency effort to design and build prototype facilities, and develop and evaluate corresponding sample screening procedures, involved the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL). As a result of this effort, two prototype AHRFs have been situated at the EPA Region 1 Laboratory in North Chelmsford, Massachusetts, and at the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) Wadsworth Center Laboratory in Albany, New York. Sample screening procedures designed specifically for use in the prototype facilities were assessed at each location to evaluate their ability to detect general categories of hazards (e.g., chemical, explosive, and radiochemical. Results of the assessment were used to improve the screening procedures, and a final AHRF Screening Protocol was published in September 2008.1 Results of the assessment are provided in EPA’s Final Report – Assessment of All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Protocol (“Assessment Report”); results also are described briefly in Sections 2.1 and 4.1 of this supplement.
Since publication of the AHRF Screening Protocol, EPA has received requests for information regarding appropriate screening equipment, operational controls, and general policies from stakeholders who are either implementing or interested in installing and implementing an AHRF or AHRF-like area. This document is intended to be a supplement to the protocol, and attempts to address stakeholder requests by providing summary information on lessons learned, general engineering controls and considerations, results of equipment testing, and general policy recommendations. This supplement also cites sources that contain additional information provided by DHS, APHL, and EPA regarding screening facility controls and equipment.
1.2 Intended Purpose of the AHRF Protocol
The AHRF Screening Protocol is a guide for screening unknown samples for general categories of chemical, explosive, and radiochemical hazards. The protocol is designed specifically for use of the equipment and facilities included in the prototype AHRFs that were designed and built by Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC) under contract to DHS. However, the AHRF and AHRF protocol can be adjusted to conform to the capabilities, needs, and goals of a particular location. As written, the screening procedures included in the protocol are not intended to provide detailed or quantitative information regarding the identity and/or amount of a particular hazard; if additional information is needed, additional or alternative equipment can be used. A brief discussion of various AHRF designs is provided in Section 3.0. Additional and more detailed information will be provided in a DHS Best Practices Guide, which is currently under development. Information about equipment that might be used in addition to, or instead of, the equipment included in the protocol, is provided in Section 4.0 and Attachment 1. Considerations for use in selecting equipment for a particular laboratory are provided in Section 4.0.
1 U.S. EPA and Department of Homeland Security. September 2008. All Hazards Receipt Facility Screening Protocol, DHS/S&T-PUB-08-0001 and EPA/600/R-08/105.
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2.0 Lessons Learned
2.1 AHRF Protocol Assessments
During 2007, EPA performed a series of four assessments to verify the effectiveness of a draft AHRF protocol. Initial assessments were performed during May and June 2007 at the EPA Region 1 and NYSDOH Wadsworth Center AHRF sites; follow-up assessments were performed during September and October 2007. During the assessments, AHRF staff appeared to be well trained and experienced with the protocol, and excellent communication was observed between staff performing activities in the bleaching station and glove box areas, and between the bleaching station team and sample delivery personnel. This level of communication was critical to appropriate decision making, sample screening, and safety. AHRF staff, panelists, and observers participating in the assessments agreed that the AHRFs (1) meet the purpose of protecting laboratory facilities and staff, and (2) support decisions concerning samples containing certain classes of potentially hazardous unknowns.
A detailed discussion of the assessments is provided in EPA’s Assessment Report. Results were used to revise and improve the protocol prior to publication. In addition to changes incorporated into the AHRF Protocol, the following information summarizes some of the lessons learned:
• Colorimetric tests can serve as good indicators of the presence of hazards, but require caution when making “yes/no” decisions. Several factors will impact colorimetric test results such as indefinite and variable color changes; the variability based on how the sample is applied to a test strip and/or responses to different environmental matrices. In addition, reading color changes accurately and consistently requires training and practice. Colorimetric test results should be assessed along with results generated by all other screening equipment used in the protocol. • There are a number of additional or alternative technologies (see Section 4.0 of this supplement) that may offer improved sensitivity and reliability. Each AHRF site should assess its needs and capabilities in relation to both the existing AHRF protocol and alternative screening tools including new and evolving equipment. • Although the radiation screening equipment proved to be reliable and appropriately sensitive, specialized training and practice is necessary to assure correct reading of results. In addition, because background radiation is ever present and is highly variable based on locale, there is a need to understand site-specific “threshold” or “action” levels. It is recommended that each laboratory containing an AHRF or AHRF-like area determine and understand localized background levels and compare the levels with the threshold levels noted in the 2008 AHRF Protocol. It is reasonable for each AHRF location to establish their own threshold levels in concert with state authorities. Threshold levels should be determined for each site and applied so that positive screening results are statistically different from background levels of radiation. • Suspicious powders require a more detailed set of instructions than the instructions provided in the 2008 AHRF Protocol. As previously noted, the protocol does not provide a basis to make decisions or recommendations regarding biological hazards. Instead, the protocol recommends that AHRF staff collect a sub-sample for biological analysis in an appropriate laboratory, after the sample has been screened for chemical, explosive and radioactive threats. • For any unknown sample, it is critical to understand, in detail, the circumstances under which the potential threat was identified and to cooperate with FBI weapons of mass destruction (WMD) officials and local law enforcement. Sample receipt personnel should thoroughly
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interview any individuals involved in sample delivery and obtain contact information for any field personnel who may be able to provide additional insight. • Large packages (greater than one foot x one foot) containing unknown materials are not addressed in the 2008 Protocol, because these packages cannot fit through the sample receipt port built into the AHRF prototypes. AHRFs should consider this problem and have a contingency plan in place. At a minimum, gamma radiation screening can be performed outside the facility with a portable gamma survey meter. Depending on the degree of suspicion, the amount of knowledge about the package, and the circumstances surrounding the package, it is recommended that follow-up action be coordinated with FBI WMD officials and the local laboratory director. • The sequence of unknown sample screening depends a great deal on the facility configuration and the available/selected screening equipment. As each assessment was performed, the protocol was fine-tuned and revised to improve screening test results. To assure an efficient and effective process, each AHRF should maintain and continuously test their protocol to assure reliable results. • Each AHRF protocol should have an internal and external (out-reach) communication system in place. AHRF screening results should be approved by the host Laboratory Director before definitive action is taken. For highly suspicious packages, it may be appropriate to first coordinate activities with the local law and FBI authorities. When a screening test is positive for a given threat category (e.g., radiation, explosive, chemical), predetermined points of contact (POCs) should be consulted to determine sample disposition. Information for predetermined POCs should include contact information for back-up POCs. • Routine training and refresher training on all phases of sample screening, particularly in the use of equipment, results interpretation, and decision coordination, are strongly recommended. Each laboratory should establish standard operating procedures and schedules for maintenance and testing of equipment used by their facility.
2.2 Lessons from Existing All Hazard Receipt Facilities
As laboratories design, install, and use AHRF capabilities, important additional site-specific, and general, observations and insight will become available regarding these facilities. Some observations made to date include:
• Maintenance of a self-standing, external AHRF facility (such as the prototype installed at the EPA Region 1 and NYSDOH Wadsworth Center laboratory sites) can be costly and time consuming, particularly when considering the intended infrequent use of the facility. These facilities are expected to be functioning on a minute’s notice and require on-going operational controls for heat and humidity, in addition to air filtering and circulation. The benefits of stand-alone facilities similar to the AHRF prototypes, however, include the relative ease of isolating hazards and the distance between potential hazards and the host laboratory. Host laboratories should weigh the benefits of having a stand-alone facility against the corresponding maintenance costs. Laboratories might also consider potential use of the facility for a portion of laboratory sample handling and/or screening samples prior to routine analyses. Additional AHRF facility considerations and options are discussed in Section 3.0. • Training for maintenance and use of the AHRFs and screening equipment, as well as for implementation of the protocols, is critical to ensure that meaningful and useful results are obtained. Each laboratory should determine a schedule to ensure this training is provided initially and periodically as needed (see Section 5.5). In recognition of this need, periodic AHRF training is being provided at the NYSDOH Wadsworth Center laboratory. During 2009, training sessions for AHRF engineering and support personnel were attended by
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participants from the New York City Department of Health and EPA Region 1; training sessions for AHRF laboratory personnel were attended by participants from California, Florida, Kentucky, Idaho, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and New Jersey state laboratories, from New York City, and from EPA Regions 1, 3, and 10. NYSDOH is continuing to provide training on operational and decision-making components of facility air handling, security, liquid handling, biosafety systems, and routine maintenance.2 • The performance of sample screening equipment can be highly variable and depends on proper maintenance and calibration, sensitivity for a particular hazard or compound, and experience of equipment handlers. Equipment handlers must understand the equipment’s limitations and abilities, and must be trained in its use, maintenance, data interpretation, and technology limitations. In addition to information and technical support provided by equipment manufacturers and vendors, testing is needed to evaluate equipment performance and limitations in terms of its ability to assess hazards in sample matrices that laboratories might receive. Some non-vendor testing information is provided in the references cited in Attachments 1a – 1j of this document. General information regarding equipment considerations and performance also is provided in Section 4.0. Additional resources include EPA’s Field Screening Equipment Information Document (EPA/600/R-10/091, September 2010) and Rapid Screening and Preliminary Identification Techniques and Methods (EPA/600/R-10/090, September 2010); ANSI N42.33 - Performance Criteria for Hand-held Instruments for the Detection and Identification of Radionuclides; and ANSI N42.34 - Performance Criteria for Hand-held Instruments for the Detection and Identification of Radionuclides. The EPA National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) continues to test screening equipment against performance characteristics, requirements, and specifications to provide reliable information regarding commercially available technologies.3 Each laboratory should establish standard operating procedures and schedules for maintenance and testing of the equipment used by their facility.
2.3 Additional Recommendations
In addition to information provided during the AHRF assessments and by stakeholders using AHRFs or AHRF-like facilities since the assessments, recommendations have been provided by technical experts during reviews of the AHRF Assessment Report and this supplement to the AHRF Protocol. The following recommendations are provided for consideration:
• Transport Vehicle Survey - Before anything is off loaded from a sample transport vehicle, a radiation screening should be performed, including general dose and swipe screens of the tires, outside surface, and interior surfaces using a Ludlum-type instrument (e.g., MicroR meter) to ensure that inadvertant spread of contamination does not occur. Therefore, to this first category, a category for "radiological survey -swipes" using the Ludlum-type instrument should be added. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements and information for screening transport vehicles are included in DOT regulations at 49 CFR 173.443 (Contamination Control). Sample delivery personnel also should be asked to remain on site until a successful DOT screen of the package is completed.
2 Information regarding AHRF training offered by the New York State Biodefense Laboratory is available at: http://www.wadsworth.org/testing/biodefense/training.html 3 Information regarding NHSRC’s Technology Testing and Evaluation Program (TTEP) can be found at: http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/ttep.html
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• Samples used during AHRF assessments, equipment testing, proficiency testing, and/or training, should be representative of the type of samples and level of hazards that might be expected to be received at the particular facility. • If available, portable X-ray equipment can be used to inspect sample packages for explosive devices prior to bringing samples into the screening facility.
3.0 Adapting AHRFs to Meet Lab-Specific Needs – General Considerations
Since publication of the AHRF Protocol, several federal, state, and municipal laboratories have begun designing and/or implementing AHRFs or AHRF-like areas, including EPA Regions 1 and 10; the states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia; New York City; and at least one Canadian Defence laboratory. Through information provided by APHL, EPA currently is aware of 26 public health laboratories with unique spaces designated for screening unknown samples within the laboratory, three public health laboratories with spaces designated to perform this function outside the laboratory, and six public health laboratories with plans for either external or internal designated spaces. Laboratories are pursuing, designing, or implementing AHRFs or AHRF-like areas ranging from mobile carts containing radiation screening equipment to expanded versions of the prototype AHRFs built by the ECBC and located at the EPA Region 1 and NYSDOH Wadsworth Center laboratories. These facilities vary greatly in design and purpose depending on the needs of each laboratory.
As stated in the AHRF Screening Protocol and in this supplement document, the protocol is a guide and does not require use of the prototype facilities (e.g., those located at the EPA Region 1 and NYSDOH Wadsworth Center laboratories). The AHRF and the AHRF Protocol may be adjusted to conform to the capabilities and goals of a particular location. A tiered approach to describing potential AHRF designs is described in the draft DHS Best Practices Guide. Although both the draft DHS guide and this supplement provide general guidelines and considerations for AHRF design, neither document provides site-specific engineering designs. Therefore, individuals planning to design and install an AHRF or AHRF-like area should contact individuals responsible for existing or planned facilities. Contact information is provided in Attachment 2 for individuals wanting to obtain information regarding the design, intended use, and current status of these facilities.
3.1 AHRF Design Options
AHRFs can range in size and configuration depending on host laboratory needs and resources. In general, given their intended purpose to screen unknown or high-risk samples, these facilities are designed to protect analysts and laboratories by isolating sample contents, controlling ventilation, and providing sufficient space for screening tools and temporary storage of hazardous samples.. The two prototype facilities at the EPA Region 1 and New York State Public Health laboratories were developed in concert with the 2008 AHRF Protocol and represent a “Tier 1” screening facility as described in the draft DHS Best Practices Guide. Three tiers are identified in the guidelines and their discriminating criteria are outlined below:
• Tier 1: A dedicated facility that is separate from the laboratory and maximizes air containment through robust engineering controls. Includes both Biosafety Level 3 and Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-3 and BSL-2) 4 rooms, such as a Class III glove box and a fume
4 Guidance regarding BSL-2 and BSL-3 areas is provided in the U.S. Department of Health Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) at: http://cdc.goc/OD/ohs/bmbl5/bmbl5toc.htm; and the joint CDC/USDA Animal and Health Inspection Services at: http://www.selescagents.gov/Resources.
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hood, both with chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal filtration systems. Room air is also vented through a CBR-filtration system. • Tier 2: A dedicated room within the laboratory containing an isolated airflow system, along with a fume hood and a Class III glove box, both with CBR filtration. • Tier 3: A dedicated room isolated from the building air flow system, containing a glove box with CBR filtration.
The Tier 1 self-standing facilities, while costly to build and operate, offer the best protection for the laboratory as well as the personnel screening the samples. Tier 2 and 3 facilities, however, provide alternatives where resources and/or needs are limited. The important point to emphasize is the intent to maximize sample containment when testing/exposing unknown samples. This is accomplished by using the best available glove box (or other sample isolation area), properly filtering air that is released from the glove box, and isolating and venting room air from the rest of the building or other routes of exposure. Also critical to the process is the availability of well- trained AHRF personnel to implement the screening equipment and to assess information about the sample before potential hazards are transferred inside the host or alternative laboratory. For facilities with limited AHRFs, highly suspicious samples may be better managed by an alternate laboratory or the FBI.
In developing this supplement, workgroup members reviewed the design of some existing or planned AHRFs, primarily within the federal and state laboratory community. Of the laboratories involved in the workgroup, that either plan to construct or have existing AHRFs, five (including the two prototypes noted above) are considered to be stand-alone Tier 1 AHRF facilities. Although there is considerable variability in design detail, these facilities emphasize the Tier 1 air containment and control criteria. Each of these facilities plans to use a range of screening equipment, from that prescribed in the 2008 AHRF Protocol to a more expanded inventory, including gas chromatography (GC) and Fourier transform infrared spectrometry (FTIR). At least two of these Tier 1 facilities have or are considering adding a biological screening component including polymerase chain reaction (PCR), immunoassay, and microscopy. One facility also includes X-ray capability for detecting explosive devices.
The remaining workgroup laboratories with AHRF or AHRF-like facilities represent a continuum of Tier 2 to Tier 3 capabilities. In most cases, laboratories have created or modified one or two areas within an existing laboratory. Most include, at a minimum, a Class III glove box with CBR filtration, and isolate room air from the rest of the laboratory. Configurations are highly variable, with sample containers typically received into a fume hood and then transferred into a glove box for analysis. These in-laboratory AHRFs also use a range of screening tools, deferring to the equipment used in the 2008 Protocol as a reference point, but often also using GC, FTIR, and/or PCR and immunoassays as appropriate. A common practice or intent among these laboratories also is to use the AHRF to conduct a preliminary screen and take sub-samples for transfer to other areas within the building for further analyses. The choice of equipment and the extent of analyses conducted in the AHRF depend on available space and room configuration. Each laboratory either has or plans to have their own protocol for receiving and handling unknown or high risk samples.
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3.2 General Considerations regarding Engineering Designs and Controls
The three tiers discussed above represent a range of general AHRF design configurations. There are many possible variations in the design of an AHRF or AHRF-like area within each tier and again much will depend on an individual laboratory’s needs. Before recommending a specific facility configuration, laboratories should consider the following factors:
• Laboratory capabilities for handling specific hazard categories - For example, a public health laboratory designed to analyze samples for biological hazards may have specific needs to screen samples for radiological or chemical hazards prior to clearing the samples for entrance into the laboratory. • Intended type of analyses - To what extent might the AHRF or AHRF-like area be used to perform quantitative and/or confirmatory analyses in addition to screening for the presence of general hazard categories? • Number of samples expected - Will the AHRF be used as a sample production/processing facility (high sample throughput) in addition to a screening facility for unknown samples (low sample volume) or both? • Available expertise to operate facility and equipment • Available resources to construct and/or retrofit space for an AHRF • Available resources to maintain the AHRF or AHRF-like area, including ensuring its availability in an emergency • Available resources for purchase and maintenance of screening equipment5 • Availability of backup electrical power source and voltage conditioning
Once the scope and functionality (i.e., intended use) of an AHRF are determined, more specific design parameters can be established. Although the list of these parameters can be long, a few key considerations are identified below:
• Size of room(s), equipment spacing/location, work space per person • Ventilation/filtration configuration • Air temperature and humidity controls • Protective clothing/gear storage and emergency shower space • Communication system within the AHRF, and between the laboratory and the AHRF • TV monitors, video, and photographic equipment • Sample and waste storage • Sample receipt portal (size, indoor-outdoor operation) • Sample pass-through and containment controls (e.g., sample transfer from receiving portal to fume hood to glove box) • Work station design (e.g., ease of sample access and manipulation) • Available horizontal space for results reporting and recordkeeping • Available equipment resources • Available space to store backup instruments, cables, batteries, instrument manuals, calibration sources, etc.
5 Information regarding storage, treatment, and disposal of hazardous samples is provided in U.S. EPA’s Laboratory Sample Disposal Information Document – Companion to Standardized Analytical Methods for Environemental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events (SAM) Revision 5.0. Anticipated publication November 2010.
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• Available space and resources for ensuring security while in both stand-by and operational modes, including security cameras, alarms, stationing of personnel at entrances and egresses during an event, etc.
4.0 Screening Equipment
The sample screening equipment included in the 2008 AHRF Protocol was specifically selected to be: (1) relatively simple to operate, (2) low cost, and (3) reasonably reliable. While the AHRF protocol provides a baseline set of screening tools, it is understood that additional or alternative tools are available and the ultimate choice of equipment will depend on a given laboratory’s preferences and needs, availability and skills of laboratory personnel, and availability of funds to purchase and maintain an AHRF operation. This section provides summary information regarding the screening equipment included in the AHRF Protocol (Section 4.1), as well as additional or alternative equipment that is either currently being used or is being considered for use by EPA responders, On-scene Coordinators (OSCs), and/or existing or planned AHRFs (Section 4.2). Additional information on this equipment, including costs and available non-vendor equipment testing information, is provided in EPA’s Field Screening Equipment Information Guide – Companion to Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events (SAM) (Note: anticipated publication date unknown) and in Attachments 1 and 3 of this document.
4.1 Equipment Included in September 2008 AHRF Protocol
Table 1 lists the tools and equipment that are included in the AHRF Protocol, along with corresponding analyte categories and hazard types targeted by the equipment.
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Table 1. AHRF Screening Equipment Types AHRF SCREENING EQUIPMENT Protocol TARGET ANALYTES Section Transport Container Survey (immediately upon receipt, outside the AHRF) Radiological MicroR Meter gamma 2.1 • Gamma Ray Emission Survey scintillator Transport Container Screen (inside the AHRF) Radiological Alpha, beta, gamma 3.2 • Alpha and Beta emitters (container surface) (1) Survey scintillator with data logger • Gamma Ray emitters (contact dose) Chemical Wipe with M8 paper if any 3.3 • Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX) Screen unusual contamination is • Blister agents (H, HD, HN, HT, and lewisite) visible • Any organic liquid Explosives Colorimetric Indicator 3.4 • Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters, nitramines, inorganic Screen nitrate compounds. Primary Sample Container Screen (in fume hood or equivalent) Radiological Alpha, beta, gamma 4.3 • Alpha and Beta emitters (container surface) (1) Survey scintillator with data logger • Gamma Ray emitters (contact dose) Explosives Colorimetric Indicator 4.5 • Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters, nitramines, inorganic Screen nitrate compounds Chemical Flame Spectrophotometer 4.1 • Compounds containing phosphorous or sulfur Screen (FSP) • Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX) • Blister agents (H, HD, HN, HT, and lewisite) Ion Mobility Spectrometer 4.1 • Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX) (IMS) • Blister agents (HD, HN, lewisite) M8 Paper 4.4 • Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX) • Blister agents (H, HD, HN, HT, and lewisite) • Any organic liquid
Sample Screen (in glove box) Radiological Alpha, beta scintillator with 5.5 • Alpha and Beta emitters (sample surface) Survey data logger Explosives Colorimetric Indicator 5.8 • Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters, nitramines, inorganic Screen nitrate compounds Thermal susceptibility test 5.9 • Explosive materials (2) • Energetic materials Chemical Photoionization Detector 5.4 • Most volatile organic compounds (VOCs) (3) Screen (PID) and Combustible • Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX) Gas Indicator (CGI) • Blood agents (CK, AC) • Blister agents (H, HD, HN, HT, and lewisite) • Choking agents (CG) FSP 5.6 • Compounds containing phosphorous or sulfur • Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX) • Blister agents (H, HD, HN, HT, and lewisite) IMS 5.6 • Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX) • Blister agents (HD, HN, Lewisite) Colorimetric paper tests: 5.12 – • Acidity/alkalinity, oxidizing compounds, alkylating pH, starch iodide, DB-3 5.13 agents (Mustard) Colorimetric enzyme test: 5.11 • Nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX) nerve agent detection kit Colorimetric test for 5.16 • Lewisite and other arsenic compounds arsenic compounds (1) Wipes are used for radiological screens of container surfaces using the alpha, beta, gamma scintillator (2) Thermal susceptibility tests use a portion of sample in a contained space (biological safety cabinet). (3) PID and CGI do not identify or distinguish between VOCs. AC – Hydrogen cyanide GB – Sarin VX – Nerve agent CG – Phosgene GD – Soman CK – Cyanogen chloride HD – Sulfur mustard DB-3 – [4-(4’-nitrobenzyl)pyridine] HN – Nitrogen mustard GA - Tabun HT – Sulfur mustard with agent
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4.1.1 AHRF Assessments –Screening Equipment Results
During the AHRF Protocol assessments performed in 2007, the protocol and screening tool inventory (chemical, explosive, and radiological equipment) were tested using simulants. The selection of simulants was based on relatively non-toxic compounds that would mimic detection properties of the target analytes. Details and results of the assessments are provided in the Final Report – Assessment of All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol - Revision 1.0, EPA/600/R-09/098, September 2010. A description of assessment samples used is provided in Section 5.6 (Proficiency Testing). A total of 88 unknown samples were prepared and processed during the assessments; hazard classes were identified correctly for 78 of these samples. Because the assessment samples were unknown to assessment participants, samples were screened for multiple potential hazards independent of the simulants they contained. Depending on the step of the protocol during which hazards were detected, samples were either isolated (e.g., early detection of gamma radiation) or continued through the entire AHRF protocol screening process. Tables 2 and 3 provide present the screening results from each of the assessments at the NYSDOH facility (Table 2) and the EPA Region 1 facility (Table 3).
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Table 2. Comparison of Sample Screening Results at U.S. EPA Region 1 AHRF Note: Shaded results correspond to samples screened during the second round assessment. Unshaded results correspond to samples screened during the first round assessment. Equipment Simulant (Matrix) Starch- NAV Thermal Comments Rad M8 pH PID FSP IMS ELITE DB-3 Iodide Ticket Susc. NEG NEG 5 POS POS NEG NEG – NEG POS – Positive results during sample Dimethoate (water) NEG NEG 4–8 POS POS NEG NEG – NEG NEG – screen inside glove box. NEG NEG 5 NEG NEG NEG NEG – NEG NEG – – NEG – – POS POS POS – POS – – – CEES NEG – – POS POS POS – – – – – (sand) Positive results during sample NEG – – POS POS POS – – – – – (1) screen inside glove box. CEES NEG NEG – POS POS NEG NEG POS – – – (soybean oil) NEG NEG (1) 6 POS POS NEG NEG POS NEG – – CEES (neat) NEG POS 6 POS POS POS – – – – – Positive result during sample NEG – – NEG NEG NEG POS – – – – screen inside glove box. Nitrocellulose (sand) Positive during transport container NEG NEG – NEG NEG NEG POS – – – – screen in fume hood. Positive result during sample Nitrocellulose (70% in IPA) NEG NEG – NEG NEG NEG POS – – – – screen inside glove box. Gamma emitter POS – – – – – – – – – – (Cs-137 button source) Positive result during transport container screen at sample Gamma emitter POS – – – – – – – – – – receipt. (Cs-137 calibration disk) CAFA (neat) NEG – – NEG NEG NEG – – – – NEG – Aerosil® (neat) NEG – – NEG NEG NEG – – – – NEG – Alpha/Beta Positive result for gamma during (2) POS – – – – – – – – – – (thorium mantle) package screen at sample receipt. Alpha/Beta Positive result for beta during POS – – – – – – – – – – (Sr-90 calibration disk) package screening in fume hood. Arsenic trichloride NEG – – POS POS POS – – – – – Positive results obtained during (sand) NEG – – POS POS POS – – – – – sample screen inside glove box. Arsenic trichloride NEG NEG (1) < 4 NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG – – – – (soybean oil) (3) NEG NEG (1) – NEG NEG NEG NEG – – – – – Positive result obtained during Arsenic trichloride (neat) NEG POS 0 NEG POS POS – – – – – sample screen inside glove box. H2O2 (1.78% in water) NEG NEG 4–7 NEG NEG NEG NEG – POS – – Positive result obtained during H2O2 (1.83% in water) NEG NEG 4–7 NEG NEG NEG NEG – POS – – sample screen inside glove box. H2O2 (1.30% in water) NEG NEG 6 NEG NEG NEG NEG – POS – –
H2O2 (35% in water) NEG NEG 1-2 NEG NEG NEG NEG – POS NEG –
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Equipment Simulant (Matrix) Starch- NAV Thermal Comments Rad M8 pH PID FSP IMS ELITE DB-3 Iodide Ticket Susc. DMMP NEG – 6 POS POS NEG NEG NEG NEG POS NEG (sand) NEG – 4–8 POS POS NEG – – NEG POS – (1) Positive results obtained during NEG NEG – POS POS NEG NEG POS – – – DMMP (soybean oil) (1) sample screen inside glove box. NEG NEG 4–8 POS POS NEG – NEG NEG POS – DMMP (water) NEG NEG 4–8 POS POS NEG – – – POS – DMMP (neat) NEG POS – POS POS NEG NEG NEG NEG POS – (1) Dimethoate NEG NEG – POS NEG NEG NEG NEG – – – (soybean oil) NEG – – NEG NEG NEG – – – POS NEG Positive result obtained during NEG – 5 POS POS NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG – sample screen inside glove box. Dimethoate (sand) NEG – 4–8 POS POS NEG NEG – NEG POS – Dimethoate (neat) NEG POS 5-6 POS POS NEG NEG NEG NEG POS – NEG – – NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG – – NEG – Blank (sand) NEG NEG – NEG NEG NEG NEG – – – – – NEG NEG (1) – NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG – – – – Blank (soybean oil) (1) NEG NEG – NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG – – – – NEG NEG 6 NEG NEG NEG NEG – NEG NEG – – Blank (water) NEG NEG 4–8 NEG NEG NEG NEG – NEG NEG – – (1) A drop of sample wetted the M8 paper, but no color change was observed after 1 minute. (2) Sample was intended for alpha/beta emission. Positive result for gamma radiation only; therefore, alpha/beta radiation was not evaluated. (3) The second sample was prepared by depositing arsenic trichloride in soybean oil onto a ceramic tile.
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Table 3. Comparison of Sample Screening Results at NYSDOH Health Center AHRF Note: Shaded results correspond to samples screened during the second round assessment. Unshaded results correspond to samples screened during the first round assessment. Equipment Simulant (Matrix) Starch NAV Thermal Comments Rad M8 pH PID FSP IMS ELITE DB-3 Iodide Ticket Susc NEG POS 1.0 POS POS NEG NEG POS NEG POS(1) – CEES (1) Positive results during sample NEG POS 1-2 POS POS POS NEG POS NEG POS – (sand) screen inside glove box. NEG – – POS POS POS – – – – – Positive result for alpha during (2) primary container screen in fume CEES POS NEG 4-5 POS NEG NEG NEG POS NEG NEG – hood. All other positives obtained (soybean oil) during sample screen in glove box. NEG NEG 4-5 POS POS NEG – POS – – – Positive results during sample CEES (neat) NEG – – POS POS POS – – – – – screen inside glove box. Positive results during sample NEG NEG 7 POS NEG NEG POS – NEG – – Nitrocellulose screen inside glove box. (sand) Positive result during primary NEG NEG – POS NEG NEG POS – – – POS container screen in fume hood. Nitrocellulose (70% in Positive result during sample screen NEG NEG 7 POS NEG NEG POS NEG POS POS – IPA) inside glove box. Gamma emitter POS – – – – – – – – – – (Cs-137 button source) Positive result for gamma during Gamma emitter package screen at sample receipt. POS – – – – – – – – – – (Cs-137 calibration disk) B. thuringiensis (pure) NEG NEG – NEG NEG NEG NEG – – – – – Positive result during sample screen Aerosil® (neat) NEG – – POS NEG NEG – – – – – inside glove box. Alpha/Beta Positive result for gamma during (4) POS – – – – – – – – – – (thorium mantle) package screen at sample receipt. Alpha/Beta Positive result for beta during POS – – – – – – – – – – (Sr-90 calibration disk) package screening in fume hood. (3) Arsenic trichloride NEG NEG 0-1 POS – POS NEG NEG NEG – – Positive results during sample (sand) NEG – – POS POS POS – – – – – screen inside glove box. Arsenic trichloride NEG NEG(3) 2 POS – POS NEG NEG NEG – – Positive results during sample (soybean oil) NEG – – NEG POS POS – – – – – screen inside glove box. Arsenic trichloride (1) NEG POS 0 POS POS POS NEG POS NEG POS - (neat)
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Equipment Simulant (Matrix) Starch NAV Thermal Comments Rad M8 pH PID FSP IMS ELITE DB-3 Iodide Ticket Susc H2O2 (3.3% in water) NEG NEG 5-6 POS NEG NEG NEG NEG POS NEG – Positive results during sample H2O2 (2.9% in water) NEG NEG 5 NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG POS NEG – screen inside glove box. H2O2 (1.30% in water) NEG NEG 6 NEG NEG NEG NEG – POS – – (1) H2O2 (35% in water) NEG NEG 1-2 NEG NEG NEG NEG – POS POS – NEG NEG 6-7 POS POS NEG NEG I(5) NEG POS – DMMP (sand) NEG NEG 5-6 POS POS NEG POS(6) NEG NEG POS – Positive results during sample DMMP NEG POS 5-6 POS NEG NEG NEG POS NEG POS – screen inside glove box. (soybean oil) NEG POS 6 NEG POS NEG – NEG NEG POS – DMMP (water) NEG NEG 5 POS POS NEG NEG – NEG POS – DMMP (neat) NEG POS 4 POS POS NEG NEG POS NEG POS – Positive results screening transport DMMP (carpet) NEG – – POS POS NEG – – – – – container headspace in fume hood. NEG POS(7) 7 POS POS NEG NEG POS NEG POS – Dimethoate (water) NEG POS(7) 4-5 POS POS NEG NEG POS NEG POS – Dimethoate NEG NEG(3) 6-7 POS NEG NEG NEG POS NEG POS – Positive results obtained during (soybean oil) NEG POS 6 POS POS NEG – NEG NEG POS – sample screen inside glove box. Dimethoate NEG POS 7 POS POS NEG NEG POS NEG POS – (sand) NEG NEG 7 POS POS NEG NEG NEG NEG POS – Dimethoate (neat) NEG POS 5-6 POS POS NEG NEG POS NEG POS – Positive result during sample screen NEG NEG 7.0 POS - NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG – Blank (sand) inside glove box. NEG NEG – NEG NEG NEG NEG NEG – – NEG – (3) Blank NEG NEG 6-7 NEG NEG NEG NEG POS NEG NEG – (3) Positive results obtained during (soybean oil) NEG NEG 6 NEG NEG NEG NEG – NEG POS – sample screen inside glove box. NEG NEG 6 NEG POS NEG NEG NEG NEG POS – Blank (water) NEG NEG 6 NEG NEG NEG NEG – NEG NEG – (1) AHRF technicians questioned this result, because the pH was well below the range required for the NAV ticket test. (2) Beta radiation was detected on the outside of the primary sample container, but was not detected during the sample screen. (3) Sample drop wetted paper but no color change was observed after 1 minute. (4) Sample was intended for alpha/beta emission. A positive result was obtained for gamma radiation only; therefore, alpha/beta radiation was not evaluated. (5) Sample was inconclusive. A very slight color change was observed. (6) Very small pink spot was observed. (7) Sample contained both an organic and aqueous layer. The organic layer gave a positive result.
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In general, under the controlled conditions provided during the assessments, the equipment performed well. The relatively high success rate for the unknown samples tested during the assessments (Table 2) was due in part to redundancy within the screening process (i.e., samples are screened using multiple screening techniques, at an average of nine tests per sample). Success was attributable to individuals having been well trained and practiced in using the equipment. As a caution, it is important to note that these screening results are considered hazard category indicators only and a not a confirmatory analytical technique. Further, testing using these tools can be impacted by multiple factors including equipment calibration status, shelf-life, detection sensitivity, and manufacture’s quality control (i.e., product consistency). Other factors affecting results can include temperature, humidity, operator technique (training), contaminant concentrations, and interferences within the sample and the surrounding environment.
The Assessment Report provides a detailed explanation of these results as well as possible explanations of why some results were not as expected. Although all tests were reasonably reliable, chemical screening tests had the most false positives or false negatives. Reasons for the chemical screening problems cannot be stated absolutely, but are assumed to be related to several possibilities, such as equipment sensitivity, cross contamination, unstable sample (i.e., vaporized), unsuitable simulant, difficulty reading color changes, etc. Radiation and explosive screening proved to be most reliable, with only three radiation samples having unexpected results and one explosives sample having unexpected results.
4.1.2 Independent Laboratory Testing of AHRF Chemical Screening Equipment
During development of the AHRF Protocol, EPA sponsored a laboratory test of 16 chemical screening tools, most of which were in use by first responders and being considered for use in AHRFs. The tools were evaluated for detection of several highly toxic chemicals, including chemical warfare agents. The purpose of the study was to verify instrument sensitivity at concentrations known to be hazardous to humans within minutes (i.e., Acute Exposure Guide Levels [AEGL] and the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation [RDTE] Standards published in U.S. Army Regulation 50.6).6 Each technology was tested with three replicate samples of each of three sample matrix types (i.e., vapor, liquid, or surface), containing either a chemical warfare agent (CWA) or toxic industrial compound (TIC), and equipment results were evaluated for false positives, false negatives, and repeatability. A summary of study results is provided in Attachment 3; additional details are provided in technology evaluation reports listed in Section 6.0.
6 Details regarding this study are included in the September 2007 and March 2008 Technology Evaluation Reports listed in Section 6.0.
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4.2 Considerations in Equipment Selection
Sample screening equipment selected can vary significantly depending on the design of the AHRF or AHRF-like area and the data and information needs of the host laboratory. As much as possible, equipment performance and limitations should be understood prior to equipment selection and/or interpretation of data results. Equipment selected for use in the AHRF protocol was intentionally designed to provide an overlap in detection of target hazards, to provide overall confirmation of results; laboratories should ensure that two or more pieces of equipment or test types are selected to ensure this confirmation capability. Laboratories should evaluate all available non-vendor and vendor information, and should also consider performing in-house studies to evaluate equipment performance under conditions of anticipated use. In selecting equipment for use in AHRF or AHRF-like areas, the following equipment capabilities and features should be understood and considered in terms of the intended use of the resulting data:
• Sample throughput (i.e., instrument response time) • Ease of use, including response interpretation • Potential for contamination • Stability and durability • Maintenance requirements • Portability and size • Ruggedness, including exposure to temperature and humidity extremes or fluctuations • Sample size needed • Sample preparation and/or destruction requirements • Application across multiple sample matrices and/or container surfaces • Detection levels and concentration ranges • Cost, including initial purchase and continuing operation • Interferences • Degree of qualitative (presence/absence) or quantitative detection • Error rate (e.g., false negatives/false positives) • Consistency/repeatability and reliability of results (precision and bias) • Intrinsic safety (e.g., will not detonate in the presence of explosives) • Hazards created by the instrument or corresponding screening test (e.g., heat source, corrosive reagents, gases) • Consumables required for equipment use and maintenance (e.g., calibration standards, reagents, etc.) • Availability of manufacturer/technical support
In selecting equipment for AHRF applications, it is recommended that laboratories envision the entire screening process to determine a suite of equipment that will be used, rather than basing selection on isolated equipment units or screening processes. This approach can facilitate decisions that balance equipment limitations against benefits (e.g., allowing for a degree of sensitivity and specificity), and allow for multiple tools to provide definitive indications of the presence of hazards. To decrease equipment contamination and increase sample throughput, laboratories should consider supplying two sets of equipment in those cases where the same equipment would be used in more than one area of the AHRF.
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4.3 Alternative and/or Additional Equipment Currently Being Used or Considered in AHRF
EPA and APHL are aware of approximately 20-30 laboratories that have incorporated, in varying degrees, the screening equipment included in the AHRF protocol. Additional or alternative equipment that is being used by EPA responders or is being used or considered for use by laboratories with AHRF or AHRF-like operations are listed in Table 4 and Figure 1; additional information regarding this equipment is provided throughout this section and in Attachment 1. Equipment in listed in Table 4 and Figure 1 does not imply that it is suitable for use in an AHRF of AHRF location. Each user must consider equipment performance capabilities and features, such as those provided in Section 4.2, before purchasing and implementing such equipment for AHRF purposes. Most of these additional or alternative tools can add complexity and cost to the screening process, but can also provide additional or more confirmatory results by identifying, with higher certainty, possible hazards and high risk agents. The information provided in this section is intended to briefly describe the general principles of operation, as well as benefits and limitations of equipment that is being used, or is being considered for use in screening unknown samples.
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Table 4. Threat Categories and Sample Screening Equipment
THREAT CATEGORY CODES Radiochemical: Chemical: Explosive: Biological: γ – Gamma Nerve – Nerve agents OX – Oxidizers Bio – Biological α – Alpha Mustard – Mustard agents NO3 – Nitro compounds β – Beta Lewisite – Lewisite and arsenic compounds Device – Explosive devices Other pH – pH Organics – organic solvents / water VOC – Volatile organic compounds Blood – Blood agents Choke – Choking agents
THREAT CATEGORY TARGET ANALYTES AHRF EQUIPMENT ADDITIONAL / ALTERNATIVE EQUIPMENT Attachment (Included in 2008 Protocol) Transport Container Survey (immediately upon receipt, outside the AHRF) Radiological γ • Gamma ray emission • MicroR meter gamma • Alpha, beta, and gamma Geiger–Müller (GM) 1a scintillator detector • Digital alpha, beta, and gamma GM or scintillation rate meter • Digital gamma rate meter / scaler • Gamma scintillation rate meter • Ion chamber meter • Radioisotope identifier Transport Container Screen (inside the AHRF) Radiological α / β • Alpha and beta emitters • Alpha, beta, and gamma • Alpha, beta, and gamma GM detector 1a (container surface) scintillator with data logger • Alpha and beta sample counter • Digital alpha, beta, and gamma rate meter / scaler • Digital alpha rate meter / scaler • Portable alpha and beta rate meter γ • Gamma ray emitters (contact • Alpha, beta, and gamma GM detector dose) • Digital alpha, beta, and gamma rate meter / scaler • Ion chamber meter Chemical Nerve • Nerve agents • Wipe with M8 paper • Ion Mobility Spectrometer (IMS)(1) 1b (2) Mustard • Mustards • Photoionization Detector (PID) (3) Lewisite • Lewisite • Flame Spectrophotometer (FSP) VOC • Any organic liquid • Colorimetric indicator paper
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THREAT CATEGORY TARGET ANALYTES AHRF EQUIPMENT ADDITIONAL / ALTERNATIVE EQUIPMENT Attachment (Included in 2008 Protocol) NO3 • Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters, Colorimetric indicator paper • Colorimetric spray kit 1b nitramines, inorganic nitrate compounds Device • Explosive devices • X ray 1j Primary Sample Container Screen (in fume hood or equivalent) Radiological α / β • Alpha and beta emitters • Alpha, beta, and gamma • Alpha, beta, and gamma GM detector 1a (container surface) scintillator with data logger • Alpha and beta sample counter • Analog alpha, beta, and gamma GM / scintillation rate meter • Digital alpha, beta, and gamma ratemeter / scaler • Digital alpha rate meter / scaler • Portable alpha and beta rate meter γ • Gamma ray emitters (contact • Alpha, beta, and gamma GM detector dose) • Analog alpha, beta, and gamma GM / scintillation rate meter • Digital alpha, beta, and gamma ratemeter / scaler • Ion chamber meter Explosives NO3 • Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters, • Colorimetric indicator paper • Colorimetric spray kit 1b nitramines, inorganic nitrate compounds Chemical Nerve • Nerve agents • Flame Spectrophotometer • Flame ionization detector (FID) 1e (FSP) Mustard • Mustards (FSP) • Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) 1c (IMS / ITMS) • Ion mobility spectrometer • Infrared spectroscopy (IR) 1f (PID / FID) 1 Lewisite • Lewisite (IMS) • Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS) 1g (FTIR / IR / (2) VOC • Compounds containing • Photoionization detector (PID) Raman) phosphorus or sulfur • Raman spectroscopy Nerve • Nerve agents • M8 paper • Colorimetric indicator paper 1b Mustard • Mustards Lewisite • Lewisite VOC • Organic liquids • Water-finding paper Sample Screen (in glove box) Radiological α / β • Alpha and beta emitters (sample • Alpha and beta scintillator • Analog alpha, beta, and gamma GM or 1a surface) with data logger scintillation rate meter • Digital alpha, beta, and gamma rate meter / scaler • Digital alpha rate meter / scaler Other • Radiological air particulate • Radiological air sampler sampling • Gamma emitters (dose rate) • Gamma air monitor / tracer
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THREAT CATEGORY TARGET ANALYTES AHRF EQUIPMENT ADDITIONAL / ALTERNATIVE EQUIPMENT Attachment (Included in 2008 Protocol) Explosives NO3 • Nitro aromatics, nitrate-esters, • Colorimetric indicator paper • Colorimetric kit 1b nitramines, inorganic nitrate • Colorimetric tube kit compounds OX • Explosive materials • Thermal susceptibility test(4) NO3 • Energetic materials Chemical Nerve • Nerve agents • Flame Spectrophotometer • Flame ionization detector (FID) 1e (FSP) (3) Mustard • Mustards (FSP) • Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) 1c (IMS / ITMS) (5) Lewisite • Lewisite • Ion mobility spectrometer • Gas chromatography (GC) 1f (PID / FID) (1) (5) Choke • Choking agents (IMS) • Infrared spectroscopy (IR) 1g (FTIR / IR / Raman) Blood • Blood agents • Photoionization detector • Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS) (2) 1h (GC) VOC • Compounds containing (PID) and combustible gas • Raman spectroscopy Pest phosphorus or sulfur indicator (CGI) • Most VOCs. Does not identify or distinguish between VOCs Nerve • Nerve agents • Colorimetric enzyme test: • Colorimetric indicator paper and tubes 1b CWA detection kit Mustard • Mustards / alkylating agents • Colorimetric test: [4-4’- nitrobenzyl)pyridine] (DB-3) dye kit Lewisite • Lewisite and arsenic compounds • Colorimetric test for arsenic OX • Oxidizing agents • Colorimetric tests: starch • Peroxide paper iodide paper
pH • Acidity / alkalinity • Colorimetric test: pH paper Biological Bio • Aerosolized particulates • Float test • Pathogens (bacteria, viruses, and protozoa) (1) IMS equipment detects HD and HN mustards only. Due to low response for VX, manufacturers recommend a heated, direct – contact attachment to reliably detect this compound. (2) References listed in Attachment 1 suggest that PIDs may not reliably detect CWAs, particularly if the device is not regularly cleaned or used at conditions other than room temperature and relative humidity of 50%. (3) Due to low response of FSP for VX, manufacturers recommend a heated, direct – contact attachment to reliably detect this compound. (4) Thermal susceptibility test is to be performed inside the bio-safety cabinet. (5) Aliquot is taken from sample if instrument cannot be operated in glove box
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Figure 1. Sample Screening Equipment
AHRF Protocol Alternative / Additional Equipment Equipment
Receipt of transportation container (outside AHRF) Receipt of transportation container (outside AHRF) Radiological • γ Spectrometer-MicroRmeter Radiological • α/β/γ Geiger-Müeller detector • Digital α/β/γ Geiger-Müeller / scintillation rate meter • Digital γ rate meter/scaler • γ scintillation rate meter • Ion chamber meter Explosives • X Ray
Secondary and primary sample container Secondary and primary sample container (inside AHRF – fumehood) (inside AHRF – fumehood) Radiological Radiological • α/β/γ Scintillator with data logger (container • α/β/γ Geiger-Müeller detector surface / contact dose) • α/β sample counter Chemical • Analog α/β/γ Geiger-Müeller / scintillation rate meter • M8 paper (colorimetric) • Digital α/β/γ ratemeter / scaler • Ion Mobility Spectrometry (primary container only) • Portable α/β rate meter • Flame Spectrophotometry (primary container only) • Ion chamber meter Explosives Chemical • Colorimetric • Flame Ionization Detector • Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy • Infrared Spectroscopy • Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometry • Photo Ionization Detector • Raman Spectroscopy Explosives • Colorimetric (spray kit) Sample screen inside glovebox Radiological • (2) α/β Scintillator with data logger Sample screen inside glovebox Chemical • Ion Mobility Spectrometry Radiological • Flame Spectrophotometry • Analog α/β/γ Geiger-Müeller / scintillation rate meter • Photo Ionization Detector • Digital α/β/γ rate meter / scaler Explosives • Digital α rate meter / scaler • Colorimetric • Radiological air sampling (1) • Thermal susceptibility test • γ air monitor / tracer (3) Biological Chemical • Float Test • Flame Ionization Detector • Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy Footnotes: • Infrared Spectroscopy (1) Thermal susceptibility test is performed using a small • Gas Chromatography sample aliquot, inside the bio-safety cabinet • Ion Trap Mobility Spectrometry (2) Aliquot taken from sample if instrument cannot be • Raman spectroscopy operated in glovebox Explosives (3) See Section 4.3.4 of this document for a discussion of • Colorimetric (tube and spray kits) biological screening
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4.3.1 Chemical
The information provided below is organized first by equipment that is included in the September 2008 AHRF Protocol detecting chemical hazards, followed by alternative or additional equipment that might be used to address the same hazard. Additional information regarding equipment capabilites is provided in Section 4.1, Attachments 1b – 1i, and Attachment 3. Sample screening equipment that is discussed in Section 4.1 and used in the September 2008 AHRF Protocol includes the following: • Colorimetric indicator papers, tubes, and enzyme detection kits • Flame spectrophotometer (FSP) • Ion mobility spectrometer (IMS) • Photoionization detector (PID)
Additional or alternative equipment that is either currently in use, or is being considered for use by EPA and/or AHRFs includes the following: • Flame ionization detector (FID) • Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) / infrared spectrometry (IR) • Gas chromatography (GC) • Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS) • Raman spectroscopy
Colorimetric indicator papers and tubes change color in the presence of a particular compound or hazard, in liquid or vapor form. In general, colorimetric tests are rapid and inexpensive. Although this screening tool typically requires little maintenance, colorimetric papers and tubes require replacement following use or expiration. Users should be cautioned that some colorimetric tests can result in false positives generated by many organic compounds, or may not be sensitive enough to detect low concentrations of hazards that may still pose a health danger. Color changes produced by these tests also can be difficult to discern and interpret, and results obtained may be affected by the operator’s ability to perceive certain color changes. Colorimetric tests are best used to identify compounds in liquid or air.
Flame spectrophotometers (FSPs) use atomic emission spectrometry to identify elements that can be excited by the thermal energy of the flame, and it can be optimized for known chemicals to provide rapid, real-time responses. FSPs are limited in that the use of a flame destroys the sample during analysis and makes them unsuitable for use in areas containing combustible gases. An exception is the AP2Ce model, which is designed to be used in explosive environments. FSPs also may not be specific for detection of sulfur- and phosphorus-containing compounds. Due to low response for VX, manufacturers recommend a heated, direct-contact attachment to reliably detect this compound. This lack of specificity can result in false positives for compounds such as CWAs. FSPs require special batteries and may require frequent gas calibration for optimum performance.
Ion mobility spectrometers (IMSs) are used to separate and identify ionized molecules in the gas phase based on their ion mobility in a carrier buffer gas. Quick response, high sensitivity, and a low occurrence of false negatives (when used within instrument thresholds) as well as the potential to detect many types of chemicals are some of the advantages. The ionization potential of certain target compounds may require special or higher range lamps. Due to low response for VX, manufacturers recommend a heated, direct-contact attachment to reliably detect this compound. IMS detectors require a high degree of maintenance, and some may use a radioactive source, such as Ni-63, which may impact transportability and storage. Additionally, IMSs with short drift tubes may produce poor resolution and/or false positives. Portable or handheld IMSs
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tend to require that the ions monitored be programmed in to elicit an alarm response; therefore, its use to detect non-specific toxic compounds may be limited.
Photoionization detectors (PIDs) use photons in the ultra-violet range to ionize molecules and are best used for air or headspace monitoring. These detectors can be optimized for specific compounds and have rapid, real-time responses. PIDs are limited in that they will not work well for compounds with low vapor pressure and, unless specifically programmed, many are not compound specific. For optimum performance, PIDs may also require frequent lamp cleaning and special batteries.
Flame ionization detectors (FIDs) are similar to PIDs, but use a hydrogen flame rather than a light source. Like PIDs, FIDs can be optimized for specific compounds, particularly hydrocarbons, and offer rapid, real-time responses. FIDs are limited in that they will not work well for compounds with low vapor pressures and, unless specifically programmed, many are not compound specific. Like FSPs, the use of a flame destroys the sample during analysis and may make an FID a poor choice to use in the presence of combustible gases. Additionally, FIDs may require frequent gas calibration for optimum performance and special batteries. FIDs are best used when monitoring air for compounds that can be burned.
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) and infrared spectrometry (IR) work by passing a beam of infrared light through a sample and measuring how much energy is absorbed at each wavelength. FTIR and IR boast large detection libraries of organic and inorganic compounds, and directly test for statistical equivalence between the measured material and each library material. Results interpretation requires some level of expertise, and affects the false identification rate. Compounds must have a covalent bond, and mixtures or complex matrices can elicit poor responses. Equipment also has a tendency to identify only the most predominant material(s) contained in a complex sample or matrix. Detection of ionic metals and weakly absorbing compounds is limited. FTIR offers an advantage over IR in that multiple wavelengths can be monitored simultaneously. FTIR and IR are best used in the field to determine unknown liquid or solid substances.
Gas chromatography (GC) works by vaporizing an injected sample or sample extract, the components of which are separated using a column. GC offers a variety of detectors (e.g., mass spectrometry, photo ionization) to identify and measure specific compounds, allowing for detection at low concentrations, and separation of complex mixtures (e.g., multi-phase or highly contaminated samples), and a robust compound library generally unmatched by other devices. GC limitations include the need for experienced operators to use, maintain, and troubleshoot the instrument; relatively long analysis time; poor response for compounds that do not ionize well; and indirect analysis of functional groups. The equipment also requires consumable carrier and calibration gases that require specific safety precautions and can increase equipment costs. With the appropriate sample preparation equipment and materials, GC can be used for determining compounds in liquid, solid, or vapor forms.
Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS) is a version of IMS with improved performance. ITMS can identify compounds in a mixture and determine their quantity through measuring the time of flight of ionized molecules down a drift tube. Differential migration of ions through a homogeneous electric field offers improved sensitivity over conventional IMS. Limitations and costs associated with this equipment are similar to those associated with the IMS equipment.
Raman spectroscopy works by Raman effect, which occurs when light passes through a molecule and interacts with the bonds and electron cloud of that molecule. Advantages of Raman spectroscopy include detection through non-opaque containers and identification of solid or liquid
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compounds as well as some ionic compounds. Some limitations of Raman spectroscopy include: small compound libraries; fluorescence interference from target compounds, container, or sunlight; poor detection of dilute concentrations (<10%); difficulty separating mixtures; and lack of detection of metals and some ionic compounds. Raman spectrometry is best coupled with IR or FTIR for the identification of unknown liquid or solid substances.
4.3.2 Explosives
The information provided below is organized first by equipment that is included in the September 2008 AHRF Protocol detecting explosive hazards, followed by alternative or additional equipment that might be used to address the same hazard. Additional information regarding equipment capabilites is provided in Section 4.1 and Attachments 1b – 1j. Sample screening equipment that is discussed in Section 4.1 and used in the September 2008 AHRF Protocol includes the following: • Colorimetric • Thermal susceptibility test
Additional or alternative equipment that is either currently in use, or is being considered for use by EPA and/or AHRFs includes the following: • Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) • Ion mobility spectrometer (IMS) • Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS) • X ray
Colorimetric indicator papers, tubes and spray kits change color in the presence of particular explosive compounds (e.g., oxidizers, nitro- or nitrate-containing compounds). In general, colorimetric tests are rapid and inexpensive. Although this screening tool typically requires little maintenance, colorimetric papers and tubes require replacement following use or expiration. Users should be cautioned that some colorimetric tests can result in false positives generated by many organic compounds, or may not be sensitive enough to detect low concentrations of hazards that may still pose a health danger. Some colorimetric tests require the use of heat or corrosive agents that may pose health and safety concerns, particularly when used in a glove box. Color changes produced by these tests also can be difficult to discern and interpret, and results obtained may be affected by the operator’s ability to perceive certain color changes. Colorimetric tests are best used to identify compounds in liquid or air.
Thermal susceptibility test determines whether the sample contains explosive or energetic materials. The test involves holding a small amount of sample to a flame, and observing the reaction. The advantages of this test are its low cost and use of readily available equipment (i.e., high-quality butane lighter). Disadvantages include its use of an open flame (which may cause safety concerns) and its inability to identify secondary explosives, which require more energy for detection or ignition than can be provided by a flame.
Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) works by passing a beam of infrared light through a sample and measuring how much energy is absorbed at each wavelength. FTIR boasts large detection libraries of organic and inorganic compounds, and directly test for statistical equivalence between the measured material and each library material. Results interpretation requires some level of expertise, and affects the false identification rate. Compounds must have a covalent bond, and mixtures or complex matrices can elicit poor responses. Equipment also has a tendency to identify only the most predominant material(s) contained in a complex sample or matrix. Detection of ionic metals and weakly absorbing compounds is limited. FTIR is capable
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of monitoring multiple wavelengths and is best used in the field to determine unknown liquid or solid substances.
Ion mobility spectrometers (IMSs) are used to separate and identify ionized molecules in the gas phase based on their ion mobility in a carrier buffer gas. Quick response, high sensitivity, and a low occurrence of false negatives (when used within instrument thresholds) as well as the potential to detect many types of chemicals are some of the advantages. IMS detectors require a high degree of maintenance, and some use a radioactive source, such as Ni-63, which may impact transportability and storage. Additionally, IMSs with short drift tubes may produce poor resolution and/or false positives. Portable or handheld IMSs tend to require that the ions monitored be programmed in to illicit an alarm response; therefore, its use to detect non-specific toxic compounds may be limited.
Ion trap mobility spectrometry (ITMS) is a version of IMS (see IMS description above) that can identify compounds in a mixture and determine their quantity through measuring the time of flight of ionized molecules down a drift tube. Differential migration of ions through a homogeneous electric field offers improved sensitivity over conventional IMS.
X ray machines and devices equipped with computed axial tomography can be used to scan containers and suspicious packages for explosive and detonation devices. Specially designed software containing libraries of known explosive threats can color code suspected threats to assist the operator identification. X ray detection is limited in that compounds hidden within electronic devices or other containers cannot be identified and may not be detected.
4.3.3 Radiological
The information provided below is organized first by equipment that is included in the September 2008 AHRF Protocol for detecting radiological hazards, followed by alternative or additional equipment that might be used to address the same hazard. Additional information regarding equipment capabilities is provided in Section 4.1 and Attachment 1a.
Radiological surveys should be performed by personnel trained in, and familiar with, the equipment that is used. It is recommended that these procedures be performed by a radiation technician/professional trained to use the AHRF equipment and to perform the calculations that may be required to obtain survey results. Technical expertise regarding use of this equipment is available within EPA’s Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA) or other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), EPA’s Radiological Laboratory Sample Screening Analysis Guide for Incidents of National Significance (EPA 402-R-09-008, June 2009) available at: www.epa.gov/narel, and the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). Information also is available through U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Reach Back Programs, including: Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), which provides initial DOE radiological emergency response including identifying the presence of radioactive contamination on personnel, equipment, and property at an incident or accident scene; Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS), which provides 24-hour medical consultation on health problems associated with radiation accidents, as well as training programs for emergency response teams comprised of health professionals; the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), which provides technical response to resolve incidents involving improvised nuclear and radiological dispersal devices, including locating and identifying devices or materials; and the Joint Technical Operations Team (JTOT), which is a combined DoD and DOE team that provides technical advice and assistance to DoD.
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Sample screening equipment that is discussed in Section 4.1 and used in the September 2008 AHRF Protocol includes the following: • Gamma spectrometer - radioisotope identifier (RIID)/MicroR meter • Alpha/beta sample counter • Alpha/beta scintillators (ABS)
Additional or alternative equipment that is either currently in use, or is being considered for use by EPA and/or other organizations in AHRF projects includes the following: • Geiger–Müller (GM) detectors • Ion chamber (IC) • Gamma sample counter • Digital alpha, beta, and gamma rate meter/scaler • Radiological air sampler • Gamma air monitor/tracer
Gamma Spectrometer - Radioisotope identifier (RIID)/ MicroR meter is a portable gamma spectroscopy system that detects and identifies multiple gamma and x-ray nuclides, providing qualitative and quantitative analysis. The RIID may be operated in a variety of survey modes with gamma-ray isotopic dose rates as the default mode of operation. The RIID uses a sodium iodide crystal with a thallium activator NaI(Tl)) gamma scintillation detector or a HP(Ge) detector, to allow for detection and identification of gamma or x-rays from 15 keV to 3 meV. Gamma rays interact with the NaI(Tl) detector crystal producing light that is converted to an electronic pulse by a photomultipler tube coupled to the detector. The charge is collected, amplified, and shaped to form an electrical pulse, which is digitized and sorted according to its amplitude (pulse height) and then stored as a count at a particular energy in a multichannel analyzer. An HP(Ge) detector has higher resolution for gamma rays than the NaI(Tl) detector, and must be operated at liquid nitrogen temperature because it is a semiconductor. Gamma- and x-rays interact with the HP(Ge) detector to produce ion pairs. Electrons are collected to produce output pulses that are amplified, digitized, and sorted according to their amplitude and then stored as a count at a particular energy in a multichannel analyzer. The spectra produced by NaI(Tl) and HP(Ge) detectors contain peaks at energies that are characteristic of various radionuclides, and are analyzed using instrument-specific software algorithms to determine the radionuclides that are present. Note that RIIDs, especially those with NaI(Tl) detectors, may misidentify the radionuclides present due to spectral anomalies and ambiguities in the analysis, and a secondary analysis of the gamma-ray spectrum by an expert may be needed to ensure the accuracy of the identification. Use of HP(Ge) detectors will minimize radioisotope misidentification. When unshielded these systems have high backgrounds from naturally occurring radionuclides.
Alpha/beta sample counter uses zinc sulfide, with a silver activator (ZnS(Ag)) adhered to a thick plastic scintillation disk for detection of alpha and beta particles. The ZnS(Ag) scintillator is used for measuring alpha particles. The plastic scintillator is used for measuring beta particles and has low sensitivity for interference from gamma rays. The detector is connected to a dual channel scaler to create an alpha/beta sample counter. A radioactive particle strikes the scintillator and produces a flash of low energy photons, which are directed to the photosensitive surface of a photomultiplier tube (PMT) where they eject electrons via the photoelectric effect. The electrons are collected in the photomultiplier and amplified to yield a current pulse, and the current pulse is converted to a voltage pulse height proportional to the number of photoelectrons and photons reaching the tube, which in turn is proportional to the initial energy of the electron. The pulse height analyzer provides alpha beta separation and displays the counts for each on dedicated readouts.
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Alpha/beta scintillator (ABS) uses zinc sulfide, with a silver activator, (ZnS(Ag)) adhered to a thick plastic scintillation material for detection of alpha particles and beta particles. The ZnS(Ag) scintillator is used for measuring alpha particles. The plastic scintillator is used for measuring beta particles and has low sensitivity for interference from gamma rays. A radioactive particle strikes the scintillator and produces a flash of low energy photons. These photons are directed to the photosensitive surface of a photomultiplier tube (PMT) where they eject electrons via the photoelectric effect. The electrons are collected in the photomultiplier and amplified to yield a current pulse, which is converted to a voltage pulse height proportional to the number of photoelectrons and photons reaching the tube, which in turn is proportional to the initial energy of the fast electron.
Geiger–Müller (GM) detectors are used for non-specific detection of ionizing radiation. Depending on their configuration, these detectors will respond to beta, gamma, and less reliably to alpha emissions. The GM detector can be configured in three basic designs: side window (cylindrical), end window, and pancake. The primary application of the side window GM is the measurement of gamma exposure rates, however, its wall can be thin enough to permit higher energy betas (>300 keV) to be counted. The end window is most commonly used to count beta activity, but can also be used to count alpha particles; however, alpha efficiencies are low due to attenuation in the window of the detector. The pancake GM tube, a truncated cylinder resembling a pancake, is used primarily to detect beta radiation, but also has some sensitivity for gamma and (low sensitivity) for alpha. It is often used for counting surfaces, air filters, and swipes. As with the end window GM tube, one end is covered with a thin (usually mica) window. When ionizing radiation passes through the cylinder, some of the gas molecules are ionized, creating charged ions and electrons. The strong electric field created by the electrodes accelerates the ions towards the cathode and the electrons towards the anode. The ion pairs gain sufficient energy to ionize further gas molecules through collisions, creating an avalanche of charged particles, resulting in a short, intense pulse of current that passes from the negative electrode to the positive electrode and is measured or counted. Most detectors include an audio amplifier that produces an audible click on discharge. The number of pulses per second measures the intensity of the radiation field. Typical GM counters display a count rate (e.g., counts per minute [cpm] and/or an exposure rate (e.g. milliroentgen per hour [mR/h]). The exposure rate does not relate to a dose rate as the detector does not discriminate between radiations of different energies. The instrument will not detect alpha or beta energies below 4MeV or 70keV, respectively.
Ion chambers (ICs) measure the number of ions within a pressurized or non-pressurized gas medium (usually air). If equipped with a mylar window, these instruments can detect gamma rays, beta particles, and alpha particles. A gas filled enclosure is contained between two conducting electrodes. When the gas between the electrodes is ionized by alpha particles, beta particles, or gamma-ray emission, the ions and dissociated electrons move to the electrodes of the opposite polarity, creating an ionization current that may be measured by a galvanometer or electrometer. Each ion essentially deposits or moves a small electric charge to or from an electrode such that the accumulated charge is proportional to the number of like-charged ions. A voltage potential (which differs depending on whether alpha particles, beta particles, or gamma ray are the target) is applied between the electrodes, allowing the device to work continuously by sweeping up electrons and preventing the device from becoming saturated. This equipment generally has a slow response time.
Digital alpha, beta, and gamma rate meter/scaler is a detector system utilizing one or a combination of either a GM detector, ABS detector, or proportional counter detector with a digital readout. The detector system can be either stationary or portable. Detection limitations are dependent on detector types selected for use; detector efficiency(s) for the analyte (alpha, beta, gamma) being measured; emission energy(s) of the alpha particle. beta particle, and/or
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gamma ray being measured; attenuation coefficient(s) of the sample media; and geometric configuration of the source to the detector.
Radiological air sampler is a device that mechanically pulls a known quantity of ambient air, containing radioactive aerosols of particulates/gas, through filter paper and/or absorption cartridges. The filter paper or cartridges are subsequently analyzed for alpha- beta- and gamma- emitting radionuclides in air-particulates or gases.
Gamma air monitor/tracer is a continuous dose evaluation monitoring system for gamma emitters in ambient air. Data is transmitted from one or more monitoring systems to a centralized data collection repository for evaluation. This equipment detects only gamma radiation, and unshielded systems have high backgrounds from naturally occurring radioactivity.
4.3.4 Biological
The AHRF protocol is currently designed to address most unknown samples, however, the biological screening test included in the 2008 Protocol is limited to a simple “float test,” which is considered inadequate by the majority of existing facilities and stakeholders. PCR is being considered for use at several locations, but can be pathogen specific and requires a relatively high level of expertise and specialized materials. For this reason, these tests were not included in the 2008 AHRF protocol. Instead, the protocol recommends that once the explosive, radiological, and chemical screens are complete, an aliquot, or sub-sample be collected for transfer into an appropriate laboratory for biological analyses.
Many laboratories have decided to include PCR as a part of their screening process. Others have also added microscopy and immunoassays. Although these additions add complexity and require specialized expertise, the tests can provide significantly improved information regarding the presence of biological hazards. Laboratories that are interested in screening or handling unknown samples for biological hazards should be prepared to provide ample BSL-3 space and personnel protection to accommodate necessary equipment, material storage and sample manipulation. Handling such samples outside a glove box would require dedicated lab space and safety envelops similar to those used in a standard BSL-3 laboratory.
5.0 Quality Control
5.1 Quality Assurance and Quality Control Procedures
The AHRF Protocol assumes that each facility will have Quality Assurance and Quality Control (QA/QC) procedures that describe, at a minimum, how samples will be analyzed, instrument calibration and routine instrument checks, equipment maintenance schedules, sample tracking procedures, staff training, data reporting, and storage of chemicals and reagents.
5.2 Quality Assurance/Quality Control included in AHRF Protocol
The AHRF Protocol assumes that the host laboratory has an approved QMP in place and implements QMP QA/QC procedures and requirements as appropriate for the AHRF or AHRF- like area. The protocol also provides certain QA/QC measures that can and should be applied generally across all AHRF or AHRF-like areas, including:
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• Documentation of sample receipt/transfer on chain-of-custody forms • Example standardized data reporting forms • Instructions to screen areas within the AHRF (i.e., glove box and hood) for contamination
5.3 Equipment Maintenance
The AHRFs and AHRF-like areas are intended for screening unknown samples that may be received by a laboratory to protect the laboratory from hazards and to facilitate decision making regarding sample dissemination. Because these facilities and areas are intended for use in such emergency situations, rather than in routine sample screening or analysis, it is important to establish procedures to ensure that AHRFs and AHRF equipment are maintained and ready for immediate use if needed, and to ensure that staff is trained and readily available. Routine schedules for equipment calibration and maintenance are critical to ensure that results will support decision making; these tasks cannot be performed on an as-needed basis. Monthly checks, using calibration standards or surrogate samples (depending on the equipment), are recommended. Each laboratory also should establish a routine proficiency testing (PT) program that includes testing equipment readings and responsiveness (see Section 5.6). If possible, it is also recommended that laboratories have a second set of equipment readily available to compensate for possible equipment malfunctions or cases when equipment maintenance must be performed off-site. To decrease equipment contamination and increase sample throughput, laboratories should consider supplying two sets of equipment in those cases where the same equipment would be used in more than one area of the AHRF.
5.4 Additional Quality Assurance/Quality Control Considerations
Each AHRF should have a site-specific Quality Assurance or Quality Management Plan that includes procedures for monitoring and controlling contamination, engineering controls, equipment, data reporting, and sample storage and disposal. In addition to the QA/QC procedures included in the AHRF Protocol, laboratories should consider applying requirements meant to maximize the accuracy of sample screening results. These requirements are highly dependent on each specific sample-receipt scenario and must consider the number, type, and amount of sample(s) received, the type of sample screening required, and the rapidity of decision making needed. Such requirements could include: documentation of equipment calibration prior to sample screening (when sufficient time is available), screening replicate aliquots of each sample (when sufficient sample material and time is available), and periodic screening of blanks and performance evaluation samples. Laboratories also should evaluate equipment to establish expected precision and bias of the screening techniques that can be used to assess whether observed error rates (e.g., false positive/false negative) meet or exceed tolerable error rates.
5.5 Training
Experience using the AHRF screening equipment is critical to accurate and rapid decision making, and the importance of training cannot be over-emphasized. AHRFs and AHRF-like areas must be ready to function at a moment’s notice, and AHRF staff should be prepared to interpret equipment results, communicate, and make decisions on short notice. During the AHRF assessments in 2007, observers and AHRF staff noted difficulty interpreting results, particularly with colorimetric tests. In addition, as noted throughout the AHRF Protocol, radiological surveys should be performed by personnel trained in, and familiar with, the equipment used. The protocol recommends further that these procedures be performed by a radiation technician/professional trained both in the use of the AHRF equipment and in performing the calculations that may be required to obtain survey results. Equipment vendors often offer training sessions, either in person, by telephone, or online. The New York State Public Health Laboratory in Albany, New
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York, also has been offering training since installation of their AHRF prototype in 2008, including hands-on training on screening equipment used in the 2008 AHRF Protocol, safety considerations, and interpretation of data results. Additional information on this training is provided in Section 2.2 of this document. Each laboratory should determine a schedule to ensure this training is provided initially and periodically as needed, and should determine a site-specific PT program (see Section 5.6).
5.6 Proficiency Testing
In addition to training, AHRF trial runs or assessments are recommended frequently enough to ensure AHRF personnel and equipment are adequately prepared. These trials can be combined with routine equipment maintenance schedules and scenarios that involve use of the AHRF equipment to screen unknown samples (including complex-matrix samples), and should address both the use of screening equipment and interpretation of results to support decision making. Screening unknown samples for potential hazards is a complex and challenging process that poses numerous considerations. As noted in Section 4.0 and Attachment 1, each analytical technique has inherent limitations that require testing various matrices spiked with compounds of concern (or surrogates) to better understand and interpret equipment responses.
Simulant samples used during the 2007 assessments of the AHRF screening procedures are listed in Table 6. Simulant samples were tested independently, prior to the assessments to ensure the simulants and concentration levels were sufficient to produce a response using the AHRF equipment, and to document expected results for comparison with results obtained during the assessments. Factors considered for determining simulant concentrations included: (1) risk levels of the agent that the simulant is targeting, (2) hazard type (inhalation, dermal contact, ingestion), and (3) expected equipment sensitivity. Results are provided in EPA’s Final Report – Assessment of All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Protocol.
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Table 5. Samples Used during AHRF Protocol Assessments Simulant Samples used during Assessments1 Target Hazard Initial Assessments Follow-up Assessments DMMP, neat DMMP, neat (applied to carpet) Nerve agent (G-agent) Not analyzed DMMP in water (18-23 mg/g) Nerve agent (G-agent) DMMP in soybean oil (19 - 20 mg/g) DMMP in soybean oil (21-24 mg/g) Nerve agent (G-agent) DMMP in sand (19 - 23 mg/g) DMMP in sand (21-22 mg/g) Nerve agent (G-agent) Dimethoate, neat Not analyzed Nerve agent (V-agent) Dimethoate in water Dimethoate in water (24.16 mg/g) Nerve agent (G-agent) (11 - 22 mg/g, dissolved first in MeCl2) Dimethoate in sand (21 - 40 mg/g) Dimethoate in sand (18-20 mg/g) Nerve agent (G-agent) Dimethoate in soybean oil (18 - 24 mg/g) Dimethoate in soybean oil (20-22 mg/g) Nerve agent (G-agent) CEES, neat Not analyzed Blister agent (HD) CEES in sand (11 - 22 mg/g) CEES in sand (11-12 mg/g) Blister agent (HD) CEES in sand (10 - 12 mg/g) Not analyzed Blister agent (HD) CEES in soybean oil (10 - 12 mg/g) CEES in soybean oil (10-12 mg/g) Blister agent (HD) H2O2 (2 - 3%, 35% by weight in water) H2O2 (1-2% by weight in water) Oxidizer Nitrocellulose (70% by weight in IPA) Not analyzed Explosive Nitrocellulose (3 - 8% in sand/IPA) Nitrocellulose (2-4% in sand/IPA) Explosive AsCl3, neat Not analyzed Blister agent (Lewisite) AsCl3 in sand (19 - 20 mg/g) AsCl3 in sand (29-31 mg/g) Blister agent (Lewisite) AsCl3 in soybean oil (19 - 20 mg/g) AsCl3 in soybean oil (29 mg/g) Blister agent (Lewisite) AsCl3 in soybean oil Blister agent (Lewisite) (30.94 mg/g applied to ceramic tile) < 1 µCi Cesium-137 button source (1) 5 µCi Cesium-137 calibration disk Gamma radiation Thorium lantern mantle (1) (2) 0.1 µCi Strontium-90 (calibration disk Alpha/beta radiation ® ® Celite Analytical Filter Aid (CAFA) Aerosil Biological Bacillus thuringiensis Not analyzed Biological Blank, water Blank, water Blank Blank, sand Blank, sand Blank Blank, soybean oil Blank, soybean oil Blank
AsCl3 = Arsenic trichloride DMMP = Dimethyl methylphosphonate CEES = 2-Chloroethyl ethyl sulfide H2O2 = Hydrogen peroxide IPA = Isopropyl alcohol MeCl2 = Methylene chloride Note: Assessment results indicated a need for additional evaluation of non-reference sample matrices such as those that might be received at a facility (e.g., soil, powders, building materials).
(1) All radiological simulants were packaged in 8”x8”x8” cardboard boxes for use during the assessments. Button sources were 2” x 0.25”. Calibration disks were 1” in diameter. (2) Thorium lantern mantles were determined to be an inappropriate choice for alpha/beta screening. Packages containing these mantles resulted in early detection of gamma radiation and, as a result, were not screened for alpha/beta radiation during the first two assessments. Strontium-90 calibration disks were selected as beta emitters for use during the second-round of assessments.
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5.6.1 Selection of Chemical Warfare Agent Simulants for AHRF Assessments
Because of the high toxicity of CWAs and issues concerning the shipment of samples containing these agents, less toxic structural analogs were selected based on compound similarities (i.e., vapor pressure, viscosity, water solubility). Dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP) was chosen as a simulant for sarin (GB), soman (GD) and VX due to the mutual presence of a P=O, P-CH3, and P-OCH2- bond. 2-Chloroethyl ethylsulfide (CEES) was chosen as a simulant for HD because it is identical in structure, with the exception of a missing chloride. With the exception of CEES and arsenic trichloride (AsCl3) in water, these simulants are assumed to be somewhat stable in the selected matrices.
5.6.2 Selection of Explosive Simulant
Picric acid was initially selected as the explosive simulant, but was found to be problematic (i.e., color changes were hard to detect using colorimetric tests, and the results of thermal susceptibility tests were questionable). Nitrocellulose was selected instead, and provided the expected results for the explosives tests during preliminary testing.
5.6.3 Selection of Oxidizer Simulant
An aqueous solution of hydrogen peroxide was selected to evaluate the AHRF screening procedures for detection of oxidizing agents. Due to the nature of oxidizer compounds (e.g., oxidizers may react with certain matrices such as corn oil), only liquid samples were evaluated.
5.6.4 Selection of Radiological Simulants
Radiological sources were selected and provided by EPA ORIA. During the first round of assessments, cesium-137 (Cs-137) button sources containing less than < 1 µCi Cs-137 were used as gamma emitters, and thorium lantern mantles were used as alpha/beta emitters. Because the thorium mantles gave a positive result for gamma radiation, packages containing these mantles resulted in early detection of gamma radiation and, as a result, were not screened for alpha/beta radiation during the first two assessments. These samples were replaced with strontium-90 (Sr- 90) calibration disks containing 0.1 µCi Sr-90 as a beta source during the second round of assessments. During the second round of assessments, ORIA also provided Cs-137 calibration disks containing 5 µCi.
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6.0 References
The following references and information sources have been used in developing this document and/or are recommended for additional information on the design of AHRFs or AHRF-like areas and sample screening equipment that could be used for AHRF applications. Several references also are cited in Attachments 1a – 1j for information specific to screening equipment that is or may be considered for use during AHRF sample screening.
• U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Draft Best Practices Guide [currently under development].
• Association of Public Health Laboratories. 2009 APHL All-Hazards Laboratory Preparedness Survey Data. http://www.aphl.org/aphlprograms/ep/ahr/Documents/APHLallHazWhitePaterEPR.pdf and http://www.aphl.org/aphlprograms/ep/ahr/pages/default.aspx.
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. September 2010. Field Screening Equipment Information Document Companion to Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events (SAM) Revision 5.0. EPA/600/R-10/091.
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. September 2010. Rapid Screening and Preliminary Identification Techniques and Methods Companion to Standardized Analytical Method for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events (SAM) Revision 5.0. EPA/600/R- 10/090.
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. September 2010. Sample Disposal Information Document – Companion to Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events (SAM) Revision 5.0. Anticipated publication November 2010.
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. September 2010. Final Report – Assessment of All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol – Revision 1.0, EPA/600/R-09/098.
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Homeland Security Research Center. January 2009. Technology Performance Summary for Chemical Detection Instruments. Technical Brief. EPA/600/S- 09/015.
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. September 2008. All Hazard Receipt Facility Screening Protocol, DHS/S&T-PUB-08-0001 and EPA/600/R- 08/105.
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Homeland Security Research Center. March 2008. Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facilities. Technology Evaluation Report. Washington, DC. EPA/600/R-08/034 http://oaspub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile?p_download_id=472251
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Homeland Security Research Center. September 2007. Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards Receipt Facilities. Technology Evaluation Report. By Kelly BT, McCauley M, Fricker C, Burckle E, and Fahey B. Washington, DC. U.S.EPA. EPA/600/R-07/104 http://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_record_report.cfm?dirEntryId=182964
Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement 33 December 2010 Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. August 2007. Draft Field Screening Workshop Instructor Guide. [Internal EPA draft; contact Matthew Magnuson, K or Scott Minameyer.]
Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement 34 December 2010 Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement
ATTACHMENT 1: Information Regarding Currently Available Screening Equipment for Use in All Hazards Receipt Facilities
Attachments 1a – 1j provide non-vendor information regarding the screening equipment included in the AHRF Protocol, as well as additional or alternative equipment that is either currently being used or is being considered for use by EPA responders, On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs), and/or existing or planned AHRFs. The equipment listed and information provided does not constitute nor should it be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology. The equipment listed also is not all inclusive of the types of available equipment or technologies; laboratories may consider and apply alternative or additional equipment as deemed appropriate to meet site-specific needs.
The listing of equipment in this attachment does not imply that it is suitable for use in an AHRF or AHRF location. Each user must consider equipment capabilities and features, such as those provided in Section 4.2, before purchasing and implementing such equipment for AHRF purposes. Attachment 1a: Radiochemistry Detection Equipment Threat Categories: Radiochemical: γ - Gamma survey α - Alpha survey β - Beta survey Other - Other radiochemical Radiochemistry Detection Equipment Equipment Included in 2008 AHRF Protocol Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type γ Gamma Berkeley (1) Homeland Security Test and Evaluation of Commercially • Radiation (field analysis) and data $9,590 Nucleonics SAM Available Radionuclide Identifiers: Results Round 1, Department logging. 935 Gamma of Homeland Security, System Assessment and Validation for Spectrometer Emergency Responders (SAVER), Market Survey Report for Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIIDs), prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC., January 2007 (must have access to System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responder [SAVER], http://saver.tamu.edu, or the Responder Knowledge Base [RKB], http://www2.rkb.mipt.org)
(2) Homeland Security Test and Evaluation of Commercially Available Radionuclide Identifiers: Results Round 2, Department of Homeland Security, System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER), Market Survey Report for Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIIDs), prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC., January 2007 (must have access to System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responder [SAVER], http://saver.tamu.edu or the Responder Knowledge Base [RKB], http://www2.rkb.mipt.org) (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory, Evaluation of Handheld Isotope Identifiers, J.M.Blackadar, J.A. Bounds, P.A. Hypes, D.J, Mercer, C.J. Sullivan, LA-UR-03-2742. http://www.ortec- online.com/papers/la_ur_03_2742.pdf
(4) Oak Ridge National Laboratory Instrument Evaluation Summary, BNC SAM-935. http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/BNCSAM935.pdf
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1a - 1 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type αβ Alpha / Beta Ludlum Model (1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Instrument Evaluation • The Ludlum 2929 (wipe counter), $4,850 2929 Summary: Ludlum Model 2929 Dual Scaler. 1996. manufactured by Ludlum Measurements, http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/2929.html Inc., performs alpha/beta sample counting. • Efficiencies (4pi geometry) for alpha emitters are reported as: 37% for 230Th; 39% for 238U; and 37% for 239Pu. • Efficiencies for beta emitters are: 8% for 14C; 27% for 99Tc; 29% for 137Cs; 26% for 90Sr/90Y. • Reported background (baseline) levels for alpha radiation is 3 cpm or less; background for beta is typically 80 cpm or less (10 µR/hr field).
αβ Alpha / Beta Ludlum Model (1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory • The Ludlum 2360 (compatable with the $1,650 2360 Ludlum 2929) is a portable rate meter manufactured by Ludlum Measurements, Inc. For use with various contamination probes. It performs alph/beta discrimination and data logging. • Typical efficiencies (4pi geometry) are reported as: 30% for 239 Pu; 30% for 90Sr/90Y; and 5% for 14C. • Reported background (baseline) level radiation is less than 3 cpm; background for beta radiation is typically 300 cpm or less (10 µR/hr field).
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1a - 2 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type γ Gamma Ludlum Model 19 (1) Department of Homeland Security. May 13, 2005. "System • Low-level gamma survey. $1,275 Micro R Results of Test and Evaluation of Commercially Available Survey Radiation Meter Meters, Version 1.3." (must have access to System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responder [SAVER], http://saver.tamu.edu, or the Responder Knowledge Base [RKB], http://www2.rkb.mipt.org)
(2) Department of Homeland Security. November 2006. "System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER), Commercial Radiation Pagers and Survey Meters Performance Assessment, Ludlum 19A Survey Meter." Prepared by Nevada Test Site (must have access to System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responder [SAVER], http://saver.tamu.edu, or the Responder Knowledge Base [RKB], http://www2.rkb.mipt.org)
(3) Pacific Northwest Laboratories. December 2004. ANSI 42.17A-1989 and 42-17C-1989 Compliance Tests. http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M19-ANSI- combined.pdf
(4) Ludlum. "Energy Response for Model 19." http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/response_curves/RC_M1 9.jpg Additional / Alternative Equipment γ Gamma Berkeley • Identifying and quantifying gamma- $9,800 Nucleonics SAM emitting radionuclides in water, air, 940 Gamma soil/sediment, and wipes. Spectrometer
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1a - 3 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type γ Gamma SAM 935 Model • Uses gamma-spectroscopy technology $23,840 935-2B-G and Quadratic Compression Algorithm to identify radionuclides within 1 second.
γ Gamma Thermo-Eberline (1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 2002. "Instrument Evaluation • Gamma emitters (not specific) in water, $2,150 RO20 Ion Summary, RO-20." air, soil / sediment and wipes. Chamber http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/ro20_0302.pdf • Instrument may be limited in assessing typical nominal background levels (e.g., (2) Pacific Northwestern Laboratory. August 2001. "PNNL-13603, approximately 10uR/hour). Beta and Gamma Correction Factors for the Eberline RO-20 Ionization Chamber Survey Instrument." http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/P NNL-13603.pdf
(3) Chiaro, P.J. Jr. September 1998. "Instrument and Controls Division, Technical Basis Document (TBD) and Users Guides ORNL/M-6604." http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/307886- oNHPGM/webviewable
(4) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. March 5 – 7 1996. "Discussion RO-20 problems/issues, posted 4/10/96." Minutes of the GOCO Health Physics (HP) Instrument Committee (HPIC) Meeting HDS-06-96 γ Alpha / Beta / Ludlum Model 15 (1) American National Standards Institute. December 2004. "Test • General portable survey meter for alpha $2,960 αβ Gamma Survey Meter Results Ludlum Model 15 ANSI N42.17C-1989 ." / beta / gamma radiation (not specific) in http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M15-ANSI- water, air, soil / sediment, and wipes. combined.pdf • Detects surface contamination. Alpha readings are particularly questionable for water or liquid samples.
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1a - 4 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type γ Alpha / Beta / Ludlum Model (1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. March, 1997. "Instrument • Digital scaler / rate meter for radiation; $1,070 αβ Gamma 2241-2 Survey Evaluation Summary, Ludlum Model 2241-2 with 44-9 GM 44-9 is pancake alpha / beta / gamma (Model Meter w/ 44-9 Probe." http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/2241_449.html detector. 2241) + probe for α/β/γ $230 (44-9 (2) American National Standards Institute. 2000. "ANSI N42-17A- detector) 1989 Test Results Model 2241-2 Digital Scaler/Ratemeter with Model 44-9 pancake G-M Detector." http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M2241- 2with44-9_ANSI%20N42.17A-1989.pdf
(3) American National Standards Institute. 2000. "ANSI N42-17A- 1989 Test Results Model 2241-2 Digital Scaler/Ratemeter." http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M2241_ANS I%20N42.17A-1989.pdf
(4) Department of Homeland Security. May 13, 2005. "System Results of Test and Evaluation of Commercially Available Survey Meters for the Department of Homeland Security, Version 1.3." (must have access to System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responder [SAVER], http://saver.tamu.edu, or the Responder Knowledge Base [RKB], http://www2.rkb.mipt.org)
(5) Ludlums. "Energy Response for Ludlum Model 44-9." http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/response_curves/RC_M4 4-9.jpg γ Alpha / Beta / Ludlum Model • Alpha / beta / gamma emitters (not $1,070 αβ Gamma 2241-3 Survey analyte specific) in air, water, soil / (Model Meter with Model sediment, and wipe. 2241-3) + 44-9 probe for $230 ( 44- α/β/γ; Model 43- 9) + $973 90 probe for α; or (43-90) + $ Model 44-2 probe 602 ( 44-2 for γ detector)
γ Alpha / Beta / Ludlum Model • Radiation emergency response kit for $2,525 αβ Gamma 2241-3RK alpha / beta / gamma. Radiation Response Kit
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1a - 5 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type γ Alpha / Beta / Ludlum Model (1) American National Standards Institute. 2000. "ANSI N42-17A- • Radiation (field analysis) and data $2730 + αβ Gamma 2350-1 w/ Data 1989 Test Results Model 2350-1 Data Logger." logging. Logger http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M2350- 1_ANSI%20N42.17A-1989.pdf γ Alpha / Beta / Ludlum Model • Floor contamination monitor for alpha, αβ Gamma 239-1F Floor beta, gamma emitters. Possible Monitor with adaptation for smooth, flat soil/sediment 2350-1 Data surfaces. Logger, 43-37- 682 Gas Proportinal Detector Coupled to Ludlum 2380-1 Data Logger
γ Alpha / Beta / Ludlum Model 3 (1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. September 1995. "Instrument • General portable survey meter for $495 αβ Gamma w/ Model 44-9 or Evaluation Summary, Ludlum Model 3 with a pancake GM radiation; 44-9 is pancake alpha / beta (Model 3) 43-90 probe probe." http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/3_w_gm.html gamma detector, 43-90 is alpha probe. + $215 (44- 9) (2) Los Alamos National Laboratory. 1995. "Evaluation of ANSI or N42-17A by Investigating the Effects of Temperature and + $905 (43- Humidity on the Response of Radiological Instruments." 90) http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/105496- W8qizd/webviewable/105496.pdf
(3) American National Standards Institute. February 2005. "Ludlum Model 3 ANSI N42-17A Tests." http://www.ludlums.com/images/stories/test_reports/M3-ANSI- combined.pdf αβ Alpha / Beta Ludlum Model • Alpha / beta radiation sample counter $3,350 3030 α/β Counter for water, air, soil / sediment, and wipes.
α Alpha Ludlum Model • Digital scaler / rate meter for radiation; $995 2241-2 Survey 43-90 probe is 100 cm2 alpha scintillator. (Model Meter w/ 43-90 2241) probe for α + $905 (43- 90)
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1a - 6 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type β Beta Ludlum Model (1) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 1997. "Instrument Evaluation • Digital scaler / rate meter for radiation; $995 + 2241-2 Survey Summary, Ludlum Model 2241-2 with 4-107 Beta Scintillation 44-107 probe is beta scintillator. Meter w/ 44-107 β Probe." http://public.ornl.gov/estd/ACTS/reports/2241_107.html Scintillation Probe Other Other RADeCo™ Model • Air sample collection only. $1,470 H810AC High Volume Air (Sample Collection) (1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas culinders, and reagents.
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1a - 7 Attachment 1b: Colorimetric Testing Equipment Threat Categories: Chemical: Explosive: CWA – Chemical warfare agents (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents) OX – Oxidizers Nerve – Nerve agents NO3 – Nitro compounds Mustard – Mustard agents pH – pH Organic – organic solvents / water TIC – Toxic industrial compounds (choking and blood agents, volatile organic compounds) S/P – Other sulfur / phosphorus compounds Colorimetric Testing Equipment Equipment Included in 2008 AHRF Protocol Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type Mustard Colorimetric DB-3 dye test • Detects alkylating agents. indicator • Consists of two solutions (4-(4- reagent nitrobenzyl) pyridine [11.25 mg/mL] in methanol and potassium carbonate [600 mg/mL] in water) and chromatography-grade silica paper, which turns an intense blue/purple in CWA Colorimetric M8 papers (1) Longworth, T.L., Barnhouse, J.L., and Ong, K.Y. February 1999. • Used for determining whether a Hazmat Organic indicator “Testing of Commercially Available Detectors Against Chemical Warfare liquid substance is organic or Smart M8: paper Agents: Summary Report.” Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, aqueous. It will turn specific colors in $6/roll AMSSB-RRT, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. the presence of CWAs (G-agents turn the paper yellow, V-agents turn the (2) U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command. October paper green, and mustard turns the 2001. “M8 Chemical Agent Detector Paper.” Soldier and Biological paper red). It is not specific for Chemical Command. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. CWAs, however, and will turn color in the presence of TICs and solvents. (3) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(4) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1b - 1 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type OX Colorimetric Starch Iodide • Detects oxidizing compounds (e.g. $80/100 indicator paper organic peroxide, nitrous acid, ozone) sheets paper which convert iodide ions to elemental iodine to form triiodide and pentaiodide ions. These ions react pH Colorimetric pH (Litmus) • Measures pH range of 0 – 14. pH is $2/100 indicator paper determined by observing the color sheets paper change. Additional / Alternative Equipment Nerve Colorimetric 3-Way Paper (1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening • HD, GB, and VX. $3/box Mustard indicator Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards • Color change occurs in seconds. paper Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. • Three sample types tested: surfaces http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf (VX only); liquid (GB, HD, and VX); and vapor (HD and GB). (2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf CWA Colorimetric M9 Chemical (1) DHS Prepardness Directorate Office of Grants and Testing. January • G, V, L and H agents in liquid; turns $5/roll Organic indicator Agent 2007. "Guide for the Selection of Chemical Detection Equipment for one color (reddish-brown) in response paper Detector Emergency First Responders, 3rd edition." to all agents. Paper • Similar false-positive responses as M8 (TICs such as solvents). • Once paper is wet, will not respond to chemical agent. OX Colorimetric Peroxide • For semi-quantitative determinations $30/100 indicator Paper in aqueous matrices. Determines sheets paper peroxide concentrations in the range of 0 – 25 mg/L. It can also be used for the determination of peracetic acid and other organic and inorganic hydroperoxides.
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1b - 2 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA Colorimetric Draeger Civil (1) Arnold, F. October 2006. "Measuring New Fumigants with Dräger- • Test Set 1: Hydrogen cyanide, $3,720 TIC indicator Defense Set Tubes®." Ninth International Working Conference on Stored Product phosgene, lewisite, arsenic, HN, HD. tube Kit Protection, New Chemicals and Food Residues." Sao Paulo, Brazil. • Test Set V: Nerve agents, phosgene, cyanogen chloride, chlorine, HD. (2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening • Works with Draegar tubes; many Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards types available. Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(3) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf CWA Colorimetric HazTech • KT1235 WMD testing system (two $3650 – OX indicator HazCat® cases): $4250 NO3 tube Chemical 1: EntryCat (alpha / beta / gamma or TIC Identification x-ray) system 2: SampleCat® (explosives, oxidizers, CWAs [GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, HD, HN, L]), solid, liquid, and gas. Also does amino acid and protein, screens non-biological substances, screens pesticides, immunoassay tests for anthrax, ricin, and botulinum toxin. CWA Colorimetric HazMat-Smart (1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening • Chlorine, pH, fluoride, nerve agents, $20/sheet OX indicator Strip® Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards oxidizers, arsenic, sulfides, mustard- TIC paper Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. H, and cyanide (in aerosol or liquid). S/P http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf
(2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
(3) Illinois Fire/EMS/Special Operations. 2003. "TopOff II Supplemental Report, Technological Field Tests."
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1b - 3 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA Colorimetric Nextteq® Civil (1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening • GA, GB, GD, VX, GF, HD, CG, AC, $1,875 OX indicator Defense Kit Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards CK, GP, HN, L, and DP. TIC paper / tube Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. • Included M8 paper did not respond kit http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf to GB in the water samples and gave false negative for VX with diesel fuel (2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening (1). Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards • Color change within 10 seconds with Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. M8; 25 seconds with M9; 5 seconds http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf with 3-way; and 3.5 minutes with colorimetric tubes (1). CWA Colorimetric Truetech (1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening • Nerve agent, sulfur mustard, 1189 TIC indicator M18A3 Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, $1190 paper Chemical Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. and phosgene. Agent http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf Detector Kit (2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf CWA Colorimetric Truetech (1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening • Lewisite, nerve, cyanide, and $178 – TIC indicator M272 Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards mustard chemical agents present in $386 $180- paper Chemical Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. water. $390 Agent Water http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf Testing Kit (2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf Organic Colorimetric Water-finding • Detects the presence of water in any $8/roll indicator Paper non-polar solvent or on any surface, paper and is especially useful for detecting
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1b - 4 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type NO3 Colorimetric Drop-Ex Plus Portable, liquid drop test kit: $210 indicator • Drop-Ex-1 is used to search for reagent kit GROUP A type explosives which include TNT, tetryl, TNB, DNT, picric acid and its salts. • Drop-Ex-2 is used to search for GROUP B type explosives which include dynamite, nitroglycerine, RDX, PETN, SEMTEX, nitrocellulose and smokeless powder. • Drop-Ex-3 is used to search for nitrate-based explosives which includes ANFO (ammonium nitrate- fuel oil), commercial and improvised explosives based on inorganic nitrates, black powder, flash powder, gun powder, potassium chlorate and nitrate, sulfur (powder), and ammonium nitrate (both fertilizer and aluminum). f
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1b - 5 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type NO3 Colorimetric Expray (1) Bjella, Kevin L. 2005. US Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Aerosol test kit for the immediate $260 indicator Research and Development Center. "Pre-Screening for Explosives detection and identification of spray kit Residues In Soil Prior to HPLC Analysis Utilizing Expray." explosives: ERDC/CRREL TN-05-2 • "E": Expray-1 is used to search for GROUP A type explosives which include TNT, tetryl, TNB, DNT, picric acid and its salts. • "X": Expray-2 is used to search for GROUP B type explosives which include dynamite, nitroglycerine, RDX, PETN, SEMTEX, nitrocellulose and smokeless powder • "I": Expray-3 is used to search for nitrate-based explosives which includes ANFO (ammonium nitrate- fuel oil), commercial and improvised explosives based on inorganic nitrates, black powder, flash powder, gun powder, potassium chlorate and nitrate, sulfur (powder), and ammonium nitrate (both fertilizer and aluminum). CWA Colorimetric Fluoride • Detects presence of fluoride in air $2/50 TIC indicator paper and liquid samples sheets (1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas culinders, and reagents.
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1b - 6 Attachment 1c: Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) Threat Categories: Chemical: Explosive: CWA – Chemical warfare agents (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents) NO3 – Nitro compounds VOC – Volatile organic compounds Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) Equipment Included in 2008 AHRF Protocol Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA IMS Smiths Detection (1) Ryoj, Sekioka; Yasuo, Takayama; Yasuo, Seto; Urasaki, Yukio. • Continuous, real-time detector of $10,000 TIC LCD 3.2E IMS 2007. "Detection Performance of Portable Colona Discharge CWAs and toxic chemicals that uses Ionization Type Mobility Spectrometer for CWAs." Bunseki Kagaku, enhanced IMS technology with a non- Vol. 56, No. 2, Annual Report. radioactive source. • Nerve, blister, blood, choking CWA IMS Smiths Detection (1) Longworth, Terri and Ong, Kwok. 2001. "Testing of the CAM- • Uses IMS principles to respond $10,000 TIC Chemical Agent Chemical Agent Monitor (Type L) Against Chemical Warfare Agents, selectively to toxic chemical agent Monitor IMS Summary Report." Domestic Preparedness Program. Edgewood vapors. Chemical Biological Center. • Detects nerve and blister agents to http://www.ecbc.army.mil/downloads/reports/ECBC_cam_typel.pdf specified NATO requirements. • Additional programming can be included to extend the range to cover other agents. Additional / Alternative Equipment CWA IMS APD 2000® (1) Ong, Kwonk; Longworth, Terri; Barnhouse, J.L. August 2000. • GA, GB, HD, GD, VX, L, pepper $9,620 NO3 “Domestic Preparedness Program: Testing of APD2000 Chemical spray, and mace in vapor and TIC Warfare Agent Detector Against Chemical Warfare Agents Summary aerosols. Report.” AMSSB-RRT Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, • Response time: HD, 3 – 52 seconds; Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. GA, 3 – 106 seconds; GB, 5 – 46 http://www.ecbc.army.mil/downloads/reports/ECBC_apd2000_detecto seconds (1). r.pdf • ~6 lbs. • CW or irritant mode; detects nerve (2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening and blister agents simultaneously Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All (CW mode). Hazards Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. • Contains back-flush mode (reverses http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf sample flow path) to protect cell assembly from cross contamination.
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1c - 1 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA IMS Sabre 4000 (1) Longworth, Terri and Ong, Kwok. August 2001. "Domestic • Detects GA and GB. $23,500 – NO3 Prepardness Program: Testing of SABRE 2000 Handheld Trace and $26,000 TIC Vapor Detector Against Chemical Warfare Agents Summary Report." Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. CWA IMS / PID Smiths Detection • Identifies/quantifies a broad range $27,360 NO3 HGVI of: CWAs (nerve, blister, choking TIC agents), TICs, explosives, flammables (from the ITF-25 list of high and CWA ITMS ITMS® Vapor (1) Longworth, Terri; Ong, Kwok; and Baranoski, John. 2002. • CWAs, TNT, NG, RDX, PETN, $24,490 NO3 Tracer™ "Domestic Preparedness Program, Testing of the VaporTracer EGDN, DNT, and HMX. VOC against Chemical Warfare Agents Summary Report." Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Research and Technology Directorate, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Http://www.ecbc.army.mil/downloads/reports/ECBC_vaportracer.pdf (1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1c - 2 Attachment 1d: Enzyme / Immunoassay Detection Equipment Threat Categories: Chemical: Explosive: CWA – Chemical warfare agents (CWAs) (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents) NO3 – Nitro compounds Blood – Blood agents Choke – Choking agents Enzyme / Immunoassay Detection Equipment Equipment Included in 2008 AHRF Protocol Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type NO3 Enzyme ELITE™ Card • Will detect more than 30 types of <$250/box Polymer explosives including a broad range of of 10 Technology nitroaromatics, aliphatics, inorganics, EL100 (ELITE™) and nitramines (including all TNT- cards based explosives, PETN, RDX, HMX, C-4, Semtex, TNT and derivatives, ammonium nitrate, and black powder).
CWA Enzyme Anachemia (1) National Research Council, Commission on Life Sciences, • Ticket from M256A kit developed by $40 – 190 Blood Polymer M256A1 kit Committee on R&D. 1999. “Chemical and Biological Terrorism, Anachemia Sciences, that can be Choke Technology Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response.” used to detect nerve agents (G, V), National Academy Press. Washington, D.C. blood agents (AC, CK), mustard (HD), and lewisite. (2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening • Can also detect other acetylcholine Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards esterase inhibitors such as organo- Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. phosphorus pesticides. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf • Kit includes multifunction card and M8/M9 or 3-way paper. (3) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening • In 2008 AHRF protocol, only the Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards enzyme ticket tests for nerve agents Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. are used. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf
(4) Petryk, M.W.P. and Lecavalier, P. 2006. "Response of M256A1 Detector Kit to the Direct Application of Liquid-phase Blister Agents, Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)." Technical Memorandum, DRDC Suffield TM 2006-023.
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1d - 1 Additional / Alternative Equipment Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA Enzyme ICX Agentase (1) Matthews, Robin; Altenbaugh, Amee L.; Longworth, Terri; Ong, • Engineered around enzyme polymer $150 Blood Polymer Chemical Kwok. 2007. "Evaluation of Chemical Agent Detector (CAD) Pens from technology to eliminate common Choke Technology Agent Detector ICx Agentase." Report 2007-ATT-008. Edgewood Chemical and environmental interferences. (CAD) Kit Biological Center. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. • Multi-phase testing capability allows users to test potentially contaminated (2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening victims, contaminated surfaces, and Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards unknown liquids or solids in any Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. environment. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf • Detects GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, HD, HN, AC, and CK. (1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1d - 2 Attachment 1e: Flame Spectrophotometry (FSP) Threat Categories: Chemical: CWA – Chemical warfare agents (CWAs) (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents) Blood – Blood agents Choke – Choking agents S/P – Other sulfur / phosphorus compounds TIC – Toxic industrial compounds (choking and blood agents and volatile organic compounds) Flame Spectrophotometry (FSP) Equipment Included in 2008 AHRF Protocol Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA FSP AP2Ce • A version of the AP2C, designed to $14,300 Blood be used in an explosive atmosphere. Choke • Same capabilities as AP2C: GA, GB, S/P GD, GF, VX, mustard gas in the form of vapor or aerosols. • Detects compounds of phosphorus (contained in G, V agents) and / or compounds of sulfur (contained in HD, V agents).
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1e - 1 Additional / Alternative Equipment Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA FSP AP2C (1) Kovacs, T. 2006. "Developed Physical Detection-Possibilities of • GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, Mustard gas $11,700 Blood Chemical Agents. " Acta Polytechnica Hungarica, 3(2): 133–141. in the form of vapor or aerosols. Choke • Detects compounds of phosphorus S/P (2) Rostker, B. July 1998. “Case Narrative Czech and French Reports (contained in G, V agents) and / or of Possible Chemical Agent Detections, Tab D, Czech and French compounds of sulfur (contained in Detection Equipment.” Department of Defense, Force Health Protection HD, V agents). and Readiness, Gulflink. • Also mentioned on the RKB: GE, VS, VN, VE, VG, H, HDL, HL, HT. (3) Longworth, Terri and Ong, K.Y. May 2001. “Domestic Preparedness • Discontinued by manufacturer; Program: Testing of Detectors Against Chemical Warfare Agents - AP4C is new model. Summary Report, UC AP2C Portable Chemical Contamination Control Monitor Collective Unit.” Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, AMSSB-RRT, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. http://www.ecbc.army.mil/downloads/reports/ECBC_uc_ap2c.pdf
(4) Seto, Y., Kanamori-Kataoka, M.,Tsuge, K., et al. 2005. "Sensing Technology for Chemical Warfare Agents and its Evaluation using Authentic Agents." National Research Institute of Police Science, Japan. Proceedings of the Tenth International Meeting on Chemical Sensors, Vol 108, Issues 1-2, 22, pp. 193-197.
CWA FSP AP4C (1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening • Flame spectrometry detector used $23,560 TIC Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards for the analysis of spectrochemical S/P Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. emissions. http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf • Looks for several elements in order to detect the presence of CW agents (2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening and TICs. Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards • Detects GA, GB, GD, GE, GF, VX, Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. HD, VS, VN, VE, VG, H, HDL, HL, http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf and HT; as well as TICs. • Can detect in solid, liquid, gas, and vapor / aerosol form. (1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1e - 2 Attachment 1f: Photo Ionization Detectors (PID) and Flame Ionization Detectors (FID) Threat Categories: Chemical: Explosive: CWA – Chemical warfare agents (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents) NO3 – Nitro compounds TIC – Toxic industrial compounds (choking and blood agents and volatile organic compounds) VOC - Volatile organic compounds Photo Ionization Detectors (PID) and Flame Ionization Detectors (FID) Equipment Included in 2008 AHRF Protocol Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA PID MultiRAE Plus (1) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening • Combines a PID with the standard $3,200 TIC PGM50-5P Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards four gases of a confined space Multigas Monitor Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. monitor (O2, lower explosive limit and PID http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf [LEL], and two toxic gas sensors) in one compact monitor with a sampling (2) EPA Technology Evaluation Report. 2007. "Testing of Screening pump. Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards • Measures volatile organic Receipt Facility." Washington, DC. compounds (VOCs) in the range 0.1 – http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf 2,000 ppm with 0.1 ppm resolution. • O2, CO, H2S, SO2, NO, NO2, Cl2,
(3) Idaho National Lab. 2006. "Data for First Responder Use of HCN, NH3, PH3. Photoionization Detectors for Vapor Chemical Constituents" • References listed in this Attachment http://www.inl.gov/technicalpublications/documents/3589641.pdf suggest that PIDs may not reliably detect CWAs, particularly if the device (4) DHS/SAVER. 2006 – 2008. "Multi-Sensor Meter Chemical is not regularly cleaned or used at Detectors Assessment Report" conditions other than room https://saver.fema.gov/actions/document.act.aspx?type=file&source=vi temperature and relative humidity of ew&actionCode=submit&id=5205 50%.
Additional / Alternative Equipment CWA IMS / PID Smiths Detection • Identifies/quantifies a broad range $27,360 NO3 HGVI of: CWAs (nerve, blister, choking TIC agents), TICs, explosives, flammables (from the ITF-25 list of
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1f - 1 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA PID / FID TVA1000B (1) Longworth, Terri; Barnhouse, Jacob; and Ong, Kwok. February • Air monitoring, including CWAs. $13,600 NO3 1999. “Testing of Commercially Available Detectors Against Chemical • References listed in this attachment TIC Warfare Agents: Summary Report.” AMSSB-RRT, Soldier and suggest that PIDs may not reliably Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. detect CWAs, particularly if the device http://www.chem-bio.com/resource/1999/dp_detectors_summary.pdf is not regularly cleaned or used at conditions other than room temperature and relative humidity of 50%.
VOC PID MSA • Multigas detector design to monitors $3,110- Orion/Sirius low-vapor pressure VOCs and $7,210 combustibles VOC PID Draeger - Multi- • Contains library of ~70 compounds $3,650 PID 2+ for detection of VOCs in soil, water, (1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents d t i h d
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1f - 2 Attachment 1g: Spectroscopy and Spectrophotometry Threat Categories: Chemical: Explosive: CWA – Chemical warfare agents (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents) NO3 – Nitro compounds VOC – Volatile organic compounds TIC – Toxic industrial compounds (choking and blood agents and VOCs) Spectroscopy and Spectrophotometry Additional / Alternative Equipment Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA Raman Ahura (1) Matthews, Robin; Longworth, Terri; Ong, Kwok; Zhu, Leyun. • TICs, TIMs, CWAs, narcotics, $34,000 – TIC Spectroscopy FirstDefender™ December 2006. "Testing of Ahura's FirstDefender Handheld precursors, white powders, binary $52,000 Chemical Identifier Against Toxic Industrial Chemicals." Edgewood compounds. Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. • Internal software contains spectra library of over 1300 chemicals. (2) Matthews, Robin; Ong, Kwok; Brown, C.L.; Zhu, L.; Knopp, K. • Results typically in 1 – 5 seconds January 2006. "Evaluation of Ahura's FirstDefender Handheld but up to 20 seconds in some cases. Chemical Identifier." pp. 1 – 53. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. • Solid or liquid substances. • ~4 lbs. • Has passed subset of Military Standard 810F tests (MIL STD). • Three modes of use with two as a point-and-shoot operation and the third as an in-vial measurment. Results from (1) suggest that there is greater precission with in-vial measurement than point-and-shoot.
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1g - 1 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA FTIR Ahura (1) Brown, Dr. Christopher. "Evaluation of Ahura Scientific's • Press-and-Shoot sampling $45,000 + NO3 TruDefender™ TruDefender™ FT Handheld Chemical Identifier." Edgewood capability can sample thousands of TIC FTIR Chemical Biological Center. Aberdeen, MD. chemicals including GA, GB, GD, GF, VX, HD, HN, L, and ITF-40 high hazard index TIMs in solids and liquids. • Spectral range: 4000 cm-1 to 650 cm-1; spectral resolution of 4 cm-1. • Headspace gas identification capabilities. • ~3 lbs. • Water-sealed unit that can be fully decontaminated. CWA FTIR Bruker Alpha • Detection in solid, liquid, or gas $15,000 + NO3 FTIR matrices. TIC NO3 FTIR Environics ID100 • Analyzes up to 25 gas compounds $59,410 TIC (organic and inorganic) at 10 scans / sec. • Can be connected with a laptop for extended analysis capability (unknowns). • Detects GA, GB, GD, VX, HD, L, DIMP, phosgene, ammonia, formaldehyde, hydrogen cyanide, sulfur dioxide, and carbon monoxide. • ~11.5 kg. CWA FTIR Gasmet™ DX- • Multi-component gas analyzer can $59,262 NO3 4030 FTIR measure 25 gases simultaneously TIC from a library of 250 gases. Option to expand to 50 gases using software. • Measureable gases include inorganics, corrosives, hydrocarbons, VOCs, ferric ferrocyanides, and perfluorocarbons.
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1g - 2 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA FTIR Smiths Detection (1) National Forensic Science Technology Center. July 2009. • Identifies: unknown liquids, $48,000 + NO3 HazMatID™ "Testing and Evaluation Report Form: HazMatID FTIR Evaluation, powders, and solids; nerve and TIC NFSTC Mobile Laboratory Project."https://www.nfstc.org/?dl_id=132 blister agents, TICs, white powders, explosives and clan lab precursors; drugs and drug precursors, and pesticides. • No sample prep required. • Library spectra of over 32,000 known compounds included. • ~23 lbs. • False readings: vinegar and hydrogen peroxide as water; sodium chloride as tellurium; diesel, lamp and kerosine as mineral oil; Al and Mg powder as tin oxide (1). FTIR Illuminator • Used in the same way as an FTIR, microscope allowing a visual comparison of system sample components such as powders. CWA FTIR Smiths Detection • Identifies: chemicals and $45,000 NO3 HazMatID™ components in mixtures, white TIC Ranger powders, WMDs, explosives, narcotics and drugs precursors, CWA FTIR Thermo Electron (1) Department of Homeland Security. March 2007. "Guide for the • Portable FTIR. $45,325 NO3 Transport Kit selection of Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency • Screens biological samples; no TIC Portable FTIR First Responders, 2nd Edition." specific identification of biological https://www.rkb.us/contentdetail.cfm?content_id=97649 samples (1). • No sample prep required. • Spectral range: 7800 – 375 cm-1; resolution: 16 – 1 cm-1 standard. CWA IR Draeger • Replaced by manufacturer with NO3 MultiWarn MultiWarn II. CWAC IR Draeger (1) Evans, Thomas; Werner, Juliane; Rose-Pehrsson, Susan; • Combustible gases and carbon NO3 MultiWarn II Hammond, Mark; and Callahan, John. August 29, 2003. "Phase 1: dioxide. TIC Laboratory Investigation of Portable Instruments for Submarine Air Monitoring." NRL/MR/6110--03-8704, Chemical Dyanmics and Diagnostics Branch, Chemisrtry Division. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA417349&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1g - 3 Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type VOC IR Draeger Polytron • List of detectable gases and vapors 7000 Series 2008: Detectors http://www.draeger.com/media/10/01/ 10/10011004/gas_list_br_9046375_e n.pdf • Relatively new item. Unable to find non-vendor information VOC Nephelometer MIE DataRam (1) Thorpe, A. and Walsh P.T. 2002. "Performance Testing of Three • Gas sensitivity from 0.001 to 400 $4,250 Portable, Direct-reading Dust Monitors." Ann. Occup. Hyg., Vol. 46, mg/m3; dust, smoke, mist, and No. 2, pp. 197 – 207 fumes. http://annhyg.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/46/2/197 (1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1g - 4 Attachment 1h: Gas Chromatography Threat Categories: Chemical: CWA – Chemical warfare agents (nerve, mustard and lewisite agents) TIC – Toxic industrial compounds (choking and blood agents and volatile organic compounds) VOC – Volatile organic compounds Gas Chromatography Additional / Alternative Equipment Threat Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Cat. Technology / Cost (1) Type CWA GC-MS (Mass Inficon HAPSITE® (1) National Institutes of Justice. 2000. "Guide for the Selection of • VOC's including TICs, some CWAs $100,000 TIC Spectrometry) Smart Chemical Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial Material Detection in air, soil and water. Vapors, VOC Identification Equipment for Emergency First Responders." headspace on water and soil. System http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/184449.htm Dynamic 104 range (i.e., working range from 5 ug/L – 50 mg/L – 20 (2) EPA Environmental Technology Verification Report. 1998. ug/L – 200 mg/L depending on "Field-portable Gas Chromatograph/Mass Spectrometer, Inficon, detection limit of analyte). Inc., HAPSITE." Las Vegas, NV. • Response time <12 minutes. http://www.epa.gov/etv/pubs/01_vr_inf.pdf • Throughput 2 – 3 water samples per hour (2). CWA GC-MAID (Micro Sentex (1) Baranoski, John; Longworth, Terri; Ong, Kwonk. August 2002. • HD, GA, and GB vapor; volatile $17,525 TIC Argon Ionization Scentoscreen Gas "Domestic Preparedness Program, Testing of the Scentoscreen hydorcarbons to polychlorinated VOC Detector) - Chromatograph Gas Chromatograph Instrument Against Chemical Warfare biphenyls. Portable. Agents Summary Report." Soldier and Biological Chemical • Retention times (in seconds): HD, Optional PID Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. 55 – 57; GB, 205 – 213; GA, 240 – http://www.edgewood.army.mil/downloads/reports/ECBC_scentos 246 (1). creen.pdf • <30 lbs. • Sampling time ~6 minutes at 250 CWA Agilent GC-MS TIC VOC CWA Shimatsu GC-MS TIC VOC (1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1h - 1 Attachment 1i: Mercury Detection Equipment Threat Categories: Chemical: Hg – Mercury Mercury Detection Equipment Additional / Alternative Equipment Threat Cat. Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Technology / Cost (1) Type Hg Mercury Jerome 411/431 (1) Ragan, Gregory; andAlvord, Gregory. 2006. "Assessing Mercury • Mercury in indoor air. $10,800 Analyzer Mercury Vapor Levels in the Wastewater of an Aging Research Laboratory Building." • Equipment also can be used to (gold film) Analyzer Chemical Health and Safety, 14(2), pp. 4 – 8. detect mercury vapor in head http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2346441 space above non-vapor samples
(2) Singhvi, R.,Turpin, R., Kalnicky, D.J., Patel, J. 2001. "Comparison of Field and Laboratory Methods for Monitoring Metallic Mercury Vapor in Indoor Air." Journal of Hazardous Materials, Issue 83(1-2), pp. 1 – 10.
Hg Mercury Lumex RA-915+ (1) EPA Technology Verification Report. May 2004. "Field • Mercury (incl. mercuric chloride, $19,650 Analyzer Mercury Vapor Measurment Technology for Mercury in Soil and Sediment." EPA methoxyethylmercuric acetate) in (gold film) Analyzer Office of Research and Development air, water, or solids. http://www.epa.gov/esd/cmb/site/pdf/papers/sb133.pdf (1) Approximate equipment costs do not include consumables, such as batteries, gas cylinders, and reagents
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1i - 1 Attachment 1j: X Ray - Information Regarding Currently Available Screening Equipment for Use in All Hazards Receipt Facilities Threat Categories: Explosive: Explosive devices X Ray Devices Additional and Alternative Equipment Threat Cat. Detection Product Name Non-vendor Performance Testing Analytes / Comments Approx. Technology / Cost Type Explosive X Ray • X-ray screening can be used to Devices detect hardware indicating the presence of an explosive device
Information in this attachment does not constitute EPA's endorsement or recommendation Attachment 1j - 1 Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement
ATTACHMENT 2: All Hazards Receipt Facility – Laboratory Contacts
AFFILIATION NAME CONTACT INFORMATION Biodefense Laboratory Wadsworth Center Christina Egan [email protected] (518) 473-6900 New York State Department of Health Kenneth Aldous [email protected] (518 ) 396-7114 120 New Scotland Ave. Albany, NY 12208 State of Connecticut, Jack Bennett [email protected] (860) 509-8530 Department of Public Health, Division of Laboratory Services 10 Clinton Street Hartford, CT 06106 Defense Research and Development Scott A. Scott.Holowachuk@crdc- (403) 544-4178 Canada Suffield, Operational Support Section Holowachuk rddc.gc.ca P.O. Box 4000, Stn. Main Medicine Hat, Alberta Canada State of Delaware Tara Lydick [email protected] (302) 223-1520 Delaware Public Health Laboratory, 30 Sunnyside Road Smyrna, DE 19977
Draft AHRF Protocol Supplement
ATTACHMENT 3: Technology Performance Summary for Chemical Detection Instruments [US EPA Technical Brief. January 2009. EPA/600/S-09/015]
Technology Performance Summary for Chemical Detection Instruments
Sixteen Instruments Tested to Determine Their Capability to EPA's National Homeland Security Screen Samples Submitted to All Hazards Receipt Facilities Research Center (NHSRC) develops All Hazards Receipt Facilities (AHRFs) were developed to products based on scientific research prescreen for chemical, radiochemical, and explosive hazards and technology evaluations. Our in samples collected during suspected terrorist attacks. The products and expertise are widely used in preventing, preparing for, and recovering technologies (i.e., instruments) used in AHRFs are intended from public health and environmental to screen samples prior to a full analysis, helping protect emergencies that arise from terrorist responders, laboratory workers, and others from potential injury. attacks. Our research and products address biological, radiological, or Evaluations of these technologies are summarized in two chemical warfare agents that could affect technology evaluation reports: indoor areas, outdoor areas, or water infrastructures. NHSRC rigorously tests 1) Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Chemical technologies against a wide range of Warfare Agents in All Hazards Receipt Facilities (CWAs) performance characteristics, requirements, and specifications. 2) Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Technology testing and evaluation is Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facilities (TICs) an effort to provide reliable information regarding the performance of The chemicals included in the reports were chosen because commercially available technologies they might be used during, or develop as a by-product that may have application for homeland from, a terrorist attack. security. The screening technologies are intended: • To be rapid and qualitative • To be simple to use and of relatively low cost • To indicate if samples contain hazardous chemicals of concern. Not all of the technologies evaluated were deemed suitable for the AHRF, although they might be useful for on scene responders.
Technology Descriptions The screening technologies tested were chosen based on a review of commercially available detection devices. From the variety of detection instruments reviewed, 16 screening technologies were selected for testing based on their suitability for use in AHRFs. The 16 technologies ranged from simple test papers, kits, and color-indicating tubes to hand-held electronic detectors based on ion mobility spectrometry (IMS), photoionization detection (PID), and flame spectrophotometry (FSP). Each technology was tested with three replicate samples for each matrix (vapor, liquid, or on a surface) containing either a CWA or TIC. CWAs and TICs were tested at concentrations
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology.
Attachment 3 - 1
known to be hazardous to humans within a few minutes of exposure (e.g., AEGL = Acute Exposure Guide Level (www.epa.gov/opptintr/aegl) and RDT&E = Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Standards (Chemical Surety, Chapter 6: Army Regulation 50-6, 26 June 2001)). The following performance parameters were evaluated for each technology: • Identifying the number of false positives/false negatives and the repeatability of test results • Time in which the instrument detected the presence of a chemical (i.e., response time) • Operational information including ease of use and response indication (e.g., color change indicating chemical detection) • Cost including initial, sample, and continuing operating costs. Technologies were tested to determine their detection capability for the following hazardous chemicals in different matrices: Vapor Liquid Surface Hydrogen cyanide Cyanide Nerve agent (VX) Cyanogen chloride Hydrogen peroxide Phosgene Fluori de Chlorine Sarin Hydrogen sulfide Sulfur mustard Arsine Nerve agent (VX) Sarin Sulfur mustard Testing Methodologies Each technology was tested with one chemical target agent at a time. Vapor Testing – Each screening technology was first sampled (or was exposed to) the clean air flow, and any response or indication from the screening technology was noted. After this background measurement, the 4-way valve was switched to the challenge plenum to deliver the target gas. The sequence of exposure to clean air, followed by exposure to the target gas, was carried out three times for each screening technology. The test apparatus used to evaluate the technologies allowed both the temperature and relative humidity (RH) to be adjusted. For each technology, the test sequence of three clean air blanks interspersed with three target gases was conducted under four different conditions (i.e., base temperature and RH; elevated temperature and RH; low temperature and RH; and base temperature and RH with an interferent, a mixture of hydrocarbons representative of polluted urban air). Testing at the base temperature and RH was conducted first, and if a technology failed under this condition, then no tests were conducted using the other three conditions. Liquid Testing – For CWAs, testing was conducted for technologies and target agents in liquid samples that were diluted in isopropyl alcohol (IPA) or deionized (DI) water. The detection device was tested with three blank samples of the solvent used (IPA or DI water) and three samples of the test solution containing the target agent. If a technology detected the chemical in at least one of the three samples in the pure solvent, then the challenge was repeated with a hydrocarbon mixture interferent (1% of the total volume) added to both the blank and challenge samples. For TICs, samples were prepared in DI water, in municipal tap water, and in DI water containing 3.0% sodium chloride by weight to simulate potential interfering sample matrices that might be encountered.
January 2009 EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology.
Attachment 3 - 2
Each screening technology was tested with three blank samples and with three samples containing the TICs. If the instrument failed to detect a TIC in all three challenge samples with the DI water matrix, then no tests were conducted with that TIC in tap or salt water. Surface Testing – Testing was conducted for each technology using three blank glass coupons and three glass coupons spiked with the nerve agent VX. All tests were conducted at room temperature and approximately 50% relative humidity. For those technologies that correctly indicated the presence of VX in at least one of these three tests, interference tests were then conducted by spiking approximately 1 mg of interferent per coupon onto both the blank and VX-spiked coupons. Additionally, for these same technologies, the blank and spiked coupon tests (without interferent) were repeated at the same low and high temperature and relative humidity conditions used in the vapor testing.
Test Results Table 1 provides a summary of the detection capability of the screening technologies tested. The following summarizes the testing information for each matrix form: Vapor • Draeger Civil Defense Kit (CDK) detected 6 of 7 chemicals 100% of the time • Sensidyne Gas Detector Tubes detected 5 of 5 chemicals 100% of the time • Draeger Chip Measurement System (CMS) Analyzer, MSA Single CWA Sampler Kit, and Nextteq Civil Defense Kit (CDK) detected 4 chemicals 100% of the time (out of 4, 5, and 5 chemicals tested, respectively) • Anachemia CM256A1, Safety Solutions HazMat Smart-Strip® (SS), and Truetech M183A detected 2 of 4 chemicals 100% of the time and Proengin AP2C detected 2 of 6 chemicals 100% of the time • Anachemia C2 and RAE Systems MultiRAE Plus detected 1 chemical 100% of the time (out of 5 and 8 chemicals tested, respectively) • Smiths Detection APD2000® did not detect either of the 2 chemicals tested 100% of the time. Liquid Due to the lack of acceptable results, samples that were diluted with isopropyl alcohol for CWA testing were not factored into the Table 1 summary results. One explanation for the lack of acceptable results may be that the technologies were not designed for application using non-aqueous solvents. • Truetech M272 Water Kit detected 3 of 3 chemicals 100% of the time • Severn Trent Services Eclox™ Strip detected 2 of 2 chemicals 100% of the time • Proengin AP2C and Safety Solutions HazMat Smart-Strip® detected 1 chemical 100% of the time (out of 4 and 5 chemicals, respectively) • Anachemia C2, Anachemia CM256A1, and Nextteq CDK did not detect any chemical 100% of the time (3 chemicals tested). Surface • All of the tested instruments detected the presence of VX 100% of the time, regardless of temperature, relative humidity, or presence of interferent. False Negatives and Positives False negative results indicate that the screening technology was not able to detect the presence of a chemical known to be present. This information is factored into the test results provided in Table 1 and in the summary information above.
January 2009 EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology.
Attachment 3 - 3
Testing for false positive responses was done using “clean” blank samples (i.e., clean air in the vapor testing, pure solvents in the liquid testing, and a clean coupon in the surface testing) or interferent blank samples (i.e., samples with the hydrocarbon mixture interferent, but without any test chemical present). Few false positives occurred. The following summarizes these occurrences: Vapor • False positive sarin responses occurred in all three interferent blank samples using Draeger CDK and the MSA Single CWA Kit • One false positive sulfur mustard response occurred in the three interferent blank samples using Smiths Detection APD2000®. Liquid • As indicated, false positives were observed only in the IPA blank samples, which was likely due to incompatibility of the screening technologies with that solvent. Proengin AP2C, in particular, responded positively to every IPA blank sample. Surface • Two false positive responses occurred using the Proengin AP2C at the high temperature and relative humidity condition. Repeatability Repeatability for the presence of TICs was tested for those instruments yielding quantitative results (i.e., Draeger CMS Analyzer, RAE Systems MultiRAE Plus, and Sensidyne Gas Detector Tubes). Quantitative results were recorded for each of the triplicate tests, and repeatability was calculated in terms of percent relative standard deviation (% RSD). The following summarizes the test information: • 32 of the 40 results had less than 15% RSD • Over half of the results (22 of 40) had less than 10% RSD • Several % RSD values exceeded 20% (e.g., Draeger CMS Analyzer for hydrogen cyanide and chlorine). Note: The PID principle of the MultiRAE Plus was not necessarily expected to respond to TICs or CWAs; however, it was tested based on the instrument’s promotion as a general toxic compound detector. Conclusions from this testing indicate that these instruments can provide reproducible results; however, this cannot be assumed to be the case under different environmental conditions (i.e., varying temperature and relative humidity) or with different concentrations.
Operational Information Table 2 provides operational information on the 16 screening technologies tested. Information included in the table includes: • Response time information (seconds or minutes to obtain an instrument response) • Ease of use • Response indication (e.g., detection is indicated by color change) • Initial cost. Response and Ease of Use Information The speed and simplicity of the vapor screening process varied widely among the tested technologies. Ease of use was not necessarily correlated with instruments’ detection capabilities. The following provides some general highlights on response time and ease of use for each sample matrix:
January 2009 EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology.
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Vapor • Color-indicating tube technologies were simple to use in principle, but differed in the time and difficulty of obtaining samples. o The number of manual pump strokes required to draw in the air sample ranged widely, as did the manual effort needed for those technologies requiring multiple pump strokes. o Nextteq CDK used an electric air sampling pump that greatly reduced the physical effort needed; however, it still required a few minutes to draw the required sample volume. • The three real-time technologies tested (RAE Systems MultiRAE Plus, Proengin AP2C, and Smiths Detection APD2000®) provided easy and rapid sample analysis for chemicals in vapor; however, there was a wide range in instruments’ detection capability. • Safety Solutions HazMat Smart-Strip® was the simplest technology, requiring only removal of a protective film to expose the indicating patches on the card. The detection response occurred within seconds. • Color-indicating tubes that require the minimum sample volume are preferable for use in AHRFs. Additionally, the use of an electrical sampling pump is helpful if a large numbers of samples are to be screened. Liquid and Surface • For surface samples, M8, M9, and 3-way indicating papers were especially easy to use and responses typically occurred within seconds. • For liquid samples, Severn Trent Services Eclox™ Strip and Truetech M272 Water Kit were relatively easy to use and responses occurred within minutes. • Analysis of liquid and surface samples with Proengin AP2C was relatively rapid because the detector’s attachments were simple to use. During homeland security events, it would be important for the technologies to screen for multiple chemicals simultaneously. Technologies using multiple color-indicating tubes at once provide this capability. Proengin AP2C provided multi-chemical detection and could be used to detect chemicals in vapor, liquid, and surface samples. Cost The initial cost of the technologies varied substantially, ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. The two exceptions were Proengin AP2C at a discounted cost of nearly $16,000 and Smiths Detection APD2000® at a cost of $10,000. Comparing purchase prices of different technologies can be misleading. Many of the technologies can screen relatively few samples with the originally supplied materials. For example, several technologies that rely on color-indicating tubes initially come with only enough tubes to screen 10 to 40 samples. Testing larger numbers of samples requires additional tubes. All technologies tested require consumable items such tubes and batteries. Simple test papers are the least expensive, with costs estimated at less than $0.50 per sample. Most technologies tested had similar costs per sample, typically ranging from $4 to $20 per sample. For more information about the technologies evaluated for use in AHRFs, or by first responders, visit the NHSRC Web site at www.epa.gov/nhsrc, or view the full reports, Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards Receipt Facilities at www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r07104.pdf and Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facilities at www.epa.gov/nhsrc/pubs/600r08034.pdf. Principal Investigator: Eric Koglin Feedback/Questions: Kathy Nickel (513) 569-7955
January 2009 EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology.
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Table 1. Instrument Detection/Screening Capabilities for Various Hazardous Chemicals in Vapor, Liquid, and/or Solid Forma CWA Vapor Testing CWA Surface Testing TIC Vapor Testing TIC Liquid Testing CWA Liquid Testing Accurately Detect ed Accurately Detected Accurately Detected Results (%) Accurately Detected Results (%) Accurately Detected Resultsb (%) Technology Vender Results (%) Results (%) (Instrument Name) Hydrogen Cyanogen Hydrogen Sulfur Hydrogen Sulfur VX Nerve Phosgene Chlorine Arsine Sarin Cyanide Fluoride Sarin VX Nerve agent cyanide chloride sulfide mustard peroxide mustard agent Agentase NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 100 (CAD Kit) Anachemia 0 0 0 NA NA NA 100 25 NA NA NA 0 0 0 100 (C2) Anachemia 100 100 NA NA NA NA 0 0 NA NA NA 0 0 0 100 (CM256A1) Draeger 100 NA 100 100 100 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA (CMS Analyzer) Draeger 100 92 100 100 NA 100 100 100 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA (CDK) MSA 100 100 100 NA NA NA 100 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA (Single CWA Detector Kit) Nextteq 0/0/0 83/0/0 33/0/0 100 100 100 NA NA NA 0 100 NA NA NA 100 (CDK) c c c Proengin 75 0 NA NA 82 100 100 0 0 NA NA 100 83 0 100 (AP2C) RAE Systems 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA (MultiRAE Plus) Safety Solutions ® 0 NA NA 100 100 NA 0 NA 0 100 0 0 NA 0 NA (HazMat Smart-Strip ) Safety Solutions ® NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 0 0 100 (HazMat Smart-M8 ) Sensidyne 100 NA 100 100 100 100 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA (Gas Detector Tube) Severn Trent Services NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 100 NA 100 NA (Eclox™ Strip) Smiths Detection ® NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 75 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA (APD2000 ) Truetech NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 100 NA NA 100 NA 100 NA (M272 Water Kit) Truetech 100 0 75 NA NA NA 100 NA NA NA NA 0 0 0 100 (M18A3) Note: Information was derived from the Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals in All Hazards Receipt Facilities and the Testing of Screening Technologies for Detection of Chemical Warfare Agents in All Hazards Receipt Facilities. Technologies were tested to determine their ability to accurately detect hazardous chemical in various matrices, at various environmental conditions, or with the addition of an interferent (Refer to the text in this brief or to the reports for specific details). The % of accurately detected results is based on the number of samples each technology accurately detected each target chemical (within an acceptable concentration range). Ranges were based on chemical concentrations that would cause irreversible or long-lasting adverse health effects (e.g., AEGL = Acute Exposure Guideline Level). aNA = Not applicable, Green = Technology accurately detected chemical 100% of the time, Yellow = Technology accurately detected chemical >0% and <100% of the time, Red = Technology did not accurately detect chemical at all (0% of the time), TIC = Toxic industrial chemicals, and CWA = Chemical warfare agents. bDue to the lack of acceptable results, samples that were diluted with isopropyl alcohol were not factored into the % of accurately detected results. One explanation for the lack of acceptable results may be that the technologies were not designed for application using non-aqueous solvents. cResults for to M8 paper, M9 paper, and 3-way paper, respectively. January 2009 EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology.
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Table 2. Performance Factors Including Response Time, Operational Information, and Cost Associated with Hazardous Chemical Detection Technologies
Technology Vender Technology Matrix Response Time Operational Instrument (Name) Type (Chemical Type)a Informationb Information Costc
Agentase Seconds – Response (color change) within 1 second at room conditions and up to Color-indicating pen Surface (CWA) Simple procedure $286 (CAD Kit) 26 seconds at low temperature/relative humidity or with interferent present
Vapor Minutes – A few minutes needed for pump strokes (40 strokes for CWAs and 10 for Relatively complex procedure Color tubes (TIC and CWA) TICs) Arm/hand strength needed for pump Anachemia $684 (C2) Color ticket Vapor (CWA) Minutes – Response (color change) within 2 minutes Simple procedure
3-way paper Surface (CWA) Seconds – Response (color change) within 5 seconds Simple procedure
Simple procedure Vapor Minutes – Response (color change) occurs within several seconds after exposure Multifunction card Breakage of two green ampules at the same time creates fumes and Anachemia (TIC and CWA) and manipulation of card takes up to one minute green liquid spray $189 (CM256A1) 3-way paper Surface (CWA) Seconds – Response (color change) within 5 seconds Simple procedure
Draeger Multicolor tubes Minutes – Automated color tube sampler and reader take several minutes for a Simple procedure d Vapor (TIC) $1,922 (CMS Analyzer) on a chip reading Misaligned gears can cause chips to become unusable
Seconds – Initial response within a few pump strokes; a few minutes required for Simple procedure Draeger Vapor Color tubes requisite 50 pump strokes Easily distinguishable color changes $3,114 (CDK) (TIC and CWA) Five compounds can be tested at one time Arm/hand strength needed for pump
Simple procedure MSA (Single CWA Vapor Minutes – 2 minutes (30 pump strokes) needed for noticeable color change. Note: Color tubes Arm/hand strength needed for pump $1,295 Detector Kit) (TIC and CWA) The time for noticeable color change depends on concentration of analyte Some color changes difficult to distinguish
Minutes – Sample drawn for 3.5 minutes; time for noticeable color change depends Vapor on concentration of analyte; required sample volume takes several minutes with Simple procedure Color tubes (TIC and CWA) electric pump Some color changes difficult to distinguish Five compounds can be tested at one time
Nextteq Liquid and Surface Seconds – Response (color change) within about 10 seconds with liquid and M8 paper Simple procedure $1,875 (CDK) (CWA) surface samples
M9 paper Surface (CWA) Seconds – Response (color change) within 25 seconds Simple procedure
3-way paper Surface (CWA) Seconds – Response (color change) within 5 seconds Simple procedure
Vapor Seconds – Response typically occurs within a few seconds (TIC and CWA) Simple procedure of starting device and observing readings from vapors or taking samples and observing readings from liquids and surface $15,708e Proengin d Flame spectrometer Liquid Seconds – Response within 10 seconds. Note: It takes less than 1 minute to install samples (discount for (AP2C) (TIC and CWA) instrument parts necessary to collect liquid samples. With regular use, batteries and low-pressure hydrogen supplies need testing) replacement periodically Surface (CWA) Seconds – Response within 25 seconds
January 2009 EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology.
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Technology Vender Technology Matrix Response Time Operational Instrument (Name) Type (Chemical Type)a Informationb Information Costc
RAE Systems d PID Vapor (TIC) Seconds – Response within approximately 15 seconds Simple procedure $3,290 (MultiRAE Plus)
Vapor (TIC) Seconds – Response (color change) within several seconds Safety Solutions Simple procedure of peeling of protective cover for immediate use ® Multifunction card $20 (HazMat Smart-Strip ) Some color changes difficult to distinguish Liquid (TIC) Seconds – Response (color change) within a few seconds
Safety Solutions ® M8 paper Surface (CWA) Seconds – Response (color change) typically within 5 seconds Simple procedure of peeling of protective cover for immediate use $6 (HazMat Smart-M8 )
Seconds – Response (color change) within a few seconds (1 minute needed per Sensidyne Simple procedure d Color tubes Vapor (TIC) pump stroke). Note: Analytes tested required only one pump stroke. $532 (Gas Detector Tube) Number of pump strokes needed depends on suspected concentration Only one TIC can be tested at a time
Severn Trent Services Minutes – Response within 3 minutes due to reaction time needed for color Color ticket Liquid (CWA) Simple procedure $510 (Eclox™ Strip) change.
Simple procedure Smiths Detection The provided chemical surrogate vapor source allows for rapid indication ® Ion mobility Vapor (CWA) Seconds – Most responses within 30 seconds $9,620 (APD2000 ) of proper operation Contains a small radioactive source
Relatively complex procedure Minutes – Response requires several minutes due to complexity of required Color tubes Liquid (TIC) Requires 60 mL of sample and multiple steps for detection Truetech procedure Minimal effort but time consuming $386 (M272 Water Kit) Minutes – Response within 3 minutes due to reaction time needed for color Simple procedure of wetting pad with sample and pressing together with a Color ticket Liquid (CWA) change second reagent pad
Relatively complex procedure Minutes – Recommended 60 pump strokes take several minutes to complete; Color tubes Vapor (TIC) Arm/hand strength needed for pump color change begins in a fraction of that time Some color changes difficult to distinguish Truetech $1,189 (M18A3) Minutes – Response within 3 minutes due to reaction time needed for color Color ticket Vapor (CWA) Simple procedure change
M8 paper Surface (CWA) Seconds – Response (color change) within 10 seconds Simple procedure
aTIC = Toxic industrial chemicals and CWA = Chemical warfare agents bGr een = Response time occurs in seconds and Yellow = Response time occurs in minutes cThese costs represent purchase prices. For long-term use, the cost of samples and consumable items need to be evaluated (refer to subject matter reports for more information on these cost). dDraeger (CMS), RAE Systems (MultiRAE Plus), and Sensidyne (Gas Detector Tube) provide quantitative readings. The PID principle of the MultiRAE Plus was not necessarily expected to respond to TICs or CWAs; however, it was tested based on the instrument’s promotion as a general toxic compound detector. Proengin (A2PC) provides semi-quantitative readings. eA model newer than the model tested is now available. The cost of the newer model is $11,700.
January 2009 EPA/600/S-09/015
This document does not constitute nor should be construed as an EPA endorsement of any particular product, service, or technology.
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Office of Research and Development National Homeland Security Research Center Cincinnati, OH 45268