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Industry Compliance Programme
Global Chemical Industry Compliance Programme GC-ICP Chemical Weapons Convention December 2006 Version 1.0 GLOBAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRY COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME FOR IMPLEMENTING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION The purpose of the handbook is to provide guidance to chemical facilities, traders and trading companies in developing a Global Chemical Industry Compliance Programme (GC-ICP) to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The GC-ICP focuses first on determining if there is a reporting requirement to your National Authority and second on collecting the relevant support data used to complete the required reports. The GC-ICP is designed to provide a methodology to comply with the CWC and establish systems that facilitate and demonstrate such compliance. Each facility/company should also ensure that it follows its country’s CWC specific laws, regulations and reporting requirements. • Sections 2, 3, and 4 guide you through the process of determining if chemicals at your facility/ company should be reported to your National Authority for compliance with the CWC. • Section 5 provides recommended guidance on information that you may use to determine your reporting requirements under the CWC and administrative tools that your facility/company may use to ensure compliance with the CWC. • Section 6 provides a glossary of terms and associated acronyms. • Section 7 provides a listing of all National Authorities by country. CWC Global Chemical Industry Compliance Programme 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section 1 Overview What is the Chemical Weapons Convention? -
Transport of Dangerous Goods
ST/SG/AC.10/1/Rev.16 (Vol.I) Recommendations on the TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS Model Regulations Volume I Sixteenth revised edition UNITED NATIONS New York and Geneva, 2009 NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. ST/SG/AC.10/1/Rev.16 (Vol.I) Copyright © United Nations, 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may, for sales purposes, be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without prior permission in writing from the United Nations. UNITED NATIONS Sales No. E.09.VIII.2 ISBN 978-92-1-139136-7 (complete set of two volumes) ISSN 1014-5753 Volumes I and II not to be sold separately FOREWORD The Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods are addressed to governments and to the international organizations concerned with safety in the transport of dangerous goods. The first version, prepared by the United Nations Economic and Social Council's Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, was published in 1956 (ST/ECA/43-E/CN.2/170). In response to developments in technology and the changing needs of users, they have been regularly amended and updated at succeeding sessions of the Committee of Experts pursuant to Resolution 645 G (XXIII) of 26 April 1957 of the Economic and Social Council and subsequent resolutions. -
Scientific Advisory Board
OPCW Scientific Advisory Board SAB-III/1 27 April 2000 Original: ENGLISH REPORT OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 1. Introduction 1.1 The Scientific Advisory Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”) held two meetings during its third session, which took place from 14 - 16 December 1999 and from 15 - 16 March 2000 in The Hague. 1.2 Dr Claude Eon of France, the Chairman of the Board, presided over its proceedings. 1.3 The Board considered the following issues: (a) adamsite; (b) analytical procedures; (c) equipment issues; (d) destruction technologies; (e) bio-medical samples; (f) future contributions of the Board to the preparation of the first Review Conference; and (g) any other business. 1.4 In preparation for its meeting the Board had received reports from its temporary working groups (TWGs) on adamsite and analytical procedures, and a report on a joint meeting of the temporary working groups on equipment issues and on chemical weapons destruction technologies. 1.5 During its meeting in December 1999, the Board received a briefing by the Deputy Director-General on the status of implementation of the Convention and on work priorities. The Board was also briefed by staff from the Verification and Inspectorate Divisions on experiences with the conduct of different types of inspection, as well as on analytical and equipment-related matters. It was further briefed on the results of an expert meeting on bio-medical samples conducted by the Secretariat in December 1999. CS-2000-1867 SAB-III/1 page 2 2. Work on substantive issues Adamsite 2.1 The Board received and discussed the draft report of the TWG on adamsite dated 7 October 1999, noted additional comments, and decided to include in its report the following considerations in relation to this matter: 2.2 Adamsite (10-chloro-5,10-dihydro-phenarsazine, code name DM, CAS registry number 578-94-9) is a yellow-green crystalline solid with a boiling point of 410ºC and a melting point of 195ºC. -
Warfare Agents for Modeling Airborne Dispersion in and Around Buildings
LBNL-45475 ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIn NAL LABORATORY Databaseof Physical,Chemicaland ToxicologicalPropertiesof Chemical and Biological(CB)WarfitreAgentsfor ModelingAirborneDispersionIn and AroundBuildings TracyThatcher,RichSextro,andDonErmak Environmental Energy Technologies Division DISCLAIMER This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government. While this document is believed to contain correct information, neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor The Regents of the University of Catifomia, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of anY information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by its trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommend at i on, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or The Regents of the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof, or The Regents of the University of California. Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory is an equal opportunity employer. DISCLAIMER Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced -
Report on Chemical Munitions Dumped in the Baltic Sea (HELCOM 1994)
Baltic Sea Environment Proceedings No. 142 Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission Chemical Munitions Dumped in the Baltic Sea Published by: HELCOM – Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission Katajanokanlaituri 6 B FI-00160 Helsinki Finland www.helcom.fi Authors: Tobias Knobloch (Dr.), Jacek Bełdowski, Claus Böttcher, Martin Söderström, Niels-Peter Rühl, Jens Sternheim For bibliographic purposes this document should be cited as: HELCOM, 2013 Chemical Munitions Dumped in the Baltic Sea. Report of the ad hoc Expert Group to Update and Review the Existing Information on Dumped Chemical Munitions in the Baltic Sea (HELCOM MUNI) Baltic Sea Environment Proceeding (BSEP) No. 142 Number of pages: 128 Information included in this publication or extracts thereof are free for citation on the condition that the complete reference of the publication is given as stated above Copyright 2013 by the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) ISSN 0357-2994 Language revision: Howard McKee Editing: Minna Pyhälä and Mikhail Durkin Design and layout: Leena Närhi, Bitdesign, Vantaa, Finland Chemical Munitions Dumped in the Baltic Sea Report of the ad hoc Expert Group to Update and Review the Existing Information on Dumped Chemical Munitions in the Baltic Sea (HELCOM MUNI) Table of Contents 1 Executive summary. .5 2 Introduction. .9 2.1 CHEMU report – subjects covered, recommendations & fulfilment. .10 2.2 MUNI report – scope & perspectives. 11 2.3 National and international activities since 1995. .14 2.3.1 Managerial initiatives. .14 2.3.2 Investigations in the Baltic Sea . .23 3 Chemical warfare materials dumped in the Baltic Sea. .28 3.1 Introduction. 29 3.1.1 Dumping activities . -
Safe Methods of Use 14: HSNO Class 6.1 Acutely Toxic Compounds
Safe Methods of Use 14: HSNO Class 6.1 Acutely Toxic Compounds Purpose: This applies to principal investigators (PIs), sector managers, designated laboratory person (DLPs), technical staff and students who use laboratories within the University of Auckland. Note: the word ‘shall denotes a mandatory requirement and the word ‘should’ denotes a recommendation. HSNO Class 6.1 Toxic Compounds will cover a wide range of chemicals, for which an exhaustive list cannot be supplied. Always consult MSDS sheets prior to handling any chemical, observe precautions and follow the recommendations for their handling. The mandatory recommendations in the SMOU will apply to HSNO Class 6.1 A and B compounds and should be treated as recommendations for handling HSNO Class 6.1C compounds where this appropriate. MSDS databases (Gold FFX) is available via the LEARN Database Appendix 1 provides a list (albeit not exhaustive) of HSNO 6.1 A, B and C Acutely Toxic Compounds with their classifications for your guidance. Please also note that chemicals that have primary HSNO classification of Class 3, 4, 5 or 8 may also be toxic. A. Incompatibilities Care should be taken to keep HSNO Class 6.1A and B compounds well away from liquid acids, bases, strongly oxidising solutions and reactive compounds. Safe Methods of Use 14 – HSNO Class 6.1 Acute Toxics Version 7 Feb 2019 Page 1 of 9 B. Storage 1. Containers with toxic compounds with an oral LD50 less than 5 milligrams/kg (HSNO 6.1A), shall be clearly labelled with identity of compound and a warning indicating their toxicity. 2. -
A Toxicological Review of the Products of Combustion
HPA-CHaPD-004 A Toxicological Review of the Products of Combustion J C Wakefield ABSTRACT The Chemical Hazards and Poisons Division (CHaPD) is frequently required to advise on the health effects arising from incidents due to fires. The purpose of this review is to consider the toxicity of combustion products. Following smoke inhalation, toxicity may result either from thermal injury, or from the toxic effects of substances present. This review considers only the latter, and not thermal injury, and aims to identify generalisations which may be made regarding the toxicity of common products present in fire smoke, with respect to the combustion conditions (temperature, oxygen availability, etc.), focusing largely on the adverse health effects to humans following acute exposure to these chemicals in smoke. The prediction of toxic combustion products is a complex area and there is the potential for generation of a huge range of pyrolysis products depending on the nature of the fire and the conditions of burning. Although each fire will have individual characteristics and will ultimately need to be considered on a case by case basis there are commonalities, particularly with regard to the most important components relating to toxicity. © Health Protection Agency Approval: February 2010 Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards Publication: February 2010 Chemical Hazards and Poisons Division £15.00 Chilton, Didcot, Oxfordshire OX11 0RQ ISBN 978-0-85951- 663-1 This report from HPA Chemical Hazards and Poisons Division reflects understanding and evaluation of the current scientific evidence as presented and referenced in this document. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Chemical Hazards and Poisons Division (CHaPD) is frequently required to advise on the health effects arising from incidents due to fires. -
Supplement to All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol
EPA/600/R-10/155 December 2010 Supplement to All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol SCIENCE Office of Research and Development National Homeland Security Research Center Supplement to All Hazards Receipt Facility (AHRF) Screening Protocol December 2010 Office of Research and Development National Homeland Security Research Center Acknowledgments This document is intended to be supplementary to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) September 2008 All Hazards Receipt Facility Protocol (AHRF Protocol), and attempts to address considerations raised by stakeholders since publication of the protocol. Development of this document was funded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC), and includes information provided by EPA Regions 1, 6, and 10; EPA Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA), the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL): State Public Health Laboratories of Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia; and New York City; and the Canadian Defence Research and Development Laboratory. This document was prepared by CSC under Contract EP-W-06- 046. Disclaimer This document is intended to be supplementary to the guidance provided in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) September 2008 All Hazards Receipt Facility Protocol (AHRF Protocol), and attempts to address considerations raised by stakeholders since publication of the protocol. This supplement assumes that: • The September 2008 AHRF Protocol was developed and provided as a guide; implementation of the protocol and the screening equipment included in the protocol may vary among locations, depending on the goals and capabilities of the laboratory to which the facility is attached. -
* * * Chemical Agent * * * Instructor's Manual
If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. · --. -----;-:-.. -----:-~------ '~~~v:~r.·t..~ ._.,.. ~Q" .._L_~ •.• ~,,,,,.'.,J-· .. f.\...('.1..-":I- f1 tn\. ~ L. " .:,"."~ .. ,. • ~ \::'J\.,;;)\ rl~ lL/{PS-'1 J National Institute of Corrections Community Corrections Division * * * CHEMICAL AGENT * * * INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL J. RICHARD FAULKNER, JR. CORRECTIONAL PROGRAM SPECIALIST NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS WASIHNGTON, DC 20534 202-307-3106 - ext.138 , ' • 146592 U.S. Department of Justice National Institute of Justice This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated In tl]!::; document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice. Permission to reproduce this "'"P 'J' ... material has been granted by Public Domain/NrC u.s. Department of Justice to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS). • Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system reqllires permission of the f ._kt owner, • . : . , u.s. Deparbnent of Justice • National mstimte of Corrections Wtulringttm, DC 20534 CHEMICAL AGENTS Dangerous conditions that are present in communities have raised the level of awareness of officers. In many jurisdictions, officers have demanded more training in self protection and the authority to carry lethal weapons. This concern is a real one and administrators are having to address issues of officer safety. The problem is not a simple one that can be solved with a new policy. Because this involves safety, in fact the very lives of staff, the matter is extremely serious. Training must be adopted to fit policy and not violate the goals, scope and mission of the agency. -
Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear Medical Countermeasures
Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear Medical Countermeasures Ron Manning,g, Ph.D. Chief, Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear Division of CBRN Countermeasures June 7, 2011 Roadmap • Rad Nuc Background and the threat • Rad Nuc Scenario considerations and Reqquirements development • Areas of Rad Nuc Programmatic Interest • Rad Nuc Portfolio Strategy • Special Considerations for Development Efforts • Solicitations in Fed Biz Ops • The Chemical Threat • Vesicants • Chem Special Instructions • Continuing Challenges • Interagency Partnering • BARDA funding 11 Rad Nuc Background •The detonation of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) has the potential to produce a large number of victims with multiple and mixed injuries •Exposure to radiation induces dose-dependent injury to cells and tissue through a cascade of molecular and biochemical changes that lead to cell death or disruption 98-- 7- 6 5- 4- Dangerous Fallout 3- ground-zero 2- --1- 0- Light Damage Miles from 1 kT Moderate Damage 0.1 kT 10 kT MdiMedium Severe Damage Small Large •Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS) is the medical consequence of approximately 2 Gy exposure •The symptoms and progressionprogression of radiation injuryinjury occur even after the radiation exposure has ceased and there is a continuity of medical consequences from the ARS to the Delayed Effects of the Acute Exposure (DEARE) to chronic radiation damage 2 IND Scenarios and Requirements Development • Hundreds of IND scenarios ─ Developed with modeling and working groups with subject matter experts ─ Several cities modeled ─ Several radiation yields ─ 12 months (Jan - Dec): (e.g. Monthly winds and weather affect the fallout pattern)pattern) • Requirements established from modeling scenarios • Fulfillment of requirements ─ Acquisition of products via Project BioShield contracts ─ Development of products via Advanced Research and Development contracts ─ Review portfolio as requirements change • Requirements are reviewed on a regular basis and do change over time. -
Health Aspects of Biological and Chemical Weapons
[cover] WHO guidance SECOND EDITION WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION GENEVA DRAFT MAY 2003 [inside cover] PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS DRAFT MAY 2003 [Title page] WHO guidance SECOND EDITION Second edition of Health aspects of chemical and biological weapons: report of a WHO Group of Consultants, Geneva, World Health Organization, 1970 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION GENEVA 2003 DRAFT MAY 2003 [Copyright, CIP data and ISBN/verso] WHO Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data ISBN xxxxx First edition, 1970 Second edition, 2003 © World Health Organization 1970, 2003 All rights reserved. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. The mention of specific companies or of certain manufacturers’ products does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by the World Health Organization in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. Errors and omissions excepted, the names of proprietary products are distinguished by initial capital letters. The World Health Organization does not warrant that the information contained in this publication is complete and correct and shall not be liable for any damages incurred as a result of its use. Publications of the World Health Organization can be obtained from Marketing and Dissemination, World Health Organization, 20 Avenue Appia, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland (tel: +41 22 791 2476; fax: +41 22 791 4857; email: [email protected]). -
Graphical Arrays of Chemical-Specific Health Effect Reference Values for Inhalation Exposures
EPA/600/R-09/061 Graphical Arrays of Chemical-Specific Health Effect Reference Values for Inhalation Exposures Includes Errata Sheet created on 4/6/2010 September 2009 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Research and Development National Center for Environmental Assessment Research Triangle Park, NC DISCLAIMER This document has been prepared by staff from the Hazardous Pollutant Assessment Group, National Center for Environmental Assessment, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EPA. For questions concerning this document, please contact Dr. George Woodall (919-541-3896; [email protected]). September 2009 ii Errata Sheet Created 4/6/2010 for the document titled Graphical Arrays of Chemical-Specific Health Effect Reference Values for Inhalation Exposures, Final Table or Page Erratum Figure 133 Changed “values” to “value,” deleted “and OSHA,” and added “OSHA PEL” before “ACGIH ” in the first sentence of the second paragraph. Added the following sentence at the end of the second paragraph: “It should also be noted that the original documentaion for the OSHA PEL cited it as a Ceiling Value (OSHA, 1996, 192249) but OSHA later clarified in a memo that the value was a time-weighted average (OSHA, 1996, 598129)” Figure 133 Replaced Figure 2.15 2.15 Table 137 Replaced “OSHA-Ceiling” with “OSHA-PEL (TWA)” in the first 2.15 column of Table 2.15. Replaced “10 min” with “8 hr TWA” in the second column. Added reference in last column. 140 Added reference “OSHA (1996).