Telegram As a Tool for Dissent: the Case of Mobilizing Mass Protest

Home , Ihar Losik, Nexta, Okrestina, Sergei Tikhanovsky

Telegram as a Tool for Dissent:

The Case of Mobilizing Mass Protest in Belarus

Thesis By Kathrin Yaromich

Submitted in Partial fulfillment Of the Requirements for the degree of

Bachelor of Arts In Mass Media and Communication

State University of New York

Empire State College

2020 2

Statutory Declaration / Čestné prohlášení

I, Kathrin Yaromich, declare that the paper entitled:

Telegram as a Tool for Dissent: The Case of Mobilizing Mass Protest in Belarus was written by myself independently, using the sources and information listed in the list of references. I am aware that my work will be published in accordance with § 47b of

Act No. 111/1998 Coll., On Higher Education Institutions, as amended, and in accordance with the valid publication guidelines for university graduate theses.

Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto práci vypracoval/a samostatně s použitím uvedené literatury a zdrojů informací. Jsem vědom/a, že moje práce bude zveřejněna v souladu s § 47b zákona č. 111/1998 Sb., o vysokých školách ve znění pozdějších předpisů, a v souladu s platnou Směrnicí o zveřejňování vysokoškolských závěrečných prací.

In Prague, 27.04.2020 Kathrin Yaromich

Acknowledgements

It is with genuine pleasure that I express my gratitude to all the people who have inspired and accompanied me throughout my journey towards the completion of this project. My Bachelor thesis would not be possible without the ever-present guidance of my mentor Todd Nesbitt, whose supportive attitude, timely advice, and enthusiastic remarks led me towards the accomplishments of the task, and Professor Iveta

Hlouchova, whose dedication, kindness, and keen interest in the world affairs helped me to become a more curious, critical, and perceptive person. I would also like to thank each and every faculty member at the University of New York in Prague and SUNY

Empire State College from whom I had the opportunity to learn.

With a deep sense of reverence, I acknowledge my gratitude towards my mother, who has supported me unconditionally and encouraged me to realize my ambitions. I also want to thank all my friends whose kind words of support and motivation helped me along the way.

Last but not least, I would like to thank all the fellow Belarusians of the democratic opposition, whose bravery, determination, and strength have enabled the fight for freedom.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction 6 2. Media Landscape in Belarus 10 2.1. Traditional media 10 2.1.1. Television 11 2.1.2. Radio 12 2.1.3. Print media 13 2.2. The Internet 14 3. Introduction to Telegram 17 3.1. Telegram Application Overview 17 3.2. The War on Telegram across the world 18 3.2.1. Iran 19 3.2.2. Hong Kong 20 3.2.3. Russia 21 4. Telegram in Belarus 24 4.1. Telegram as a Media Phenomenon of 2020 24 4.2. Mass Coordination in Belarus through Telegram prior to the Post-election Protests of 2020 28 4.3. The 2020 Post-Election Protest Plan 29 4.4. Telegram Activity and Behavior Analyses 31 4.4.1. Activity Analysis 31 4.4.2. Behavior Analysis 33 4.5. The Present and the Future of Telegram Channels in Protest Coordination 35 5. The Power and Fragility of Telegram-revolution 37 5.1. Telegram across the Stages of Social Movement 37 5.1.1. Emergence 37 5.1.2. Coalescence 39 5.2. Telegram Channels in the Context of Political Innovations 40 5.3. The Potential Weakness of Rapid Organizing 42 5.4. Protest Visibility and Telegram 43 6. Conclusion 48

Abstract

Can a messaging platform become the key actor in mobilizing the protest movement and sustaining it over a long-term period? That is the essential question this paper seeks to answer by looking at the case study of Belarus and the use of Telegram application during the protest in the aftermath of the 2020 presidential elections. In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Telegram media phenomenon in Belarus, this thesis first looks at the media landscape of the country, followed by the analysis of strengths, weaknesses, and the use of Telegram in general. Further, a close focus is allocated to

Telegram’s role during the mass protest in the aftermath of the Belarusian 2020 elections in August. The paper concludes that despite several advantages associated with the use of the Telegram platform, such as instancy, wide reach, and the increase of protest visibility, there are also dangers of rapid organizing caused by the lack of inter- institutional communication among media, NGOs, and opposition leaders. Thus, the effectiveness of protest organizing can potentially be improved by bringing about change at every level, from organizational to political and social.

Keywords: protests in Belarus, social movement, protest movement, mobilization,

Belarus, Belarus elections 2020, Telegram

1. Introduction

“The riot is the language of the unheard”, echoed the famous words of Martin Luther

King in Belarus as millions of people faced a deep sense of betrayal and neglect when their voices and votes were yet again dismissed. In the aftermath of the 2020 Belarusian presidential election, the victory of the incumbent president Alexander Lukashenko who has been in power for 26 years, sparked a wave of the largest protests in the country’s history. As claimed by the Central Election Commission of Belarus (2020), Lukashenko won 80.23 percent of the vote. Yet, when the exit poll results appeared on election day, thousands of people across the country fled to the streets to express their disbelief in the fairness of the election system and to demand Lukashenko’s resignation.

Alexander Lukashenko has won every presidential election since the first one in the country’s sovereign history in 1994, with all but the first being considered by international monitors as neither free nor fair (CDG, 2019). Throughout his rule, all dissenting voices have been suppressed: while some were forced to exile, several other prominent opponents have gone missing and are believed to be dead (Trippe & Sotnik,

2019). During this election campaign, many new opposition faces emerged, but they did not make it to the elections as they were either detained or had to go into exile. Only

Sviatlana Tikhanovskaya, the wife of the detained candidate Sergei Tikhanovsky, participated in the race because, at the time, no one considered a stay-at-home mom as a threat that could challenge the regime. Eventually, she claimed to have won a decisive victory with at least 60 percent of the vote in the districts where the votes were counted fairly (Manenkov & Litvinova, 2020). Forced to exile, she has been meeting with

European leaders and negotiating the future of Belarus as a recognized leader. 7

From August 2020 to December 2020, the protests continued in some form or another.

Every Sunday, thousands of people across the country went “on a walk” and brought flowers, balloons, and national red-and-white flags with them as a symbol of peaceful resistance. On Saturdays, women used to ‘march for freedom’, and pensioners – who typically have been considered the main source of Lukashenko’s reliance and support – also had their own marches on Monday. October 26 marked the national strike day when Belarusian factory workers, students, and business owners stopped their work demanding Lukashenko to resign. Subsequently, many of the businesses have been shot down, students expelled, and workers fired due to their participation.

According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, around 7,000 people were detained only during the first four days of the protests, and by the end of November, almost 24,000 had been detained (UN, 2020). Furthermore, from the start of the presidential campaign in the spring of 2020 until November 10, 2020, at least 5,000 individuals were brought to administrative liability on political grounds; at least 950 persons became suspects in politically motivated criminal cases, and 147 of them were recognized as political prisoners. Protesters faced rampant abuses: they were randomly chased and kicked; detainees were beaten by security; and unidentified masked men together with riot police were dispersing protests, heightening a climate of fear and impunity. As a result, thousands of complaints of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in custody were lodged (UN, 2020).

Among those detained from August through December 4th were 373 journalists (UN,

2020). In fact, authorities kept the media in their crosshairs during the months of ongoing protests against the president. Journalists were frequently detained for days and were accused of taking part in demonstrations; they were beaten, their equipment 8 destroyed, and accreditation canceled. The Belarusian Association of Journalists (2020) registered more than 500 violations of journalists’ rights. Belarusian authorities attempted to restrict the work of the media by multiple means: Internet blackouts, cancellation of journalists’ accreditations, revoking credentials of a country’s biggest news outlet TUT.BY, and blocking over 100 websites, including news sites.

In the aftermath of the government restrictions of the independent media resources in

Belarus, Telegram channels, which are more secure and harder for the authorities to block, have emerged post-elections as an important source of information and communication. These channels have gained multimillion audiences and played a central role in publicizing and mobilizing the opposition movement by being the primary source of both information and protest planning.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze the effectiveness of Belarusian Telegram channels and chats in organizing mass resistance to the government in order to assess their potential in bringing about social change. It begins with an overview of the media landscape in Belarus, including traditional and online media, so that the use of Telegram can be understood in a larger media framework. The following chapter introduces

Telegram as an application, discusses its strengths and weaknesses, especially in the context of social movements. After that, the use of Telegram in Belarus is evaluated, with a close focus on its role during the mass protest in the aftermath of the Belarusian

2020 elections in August. It analyzes the trends in user activity and behavior and then reviews the use of Telegram chats and channels for protest planning and coordination.

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the use of Telegram, the next chapter allocates its focus to the crucial stages of social movements and the role of media in them. Upon shedding light on the theoretical aspects of social movement formation, the use of 9

Telegram is examined in the context of political innovations and is critically analyzed in terms of potential weaknesses of rapid organizing through online messengers.

2. Media Landscape in Belarus

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the media landscape in Belarus by looking into trends in traditional and online media. This overview will help identify the role of social networks and the online environment as compared to the traditional media.

The Constitution of Belarus guarantees “freedom of thoughts and beliefs and their free expression” (Belarus Const. art. 33). Meanwhile, censorship and monopolization of the mass media by the state, public associations, or individual citizens are prohibited

(Belarus Const. art. 33). In spite of these legislative acts, the practice of their application limits the freedom of media. Having taken control over traditional media, the state exercises its power also over the Internet and soon – the publishing industry. Belarus falls under a ‘not free’ country category, according to both the Global Freedom Status

(2019) and Internet Freedom Status (2020) by Freedom House. Furthermore, Reporters

Without Borders (2021) ranked Belarus 158th out of 180 countries by the World Press

Freedom Index, naming it the most dangerous country in Europe for media personnel.

Overall, countless issues related to the freedom of expression and press freedoms regularly draw the attention of the special UN Human Rights Rapporteur in Belarus,

OSCE representatives on media freedom, international journalists, human rights activist organizations, and civil society representatives.

The modern media landscape in Belarus began to take shape with the country's independence in the early 1990s. At the same time, denationalization and privatization of the media have not yet taken place in the country. The state retains control over the sphere of traditional media while also trying to expand it to the Internet.

2.1. Traditional media 11

2.1.1. Television

Although television remains the main source of information for the citizens of Belarus, there is not a single public TV and radio broadcaster in the country. The state controls the largest broadcast media, which receive significant subsidies from the budget.

Meanwhile, the share of television in the structure of media consumption is decreasing, and the circulation of printed publications is falling.

According to the Information and Analytical Center of the Presidential Administration of Belarus (IAC), 72 percent of Belarusian residents in 2018 called television "a source of essential information about life in Belarus and abroad" (BAJ, 2020). In 2010, the share was almost 92 percent (BAJ, 2020). The decrease in the level of consumption of television content is related to the increasingly significant role of the Internet as a source of information. Television is most popular with the members of the older generation. More than 88 percent of citizens aged 50 and older name TV as their main source of information, whereas more than 50 percent of Belarusians aged 18-34 watch

TV (BAJ, 2020). According to various surveys, 8 to 15 percent of the country's residents do not watch TV at all (BAJ, 2020).

On June 17, 2015, Belarus fully completed the transition from analog to digital television broadcasting. The public package includes nine TV channels with eight

Belarusian state channels and the Mir TV channel, which was created by the agreement of the heads of member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (BAJ,

2020). Furthermore, most of the programs of state television operate in the Russian language, and the majority of content is Russian production. 12

The Belarusian-language Belsat TV channel, which is part of Polish Television (TVP), broadcasts in Belarus via satellite and the Internet. It positions itself as the first independent TV channel in the country. Meanwhile, Belarusian authorities refused the official requests of the TV channel for accreditation and for opening a broadcasting station in Belarus four times. In addition, Belsat reporters in Belarus have been repeatedly subjected to repression through detentions accompanied by the use of force, administrative arrests, and fines. In April 2019, the Belarusian Investigative Committee conducted a search at Belsat’s office in Minsk and confiscated the computer equipment and information storing drives (BAJ, 2020).

During the nationwide strikes in August 2020 against Lukashenko, the workers of the

Belarusian state TV channels – from journalists, presenters, and news anchors to operators, video engineers, light-transmitters, and others – joined the protesters, quit their jobs, or have eventually been fired as a result of participation in the strike. The newsrooms became empty, and it was nearly impossible to find a qualified substitute in a short period of time (Zenkovich, 2020). Thus, Lukashenko invited Russian journalists from the RT TV Channel. Since that moment, Russian propaganda intensified, and several analysts noticed that unconventional and unprecedented propaganda techniques appeared on Belarusian television (Aleksandrov, 2020).

2.1.2. Radio

Radio in Belarus is following the worldwide trend of decline as it is losing its audience.

Thus, according to a study by IAC, in 2018, less than 13 percent of respondents named it as a source of information; although, in 2009 the figure was above 40 percent (BAJ,

2020). Besides, two-thirds of the country's residents do not listen to the radio at all. 13

The allocation of radio frequencies for broadcasting is handled by a special State

Commission under the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus. It is composed exclusively of officials from state bodies including law enforcement agencies, special services, and the armed forces, as well as a number of ministries and departments.

However, the state’s monopoly on broadcasting is somewhat violated by such foreign stations as Radio Svaboda (Radio Liberty), European Radio for Belarus, and Radio

Racyja. Their programs are directed at Belarusian audiences and are produced mostly by Belarusian journalists. However, Radio Liberty terminated its broadcasting on April

30, 2019, switching exclusively to the distribution of its content on the Internet. During the Internet blackout following the election day, Radio Liberty announced its plans to come back to radio broadcasting. European Radio for Belarus is able to broadcast on the

FM-band only in some districts of the Grodno and Brest regions and otherwise broadcasts also on the Internet and via satellite (BAJ, 2020).

2.1.3. Print media

The number of print media and their total circulation in Belarus has been steadily declining (BAJ, 2020). According to the Ministry of Information, as of March 1, 2020, there are officially 722 newspapers and 864 magazines registered; 27 percent of all registered print media are state-owned (BAJ, 2020). Both the number of newspapers and their circulation have been steadily decreasing over the past years. The vast majority of private print media focus on entertainment or advertising. According to the

Belarusian Association of Journalists (2020), there are no more than three dozen private socio-political newspapers in the country. Amid the drop in newspaper circulation, a number of print publications are successfully transitioning to digital platforms. For 14 instance, the top ten most popular online media sites among residents of Belarus in

December 2019 were the ones that also come in a print version.

In the post-election period, some newspapers that reported on the protests of 2020 faced persecution by the government. Since August, the State Printing House stopped the printing and the circulation of two independent newspapers, Komsomolskaya Pravda v

Belorussii – the country’s most popular newspaper – and Narodnaya Volya. Both newspapers wrote objectively about the protests and police brutality. The printing house maintained that the equipment broke, and the newspapers were then printed in the

Moscow region, Russia (Bykovsky, 2020). The issues of the newspaper Narodnaya

Volya were distributed by volunteers and given to the people for free, targeting mainly the elderly who may not have much trust in the Internet and are otherwise exposed only to the state-TV coverage. However, in November, the police came to the editorial office of this newspaper and seized the circulation without any ground. After that, the publishing house in Moscow terminated their contract with Narodnaya Volya. Many other smaller local newspapers also lost their contracts with their printing houses in

Belarus when they reported events in an objective manner (Bykovsky, 2020).

2.2. The Internet

The Internet is becoming increasingly influential, and the use of mobile platforms and messengers is expanding – 60 to 74 percent of Belarusians agree with this statement

(BAJ, 2020). In January 2020, there were over 5.3 million Internet users (country’s population: 9.4 million). The most popular sites among the residents of Belarus include global Internet resources, such as Google, YouTube, Wikipedia, and AliExpress; large 15

Russian social networks and portals, such as VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Yandex, and

Mail.ru, as well as Belarusian projects, such as TUT.BY, Onliner, Kufar.by, and others.

The list of the most visited news resources in Belarus mainly includes non-state online media, although among the category leaders, such as TUT.BY, Naviny.by, and

Komsomolskaya Pravda, there is also a website of the state news agency BelTA.

However, the most popular websites are social networks, in particular, Vkontakte and

Odnoklassniki. According to some estimates, they are used by 3.9 million people (BAJ,

2020). In general, due to the proliferation and development of mobile technologies, about 60 percent of traffic in Belarus happens on mobile devices.

In August, the Belarusian Ministry of Information made a decision to block around 70 websites, among which were news portals such as Belarusian News, Nasha Niva,

Belsat, Euroradio, Radio Svaboda, and many others, as well as official websites of former presidential candidates Viktor Babaryko and Valery Tsepkalo (TUT.BY, 2020).

The blocked resources now continue to post content on social networks and messengers, including Telegram channels.

The development of the mobile Internet makes messengers more and more popular among Belarusians. In 2019, the most popular messengers among Belarusians were

Viber (70%), Skype (38%), WhatsApp (25%), Telegram (23%), and Facebook

Messengers (17%) (Information Policy, 2019). Telegram channels, some of which are anonymous, become more and more popular and all more often become sources of information for users and journalists of traditional and online media. They publish often sharp and different content, such as news, analytics, and satire, which concerns political life in the country and in other areas. Telegram channels become important platforms for media, opinion leaders, and government agencies in reaching new audiences. 16

Although the majority of Telegram channels use anti-government rhetoric, the press office of the president also decided to keep up with the trend and has launched its own channel. The impact of Telegram channels on the country's information field was noted even by Lukashenko: “Telegram channels, blogs, social networks in terms of influence have at least equaled traditional media. The youth are mostly there” (Press Office of the

President of RB, 2020).

In the course of 2020, the influence of Telegram channels has grown exponentially.

Some of the channels increased their audience up to 1300 percent from July to

September; the number of posts also surged to 12 times as many a month (TGSTAT,

2020). Telegram channels created to-do lists for protesting, laid out goals, gave times and locations of rallies, and spirited encouragement. The next chapter will provide an extensive overview of Telegram channels in different contexts.

Overall, the use of traditional media in Belarus corresponds with the worldwide trend of gradual decline. Fueled by the state propaganda of the state-owned media, the increasing number of people are going online to get information, while traditional media is mostly popular with the older audiences. While messengers have been popular within the Belarusian society for several years, in the year 2020, Telegram surged at the forefront, marking a sharp increase in the number of users. The success of the application and its impact on 2020 Belarusian protests will be discussed in the upcoming chapters.

3. Introduction to Telegram

This chapter aims to look at the Telegram application in greater detail. First, it will provide a general overview of the application, its most prominent features, and its advantage over other messengers. Second, it will briefly examine the role of the platform during the civil unrest in other parts of the world in order to identify a common pattern.

3.1. Telegram Application Overview

Telegram messenger is a cloud-based messaging platform, which was created in 2013 by Pavel Durov, the founder of the Facebook-resembling Vkontakte social network. As he refused to reveal the user data of the network to the Russian authorities, he fell under extreme surveillance by the state, which inspired him to develop Telegram (Akbari &

Gabdulhakov, 2019). The platform stands out among other messengers due to the emphasis on encryption and privacy, diverse communication capacities, such as groups with an unlimited number of people, voice calls, polls, and channels for broadcasting public messages to large audiences. It also allows users some extra security functions, such as self-destruct messages akin to Snapchat and ‘secret chats’, which recognize messages stored on devices as opposed to the cloud. Overall, the messenger is branded as being "in opposition to the economic outlooks that dominate the global IT market and to the localized restrictions on data privacy" (Akbari & Gabdulhakov, 2019, p.223).

Furthermore, Durov has been outspoken on the deliberate avoidance of the market- based rules of platform development, such as mergers and acquisitions, so the funding of the platform comes from the founder himself (Akbari & Gabdulhakov, 2019). In

December 2020, he announced the plan for "app monetization" since the user base has 18 been growing rapidly. He clarified that the messenger would remain free for users, new functions would be added, and the advertising would not be intruding in personal and group chats (Durov, 2020). This monetization process would allow Telegram to remain independent and preserve its integrity (Durov, 2020).

According to Akbari and Gabdulhakov (2019), a complicated web of decentralized companies enables Telegram to defy state regulation. As a result, Telegram quickly gained popularity in countries with authoritarian regimes that practice mass surveillance, such as Russia and Iran. Moreover, many users find the messenger's ideology, dedication to privacy, and user data protection from third parties to be rather appealing. Meanwhile, both Iran and Russia used a national security argument in their attempts to block Telegram in the countries (Akbari & Gabdulhakov, 2019).

In January 2021, Telegram reported having gained over 500 million monthly active users, with 25 million new users joining within the three days after WhatsApp announced the change in their privacy policy (Shroeder, 2021). Still, in terms of messenger apps ranking, it ranks fifth after WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, WeChat, and QQ (Iqbal, 2021). It is listed as the most popular messenger in Ethiopia, Iran, and

Uzbekistan.

However, Telegram has been criticized for its policy of not taking down illegal content in chats or private groups, which has allowed the spread of nonconsensual pornography

(Shroeder, 2021). Furthermore, it has become popular within far-right extremist groups, drug dealers, and terrorist groups since there are no external fact checks or deletion of hate messages.

3.2. The War on Telegram across the world 19

To understand the pattern of the use of the Telegram application across the world during protests, this subsection looks into the periods of civil unrest in Iran, Hong Kong, and

Russia and the governments’ efforts to control the platform.

3.2.1. Iran

Access to the Internet and online content in Iran are regulated by a complex assemblage of overlapping governmental and non-governmental institutions (Akbari &

Gabdulhakov, 2019). Predominantly, these structures identify “online content that violates public morals, contradicts Islam, threatens national security, criticizes public officials or organizations, or promotes either cyber crimes or the use of circumvention tools” (Akbari & Gabdulhakov, 2019, p.224). There are several methods that the Iranian government utilizes to control the content and hinder Internet access through technical means. Generally, these methods can be divided into three categories: preventative, interceptive, and reactive (Akbari & Gabdulhakov, 2019). Furthermore, the government constantly maintains the bandwidth and the speed of the Internet intentionally low.

Meanwhile, Telegram holds a number of features, such as Voice Over Internet Protocol

(VoIP) calling, broadcasting channels with unlimited members, bots and polls, and data encryption, which enabled Iranians to have an advanced communication tool. Since

2018, the messenger has been banned in the country, but it can still be accessed through virtual private networks (VPNs) that create hidden point-to-point connections on existing infrastructure. It is estimated that nearly half the Iranian population – 40 million users – used the messenger, crossing all “socioeconomic, age and geographic divides” (Center for Human Rights in Iran, 2018). For many Iranians, Telegram was the only place that provided access to unfiltered information. In the aftermath of the 2009 20 election protests, Twitter and Facebook have remained restricted, and from 2017 to

2019, communication among protesters was largely facilitated through Telegram.

However, the efforts to ban the app have proven to be ineffective as the number of users was back up to 56 percent in 2019, after having fallen from 60 percent to around 47 percent after the ban was announced in May 2018 (Esfandiari, 2019).

Overall, the Telegram ban shows the Iranian leaders’ deep fear of the free flow of information and their reckless prioritization of censorship at any cost (Center for

Human Rights in Iran, 2018). In the meantime, the messenger has become deeply integrated into the personal, professional, and financial lives of half of the Iranian population. Despite the attempts to ban Telegram, VPNs have made it possible for

Iranians to have access to the app and information. Amidst the political and social unrest in the country, Telegram has been playing a key role in providing people with information and served as an important mobilization instrument (Center for Human

Rights in Iran, 2018).

3.2.2. Hong Kong

In 2019, Telegram began to gain popularity also in Hong Kong, in particular, with the rise of the civil unrest in July, which saw a 323 percent year-on-year increase in the first-time Telegram installs that month (Iqbal, 2021). Meanwhile, Telegram is officially banned in China, but users are able to access the app through the use of VPNs.

Telegram was used for protest organization, and amidst fears of infiltration at the end of

2019, the messenger allowed users to cloak their phone numbers, making it harder for government law enforcement and intelligence services to identify participants in group chats by searching for phone numbers (Iqbal, 2021). 21

3.2.3. Russia

The Russian government has made several attempts to take control over the Internet by passing legislations. Triggered by the “Yarovaya Law” – which imposes onerous data retention requirements on providers – prices for connections rose as service providers passed on the cost of implementing the law to consumers (Freedom House, 2019).

Furthermore, the Russian authorities continued their attempts to block Telegram for violating this law.

In addition to several legal approaches, the Kremlin surveillant assemblage encompasses online and offline actors. Among online actors are pro-Kremlin bloggers and trolls, who spread counter-dissent content, and kiberdruzhinas, or Cyber Guards, that screen harmful content online and report it to the authorities (Akbari &

Gabdulhakov, 2019). Among offline actors are the Cossacks who are recruited to physically suppress activism and opposition. Furthermore, police forces operate both online and offline as they surveil outspoken citizens “who are already known to the local Centre E [counter-extremism] police force, the local FSB (Federal Security

Service) branch, or the local district attorney” (Akbari & Gabdulhakov, 2019). Bearing in mind the variety of the ways that Russian authorities use to control cyberspace,

Telegram’s refusal to cooperate turned the platform into a bullseye (Akbari &

Gabdulhakov, 2019).

Despite the numerous attempts of the Russian authorities to block Telegram as they refuse to provide the government with encryption keys, in June 2020, it was announced that blocking restrictions on the messenger would be lifted (Roskomnadzor, 2020). Prior to that, Durov announced that his team improved the methods of identification and 22 deletion of extremist propaganda. He, then, wrote on his Telegram channel that during the two years of blocking attempts the number of users has increased twice (Durov,

2020).

Overall, in recent years Telegram has become an important tool of communication especially during the time of civil unrest in the countries where Internet freedoms are constantly being undermined. It appears that government bans on the messenger are ineffective largely due to the proliferation of VPNs. In fact, Durov’s team and other engineers have built “rotating proxy servers, ways to hide traffic and other anti- censorship tools” (Durov, 2020, para. 1). He noted that as thousands of engineers joined to set up proxies for Telegram users, the decentralized movement called “Digital

Resistance” was formed. After the Russian government announced the lifting of the restriction on Telegram, Durov (2020) wrote on his channel that as the political situation in the world becomes more unpredictable, more governments may try to block privacy-focused apps like Telegram, and thus the role of proxy servers becomes essential in countries like Iran and China. He concluded his message:

The Digital Resistance movement doesn’t end with last week’s ceasefire in

Russia. It is just getting started – and going global. (Durov, para. 8)

The examples of the authoritarian states, such as Iran, Russia, and China, show that

Telegram’s ideology of non-compliance with governments’ demands, commitment to privacy, and the spurring of the Digital Resistance movement to provide people with access to the Internet put Telegram in a unique position of being an essential app of the protest movement in countries prone to mass surveillance and citizen repression.

Belarus has become the latest hotspot where Telegram has proven essential in order to 23 counter an authoritarian government. In the next chapter, a closer look will be taken into the use of Telegram in Belarus, main trends, content and behavior analysis, and key developments.

4. Telegram in Belarus

Telegram played an important role in the uprisings against authoritarian regimes across the world, and Belarus has recently continued the tradition. The nationwide mass protests that erupted after election day on August 9, 2020, used the platform to establish the secure connection among people, spread information, and organize the protests. This chapter will discuss the reasons for Telegram’s popularity, its use for protest organization and coordination, and trends in the application usage.

4.1. Telegram as a Media Phenomenon of 2020

Researchers have long been discussing the role of the Internet for the success of political protests. Internet technologies have played a role both during the protests that have caused serious political changes, such as the Arab Spring and Euromaidan, as well as the protests not leading to the change of the regime (e.g., Iran in 2009, Russia 2011-

2012, or Turkey in 2013). The wide spectrum of political technological innovations raises the degree of transparency of the protest coverage along with easing the mobilization and coordination actions (Asmolov, 2020).

In Belarus, Telegram has become a media phenomenon of 2020. In 2015-2016, the number of Telegram users was relatively small, and the number of Belarusians using the messenger has started to grow since September 2017 (Nazarenko, Shelest & Shutov,

2020). In 2019, there was a steady growth (two times compared to previous years), which gave way to a surge beginning in March 2020 (Nazarenko, Shelest & Shutov,

2020). 25

Already in 2019, the growth in popularity of Telegram was seen in the increase in the number of Telegram channels, which focused on the socio-political agenda. Back then, the majority of the channels and group chats still largely carried out the function of mass information, communication, and interaction, but in 2020, they became also the means of the mass organization (or self-organization) (Nazarenko, Shelest & Shutov,

2020).

A similar dynamic was observed during the protests against "deepening integration" with Russia at the end of 2019, and at the beginning of the 2020 election campaign, but most actively Telegram channels and groups chats began to be used for coordination of actions and transmission of operational information with the start of protests that broke out after election day. Information channels, such as "NEXTA Live" and "Belarus of the

Brain" ["Беларусь головного мозга"], as well as Telegram channels of many independent media, began to work in real-time information mode. Their content was heavily reliant on messages, photos, and video materials sent by direct participants and eyewitnesses of events.

The notion of the ‘Telegram revolution’ has repeatedly appeared in many of the

Western media, highlighting the role that the app played during the protests. An important indicator of the government’s recognition of the importance of Telegram channels is the repressions towards telegram bloggers by the regime. Two Telegram bloggers, Dmitri Popov and Ihar Losik, have been detained for several months

(Ivashenko, 2021), while the biggest Telegram-channel NEXTA was declared extremist by the Belarusian authorities (RFE/RL, 2021). 26

The core difference between Telegram and other platforms is that it enables users to directly receive practical news from primary sources and discuss them there. Due to the fact that open political participation is suppressed by the authoritarian government, a closed community of Belarusian political bloggers formed on Telegram along with chats for the discussion of various problems that gained popularity among the application’s users (Auseyushkin, 2021). The high level of security made it possible to share and post any content quickly and safely without the fear of consequences. By doing so, people sublimate their need to speak out, which is unrealizable under conditions of authoritarianism (Auseyushkin, 2021).

The Center for European Transformation lists the following reasons for the messenger's popularity: 1) messenger’s freedom from censorship and resistance towards dictatorial regimes (the example of countering attempts to block the messenger in Russia and Iran);

2) popular socio-political channels and bloggers who made a significant contribution to the political mobilization of 2020; 3) safety, efficiency, and flexibility in use (ease of creating channels and group chats, different degrees of their transparency and security, different ways of accession, etc.) (Nazarenko, Shelest & Shutov, 2020).

Furthermore, users of the Belarusian Telegram segment were from the very beginning better equipped for various kinds of Internet blocking, which began on August 9, as they had been urged to connect to VPNs and download offline Bluetooth-based messengers to avoid the highly anticipated Internet shutdown. Therefore, during the most intense periods of protest, Telegram was almost the only source of information about what was happening locally and nationally due to the connection established through VPNs. From the evening of August 9 to the morning of August 12, mobile 27

Internet was completely disconnected in Belarus for all three Belarusian operators, which constituted a total of 31 hours and 45 minutes (Kolos, 2020).

In addition to an increase in the number of subscribers to existing Telegram channels, dozens of new channels appeared in the summer of 2020, smaller in coverage, but narrower and more specialized, targeting either specific audiences (e.g., women, pensioners, car owners, various professional groups, etc.) or particular issues (e.g., assistance to repressed persons and their relatives, solidarity actions, searching for and disseminating information, etc.) (Nazarenko, Shelest & Shutov, 2020). Telegram channels began to be used for the coordination of various kinds of actions and organization of mutual assistance. Particular attention was paid to the coordination of assistance to those arrested and released from custody. Special channels were dedicated to the deanonymization of individuals involved in election fraud and violence against peaceful protesters (TUT.BY, 2020).

According to the report by the Center for European Transformation, there are at least four ways of formation of Telegram channels and groups chats (Nazarenko, Shelest &

Shutov, 2020):

1. Group chats operating as Telegram channels;

2. Group chats that were formed for carrying out specific

events/actions;

3. Group chats formed by professional aspects (students, doctors,

teachers, workers, etc.);

4. Local group chats (city, region, yard or house). 28

In this light, Telegram functions also as a closed ‘ecosystem’ with several functions, such as securitized interpersonal communication; group communication and interaction; and the information field allowing the free flow of information and setting the agenda.

4.2. Mass Coordination in Belarus through Telegram prior to the Post-election

Protests of 2020

The first use of Telegram channels in Belarus in the context of mass coordination took place in December 2019 when Russia’s push for deepening integration with Belarus was marked by the signing of the treaty of the Union State with the Russian Federation, notes Auseyushkin (2021) in the article “Telegram in Belarus: More than a messenger”.

The biggest Telegram channels published an open appeal declaring that the

“independence of Belarus is not a bargaining chip and that the deepening of integration with Russia harms the country’s national interests” (Auseyushkin, 2021, para. 5). This appeal gained over 300,000 views and appeared on the tabloids of other media. Overall, the channels largely shaped the agenda as they set the tone for the entire discourse over the topic of the integration with Russia.

Further extension of the Telegram community was brought about by the events of the

Covid-19 pandemic in the country. In the beginning of the pandemic in the country, the authorities acknowledged the threat as the Ministry created its own Telegram-channel to publish up-to-date statistics (Auseyushkin, 2021). However, Lukashenko became a

Covid dissident as he diminished the threats of the Covid-19 virus and refused to take any action to contain its spread across the country. As a result, the Ministry’s attempt at transparency rapidly ended leaving the public with an unsatisfied demand for information. 29

In this environment with no official information regarding the state of the pandemic,

Telegram channels became the primary source on the topic of coronavirus as doctors shared their insights and stories from the hospitals anonymously via Telegram bots. At the same time, the content-starved audience was ready to consume any information, and the number of rumors and fake news on Telegram channels was quite high

(Auseyushkin, 2021). However, there was still reliable information on the state of hospitals and necessary assistance. The increased momentum of the Covid pandemic quickly turned into a political campaign. Telegram channels, which are unrestrained by the rules of registered media and with the support of their loyal audiences, set the agenda for the pre-election presidential race of 2020.

Furthermore, the announcements of pickets to collect signatures of independent candidates and the meeting with voters happening across dozens of Belarusian cities were posted on independent Telegram channels, including regional chats. Auseyushkin

(2021) believes that following the arrests and expatriation of the most popular opposition candidates with the exception of Svetlana Tsikhanovskaya, all opposition channels unanimously supported her, which in turn played a role in her electoral success.

4.3. The 2020 Post-Election Protest Plan

The methodology of the modern coup d'état is based on the concept of isolating the

"pillars of support" of the political regime, such as the institutions and social groups that provide the regime with sources of power (Helvey, 2004). The American methodologist of non-violent revolutions Helvey (2004) identifies the following pillars: the police, the army, the bureaucracy, the media, the business community, youth, workers, religious 30 organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The systemic isolation of these institutions of power leads to the downfall of the political regime.

In the run-up to the elections in Belarus on August 8, 2020, the opposition Telegram channel NEXTA (2020) published a detailed scenario for the mobilization of

Lukashenko's opponents. It encompassed the following: 1) to gather supporters of opposition candidates near polling stations on the eve of their closure; 2) after the closure of the polling stations to demand an open recount and public announcement of the protocol while creating a massive crowd; 3) to mobilize protesters at 22.00 in the city center near the Minsk stele" or on Independence Avenue; 4) in the regions of the country, to gather in central squares and exert pressure on the authorities; 5) starting from August 10, to continue daily gathering of protesters in central squares of the capital and cities to create protest centers (Nagornyak, 2021). Overall, this scenario was similar to the Ukrainian of 2013-2014, where the main events took place in the central square of the capital. The founder of the channel said in an interview that this and other weekly plans were drawn up in a private chat together with the administrators of other biggest Belarusian opposition channels (Auseyushkin, 2021).

Furthermore, the plan encompassed some of the features of scattered protests in Hong

Kong in 2019 and pedestrian protests in Armenia in 2018. On August 9, 2020, the opposition Telegram channel NEXTA published a mobilization message with a plan for public nonviolent protests on August 9-10, 2020. Beginning August 10, protest organizers announced a strike at state-owned enterprises in the country (NEXTA, 2020).

On a daily basis at 7 p.m., the residents of Belarus were urged to gather at the most popular sites of their cities or district administrations and demand officials to side with the protesters. The protesters in the regions of the country were tasked with blockading 31 local executive committees along with urging the officials to join the protesters

(NEXTA, 2020). For this purpose, it was planned to occupy the central squares in front of the buildings of authorities. Particular attention was paid to the pedestrian march of small groups, which were suggested to move towards the center of Minsk, where all groups were to merge into a single column. The Telegram channel also advised scattering nails, self-tapping screws and homemade hedgehogs on the roads in order to block the movement of law enforcement officers (NEXTA, 2020). The organizers of the mass protests had planned that the violence stemming from the detentions by law enforcement would become the point of no return for the political regime (Nagornyak,

2021). Thus, the actors of the "network revolution" planned to paralyze the three "pillars of support" for the political regime of the state: 1) the state apparatus, 2) the institutions of state protection, and 3) the economy (Nagornyak, 2021, p.67).

4.4. Telegram Activity and Behavior Analyses

Based on the data retrieved from Telegram Analytics and Google Trends, Nagornyak

(2021) identifies the main trends in user activity and behavior during the protests in

Belarus in August-November 2020 in the article “Activity of Opposition Telegram

Channels and Behavioral Factor of Google Users as a Research Method for Analyzing the Protests in Belarus in 2020”.

4.4.1. Activity Analysis

The Telegram messenger enabled the organizers of the protests, mainly the NEXTA channel, to unite the activities from being scattered across the platforms into a single information flow. The developments across the country that were scattered in space and time were formed into a single continuous tape, creating the effect of mass character for 32 the reader (Nagornyak, 2021). The forms of protests were based on the principles that researchers Brodovskaya and Dombrovskaya (2018) identified as an opposition- mobilizing information model, which emphasizes the direct correlation between the protester activity and the volume of published material in the information field.

Nagornyak (2021) used the Telegram Analytics service to identify the cycles of activity.

He looks at the following opposition channels on Telegram: “NEXTA Live”, “NEXTA

TV”, “TUT.BY News” [“TUT. BY новости”], “My Country Belarus” [“Мая Краіна

Беларусь”], “Belarus of the brain” [“Беларусь головного мозга”], “Radio Liberty

Belarus” [“Радио Свобода Беларусь”], “Nasha Niva” [“Наша Нiва”], and “Khartia-

97” [“Хартия–97”] – and divides them into weekly stages from August 9 to the end of

November, the last period of mass protest activity.

The first cycle during the first week of protests from August 9 to August 15 marks the highest protest activity. During the specified period, the maximum number of news was published on the public pages, namely – 10,519 materials (Nagornyak, 2021). The second cycle from August 16 to 22, 2020, is characterized by a decline in protest activity with a total of 5,383 publications. From August 23 to 29, 2020, there is a decline in activity marked by a total of 4,205 publications. The week from August 30 to

September 5, 2020, is characterized by a sharp surge in activity, as student protests began with 5,423 publications. The weekly cycle of September 6-12, 2020, is characterized by a decrease in protest activity - 4,490 publications. From September 13 to 19, 2020, there were 3,977 publications. September 20-26, 2020, is distinguished by a sharp surge in activity associated with the secret inauguration of Lukashenko, 5,005 publications. Then there is an observed two weeks of decline in activity in the cycle of 33

September 27 - October 3, 3,744 news; 4-10 October - 3,799 publications (Nagornyak,

2021).

On October 11-17, 2020, there is a slight increase in activity with 4,148 publications.

During this period, a "March of Pride" coordinated by NEXTA took place in Minsk, during which law enforcement officers and protesters clashed. Besides, Lukashenko met with the imprisoned leaders of the opposition, including Babariko, Tikhanovsky, and others. October 18-24, 2020, is characterized by a decline in activity to 3,364 publications. Next week, from October 25 to 31, marks the increase in publications up to 5,128. This is due to the fact that on October 26, 2020, the term of the ultimatum of the former presidential candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya ended. She called for workers of state enterprises, transport, miners, teachers, and students to begin a national strike

(Nagornyak, 2021).

On November 1-7, 2020, there is a decline in activity to 3,283 publications. November

8-14, 2020 shows an increase in the activity of public pages to 4,171 items. During this period, opposition Telegram channels and media broadcast the story of the brutal murder of a resident of Minsk, Roman Bondarenko. In the cycle of November 15-21,

2020, there is a decline in activity with a total of 3,517 publications (Nagornyak, 2021).

4.4.2. Behavior Analysis

The service Google Trends allows identifying the most popular themes that interest the browser users. Nagornyak (2021) juxtaposes the intensity of publications in opposition

Telegram channels with the behavioral factors of Internet users in Belarus. 34

In Graph 1, the red line shows the dynamics of the popularity of search query "protest", the yellow line – "strike", and the blue line – "Molotov cocktail" in the Belarusian segment of the Google search engine. The data illustrates that on August 8, users had little interest in the topics, such as "protest", "strike" and there were practically no requests for "Molotov cocktail".

Figure 1. The popularity of the Search Queries “Protest”, “Strike”, and “Molotov cocktail” in the Belarusian segment of Google from August 7 to January 1 (Google

Trends, 2021).

The peak of the theme "Molotov cocktail" fell on August 10, after that it began to fade away, and by August 16 it disappeared. This was the time when Telegram channels urged protesters to resort to violence when necessary and prepare Molotov cocktails.

Regional and local chats posted the recipes for the ‘cocktails’ also on Telegram. The peak of the "strike" query was on August 11 and gradually faded away by August 28.

During this time, Telegram channels were actively urging workers to go on strikes.

Also, during the statement by S. Tikhanovskaya on October 26, users again had an interest in the topic "strike", which lasted until October 30 and then faded away. The channels picked up the statement and were sharing updates related to strikes and praising those who joined the strike movement. The peak of the "protest" query falls on 35

August 11. After that, it fades out by August 25. Besides, users' interest in the topic

"protest" arises mainly on the weekends, which coincides with the cycles of protests.

Telegram activity and content analysis reveal a pattern of both activity and content related search queries associated with the cycles of the protest (Nagornyak, 2021). The use of Telegram channels by users influenced their other online activities and contributed to the proliferation of common themes depending on the developments in the protest movement and their framing by largest Telegram channels in Belarus.

4.5. The Present and the Future of Telegram Channels in Protest Coordination

Since the end of protest activity in November 2020, the largest Belarusian channel

NEXTA was struggling to keep their once record audience as the number of subscribers was increasingly shrinking – from 2.16 million on August 25, 2020, to 1.37 million on

March 25, 2021. Auseyushkin (2021) lists audience fatigue, harsh rhetoric, balancing on the edge of hate speech, weak fact checking as the reasons for massive turnover of subscribers. In an interview on March 10, the founder of the NEXTA channel Stepan

Putilo said that they changed their tactic and will no longer assist people with protest coordination (Stork, 2021). He added:

In August, because of the Internet blockage, they [Belarusian people] asked us

to help coordinate their actions a bit, to tell them where they were going. Now

we have moved away from that because people organize themselves. (Stork,

2021, para. 34)

After that, the role of protest organization has been taken up by BYPOL, a network of dissident former officers from the Belarusian security services and criminal justice 36 system (Kobets & Kramer, 2021). The BYPOL initiative continued the tradition of using Telegram as a prime platform for mass communication.

However, on March 10, BYPOL and NEXTA announced their partnership within the

Situation Analysis Center, which is initiated by Svetlana Tsikhanovskaya (BYPOL,

2021). This analytical cooperation aims to increase the efficiency of activist actions and of the resistance at large. This new development signals that upon the reflection on the tactic exercised by NEXTA during the wave of protests in August-November, it appears that both the NEXTA-channel, the opposition leadership of Tikhanovskaya, and other activist organizations, such as BYPOL, recognized the limitations of a sole protest coordinating body. Thus, they made an effort to bring in cooperation, structure, and horizontal communication among the media, activists, and opposition into the protest coordination.

The next chapter will focus on the role of Telegram channels in the 2020 Belarusian protest movement and their effectiveness in coordinating and sustaining the mass resistance.

5. The Power and Fragility of Telegram-revolution

While the advent of social media has changed the nature of connectivity by making it increasingly digital, it has affected the state of affairs across the world. The technological transition is bringing about a historic revolution in the fields of politics, civil society, culture, and structures of protest movements (Rafiq, 2018). The latter aspect will be the focus of this chapter as it aims to analyze the effects of digital media on the organization of the opposition movement from various perspectives in the context of Belarusian protests. As discussed before, Telegram channels played a key role in protest formation and coordination, so their strengths and weaknesses will be evaluated in this chapter to better understand the dynamics among digital media, resistance movement, and the realization of the movements' aspirations.

5.1.Telegram across the Stages of Social Movement

According to Christiansen (2009), there are four main stages of social movements: emergence, coalescence, bureaucratization, and decline. In the recent uprisings across the world, social media has played a part throughout all of the stages of social movements. The role of media in the aftermath of the elections in Belarus was especially evident and important at the stages of emergence and coalescence.

5.1.1. Emergence

At the preliminary or emergence stage, where people become aware of an issue and leaders emerge, social media has a great capacity to speed up the process. In Belarus, where the Internet was cut off for several days after the election results were announced, the Telegram application was the only platform, which could bypass the restrictions due 38 to the VPNs. In light of this, Telegram was the only source of information about the events and the scale of police brutality across the country.

At this stage, the Telegram channel NEXTA was the most proactive. It was posting a lot of content sent by people from different places in the country, informing people where the police guards were, as well as to which direction they were heading based on the tips they were receiving; they also named places of gatherings for people in different cities and outlined the action plan. From August 8, 2020, to August 17, 2020, the number of NEXTA's subscribers has increased from 340 thousand to 2.16 million, and the number of views from 12.5 million to 100 million (Tgstat, 2021). As people became aware of the issues mainly through the NEXTA Telegram-channel, the channel emerged as a protest leader due to its tech-savviness, engagement with the audience, timeliness, and powerful thesis-driven formulations. Thus, by exposing the audience to the atrocities carried out by the state, the channel editors took upon the leadership role and decided to direct the anger and frustration into more coordinated and sustainable actions.

During this emergence state, people become increasingly discontent with the information they learn, yet there is no collective strategic response. At the time of the

Civil Rights Movement, there were several social movement organizations that arose in order to carry out tasks for the movement to survive, be robust and successful, such as the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and many others (Christiansen, 2009).

Although they had different functions, they all had the same goal in common.

Meanwhile, in Belarus, there was no organized strategic social movement, and digital 39 media, the NEXTA channel in particular, became the main driving force behind the protest organization.

5.1.2. Coalescence

The next stage of the cycle is crucial for a social movement because it has to overcome many challenges. During this stage, the sense of discontent built up during the first stage becomes focalized and collective (Christiansen, 2009). This is the prime time for individuals to be organized and strategic in their outlook. In the context of Belarus, this stage was not as important because the resistance was widespread and fueled, first, by the unfair outcome of the elections and, second, by unjustified police brutality, mass arrests, and killings of the protesters.

The attitudes of the people in post-election Belarus were so strong that without any coordination, people fled to the squares in their cities. In the first hours after the announcement of the first results of the voting, numerous proofs of the scale of falsifications began to appear on the Internet. The photos of the final protocols attested that Svetlana Tikhanovskaya won a convincing victory (Asmolov, 2020). In fact, it was not the mere fact of falsifications, but their scale that played a role in delegitimizing the elections. While falsifications were the primary reasons for protests, reports of violent repression of peaceful protest appeared on the Internet and within hours social media was flooded with evidence of unprecedented violence (Asmolov, 2020). New evidence was brought nearly every minute, including the beating of random passersby with truncheons, attacks from the back, and the shooting of cars and residential buildings.

Telegram channels, primarily NEXTA and Belarus of the Brain [Беларусь головного

мозга], turned into a stream of bulletins from the battlefield. The scale of that stream 40 was also caused by the fact that the violence was omnipresent: not only on the outskirts of the squares, but everywhere, including courtyards and roads (Asmolov, 2020).

Regular residents of apartment buildings witnessed and often recorded the mayhem from their windows, and drivers sent footage of the oncoming traffic lanes from dash cams. These testimonies were supplemented with footage of the brutal treatment of detainees in pre-trial detention facilities, also filmed from the windows of neighboring houses.

Overall, throughout the stages of emergence and coalescence, gaining the attention of the public is a crucial and distinctive feature. Arguably, in the environment of the information vacuum in which there was no connection to the Internet, the access to

Telegram channels generated even more attention and escalated the interest of the public in the ongoing events.

5.2. Telegram Channels in the Context of Political Innovations

Similar to other messaging platforms during the time of resistance to the authoritarian regimes, Telegram channels have greatly empowered protesters in three key areas, such as 1) gaining public attention, 2) evading censorship, and 3) coordination or logistics

(Tufekci, 2014). Digital technologies like Telegram have allowed people not only to access information that governments would otherwise deny them but also to coordinate on the fly. Bennett and Segerberg (2012) identified the new type of collective action named connectivity actions, which allow organizing collective actions without the need for an organization or party. Institutions, in this case, are substituted with information platforms, and thus it is easier to organize political formations (Benett & Segerberg,

2012). 41

Telegram channels have allowed Belarusians to bypass Internet blackouts with the help of various tools, such as VPNs and anonymizers (e.g. Psiphon). Participants of the protest were also encouraged to use mesh-networks (e.g. Bridgefy), which allow staying in touch with connected users even without the Internet. Telegram channels and chats were then used to coordinate actions and spread information about the geolocation of riot police, although the effectiveness of this communication in the context of the overabundance of information and problems with its reliability remains questionable

(Asmolov, 2020). Meanwhile, more complex crowdsourcing solutions for data collection were hardly used, with the exception of simple maps based on Google Maps and later the crowdsourced "Map of Popular Protests and Enterprise Strikes" (Asmolov,

2020).

Mutual assistance and nationwide solidarity, which were carried out with the help of digital technology and Telegram channels in particular, played a big role in the resistance movement. For instance, local Telegram channels posted information sent by people sharing access codes to house entrances, where protesters could hide. People would also leave medical aids, water, and food inside the entrances. Special attention was paid to coordinating assistance to those released after their detentions with the help of volunteers. A Telegram channel "Okrestina's Lists" was used to search for detainees and publish lists of all those in the notorious detention center Okrestina (Asmolov,

2020). Furthermore, special channels were dedicated to the deanonymization of government officials involved in violence. The so-called 'cyberpartisans' also leaked the data of thousands of riot police officers.

By and large, the effect of Telegram’s channels on coordination and logistics is not limited to coming together during a protest and being informed of the news. There are 42 also ways in which people utilize channels to build solidarity initiatives, organize volunteers, and create verification and open-source platforms. However, this kind of digital empowerment also has a downside for social movements.

5.3. The Potential Weakness of Rapid Organizing

According to Tufekci (2014), the trajectory of social movements directed by digital infrastructure has complex consequences . By applying the theory of capabilities and signals from development economics to political movements, protests, among other things, are viewed as signals of capacity to power, in particular in terms of capacity for disruption, negotiations, and the challenge of power. Furthermore, the theory emphasizes focusing on the "capabilities that are developed, rather than what participants can do at any one moment, and the signals those capabilities can send"

(Tufekci, 2014, p.12). Digital technologies brought about profound changes in movement capabilities by allowing protesters to scale up quickly, without lengthy preparations and coordination. At the same time, the same medium can act as a scaffold to movements that mask other weaknesses, such as capacities in organizing, decision- making, and general work dynamics (Tufekci, 2014).

The majority of contemporary social movements enter directly into the most contentious phase, without any prior experience of working together and managing critical situations in crisis environments. This happens due to the shortcuts that digital instant communication provides. Although it might appear as an advantage, it can also present a significant obstacle. For instance, Belarusian protests, which have been largely described as leaderless, were mostly navigated via NEXTA-channel and local group chats (Morozov, 2021). Without formed opposition and institutions, decision-making 43 tends to be informal, so ad hoc organizing occurs with a horizontalist rather than a hierarchical structure where participants have no experience working together.

Although this style of protest structure has been preferred by the participants (Tufekci,

2014), there arise questions around deliberation at scale, a delegation of representation, and negotiation with authorities.

In light of the lack of available information in August, the NEXTA-channel not only published developments from the protests but also took upon the role of protest coordinator. The channel published the weekly plans from August to October, where they urged all people to flee to the streets upon assigned date and time, continue worker strikes, financially support workers, spread information and leaflets, build solidarity chains, chant freedom slogans, and many more. Tufekci (2014) points out that the initial energy that emerged in social movements tends to fade away when the government begins to employ more repressive methods. In Belarus, these methods encompassed large-scale detention and subsequent imprisonment, persecution of the individuals and their families by the state, shut-downs of businesses, etc. Under such adversarial conditions, the protest energy in Belarus depleted by December. While the protesters were accustomed to organizing in an ad hoc manner, upon the depletion of the mass protest, they were unable to respond to government actions and decide the next course of action (Tufekci, 2014).

5.4. Protest Visibility and Telegram

One of the factors determining the success of a political protest is the spectrum of participation in a political conflict (Asmolov, 2020). State attempts to limit the spectrum of participation through repressive measures often have the opposite effect: research 44 shows that Internet blackout leads to protest escalation because the information vacuum forces people to go on the streets (Rydzak, et al, 2020). The aggressive suppression of protest by the state creates a dilemma for protesters. On the one hand, the risk for participation in actions grows. Moreover, the seeming success of the suppression of protest can lead to an increase in the number of so-called 'free-riders' who hope that political goals will be achieved without their participation. On the other hand, it is fundamentally important to create a perception that the number of participants is growing in response to the violence and the protest is gaining momentum in order to outweigh the logic of risk with the desire to participate (Asmolov, 2020).

Telegram proved to be fundamentally important not only to coordinate the protest but also to create a sense of its invincible growth. This applies both to the geography of protests and to the diversity of participants, regardless of location, gender, age, or social affiliation (Asmolov, 2020). Researchers refer to this phenomenon as a problem of protest 'visibility': it is not enough to take to the streets, it is important to show this exit in such a way that it evokes a subjective sense of mass participation among those left at home (Thompson, 2005). An example of a "technology of visibility" is the use of aerial photography with drones, and the images from the protests were later shared via social media to emphasize the scale of the protest (Asmolov, 2020).

The hyperlocality and multiplicity of sites of decentralized protest are often an advantage because they are harder for the state to suppress (Asmolov, 2020). While in the past, however, it was more complicated to depict the mass involvement, currently, as the situation in Belarus shows, information technology manages to compensate for the lack of visibility of the square crowd effect by creating a mass participation effect through information flows that constantly point to new sites and developments of 45 protest (Asmolov, 2020). For instance, in the critical hours, when riot police increased the level of risk for participation in protests through violent means and thus sought to stop them, the opposite happened. The documented violence created a new motive for mobilization: the effect of both scale and geographical diversity of protests created in the feeds of Telegram channels overcame the subjective participation threshold.

Asmolov (2020) refers to this threshold as the moment when the subjective feeling of danger from participation in protests is being replaced with readiness to go on to the streets because everyone is going. In other words, the snowball effect in the new information environment makes people feel that wherever they join the protest, they will not be alone (Asmolov, 2020).

At the same time, the messaging platform might have played a secondary role in the tactic coordination of the protests (Morozov, 2020). Still, many forms of coordination were quite effective. For instance, women created closed Telegram chats which were available only by inviting one's female acquaintances causing a chain reaction. The goal was to organize the place and time for building solidarity chains to which women would wear white clothes and bring flowers to emphasize their peaceful intentions. Men were encouraged to avoid coming to solidarity chains in order not to provoke the police force

(Korelina, 2020). However, chains were often unable to deal with the chaos of contradictory messages and instructions, which also made it more difficult for the authorities to track the development of protests (Asmolov, 2020). Overall, coordination proved essential within small groups rather than within the critical mass of participants.

As soon as the widespread chain reaction begins, the mass character of the protest becomes more important than coordination (Asmolov, 2020). 46

Furthermore, the viral sharing of stories showing moments of victory for the protesters over the law enforcement agencies also contributed to the mobilization effect. For instance, the footage of people fighting the police over freeing detained participants or stories of law enforcement officials giving up their IDs, uniforms, and shoulder straps as a sign of rejection of violence.

All things considered, Telegram channels played an important role in highlighting the visibility of the protest, which in turn moved many people to join the movement either by participating in solidarity chains, protests, or by the means of online activism.

However, there is a critical issue that arises from this process: while many Telegram channels emphasized the mass character of the protest and raised people's spirits by sharing stories of success, they were also creating a feeling of indisputable positive outcome - the government's resignation. Auseyushkin (2021) mentions that the audience of Telegram channels then experienced fatigue over the flows of information on the app as the number of subscribers on several channels has been reducing. Oversaturation with information in the first months of protest coupled with the lack of any positive developments may have largely exhausted people. Since numerous claims and promises that the winning is inevitable have not turned out to be true, people’s trust for Telegram channels has decreased along with their motivation to participate politically.

Meanwhile, the protest visibility facilitated by Telegram also sparked the formation of an unprecedented national collective identity, which supported the protests activities and transcended socio-economic disparities among people as they were unified by a shared mobilizing element of emotional grievance (Kazharski, 2021). The information environment of Belarusian Telegram channels is characterized by the extensive sharing of atrocities relating to the regime’s response to the protesters and the resistance 47 movement at large. As a result, the hitherto politically apathetic majority of the

Belarusian society were emotionally mobilized by the content generated and shared via

Telegram (Herasimenka, 2020).

6. Conclusion

Social media and messaging platforms have played an important role in contemporary society, in particular in regard to the spread of information and self-organization during the civil unrest. While mass media coverage has long played a role in driving demonstration turnout, messaging platforms have repeatedly become a key element in organizing and coordinating political protests – from Black Lives Matter and #MeToo to protests in Iran, Russia, Hong Kong, and Belarus.

This thesis paper aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of Telegram channels in organizing mass resistance to the Belarusian government in order to assess their potential in bringing about social change. Based on different approaches to social movements, the analysis revealed that while the channels played a key role in mass protest organizing, there are both advantages and weaknesses of online actors, such as

Telegram bloggers, as sole mass resistance organizers.

On the bright side, Telegram’s ideology of non-compliance with governments, commitment to privacy, and enabling the VPN’s services to bypass state’s Internet restrictions and blackouts allow the use of the application in times of civil unrest. Many people felt safe submitting their photos and videos to the opposition channels, and thus taking upon the role of citizen journalists. The established opposition media often reposted the content first published on the Telegram channels, so that the channels became prime sources of information.

Furthermore, Telegram was also used by protesters as the communication platform: regional and local chats were established to discuss protest plans and share information on the location of the police forces. However, these chats were open to an unlimited 49 number of participants, so they often became overflooded with messages, making communication even more difficult. As revealed by the trends of Telegram activity and behavior analysis, the largest Telegram channels in Belarus might have influenced the online activities of the users and contributed to the proliferation of common themes depending on the developments in the protest movement and their framing by these channels.

An important factor linked to the work of Telegram channels is the creation of ‘protest visibility’. While the opposition channels were publishing dozens, and sometimes even hundreds of posts per day depicting developments of protest movements all across the country, more people were motivated to join the protest movement. Furthermore, the evidence of unopposed mass violence from the side of the police force, which was shared through the channels, encouraged people to resist the injustice. Arguably, by highlighting the protest visibility, Telegram channels also contributed to the rise of mass solidarity and the building of national identity.

On the other hand, the Belarusian social movement is one of the many contemporary movements that have struggled with innovation following an initial phase of protests as they lacked "the culture and the infrastructure for making collective decisions" (Kubler,

2019). Overall, the capability of the Telegram channel NEXTA to scale up a protest in rapid time is the strength of the modern protests, while the lack of robust structures reflects its weakness. Thus, the Lukashenko government benefited from the fact that the size of the large national protest did not correlate with the capacity to sustain a durable movement by an isolated actor within the realm of media. 50

Although digital connectivity has enabled the mobilization of the protests as well as organization of volunteers and activist initiatives, one might argue that the outcomes of the protest movement were not proportional to the size and energy they inspired. It has been pointed out that the ease that technology provides for protest movements can also be seen as a downside because the quick escalation of the movement without a strong organizational base lacks tactic and a strategy that would be sustainable over time.

In the case of Belarus, the Telegram channel NEXTA was a key actor in protest mobilization and coordination. When the momentum was lost and people began to face serious repressions from the state authorities on a massive scale, there was little that

Telegram bloggers could have done. As they encouraged the bravery of people and maintained that the sacrifices are not in vain, over time people have lost the trust in the channels as the dropping number of subscribers indicates. Thus, Telegram channels were not effective in sustaining the movement long-term as they lacked the organizational capacity and the cooperation with other structures, such as opposition leaders and activist organizations.

In March 2021, NEXTA channel announced that the new wave of protests in 2021 will be organized by a coalition of founders of the largest Telegram channels, opposition organization BYPOL, and the opposition government of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya. As they encouraged other civic organizations to join them, it became clear that they abandoned their former strategy of acting as the only protest mobilizing unit. This development confirms this paper’s argument that an online media actor, such as a

Telegram channel, is not effective in sustaining a large protest movement that would lead to a social change. Instead, there has to be coordination not only within the media 51 but also among different branches of resistance sectors that would work together and make decisions collectively.

The road to bringing about social change is not a straight highway but a rather complex structure of intersecting traffic lanes; thus, to ensure the smooth operation of the intersection, there needs to be a clear structure and coordination. Moreover, innovation should occur at every level, from organizational to political and social. Therefore, further research may examine the changes and their effectiveness within the Belarusian resistance to Lukashenko’s government in the year 2021.

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