1 Telegram as a Tool for Dissent: The Case of Mobilizing Mass Protest in Belarus Thesis By Kathrin Yaromich Submitted in Partial fulfillment Of the Requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts In Mass Media and Communication State University of New York Empire State College 2020 2 Statutory Declaration / Čestné prohlášení I, Kathrin Yaromich, declare that the paper entitled: Telegram as a Tool for Dissent: The Case of Mobilizing Mass Protest in Belarus was written by myself independently, using the sources and information listed in the list of references. I am aware that my work will be published in accordance with § 47b of Act No. 111/1998 Coll., On Higher Education Institutions, as amended, and in accordance with the valid publication guidelines for university graduate theses. Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto práci vypracoval/a samostatně s použitím uvedené literatury a zdrojů informací. Jsem vědom/a, že moje práce bude zveřejněna v souladu s § 47b zákona č. 111/1998 Sb., o vysokých školách ve znění pozdějších předpisů, a v souladu s platnou Směrnicí o zveřejňování vysokoškolských závěrečných prací. In Prague, 27.04.2020 Kathrin Yaromich 3 Acknowledgements It is with genuine pleasure that I express my gratitude to all the people who have inspired and accompanied me throughout my journey towards the completion of this project. My Bachelor thesis would not be possible without the ever-present guidance of my mentor Todd Nesbitt, whose supportive attitude, timely advice, and enthusiastic remarks led me towards the accomplishments of the task, and Professor Iveta Hlouchova, whose dedication, kindness, and keen interest in the world affairs helped me to become a more curious, critical, and perceptive person. I would also like to thank each and every faculty member at the University of New York in Prague and SUNY Empire State College from whom I had the opportunity to learn. With a deep sense of reverence, I acknowledge my gratitude towards my mother, who has supported me unconditionally and encouraged me to realize my ambitions. I also want to thank all my friends whose kind words of support and motivation helped me along the way. Last but not least, I would like to thank all the fellow Belarusians of the democratic opposition, whose bravery, determination, and strength have enabled the fight for freedom. 4 Table of Contents 1. Introduction 6 2. Media Landscape in Belarus 10 2.1. Traditional media 10 2.1.1. Television 11 2.1.2. Radio 12 2.1.3. Print media 13 2.2. The Internet 14 3. Introduction to Telegram 17 3.1. Telegram Application Overview 17 3.2. The War on Telegram across the world 18 3.2.1. Iran 19 3.2.2. Hong Kong 20 3.2.3. Russia 21 4. Telegram in Belarus 24 4.1. Telegram as a Media Phenomenon of 2020 24 4.2. Mass Coordination in Belarus through Telegram prior to the Post-election Protests of 2020 28 4.3. The 2020 Post-Election Protest Plan 29 4.4. Telegram Activity and Behavior Analyses 31 4.4.1. Activity Analysis 31 4.4.2. Behavior Analysis 33 4.5. The Present and the Future of Telegram Channels in Protest Coordination 35 5. The Power and Fragility of Telegram-revolution 37 5.1. Telegram across the Stages of Social Movement 37 5.1.1. Emergence 37 5.1.2. Coalescence 39 5.2. Telegram Channels in the Context of Political Innovations 40 5.3. The Potential Weakness of Rapid Organizing 42 5.4. Protest Visibility and Telegram 43 6. Conclusion 48 5 Abstract Can a messaging platform become the key actor in mobilizing the protest movement and sustaining it over a long-term period? That is the essential question this paper seeks to answer by looking at the case study of Belarus and the use of Telegram application during the protest in the aftermath of the 2020 presidential elections. In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Telegram media phenomenon in Belarus, this thesis first looks at the media landscape of the country, followed by the analysis of strengths, weaknesses, and the use of Telegram in general. Further, a close focus is allocated to Telegram’s role during the mass protest in the aftermath of the Belarusian 2020 elections in August. The paper concludes that despite several advantages associated with the use of the Telegram platform, such as instancy, wide reach, and the increase of protest visibility, there are also dangers of rapid organizing caused by the lack of inter- institutional communication among media, NGOs, and opposition leaders. Thus, the effectiveness of protest organizing can potentially be improved by bringing about change at every level, from organizational to political and social. Keywords: protests in Belarus, social movement, protest movement, mobilization, Belarus, Belarus elections 2020, Telegram 6 1. Introduction “The riot is the language of the unheard”, echoed the famous words of Martin Luther King in Belarus as millions of people faced a deep sense of betrayal and neglect when their voices and votes were yet again dismissed. In the aftermath of the 2020 Belarusian presidential election, the victory of the incumbent president Alexander Lukashenko who has been in power for 26 years, sparked a wave of the largest protests in the country’s history. As claimed by the Central Election Commission of Belarus (2020), Lukashenko won 80.23 percent of the vote. Yet, when the exit poll results appeared on election day, thousands of people across the country fled to the streets to express their disbelief in the fairness of the election system and to demand Lukashenko’s resignation. Alexander Lukashenko has won every presidential election since the first one in the country’s sovereign history in 1994, with all but the first being considered by international monitors as neither free nor fair (CDG, 2019). Throughout his rule, all dissenting voices have been suppressed: while some were forced to exile, several other prominent opponents have gone missing and are believed to be dead (Trippe & Sotnik, 2019). During this election campaign, many new opposition faces emerged, but they did not make it to the elections as they were either detained or had to go into exile. Only Sviatlana Tikhanovskaya, the wife of the detained candidate Sergei Tikhanovsky, participated in the race because, at the time, no one considered a stay-at-home mom as a threat that could challenge the regime. Eventually, she claimed to have won a decisive victory with at least 60 percent of the vote in the districts where the votes were counted fairly (Manenkov & Litvinova, 2020). Forced to exile, she has been meeting with European leaders and negotiating the future of Belarus as a recognized leader. 7 From August 2020 to December 2020, the protests continued in some form or another. Every Sunday, thousands of people across the country went “on a walk” and brought flowers, balloons, and national red-and-white flags with them as a symbol of peaceful resistance. On Saturdays, women used to ‘march for freedom’, and pensioners – who typically have been considered the main source of Lukashenko’s reliance and support – also had their own marches on Monday. October 26 marked the national strike day when Belarusian factory workers, students, and business owners stopped their work demanding Lukashenko to resign. Subsequently, many of the businesses have been shot down, students expelled, and workers fired due to their participation. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, around 7,000 people were detained only during the first four days of the protests, and by the end of November, almost 24,000 had been detained (UN, 2020). Furthermore, from the start of the presidential campaign in the spring of 2020 until November 10, 2020, at least 5,000 individuals were brought to administrative liability on political grounds; at least 950 persons became suspects in politically motivated criminal cases, and 147 of them were recognized as political prisoners. Protesters faced rampant abuses: they were randomly chased and kicked; detainees were beaten by security; and unidentified masked men together with riot police were dispersing protests, heightening a climate of fear and impunity. As a result, thousands of complaints of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in custody were lodged (UN, 2020). Among those detained from August through December 4th were 373 journalists (UN, 2020). In fact, authorities kept the media in their crosshairs during the months of ongoing protests against the president. Journalists were frequently detained for days and were accused of taking part in demonstrations; they were beaten, their equipment 8 destroyed, and accreditation canceled. The Belarusian Association of Journalists (2020) registered more than 500 violations of journalists’ rights. Belarusian authorities attempted to restrict the work of the media by multiple means: Internet blackouts, cancellation of journalists’ accreditations, revoking credentials of a country’s biggest news outlet TUT.BY, and blocking over 100 websites, including news sites. In the aftermath of the government restrictions of the independent media resources in Belarus, Telegram channels, which are more secure and harder for the authorities to block, have emerged post-elections as an important source of information and communication. These channels have gained multimillion audiences and played a central role in publicizing and mobilizing the opposition movement by being the primary source of both information and protest planning. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the effectiveness of Belarusian Telegram channels and chats in organizing mass resistance to the government in order to assess their potential in bringing about social change. It begins with an overview of the media landscape in Belarus, including traditional and online media, so that the use of Telegram can be understood in a larger media framework.