.
32041 KEESINGS VOLUME XXIX MarchJ
The almost universal international condemnation of the Beirut agents" had been responsible; and liii) six Israeli soldiers we atrocities was reflected in the unanimous adoption by the UN Security and22injuredon Oct.3 when theircoach was ambushed byunii Council on Sept. 19 of a resolution expressing outrage at the "criminal gunmen on the Beirut-Damascus highway near Alieh. (It wasam, massacre of Palestinians in Beirut" and authorizing the UN Secretary- on Oct. 3 that Mr Arafat had appointed Mr Mohammed Affani~, General (SrJavier Perezde Cuellar) to investigate the possibility of UN named Abu Mutasem—as PLO chiefof staff in succession to Mr- troops beingdeployed to assist the Lebanese Government "in ensuring who was said to be the highest-ranking PLO officer killed in full protection for the civilian population". The same resolution (which since the Israeli invasion of June 1982.) did not mention Israel by name) also authorized an immediate increase- to 50 personnel—in the size of the UN observer force which had been From early October 1982 the Lebanese Army laum. created to monitor the ceasefire in Beirut under an earlier Security major drive to establish its authority in the numerous areas Council resolution of Aug. 1, 1982 [see page 31918], the various contending militia factions presented a conl Within the Arab world official expressions of outrage at the Beirut threat to internal security. After carrying out a security massacre focused on the alleged responsibility of Israel,which waswidely of west Beirut on Oct. 5-14 (during which many arrests «tn chargedwith having playeda direct role in the killings. On Sept. 20 the made and considerable quantities of arms confiscated), reafe Egyptian Government recalled its ambassador (Mr Saad Mortada) from army units moved into Christian east Beirut onOct. 15, althowr Tel Avivfor an "indefinite'" period, and on Sept. 22 President Mubarak inthis areathey made noattempt to disarm the Christian mifa tolda rally of the ruling National Democratic Partythat Egyptconsidered groups which had exercised effective control since the 1975.7$ Israel "fully responsible for thisbarbarism and carnage"because it had civil war. On Oct. 18 the Lebanese Army also established! taken place while Israeli forces were in occupation of Beirut. Also on presence in the Shouf mountain region to the south-east ol Sept. 20 King Hussein of Jordan, comparingthe Beirut atrocities to the capital (where serious clashes between Moslem and massacre of Palestinian civilians by Israeli terrorists at Deir Yasin in factions had been in progress for several days); howew. 1948 [see page 9240], maintained that the Israelis had organized the penetration ofthe Palestinian camps inorderto undermine UScredibility Israeli forces which had controlled this area since June intheArab world. The most specific allegations ofdirect Israeli complicity were not withdrawn and therefore continued to exercttj came from the PLO, on whose behalf Mr Arafat (speaking in Saudi predominant militaryrole [see also above]. Arabia onSept. 21) also claimed thattheUnited States boreresponsibility In early February 1983 the three-nation peace-keeping] in that President Reagan had guaranteed the security of Palestinian in Beirut was joined by a fourth national contingent wl_ civilians in Beirut under the August 1982 agreement providing for the British soldiers of the Queen's Dragoon Guards arrived evacuationof PLO militarypersonnelfrom the city; for this reason, said Lebanese capital. It was reported that the British conl the PLO leader, the Arab League should immediately impose sanctions on the United States. would form an armoured reconnaissance unit working co-operation with the US Marines deployed in the In the wake of the massacre revelations, the Lebanese Cabinet sector of Beirut around the international airport. decided on Sept.20 to requestthat the US-French-Italian peace keeping force should be redeployed in Beirut to maintain order. Internal Israeli controversy over Beirut massac Later the same day President Reagan announced on US television Eventual establishment of independent judicial that the United States would accede to the Lebanese request Findings of Kahaninquiry commission - Resignat and that both France and Italy had also agreed to the redeploy Mr Sharon as Defence Minister ment. The following day (Sept. 21) the Israeli Government indi cated its acceptance (reportedly after coming under heavy press The Beirut atrocities gave rise to a traumatic polil ure from the US Government to do so), with the result that the troversywithinIsrael,where Mr Begin not only rejected1 first contingent of the force—some 350 French paratroopers- opposition calls for his own and Mr Sharon's resignatio arrived in Beirut on Sept. 24. Italian troops arrived shortly Sept. 19) but also initially resisted widespread demands! thereafter and on Sept. 27 a joint French-Italian force entered establishment of an independent inquiry into the circus the Chatila and Sabra Palestinian refugee camps to assume of the massacre. Although President Navon himself on ! responsibility for their security. Meanwhile, the Israelis carried publicly expressed hissupport for a full inquiry, a parlia out a withdrawal from the positions in west Beirut to which they motion to that effect (tabled by the small Shinui par had advanced on Sept. 15-16, this withdrawal being completed defeated by the Government on Sept. 22 by 48 votes by the time that the first contingent of US Marines arrived at Pressure nevertheless mounted on the Prime Minister, nfl Beirut airport on Sept. 29. from the opposition parties but also within the Gover The second international peace-keeping force in Beirut was substan own ranks, with the result that the Cabinet decided unanii tially larger than the first, being comprised of 1,600 French, 1,200 US on Sept. 28 to authorize the establishment of an independei" and 600 Italian troops, whereas the first such force had totalled 2,000 judicial inquiry "to put an end to the baseless libel to thedkV men. In the second deployment the French troops took responsibility that the Israeli Government has something to hide in thisnrtW for security in the northern sector of the Lebanese capital, the Italians or that it would like to avoid its full clarification". for the central sector and the US Marines for the area around Beirut In an address to the Knesset (Parliament) during the Sept. 22debs" airport in the south. The first casualties among the force occurred on Mr Sharon disclosed for the first time that he and senior Israeli mffi*'1 Sept. 30, when a US Marine was killed and three injured as they tried officers had met Phalangist leaders in Beirut on the afternoon ofSef to defuse a cluster bomb (supplied to Israel by the United States—see 15 and had spoken "in principle of their dealing with the camps": "v pages 31917;29652) which hadbeendiscovered at Beirutairport. following day, afterit had become clear that the Lebanese Army*ou*1 In other military incidents in late September and early October, lii not act, local Israeli commanders had met with Phalangist represents*^ two American and two European members of the UN observer force in "to co-ordinate their entry" into the camps, but on the understso*^ Beirut were killed on Sept. 25 when their jeep struck a landmine on a that the operation would be directed against PLO terrorists and •' road east of the capital; (ii) the PLO "chief of staff", Mr Saad Sayel civilians should not be harmed. (code-named Abu Walidl, was killedon Sept. 27 when he was ambushed Although in the course of the Sept. 22 debate the Prime Mi"i,,c while inspecting Palestinian positions behind Syrian lines in the Bekaa undertook to hold an investigation into the massacre, his opt-— Valley, the PLO claiming that "Zionist murderers and their criminal that stage toa full judicial inquiry provoked the resignation ofMr'"
; jfjtf*^ £^/*/*«**-\ JyoU^u-,
•• March 1983 KEESINGS VOLUME XXIX 32042
Herman (Libera\-Likud) as Energy Minister (in which capacity Mr Ber- As regards individual culpability, the report found that Mr mln was subsequently replaced by Mr Itzhak Moda'i, also Libera]-Likud Sharon, Lt.-Gen. Eitan,Maj.-Gen. Saguy and Brig.-Gen. Yaron tnd hitherto Minister without Portfolio). Within the government coalition all bore responsibility for failing to prevent or to stop the ttrong support for a full inquiry was also expressed by the National Religious Party led by DrJosef Burg (the Interior Minister). Opposition massacre. The Defence Minister was censured in particular for pressure for a full inquiry included the holding of what was described as taking the decision to allow the Phalangists into the camps in the largest protest rally in Israel's history in Tel Aviv on Sept. 25, the disregard ofthedangerto theinhabitants, the report recommend number of those participating being estimated at 350,000 by the ing that he should resign his portfolio, failing which the Prime organizers and at 100,000 by government spokesmen. Minister should consider dismissing him. Lt.-Gen. Eitan was • In accordance with the Cabinet's decision of Sept. 28, Mr found to have beenguilty of dereliction ofdutyas Chief of Staff, Ik-gin the following day formally requested the ChiefJustice of although no penalty was recommended in the light of the the Supreme Court, Mr Itzhak Kahan, to establish a full judicial imminence of the expiry of his term of service (in April 1983) inquiry intothe political and military circumstances of the Beirut [for his appointment in April 1978, see 28846 C]. Maj.-Gen. massacre, in terms of the 1968 Commissions of Inquiry Law. Saguy was censured for breach of duty and his dismissal as Chief Justice Kahan subsequently informed the Prime Minister director of military intelligence recommended, while Brig.-Gen. thai he would head the inquiry commission himself and that its Yaron was found to have misjudged the situation and to have othei two members would be Prof. Aharon Barak, a Supreme reported inadequately to his superiors, in the light of which the Court judge and former Attorney General, and Maj.-Gen. report recommended that he should not hold a field post for the ireserve) Yona Efrat, a distinguished Israeli soldier who had next three years. previously served on a number of disciplinary panels involving While making nofurther recommendations inrespect ofpenal military personnel. Invested with full powers to call any relevant ties, the reportalso (i) found MrBegin responsible fordisplaying persons (including ministers and military leaders) to give tes indifference to reports that the Phalangists had entered the timony under oath, the commission opened its investigation on camps; (ii) stronglycriticized Mr Shamirfor not verifying reports Oct. 11. which he received of the killings: and (iii) censured Maj.-Gen. Over the following six weeks the commission heard evidence Drori for not taking adequate measures to terminate the from numerous people, including Mr Sharon on Oct. 25 and Mr Phalangist operation. On the other hand, the head of Mossad Begin on Nov. 8; most of the proceedings were conducted in and Mr Dudai were found to have verylimitedpersonal responsi public, although some military evidence was given in camera for bility, the former because he had only been appointed four days security reasons. Having completed the first stage of its inquiry, before the massacre. the commission on Nov. 24 notified Mr Begin and eight others The published Hebrewtext of the Kahan commission's report thatthey "maybe harmed"byitsfindings and that they therefore ran to 122 pages, it beingstated that certainsections amounting had the right to give additional testimony and to cross-question to about 10 per cent of the full text had not been published other witnesses (through legal counsel if desired). In addition to because they covered sensitive security matters. The following the Prime Minister, thoseso notified wereMrSharon,MrShamir, passages of the official English translation of the report are Lt.-Gen. Rafael Eitan (the Israeli Chief of Staff), Maj.-Gen. extracted from the section headed "The functioningof establish Yehoshua Saguy (director of military intelligence), Brig.-Gen. ments" and from the commission's final conclusions on the roles Amos Yaron (the Beirut divisional commander of the IDF), played by certain of the principal figures involved. Maj.-Gen. Amir Drori (officer commanding the IDF Northern Command), MrAvi Dudai (personal aide to MrSharon) andthe Flaws in communications. "The decision on the entry ofthe Phalangists head of Mossad (the Israeli secret service), whose namewas not into the refugee camps was taken on Wednesday (Sept. 15, 1982) in the disclosed. morning. The Prime Minister was not then informed of the decision. The Prime Minister heard about the decision, together with all the other Of these nine, Lt.-Gen. Eitan, Maj.-Gen. Saguy, Maj.-Gen. Drori, Mr ministers, in the course of a report made by the Chief of Staff at the Dudai and the head of Mossad reappeared before the commission, while cabinet session on Thursday (Sept. 16l when the Phalangists were already Mr Sharon, Mr Shamir and Brig.-Gen. Yaron presented additional writ in the camps. Thereafter, no report was made to the Prime Minister ten memoranda. Mr Begin declined to give further evidence and in a regarding the excesses of the Phalangists in the camps, and the Prime tetter tothe commission on Dec. 7 restated his contention that when the Minister learned about the events in the camps from a BBC broadcast jahinet had taken the decision to allow Phalangist militiamen into the on Saturday afternoon (Sept. 18•- cirut camps there had been "nogrounds toassume thatatrocities against • civilian population would be committed". (In his oral testimony to the "This state of affairs is unsatisfactory on two planes. First, the import "•mmission onNov. 8 the Prime Minister had repeated anearlier asser- ance of the decision on the entrv of the Phalangists, against the backdrop ""n,hat he had first heard ofthe atrocities from a BBC overseas service of the Lebanese situation as it was known to those concerned, required news bulletin in the late afternoon ofSept. 18.) that the decision on having the Phalangists enter the camps be made Eventually published on Feb. 8, 1983, the report of the Kahan with the prior approval of the Prime Minister. Moreover, once the "'mmission unequivocally placed direct responsibility for the decision had been taken without the Prime Minister's participation, «rut massacre on the Lebanese Phalangists and dismissed sug orderly processes of government required that the decision be made gestions that Israeli troops had taken part as "baseless libel"; it known to him at the earliest possible moment. It is not proper procedure for the Prime Minister to hear about this decision in an incidental manner lstl found no evidence to indicate that Maj. Haddad's forces along with the other cabinet ministers during a cabinet session, when the ,''" cen involved in the killings. At the same time, the report j"*J. that certain Israeli political and military leaders bore Phalangists were already in the camps. rect responsibility because "everyone who had anything to "Second, once the decision was taken, orderly processes of government required that the Prime Minister be informed of any excesses committed. *'th events in Lebanon should have felt apprehension about What the Defence Minister, the Chief of Staff and the general of command assacre in the camps if armed Phalangist forces were to be knew on Friday and on Saturdav morning, the Prime Minister ought also ed into them without the IDF exercising concrete and to have known. It is inconceivable that the Prime Minister should receive eenve supervision and scrutiny of them". his information about this from a foreign radio station.
* ^^^mmhMhh ^^^^_—_ 32043 KEESINGS VOLUME XXIX March
"Aswe have seen, thedecision onthePhalangists' entry intothecamps conversations. The Prime Minister held many conversations took final shape on Wednesday morning (Sept. 15) on the roof of the Defence Minister and the Chief of Staff, including the conversatii divisional forward command post. When this decision was taken its which the decision was taken to seize key positions in west Beir ramifications were not examined, nor were its advantages and disadvan not surprising, therefore, ifa certain difference exists between the j tages weighed. This is explicable in that the decision was taken under Minister's version of a guideline issued by him, and that of the l pressure of time. Nonetheless, enough time existed before the Staff regarding the guideline he received. Phalangists' entryon Thursday evening (Sept. 16)to carryout a situation appraisal in which the decision, its manner of execution and its possible "The Defence Minister and the Chief of Staff held a conversati results could be examined. Nosuch deliberation in fact took place. The Tuesday evening (Sept. 141 in which a number of important do discussion held by the Defence Minister on Thurday morning. .., in were taken. Thisconversation was not recorded in any form. which he said I would move the Phalangists into the camps', cannot be "We believe that it isdesirable to determine guidelines in thisi regarded as a situation appraisal in the usual sense of the term. The in order to prevent a situation in which important decisions Chief of Staff told us that on Wednesday heordered his deputy to hold documented." a consultation among branch heads. Such a discussion did in fact take Mr Begins role. "We may certainly wonder that the participati place in the late afternoon hours... but it was a briefing and not a the Phalangists in the entry to west Beirut and theirbeing given th situation appraisal. The issue of the Phalangists' entry was mentioned in of 'mopping up' in the camps seemed so unimportant that the I that discussion in a general manner, but the decision was not presented Minister didnotinform the Prime Minister ofitanddidnotget his I indetail,noexamination was madeof the security measures to be taken, for the decision. and no evaluation was made of the possible ramifications of the decision.... "However, that question does not bear on the responsibility | "The absence of the required staff discussion regarding the entry of Prime Minister. What is clear is that the Prime Minister was not i the Phalangists into the camps was accompanied by another inevitable to the decision to have the Phalangists move into the camps, an flaw. The information about the decision was not transmitted in an orderly he received no report about that decision until the cabinet session i evening of Sept. 16, 1982. fashion to all the parties who should have known about it. We have already seen that the Prime Minister was unaware of the decision. The "We do not believethat we ought to be critical of the Prime 1 Foreign Minister, too,learned ofthePhalangists' entryonly inthecabinet because he did not on his own initiative take an interest in th session. We have already cited the account of the director of military of the operation of the entry into west Beirut, and did not intelligence that he, too, did not learn about the decision until Friday through his own questions, that the Phalangists were taking pa morning. Although we have stated that we find it difficult to accept that operation. The tasks of the Prime Minister are many and diver account, this cannot justify the absence of an orderly report about the hewas entitled to rely ontheoptimistic andcalming report oftheI decision being made to all the various staff elements. Minister that the entire operation was proceeding without any i "Thus, forexample, it emerged that thecommand intelligence officers and in the most satisfactory manner. were first briefed by the command intelligence officer about the fact that "We have cited above from remarks made at the cabinet s the Phalangists would enter the camps on Thursday, some two hours Sept. 16, 1982, during which the Prime Minister learnt after the operation had already commenced. According tothe testimony Phalangists had that evening begun to operate in the camps, of the military intelligence research officers whose task it is to prepare that meeting norafterwards did the Prime Minister raise any op situation appraisals,they receivedno prior informationabout the decision or objection to the entryof the Phalangists intothe camps, to have the Phalangists enter the camps. As a result, that department react to the remarks of Deputy Prime Minister [David] Levij was unable to prepare its own appraisals, as would have beenexpected contained a warning of the danger to be expected from the Phauf of it priorto the Phalangists' entryintothecamps. This also had a certain entry into the camps. According to the Prime Minister's testimo effect on the manner in which that department functioned at the stage one conceived that atrocities would be committed ... ; simply, when it received the report about the 300killed... [i.e. a report which us, no minister,none of the other participantssupposedsuch a th the Israeli command in Beirut had received from the Phalangists at 11 p.m. on Sept. 16to the effect that about 300people had been killed "The PrimeMinisterattached no importanceto MinisterLevi'i in the camps up to that point]. because the latter did not ask for a discussion or a vote on this4 When Minister Levi made his remarks, the Prime Minister "The head of the Mossad learned of the decision only at the cabinet formulating the concluding resolution ofthe meeting, and fortl session. Despitethe factthat Mossad personnel were in Beirut when the events occurred, and maintained on-going contacts with the Phalangist as well he did not pay heed to Minister Levi's remarks. commanders, no report was received from them regarding the special "We have already said above, when we discussed the que role of the Phalangists in the camps prior to their entry, nor did they indirect responsibility, that in our view, because of things that i collect any data at all on events in the camps after the Phalangists had known to all. it should have beenforeseen that the danger of a i entered.... existed ifthe Phalangists were to enter the campswithoutmeasur taken to prevent them from committing acts such as these. "The reports that were received via the various channels were also notalways handled according tothestanding procedures, the result being "We are unable to accept the Prime Minister's remarks that J that the reports sometimes became worthless. Sometimes, reports absolutely unaware of sucha danger. According to what he hin received were not recorded in the designated log books; reports that he told the Chief of Staff on the night between Sept. 14 and were relayed were sometimes transmitted with important omissions, in explaining the decision to have the IDF occupy positions which prevented their being handled properly. Reports that were dealt Beirut, that this was being done in order to protect the Moslems] with (such as the handling of the report about the 300 killed within the the vengeance of the Phalangists'. and he could well suppose th« framework of military intelligence/research) were at times handled the assassination of Bashir[Gemayel], the Phalangists' beloved I superficially, with a fruitless internal runaround and without exhausting they would take revenge on the terrorists the various possibilities for verification and examination The Prime Minister was aware of the mutual massacres con "In the course of the testimony we heard, we often came across in Lebanon during the civil war, and of the Phalangists' feeling I conversations—whether face-to-face or over the telephone or radio- for the Palestinians, whom the Phalangists held responsible for | between highlyresponsible personnel. Contradictions were often evident calamities that befell their land. The purpose of the IDF's enO in the testimony about these conversations—not out of any intention to west Beirut—in order to prevent bloodshed—was also stressed1 conceal the truth, but as a natural result of flaws in human memory Prime Minister in his meeting with ambassador [Morris] Draper | There is no satisfactory explanationof why no notes were taken of these United States] on Sept. 15, 1982.
' March 1983 KEESING'S VOLUME XXIX 32044
Weare prepared to believethe Prime Ministerthat, beingpreoccupied operation and without the IDF being able to maintain effective and (, ,|,e cabinet session with formulating the resolution, he did not pay on-going supervision of their actions there. na.j to the remarks of Minister Levi, which were uttered following lengthy reviews and discussions. However, in view of what has already "The sense of such a danger should have been in the consciousness ofevery knowledgeable personwhowascloseto thissubject,and certainly ,a „ noted aboveregardingforesight and probabilityof actsof slaughter, in the consciousness of the Defence Minister, who took an active part M ,ire unable to accept the position of the Prime Minister that no one in everything relatingto the war. His involvement in the war wasdeep, •n.^med that what has happened was liable to happen, or what follows and the connexion with the Phalangists was under his constant care. .,,iin his remarks: that this possibility did not have to be taken into K,,nint inthedecisiontaken to havethe Phalangists moveinto the camps. "If in fact the Defence Minister, when he decided that the Phalangists would enter the camps without the IDF taking part in the operation, did As noted, the Prime Minister first heard about the Phalangists' entry not think that that decision could bring about the very disaster that in „i,i the camps about 36 hours after the decision to that effect was taken, fact occurred,the onlypossible explanation for this isthat hedisregarded nid did not learn of the decision until the cabinet session. When he heard any apprehensions about what was to be expected because the advan ,ihhii the Phalangists' entry into the camps, it had already taken place. tages—whichwe have already noted—to be gained from the Phalangists' Wording to the 'rosy' reports the Prime Minister received from the entry into the camps distracted him from the proper consideration in Ik-fence Minister and the Chief of Staff, the Prime Minister was entitled this instance. 1,1 .issume at that time that all the operations in west Beirut had been "As a politician responsible for Israel's security affairs,and as a minister YiMrmed in the best possible manner and had nearly been concluded. who took an active part in directing the political and military moves in We believe that in these circumstances it was not incumbent upon the war in Lebanon, it was the duty of the Defence Minister to take into ilw Prime Ministerto object to the Phalangists' entry into the camps or account all the reasonable considerations for and against having the •. order their removal. On the other hand, we find no reason to exempt Phalangists enter the camps, and not to disregard entirely the serious the I'rime Minister from responsibility for not having evinced, during or consideration mitigating against such an action, namely that the .itit-r the cabinet session, any interest in the Phalangists' actions in the Phalangistswere liable to commit atrocities and that it was necessaryto .imp. forestall this possibility as a humanitarian obligation and also to prevent the political damage it would entail.... Ii hasalready been noted above that no report about the Phalangists" operations reached the Prime Minister, except perhapsfor the complaint "Had it become clear to the Defence Minister that no real supervision regarding the Gaza hospital [in the vicinity of the camps and the recipient could be exercised over the Phalangist force that entered the camps with til many of the Palestinian casualties], until he heard the BBC broadcast the IDF's assent, his duty would have been to prevent their entry. The inwards evening on Saturday. For two days after the Prime Minister usefulness of the Phalangists'entry into the campswaswholly dispropor heard about the Phalangists' entry, he showed absolutely no interest in tionate to the damage their entry could cause if it were uncontrolled.... ihcit actions in the camps. This indifference would have been justifiable "We do not accept the contention that the Defence Minister did not il we were to acceptthe Prime Minister's position that it was impossible need to fear that the Phalangists would commit acts of killing because •mil unnecessary to foresee the possibility that the Phalangists would in all outward aspectsthey looked like a disciplined and organizedarmy. mmmit acts of revenge; but we have already explained above that It could not be inferred from the Phalangists'orderly militaryorganization •ii-curding to whathe heard intheThursday cabinetsession, and according that their attitude towards human life and to the non-combatant popula In what he said about the purpose of the move into Beirut, such a tion had basically changed. It might perhaps be inferred from their possibility was not unknown to him. military organization that the soldiers would heed the orders of their It may be assumed that a manifestation of interest by him in this commanders and not break discipline; but at the very least, care should matter, after he had learnt of the Phalangists'entry, would have increased have been taken that the commanders were imbued with the awareness Ifcc alertness of the Defence Minister and the Chief of Staff to the need that no excesses were to be committed.... '" take appropriate measures to meet the expected danger. The Prime "We shall remark here that it is ostensibly puzzling that the Defence Minister's lack of involvement in the entire matter casts on him a certain Minister did not in any way make the Prime Minister privy to the decision •li-grce ofresponsibility." on having the Phalangists enter the camps. Mr Sharon's role. "It is true that no clear warning was provided by "It is our view that responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of military intelligence or the Mossad about what might happen if the Defence for having disregarded the danger of acts of vengeance and Phalangist forces entered the camps.... But in our view, even without bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population of the refugee camps, MK'h warning, itis impossible tojustify the Minister of Defence's disregard and having failed to take this danger into account when he decided to "I the danger of a massacre. We will not repeat here what we have have the Phalangists enter the camps. already sa'd above about the widespread knowledge regarding the "In addition, responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defence 'halangists' combat ethics, their feelings of hatred toward the Pales- for not ordering appropriate measures for preventing or reducing the ""l;"is, and their leaders' plans for the future of the Palestinians when danger of massacre as a condition for the Phalangists' entry into the i" lca
* 32045 KEESINGS VOLUME XXIX March ] of Staffshould have known and foreseen—by virtue of common know atrocities; it therefore has importance from the perspective of I, ledge, as well asthe special information at his disposal—that there was moral fortitude and its functioningas a democratic state that scrupu a possibility of harm to the population in the camps at the hands of the maintains the fundamental principles of the civilized world. Phalangists. Even if the experts did not fulfil their obligation, this does •We do not deceive ourselves that the results of this inqnif not absolve the Chief of Staff of responsibility convince or satisfy those who have prejudices or selective consci but this inquiry was not intended for such people. We havestrive "We find that the Chief of Staff did not consider the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed being perpetrated against the population have spared noeffort to arrive at the truth, and we hope thatall p, of the refugee camps in Beirut; he did not order the adoption of the of good will who will examine the issue without prejudice will h appropriate steps to avoid this danger; and his failure to do so is tan vinced that the inquiry was conducted without any bias." tamount to a breach of dutythat was incumbent on the Chief of Staff." Mr Sharon resignsDefence portfolio - PLO reaction Gen. Saguy's role. "The picture received according to the testimony Publication of the Kahan report gave rise to renewed po ofMaj.-Gen. Saguy himself is of indifference and a conspicuous lack of furore in Israel, centring on whether Mr Sharon would i concern, ofshutting his eyes andearsto a matter regarding which it was the Defence portfolio. Mr Sharonsaid on Feb. 8 that there incumbent on the director of the intelligence arm of the IDF to open sections of the report which he could not accept, notabl his ears and listen well to all that was discussed and decided." concept of "indirect guilt" put forward by the commissior Mr Shamir'srole. "The phenomenon that came to light in this case- was later quoted as saying that he would not resign. Hov namely that the statement ofone minister to another did not receive the after the Cabinet had voted on Feb. 10 by 16 to one (Mr St attention it deserved because offaulty relations between members of the to accept the Kahan reportandits recommendations, MrS Cabinet—is regrettable and worrisome [Here the commission was referring totestimony from the Communications Minister, Mr Mordechai wrote to Mr Begin the following day effectively resignir Zipori, that he had immediately informed Mr Shamir of reports which Defence portfolio, while making it clear that he intend he had receivedfrom a journalist at 11 a.m. on Sept. 17 that a massacre remain a member of the Government. Mr Sharon's resigt was in progress in the camps; in his own testimony Mr Shamir admitted was formally accepted by the Cabinet on Feb. 13, the D< receiving a telephone call from Mr Zipori about the situation in the portfolio being taken over ad interim by Mr Begin pendii camps but said that he could not remember the word "massacre" being appointment of Mr Moshe Arens (currently Israel's amba.* used.] The Foreign Minister did not make any real attempt to check to the United States) as the new Defence Minister later whether there was anything in what he had heard from Minister Zipori month. Mr Sharon remained in the Cabinet as Minister w on the Phalangists' operations in the camps because he had an a priori Portfolio and on Feb. 20 was reappointed, on Mr Begin' sceptical attitude toward the statements ofthe Minister It isdifficult posal, to the ministerial committees responsible for defem to find a justificationfor such disdain." for negotiations on Lebanon. The Cabinet's unanimous nc Concluding remarks. "Inthewitnesses' testimony andinvarious docu tion of Mr Arens (57) as Defence Minister was approved ments, stress is laid on thedifference between the usual battle ethics of Knesset on Feb. 23 by61 votesto 51 with two abstentions the IDF and the battle ethics of the bloody clashes and combat actions among thevarious ethnic groups, militias and fighting forces inLebanon. In the daysfollowing the publication of the Kahan report sever The difference is considerable. In the war the IDF waged in Lebanon, demonstrations tookplace inlerusalem andelsewhere involvingl many civilians were injured and much loss of life was caused, despite ters of Mr Sharon on the one hand and thosedemanding hisresi| the effort the IDF and its soldiers made not to harm civilians. On more on the other. During one anti-Sharon demonstration outside th« than one occasion, this effort caused IDF troops additional casualties. Minister's lerusalem office on Feb. 10 a hand grenade was threw During the months of the war, IDF soldiers witnessed many sights of the crowd, one man being killed and 10 people being injured killing, destruction, and ruin. From their reactions (about which we have 10,000 people, including government and opposition leaders, st heard) to acts of brutality against civilians, it would appear that despite the funeral (in Haifa on Feb. 11) of the demonstrator killed, w the terrible sights and experiences of the war and despite the soldier's reported to be the first Jewish fatality of apolitical demonstration ii obligation to behave as a fighter with a certain degree of callousness, Commenting on the Israeli inquiry report in Ammano IDF soldiers did not lose their sensitivity to atrocities that were per 8, Mr Arafat criticized the Kahan commission for not ms petrated on non-combatants either out of cruelty or to give vent to "decisive condemnation" of Mr Begin and called for the vengeful feelings. up of an international court "tofollow up this ugly crime". "It is regrettable that the reaction by IDF soldiers to such deeds was was little official reaction to the report from other Arab s notalways forceful enough to bring a halt to thedespicable acts. It seems men, however, apparently because of a general relucta to us that the IDF should continue to foster the [consciousness of] basic comment on an inquiry conducted by a state which Arab I moral obligations which must be kept even in war conditions, without members did not recognize, especially one which in the i prejudicing the IDF's combat ability. The circumstances of combat many people showed Israel's democratic political systei require the combatants to be tough—which means to give priority to sticking to the objective and being willing to make sacrifices—in order favourable light. to attain the objectives assigned to them, even under the most difficult For its part, the Lebanese Government had by mid-Fe conditions. But the end never justifiesthe means, and basic ethical and given no indication of the progress of its own inquiry ii human values must be maintained in the use of arms. massacre, which had been instituted shortly before the "Among theresponses to the commission from the public, there were commission began its investigation in October. Notwithsl those who expressed dissatisfaction with the holding of an inquiry on a the findings of the Israeli inquiry, Phalangist leaders in D subject not directly related to Israel's responsibility. The argument was continued to deny that the Sabra and Chatila killings ha advanced that in previous instances of massacre in Lebanon, when the perpetrated by their militiamen. lives ofmany more people were taken than those ofthe victims who fell in Sabra and Chatila, world opinion was not shocked and no inquiry Military and security developments in Lebanon f commissions were established. We cannot justify this approach to the late 1982 to early 1983 - Casualty figures - Rent issue of holding an inquiry, and not only for the formal reason that it of UNIFIL Mandate was not we who decided to hold the inquiry, but rather the Israeli Government resolved thereon. The main purpose of the inquiry was to During late 1982 and early 1983 the presence of the l bring to light all the important facts relating to the perpetration of the tional peace-keeping force in Beirut facilitated the maint
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i relatively stable security situation in the Lebanese capital, destroyed an Israeli reconnaissance plane on the ground to prevent it .: jn otherpartsof Lebanon tensions related to the continuing falling into enemy hands. The article stated that the Israeli plane, which ,-jeli military occupation remained acute. On Nov. 3 the Israeli had been brought down by the Syrians, had been carrying sophisticated •horities claimedthat between2,000 and 3,000 PLO guerrillas electronic counter-measures equipment and was being dismantled by the ..j been redeployed in the Bekaa Valley after being evacuated Soviet technicians when the Israeli jets attacked. -n Beirut to Syria in August, such reports giving rise to fears Having been extended for an "interim period" of three months Israel that Israeliforces in Lebanon werefacing a lengthy war on Oct. 18 [see page 31910], the mandate of the 7,000-strong jttrition with no political solution in sight. In the same period UNIFIL force in southern Lebanon was extended for a six-month ;her conflicts erupted between Moslem and Christian period bythe UN Security Council onJan. 18, 1983, by 13votes .^anese factions, while in southern Lebanon troops of the UN to none, with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining. leriffl Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) continued to sustain Quest for negotiated withdrawal of foreign forces from ;.ualties. Lebanon - Opening ofdirect Israeli-Lebanese negotiations In major military incidents during this period, lii three Irish UNIFIL During the latter part of 1982 US diplomatic efforts in the diers were killed by unidentified assailants on Oct. 27, their deaths cmg the total of force members killed since its deployment in 1978 Middle East were concentrated on establishing the basis for <6; (ii) two Syrian anti-aircraft missileswere fired at Israeli reconnaiss- negotiations on a withdrawal of Israeli and other non-Lebanese ;cjetsover the BekaaValley on Oct.31, without hitting theirtargets; forces from Lebanon, which was seen as a necessary prerequisite j iii lan Israeli soldier on patrol in a jeep in the port of Sidon (southern for any progress towards a solution of the broader Arab-Israeli inon) was killed by gunmen on Nov. 19, the "Armed Struggle conflict on the lines of President Reagan's peace initiative of wnization" later claiming responsibility. (The "Armed Struggle Sept. 1 [see above]. Serious differences separated the interested -tanization" had also claimed responsibility for an explosion which parties, however, relating principallyto Israel's insistence that a polished the Israeli headquarters in the southern Lebanese coastal simultaneous withdrawal of its own and Syrian troops from *n ofTyreon Nov. 15,killing 75Israeli soldiers andsecurity personnel Lebanon must be preceded by a complete evacuation of PLO *ell as 14 Arabs beingheldinthe building for interrogation; however, forces which remained in the country and also by the establish Israeli investigation later established that the explosion had been ijsed by leaking bottled gas.) ment of new arrangementsaffording security to Israel's northern border area. In the continuing absence of effective central government authority, vaeli forces in Lebanon played a major role in curbing renewed hos- Israel's proposals for a settlement with Lebanon, as reformulated by ities between Druse Moslems and Christians which broke out in the the Cabinet inearly October, were reported to envisage (i) thesignature wuf mountains in mid-October and later spread to the southern suburbs ofa definitive peaceagreementbetween the twocountries; (ii) a timetable I Beirut. Tension between the two communities increased after the for the withdrawal of Israeli and all non-Lebanese Arab forces under >use leader, Mr Walid Jumblatt (also leader of the Moslem-leftist which the estimated 7,000 Palestinian guerrillas stationed in northern National Movement in Lebanon), had been injured on Dec. 1 in a car and eastern Lebanon would leave first, followed by a joint and simul ••mb explosion in Beirut which killed four people; by late December taneousevacuation of Syrian and Israeli troops;and (iii) prior agreement •; number of deaths in Druse-Christian fighting since mid-October was (i.e. before an Israeli withdrawal) on new security arrangements which Mt at170bythe Lebanese authorities. Israeli efforts to maintain security would guarantee "that Lebanon will notagain revert to becoming a base Milted in several clashes with regular Lebanese forces (in one of which anda launching ground foraggressive actsofhostile forces against Israel". Dec. 8 two Lebanese soldiers were killed in east Beirut), while in In this last respect, Israel continued to insist on the creation of a demilitar irlv 1983 Israeli forces in southern Beirut were involved in a number ized zone within an arc drawn some 40 to 50 kilometres from its northern ' confrontations with US Marines of the international peace-keeping border [see map on page 31916], with the security of this zone being .'ce. assured by an international force (not linked to the United Nations) and bysmall numbers of Israeli military observers who would be ableto give Israeli casualties in Lebanon in the period from the launching of the advance warning of any encroachment on its demilitarized status. we 1982 invasion to the end of the year were officially given as 450 ^icemen killed and 2,434 injured, while five were listed as missing In talks between Mr Shamir (Israeli Foreign Minister) and Mr Shultz "d 11 as being held captive. Lebanese official sources on Dec. 1 put (US Secretary of State) held in Washington on Oct. 14 the two sides - total number of non-Israeli dead in all categories (i.e. including registered agreement on theprinciple ofanearlywithdrawal ofallforeign lians aswell asPalestinian andSyrian military personnel) at 19,085— troops from Lebanon but differed as to the timing and procedures to be • substantial increase as compared with figures issued three months followed. According to State Department officials, the US Government '••• iously [see page 31919] reflecting thediscovery ofmany more bodies wascurrentlyenvisaging that allforeign forces in Lebanonwould partici Beirut; the Israeli authorities continued to regard official Lebanese pate in a phased withdrawal, moving towards the objective of a full :-ualty figures as greatly exaggerated. evacuation in a series of agreed and co-ordinated limited withdrawals applying to Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces concurrently. In the light of The Israeli military authorities claimed on Jan. 4, 1983, that the differing US and Israeli conceptions of how a withdrawal was to be *o basesfor Soviet-suppliedSAM-5surface-to-air missiles were accomplished, Mr Shultz and Mr Shamiragreed on Oct. 14 to set up a •rently under construction "deep in Syria" and stated that joint working group which would study and evaluate the various with rael "is continuing to follow developments" in the light of the drawal proposals and report to the respective governments. reat which these missiles would pose to Israeli reconnaissance Prior to the Shamir-Shultz talks, the Syrian Government had informed :^hts over Syria; according to Israeli sources, the advanced US negotiators on Oct. 2 that it agreed in principle to the proposal for ^M-5 missile batteries had never previously been deployed a joint Israeli-Syrian troop withdrawal from Lebanon and had reiterated Jtside the Soviet Union. [For the destruction by Israeli planes its willingness to withdraw its ADF forces in terms of the declaration issued by Arab League members at the Fezsummit the previous month Syrian SAM-6 missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley in the [see above]. On the other hand, PLO leaders called upon Arab govern :rK stages of the June 1982 invasion of Lebanon, see page ments to oppose any proposal for a further Palestinian withdrawal from 915.] Lebanon as long as no progress had been made towards fulfilment of 'n December 1982 US Assistant Defence Secretary Mr Richard Perle the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in their own homeland. ealedin a magazine articlethat 11 Soviet technicians had been killed President Gemayel of Lebanon addressed both the UN Gen 'he Bekaa Valley in the spring of 1982 when Israeli warplanes had eral Assembly and the Security Council in New York on Oct.
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