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The Occupation and the Employment of the Israel Defense Forces

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The Occupation and the Employment of the Israel Defense Forces Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2002-12 Breaking consensus : the occupation and the employment of the Israel Defense Forces Scoratow, Leon B. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3316 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS BREAKING CONSENSUS: THE OCCUPATION AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES by Leon B Scoratow December 2002 Thesis Advisor: Glenn E Robinson Second Reader: Jeffrey Knopf Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 2002 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Breaking Consensus: The Occupation and the 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Employment of the Israel Defense Forces 6. AUTHOR Leon B Scoratow, LT, USN 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited With the establishment of universal conscription in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and reserve duty lasting much of the average male’s adult life, the IDF became one of the central institutions of the State of Israel. The occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Sinai, and Golan in 1967, forced Israelis to re-examine their deeply shared, or hegemonic views about security, peace, and war, especially regarding the employment of the IDF. This thesis examines the effects of Israeli political divisions, specifically with regard to the occupied territories, and further, how those political cleavages affect the employment of the IDF. Its first case study examines the progression of selective refusal to serve in the IDF from the extreme left of the Israeli political spectrum to the center-left, from the Lebanon War through the current uprising. The second case study examines the relationship between the IDF and Fundamentalist Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories, emphasizing resistance to settlement removal over time. This thesis concludes with prescriptions for redefining the borders of the State of Israel in order to prevent a loss of consensus regarding the legitimacy of the state from the right or the left of the political spectrum. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Israel, IDF, Occupied Territories, Selective Refusal, Jewish 15. NUMBER OF Fundamentalism, Civil-Military Relations PAGES 75 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited BREAKING CONSENSUS: THE OCCUPATION AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES Leon B. Scoratow Lieutenant, United States Navy B.A., Carnegie-Mellon University, 1997 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL DECEMBER 2002 Author: Leon B. Scoratow Approved by: Glenn E. Robinson Thesis Advisor Jeffrey Knopf Second Reader James J. Wirtz Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT With the establishment of universal conscription into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and reserve duty lasting much of the average male’s adult life, the IDF became one of the central institutions of the State of Israel. The occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Sinai, and Golan in 1967, forced Israelis to re-examine their deeply shared, or hegemonic views about security, peace, and war, especially regarding the employment of the IDF. This thesis examines the effects of Israeli political divisions, specifically with regard to the occupied territories, and further, how those political cleavages affect the employment of the IDF. Its first case study examines the progression of selective refusal to serve in the IDF from the extreme left of the Israeli political spectrum to the center-left, from the Lebanon War through the current uprising. The second case study examines the relationship between the IDF and Fundamentalist Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories, emphasizing resistance to settlement removal over time. This thesis concludes with prescriptions for redefining the borders of the State of Israel in order to prevent a loss of consensus regarding the legitimacy of the state from the right or the left of the political spectrum. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION: THE IDF AND ZIONIST HEGEMONY ................................1 A. ISRAEL AND THE IDF: HEGEMONIC PROJECTS................................1 B. THE ZIONISTS & THE IDF: HEGEMONIC CONSENSUS ....................2 C. HEGEMONIC CHALLENGES.....................................................................5 D. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................6 E. THE POTENTIAL FOR UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT AND A RETURN TO HEGEMONY.......................................................................7 II. HEGEMONIC CHALLENGES TO THE IDF: YESH GVUL AND SELECTIVE REFUSAL.............................................................................................9 A. SERVICE AND SELECTIVE REFUSAL ....................................................9 B. HEGEMONIC CONSENSUS, “NO-CHOICE WARS,” AND 1982 AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE ........................................................................10 C. SELECTIVE REFUSAL TO SERVE IN LEBANON, THE FORMATION OF YESH GVUL, & DISSATISFACTION IN THE IDF...................................................................................................................13 D. FROM LEBANON TO THE INTIFADA ...................................................16 E. THE FIRST INTIFADA................................................................................18 F. SELECTIVE REFUSAL AND THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA ....................22 G. SELECTIVE REFUSAL IN CONTEXT.....................................................25 III. THE HEGEMONIC PROJECT OF RELIGIOUS ZIONISM...................................27 A. FROM RELIGIOUS ZIONISM TO JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM ...27 B. EARLY RELIGIOUS ZIONISM .................................................................28 C. FROM MARGINAL PHILOSOPHY TO ENTRENCHED MOVEMENT .................................................................................................29 D. EARLY SETTLEMENTS AND EARLY SETTLER ACTIVITY............32 E. YAMIT............................................................................................................36 F. POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION AND UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY......................................................................................................40 G. THE JEWISH INTIFADA............................................................................47 H. YAMIT IN YESHA?......................................................................................50 I. WITHDRAWAL PANGS .............................................................................52 IV. UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL: THE TRIUMPH OF HEGEMONIC CONSENSUS .............................................................................................................53 A. UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL IN THE MAINTENANCE OF HEGEMONY .................................................................................................53 B. TOWARDS UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT ....................................53 C. YAMIT AS A PRESCRIPTIVE MODEL...................................................56 vii V. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................59 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................61 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................65 viii I. INTRODUCTION: THE IDF AND ZIONIST HEGEMONY A. ISRAEL AND THE IDF: HEGEMONIC PROJECTS This thesis applies Gramsci’s concept of hegemony – an intellectual discourse or worldview so dominant within a society that it becomes “common
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