An Mora Constrts

Yitzchak Blau

Rabbi Blau is a Ram at Yeshivat Hamivtar in Efrat, IsraeL.

PLOUGHSHAS INTO SWORDS: CONTEMPORA RELIGIOUS ZIONISTS AN MORA CONSTRTS

AUTHOR'S NOTE: When Jewish communities are threatened, we rightfully incline towards communal unity and are reluctant to engage in internal criticism. In the wake of recent events in Israel, some of which I have witnessed firsthand, one might question the appropriateness of publishing this article. Nevertheless, the article remains timely. It attempts to correct a perceived misrepresentation of yahadut, irrespective of political issues, and such a step is always relevant. Furthermore, the decision to delay our own moral questioning during difficult times could lead in modern Israel to a de facto decision never to raise such questions. Finally and most significantly, times of heightened anger, frustration and fear can cause cracks in the moral order to widen into chasms. I hope the reader will agree that the issues analyzed in the article remain very much worthy of discussion. The article does not advocate a particular political approach. While readers of a dovish inclination will no doubt find the article more congenial, it is the more right wing readers who truly stand to benefit from the discussion. It is precisely the militant excesses of the dati le)ummi world that enable and lead others to ignore their legitimate criticisms. The ability to combine a more right wing political view with a more moderate expression of Judaism would be both a kiddush hashem and more successful politically as well.

"In ths situation of war for the land of our life and our eternal free- dom, the perfected form of our renewal appears: not just as the People of the Book-the galuti description given us by the genties- but rather as God's nation, the holy nation, possessors of the Divine Torah implanted therein, for whom the Book and the Sword descended intertwned from the heavens . . . the men of the Sword cannot be detached and exempt from the Book, which is the strengt of our lives and the lengt of our days, and the People of the Book canot be detached and exempt from the Sword, when it (the Sword)

is enjoined by ths holy source of life itself"l (R. Zvi Yèhuda ¡(ook)

TRAITION34:4 / (f 2000 39 Rabbinical Council of America TRADITION

shift in the thinking of sections of the religious community in The wordsthe wake above, of thedelivered formation in aof 1948 a Jewish speech, state. herald The designation a paradigm of the Jews as "the People of the Book," is no longer our primary source of pride and becomes but an incomplete portrayal of Jewish ideals. The Sword, frequently looked down upon as the instrument of violence and death, becomes a crucial supplement to the Book. Jews must take Book and Sword in hand in their quest to achieve renewaL. R. Zvi Yehuda took the image of Sword and Book descending together from Sifei (Devarim 11: 13) and transformed the image from its original midrashic usage. In the midrash, God does not give man both as instruments for human use. Rather, God says that if we do not keep what is written in the Book, we will be punished by the Sword. The need to read the midrash as advocating humans taking up the Sword stems from the novel reality presented to Jews in the twentieth century. The formation of the State of Israel posed fresh challenges to religious Jewry in both thehalakhic and aggadic spheres. The first organ- ized Jewish army in almost two milennia turned our attention back to the Rambam's hilkhot melakhim: long neglected laws applied to present- day warfare. The existence of a Jewish army also inspired a search for midrashim about the saints who excel in both the bet midrash and on the battlefield. As the State's hostile neighbors made maintaining a strong army a necessity, it became imperative to show that valor in bat- tle did not contradict the ideal image of the pious Jew. Tanakh helpfully provided many examples of righteous forefathers who also successfully took Sword in hand. The renewal of Jewish autonomy in a geographical area also popu- lated by other nationalities created its own halakhic and aggadic issues. Halakhot pertaining to a Jewish court system, anon - Jewish minority in Israel and other thorny problems received extensive attention. On an aggadic level, the desire to find the appropriate context within which to thank God for the gift of the State led to a search for midrashim about the significance of Jewish self-rule and of living in the Holy Land. Of course, the phenomenon described above reflects the enduring and dynamic nature of halakha and aggada. The Jewish tradition provides enough material for guidance through all legal and philosophical problems that arise in the vicissitudes of time. However, the excitement and enthusiasm generated by a new situation can create dangers as welL. Values that receive renewed emphasis can move beyond legitimate expression to the point where other necessary balancing values are

40 Yîtzchak Blau ignored. An overemphasis on miltary valor can lead to an idealization of war and a de-legitimization of the striving for peace. A constant focus on Jewish sovereignty can erode important moral constraints about ruling over other populations. Significant segments of the current dati le)ummi community suffer greatly from this lack of balance.2 A number of writers have pointed out some of the extreme and dangerous excesses in contemporary Religious Zionist circles.3 We need not list them here because most readers wil not need convincing that rabbinic statements downplaying the severity of killing non-Jews or praising acts of terrorism committed by Jews are extremely problematic. Indeed, most dati le)ummi thinkers reject these positions.4 There is, however, a more subtle danger in the shift to idealize the Sword. The search to create a midrash, as it were, about the para- mount significance of Jewish autonomy and Jewish army heroics, I fear, has led to a worrying imbalance in some Religious Zionist circles. In these circles, there is an attempt to quiet all moral qualms in pursu- ing the Religious Zionist go.al. The following pages ilustrate this spirit. The published writings of some prominent community rabbis, heads of yeshivot hesder and Havrei I(enesset from the world of Religious Zionism join together to create a distortion of emphasis regarding the roles of war and peace, the rela- tionship between Jew and gentile and the place of morality in the halakhic system. While some of the quotes taken in isolation would prove quite harmless, it is in the cumulative effect of these voices on the community that the danger lies. With a couple of exceptions, I wil limit my citations to fairly well known names in the dati le)ummi world. This will demonstrate the prominent role these ideas play in the sociological group under discussion.5

At the same time, we must be wary of painting an entire community with the same brush. The term Religious Zionist incorporates a multitude of different views and a perusal of the literature reveals writers from either side of the political spectrum whose writings are free of the faults mentioned above. Furthermore, not all of the people criticized in this paper deserve identical treatment. R. Dov Lior and R. Shlomo Aviner certainly write about peace with different voices. However, despite the diversity among Religious Zionists, this paper argues that the problems are widespread enough to cause concern. We shall look at three problematic aspects in these writers employment of traditional sources. First, though different times call for different emphases, there must be some limit on one-sided portrayal of a

41 TRADITION given issue. If a writer constantly cites one theme, and totally ignores a balancing theme prominently featured in Jewish sources, his or her writing approaches distortion. Second, these writers often cite a source reflecting a theme clearly opposed to their own viewpoint in order to reread that source as a support for their outlook. This paper argues that these new interpretations consist of strained attempts to change the obvious meaning of a text. Finally, even when a specific interpretation is justifiable, we should be concerned about the moral effect that focusing on certain themes might have on our community. We shall return to these three problems towards the end of the paper.

WAR6

Judaism clearly rejects the extreme pacifism of a Gandhi, as the halakha includes the categories of both a mandated war and a permissible war. However, the halakha also insures that no capricious wars are fought by requiring a Jewish government considering a permissible war to receive first the approval of the Sanhedrin and possibly the Urim ve- Tumim as well.? R Moshe Feinstein extends the need for Divine sanction to the mandated war and thus concludes that the only halakhically legitimate war today is a war of self-defense. 8 Furthermore, admitting the need for war need not conflict with maintaining distaste for military endeavor. A number of classical sources indicate a Jewish revulsion toward war and its implements. The Sages refused to let people walk outside on shabbat wearing their weapons as "they are nothing but a disgrace." (Shabbat 63a).9 Rashi and Ramban explain that the prohibition of employing hewn stones for the altar reflects our recoil from associating the house of God with the violent Sword needed to cut the stones.10 According to the account in Divrei ha- Yamim (I 22:8), David could not build the temple due to the blood he spiled in his many battles. Furthermore, Hazal tellingly regularly reinterpret military feats of biblical heroes in spiritual terms. The "Sword and the bow" (Bereshit 48:22) with which Yaakov defeated the Emorites were prayer and good works (Bereshit Rabba 97:6). Benayahu's vanquishing of the strong men of Moav (Shemuel II 23:2) refers to his study of Torah (Berakhot 18b). The sixty strong ones who surround Shlomo's bed (Shir ha- Shirim 3:6) are the letters in the priestly blessing (Shir ha-Shirim Rabba 3:6).i Apparently, Hazal want to emphasize that Jewish heroism occurs primarily in the study hall and the synagogue, not on the battlefield.12

42 Yitzchak Blau

Indeed, they view weapons as the implements of Esav, inappropriate in Jewish hands (Bereshit Rabba 98: 5). Many dati leJummi thinkers, who view the existence of war as a significant part of religious reality, feel the need to shift the tone of these sources. R. Eliahu Zini, rabbi of the Technion, argues that David himself offered this reason for his inability to construct the temple but that no prophet ever said it.13 However, R. Zini's attempt to remove any negative sentiments about war from the biblical text proves unsuc- cessful for three reasons. 1) Major rishonim such as the Rambam,14 Ramban,1s Ibn Ezra16 and others accept David's explanation for why he could not build the temple. Ibn Ezra even employs the verse to ilustrate that Judaism takes the lives of gentiles seriously. 2) While it is true that David states the idea in question and neither God nor prophet ever explicitly confirms it, David prefaces his remarks by saying "the word of God came upon me." Why doubt him? 3) Even if we accept the suggestion that it was David's idea-and his alone-David himself, as a model for the Jewish warrior, can also instruct us regarding Jewish values. Rav Abraham Balas, an author and regular contributor to MeJat Min ha-Or, argues against the humanistic reading of Divrei ha- Yamim much more forcefully. 17 According to R. Balas, "the blood that David spilled, (the blood) that was spiled for the defense and revival of Israel, did not diminish in the slightest the purity of the soul or right- eousness of the path of King David. On the contrary, it raised his value. ,ns R. Balas claims that David could not build the Temple because then people would think that his wars only had the instrumen- tal value of enablíng the construction of the Temple. In fact, wars have intrinsic value in expressing Jewish sovereignty. Where R. Zini attempts to neutralize the anti war sentiment in Divrei ha- Yamim, R. Balas turns the message on its head in order to generate a radical endorsement of military endeavor. Rav Yaakov Medan, Ram in Har Etzion, offers a novel explanation for why Hazal keep converting miltary feats into prayer and study. R. Medan writes "in places where the Sword appears, according to the sim- ple reading of the text, the midrash comes and drags after it (the Sword), and intertwnes within it, the Torah; and thus, wherever we find the Sword of the Divine wars, Torah is there. "19 He ignores the more obvious possibility that Hazal want us to think of the biblical great men we must emulate as scholars and saints rather than as warriors.

43 TRADITION

EFFECTS OF WAR

Many Jewish sources express concern about the moral erosion that war and violence bring to a society. Rambam views the many mitsvot addressed to the soldier as the Torah's attempt to deal with the moral decay associated with wartime.2o Ramban suggests that the mitsva of "ve-nishmarta me-kol davar ra" specifically demands extra diligence, so that our soldiers not fall prey to the violent tendencies unleashed in bat- tle.21 Neither of them assumes that Jews can easily escape these moral difficul ties. In his Shemoneh Perakim, Rambam employs the example of David to prove that a prophet need not possess all moral attributes.22 God communicated with David despite David's trait of akhzariyyut, the trait that disqualified him from building the Bet Hamikdash. Rambam clearly accepts the conventional reading of the verses in Divrei ha- Yamim, unlike R. Balas and R. Zini. More significantly, Rambam highlights the negative effects of war on the moral personality. R. Naftali Tsvi Yehuda Berlin famously comments that the "berit shalom" given to Pinhas after killng Zimri, and the promise of mercy adjacent to the mitsva of completely destroying an ir ha-niddahat) reflect God's promise that these acts of aggression wil not corrupt the personality of Pinhas nor the court that executes the ir ha-nid¡fahat.23 He emphasizes that it was Pinhas' acting "le-shem shamayim," out of the most noble motivations, that enabled him to receive this "berit shalom" and maintain his peaceful personality. Clearly, even if we extend this idea of the Netsiv to every Jew engaged in a moral war, the "le- shem shamayim" component needed to remain uncorrupted wil not be achieved by every Jewish soldier. Nevertheless, R. Dov Lior, Rosh Yeshiva in Kiryat Arba, dismisses the notion that army maneuvers that harm civilians might have negative moral consequences for the soldiers involved. R. Lior turns the Netsiv's idea into a Divine guarantee of Jewish incorruptibility. R. Lior writes that "the attribute of compassion is a hereditary trait of Am Yisrael . . . one inherits this characteristic without ever having to learn it". 24 According to R. Lior, Jews proceed through life without any need to work on their moral selves, having been biologically assured of their moral superiority.

44 Yitzchak Blau

PEACE A multitude of talmudic and midrashic sources extol the virtues of peace with a hyperbole beyond the rabbinic norm. The gemara views the promotion of peace as the purpose of the entire Torah (Gittin 59b). According to one midrash, God commended Moshe for sending peace overtures in defiance of a Divine command to wage war (Bamid- bar Rabba 19:29). According to a different midrash (Bereshit Rabba 38:6), the peace formed between idol worshipers saves them from Divine punishment. Some Religious Zionists, however, present a different picture. R. Balas attempts to radically redefine peace. In response to a question about peace with Egypt, R. Balas says "True, we achieved a peace of a few months. Whoever was privileged to be in Yamit in its last months before the evacuation saw what peace is. Peace is a vision, a joy, a boundless love for the people and the land and a life full of Torah, joy and pioneering spirit. "25 The Jewish goal of peace refers to the settling of Yam it. Another approach limits the celebration of peace to the complete peace achieved in the messianic era and rejects any partial peace as worthless. R. Yaakov Ariel, Rav of Ramat Gan, writes "Peace that is not founded on the shared belief in, and concept of, one God is not a authentic and lasting peace. . . a Jew who believes in the true worth of peace is not wiling to exchange it for a phony peace of trips to the pyr- amids, eating and dancing or even the loftier concept of easing the security burden which is also an issue of material comfort. "26 R. Ariel ignores the possibilty that an ethical desire to prevent killng may not be founded on shared theological assumptions. A striking irony emerges from R. Ariel's argument. He identifies with a religious group that proclaims the arrival of the messianic era despite the incomplete nature of our current redemption. This group demands that we celebrate our current achievement even as we wait patiently for the rest of the messianic process to unfold. However, when it comes to peace, it adopts an all or nothing approach in which any pale substitute for the messianic utopia must be rejected. R. Shlomo Aviner, Rosh Yeshiva of Ateret Kohanim and Rav of Bet EI, creates his own midrash in explaining the parameters of peace. Playing off the verse, "God grants strength to His people; God blesses His people with peace," R. Aviner argues "we certainly want peace- but in what fashion (Tehillim 29:11)? The foundation is strength. . . . If

45 TRAITION we want a true peace, it has to be clear who the Jews are and who the gentiles are. We are not on the same leveL. "27 Without providing any clear rabbinic source material, R. Aviner turns a discussion of peace into a call for Jewish strength and chauvinism.

PEACE AND DIVNE PUNISHMENT

R. Lior's position on peace goes beyond any of the views cited above. In his worldview, all calamities are to be traced back to our attempts to resolve our conflict with the Arabs. In the journal of his yeshiva, R. Lior argues that the Lebanon war followed closely after the withdrawal from the Sinai as the war represents Divine punishment for our abandoning the Sinai.28 In Nekuda, R. Lior is cited as viewing the capture of some Israelis in Lebanon as God's payment for the arrests of the mahteret, the Jewish underground.29 Two problems emerge from R. Lior's methodology. Assuming cause and effect based on chronological proximity can prove anything. One could just as easily argue that the Religious Zionist refusal to leave Yamit and the very actions of the mahteret are what brought about Divine displeasure in the two cases mentioned. More troubling though, is R. Lior's inability to conceive of a more serious transgression to which to attribute our misfortunes than our attempts to make peace with Egypt and our arresting Jews, some of whom planned the indis- criminate murder of Arabs. Let us assume for the sake of argument that evacuating YamIt and stopping Jewish counter-terrorism was wrong. Is there nothing worse going on in the Jewish community? We have seen how this midrash of some Religious Zionists attempts to change traditional attitudes to war and peace. In a similar fashion, this school attempts to close off all thinking that might introduce moral constraints into Jewish political life. Once again, traditional terms receive a new emphasis in the attempt to sanctifY Jewish sovereignty.

I(IDDUSH HASHEM

The term "kiddush hashem" and its converse "hillul hashem" include a number of different meanings. Many Religious Zionists love to cite Yehezkel 36:20 which links the term "hillul hashem" with the gentile perception of Jews being driven into exile. They also cite analogous themes in Tanakh in which the specific term "hìllul hashem" does not

46 Yitzchak Blau

explicitly appear. Moshe's pleas on behalf of the Jewish people after the sins of the Golden Calf (Shemot 32:12) and the Spies (Bamidbar 14:15) incorporate an argument that the collective misfortune of the Jewish people profanes the Divine name. Perhaps the non - Jews wil claim that God brought the people out of Egypt to kill them in the desert or perhaps God did not have the ability to bring them into IsraeL. Such a claim would constitute a desecration of the Divine Name. Abraham Holz points out that this type of hillul hashem motivates Divine behavior in Tanakh but is not employed as a reason for human action.30 Thus, it remains unclear whether or not the Jewish people should allow such considerations to playa role in decision making. Nevertheless, such a notion of kiddush and hillul hashem can claim biblical precedent. However, subsequent rabbinic employment of these terms tends to focus on different ideas. The gemara employs kiddush hashem to refer to martyrdom and to refer to the ethical behavior of Jews in general and talmidei hahamim in particular (Sanhedrin 74b). Many rabbinic texts express the latter idea in powerful terms. Thus, one tanaatic source eval- uates theft from gentiles as worse than theft from Jews due to the desecration of God's name (Tosefta Bava I(amma 10:8). R. Meir Simha haKohen of Dvinsk suggests that murder of gentiles can not be atoned for by capital punishment because the murderer must achieve kappara for both murder and hillul hashem.31 As representatives of the Divine message, our ethical behavior toward outsiders creates an impression about the nature of that message. In the same way, the behavior of talmidei hakhamim, those more strongly associated with the message of Torah, toward fellow Jews can either sanctifY or desecrate the Divine name. Rav states that his buying meat on credit rather than paying immediately would constitute a hillul hashem (Yoma 86a). A scholar who fails to get along with people also falls into the category of desecration of the Divine name (Ibid.). Someone whose ethical behavior reflects the character of Torah must act with the utmost ethical excellence. Some Religious Zionist writers argue that we should ignore all moral criticism from the gentile world. But this last type of hillul hashem relates precisely to the gentile perception of Jewish behavior. Thus, according to the gemara, David uprooted a Torah principle in punishing Shaul's descendants for Shaul's crimes (against the Givonim) in order to avoid desecrating the Divine name (Yèvamot 79a). Both the gemara and Rashi make it clear that the hillul stems from what non-

47 TRAITION

Jews will say about our care for converts. Furthermore, the notion that avoiding hillul could justify "uprooting the Torah" grants significant halakhic weight to such avoidance. Fulfillment of a Divine directive does not obviate the need to guard diligently against such a hillul. R. Yaakov Kaminetsky suggests that Avraham planned to not tell the "shenei nearim" the truth about the akeda as they would view it as an unethical act and that would desecrate the Divine name.32 In the same spirit, Rashi states that when redeeming a Jewish slave from an idol worshiper one must pay the due amount to avoid hillul hashem.33 The critical importance of the work one is engaged in does not cancel concern for the ethical hillul hashem. This last type of hillul hashem receives no mention in much of today's Religious Zionist writings. Instead, the writings focus exclusively on the hillul hashem suggested in Yèhezkel, and expand it significantly.34 From this perspective, any sign of Jewish power signifies a sanctifi- cation of the Divine name and any concession is a desecration of that name. Rabbi Zevulun Melammed, Rav of Bet EI, cites R. Zvi Yehuda Kook as saying that an Israeli government that stays in power due to the votes of Arab Knesset members desecrates the Divine name.35 One could argue that allowing the Arab minority to have a voice in our government fulfills the ethical behavior type of kiddush hashem. Instead, R. Kook equates Jews sharing power with being driven into exile, a dubi- ous comparison, in order to come to the opposite conclusion. Rabbi Eliezer Waldman, Rosh Yeshiva in Kiryat Arba, writes that "complete kiddush hashem exists only in Israel"36 where we are not sub- servient to the gentiles. This statement reflects the thrust of all his writings which cast aside the ethical kiddush hashem in order to identify kid- ddush hashem solely with Jewish power. Only such a slant can explain R. Moshe Levinger's reaction to the Jewish terrorist attack on the Islamic College in Hebron. R. Levinger, a leading figure in Gush Emunim, declared that "those who carried out this action publicly sanctified the Divine name. "37 From the perspective of ilustrating to the gentiles our ethical behavior, a radically different conclusion emerges. However, R.

Levinger's interest in hillul hash em focuses exclusively on Jewish honor. R. Balas shows us how far this skewed perspective can go. He writes "the epitome of hillul hashem is the Jewish people in exile and by necessity, the epitome of kiddush hashem is their return to, and settlement of, their land."38 He proves his case from the gemara (Yòma 86a) employing Yèhezkel 36:20 mentioned above as an example of kiddush hashem. In doing so, he completely ignores the talmudic context in which that

48 Yitzchak Blau

verse is mentioned. The gemara cites that verse when discussing the il effect of a rabbi who does not get along with people. Thus, a talmudic source about the ethcal kiddush hashem transforms into another argument for Jewish power. R. Aviner provides an even more striking example of the one sided depiction of hillul hashem. As he equates any Jewish subservience with hillul, he comes to the conclusion that a good deal of Sefer Bereshit is a hillul hashem. Thus, Yaakov's need to get the bekhora by sellng lentils, his running away from Esav and his placating an angry Lavan are seen as a hilluL. Shimon and Levi's wiping out of Shekhem is also a hillul. "Is this the way one kills and setdes scores? Go out and fight! "39 How different the above is from the concerns of mefarshim over the past thousand years to explain the moral conduct of the avot. Thus, Rashbam argues that Yaakov sold the birthright for cash and the lentils were a meal to seal the dea1.40 R. David Kimhi faults Yaakov for attempting to take his brother's birthrightY R. NaftalI Tsvi Yehuda Berlin views the avot)s gentle conduct toward hostile neighbors as a model for future generations.42 Ramban understands Yaakov's deathbed criticism of Shimon and Levi as a moral condemnation of their destroying an entire town., He writes that Yaakov was afraid that people would think that Yaakov himself was involved and there would be "a hillul hashem that a prophet was involved in violence. "43 Here, the dissonance between the classical mefarshim and some modern dati le)ummi writers emerges sharply. The earlier group was concerned to show that our forefathers treated their gentile neighbors in exemplary fashion. At times, they argued that our forefathers made errors on ths score and Ramban applies the term hillul hashem to one such error. On the other hand, Rav Aviner shifts the primary focus to questions of Jewish sovereignty, honor and pride. This reflects nothing less than a transvaluation of values. Rabbi Eliezer Melammed, Rav of both the yishuv and the yeshiva Har Beraka in Shekhem, uses the kiddush hashem of martyrdom to arrive at the desired political result. Halakha commands Jews to give up their lives rather than be forced to publicly transgress Jewish law when the gentile forcing them intends to make the Jews transgress, but not when the coer- cion is aimed at his own benefit. As the Arab Israeli conflict reflects a religious polemic regarding the truth of biblical prophesies, Jews are obligat- ed to give up their lives rather than relinquish any territory.44 Two faulty assumptions plague the above argument. On a factual level R. Melammed apparently assumes that the Arabs are only interest-

49 TRADITION ed in Israeli territory as a means of proving the truth of the Islamic religion and disproving Judaism. The possibilty that Arabs might be interested in this land because many of them live there and many others lived there before the 1948 war with the Jews seems irrelevant to him, as does the fact that many secular Arabs involve themselves in this struggle. Additionally, their aspirations might also be fueled by a religious motivation not related to disproving Judaism. They want to control the Dar-al- Islam, land of the Moslems.45 On a halakhic level, R. Melammed assumes that another religion trying to prove its superiority over Judaism with respect to biblical prophecies parallels a gentile forcing a Jew to violate a commandment. I am aware of no other halakhic source that makes such an equation. Before one issues a halakhic decision that obligates Jews to give up their lives, one would expect more analysis of sources. Instead, R. Melammed simply asserts his innovation as if it were an obvious position.

ETHICS AND HAAKA

Another factor that might balance our nationalistic aspirations would be the notion that there exist ethical obligations outside the boundaries of the halakha. The question of ethics outside the halakha is complex and sources can be marshaled on both sides.46 Rav Kook, in a well-known passage, writes that "it is forbidden for the fear of heaven to push aside man's natural morality for then it would no longer be pure fear of heaven."47 According to R. Kook, man's ethical intuitions carry weight even when no clear halakhic source serves as a basis for those intuitions. Furthermore, the halakha itself, by positing general mitsvot to act ethically, demands that we go beyond the letter of the law in our ethical behavior. Nevertheless, the writers here discussed assume without any discussion that no ethics exist other than what halakha demands. If so, we need show no concerns over war beyond the explicit constraints of the halakha. Rav Aviner writes that the commandment to conquer the land "is above and beyond any moral, humanistic considerations and national rights of gentiles to our land. . . because all ethics and justice in the hearts of man have no existence whatsoever if not for their having been drawn from the word of God. God, as the source of ethics, instructs us to ignore human ethical considerations in conquering the land. "48 Rav Aviner further argues that this kibbush actually reflects ethical behavior.

50 Yitzchak Blau

"Fortunate is the world in which the Jewish people return to health and a normal settlement of their entire land. Thus declares the musar elyon, not the lower ethics that are detached from their Divine source and bring suffocation to the spirit of the King Messiah. "49 In Rav Aviner's view, ethical concerns about Arab rights fall away in the light of the higher ethcs. Rav Eliyahu Zini, Rav of the Technion, also rejects any human ethic. Reading his writings leaves one with the impression that the celebration of compassion reflects Christian values and not Jewish ones. He cites the talmudic statement (Berakhot 33b) that one should not, in prayer, attribute sending away the mother bird to God's compassion on the bird, without mentioning the various opinions that attempt to limit the force of that gemara.50 Rambam51 held that this talmudic opinion is rejected outright and Ramban52 argued that God may not be showing mercy toward the bird but that the Torah does want to teach man about mercy. Strangely, Rav Zini proves that Judaism rejects the notion of the "sanctity of life" because there are scenarios where halakha demands giving up one's life.53 Of course, halakha also at times demands viola- tion of Shabbat, as in a case where a life hangs in the balance. But this certainly does not prove that Judaism rejects any notion of kedushat Shabbat. The fact that a given value may be overridden does not prove that it is not a value. Otherwise, almost nothing could be a value.

COMPASSION FOR AN ENEMY

Traditional sources indicate an ambivalent reaction to our enemies' downfalL. On the one hand, the verse states "in the destruction of the wicked is rejoicing" (Mishlei 11:10) and a gemara says that David did not exclaim halletuya until he witnessed the downfall of the wicked (Berakhot 9b). On the other hand, the midrash famously explains our not reciting the complete hallet on the seventh day of Pesah as an expression of reduced joy due to the drowning of the Egyptians (Yalkut Shimoni 247). A talmudic text explains similarly why God did not allow the angels to burst out in song at the very moment of cross- ing the Red Sea (Sanhedrin 39b). Such a notion inspires the idea that the Jewish tradition incorporates some degree of compassion for the enemy. Some current Religious Zionists cannot live with this notion. Thus, both R. Yaakov Ariel54 and R. Ben Tzion Benedict,55 Rav of

51 TRAITION

Ahuza, claim that the gemara actually refers to the distress of the Jews. The angels were prohibited from singing until the Jews were completely out of danger. Let us assume that these rabbis interpret the gemara in Sanhedrin correctly. Wil that make the other midrashic source go away? A midrash clearly exists to the effect of limiting rejoicing when our enemies perish and the rereading of Sanhedrin fails to contradict that notion. Further- more, all earlier authorities interpret the gemara as referring to the suffering of the Egyptians.56 Thus, the theme of compassion for the enemy has more than adequate precedent in rabbinic literature. Finally, R. Ariel and R. Benedict's employ questionable argumentation to justify their novel reading. Rabbis Ariel and Benedict point to an alternate midrash, Tanhuma Yashan Beshalah 13 in which God restricts the angels singing because His children are in distress. They assume that the gemara in Sanhedrin reflects the same theme of Jewish suffering. However, they equate the wording in the Tanhuma, "my children are in distress," with the wording in the gemara, "my creations are drowning". Surely, the shift to from "my children" to "creations" and from "distress" to "drowning" meaDS that we are discussing the Egyptians and not the Jews. The fact that the gemara in Sanhedrin applies the same principle to Yehoshofat's victory over Amon and Moav also points to the Egyptians as the people whose suffering prevents song.

GOOD OF HUMAITY

Judaism includes both particularistic and universalistic elements which clash at times such as the present. The situation in Israel may create a feeling that our own nation's needs conflict with our service to humanity. To combat this feeling, some Religious Zionist leaders assure us that there is no need to worry. As the messianic beatitude depends on Jewish control of the holy land, what seems to be personal, self-interested aspirations are in truth purely altruistic. To put it blunt- ly, we can act selfishly and feel downright moral about it too. Rav Yaakov Ariel writes that: "giving preference to the rights of existence of the Jewish people over the national rights of other peoples is not some crude egocentric love. Love of Israel means love of the entire world. . . . Therefore, the good of all humanity . . . requires giving preference to the existence and normal development of the Jewish people in their land" .57

52 Yitzchak Blau

This kind of reasoning enables rabbinic writers to feel that they are continuing the tradition of Rav Avraham Yitshak haKohen when they actually radically depart from central elements in his worldview. Rav Kook writes frequently of the need to love all of humanity and desire to improve their lot. 58 Indeed, he writes of a love of Israel and a yearning for the redemption that does not conflict with the love of humanity as it sees Israel's role in bringing on the universal redemption. However, he does not say that the love of Israel obviates the need to love humanity, and to try to improve their lot, nor that love of Israel always overrides the love of humanity. Furthermore, Rav Kook never denied the possibility of a Jewish nationalism not founded on universal love but rather on hatred for the other. He writes that "Love of Israel demands love of all humanity and when it forms hatred or any part of humanity, this reveals that the soul has not yet been purified of its filth" .59 In this passage, Rav Kook fore- sees the problem of a love of Israel intertwined with a hatred of gentiles and criticizes such a love. These writers reduce Rav Kook's emphasis on the need to love all humanity to an idea with no practical ramifications. All that is required is love of IsraeL. Rav Kook writes that "only in a soul rich in love for humanity can the love of the nation arise in its majestic nobilty and spiritual grandeur" .60 This citation confirms that Rav Kook demands that we move beyond the parochial love that cares only about fellow Jews. Nevertheless, Rabbi Waldman converts the message entirely. He quotes this line from Rav Kook to ilustrate that loving Israel encom- passes love of humanity as anyone with great love for Israel loves humanity by definition.61 Rabbi Waldman writes "We are responsible also for our enemies as they too are God's creations. However, they must understand that their desolation wil not be removed if they impede the connection between the Jewish people and the land of IsraeL. . . . We want to bring berakha out of a sense of love and responsibilty to the entire world. Only with this power do we engage in building and defending the land of Israel, with great care that the hair on a Jew's head not be harmed as this would be a blow to God, as it were; this would hold back the berakha from all the nations of the world. "62 Even assuming this view of the road to the messianic beatitude, the argument has two flaws. It confuses ends and means: knowing that a particular event bring about a blessing does not always justify all means of bringing about that event in order to arrive at the blessing. For

53 TRAITION example, it does not follow from Rashi's understanding of Yèshayahu 53, the suffering of the Jewish people provides a blessing for humanity, that we should work to insure that such suffering occurs.63 Secondly, this argument is irrelevant in the world political arena in which each government, including (and perhaps especially) those of a fascist nature, thinks that its country's expansion would be a boon to humanity. Ifwe want to interact with other countries on a level playing field, we cannot employ arguments that would terminate all constructive discourse. Hanan Porat, a Knesset member and leader in Gush Emunim, attempts his own midrashic justification for this approach. God's command to Avraham to depart for Israel includes the idea that all the nations achieve blessing through Avraham (Bereshit 12:1-3). Porat infers that blessing to the world stems from the Jewish presence in IsraeL. 64 However, the fact that the message to Avraham incorporates both the command to head to Israel and the promise of boon to humanity does not prove a causal link between the two. Even if we accept such a link with regard to Avraham, it does not follow that ths link would continue for the generations following the covenant of Avraham.

JEWS AS VICTIMS

Another way to silence all moral qualms mobilizes thousands of years of Jewish suffering at gentile hands, as a guarantee of moral superiority. R. Yaakov Ariel writes, "the history of the Jewish people and its righteous ones, in contrast to the history of the nations of the world, proves who withstood the ethical test and proved their ethical superiority, and who did not" .65 While it is clear that Jews have suffered terrible persecutions, it is not clear why that fact should provide us with a safety net against all moral questioning. Indeed, emphasis on this note encourages a dangerous attitude in which we can do no wrong as our victimhood reflects a permanent status. Rabbi Zevulun Melammed employs the blood libel as the paradigm of false gentile accusations. In his view, we need not worry about gentile complaints regarding our actions in Lebanon or about Arab rights in Israel just as we need not worry about the veracity of a blood libeL. 66 Yet, analogies are only as potent as the strength of the comparison. Surely, we need to analyze whether we acted ethically in Lebanon before we assume that the gentiles are interested in spreading another false blood libeL.

54 Yitzchak Blau

SELF CRITICISM IS DANGEROUS

A few Religious Zionists also argue that self-criticism plays into the hands of the enemy. Hanan Porat writes that "doubts, hesitations and remorse (regarding our sovereignty in Israel) invite terror" .67 Afer the acts of the mahteret, R. Moshe Levinger said, "Any public reservations we have are superfluous and only strengthen the Arabs" .68 Afer Sabra and Shatia, R. Eliezer Waldman wrote that those who criticize "weaken our strong stand in this fateful struggle of Medinat Yisrael for independ- ence and existence in our land. "69 Once again, these writers seem to take a stand in which we are not allowed to question ourselves morally.

RACISM

In one final tactic, some writers portray the Arabs in such disgusting terms as to make us the "good guys" by definition.70 Rav Dov Lior writes that "every intellgent person knows that wild savagery is a basic trait of the Arab personality".71 One might have hoped that years of Jewish suffering as a result of such racist claims about Jews would have sensitized us to speak more carefully. After all, one can criticize the actions of the Arab states without making such actions inherent to the Arab personality. Nevertheless, such racism serves the purpose of declar- ing our inherent moral superiority in the struggle for the land of IsraeL. In the fashion we have outlined, the new Religious Zionist midrash attempts to change traditional attitudes to war, peace, kiddush hashem and other issues discussed in traditional sources. At the same time, it attempts to silence moral questions about how we conduct ourselves on a national leveL. This combination is likely to prove morally disastrous as we currently rule over a conquered population and the temptation exists to ignore all complaints, legitimate and ilegitimate, in the name of our nationalistic dreams. Aviezer Ravitzky points out another factor that encourages a lack of moral concern. Many modern religious Zionists view the state as satu- rated with holiness. If so, its actions, including wars, exude sanctity by definition.72 Thus, Rav Tsvi Tau, a longtime rebbe at Mercaz haRav, could say during the Lebanon war that "Israel's wars are in their inner- most essence wars against war".73 This conception does not allow for the possibility that we might start an unjustified war. There may also be an ironic influence in the history of ideas playing

55 TRADITION an influential role. Secular Zionists in the first half of this century iden- tified with Nietzsche's criticism of Judaism for downplaying the values of pride, honor and power. Men such as Micha Berdyczewski, Uri Tsvi Greenberg and Abba Ahimeir negated the rabbinic tradition that they claimed had produced the peace loving Jew devoid of vitality. For these writers, the authentic Jewish heroes were the conquerors of Canaan, the hurbanmartyrs of Masada, and the biryonim Bar who Kokhba.74 fought the Romans prior 'to the I suggest that the attitudes expressed above made their way in a more subdued form into the religious camp as well. Of course, religious Jews did not completely reject two thousand years of rabbinic writing. However, they did begin to talk of a galuti perspective that we abandon in our return to Zion. They also began to grant great value to ideas such as kavod ha-uma, matsav bari shel ha-uma and ga)avat ha-am. This may reflect the influence of Secular Zionists more than the influence of rabbinic sources. It would be quite an irony to discover that a virulent critic of Judaism, Friedrich Nietzsche, indirectly influenced the religious Jewish community.

Now that we have completed the citations of Religious Zionist writers, we can provide examples of the three problems raised at the outset regarding the usage of sources. Our first problem was ignoring sources that provide balance. In the militant rhetoric we have examined, both the ethical kiddush hashem and powerful rabbinic statements regarding the primacy of peace are shunted aside. Our second problem was the forced reinterpretation of all opposing sources. Thus, David's inability to build the Bet Hamikdash and the angels not bursting into song at keriat Yam Sufare reread beyond recognition. Finally, we raised the problem of the moral consequences such an approach has for our society. When leading educators frequently extol the virtues of war and downplay the significance of peace and when their reading of Bereshit seems more interested in Jewish power than Jewish ethics, their students get the message. This author contends that the effects of the above on Religious Zionist society can be clearly seen in the last fifteen years. In instances of Jewish violence against Arabs, it is frequently religious voices that are most vocal for absolving the per- petrators of guilt. In miltary actions that place non-Jewish civilians in danger, it is often religious voices that feel no reservations about callng for such action. Finally, the notion that ruling over another population presents ethical difficulties finds little expression in religious circles. One final counter argument deserves mention. Perhaps these writ-

56 Yitzchak Blau ers feel that Israel's peace process with its Arab neighbors imperils its existence. Therefore, it becomes imperative to present an unbalanced perspective on rabbinic source material regarding certain issues, in order to convince the public to reject any peace agreement. Such an argument might justify some of the writings criticized above. The above argument assumes an educational stance that attempts to avoid any nuance or complexity. It should be possible to oppose a given peace accord, even while teaching that yahadut grants peace immense value and that any decision regarding our treatment of gentiles must include kiddush hashem as a concern. We do not react to a problem of phony tsedaka collectors by teaching people that charity is not important and that stinginess plays an important role in Judaism. Further- more, the argument focuses too exclusively on short-term considerations. The Arab-Israeli conflict may not remain the burning Jewish issue of the next century. The portrait of Judaism currently painted by Jewish educators will, alas, be passed on to subsequent generations. The degree to which that portrait is marred should deeply concern us. As we mentioned earlier, Religious Zionism does include many voices on all sides of the political spectrum that reject much of the nationalistic and militaristic excess. Rav Aharon Lichtenstein,75 Rav Yoel ben Nun76 and Prof. Uriel Simon77 are just some of the prominent names whose writings reveal a different side of Religious Zionism. Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to dismiss the trends outlined in this paper as the work of a few fanatics on the fringes. Among the people cited in this paper are the heads of four hesder yeshivot, two Havrei I(enessct and the rabbanim of five cities or yishuvim. These are people whose writings appear in the mainstream Religious Zionist pub- lications such as Tehumim) Amuddim) Nekuda and Hatsofeh. One can attempt to defend their ideas; but one cannot ignore them as irrelevant in Religious Zionist society. We take great pride in the dedication that the religious community has shown to our national renewaL. We must work toward the day when we can, at the same time, take great pride in the religious community's dedication to an ethical society. Ultimately, a society that does not tol- erate any moral questioning of its political policies wil invariably turn corrupt. In contemporary Israel, unfortunately, there are too many stri- dent, well-positioned religious voices arguing for just such a society.

57 TRADITION

NOTES

The author would like to thank Dr. David Berger and Rabbi Shalom Carmy for their helpful comments. 1. z. Y. Kook, Le-Netivot Yisrael (Jerusalem, 5727), p. 113. All translations from the Hebrew are by the author. 2. For a survey of both religious and secular Zionist attitudes to power, see Ehud Luz, MaJavak be-Nahal Yabok: Otsma, Musar ve-Zehut Yehudit (Jerusalem, 1998). The attitudes of secular Zionists to power before the state are surveyed in Anita Shapira, Herev ha- Yona: ha- Tsiyyonut ve-ha- Koah 1881-1948 (Tel Aviv, 1993). There is an English translation entitled Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force) 1881-1948 (Stanford, 1999). 3. A frightening group of citations is collected in Amnon Rubenstein, Mi- Herzl ad Rabin ve-Halla: Meah Shanim Tsiyyonut (Schocken, 1997), chapter 7, 4. See R. Yigal Ariel's vigorous rejection of the idealization of revenge in "Gedola NeJ(amma 0 Gedola Ahava," Tsohar 2 (1999). Rav Ariel is the Rabbi of Nov. 5. AvI Ravitzky has outlined the impact of messianic thinking on contemporary religious Zionism in his ha-Kez he-Meguleh u-Medinat ha-Yèhudim (Tel Aviv, 1993), chapter 3. There is an English translation by M. Swirsky and J. Chipman entitled Messianism, Zionism and Jewish Religious Radicalism (Chicago, 1996). 6. Two articles on the Jewish conception of war with a myriad of helpful sources are David Shapiro, "The Jewish Attitude Towards War and Peace," in Studies in Jewish Thought (New York, 1975) and Rueven Kimmelman, "Hilkhot Milhama u-Migheloteha" in Yeshayahu Gafni and Avi Ravitzky ed., Kedushat Hayyim ve-Heruf Nefesh: Kovez Maamarim le-Zikhro shel Amir Yèkutiel (Jerusalem, 5753). 7. See Kimmelman, pp. 236-238. 8. R. Moshe Feinstein, Igerot Moshe (New York, 1985), Hoshen Mishpat 2:78. 9. R. Eliezer disagrees and allows wearing a weapon on Shabbat because it serves as an ornament. However, the halakha follows the contrary position of the majority. See Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Shabbat 19:1; Shulkhan Arukh, Grah Hayyim 301:7. 10. See their respective commentaries on Shemot 20:2L. 11. See also Berakhot4a, Hagiga 14a and Megilla 15b. 12. This does not mean that heroism on the battlefield is not a value. It does mean that Hazal wanted to downplay that value and emphasize others. 13. E. Zini, "Al ha-Mussar he-ShaJat Milhama," in Arakhim be-Mivhan ha- Milhama-Milhama u-Mussar be-Rei ha-Yahadut (Jerusalem, 5785), p. 33. Radak does raise the possibility that David independently came up with this notion but Radak immediately proposes that Nathan might have told David, insofar as Tanakh frequently leaves out parts of a story that are referred to later. 14. Shemoneh Perakim, chapter 7. 15. Commenatry on Bamidhar 16:21. 16. Commentary on Shemot 21:21.

58 yitzchak Blau

17. MeJat Min ha-Or is a weekly pamphlet whose editorial board includes Hanan Porat and Rabbis Eliezer Melamed and Menahem Felix. is. A. Balas, Zehav ha-Arez (Bet EI, 5754), p. 124. 19. Y. Medan, "ha-Milhama ke-TofaJa Ruhanit ba-Olam: Ever Hiyyuni 0 Sapahat," in Arakhim ete., pp. 93-94. 20. Moreh Nevukhim 3:41. 21. Commentary on Devarim 23:6. 22. See note 11. 23. HaJamek Davar on Bamidbar 25:12 and Devarim 13:18. 24. D. Lior, "Musar Yehudi," in Bet Haggai (Kiryat Arba, 5745), p. 423. 25. Note 14, introduction. 26. Y. Ariel, "ha-Musar, ha-Emuna ha-Datit u-Mediniyut ha-Shalom," Niv Hamidrashia 13 (5738/9), p. 210. 27. S. Aviner, "Shalom u-Milhama be-Mishnat Rabbenu ha-Rav Zvi Yèhuda," Yesha Yemino 43 (Tevet 5755), p. 8 28. D. Lior, "Hirhurim be-Ikvot ha-Milhama," Alon Mamre (Erev Rosh Hashana 5743), p. 8. 29. Nekuda 74, p. 27. 30. Abraham Holz, "Kiddush and Hilul Hashem," Judaism 10 (1961): pp. 360-367. 31. Meshekh Hokhma, Shemot 21:4. 32. Emet le-Ya)akov, Bereshit 17:1. 33. Commentary on Vayikra 25:48. 34. R. Aviner writes that "our abandoning parts of our homeland to the gentiles is the most horrible hilul hashem in history." See his Mi-Kedem le-Bet El (Jerusalem, 5790), p. 22L. 35. Yesha Yemino 35 (Tevet 5753), p. 12. 36. E. Waldman, Al Da)at ha-Makom veha-Zeman (Kiryat Arba, 5753). p. 3L. Cf. Pages 72, 113. 37. Cited in Hagai Segal, Ahim Yèkarim: Korot ha-Mahteret he-Yehudit (Keter, 1987), p. 153. 38. See note 14, p. 122. 39. R. Shlomo Aviner, me-Hayil elHayil (Jerusalem, 5759), p. 142. 40. Commentary to Bereshit 25:33. 41. Commentary to Bereshit 25 : 31. 42. Introduction to Ha)amek Davar Bereshit. 43. Commentary to Bereshit49:5. 44. E. Melammed, Peninei Halakha, VoL. 1 (Israel, 5754), pp.248-9. 45. I am indebted to Dr. David Berger for this last point. 46. See A. Lichtenstein, 'Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic Independent of the Halakha," Marvin Fox ed. Modern Jewish Ethics (Columbus, 1975). 47. Orot ha-Kodesh, VoL. 3, p., 17. 48. S. Aviner, Am ke-Lavi, VoL. 2 (Jerusalem, 5743), pp. 195-196. 49. Ibid. 50. See note 10 above, pp. 27-28. 51. Moreh Nevukhim, 3:48. 52. Commentary to Devarim 22:6.

59 TRADITION

53. Ibid. p. 28. 54. Y. Ariel, "Ha-Musarha-Milhamti ba-Torah," in Arakhim ete., p. 89. 55. B. Z. Benedict, "Hallel ve-Shira," in Asufat MaJamarim (Jerusalem, 1994). 56. See R. Shmuel Edels, Maharsha Sanhedrin 39b, s.v. u-mi hadi; R. Yair Bachrach, Havot Yair, Responsa 228 and R. Avraham Yitshak haKohen Kook MJaamerei ha-RaJayah (Jerusalem, 1984), p. 509. 57. See note 22, p. 208. 58. Arpelei Tohar (Jerusalem, 5783), p. 31; Grot ha-Kodesh, Vol. 3 (Jerusalem, 5763), p. 349; Mussar Avikha, "Ahava," no. 2, 5; Ma)amarei ha-RaJayah, p.252. 59. Orot(Jerusalem, 1985), p. 149. 60. Musar Avikha) "Ahava," no. 10. 61. See note 30. pp. 78-79. 62. Ibid., p. 83. 63. I am indebted to Dr. David Berger for the Isaiah example. 64. H. Porat, Et Ahai Anokhi Mevakkesh (Bet EI, 5752), pp. 95-96. 65. See note 22, p. 207. 66. Yesha Yèmino 31 (Kislev, 5752), p. 6. 67. EtAhai, p. 179. 68. Cited in H. Segal, Ahim Yèkarim, p. 176. 69. See note 30, p. 102. 70. One writer in Nekuda 151 (Tammuz, 5751) writes that Arab culture is more horrid than that of the Nazis. 71. D. Lior, "be-Inyane ha-Sha)a," in Alon Mamre (Tu be-Shvat, 5753), p. 5. In contrast, see Rav Kook's reaction to negative portrayal of Arabs in Iggerot ha-RaJayah, Vol. 2, Letter 56. 72. See note 4, pp. 115-119. 73. Ibid., p. 117. 74. See the works cited in note 2. 75. A. Lichtenstein, "Hahazarat ha-Ga)ava ha-Leummit u-Zekifat ha-Koma ha- Yisraelit," Amudim 444 (Kislev, 5743), pp. 75-78. 76. Y. Ben-Nun, "Mipenei Hataenu Hulkah ha-Arets," Nekuda 219 (Heshvan, 5759), pp. 14-15. 77. U. Simon, "Religion, Morality and Politics," Forum 28/29 (Winter, 1978), pp. 102-110.