University of Amsterdam

Masters in East European Studies

The Influence of International Funding on the Chechen Separatist Movement in Post-Soviet

Author: Colm Fitzpatrick

Introduction

Given the current political and social climate, it has become commonplace to link an insurrectionist movement of a predominantly Muslim population to a global concept of

Islamic awakening. The conflicts and post-conflict dissidence in and her neighbours have at times been placed into this category of dubious self-determination. Indeed, Vladimir

Putin has often justified the heavy handed approach of the Kremlin in the region since 1999 by associating the insurgency in Chechnya with the endeavours of the Western powers in fighting the ludicrous War on Terror. However, it would be equally as irresponsible to claim that the violence in Chechnya over the past three decades was purely a question of a coloniser combatting nationalists. Although nationalism has played a significant role in the politics of

Chechnya and the initial motivation for self-determination; pan-Islamic philanthropy and transnational military mobilisation with a discernible radical ideology have dramatically altered to conception of the Chechen conflict. This essay will endeavour to asses to what extent the involvement of international actors and organisations motivated by the pan-

Islamist agenda had on the gradual adoption of radical Islam by the chief proponents of

Chechen independence during the 1990s. Was the Chechen conflict co-opted or hijacked by global Islam; or were the Chechens supremely pragmatic in accepting the only tangible international support afforded them in their desperate confrontation with Russia?

Chechnya as Nation

Before delving into the broad question of Chechen indoctrination into the global Islamist agenda, it is pertinent that one assess the potency of the nationalist movement that brought about secession and consequent conflict with Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Chechnya’s initial push for self-determination was the crescendo of a burgeoning nationalism

1 that in many ways was the fallout of Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost policy. Ethnic identities, both historical as in the Baltics and fictive creations of the Soviet Union as in Central Asia, and the memories of crimes against one’s culture played a significant role in promoting a sort of ethno-regional nationalism that concluded with separatism and the dramatic dissolution of the conglomerate sub-national state. Chechnya with its considerably homogenous Muslim population, and fuelled by memories of Stalinist repression and deportation were therefore equally as motivated as their Ukrainian or Baltic brethren to escape the yoke of Kremlin rule.1

The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a revival of historical debate in Chechnya in conjunction with the general reappraisal of the Soviet Union and the openness promulgated by Gorbachev’s slogan of transparency, glasnost. The liberation of regional historical thought and religious practice sharpened the notions of disparity between the Muslim populations of the Northern Caucasus and their Orthodox Muscovite superiors. Observance of the discrimination of the Chechen people under Joseph Stalin accentuated a national revival that initially was far from sectarian. Considering many of the disenfranchised Chechen population were born in exile, it is unsurprising that the central powers of the Kremlin could be viewed as somewhat nefarious and untrustworthy to Chechen identity.

Prior to 1991 there was debate amongst politicians in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR as to how to proceed with its relationship with the Soviet Union. There were three proposed actions. The first was for the region to seek out limited sovereignty within the Russian element of the Soviet Union. The second promoted independence of the Chechen-Ingush

1 Sokirianskaia, Ekaterina, ‘Ideology and conflict: Chechen political nationalism prior to, and during, ten years of war’ in Gammer, Moshe (editor), Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus, (Abingdon, 2008), p. 111

2 ASSR, creating a republic representing the variegated Nakh people of the Caucasus. The third polity, promoted by the Chechen National Congress (CNC), was the the secession of the

Chechen lands from both Russia and the Soviet Union and the inauguration of the Chechen

Republic of Ichkeria.2 In November 1990 the unity of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR began to unravel as the CNC declared a republic, much to the behest of local and federal authorities.3

The putsch against Gorbachev in August 1991 by hard-line elements of the Communist Party ultimately confirmed the dissolution of the USSR and the outright secession of Chechnya. The successor organisation of the CNC, the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCP), supported the Russian nationalist , while the official authorities in eschewed any outright condemnation or support for the putsch.4 This miscalculation resulted in the NCCP, headed by the former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokar Dudayev, taking unequivocal control of Chechnya, legitimising the previous declaration of independence.5

While the NCCP supported Yeltsin, Yeltsin did not support Chechen separatism and endeavoured to quash the insurrection. The succedent years saw both the Russian Federation and Chechnya in a state of flux. Moscow attempted to negotiate with the more surreptitious republics of its realm, namely Tatarstan and Chechnya, offering limited self-determination while maintaining the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.

Although Dudayev proclaimed authority, the years 1991-1994 were defined by political unrest, protracted negotiations with the Kremlin and attempts at military coercion

2 Ibid, p. 113. 3 Trenin, Dmitrij and Malashenko, Aleksei V., Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post- Soviet Russia, (Washington D.C., 2004), p. 17. 4 Sokirianskaia, ‘Ideology and conflict: Chechen political nationalism prior to, and during, ten years of war’, p. 114. 5 Trenin, Dmitrij and Malashenko, Aleksei V., Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post- Soviet Russia, (Washington D.C., 2004), p. 17

3 on the borders of Chechnya. During this period, Islam was not overtly on the political agenda for Dudayev. As Sokirianskaia outlines, Dudayev’s strategy in campaigning for sovereignty was on the basis of historical “memories of grievances” and highlighting the “security dilemma”.

The “grievances” related to the anamnesis of ethnic cleansing in the 1940s. Moscow ultimately aided Dudayev with the notion of Chechen security as military manoeuvrings on the borders only served to accentuate the reality that Chechnya was under constant and significant threat of attack.6 As Wilhelmsen outlines, the primary goal of the NCCP was to

“resolve problems the Chechen ‘nation’ was facing.” The priority was to cease and prevent further discrimination of the Chechens in their homeland, and to assemble all Chechen people into one definitive independent political entity.7

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities between the Russian and Chechen military factions, support for Dudayev had remained uncertain. Conformity with Dudayev was greatly enhanced after Yeltsin opted to reimpose Moscow’s hegemony over the breakaway southern republic in the winter of 1994. The succeeding war rallied nationalist sentiment in Chechnya against their habitual Russian foe. The was very much a conflict of nationalisms, where Russian nationalist feeling toward maintaining its integrity and negating a geopolitical disintegration akin to that of the Soviet Union faced off against a Chechen nationalism, defensive against another invasion of Russian aggression. Chechen nationalism at this stage remained secular. Dudayev, being a former Soviet General, had found inspiration while stationed in Tartus, Estonia, far from proponents of Islamic identity.8 Of course, Islam

6 Sokirianskaia, ‘Ideology and conflict: Chechen political nationalism prior to, and during, ten years of war’, p. 115. 7 Wilhelmsen, Julie, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement’ in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 1, (Glasgow, 2005), p. 36. 8 Sokirianskaia, ‘Ideology and conflict: Chechen political nationalism prior to, and during, ten years of war’, p. 116.

4 remained synonymous with Chechen identity; however, the motivation remained an indigenous nationalism. In terms of rhetoric it is easy to see Dudayev as somewhat disingenuous, or perhaps simply Machiavellian. Although preferring secularism, Dudayev openly exploited Islamic terminology by calling for a ghazawat or holy war to be waged against Russia.9 As with every conflict, the distinctive differences between the belligerents became more acute as the brutality heightened. It is within such a context that one can comprehend the diversion from overt nationalism to a more radical theological motivation for separation from Russia.

Considering the époque and geopolitical affiliation, it would be easy to categorise

Chechen self-determination in the 1990s as being inherently linked to the demise of the

Soviet Union and the trend of Soviet dissident republics to secede. Of course it is most assuredly true that Chechen separatism of the early 1990s follows said trend. However, the conflicts that brought such desolation and destruction on this region of the Northern

Caucasus were heavily impacted on by a burgeoning global Islamic radicalism that in many ways shared a common enemy in the powers of the Kremlin. The question of radical Islamic adoption or indoctrination in Chechnya first became an issue during the First Chechen War.

For Dudayev, the necessity for financial alliances in order to arm the Chechen separatists led to an embracing of Islamic rhetoric. It is unlikely that he wished to implement strict tenets of

Islamic law, but rather was pragmatic in the reality of the quandary the burgeoning Chechen republic faced. Islam was also used as a rallying call for the youth of Chechnya. In differentiating between their aggressors, Chechen separatists exploited Islamic hyperbole in

9 Gammer, Moshe, ‘Between Mecca and Moscow: Islam, Politics and Political Islam in Chechnya and Daghestan’ in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 41, No. 6, (2005), p. 835.

5 order to mobilise mass support within the region.10 The role of international agents and organisations is crucial in understanding the gradual alteration of the ideology behind

Chechen separatism. While it is rather facile and perhaps lazy to simply follow the Russian party line in emphasising the role of nefarious foreign organisations in co-opting the Chechen struggle; the military weakness of the Chechens engaging the ultimately necessitated acceptance of any support offered from any corner of the world. The reality for this enclave in the Northern Caucasus was that Western secular nations were never going to antagonise the Russian Federation by overtly supporting a break away Muslim nation in the

Kremlin’s back garden. Confronted by a Russian onslaught, foreign fighters and influential organisations were welcomed and their politics embraced by those who could profit from such acquaintances.

Mujahedeen: From Afghanistan To Chechnya

The escapade of the Soviet Union during the previous decade in Afghanistan had resulted in a mobilisation of fighters from many quarters of the Islamic world. Their cause was to defend the land of their common beleaguered brethren against the atheist infidel.11 This mass mobilisation on the grounds of a certain kinship is in some ways reminiscent of the crusade against fascism during the Spanish Civil War. The irony here of course was that the Soviet

Union was now the opponent of such an assembly of nationalities. The chief ideologue behind this global movement was Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Sunni who promoted a pan-Islamic discourse and facilitated the arrival of would-be mujahid in Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan

War. As a contrast to the typical nationalism often propagated during this period for

10 Wilhelmsen, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement’, p. 36. 11 Moore, Cerwyn, ‘Foreign Bodies: Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the North Caucasus and “Beyond”’ in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 27, No. 3., (2015), p.399.

6 justification of insurrection, Azzam placed the umma or Islamic Nation as the priority. He advanced that the common kinship between the peoples of Islam was superior to national, linguistic or cultural boundaries.12

In the aftermath of the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, Azzam advocated the establishment of international brigades along the lines of the Afghan-Arab Mujahidin in order to defend harassed Muslim communities around the world.13 With the defence of Afghanistan secured, these volunteer groups absconded to Tajikistan, Kashmir and Bosnia to continue their jihad. When Boris Yeltsin resolved to affirm Moscow’s central control over Chechnya in

1994, the trans-national defenders of Islam were provided their casus belli for engaging

Russian forces once more. For the Chechen cause, undoubtedly the most influential member of the international Islamists was a Saudi born man by the name of Ibn al-Khattab. In 1995

Khattab landed in , having fought on the side of the United Tajik Opposition post-

Afghanistan.14 While Chechnya appeared the more volatile region due to its declaration of independence and eventual war against the Russian Federation; Dagestan was also a hotbed for radical Islam and would play a crucial role in the adoption of Salafism by many of the prominent figures of Chechen revolution.

The rivalry between Sufi and Salafi Islam is important in understanding the development of the Chechen independence movement. Salafism in its strict adherence to shari’a law conflicted greatly with the predominantly Sufi Islam culture resident in the

Northern Caucasus. The prohibition of music and dancing for instance would go against the

12 Ibid 13 Wilhelmsen, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement’, p. 41. 14 Moore, ‘Foreign Bodies: Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the North Caucasus and “Beyond”’, p.399.

7 Chechen Sufi identity.15 The gradual adoption of Salafism by the influential Chechen warlords has been linked to outside influence. It is one of the chief reasons that has justified his stance on the Chechen quandary as being a part of the global war on terror. There is a certain truth to this. However, his assertion that trans-national Islamists are the root cause of the radicalisation of an initially moderate or perhaps even quasi-secular independence movement overly simplifies a complex issue in an even more complex region.16 While international actors and finance played a significant role in radicalising members of the

Chechen dissidents; Salafism was afforded an open market in the Northern Caucasus during the transitional period from Soviet Union to the Russian Federation. The curtailing of religious doctrine under the Soviet regime resulted in a revival of the various creeds during the glasnost years of Mikhail Gorbachev. This rejuvenation led to the embracing of Salafi Islam in some localities of Dagestan and Chechnya. Salafism in Dagestan became particularly attractive during this period of socio-economic turmoil due to the inadequacy of the government linked muftiats in tackling the primary social problems.17

The perestroika period caused significant tumult in the region. The freedom of expressing a certain cultural-religious-nationalist identity facilitated a sort of splintering from the Soviet Union, and subsequent Russian Federation model. While Chechnya and Dagestan certainly shared elements of such an identity, Dagestan’s cacophonous ethnic make-up set it apart from its Chechen neighbours. Independence from the Russian Federation was a logical

15 Knysh, Alexander, ‘Contextualizing the Salafi-Sufi Conflict (from the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt’ in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4, (Abingdon, 2007), p. 506. 16 Cornell, Svante E., ‘The War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: A Case for Distinction’ in Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 2003, Vol.2, No. 2, (2013), p. 168. 17 Yemelianova, Galina, ‘Divergent trends of Islamic radicalization in Muslim Russia’ in Dannreuther, Roland and March, Luke, Russia and Islam: state, society and radicalism, (Abingdon, 2010), p. 130.

8 step for a mono-ethnic region like Chechnya; however, Dagestan with it’s multiple creeds and dialects was better suited lobbying for more autonomy within the multi-ethnic Russian federation.18

Communism with it’s imposed atheism did not result in the death of Islam, nor

Orthodoxy; rather the policies of the Kremlin stymied the influence of religious institutions and made it somewhat troublesome to openly express devotion to ones belief. Due in part to the uncertain geopolitical future of the conglomerate Muslim republics of the Soviet Union during this period, it is understandable that for many the question of identity became more closely linked to dogma rather than nationalism. Nationalism implied borders and in many cases necessitated a homogenous population which was ultimately implausible in Dagestan.

With the religious revival in the early 1990s came a desire to seek out the “true” or “pure”

Islam emanating from the Gulf.

The Caucasus were quickly recognised as a fertile corner of the world for the teachings of gulf state missionaries. The spending power of the polities of the Middle East enhanced their capacity to influence.19 The revival of religious doctrine led to an increase in participation in the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) by residents of the Northern Caucasus. Such expeditions no doubt resulted in further reappraisal of strict Islamic thought while also cultivating diplomatic and financial links to the Gulf region. The importance of the Gulf states in at the very least aiding the development of Islam becomes clear when one considers that the figures for the construction of Mosques in Chechnya and Ingushetia prior to the collapse of the USSR

18 Knysh, ‘Contextualizing the Salafi-Sufi Conflict (from the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt’, p. 508. 19 Ibid, p. 513.

9 reached over 200, with significant subsidies offered by foreign Islamic foundations.20 21

Education was a chief tool in indoctrinating the Caucasian population. Finance from the

Middle East provided opportunities for advancement to the inhabitants that was heretofore rare. The strengthening of ties between the Caucasus and Arabia presented young Muslims the opportunity to study Islam in third level institutions in the Middle East.22 From this one can link international influence with the limited adoption of Salafism in Dagestan and

Chechnya during the early 1990s. However, to suggest some form of ideological invasion would be false. Many in the region, and in particular the younger generation, were open to the more radical elements of Sunni Islamic interpretations. As it was, a cogent domestic base for Salafism was established in Dagestan. Ibn al-Khattab did not simply land in a moderate

Muslim region with designs to radicalise the populous. He was invited by local Salafists like loyal to the teachings of Azzam and the goals of pan-Islamism.23

Ideology and the Warlords

The deviation from nationalism in Chechnya is closely linked to the radicalisation of the influential Chechen warlords during the First Chechen War and in the post war period. While some like Zelimkhan Yandarbiev and gradually came to the view that the conflict between Chechnya and Russia was one of global Islam versus an army of the Western kafir; others such as Movsar and Arbi Baraev were motivated by the economic support that could be afforded them in proclaiming affiliation to the notions of Salafism.24 Within this

20 Sagramoso, Domitilla and Yarlykapov, Akhmet, ‘Caucasian Crescent: Russia’s Islamic Policies and its Responses to Radicalization’ in Ware, Robert Bruce (editor), The Fire Below: How the Caucasus Shaped Russia, (London, 2013), p. 54-55. 21 Yemelianova, ‘Divergent trends of Islamic radicalization in Muslim Russia’, p. 130. 22 Akaev, Vahit, ‘Islam and politics in Chechnia and Ingushetia’ in Yemelianova, Galina (editor), Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union (Abingdon, 2010), p. 62. 23 Moore, ‘Foreign Bodies: Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the North Caucasus and “Beyond”’, p.400. 24 Wilhelmsen, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement’, p. 39.

10 context we see the realities of war whereby certain actors remain pragmatic in acquiescing to alliances without consideration for the motivations and ideologies of those offering such support; while others embrace the ideology and take up said cause. In the interwar period, political rivalry also played a role in the splintering of the consanguinity of the Chechen cause.

Arbi Baraev and his undoubtedly criminal enterprise are a fine example of both war profiteering and affiliation with Islam on an unidealistic basis. During the First Chechen War,

Baraev established the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, a paramilitary unit that exploited the influx of foreign jihadis and foreign finance through Khattab and later his successor Abu

Walid.25 Baraev and his cohorts profited greatly from the war and the ensuing uncertainty in the quasi independent Chechnya by earning millions of dollars through oil smuggling, kidnappings and contract killings.26 The criminality propagated by Baraev undermined

Maskhadov’s efforts at bringing order to Chechnya. The friction with the elected government led Baraev to cultivate closer ties to Islamists. His culpability in the beheadings of three British and one New Zealander in 1998 are thought to be linked to foreign Islamists ordering the executions.27

Undoubtedly the most enigmatic character in relation to the question of indoctrination is Shamil Basaev. It is difficult to decipher whether Basaev was pragmatic, loyal or inevitably simply persuaded by the teachings of radical Islam. In cherry picking some of his actions and rhetoric one could make the argument for all of the above. Like many of his peers,

Basaev initially fought on the basis of Chechen nationalism. However, by the conclusion of

25 Ibid, p. 41. 26 Galeotti, Mark, ‘’Brotherhoods’ and ‘Associates’: Chechen Networks of Crime and Resistance’ in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 11, No. 2-3, (2002), p. 351. 27 Ibid

11 the war with the signing of the Accord in 1996, Basaev boasted of having introduced sharia courts into his fiefdom.28

Basaev was noted for his ventriloquism in orchestrating some of the more deplorable acts of terrorism, namely the in 2004. The tactics of terrorism and suicide bombings that became somewhat of a calling card of Basaev places him firmly in the category of indoctrinated Islamist terrorist. His relationship with Khattab was crucial to this alteration in character and demonstrates the potency of the dogmatic impact of international actors on the Chechen cause. However, unlike Udugov and Yandarbiev, Basaev did not strictly advocate a particular Pan-Islamic agenda. That is to say, while he promoted sharia law and political

Islam, his concern was the region of the Caucasus, rather than a consummate expedition to disperse and impose Islam as far afield as possible. It would be wrong to suggest that his close partnership with Khattab was purely financial, as there appeared to be a kinship between the two men; however, it is difficult not to view Basaev as being utterly Machiavellian in his relationship with the international financiers. Souleimanov & Ditrych offer such a polemic for the actions of Basaev. Their argument centres on the idea that Basaev recognised the importance of the media in defeating the Russian army.29 As the Chechen forces were considerably weaker, they were obliged to engage the Russians through guerrilla warfare.

However, the sheer brutality of the Russian forces in Chechnya during both wars, and the relative difficulty to receive international support for their suffering outside of clandestine charitable organisations guaranteed an inevitable defeat of the separatists. The priority became attacking vulnerable civilian populations in order to mobilise the Russian electorate

28 Wilhelmsen, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement’, p. 37. 29 Souleimanov, Emil & Ditrych, Ondrej, ‘The Internationalisation of the Russian–Chechen Conflict: Myths and Reality' in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 7, (2008), p. 1213.

12 to push for a withdrawal. Within this context the Dubrovka theatre siege of 2002 and the

Beslan school siege of 2004 can be comprehended as unscrupulously calculated attacks. The value of terrorism has always been in mobilising society to force their leaders to change tactics. Alas for those of Basaev’s ilk, the Kremlin elected to continue their war against the

Chechen separatism and the international insurgency.

In narrative terms, the inter-war period saw a gradual shift towards radical Islamism from almost all of the chief political actors. Zelimkhan Yandarbiev’s brief tenure as acting president after Dudayev’s death saw the writer turned politician attempt to implement sharia law in post-war Chechnya.30 However, the Chechen population were far from willing to accede to Salafist ideas when the relative moderate, , was elected president in January 1997. His opponents had been Yandarbiev and Basaev, so victory for Maskhadov in the plebiscite was a confirmation that society was reticent about the imposition of radical

Islam in their region of the North Caucasus. However, Maskhadov faced an insurmountable task in creating stability. Chechnya had been decimated during the first war. Maskhadov had hoped for investment from Moscow, but the Russian economy was ill-equipped to aid the redevelopment of a state that had recently seceded and who’s separatists were responsible for the deaths of a plethora of Russian soldiers.31 High unemployment in the youth population led many to the Islamists who since his election had endeavoured to undermine Maskhadov’s presidency, or at least goad him into introducing Islamic law. In reality, Maskhadov’s dominion did not go far beyond the confines of the capital Grozny. His authority was perpetually fictive as was evident when Basaev and Khattab orchestrated a pseudo-invasion

30 Wilhelmsen, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement’, p. 36. 31 Ibid, p. 46.

13 of neighbouring Dagestan in August 1999. This action coupled with a serious of unclaimed apartment bombings in several Russian cities in September 1999 hardened the Kremlin and brought about the .32

International Finance

Having established that although Chechen society was far from favouring the institutions of

Islamic political thought, the adoption of Salafism by the influential warlords, for the varying reasons highlighted, led to the Islamisation of the Chechen struggle. It is pertinent that within this context one examines from where the international funds came. The exact figures and sponsors of Chechen separatism remain unclear. The sources for this section of the essay provide limited information of the nature of the financial assistance offered, and which factions in the conflict benefitted from said contributions. For example, at the height of the violence during the Second Chechen War, Russian analyst Alexei Malashenko estimates that between $10 million and $200 million a year reached Chechnya from Islamist groups.33

Nevertheless the broad overview of nations and organisations sympathetic to the Chechen cause goes some way towards explaining why the adoption of a radical Islamic ideology became expedient in enticing foreign resources.

Paul Murphy offers an extensive insight into the international financing of the

Chechen insurrection in his book The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen

Terrorism (2004). However, after brief assessment I am reticent to use this source material as the diatribe proposed by Murphy appears to be thoroughly sensationalist, painting the

32 Giuliano, Elis, ‘Islamic Identity and Political Mobilisation in Russia: Chechnya and Dagestan Compared’ in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2, (London, 2006), p. 213. 33 Wilhelmsen, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement’, p. 44.

14 Chechen cause as inherently a question of Islamic terrorism, without giving much credence to the nuances of the independence movement. Furthermore, the terminology he employs, designating the separatists as “wolves” at every available opportunity is nothing short of a bizarre fashion to analyse a serious scholarly topic.34 This is not to say that the content of

Murphy’s tome is incorrect; rather I prefer to err on the side of caution than cite a dubious secondary source.

Due to the clandestine nature of financing dissident organisations and surreptitious politicians, it is difficult to put definitive figures on the contributions received over the two wars and beyond. Equally, as a result of the politically charged character of funding rebellion in a Muslim majority area at the dawn of the millennium, the veracity of some, or indeed all, of the sources quoted may be questionable. The reasons for this fall into the general complicated essence of diplomatic relations and maintaining or propagating a certain authority or dominance. It is possible that in some instances governments have disseminated limited or false information on the basis of maintaining relations. Considering the international financing of the Chechen rebels encompasses a consummate Chechen diaspora, as well questionable charitable organisations based as far flung as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, places the notion of government transparency on weak footing.

None of the above states are likely to be communicative of the furtive fundraising of its citizens in such a conflict against Russia. Thus we are left with somewhat ambiguous figures for international and transnational sponsorship.

34 Murphy, Paul, The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terrorism, (Dulles, 2004), p. 137.

15 The involvement of Khattab in the fundraising dilemma for Chechen separatism was arguably more significant than his military contribution. Through his transnational connections he was in a position to exploit financiers with links to Osama bin Laden’s Al

Qaeda. The primary source in this respect was the Saudi based charity Al-Haramain. According to the FSB, Al-Haramain managed to funnel an estimated $50 million into the Chechen based mujahidin.35 In 1999, the group set up an office in neighbouring Azerbaijan with the specific remit to help support the Chechen cause from relative proximity. It offered backing to the

Foundation of Chechnya, an organisation with explicit channels to the mujahidin. Such was the success in this endeavour that Wilhelmsen states that Chechen separatism received $6 million a month in the year 2000.36 The efficacy of Al-Haramain caused considerable friction between Moscow and Riyadh. Putin launched a harsh rhetoric against Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, linking the fact that some of the terrorists of that fateful day were Saudi born with the notion that Saudi governance financed global terrorism.37

Surprisingly, or perhaps unsurprisingly depending on one’s disposition, substantial funds were transferred to Chechnya from within the United States of America. Al-Haramain were amongst the chief organisations maintaining this distribution of wealth. Another crucial charity was the Chicago based Benevolence International Foundation (BIF). This group had specific ties to the Jordanian-Chechen Fathi Mohammed Habib who had arrived in Chechnya in 1993, preceding the Afghan mujahidin by a number of years.38 The work of the BIF in

35 Vidino, Lorenzo, ‘How Chechnya Became a Breeding Ground for Terror’ in Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3, (2005), p. 6. 36 Wilhelmsen, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement’, p. 44. 37 Katz, Mark K., ‘Saudi-Russian Relations Since 9/11’ in Problems of Post Communism, Vol. 51, No. 2, (2004), p. 4 38 Vidino, ‘How Chechnya Became a Breeding Ground for Terror’, p. 6.

16 Chechnya demonstrates the tenuous links between the Chechen struggle and Al Qaeda’s global war. In 1998, an Al Qaeda military commander by the name of Saif al-Islam el-Masry served as an officer of the BIF in Chechnya. Trenin, Malashenko and Lieven provide a broader outline of Gulf state financial assistance. The Kuwait based Islamic Centre appears to have backed Maskhadov to the tune of $13,5 million. However, no specific timeline is given for such a payment, which is problematic in tracing Maskhadov’s own gradual affiliation to radical

Islam. Unsurprisingly, the Muslim Brotherhood were present in the outlaying of currency to the Chechens; undoubtedly with a particular political caveat. The Jordanian branch of the organisation had supplied $20 million by the end of 1999.39 Although the specific impact of the global investment in Chechnya remains opaque, one can nevertheless conclude that the organisations involved almost certainly financed the Chechens on the basis of a certain political agenda; and thus it becomes evident why the various warlords and politicians adapted their rhetoric as the strife against Moscow became ever more protracted.

Conclusion

The Second Chechen War saw the gradual decimation of the Chechen resistance movement and the abandonment of Chechen nationalist independence. The strength of the Russian military, in stark contrast to its weakness during the First Chechen War, ensured that the

Chechen forces were ill equipped and would be ill advised to engage them on the battlefield.

Basaev and others chose to resort to guerrilla warfare and terrorism as their primary method of avenging Russian atrocities and maintaining an audience outside of Russia in the hope of mobilising support for separatism. Although Maskhadov deplored Basaev’s tactics, he was

39 Trenin and Malashenko, Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post- Soviet Russia, p. 93.

17 unable to convince the warlord of refraining from attacking civilians. The death of Maskhadov and the appropriation of the presidency to Abdul-Halim Sadulayev altered dramatically the

Chechen cause.40 Sadulayev convinced Basaev to cease his scaremongering tactics. More potently, the new president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria made the first inferences of bringing an end to the “Chechen” struggle, in favour of portraying their cause as purely Islamic and therefore transnational. While Rezvani views Sadulayev’s rhetoric as confirming the hijacking of the independence struggle by Salafist Islam; the reality is far more nuanced.

Tracing the Chechen cause from the fall of the Soviet Union to the modern day where we see Chechen mujahideen engaging in jihad in Syria and Iraq, it is with relative assuredness that one could affirm that the Chechen struggle was Islamised. However, the notion that international Salafist Islam co-opted or hijacked the secular independence cause does not represent the reality of the struggle against the Kremlin. To suggest that the few hundred transnational fighters to have arrived in Chechnya ultimately forced the thousands of

Chechens to alter their fundamental ideology and abandon independence is to suggest a

Chechen incapacity for cognitive self-determination.

Ultimately Chechen independence was doomed from the outset. Moscow was never likely to acquiesce to the secession of a territory of such rich resources and metaphorical geopolitical importance. The suppression of the independence movement meant that either the Chechen insurrectionists were to accept Russian hegemony or seek external support. Alas, international recognition and backing was not forthcoming. Dudayev would have preferred

40 Rezvani, Babak, ‘Reflections on the Chechen Conflict: Geopolitics, Timings and Transformations’ in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 50, No. 6, (2004), p. 878

18 Western patronage as a bulwark against the inevitable Russian repression and when this was not at hand the Chechen separatists had little option but to wilfully accept Islamic extremism.

It has suited the Kremlin to emphasise the Islamist nature of the Chechen conflict. In the aftermath of 9/11 Putin gleefully dismissed Chechen separatism and preferred to highlight the conflict as a sort of invasion by a clandestine group of extremists.41

The explosion of hostilities in the Middle East over the past decade has resulted in a waning of international involvement in the Chechen conflict. Moreover, the renouncing of the independence movement in favour of ’s , in conjunction with ’s heavy handed domination of Chechnya has led to a new wave of mujahideen, as Chechnya now exports fighters to continue the struggle, with hundreds of

Chechens and Georgian Kists active in Syria.42 Although dissidence still exists across the

Caucasus, the Russian authorities succeeded to a great degree in crushing the insurrection.

The Islamisation of the conflict has meant that the struggle has now no fixed abode. Since the

Iraq war Chechnya was no longer the field of interest for the jihadis. For the Chechen generation who has grown up through conflict, those unwilling to accept Kadyrov and Putin’s hegemony no longer have a requirement to stay at home and engage in war, for their war is elsewhere now.

41 Katz, ‘Saudi-Russian Relations Since 9/11’, p. 4 42 Moore, ‘Foreign Bodies: Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the North Caucasus and “Beyond”’, p. 408.

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