The Rise of Islamic State in the North Caucasus: Co-Opting a Global Movement Or Revolutionary Pragmatism?
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The Rise of Islamic State in the North Caucasus: Co-opting a Global Movement or Revolutionary Pragmatism? MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam Author: Colm Fitzpatrick Student No: 11104503 Main Supervisor: Prof. Michael Kemper Second Supervisor: Dr. Erik Van Ree Table of Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 Chapter I – Salafism in the Post-Soviet North Caucasus ..................................................... 4 Dagestan ................................................................................................................................ 5 Chechnya and Ingushetia ..................................................................................................... 8 Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia ............................................................... 9 The First War ...................................................................................................................... 11 The Second War .................................................................................................................. 14 Chapter II: Towards a Global Doctrine .............................................................................. 18 Radicalising the “Moderates” ............................................................................................ 18 Imarat Kavkaz ..................................................................................................................... 25 Sochi and the Counter-Insurgency .................................................................................... 34 Chapter III - Syria and the Demise of the Caucasus Emirate ........................................... 38 North Caucasians in Syria .................................................................................................. 38 Why Islamic State? ............................................................................................................. 41 What next for the Nomadic North Caucasians? ................................................................ 44 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 46 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 48 Glossary of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... 54 Introduction On 20 December 2014, a video was posted to YouTube in which Rustam Asilderov and Arsanali Kambulatov, two leading members of the Dagestani Vilayat of the regional militant group the Caucasus Emirate (CE) declared a bayat (oath) to the leader of the Islamic State (IS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.1 On the surface, the departure of these two figures from the ever weakening Caucasus Emirate represented a dramatic shift in the direction of the group. Although the CE espoused a similar world view to that of the IS, the decision of the Dagestani duo to pledge allegiance to a foreign head of state finally confirmed the capitulation of the local agenda of the Islamist militants of the North Caucasus in favour of alignment with a global revolutionary movement pollinating from Syria and Iraq. In reality this action was far from surprising. Since the outbreak of civil war in Syria, North Caucasian militants have flocked to fight for the myriad of Islamist militias and armies in situ, eschewing the domestic jihad for which the CE embodied. Their presence in the Levant has considerably bolstered the military prowess of the factions for whom they fight and in some instances lead. Islamic State is no exception to this. Until his death in March 2016, Tarkhan Batirashvili (better known as Omar al-Shishani), an ethnic Chechen from the Pankisi Valley in Georgia, was a senior commander in IS. His presence acted as a lightning rod for new recruits from the Russian speaking world, particularly for those fleeing persecution in the North Caucasus. Many combatants and prospective warriors have left the Russian Federation for Syria, ultimately crippling the recruitment capacity of the CE. This is in part due to the considerably successful counterinsurgency embarked upon by the Russian authorities over the past decade The paramount nature of security for the 2014 Sochi Olympics resulted in a heavy crackdown of any possible miscreants and malcontents in the region. The law enforcement has since made a concerted effort to remove the head of the snake as soon as it slithers out from its brumation. The death of the first Emir of the CE, Dokku Umarov, in late 2013 considerably affected the militant group’s already waning organisation. His successor, Aliaskhab Kebekov 1 Vatchagaev, Mairbek, ‘The Islamic State Is Set to Replace the Caucasus Emirate in the North Caucasus’, The Jamestown Foundation, (8 January 2015) - http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43246&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid% 5D=786&no_cache=1#.V8Zr4JN968o - Consulted 8 July 2015 1 did not command the same authority as Umarov. His moderate stance on civilian casualties did not sit well with the more hard-line elements in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. The assassination of both Kebekov and his successor, Magomed Suleimanov, in the spring and summer of 2015 brought the CE to it’s knees.2 In June of 2015, the Islamic State announced the establishment of the governorate in the North Caucasus, effectively usurping the mantel of the CE and confirming that the militancy of the region is now but a minor theatre in a larger war.3 Of course the argument could be made that the since adoption of the militant Salafist ideology, the insurgency in the North Caucasus has always been but a small fish in a big pond. The CE itself espoused a fairly analogous philosophy as IS does now. The inauguration of the Caucasus Emirate was a result of the gradual inclination towards Salafi teachings amongst a minority of the Islamic communities of the North Caucasus over several decades. Salafism offered a rejection of modern society, a revolutionary ideology that saw both Communism and market economy Capitalism as being ill conceived for human consumption. For Russia, perestroika did not solely open the gates for sedition and irredentism, it also provided greater access to the teachings of the Quran and investment from the Gulf states which bolstered a burgeoning religious revival. The impact of the two wars fought for the soul of Chechnya in the 1990s and early 2000s was consequential. Animosity towards the Salafi communities had already long existed, before the authorities began to harshly crack down on their proselytising activities. Moderate and influential ideologues who once shunned any notions of jihad like Yasin Rasulov and Anzor Astemirov became heavily ingrained in the development of militant Salafism in a backlash against state sponsored brutality. These “renovationist” characters held great sway over their youthful compatriots and their participation in both the struggle for Chechnya and later the Caucasus Emirate enhanced recruitment and gave theological legitimacy to the cause.4 2 Jocelyn, Thomas, ‘New Leader of Islamic Caucasus Emirate Killed by Russian Forces’, The Long War Journal, (11 August, 2015) - http://www.longwarjournal.org/archive/2015/08/new-leader-of-islamic-caucasus- emirate-killed-by-russian-forces.php - Consulted September 15, 2016. 3 Gambhir, Harleen, ‘ISIS Declares Governorate in Russia’s North Caucasus Region, Institute for the Study of War, (June 23, 2015) – http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-declares-governorate-russia’s-north - caucasus-region– Consulted September 15, 2016. 4 Kurbanov, Ruslan, ‘‘Urban’ and ‘Rural’ Islam in the Caucasus: Modernisation versus Conservation’, Religion, State and Society, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, (2011), p. 351. 2 There is an argument that external investment and the participation of the foreign fighters in the defence of Chechnya is primarily responsible for the delineation from nationalist interests in the region since the early 2000s. This paper will not be arguing such a position. The purpose of this paper is to outline why the global reactionary ideology that the Islamic State embodies has found a particularly potent following in the Northern Caucasus in recent years, much to the detriment of the regionalist movement it has supplanted. It will trace the development of Salafism in the chief republics linked to the violent insurrection against the Russian state and her allies. The diatribe that will be advanced positions the adoption of the IS ideology by Asilderov and his cohorts as both revolutionary pragmatism and co-opting a global movement. The structure and resources of the Caucasus Emirate in the face of an adversary of considerable strength and unnerving ruthlessness meant that it was always going to be ill equipped to fight the long fight. The Islamic State boasts a command of the strategy of propaganda heretofore never seen nor exploited to such an extent. North Caucasians are at the heart of this organisation and therefore it was inevitable that the flag of the IS would fly above Dagestan and Chechnya someday. 3 Chapter I – Salafism in the Post-Soviet North Caucasus The simplistic view of the development of Salafism and the parallel adoption of the notions of jihad in the North Caucasus has too often predominantly been attributed to