The Rise of Islamic State in the North : Co-opting a Global Movement or Revolutionary Pragmatism?

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam

Author: Colm Fitzpatrick Student No: 11104503

Main Supervisor: Prof. Michael Kemper Second Supervisor: Dr. Erik Van Ree

Table of Contents Introduction ...... 1

Chapter I – Salafism in the Post-Soviet ...... 4

Dagestan ...... 5

Chechnya and ...... 8

Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia ...... 9

The First War ...... 11

The Second War ...... 14

Chapter II: Towards a Global Doctrine ...... 18

Radicalising the “Moderates” ...... 18

Imarat Kavkaz ...... 25

Sochi and the Counter-Insurgency ...... 34

Chapter III - Syria and the Demise of the ...... 38

North Caucasians in Syria ...... 38

Why Islamic State? ...... 41

What next for the Nomadic North Caucasians? ...... 44

Conclusion ...... 46

Bibliography ...... 48

Glossary of Abbreviations ...... 54

Introduction

On 20 December 2014, a video was posted to YouTube in which Rustam Asilderov and Arsanali Kambulatov, two leading members of the Dagestani Vilayat of the regional militant group the Caucasus Emirate (CE) declared a bayat (oath) to the leader of the Islamic State (IS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.1 On the surface, the departure of these two figures from the ever weakening Caucasus Emirate represented a dramatic shift in the direction of the group. Although the CE espoused a similar world view to that of the IS, the decision of the Dagestani duo to pledge allegiance to a foreign head of state finally confirmed the capitulation of the local agenda of the Islamist militants of the North Caucasus in favour of alignment with a global revolutionary movement pollinating from Syria and Iraq. In reality this action was far from surprising. Since the outbreak of civil war in Syria, North Caucasian militants have flocked to fight for the myriad of Islamist militias and armies in situ, eschewing the domestic for which the CE embodied. Their presence in the Levant has considerably bolstered the military prowess of the factions for whom they fight and in some instances lead. Islamic State is no exception to this. Until his death in March 2016, Tarkhan Batirashvili (better known as Omar al-Shishani), an ethnic Chechen from the Pankisi Valley in Georgia, was a senior commander in IS. His presence acted as a lightning rod for new recruits from the Russian speaking world, particularly for those fleeing persecution in the North Caucasus.

Many combatants and prospective warriors have left the Russian Federation for Syria, ultimately crippling the recruitment capacity of the CE. This is in part due to the considerably successful counterinsurgency embarked upon by the Russian authorities over the past decade The paramount nature of security for the 2014 Sochi Olympics resulted in a heavy crackdown of any possible miscreants and malcontents in the region. The law enforcement has since made a concerted effort to remove the head of the snake as soon as it slithers out from its brumation. The death of the first Emir of the CE, Dokku Umarov, in late 2013 considerably affected the militant group’s already waning organisation. His successor,

1 Vatchagaev, Mairbek, ‘The Islamic State Is Set to Replace the Caucasus Emirate in the North Caucasus’, The , (8 January 2015) - http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43246&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid% 5D=786&no_cache=1#.V8Zr4JN968o - Consulted 8 July 2015

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did not command the same authority as Umarov. His moderate stance on civilian casualties did not sit well with the more hard-line elements in and Kabardino-Balkaria. The assassination of both Kebekov and his successor, Magomed Suleimanov, in the spring and summer of 2015 brought the CE to it’s knees.2 In June of 2015, the Islamic State announced the establishment of the governorate in the North Caucasus, effectively usurping the mantel of the CE and confirming that the militancy of the region is now but a minor theatre in a larger war.3

Of course the argument could be made that the since adoption of the militant Salafist ideology, the insurgency in the North Caucasus has always been but a small fish in a big pond. The CE itself espoused a fairly analogous philosophy as IS does now. The inauguration of the Caucasus Emirate was a result of the gradual inclination towards Salafi teachings amongst a minority of the Islamic communities of the North Caucasus over several decades. Salafism offered a rejection of modern society, a revolutionary ideology that saw both Communism and market economy Capitalism as being ill conceived for human consumption. For , perestroika did not solely open the gates for sedition and irredentism, it also provided greater access to the teachings of the Quran and investment from the Gulf states which bolstered a burgeoning religious revival.

The impact of the two wars fought for the soul of in the 1990s and early 2000s was consequential. Animosity towards the Salafi communities had already long existed, before the authorities began to harshly crack down on their proselytising activities. Moderate and influential ideologues who once shunned any notions of jihad like Yasin Rasulov and became heavily ingrained in the development of militant Salafism in a backlash against state sponsored brutality. These “renovationist” characters held great sway over their youthful compatriots and their participation in both the struggle for Chechnya and later the Caucasus Emirate enhanced recruitment and gave theological legitimacy to the cause.4

2 Jocelyn, Thomas, ‘New Leader of Islamic Caucasus Emirate Killed by Russian Forces’, The Long War Journal, (11 August, 2015) - http://www.longwarjournal.org/archive/2015/08/new-leader-of-islamic-caucasus- emirate-killed-by-russian-forces.php - Consulted September 15, 2016. 3 Gambhir, Harleen, ‘ISIS Declares Governorate in Russia’s North Caucasus Region, Institute for the Study of War, (June 23, 2015) – http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-declares-governorate-russia’s-north - caucasus-region– Consulted September 15, 2016. 4 Kurbanov, Ruslan, ‘‘Urban’ and ‘Rural’ Islam in the Caucasus: Modernisation versus Conservation’, Religion, State and Society, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, (2011), p. 351.

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There is an argument that external investment and the participation of the foreign fighters in the defence of Chechnya is primarily responsible for the delineation from nationalist interests in the region since the early 2000s. This paper will not be arguing such a position. The purpose of this paper is to outline why the global reactionary ideology that the Islamic State embodies has found a particularly potent following in the Northern Caucasus in recent years, much to the detriment of the regionalist movement it has supplanted. It will trace the development of Salafism in the chief republics linked to the violent insurrection against the Russian state and her allies. The diatribe that will be advanced positions the adoption of the IS ideology by Asilderov and his cohorts as both revolutionary pragmatism and co-opting a global movement. The structure and resources of the Caucasus Emirate in the face of an adversary of considerable strength and unnerving ruthlessness meant that it was always going to be ill equipped to fight the long fight. The Islamic State boasts a command of the strategy of propaganda heretofore never seen nor exploited to such an extent. North Caucasians are at the heart of this organisation and therefore it was inevitable that the flag of the IS would fly above Dagestan and Chechnya someday.

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Chapter I – Salafism in the Post-Soviet North Caucasus

The simplistic view of the development of Salafism and the parallel adoption of the notions of jihad in the North Caucasus has too often predominantly been attributed to the investment of Gulf State actors and organisations in the troubled region. While the foreign investment into both education and the construction of religious institutions was significant in the process of indoctrination, a certain respect must be afforded to the local actors who promoted this fundamentalist understanding of Islam against the social norms of Caucasian . The flourishing of Salafism in the North Caucasus owes much to the reform movement of Mikhail Gorbachev known as perestroika. From the late 1980s, Gorbachev attempted to preserve the unity of the in the face of growing nationalist tensions. Perestroika was largely a process of economic reform. However, although Gorbachev abhorred the notion of organised religion, he saw the necessity of removing the hindrance on some expressions of religious reverence in order to foster support for his attempted restructuring of the economy.5

Due to the extreme anti-religious nature of the Soviet Union since its inception, the relaxing of religious restrictions led to a revival of Islamic teachings. This theological renaissance, coupled with a more outward looking Soviet Union afforded Islamic communities greater contact with the Islamic world, which in turn led to an ever increasing flow of finances and missionaries from the Gulf states, Turkey and Pakistan.6 With the danger of persecution significantly decreased and the coffers bountiful, the construction of new mosques and the dispersion of Islamic centres of education served to further enhance the increasing religiosity of many communities.7 Although perestroika was intended to save the Soviet Union from dissolution, the reality of Gorbachev’s reformist policies was that they exponentially increased the demand for such a dissolution as the various republics and regions were facilitated in expressing their inherent cultural differences from the central state. For the North Caucasus perestroika opened the borders for its citizens to make contact with other Muslim communities around the world. For many this offered the true realisation that although they were denizens of the Soviet Union, they belonged to the global Islamic umma.

5 Hunter, Shireen T., Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security, (New York, 2004), p. 38. 6 IBID, p. 39. 7 Campana, Aurélie, Clivages Générationnels et Dynamiques Nationalistes. La Radicalisation des Mouvements Nationalistes Tchéchènes et Ingouches, Revue internationale de politique comparée, Vol.16, No. 2, (2009) p. 268.

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Increasing participation in the hajj led to greater contact between the umma which in turn facilitated the study of Islam in theological institutions and universities in the Middle East. The Salafist ideology was advanced by missionaries and Islamic charities that began to operate in the region, such as Al Haramein, the International Islamic Salvation Organisation, Islamic Relief and the Islamic Benevolence Foundation.8

As a result of these developments many young North Caucasians improved their understanding of Islam from the perspectives of a global interpretation. Contact with the outer world afforded the youth of the region the opportunity to advance their knowledge beyond that of their forebears. In a period of tumult and reformation, it is understandable that alternative ideas were endorsed.

Dagestan

The collapse of the Soviet Union created an existential crisis for many. Both communism and western notions of democracy were perceived to be ill equipped to solve the social problems deeply ingrained in North Caucasian society. Salafism offered a highly revolutionary perspective. Crucial to the attraction of Salafism to many of the downtrodden was its overt promotion of equality and social justice. The fall of the Soviet Union had confirmed the inadequacy of communism. The implementation of a market economy saw widespread corruption of the ruling elite, further disillusioning the general populace. Salafism offered a doctrine that not only promoted equality but also ignored the traditional hierarchical structures of Caucasian society. Membership of a particular clan or indeed ethnic identity was of little concern to the Salafists. In a multi-ethnic republic like Dagestan, Salafism promoted a certain ideal of unity in a time of utter discord. The unity of the umma was paramount. Furthermore, younger imams who had benefitted from studying in the Middle East offered a perceived legitimate interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. They were able to boast fluency in and thus could curate theological debates about the state of society and advance the eminency of Salafism as a solution, whereas many of their Sufi peers lacked the same

8 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 567.

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acumen in both linguistic and metaphysical terms.9 In a secular world, such theological stewardship is of little consequence in the grand scheme of who holds the greatest scriptural perspicacity. However, for communities bound by religiosity as in Dagestan and much of the greater Northern Caucasus, receiving one’s education from the original heartland of the central dogma inherently bolsters one’s influence and authority.

There is some debate over the existence of Salafism in the North Caucasus prior to the dawn of perestroika. Rich & Conduit state that the arrival of jihadist foreign fighters into Chechnya in the mid 1990s “introduced a foreign Salafist framing that was distinct from the historical traditions of the region.”10 However several scholars refute this line of analysis. Sagramoso advances the argument that although Salafism experienced growth in popularity from the late 1980s onwards, Dagestan had incubated Salafist communities from as early as the 1970s. Furthermore, Moore & Tumelty rightly emphasise the foundation of the All-Union Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) in Astrakhan in 1990 as perhaps one of the first coherent indigenous multi-ethnic Salafist movements that promoted a unity between Caucasian Islamists under a single banner. 11 At the heart of this organisation was the influential Chechen ideologue , who would later become chief propagandist for the Caucasus Emirate, and Bagautdin Kebedov, the exiled spiritual leader of Dagestani Salafism.12 The debate over when Salafism reached this region is another strand of the argument over the international co-opting of Chechen and a broader North Caucasian sedition from the Russian central state. In reality it is of little relevance whether Salafism was welcomed into the region in the 1970s or indeed during the bloodiest of days in the . Of paramount importance is that certain local actors and communities chose to tie their flags to the mast of radical Sunni Islam. If we are to structure our analysis on whether the radicalisation of political movements is authored by foreign agents, we will ultimately continually fail to accept the personal agency of the local actors in such complex

9 IBID, p. 568. 10 Rich, Ben; Conduit, Dara, ‘The Impact of Jihadist Foreign Fighters on Indigenous Secular-Nationalist Causes: Contrasting Chechnya and Syria’ in Studies in Conflict & , Vol. 38, No. 2, (2015), p. 116. 11 Moore, Cerwyn; Tumelty, Paul, ‘Assessing Unholy Alliances in Chechnya: From Communism and Nationalism to and Salafism’ in Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1, (2009), p. 83. 12 Vatchagaev, Mairbek, ‘Sufis and Salafists Temporarily Unite in Dagestan’ in Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 9, No. 95, (2012) - http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39392&cHash=fa45af4d9496df5 e880c01da6e34082a#.V680XpN97ox

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conflicts. As it was with Chechnya and the North Caucasus as a whole, foreign missionaries and jihadists were a boon for a cause that already had limited support amongst the natives.

Adhering to the Sagramoso narrative, Salafism began its gradual uptake in Dagestan through the work of several young imams, namely the Kebedov Brothers and Akhmad-kadi Akhtaev. Initially these figures represented a more moderate scholarship of fundamentalist Islam as they had been educated within the Sufi Naqshbandiya and Qadiriya tariqats. However, like many of their Middle Eastern contemporaries, they were influenced by the writings of Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Turabi.13

Dagestani Salafists offer an interesting case study for the development of militant Salafism in the post-Soviet period. The moderate strand of Salafism in Dagestan was headed by Akhmad-kadi Akhtaev. His political persuasions fell along similar lines as those of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Akhtaev led the local Dagestani branch of the IRP, and he and his disciples promoted the typical precepts of Salafism: a rejection of cultural innovations in the worship of Allah (bid’a) and an absolute devotion to the concept of monotheism (tawhid) without any constraint in interpretation from Islamic schools of thought, or in this instance Sufi orders.14 Although Akhtaev and his band of merry men rejected the inherent bid’a of the Sufi creed which invariably surrounded them, they remained ultimately against any forceful imposition of their beliefs, preferring pacific proselytism over jihad. Akhtaev encouraged initiatives which nurtured the cultural and theological scholarship of a fundamental Islam. He founded the ‘Al-Islamiyya’ organisation with a view to fostering a cultural and theological revival of Islam in his region.15 Although the more radical ideologues place Sufis and Shiites in the category of apostasy (takfir), Akhtaev favoured developing amicable relationships with Sufi sheikhs with a view to eventual conversion rather than coercion. Akhtaev also voiced a desire for a coalition with Chechnya with a view to uniting the entire Islamic Caucasus against the ‘imperialist’ central state. He perceived this to be a feasible method for gaining a greater economic and political freedom from Moscow.16

13 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 568. 14 Ware, Robert Bruce; Kisriev, Enver, Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance in the North Caucasus, (London, 2010), p. 96. 15 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’,p. 569. 16 Ware; Kisriev, Dagestan: Russian Hegemony in the North Caucasus, p. 96.

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The death of Akhtaev in 1998 contributed to a hardening of the resolve of the Dagestani Salafists. If Akhtaev was indeed a moderate, his death opened the door for radicals like Bagauddin and Abbas Kebedov. Further exacerbating the situation was the fact that his death came at a time of considerable unrest in neighbouring Chechnya, with the presidency of weakening in the face of opposition from influential Salafists like Zelimkhan Yandarbiev.17

Bagauddin Kebedov and his supporters adhered to a very strict interpretation of the Salafist doctrine. For them Sufism was tantamount to polytheism (shirk) and council between Salafists and Sufis could not be tolerated. Kebedov thus began a propaganda campaign against the local Sufi tariqats which at times turned violent. More potently, both the local Dagestani legislature and the central government in Moscow were denounced as kafir (a derogatory term for godless) which essentially meant that their authority was illegitimate. For Kebedov, like the many proponents of the radical Salafist slant of Islam, the separation of Islam and the state was irreconcilable. Addressing his followers in 1997 he stated “any law, which is not based on the Quran and the hadiths is to be considered taghut (idolatry), […] any government which does not rule according to Allah’s law is to be considered taghut, and must therefore be shunned.”18

Chechnya and Ingushetia

The scholar of passing interest in terrorism perpetrated in the name of Islam in Russia could be forgiven for assuming that Chechnya was the hub for the most extreme elements of the post-Soviet Islamic revival of the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, in recent years Dagestan and Ingushetia, have been credited with being the more virulently insurrectionist republics in the North Caucasus, superseding the prowess of the Chechen revolutionaries primarily due to the undeniably successful, albeit utterly brutal, counter-insurgency and repression inflicted on any libel to oppose . In many ways, this is a return to type. While the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic did produce and host Salafist debate during the perestroika years, the following accrued here was

17 Wood, Tony, Chechnya: The Case for Independence, (London, 2007), p. 135. 18 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 570.

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of considerably limited significance in comparison with neighbouring Dagestan. Why this is the case is uncertain. Although Chechnya opted to secede and then defend its secession through a military campaign, the initial driving force was a form of secular nationalism, led by former Soviet commanders like Dudayev and Maskhadov who were sooner inspired by Baltic state independence movements than an emerging political Islam epitomised by the Taliban and the Sudanese National Islamic Front.

Nevertheless, a burgeoning Salafist movement did receive a minor audience in Chechnya and Ingushetia prior to the outbreak of war in the former in 1994. With the Soviet Union on the brink of collapse, small groups emerged, dedicated to the supplanting of the local Sufi hegemony through a political discourse that put them in line with their neighbouring idealists. The mutual desire of Salafists from Dagestan and the Chechen-Ingush ASSR to cultivate close ties with a view to a political-theological union acted as a precursor for the cooperation of bellicose jamaats of the Caucasus that succeeded the demise of Chechen militant nationalism in the 2000s. However, in the early 1990s the Chechen branch of the IRP, led by Akhmed Mataev and Islam Khalimov, had to contend with this nationalism and consequently found a considerably meagre following for their cause in Chechnya.19

Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia

Radical Islam also developed in a similar manner in the Muslim majority republics of the North Caucasus of lesser note, or rather of less frequent strife: Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. An emphasis should be placed on the context in which Salafist Islam was fostered and nurtured in these two republics, but particularly Kabardino-Balkaria. Here, as in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya, a burgeoning class of Middle Eastern educated youth emerged with a steadfast desire to institute their belief system. The chief proponents of this Islamic revival were Anzor Astemirov, Rasul Kudaev and Musa Mukozhev. These three young imams rejected what they saw as imperceptive teachings of Islam, led by a corrupt clergy who colluded with the authorities. Astemirov and Mukozhev repudiated violence as their modus operandi, preferring education and proselytising in an effort to win over the

19 Moore, Cerwyn; Tumelty, Paul, ‘Assessing Unholy Alliances in Chechnya: From Communism and Nationalism to Islamism and Salafism’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1, (2009) p. 83.

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general population to their cause. Although they disagreed with the authority of the central state, they recognised that the preconditions for were not yet present in Kabardino- Balkaria and therefore opted for overt transparency in all their machinations rather than a surreptitious campaign against the state that could lead to conflict. Accordingly, all missionary work was conducted in accordance with the legislature and in 1993 they established an ‘Islamic Centre’ in the capital to continue their indoctrination through education. The success in promoting a non-violent interpretation of Salafism led all such communities in the republic to align themselves under Astemirov and Mukozhev, forming the Kabardino-Balkaria jamaat. Their tactic of promotion through peaceful and open means struck a chord with many young followers of this brand of religion, and what emerged was a unified, hierarchically well-structured organisation with the primary goal being the indoctrination through largely pedagogical and sermonising means.20

Of the regions concerned in this paper, Salafism was weakest in the Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia in the early 1990s. Muhammad Bidzhiev, an Islamic scholar and local representative of the IRP led the Salafist community of Karachaevo-Cherkessia. Like his counterparts in Kabardino-Balkaria, Bidzhiev recognised that establishing state functions in line with his beliefs was nigh on impossible in his region of the burgeoning Russian Federation. This was not simply because local Sufi beliefs were too strong, but also for the demographic make-up of the republic whereby just short of 50% of the population adhered to any form of Islamic faith. If Astemirov and Mukozhev were astute in their tactics for the gradual development of their ideology, Bidzhiev offered the “how not to” manual of pushing an ideology with an exceedingly limited base in a hostile environment. Rather than focusing on indoctrination, Bidzhiev chose to take control of a given territory with a view to expansion. In November 1991, with the Soviet Union in total collapse Bidzhiev set up his own small fiefdom in the town of Karachaevsk and announced the creation of the Karachai Imamate. While Bidzhiev was popular amongst the youth of the region, his endeavour put him at odds with the central authorities as well as local leaders. As a result, his Imamate was dissolved in 1993 and he was forced to flee. Other groups emerged during the mid 1990s, no

20 Kurbanov, Ruslan, ‘Globalization of Muslim Consciousness in the Caucasus: Islamic Call and Jihad’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 6, No. 42, (2006), p. 65.

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doubt influenced by the evolving conflict in Chechnya. However, Salafism remained on the margins in Karachaevo-Cherkessia.21

The First War

If radical Islam had a limited, but nevertheless devout audience in the early 1990s, the two wars fought for the soul of Chechnya from 1994 onwards dramatically altered both the uptake and the financing of this movement. While Chechen nationalism was ostensibly the driving force behind the first war (1994-1996), the very nature of the conflict, whereby a rather indigent Muslim polity was invaded by a ‘western’ military force of considerable might designated the war as a battle between Islam and a crusader. In fact, although the Chechen leader Dzhokar Dudayev was reticent to play the Muslim card as he maintained an allegiance to the ideas of secularism, he did invoke the idea of a religious war with the notion of gazawat. This was the term used to describe the resistance of the Muslim people of the North Caucasus against the Russian imperial invasion of the 18th and 19th centuries and essentially equates to holy war.22 Such a petition for mobilisation, whether intentional or accidental, beseeched not only neighbouring Muslim communities for assistance, but also provoked Islamic fighters from the Middle East and Central Asia to migrate to Chechnya and wage their own jihad against the Kremlin forces.

The outbreak of hostilities resulted in the arrival of radical religious figures from Dagestan and further afield who came with the intention of offering military assistance as well as proselytising the indigenous population and establishing centres of education and theological guidance. One of the chief ideologues to arrive during this period was the Jordanian of Chechen extraction Sheikh al-Fathi al-Shishani.23 Due to his capacity to converse in Chechen, al-Fathi al-Shishani was able to establish with relative ease several Salafi jamaats and accrue considerable popularity amongst the youth of Chechnya. Bagauddin Kebedov also opted to spread his ideology after fleeing to Chechnya from

21 Kurbanov, Ruslan, ‘‘Urban’ and ‘Rural’ Islam in the Caucasus: Modernisation versus Conservation’, Religion, State and Society, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, (2011), p. 357. 22 Knysh, Alexander, ‘Contextualizing the Salafi – Sufi conflict (from the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt)‘, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4, (2007) p. 511. 23 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 573.

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Dagestan in 1998. Based in the Urus-Martan area of Chechnya, Kebedov and his followers set about preaching the principles of Salafi Islam, while also cultivating links with influential local players like Zelimkhan Yandarbiev.24

During this period, arguably the most influential vagabond to land in Chechnya was Ibn al-Khattab, a jihadist in every sense of the word from . Khattab began his career in Afghanistan in 1988, ironically fighting military units of the Soviet Union. The conflict in Afghanistan with the USSR was in some ways a precursor to what we are witnessing in Syria today. Then, thousands of Muslim volunteers flocked in order to defend Afghanistan from the onslaught of the godless Soviets. Buoyed by the rallying call of scholars like the Palestinian theologian Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, units of fighters from varying backgrounds and nationalities were trained in Pakistan and formed a coherent opposition to the Soviet forces. In 1989, with the retreat of the Soviets confirmed, Azzam who would later found Al Qaeda with Osama bin Laden, advocated the establishment of transnational brigades that would defend Muslim communities and provoke a bellicose interpretation of jihad around the world.25 Khattab was very much a disciple of Azzam, believing that jihad as a defence of Islam was the responsibility of every able bodied Muslim male. Furthermore, Khattab followed Azzam’s interpretation of belligerent jihad in conjunction with dawa (proselytising) as necessary tactics in the expansion of Islam beyond its traditional homelands. In Chechnya in this period of significant unrest, Khattab found support in influential Chechen Salafist ideologues like Movladi Udugov and popular warlords like Shamil Basaev, Salman Raduev and Arbi Baraev who either espoused similar goals or were willing to cede ideological ground in order to benefit from foreign recapitalisation and recruitment of experienced personnel that Khattab’s presence guaranteed.26

The nominal Chechen victory in the first war should have ushered in a period of harmony and consolidation. However, the conflict had destroyed the infrastructure of an already impoverished region. Furthermore, the Accords did not implicitly signify a Chechen independence, meaning the burgeoning polity remained in the murky Russian sphere of influence and was unable to necessarily access global funding for the reconstruction

24 Ibid, p. 573 – 574. 25 Wilhelmsen, Julie, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement’ in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 1, (2005), p. 41. 26 Giuliano, Elise, ‘Islamic Identity and Political Mobilisation in Russia: Chechnya and Dagestan Compared’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2, (2005), p. 210

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of the cities and towns. Moreover, the Kremlin was far from forthcoming with aid, especially considering the casualties incurred at the hands of the Chechen military.27 This situation of destitution meant that Salafism was ripe for consumption. Not satisfied with subverting the secular nationalism previously advocated, Udugov, Basaev and Khattab drew up plans for the unification of the Caucasian Muslim republics under the Black Standard flag of Islam. The first step was uniting Chechnya and Dagestan. In 1997, Udugov established the movement Islamskaya Natsiya which endeavoured to bring about an Islamic State on the territories of Dagestan and Chechnya. Udugov stated that “Ichkeria (Chechnya) is an integral part of Dagestan […] historically our peoples have had very close ties, so it is quite natural for the nations of Dagestan and Chechnya to wish to live in one united Islamic state.” 28 Following on from this, the Congress of Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan (CPID) was inaugurated in April 1998 with Basaev as the head of the organisation. In what can only be described as an unintentionally facetious appellation, the military wing of the CPID was entitled the Islamic Peace-making Battalion.29

These machinations were not simply manifestations of an expansionist Chechen agenda. Bagauddin Kebedov and his Dagestani Salafi compatriots were also in favour of unifying Islam and installing sharia on much of the North Caucasian region, with a Chechen- Dagestani unification the logical first step. The failure to bring about an extensive adoption of Salafism and consequent societal change through peaceful means, forced Kebedov to alter his stance on violent insurrection. In 1998, in the Buinaksk district of Dagestan, a jamaat under the command of Djarulla Radjbaddinov unified and took over four villages in central Dagestan – Kadar, Durangi, Chabanmakhi and Karamakhi – removing the juridical authority of the central government and installing their interpretation of sharia. Khattab and Basaev played a significant role in the arming and defensive organisation of this burgeoning independent entity through the CPID.30 Emboldened by the untrammelled success of this initial move for sedition, Khattab and Basaev made a significant attempt to couple Dagestan and Chechnya with a minor invasion of sorts from Chechnya into the Botlikh district of Dagestan in August 1999. Basaev was steadfast in his interpretation of events:

27 Lieven, Anatol, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, (New Haven, 1998), p. 142-143. 28 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 574. 29 Ibid 30 Moore, Cerwyn, ‘Foreign Bodies: Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the North Caucasus and “Beyond”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 400.

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“What is going on in Dagestan is a mighty ‘jihad’, a holy war to expel the infidels from an Islamic land, which has been in the Islamic fold for thirteen centuries. […] We are fighting for the proclamation of an Islamic republic and the establishment of a greater Chechen empire in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia.”31

Despite this gradual acclivity towards the more militant Salafist dogma in Dagestan and Chechnya, Sufism remained the dominant credenda of the Muslim communities. Even Salafists in the other republics remained relatively pacifistic. In Chechnya itself, the leader of the republic, Aslan Maskhadov, was abhorred by the actions of the band of pugnacious warlords led by Basaev and Khattab. In Kabardino-Balkaria, the duo of Astemirov and Mukozhev remained reticent to violent insurrection and strongly canvassed their flocks to remain ardent in their support for placid proselytising. While the ‘moderates’ broadly succeeded in upholding non-violent opposition, some youthful radicals nevertheless absconded from all reaches of the Northern Caucasus, and indeed from other Muslim communities of the Russian Federation, to Chechnya in order to join the sedition and acquire both military and ideological instruction at training camps set up by Khattab and Basaev.

The Second War

The arrival of on the political scene dramatically altered the secessionism fomenting in the Northern Caucasus region. The irredentism of Basaev and co. offered the recently appointed Prime Minister a potent provocation for securing his authority and subsequent ascension to the presidency. The of 1996 had concluded an uncertain peace between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Although a de facto separation was concluded, the treaty failed to ensure Russian recognition of the Chechen state, rather deferring such a determination until 2001.32 However, the simple notion that the Kremlin was forced to negotiate a settlement of a conflict with a force of comparable mediocrity in terms of strength and resources meant that the First Chechen War was nothing short of a humiliating defeat in an époque of already composite disarray for the successor state of the Soviet Union.

31 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 575. 32 Akhmadov, Ilias; Lanskoy, Miriam, The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost (New York, 2010), p. 89.

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If the skirmishes and incursions of Chechen rebels into neighbouring Dagestan presented the case for round two, a series of bombings on residential apartment buildings of a very questionable origin ensured widespread public approval for another military intervention.33 Although discussing the events that formed the casus belli for another Russian escapade into it’s breakaway southern province risks a certain digression from the matter at hand; the quite plausible culpability of the clandestine authorities in the bombings of September 1999 is a valuable reference for the unscrupulous tactics that were to be employed under Vladimir Putin in bringing Chechnya to heel. In an effort to avoid the typical tropes of conspiracy theories as to why the FSB may have played a minor, or indeed major, role in the events of September 1999, I will simply lay out the known facts at my disposal. Initially the Russian authorities were sluggish in their response to the revolt and invasion of the ‘Wahhabists’ in Dagestan in August 1999. However, the radicals were broadly condemned by the local population and thus were ill equipped to truly claim sovereignty over any significant quarter of Dagestan beyond villages already receptive to the Salafi ideology.34 Nevertheless, the Russian forces eventually responded with Putin ordering the bombing of Salafi enclaves in both Dagestan and Chechnya. Limited but sufficient ground forces pushed the rebels back over the border into Chechnya. What followed the brief conflict in Dagestan and preceded the Russian invasion of Chechnya was a series of bombings on apartment buildings against civilian targets. The first such act of aggression occurred on 4 September with the bombing of a building in Buinaksk, Dagestan housing military personnel and their families which resulted in the deaths of 65 people.35 Following on from this, two bombings on 6 and 13 of September in Moscow killed a total of 228 civilians, with another 16 to follow in the city of Volgodonsk in the Rostov Oblast on 16 September.36 Considering how unpopular the First Chechen War proved to be, a weighty pretext was needed for the Russian electorate to acquiesce to a second crusade against the southerners. Furthermore, Putin was an unknown quantity at the beginning of his premiership, garnering a meagre 2% approval rating at the outset of the Dagestan operations which was to significantly jump to 25% by late October as a result of his jingoistic rhetoric and alacrity in manoeuvring against the Chechen polity. So the bombings provided justification for invasion and boosted the profile of the

33 Wood, Chechnya: The Case for Independence, p. 98. 34 Politkovskaya, Anna, A Dirty War, (London, 2001), p. xx. 35 Souleimanov, Emil, An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective (Frankfurt am Main, 2007), p. 153. 36 Zürcher, Christoph, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, (New York, 2007), p. 92.

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unheard of Leningradtsy who would be king, or tsar in this instance. This makes the events of 22-23 September in Ryazan all the more murky. With the Russian population on high alert from the indiscriminate terrorism of the preceding weeks, residents of an apartment building in Ryazan on the night of 22 September alerted authorities of suspicious goings on in the basement of their building. Police duly found explosives and a timer and swiftly managed to apprehend the culprits, only for said persons to turn out to be FSB agents. For 48 hours the FSB failed to offer an adequate justification for the actions of their agents, only finally settling on a ludicrous fable that they were merely setting up a training exercise for local law enforcement.37 Considering that Khattab, Maskhadov and Basaev steadfastly denied any involvement in the various bombings,38 and evidence of sufficient Chechen culpability never truly established, one could be forgiven for questioning the motives of the FSB, an organisation headed by Putin until his appointment as Prime Minister in August 1999. As Tony Wood quite eloquently puts it:

“The Riazan’ incident captures several essential qualities of Putin’s Russia: at the very least, the government had manipulated the fears of the populace and placed a breathtakingly low value on the security of its own citizens. The truth could be more monstrous still: a regime driven by cold calculation and bottomless cynicism, willing to murder its own people to further the goals of an authoritarian, kleptocratic elite.”39

The apartment bombings of September 1999 were to set the tone for the coming events in Chechnya and the responses of the Chechen rebels. Although ideology and nationalism played their roles in motivating and justifying the atrocities for which both sides were culpable; the appears to have been a conflict intensely driven by revenge more than anything else. The Kremlin took revenge on Chechnya for the apparent culpability in the apartment bombings, but also for their military defeat three years previously. In response, the Chechens, for whom the notion of revenge or blood feud is ingrained in their cultural identity,40 embarked upon a campaign of particularly virulent terrorism, most brutally remembered outside of the region with the hostage crises at the Dubrovka Theatre in 2002 and in Beslan in 2004. In qualifying the motivations of the culprits

37 Satter, David, Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State, (New Haven, 2003), p. 28. 38 Akhmadov, Ilias; Lanskoy, Miriam, The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost (New York, 2010), p. 162. 39 Wood, Chechnya: The Case for Independence, p. 99. 40 Janeczko, Matthew, ‘‘Faced with death, even a mouse bites’: Social and religious motivations behind terrorism in Chechnya’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 25, No. 2, (2014), p. 435-438

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of acts such as the there is a danger that one could be accused of condoning such tactics, which of course is absurd. The siege of School Number One in September 2004 resulted in the deaths of 331 civilians, of which more than half were children under the age of 12.41 While it is facile to simply conclude that the perpetrators of this event are morally bankrupt, summations of this nature only serve to perpetuate an eye for an eye brutality. The justification offered for Beslan by Basaev was that the Chechen separatists want “to show the world, again and again, the true face of the Russian regime, the true face of Putin with his satanic horns so that the world sees his true face. In order to stop the genocide, we will stop at nothing.”42 The ‘true face’ for which Basaev references is the one that repeatedly and indiscriminately bombs civilian targets. There is a myriad of examples of serious Russian indiscretions committed by the armed forces during the Second Chechen War. On 18 October, 1999, a missile made a direct hit against the central market of , killing 130 civilians. But even this act was relatively tame in comparison to the events of 4 February, 2000 in the village of Katyr-Yurt. Here, the Russian air force used vacuum bombs, a type of explosive that essentially weaponises the oxygen in the target vicinity. After inflicting considerable casualty on a civilian population, the Russians offered an evacuation to the surviving inhabitants by providing a convoy of buses. Once outside the town, the convoy was itself bombed. 363 people were killed in total throughout the day.43 In an interview with the Swedish TT News agency in 2005, Basaev once more laid out his world view in relation to the barbarity of his actions:

“Today, a great many people are once again convinced that a brazen and unceremonious law of force, rather than the force of the law, is dominant in the world. And no matter how much we try to come to terms with the rules of this world, neither so-called international law, nor democracy, nor human rights and other fancy things will save us from genocide; we merely grow weaker from relying on these terms and promises. While they talk to us about democracy, international law and the rest, 200,000 of our people have been killed; that is 25 percent of our people.” 44

41 Zürcher, Christoph, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, (New York, 2007), p. 96. 42 Ó Tuathail, Gearóid, ‘Placing blame: Making sense of Beslan’ in Political Geography, Vol. 28 (2009), p. 8. 43 Sweeney, John, ‘Revealed: Russia’s worst war crime in Chechnya’, The Guardian, 5 March, 2000 - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/05/russia.chechnya - Consulted 12 August, 2016. 44 Interview with by Swedish TT news agency - http://www.radicalparty.org/en/content/shamil- basayev-interviewed-swedish-tt-news-agency

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Chapter II: Towards a Global Doctrine

Radicalising the “Moderates”

The brutality of the Second Chechen War, coupled with authoritative measures taken against the practice of ‘Wahhabism’ in the North Caucasus region as a whole resulted in the radicalisation of hitherto peaceful Salafists. Although the Kremlin was to succeed in reclaiming Chechnya and installing a loyal, local autocrat to govern the republic with an iron fist; the insurgency that was to follow the relatively brief frontline battle against Grozny pushed many previously open radicals underground and amplified the connections between the various jamaats of the region and the experienced hardliners of Chechnya.

The mid-2000s saw the emergence of Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria as the primary hubs of influential ideologues and combatants of the burgeoning global jihad of the North Caucasus. The previously peaceful Salafist movement of Kabardino-Balkaria developed a potent militant faction under the initial stewardship of Muslim Atayev. Splintering from the nonviolent philosophy fostered by Astemirov, the Yarmuk jamaat called on a jihad to be established against the Kabardino-Balkaria authorities and central government and stated that a defensive jihad was mandatory (fard’ayn) for every able-bodied Muslim.45 A signifier of the drift towards a transnational Islamist ideology is the title ‘Yarmuk’ whose origins reside in the Middle East, rather than Transcaucasia. ‘Yarmuk’ is the name of a river that straddles the Israeli-Jordanian border. The title also references an early military victory in the expansion of Islam in 636 AD.46 The actions of the Yarmuk battalion and the consequent retributions of the authorities only served to embitter and radicalise those advocating non-violent disobedience. Astemirov joined the fight in 2005 after being accused of orchestrating and partaking in an attack against the Federal Anti-Narcotics Service in December 2004.47 Previously reticent of bellicose tactics, Astemirov recognised that regardless of his stated aims and means, he and his followers can and would be accused of odious acts when it suited the authorities to subvert their cause. Astemirov was subsequently

45 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 577. 46 Hahn, Gordon M., The Caucasus Emirate : Global in Russia’s North Caucasus and Beyond, (Jefferson, 2014), p. 185. 47 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 577.

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appointed Emir of Yarmuk in the Spring of 2005, after the death of Atayev in late 2004. His colleague and compatriot Musa Mukozhev, an even more ardent proponent of non-violent insurrection joined the jihadist movement in late 2006. The deviation of these key figures of pacifistic proselytising Islam to jihad was significant. Both Mukozhev and Astemirov held significant sway in the Salafi communities within and beyond the borders of Kabardino- Balkaria. Their tergiversation of passivity was a boon for all proponents of jihad from the Black Sea to the Caspian. Their advocacy of jihad would only serve to boost the numbers of fighters to the surreptitious regional cause that was to transform into the Caucasus Emirate.

In the region, of Karachaevo-Cherkessia from the early 2000s, the burgeoning of the 1990s also suffered under stricter controls deemed necessary by the central government. Much of the movement was forced underground as a result of invasive counter- terrorism operations that coincided with the Second Chechen War. However, much like the relative lull in activities in the immediate aftermath of the war, the militants emerged from their foxholes once more in 2004, targeting government and administrative officials, law enforcement agents and members of the regional Islamic clergy whom they considered apostates. Although the effectiveness of the actions of the Karachai jamaat paled in comparison to that of their brethren in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia; the development of a coherent jihadist ideology in a heretofore compliant republic signified that rather than quelling the radicals that were so vehemently combatting the Russian forces in Chechnya, Putin and his cronies were facilitating its dilution and dispersal throughout the North Caucasus Federal District. However, the weakness of the Karachai jamaat in both manpower and ideologues required that it unite with the more powerful movements of the region. With the Chechen cause on the wane, the leader of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria opted to develop closer ties with associate movements in a consolidated fashion. With this, Sheikh Abdul-Kalim Sadulaev inaugurated in May 2005 the ‘Caucasus Front’, an organisation ostensibly under the control of the Chechen leadership, in which logistical cooperation was promoted between the jamaats of Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnya, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Stavropol, Adygea, Krasnodar and Dagestan.48

48 Moore, Cerwyn; Tumelty, Payl, ‘Assessing Unholy Alliances in Chechnya: From Communism and Nationalism to Islamism and Salafism’ in Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1, (2009), p. 87.

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During this same period, Dagestan went through a limited reformation amongst its Salafi adherents. The rebellious actions of Bagauddin Kebedov and his complicity in the Chechen invasion of Dagestan in 1999 had resulted in a harsh crackdown and limited bombing campaign against certain villages. The vast majority of the population, including those inclined towards Salafism denounced Kebedov and his followers. What emerged in the first half of the 2000s in Dagestan was a move towards the nonviolent preaching methods once advocated by Akhmad-kadi Akhtaev. At the heart of this revival of sorts was a burgeoning educated youth who began to promote the study of theology and Islamic history over notions of jihad against the infidels. The primary actor at the centre of this movement was Yasin Rasulov. Unlike Kebedov and his cohorts who lauded the bellicose sermons of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam and Sayyid Qutb, Rasulov looked to the writings of more moderate Salafists like Yusef al-Qaradawi, a chief ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood during the latter part of the twentieth century.49

However, as in Kabardino-Balkaria, militant Salafism found its feet once more towards late 2003 in response to repressions against ‘Wahabbism’. Several fighting jamaats were established in Dagestan during this period. Although they were initially guided by veterans of the Chechen wars like Rappani Khalilov, these jamaats began to appeal to a youth all too accustomed to police harassment because of suspicion of collusion or participation with militants. Essentially the conjecture of the authorities became a self- fulfilling prophecy – by targeting young male members of Salafi communities with charges of participation or association with the militant factions, they hardened a minority already ill at ease with the pervasiveness of the counter-insurgency and the corruption of the administrative class.

As with Astemirov and Mukozhev, Rasulov began to gravitate towards the more antagonistic protest that jihad offered. Rasulov sought justification for his progression from peaceful disassociation by emphasising a linear narrative between the nineteenth century struggle of Imam Shamil against Russian imperialism and the growing violent intransigence to the Kremlin in the modern day North Caucasus. The jihad in the North Caucasus was thus a regional, historical struggle between Russian imperialism by Dagestani led factions of the North Caucasus. However, Rasulov reappropriated the driving philosophy of Imam Shamil.

49 Dannreuther, Roland, ‘Shifting Dynamics of the Insurgency and Counter- insurgency in the North Caucasus’, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 13, No. 4, (2014), p. 391.

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He negated the notion that Shamil was motivated by Sufism, and instead forwarded the argument that Dagestani Salafism, introduced into the region in the seventeenth century by Muhammad Ibn Musa al-Quduqi, provided the true inspiration for the resistance.50

“The nineteenth century Salafi movement of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab became the catalyst of the anti-colonial movement in the entire world, including in the North Caucasus. At the end of the twentieth century, Dagestani Salafis re-took this idea of the creation of an Islamic state in the eastern North Caucasus.”51

The Dagestani militant jamaats benefitted significantly from the gradual attraction of Rasulov and his contemporaries to violent jihad. Rasulov joined the fighting jamaat Shariat of Rasul Makasharipov in 2005. Due to his scholarly wisdom he became the chief ideologue of the jamaat. His presence, along with other ideologues of a similar stature, like Abu-Zagir Mantayev,52 provided a theological legitimacy to their armed struggle, further bolstering support and recruitment. Although Rasulov was eventually killed by security forces in April 2006, his relatively brief sojourn in the helped aid an expanding cause. By 2006 jamaats of varying degrees of power and prestige were to be found in , , Gubden, Khasavyurt, Buinaksk and Botlikh. The stated motivations of the assorted militant groups of Dagestan, as published by in November 2005, places them within the same global cause against imperialism and corruption with the intention of implementing a pious, puritanical society.53

“Our purpose – is establishment of valid society on the basis of the laws of Allah. Only in this society is possible prosperity and morals. The state Kufra does not give to achieve the peaceful call, understanding, that the truth of Islam will conquer the hearts of people. Therefore, all forces of government machine today are to the suppression of Islam, destruction and erosion of its boundaries. The Moslems of Daghestan undergo spiritual and physical oppression from the side of authority.”54

50 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 580. 51 Ibid 52 Kurbanov, Ruslan, ‘‘Urban’ and ‘Rural’ Islam in the Caucasus: Modernisation versus Conservation’, Religion, State and Society, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, (2011), p. 357. 53 Ibid 54 Jamaats “Shariat”, ‘Our Purpose – Establishment of the Validity’, Kavkaz Center, 7 November 2005 - http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2005/11/07/4201.shtml - Accessed 15 August 2016

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For the Republic of Ingushetia, it was its proximity to Chechnya that played a decisive role in the radicalisation of it’s disaffected youth. The brutality of the Second Chechen War resulted in a considerable population of Chechen refugees fleeing to Ingushetia. By late 2000 it was estimated that 300,000 Chechens were residing in Ingushetia. The ascension of the former member of the KGB and FSB, Murat Zyazikov, to the office of the Ingush presidency led to a repression against Salafi communities and would be insurgents. Viewing refugee camps as possible sanctuaries for Chechen radicals, Zyazikov ordered clean up operations that were characterised by violations against human rights such as arbitrary arrests and ‘disappearances’ of suspected insurgents.55 This repression served to radicalise and mobilise communities hitherto less inclined towards jihad. Ingushetia developed into one of the most violent and unstable republics of the region from 2005 onwards. The emergence and developing prowess of the Ingush jamaat was encapsulated by the events of 22 June 2004, when an organised band of Chechen and Ingush militants attacked several municipal targets in the capital of Nazran, which resulted in nearly 100 casualties, mostly of security forces.56 The Nazran raid, along with a similar action against Nalchik, the capital of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, represented well the dispersal of conflict throughout the region.57

While the Ingush were motivated by similar ideas of combatting Russian imperialism and installing an Islamic State within their fiefdoms, unlike the Dagestanis and the Kabardins, the Ingush lacked in terms of ideological leaders, which weakened both their propaganda arm and their ability to proselytise and recruit. Thus the Ingush jamaat was less vocal than their contemporaries. Nevertheless, on 8 July 2004 Kavkaz Center published a statement from the Ingush jamaat which laid out their motivations and ideology. Relying on the translation from Russian of Domitilla Sagramoso, the jamaat of Ingushetia made a declaration that mixed local nationalism with the notions of liberation through jihad:

“Russian troops, together with Ossetian formations seized Ingush territories, and expelled the Ingush from their homes. Thousands of Ingush Muslims were killed, hundreds went missing. […] Anyone who cooperates with the occupiers and helps them in their fight against Muslims either

55 Souleimanov, Emil; Ditrych, Ondrej, ‘The Internationalisation of the Russian–Chechen Conflict: Myths and Reality’, Europe Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 8, (2008), p. 1218 56 Aliyev, Huseyn, ‘Aid Efficiency in an Armed Conflict: The role of civil society in the escalation of violence in the North Caucasus’, IFHV Working Paper, Vol. 1, No. 1, (June 2011), p. 9. 57 Kurbanov, Ruslan, ‘‘Urban’ and ‘Rural’ Islam in the Caucasus: Modernisation versus Conservation’, Religion, State and Society, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, (2011), p. 361

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with weapons, or as an informant, is one of them. The Shari’ah law will be applied to those individuals. These people will be punished by death, because those who fight or help infidels, who are waging a war against Muslims, are to be excluded from Islam.”58

The denouncement of “Ossetian formations” is a reference to the dispute between Ingushetia and North Ossetia over the status of the Eastern Prigorodny district of the Republic of North-Ossetia-Alania. The conflict relates to the historical repression of the Chechen and Ingush people under both the Tsarist regimes and Stalin. Due to suspicions of collaboration with the Nazis during the Second World War, the Chechens and Ingush were deported to Central Asia. East Prigorodny was subsequently transferred to North Ossetia in 1944. In 1957, some years after the death of Stalin, the deported peoples were allowed to return home. However, East Prigorodny remained in the majority Orthodox state of North Ossetia.59 In referencing this conflict, the Ingush jamaat portrayed a more closed interpretation of the global Salafist doctrine. Although Islam was imperative, nationalist interests were of great concern and acted as an at times separate motivator for insurrection against Russia and ostensibly as a jingoistic call to arms for the invasion of North Ossetia. Ingushetia’s dearth of educated Salafi ideologues made it more difficult for the jihadists to fully supplant the nationalist fervour. Ali Taziev (Emir Magas), the leader of the Ingush jamaat, struggled to integrate some militant groups who were ill at ease with the Salafi ideology and steadfastly promoted the cause of Ingush independent nationalism. Taziev was a close ally of Basaev. From 2006 until his arrest in 2010, he achieved a certain degree of success in uniting the various militant groups of Ingushetia under the banners of the Caucasus Front and then the Caucasus Emirate.60

In a similar vein, Chechen militancy maintained some notions of nationalism as a driving force, well into the mid 2000s. The Chechen president, Aslan Maskhadov, had never adopted the radical ideology forwarded by the likes of Yandarbiev and Udugov. Even Shamil Basaev, a man lazily denounced as Chechnya’s Osama bin Laden,61 eschewed an outright embrace of global Salafism. Indeed, although Basaev cultivated profitable amicability with members of the global mujahideen like Khattab and Melfi Al Hussaini Al Harbi (better

58 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 582. 59 International Crisis Group, ‘Chechnya: The Inner Abroad’, Europe Report, No. 236, (30 June, 2015), p. 15. 60 Campana, Aurélie; Ratelle, Jean-François, ‘A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 37, No. 2, (2014), p. 127. 61 Murphy, Paul, The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terrorism (Dulles, 2004), p. 7

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known by his nom de guerre ), his chief concern was the North Caucasus. In a sense, Basaev represented a modern incarnation of his namesake Imam Shamil. His cause was the Muslim people of the North Caucasus first and foremost. Maskhadov, Basaev and Udugov all represented different forms of insurrection in Chechnya. Understanding the motivations and the ideology each espoused can go a long way to understanding the conflict at hand and its development from a regional affair to a possible bit part player in a global revolution. Maskhadov, the former military commander in the Soviet Armed Forces, was a devout Muslim and recognised both the value of Islam as a motivator and its necessary input in the formation of a successful Chechen independent state. In 2002 Maskadov approved changes to the constitution of the Republic of Ichkeria which added more Islamic elements to its design. The first article of the constitution stated that the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya, is a sovereign, independent Islamic legal state.” It also stipulated that the Quran and the were the sources of all legal doctrine, which ultimately invoked the establishment of some form of sharia.62 However, Maskhadov remained steadfast against jihad and maintained a tumultuous relationship with Basaev and other militants, often denouncing their actions as terrorism, and renouncing the involvement of the CRI in such operations.63

Movladi Udugov represented the more fundamentally extremist element of the insurgency. He rejected all forms of modern governance and staunchly promoted the creation of a true Islamic State in the North Caucasus with the enforcement of strict sharia of paramount importance.

Basaev was possibly the most enigmatic of actors in the conflict between the Muslim populations of the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation. He advocated the creation of an Islamic State in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus as a whole. However, despite Basaev’s close relationship with Khattab, his motivations for insurrection were not purely in defence of his dogma. Although he was greatly influenced by the Quran and Islamic scholars; he also drew inspiration from secular figures like Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara.64 In 2004, Basaev published Book of a Mujahideen, a rethinking of Paulo Coelho’s Manual of the Warrior of the Light, in which the reader is educated on the notions of jihad and what it means to be a

62 Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 583. 63 Wood, Chechnya: The Case for Independence, p. 151. 64 Derluguian, Georgi M., ‘Che Guevaras in Turbans’, New Left Review, Issue 237, (September 1999), p. 9.

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mujahid.65 The book is a general manual for both tactical warfare and spiritual guidance for would-be militants. Basaev’s allegiance lay with the people of the North Caucasus rather than specifically the global umma. This is evident in his exploits in the conflicts over Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh in the early 1990s. In 1992 Basaev and an estimated 300 strong Chechen battalion assisted the Azerbaijani side in their war with Armenia over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1993 he then led the Chechen-Abkhaz battalion in aid of the Abkhaz separatist movement against Georgian aggression. There are some suggestions that the Chechen forces under his command in Abkhazia received both training and logistical support from Russia.66 Basaev’s desire to free the people of the North Caucasus from Russian (and arguably Georgian) hegemony played a role in expanding the Chechen conflict beyond its initial borders. From 2002 onwards Basaev worked with radicals throughout the region in order to establish militant jamaats in each republic. The cacophonous ethnic makeup of the North Caucasus meant that nationalism was ill equipped as a motivation for a unified break from the Kremlin’s authority. Militant Salafism on the other hand offered the perfect marriage of revolution on the grounds of equality within the confines of a creed that was representative of the population and eschewed any notions of ethnic superiority. An Avar, a Chechen and Kabarday could all fight under the flag of militant Islam with the united goal of installing an Islamic State.

Imarat Kavkaz

The respective deaths of Maskhadov and Basaev in 2005 and 2006 facilitated the gradual regional and subsequent global shift of the ideology supplanting Chechen nationalism. Maskhadov was succeeded by Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev, the hitherto chairman of the Supreme Shari’ah Court of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Bringing the Chechen state model more into line with Islamic ideals, Sadulaev reaffirmed the supremacy of Islamic law and abolished the institution of the presidency in favour of that of Emir of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.67 As previously alluded to, Sadulaev like Basaev favoured spreading the Chechen jihad beyond its borders and established an organisational structure whereby the various

65 Basaev, Shamil, Book of the Mujahideen, (2004), p. 1. 66 Hughes, James, ‘The Chechnya Conflict: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 15, No. 3, (2007), p. 303. 67 Russell, John, ‘Kadyrov's Chechnya—Template, Test or Trouble for Russia's Regional Policy?’, Europe Asia Studies, Vol. 63, No. 3, (2011), p. 514.

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jamaats would fall in under the leadership of the Chechens. In 2006 all the leaders of the Islamic jamaats of the North Caucasus pledged allegiance to Sadulaev. While this represented a dramatic conjectural shift in ideology, in practical terms the various jamaats maintained an organisational freedom. The ability of the state authorities to subvert and contest the development of insurgent jamaats meant that it was impossible for a coherent structural organisation under Chechen command to be installed. Nevertheless, the Caucasus Front represented an ideological alignment between the beleaguered radicals of the North Caucasus, supplanting nationalism as the principal for liberation. Furthermore, Sadulaev’s reputation as a religious figure first and foremost enabled him to negotiate the ethnic boundaries that would possibly have prevented the more military figures of the Chechen leadership from appealing to the myriad jamaats under the insignia of the Caucasus Front.

“Today all Mujahideen are joined in a single structure. Together they are waging war on the path of Allah, on the path of building a full-fledged Islamic state. And on the path, the Mujahideen, by the grace of Allah, are trying everything to adhere to shari’ah, to adhere to the norms and behaviour of Islam … and to strengthen our unity.”68

Sadulaev’s leadership was relatively short-lived. After his death in June 2006 at the hands of Russian Special Forces, Dokku Umarov, a comrade of Aslan Maskhadov, became leader of the Chechen insurgency. Umarov was a comparative moderate who espoused a similar rhetoric to Basaev. Islam was an important element in his motivations, but like Basaev his concern with an Islamic themed deliverance related predominantly to the people of Chechnya and the greater Transcaucasia. Through the guidance of both foreign and domestic ideologues, Umarov began to sway towards the more radical doctrines of Islamic revolution. His close ties with the likes of Anzor Astemirov and Seif Islam led to the hardening of his rhetoric, with utterances of jihad and the duty of all Muslims to partake in such actions firmly embedding themselves in the lexicon of the Chechen militant. The appointment in March 2007 of Supyan Abdullayev, a known Salafi, as vice president of the CRI was a further step away from the diplomacy of Maskhadov. His conversion, and that of the Caucasus insurgency, was complete by October 2007:

68 Sadulaev, Abdul-Kalim – as cited in Sagramoso, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’, p. 587.

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“I am announcing to all Muslims that I am at war against the infidels under the banner of Allah. This means that I, Amir of the Caucasian Mujahideen, reject all infidel laws that have been established in this world. I reject all laws and systems that the infidels have established on the land of the Caucasus [...] I outlaw all ethnic, territorial and colonial zones named ‘North- Caucasian republics” […] We renounce all these names”69

The move towards a global ideology with a regional twang was becoming a certainty. The resistance movement known as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria appears to have perished with the death of Maskhadov and piecemeal agglomeration of power and authority by Ramzan Kadyrov in Grozny. Umarov observed this with in the same proclamation referenced above:

“We are an inseparable part of the Islamic ummah […] Today our brothers are fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Palestine […] Those who attack Muslims are our common enemies; our enemy is not only Russia, but all those who conduct war against Islam and against Muslims.70

The above statement was a precursor to the declaration of the Caucasus Emirate on 21 November 2007. Although Sadulaev had guaranteed the Islamic nature of the CRI and even went as far as to replace the position of leader from a presidency to an emir; the resistance movement had maintained certain vestiges of a western style governance. The declaration of the Caucasus Emirate was recognition of the eschewing of nationalism and secularism and the supposed unity of the Muslim people of the North Caucasus under a system of sharia, guided by an autocratic Supreme Emir. Some primary actors in the Chechen insurrection were dismayed by the proclamation. Akhmet Zakayev, the London based foreign minister of the CRI vehemently denounced Umarov for betraying the cause of independence. The response of Movladi Udugov to Zakayev’s censuring of Umarov adds insight into the thinking of the Chechen, and greater North Caucasian leadership who remain in the region. In an interview with Kavkaz Center shortly after the announcement of the Caucasus Emirate Udugov suggested that Zakayev’s status as a glorified asylum seeker in London puts him at odds with the leadership on the ground. Udugov questions the secularists of the Chechen diaspora who acknowledge the place that Islam holds but who shy away from calling for

69 Umarov, Dokku – as cited in Sagramoso, Domitilla, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’ in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 64, No. 3, p. 588-589. 70 Ibid

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authoritative adoption of Islam as a legal and social model for society. His argument centres on the rhetoric of the likes of Zakayev who advocate a secular democratic agenda as the ideology of installing an Islamic state is unpopular in the west.

“Ideology is the core of any group, organization and state. Everything else is built around this core: from policies to relations between people […] After the lapse of 16 years of our ineffectual policies, which proved to be an absolute failure, today we are still trying to come up with some logical explanation for it, while using intricate words and expressions. Stepping on the same shovel a thousandth time, we are again and again scaring each other that it will hurt even more if we take another way. After the lapse of 16 unsuccessful years of Chechen "diplomacy" they still keep suggesting to us that there are allegedly some diplomatic niches that cannot be abandoned, otherwise Russia will take them immediately and it will be even worse for us.”71

Aside from Udugov’s absolute allegiance to the ideal of an Islamic state, his rhetoric here is cutting in the face of arguments for diplomacy and maintaining a secular rhetoric. Never mind the fact that the Chechen cause discarded secularism long ago – even Kadyrov eschews secularism – the reality of the situation for Chechens since the end of the Cold War is that the West does not concern itself with the affairs of Russian domestic policy. Furthermore, the ‘war on terror’ and the actions of Chechen militants towards civilians has made their cause irredeemable in the eyes of a much of the world.

2007 was a year of dramatic change within the insurgency and in retrospect the declaration of the Caucasus Emirate appears to have been an inevitability. In July of that year Ali Taziev, leader of the Ingush jamaat, had been appointed military commander of the Caucasus Front. Anzor Astemirov, the mercurial theologian of the Yarmuk jamaat, was appointed Chairman of the sharia court.72 The Caucasus Emirate thus was also an acknowledgment of the progressive strengthening of the non-Chechen jamaats or the progressive weakening of the Chechen militancy. Whereas before Basaev aided the Kabardins, Ingush and Dagestanis in establishing and consolidating their military units; now the likes of Astemirov, Taziev and Aliaskhab Kebekov in Dagestan were crucial to the recruitment, financing and proselytising necessary to continue the struggle. Ultimately, the proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate goes far beyond Chechnya. It is in some respects a

71 Udugov, Movladi, ‘It is war for the way of life…’, Kavkaz Center, 27 June, 2008 - http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2008/06/27/9927.shtml - Accessed 13 August 2016. 72 Campana; Ratelle, ‘A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia’, p. 128.

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fallacy to claim that the Caucasus Emirate is the successor fictive state to the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. The CE represents a unification of the weakened Chechen insurgency with regional bedfellows. The participation of ideologues like Astemirov and Rasulov in the radicalisation of certain Chechen field commanders, and indeed the participation of many militants like Ali Taziev in manoeuvres under the banner of the CRI means that the development of the Chechen insurgency was greatly impacted upon by external miscreants and malcontents.

The arrival of the Caucasus Emirate further bolstered a possible recruitment drive beyond even the boundaries of the North Caucasus. The motivation for previous excursions of foreign Islamic fighters in the region was out of a fraternal defence of a beleaguered independence movement by a Muslim population against a secular central state. Now, fighters could travel to the region with the consummate ideal of trying to establish an Islamic state that eschewed ethnic boundaries and perceived western notions of nationalism, democracy, communism etc. The considerable contribution of (Aleksandr Tikhomirov) to the cause of the CE until his death in 2010 is representative of the attraction that the shift in ideology garnered beyond it’s immediate borders.73 Buryatsky was a native of the distant Republic of , as his nom de guerre suggests. Raised a Buddhist, he converted to Islam in his teens and undertook Islamic scholarship in Egypt and Kuwait.74 An ardent Salafist, Buryatsky’s greatest strength was his adeptness at exploiting the modern propaganda machine – YouTube. His sermons received an avid following from Muslims throughout the Russophone world. Furthermore, his ability to recite the Quran in Arabic bolstered his credentials as an influential and reliable ideologue.

“After the proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate, all doubts vanished. We have one Amir and one State. And the direct obligation of each Muslim today is to come out to Jihad and help the Jihad in word and property”75

73 International Crisis Group, ‘The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (II), Islam, The Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, Europe Report, No. 221 – 19 October 2012, p. 14. 74 Vatchagaev, Mairbek, ‘Killing of Said Buryatsky Unlikely to Deter North Caucasus Insurgency’, The Jamestown Foundation, March 11 2010 - http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttne ws%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=buryatsky&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=5&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36146 &tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=e0c13af3d8fb51dc770867cc538c53fe#.V8UnrpN968o - Consulted 13 August 2016 75 Buryatsky, Said – as cited in Sagramoso, Domitilla, ‘The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?’ in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 64, No. 3, p. 590.

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On the ground the announcement of the Caucasus Emirate changed little to the lives of the militants and indeed the general population. As before the jamaats continued to predominantly target officials of the local authorities. Several high ranking Russian officials were assassinated between 2007 and 2009. Colonel Anatoly Kyarov, the head of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria’s organised crime unit was killed in Nalchik. A fellow member of his brigade, Mark Metsaev, met his maker on March 7 of the same year. Of arguably greater stature, the Interior Minister of Dagestan, General Adilgerei Magomedtagirov was slain in Makhachkala on June 12, 2009. Suicide bombings also returned to the arsenal of the militants with the famed black widows (female suicide bombers) causing considerable destruction and casualty. In November 2008 twelve people were killed outside a market in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia by a female suicide bomber. Two Chechen police officers also met their end in the same manner in Grozny in June 2009.76 Russia on a whole began once more to feel the wrath of home grown Islamic militancy with the bombings of the Nevsky Express train in November 2009, which was travelling between and Moscow and killed 39; the bombings of March 2010 which resulted in 40 deaths at the hands of two simultaneous suicide bombers; and the Domododevo Airport bombing in January 2011, resulting in the deaths of 37 travellers.77 In the Autumn of 2010, the insurgents managed to inflict a pain of lesser gravity but of greater symbolic significance on the Chechen President, Ramzan Kadyrov. In August of that year, Kadyrov’s hometown of Tsenteroi was targeted by militants and 19 people perished in the attack. Then in October a gun battle broke out at the Chechen Parliament, killing three, but most significantly showing the incapacity of Kadyrov’s merciless law enforcers to thoroughly quash the insurrection with sheer brutality in his own domain.78

Recognising the correlation between economic destitution and the radicalisation of the youth of the North Caucasus, the then Russian President Dmitri Medvedev chose to split the Southern Federal District of the Russian Federation in two, creating the North Caucasus Federal District. He placed the governor of Krasnoyarsk, Aleksandr Khloponin in charge of

76 ‘Insurgency in the North Caucasus: changes in tactics in 2006-2011’, Agentura.ru, (March 2011) - http://www.agentura.ru/english/terrorism/insurgencychanges/ - Consulted 15 August 2016. 77 Aliyev, Huseyn, ‘Socio-Political and Socio-Economic Causes of Conflict Escalation in the North Caucasus’, Ethnopolitical Papers, No. 25, (June 2013), p. 7. 78 Belton, Catherine, ‘Insurgents attack parliament in Chechnya’, Financial Times, October 19, 2010 - http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cf3b1154-db46-11df-ae99-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4InuuQ9Um - Consulted August 3, 2016.

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affairs and ordered him to focus on economic reform and combatting corruption in an effort to placate the region.79 Khloponin’s appointment was generally met with praise. He was well respected as an experienced and sharp civil servant, particularly in the field of financial planning. However, his grand plan for investment and economic renewal in the region was a $15 billion project to build five ski resorts in five separate republics.80 This enterprise, while ambitious and certainly feasible in a region of greater stability, was ill suited for the purpose of preventing radicalisation. The notion that a burgeoning skiing industry could have any possible impact on the fortunes and consequent antipathy of poor, young, uneducated communities in Dagestan, Chechnya or Ingushetia is ultimately quite questionable. Even a boom in tourism would only serve to bring more wealthy targets for Islamic aggression to the region. The inefficient level of education of the workforce within the North Caucasus has been earmarked as a possible contributing factor for the lack of investment. In an effort to counter this, the Kremlin advocated a process of internal migration. The government wished to see the transfer of some 40,000 North Caucasian labourers throughout the state, with a comparative number of educated workers flowing in the opposite direction.81 It is debatable whether these endeavours had any great effect on the Caucasus Emirate. Figures for 2010 suggest that the insurgency maintained its relative success in disruption and general production of mayhem. According to Ivan Sydoruk, Deputy Prosecutor General of Russia, the North Caucasus Federal District witnessed a dramatic increase in terrorist attacks in 2010. Figures published by the Interior Ministry quote 242 law enforcement officers killed, along with 127 civilians for the year.82 Indeed, the notion of internal migration was met with emotive opposition in December 2010 when some 5,000 Russian nationalists rioted at the Kremlin, declaring that Russia was for Russians and calling for the deportation of North Caucasians from Moscow.83

For the Caucasus Emirate, 2010 authored considerable tumult. Actors of significant authority in the insurgency were either killed or captured. The death of Said Buryatsky

79 Caucasus Report, ‘Medvedev Creates New North Caucasus Federal District’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, January 20, 2010 - http://www.rferl.org/content/Medvedev_Creates_New_North_Caucasus_Federal_District/1934705.html – Consulted August 2, 2016. 80 Dzutsati, Valery, ‘Another Lost Year for the Kremlin in the North Caucasus: 2010 in Review (Part Two)’, The Jamestown Project - http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37355&no_cache=1#.V8VrWpN968o – Consulted 14 August, 2016. 81 Ibid 82 Agentura.ru, Insurgency in the North Caucasus: changes in tactics in 2006-2011’ 83 Dzutsati, Valery, ‘Another Lost Year for the Kremlin in the North Caucasus: 2010 in Review (Part 1)

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weakened the propaganda arm of the militants. Anzor Astemirov and Magomedali Vagabov, the leader of the Dagestani jamaat, also followed Buryatsky, further diminishing the strength of the leadership around Umarov.84 Moreover, Ali Taziev, leader of the Ingush jamaat was captured alive, a feat that represented a significant boon for the authorities, and one suspects further tested the unity and cohesion of the Emirate as Taziev was doubtlessly compelled to provide information on logistics of the insurgency. In a sign of things to come, the Emirate was thrown into utter disarray on 1 August 2010 when Dokku Umarov resigned his post and named another Chechen, Aslambek Vadalov, as his successor. If the insurgency had shown its prowess over the recent years and months, the true nature of its disunity became instantly apparent. Within several days Umarov had retracted his statement and bizarrely claimed his previous proclamation to having been a “fabrication.” The reality appears to have been a simple question of rolling back on the ideology of the Caucasus Emirate from the perspective of the Chechens. The ineffectual leadership that Umarov offered was, according to Yulia Latynina, encapsulated by his inability to contact his various subordinates. The mode of communication that Umarov was limited to was posting messages on internet forums and waiting for his local Emirs to respond. His position was thus consigned to that of a nominal head. He would represent the insurgency’s regional ideology, but the local leaders would maintain absolute authority over their particular jamaats. His decision to cede control to Vadalov was doubtless an effort to return to the cause of Chechen nationalism, which was ultimately greeted with ample animosity by the other jamaats.85 Whether Umarov wished to return to the Chechen-centric cause remains to be seen. What is certain is that the Dagestani and Kabardin jamaats were less than satisfied that a Chechen succeed the sitting Chechen; certainly considering Chechnya had been long superseded in terms of chief generator of violence.

Dissent in the Caucasus Emirate was the ultimate conclusion of the question over Umarov’s leadership. Three Chechen field commanders, Vadalov, Tarkhan Gaziev, and Khusein Gakaev, along with the Arab commander, Muhannad, renounced their oath of allegiance to Umarov. The obvious incapacity of Umarov to maintain any form of authority was confirmed when the rebellious commanders announced Gakaev as the new Emir of the

84 Sukhov, Ivan, ‘War on Terror: North Caucasus Federal District’, Agentura.ru, (3 September, 2010) - http://www.agentura.ru/english/terrorism/ncfd/ - Consulted 6 August 2016. 85 Latynina, Yulia, ‘Will the Real Caucasus Emir Please Stand Up’, The Moscow Times, (11 August, 2010) - https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/will-the-real-caucasus-emir-please-stand-up-551 - Consulted 15 August, 2016

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Vilayat of Nokhchicho, the Chechen jamaat of the Caucasus Emirate. Furthermore, Ahmad Zakayev, the man steadfastly maintaining (in exile) the by now chimerical Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, pledged fealty to Gakaev and announced the dissolution of his position as president with Gakaev the new recognised leader of the Chechen Insurgency.86 The fitna came to an end in July of 2011, when Gakaev and Vadalov returned to the fold. In a video posted on 25 July 2011, Umarov, bestrode either side by Vadalov and Gakaev, promised the renewal of a unified insurgency and called for the inauguration of a “new chapter” in their fight.87

"We are calling on all mujahedin in the Caucasus and in other territories so that all differences stay in the past and that all our strength, will and power is directed at attesting to the word of Allah and against our enemy."88

This episode in the history of the ongoing conflict in the region demonstrated that the stated united ideology was a fallacy. Although the vast majority of militants were motivated by the ideal of bringing about a unified Islamic state, the sheer force of the authorities had made it nigh on impossible to coordinate and indeed subjugate mutinous factions. With the deaths of key figures in early 2010 impacting greatly upon the cohesion of the insurgency, it is evident that Gakaev and Vadalov saw their true allegiance was with Chechnya and recognised the implausibility of provoking the creation of a successful Islamic state in the North Caucasus so long as the Russian forces garnered such military potency and, in propaganda terms, moral supremacy. Such sedition from the temperate authority of the central Caucasus Emirate leadership was further encapsulated in the aftermath of the capture of Ali Taziev in 2010. The capture of the leader of the Ingush faction of the Caucasus Emirate brought about a tacit return to nationalism amongst the chief combatants of the Ingush jamaat. In October of that year, the new stewards of the Ingush militancy declared that it would return to targeting North Ossetians, the familiar enemy of the Ingush, and

86 The Jamestown Foundation, ‘Can Anti-Umarov Rebel Faction Win Support Among Non-Muslims?’, (15 October, 2010) - http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttne ws%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=vadalov&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=2&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37035&t x_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=f1d9fcec62687e70e4c848e16d50ddf7#.V8V06ZN968o - Consulted 6 August, 2016. 87 Reuters, ‘Umarov Promises New Chapter in Insurgency’, The Moscow Times, (26 July, 2011) - https://themoscowtimes.com/news/umarov-promises-new-chapter-in-insurgency-8472 - Consulted 3 August, 2016 88 Umarov, Dokku – as cited by Reuters, ‘Umarov Promises New Chapter in Insurgency’, The Moscow Times, (26 July, 2011) - https://themoscowtimes.com/news/umarov-promises-new-chapter-in-insurgency-8472 - Consulted 3 August, 2016

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reduce it’s militant activities against law enforcement agencies.89

Ultimately, the true nature of the Caucasus Emirate became clear. Although there was a general coordination along ideological grounds, the CE never amounted to anything more than a fictive state, a banner under which a disparate number of militant units claim responsibility for crimes committed but in reality offers no consistent and coherent authority. Dokku Umarov was little more than a figurehead. It’s capitulation in the face of the more de jure brand in Islamic State was perhaps inescapable.

Sochi and the Counter-Insurgency

Preparation for the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014 implied a hardening of the already zealous law enforcement agencies against all sorts of miscreants, from possible jihadists to LGBT activists. Militant jihadist groups were targeted with fervour, and Salafi communities wherein such groups flourished were suppressed and harassed. Prior to this, Medvedev had advocated a more soft-power approach to Salafi communities; recognising that antagonism tended to result in radicalisation. From 2010, the general tactic was to allow peaceful Salafis express their ideals within the confines of the laws of the state. Dialogue was promoted between the Sufi and Salafi communities, particularly in Dagestan. The two chief organisations representing the rival communities spearheaded this opening of discourse. The Sufis were represented by the Spiritual Board of Muslims, while the Association of Scholars of Akhlu-Sunnah spoke for the Salafis. In a true sign that Moscow and Makhachkala were willing to sew for peace, a consummate effort to reintegrate former militants was fostered by the president of the Republic of Dagestan. These efforts led to a decrease of 15% in the number of victims of the Caucasus Emirate in Dagestan.90

However, although clear progress was being made, it was insufficient as the Kremlin feared the Winter Olympics would be targeted. Sochi 2014 was important for both the prestige of the Russian Federation, but also the internal and external advertisement that it offered the region with regards to tourism. Sochi was the showcase for a burgeoning skiing

89 Campana; Ratelle, ‘A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia’, p. 127. 90 International Crisis Group, ‘The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad?’, Crisis Group Europe Report, No. 238, (16 March, 2016), p. 5-6.

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industry Russia hoped to inaugurate. 2013 thus saw a swift return to the harassment of communities throughout the region. Efforts at rehabilitation were suspended indefinitely and the Kremlin returned to the invasive policies of surveillance of would-be jihadists and their relatives. The repression of peaceful Salafi communities returned with mass arrests and the closure of mosques, educational institutions and charities.91

Although the authorities risked radicalising communities once more, such was the veracity of their actions that they managed to suffocate the insurgency rather than necessarily radicalise, or at least those who were radicalised often absconded to Syria. Even those willing to continue their jihad in the Caucasus were crippled by the sheer paranoia that the authorities provoked in them. The surveillance was so pervasive that the militants feared that any and all electronic communications were being tracked. Furthermore, extensive infiltration of the insurgency took its toll with much of the food sent into the mountains for the militants being poisoned. Dokku Umarov himself fell victim to this tactic in August 2013, succumbing to the inflicting damage of the poison one month later.92 The atmosphere thus became one of suspicion. The fact the the Caucasus Emirate had struggled to coordinate under Medvedev’s relatively docile presidency, meant that the situation in the region prior to Sochi had made it impossible to move, let alone coordinate and recruit. Indeed, recruitment became a serious bone of contention. The fear of Russian agents infiltrating the mountain enclaves resulted in new recruits having to undergo a period of quarantine.93

Sochi represented a watershed moment for the insurgency. Despite Umarov’s demise coming a full six months prior to the games, a successor was not named until March 2014. Old threats of targeting the events fell on deaf ears. The Caucasus Emirate managed to spark some fear with the successful double suicide bombing of Volgograd in December 2013, resulting in the deaths of 34 people.94 But in reality the militants offered little in the way of disruption to Putin’s showpiece. This inability to strike at Sochi severely hurt the image of the Caucasus Emirate. Moreover, Umarov’s successor, Aliaskhab Kebekov was a theologian, not a fighter. Rather than countering the growing attraction of Islamic State, Kebekov chose

91 Ibid 92 Caucasus Report, ‘Insurgency Commanders Divulge Details Of Umarov’s Death, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, (23 July 2014) - http://www.rferl.org/content/insurgency-commanders-divulge-of-umarovs- death/25467747.html - Consulted 29 July 2016 93 International Crisis Group, ‘The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad?’, p. 6. 94 Charap, Samuel, ‘Is Russia an Outside Power in the Gulf’, Adelphi Series, Vol. 54, No. 447-448, p. 188.

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to limit the tactics of the Caucasus Emirate, by calling for an end to suicide bombings and the participation of women in the insurgency. With many angry youths ready to fight the Russians harassing their communities and families, the restriction of tactics further alienated many.95

The discord that had been fomenting in the Caucasus Emirate for many years approached its denouement towards the end of 2014. Several Dagestani militants declared allegiance to the leader of Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Chief among these was Rustam Asilderov. It should be qualified that the drift towards pledging allegiance to Islamic State was orchestrated by rebels who had never been to Syria and therefore have evidently had no specific contact, beyond through electronic communication with Islamic State. This is to say that Islamic State ostensibly has a presence in the North Caucasus, but the North Caucasus has not in the very broadest of sense been infiltrated or indeed attacked by Islamic State.96 It is the ideology rather than the state structure that is currently present in Dagestan. From this we can extrapolate that the fealty to Islamic State is as much to do with discontentment in the internal struggle as it is to an admiration of the Islamic State ideology. In general, Islamic State represents the most fundamental interpretation of the militant Salafist doctrine. But the Caucasus Emirate, and more or less the Chechen independence movement since 2004 both fall into this same category. Islamic State’s prowess in terms of propaganda and their global presence in the media makes them arguably the most attractive ideology to follow as their continued success could lead to a financial and logistical support for the insurgency in the North Caucasus. However, if their territorial integrity in the Levant is undermined in the future, it remains to be seen whether the Dagestanis or any other militants of the North Caucasus will maintain their allegiance. As we have seen before, when the brand wanes in influence, it tends to be discarded. Had the Chechen cause not been so effectively undermined by brutal counter-insurgency, then Umarov would not have perhaps declared the creation of the Caucasus Emirate.

The conflict between Kebekov and Islamic State is worth analysing purely in terms of the tactical strategy they espouse. While Kebekov’s lacklustre bloodlust does not appear to have endeared him to the angry young Muslims of his region, his rhetoric aligns very closely

95 International Crisis Group, ‘The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad?’, p. 6. 96 Baranec, Tomáš, ‘Is the North Caucasus becoming another battlefield in the global jihad?’, The Central Asia- Caucasus Analysis, (8 July, 2015) - http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13244- north-caucasus-becoming-another-battlefield-global-jihad.html - Consulted 9 June, 2016.

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with that of Al-Qaeda and the al-Nusra Front in Syria. Both groups, who until very recently were associated with one another have for some time called for an end to the targeting of Muslim civilian populations.97 This concept was central to Kebekov’s stewardship of the Caucasus Emirate. Islamic State, however, eschew such tactics by declaring those not adhering to their world view as apostates, including Sunni Muslims. In Syria itself the conflict between Al-Qaeda and Islamic State has borne witness to a dramatic split between North Caucasian militants. The split within the North Caucasian jihadists was encapsulated by the departure of Omar Shishani from Jaish al-Muhajereen wal-Ansar in favour of Islamic State. The final nail in the coffin of the Caucasus Emirate was hammered in the summer of 2015. Continuing the successful demolition of the insurgency, Kebekov was killed in April.98 His successor, Magomed Suleimanov, was despatched with even swifter aplomb by August of the same year, putting credence to the notion that it has become untenable to wage an insurgency in the region. No successor has been announced since Suleimanov’s death, which suggests that the Caucasus Emirate no longer holds any presence in the jihad of the North Caucasus, and had thoroughly been supplanted by Islamic State.

97 Joscelyn, Thomas, ‘Dagestani jihadist swears allegiance to Islamic State, invoking backlash’, The Long War Journal, (31 December, 2014) - http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/12/jihadists_in_dagesta.php - Consulted 6 May, 2016. 98 Joscelyn, Thomas, ‘Amid defections, Islamic Caucasus Emirate publicly recognizes new leader, The Long War Journal, 6 July 2015 - http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/07/amid-defections-islamic-caucasus- emirate-publicly-recognizes-new-leader.php - Consulted 5 July 2016.

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Chapter III - Syria and the Demise of the Caucasus Emirate

North Caucasians in Syria

From its inauguration in 2011, the Syrian Civil War has attracted thousands of foreign fighters seeking to play a role in the liberation of Syria from the Assad regime and create states in the image of the ideology they espouse. While some fight for independence of the Syrian state with the borders it embodied from the outset; others like the Kurds and Islamic State hold converse ideas of the creation and maintenance of new states. North Caucasian volunteers have been present from at least 2012. Although many come from the region itself, many more are from diaspora communities based in Europe and the Middle East. Some estimates place North Caucasian fighters second after non-Syrian Arab volunteers in the numbers of conscripts present.99 Consequently, the outcome of the Syrian conflict and the survival of these North Caucasian fighters could have a significant impact on the domestic politics of the Russian Federation in the coming years. Furthermore, the contacts and allegiances these fighters may cultivate will almost certainly have an impact on the insurgency in the North Caucasus, whether that pertains to military training, financing, ideological influence or a renewal of foreign recruitment to the cause similar to Chechnya in the late 1990s.

The figures for the number of foreign fighters in Syria are inconclusive, but Souleimanov puts it at 10,000.100 This appears modest but nevertheless places foreign involvement in the Syrian Civil War in a similar bracket to that of the Afghan-Arabs’ jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.101 According to an FSB report, at least 1,700 Russian citizens may have departed for Syria since 2011. The head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, has further suggested that this figure may have doubled since 2015.102 Ekaterina Sokiryanskaya has suggested that such figures have Russians in third place in terms of numerical support for insurrection in Syria. Chechens and Dagestanis are the prominent representatives of the Russian republics in the Levant. They are joined in lesser numbers by

99 Souleimanov, Emil A., ‘Globalizing Jihad? North Caucasians in the Syrian Civil War’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 21, No. 3, Fall 2014, p. 154. 100 Ibid 101 Hegghammer, Thomas, ‘The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad’, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 3, (Winter 2010-2011), p. 66. 102 Souleimanov, Emil; Petrtylova, Katarina, ‘Russia’s Policy toward the Islamic State’, Middle East Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3, (2015), p. 69.

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Ingush, Circassians, Karachais, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Bashkirs and ethnic Russians.103 The argument that many have departed from the North Caucasus to fight Russia and her allies in a different theatre of war is a salient one. In a report on the North Caucasian involvement in the Syrian quagmire, the International Crisis Group quotes a local activist who confirms that the insurgency in his locality has become so difficult to continue that one can “hope to become an Amir at best” before meeting his maker in rather short time.104 Although Chechens and Dagestanis have heretofore infrequently left their homeland to combat their old enemy, the brutality of the counter-insurgency in the region at the moment has thus led many to question the intelligence of fighting an ongoing lost cause from the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains, when one can fight alongside a myriad of nationalities in Syria, or indeed alongside Ukrainians in their pseudo-civil war.105 The demolition of the most recent leaders of the Caucasus Emirate is testament to the precarious nature of the jihad in Russia today. The added attraction to the Syrian conflict is that in conjunction with the Assad regime being Russia’s most valuable ally in the Middle East, the dictator is an Alawite Muslim and therefore an apostate to the radicals of Sunni Islam.106

The mythologising of the Chechen cause has led to the perception of Russian citizen jihadists as quite adept combatants. Whereas most foreign fighters arrive in Syria with little or no combat experience, the perception of Russian Muslims, and particularly those of the southern border region, is that they have been fighting a twenty-year war with Moscow. Therefore their recruitment is seen as particularly valuable, and Islamic State have made a point of aiming much of their propaganda at the Russian market through their arm Furat Media.107

Despite the high appraisal, most Russian speaking foreign fighters arrive in Syria without combat experience. Nevertheless, multiple high profile belligerents do indeed have a history of facing off to the . Among them is Muslim Shishani (Murat Margoshvili), commander of the Latakia based militant group Junud al-Sham. Margoshvili,

103 Souleimanov, ‘North Caucasians in the Syrian Civil War’, p. 155. 104 International Crisis Group, ‘The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad?’, p. 6 105 Walker, Shaun, ‘’We like partisan warfare.’ Chechens fighting in Ukraine – on both sides’, The Guardian, 24 July 2015 - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/chechens-fighting-in-ukraine-on-both-sides - Consulted 6 February 2016. 106 Souleimanov, ‘Globalizing Jihad? North Caucasians in the Syrian Civil War’, p. 156. 107 Europol - North Caucasian Fighters in Syria and Iraq & IS Propaganda in Russian Language – 041 Counter Terrorism & 047 EU Internet Referral Unit, The Hague – 10 November, 2015.

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an ethnic Chechen Kist from the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, fought in both Chechnya and Ingushetia during the 1990s and 2000s before arriving in Syria. He has developed a somewhat romantic persona in the eyes of many North Caucasians with some equating him to Che Guevara.108 Junud al-Sham is a small independent jamaat that has fought in parallel with larger groups like the one time Al Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front. However, the group has been significantly weakened by Russian bombings in Latakia province and desertions to Islamic State.109 Another prominent figure from the Northern Caucasus is Abdul Hakim Shishani (Rustam Azhiev), the Emir of the group Aynad al-Kavkaz. This jamaat, also based in Latakia, is comprised predominantly of Caucasian troops who have designs on returning home in order to continue their fight against the Russian state. Azhiev himself was wounded in Chechnya and after receiving treatment in Turkey was unable to re-enter the Russian Federation as the FSB had placed him on a wanted list.110

Before Islamic State became the primary recruiters in Syria of Russian citizens the vast majority of prospective mujahidin opted to join the group Jaish al-Mujariheen wal-Ansar (JMA - the Army of Emigrants and Supporters). The JMA was initially led by another Georgian Kist of the Pankisi Valley, Abu Omar al-Shishani (Tarkhan Batirashvili). The group split in 2013 when Batirashvili absconded to Islamic State, taking with him a proportion of loyal soldiers.111 Dokku Umarov’s representative in Syria, Salahuddin Shishani (Feyzulla Margoshvili) subsequently took control of the JMA but was removed from his post as a result of a leadership struggle which saw the JMA come under the command of a Saudi and subsequently ally itself to the al-Nusra Front. Batirashvili meanwhile rose up the ranks of the IS military and became the chief figure of militants from the former Soviet space. He played a commanding role in the acquisition of Anbar province in Iraq, as well as the easterly expansion of IS into Syria. The greater implication is the boon that Batirashvili afforded IS in terms of recruitment. His status as a household name in Syria, and his perceived military prowess enticed more Russian sphere militants to IS than rival militias.

108 Ali, Mohanad Hage, "Meet ISIS’ New Breed of Chechen Militants." In Al Arabiya, (August 31, 2014) - Accessed May 21, 2016. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/08/31/Meet-ISIS-new-breed- of-Chechen-Militants-.html. 109 Sokiryanskaya, Ekaterina, "Абу Мясо. Так в ИГИЛ прозвали чеченского командира, отправляющего своих бойцов на смерть." in Новая Газета, (May 11, 2016) - Accessed May 21, 2016. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/73029.html 110 Paraszczuk, Joanna, "A (Very) Short Bio of Khamza Shishani, Military Amir of Ajnad Al-Kavkaz." in From Chechnya To Syria, (January 03, 2016) - Accessed May 21, 2016. http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=24610#more-24610. 111 Atwan, Abdel Bari, Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate, (Croydon, 2015), p. 171.

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The death of Batirashvili could have a significant impact upon IS’ ability to recruit and perhaps sew disquiet amongst the ranks of current Russophone IS members. According to Vatchagaev, Chechen militants in IS are less amenable to Arab commanders and in the event that Batirashvili is replaced by an Arab, conflict could ensue. Furthermore, if Batirashvili was such a crucial element to the recruitment of his brethren to IS, his death could see a drop in enrolees who may favour fighting under an ethnic Chechen commander like Murat Margoshvili.112 In spite of commanding the propaganda war, the importance of having high ranking influential and charismatic figures when it comes to recruitment cannot be underestimated. The Syrian conflict has seen the mobilisation of a significant Chechen diaspora. The offspring of families who fled the destruction of the 1990s are now of an age to intervene and many see Syria as the ideal theatre in which they can engage Russian forces for the first time.113 Thus, the death of Batirashvili may turn out to be crucial in the dispersion of North Caucasian fighters in Syria.

Why Islamic State?

So far this paper has attempted to outline the development of militant Salafism in the North Caucasus and extrapolate how this ideology has come to supplant nationalist motivations that were once the call to arms in the immediate post-Soviet period of the early 1990s. The gradual drift towards both an Islamic identification under a somewhat superficial banner of regional unification of resources and ideologues certainly suggests that the diffusive Islamic State ideology is ripe for consumption in the North Caucasus. However, spikes in nationalist fervour as witnessed in Chechnya and Ingushetia in 2010, along with the continued participation of non-IS Islamo-nationalists of North Caucasian ethnicity in the conflict in Syria, hints at a far more nuanced picture that does not necessarily lend the militants, let alone the region as a whole, to overt fidelity to the global cause of Islamic State. So the question is, to what extent is the developing relationship between Raqqa and clandestine

112 Vatchagaev, Mairbek, "Death of Top Chechen IS Commander May Change the Face of the Syrian Insurgency", The Jamestown Foundation, (March 11, 2016) - Accessed May 21, 2016. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45196. 113 Sokiryanskaya, Ekaterina, "Абу Мясо. Так в ИГИЛ прозвали чеченского командира, отправляющего своих бойцов на смерть." in Новая Газета, (May 11, 2016) - Accessed May 21, 2016.

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elements of the North Caucasian insurgency about operative pragmatism or devotion to the cause at hand?

At the risk of stating the obvious, the primary attraction to the Islamic State in the North Caucasus is on the basis of religion. In interviews with the International Crisis Group, pro-IS respondents from the North Caucasus stated that their chief motivation for absconding to Syria and joining IS was related to the creation of a type of utopic Islamist state. The report suggests that cultural sympathies to the notions of grand eschatological events aligns the regions’ Islamists with the similar world view held by Islamic State leaders.114 One of the primary obsessions of the central Levant based leaders of the Islamic State is the belief that the armies of “Rome” will be brought to their knees at Dabiq, a small town near the Turkish border in Syria. Rome in this instance is believed to be the armies of the Western powers and the Muslim polities who buttress their endeavours.115 However, it is the definition of Islamic State as the new Caliphate that offers the most compelling religious argument for the militants, and of course the youth of the North Caucasus, in offering their sword to Raqqa. Notions of individual obligations to defend the Caliphate (fard’ayn) and fraternity with Sunni Muslims in both Syria and Iraq who are deemed to be subjugated by Shia and Alawite regimes in these countries further bolsters the IS call to arms. Moreover, the utopian dream that the Caliphate represents offers a sense of adventure and escapism from the hardship of life for many in the North Caucasus. According to a Novaya Gazeta expert on Chechnya: “If you are not related to the ruling clan, you can’t have a dignified life. They go into the Caliphate to start a new life.”116 Escapism is thus a driving force.

Here is where the effective propaganda of the Islamic State plays a significant role. While the geographical expansion of IS since its inception hints at a certain degree of military excellence; it is in its media department where IS truly comes into its own. Moving away from the sermonising of Bin Laden and Zawahiri, IS have focused their propaganda on a mixture of action, threats and a certain form of domestic bliss. Highly proficient editing of videos depicting bloody confrontations between IS forces and their enemies, along with brutal executions have served to enhance recruitment from Sunni communities throughout the globe. Moreover, propaganda films depicting effective social services like health care,

114 International Crisis Group, ‘The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad?’, p. 24 115 Stern, Jessica; Berger, J.M., ISIS: The State of Terror, (New York, 2015), p. 205 116 International Crisis Group, ‘The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad?’, p. 25

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nursing homes and schools paint the domain of IS as a destination for entire families to abscond to.117

Arguably this is the greatest strength of the IS propaganda machine. While the films of brutality may appeal to a younger demographic with a certain bloodlust, it is the depictions of a working society with the perception of equality in its governance and social order that is most attractive to North Caucasian militants. IS paints itself as the successful embodiment of the Salafist state. Its inherent design as a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, multi-national population that cooperate and are in the process of building a state based on equality, social justice and religious purity understandably appeals to a marginalised youth in Dagestan, Chechnya and beyond. With surveillance and repression a daily reality for peaceful Salafi communities in the North Caucasus, it is little wonder that IS have a growing audience in the Southern Russian border. The work of Aurélie Campana and Jean-François Ratelle on the sociological diffusion of conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan highlights this reality. From conducting interviews with young Dagestani men of the Salafist trend (aged 18 to 25), Ratelle concluded that their faith was the one avenue believed to offer an escape from the daily reality of repressive security services, unemployment and corruption in the region.118 Ratelle was himself subjected to harassment from law enforcement agents while conducting fieldwork in Dagestan solely for his association with these “Wahhabi” communities. Ultimately, the attraction to IS in both supplanting the Caucasus Emirate domestically, and motivating the adventurous and the downtrodden alike to migrate to the Levant primarily stems from an exasperated disconnection with the central state. As Campana and Ratelle quite adeptly summarise:

“Most of the participants in the insurgency in Dagestan have not become insurgents because they supported the idea of global jihad and Salafism, views that are generally held by brokers associated with diffusion of the conflict. Instead, young people in Dagestan have slowly and incrementally adopted this ideology as a reaction to harassment and the absence, in their opinion, of other possible solutions.”119

117 Byman, Daniel, ‘Understanding Islamic State – A Review Essay’, International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4, (2016), p. 147. 118 Campana; Ratelle, ‘A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia’, p. 124. 119 Ibid

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What next for the Nomadic North Caucasians?

The question now is to what extent the Russian Federation could be threatened by the conglomeration of these combatants, particularly in the event of a finality of hostilities in the Levant? The reality is that a number of factors preclude a resurgence of insurrection in Russia on the basis of returning dissenters from Syria. First and foremost is the fact that the Syrian conflict has been for quite some time an utter quagmire, or war of attrition that is nowhere near reaching a conclusion. Russian intervention on the side of Assad served to reinforce Assad’s positions and reinvigorate the Syrian Army. However, they remain far from capable of mounting a significant assault against their rivals, which ultimately means that the conflict will perpetuate for the foreseeable future. Even in the event of a coherent and workable peace process being put into place, several key actors have not been invited to the table. So even if accord was to be reached between the “moderates” and Assad, militant Salafism would prevail as Raqqa will not be sending any delegates.

Even beyond the unlikely event of armistice and ultimate conciliation, the nature of the conviction of these foreign fighters must be understood before one posits an inaccuracy that they stand for a nationalist cause. Although some like Murat Margoshvili have expressed a desire to return to their homeland in order to liberate and install their system of society; the reality is that for many they now fight for a transnational movement that although does not preclude liberating one’s terra firma, it does place the onus of their cause on a collective allegiance to their Muslim kin rather than their geographical place of birth. The history of the Islamic Brigades has shown that fighters tend to remain combatants even after achieving their goals in a certain land. While they should not be considered mercenaries, as they fight for an ideology rather than monetary gain, they nevertheless represent a sort of professional soldier that follows the wave of the movement. Those who fought in Afghanistan in the late 1980s continued their war throughout the 1990s in places like Sudan, Bosnia and Tajikistan. 120 For those who choose not to continue their jihad, the likelihood of returning to the Northern Caucasus or Central Asia after the conflict is nevertheless improbable. Considering the paranoia that many states live under with respect to the return of transnational rebels to their homelands, it is reasonable to assume that many returnees will be arrested on the grounds of

120 Moore, Cerwyn, ‘Foreign Bodies: Transnational Activism, the Insurgency in the North Caucasus and “Beyond”’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 27, No. 3, (2015) p. 399.

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sponsoring or partaking in international terrorism. Furthermore, having spent a number of years in a foreign land, many foreign fighters will have cultivated roots in their adopted home and would be more than likely reticent of departing.121

121 Souleimanov; Petrtylova, ‘Russia’s Policy toward the Islamic State’, p. 70.

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Conclusion

The study of history has a tendency to gravitate towards conflict and at times eschews the societal analyses that is paramount in addressing the causes of conflicts, particularly those of lesser global significance. Undoubtedly there is a greater market for tomes that discuss the more sanguine periods of our past, and the Northern Caucasus is no exception to this rule. While there are many fine scholars such as Roland Dannreuther, Emil Souleimanov, Alexander Knysh, Domitilla Sagramoso, Aurélie Campana and Jean-Francois Ratelle to name but a few who have attempted to forward the argument that radicalisation in the Northern Caucasus is as much, if not more, a result of social and political neglect of a significant population; many diatribes have steadfastly argued that foreign Islamic investment and expeditions to Chechnya in the 1990s and early 2000s have been a primary factor in the demise of regional nationalism in favour of global Islamism. Paul Murphy,122 Yossef Bodansky123 and Gordon Hahn124 have each overstated international links to radical jihadist networks to explain the collapse of nationalism in favour of fanatical Salafism in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus on a whole. Indeed, Murphy positions himself very much in the “war on terror” camp in The Wolves of Islam (2004) by his use of a Saudi, Ibn al-Khattab, rather than a Chechen for the dust cover of a publication ostensibly analysing Chechen terrorism.

Of course it is far from inaccurate to highlight the role played by international actors in the Chechen struggle, particularly with respect to the Second Chechen War. However, it is ultimately misleading and far from constructive to advance a narrative that suggests a nefarious hijacking of the Chechen struggle by surreptitious foreign bodies and states. It is unquestionable that the the arrival of the mujahideen in Chechnya in late 1994, early 1995 contributed to the ambling towards a Salafist-jihadist gambit. However, without having a significant population open to the adoption of a literal interpretation of the teachings of the Quran, and the ultimate implementation of the tenets of sharia, the foreign volunteers modelled on the Azzam brigades would have received a short-lived welcome, as was the case

122 Murphy, Paul, The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terrorism (Dulles, 2004) 123 Bodansky, Yossef, Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Training Ground and the Next Wave of Terror, (New York, 2007) 124 Hahn, The Caucasus Emirate Mujahideen: Global Jihadism in Russia’s North Caucasus and Beyond

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in Bosnia until the Dayton Accords of 1995.125 The common narrative placing the onus on outside influence appeals solely to the various leaders whose authority and general competence could be called into question if said radicalisation was overtly voiced as a result of deficient domestic political and social policy. Indeed, Vladimir Putin happily boarded the post 9 / 11 bandwagon that proclaimed every aberration of insurrection under the banner of Islam as being intrinsically part of the ludicrous and indefensibly ambiguous global “war on terror”.126 This afforded him a brief period of affinity with Western powers, and arguably a less scrupulous international press regarding the malpractice of Russian forces in Chechnya, while simultaneously ignoring both the Kremlin’s responsibility for allowing unrest to foment and paying no heed to historical grievances that have consistently served to inflame sentiment against the central authorities.

The aim of this paper was to track the development of a localised Salafism in the North Caucasus, whose roots can be traced back to before the period of perestroika which opened up the region to foreign investment and consequently foreign ideologies. The emergence of Islamic State in the Northern Caucasus in 2014 was a culmination of a gradual radicalisation of minority communities in the district of the Russian Southern border. While one must acknowledge the role played by foreign actors in the demise of regional and national identities that have led to the development of a fealty to Islamic State in Dagestan, Chechnya and beyond, the agency of these malcontents and the local realities that brought about such a digression must be acknowledged. Ultimately, the presence of radical Islam in the Northern Caucasus is not as a result of a preponderance to religious zealotry. Societal ills have fed the radicalisation of North Caucasian youths. In the words of the Dutch anthropologist and sociologist, Peter Kloos:

“Ethnic movements in an age of globalization … may bypass the state and turn to transnational regimes for support: ethnic movements, however localized opt for global strategies in their quest for identity, seeking support beyond the boundaries of the state that frustrates them … In this view, localization, or the rise of local, and often ethnic identities within the boundaries of a state … is supported and occasionally even triggered by its apparent counterpart globalization.”127

125 Kepel, Gilles, ‘The origins and development of the Jihadist movement: from anti-communism to terrorism’, Asian Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2, (2003), p.100 126 Cornell, Svante E., ‘The War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: A Case for Distinction’, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 2003, Vol.2, No. 2, (2013), p. 168. 127 Winslow, Donna; Moelker, René; Companjen, Françoise, ‘Glocal Chechnya from Russian sovereignty to pan-Islamic autonomy’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 24, No. 1, (2013), p. 130.

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Glossary of Abbreviations

CE – Caucasus Emirate CRI – Chechen Republic of Ichkeria JMA – Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar IRP – Islamic Rennaissance Party IS – Islamic State

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