The Rise of Islamic State in the North Caucasus: Co-Opting a Global Movement Or Revolutionary Pragmatism?

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Rise of Islamic State in the North Caucasus: Co-Opting a Global Movement Or Revolutionary Pragmatism? The Rise of Islamic State in the North Caucasus: Co-opting a Global Movement or Revolutionary Pragmatism? MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam Author: Colm Fitzpatrick Student No: 11104503 Main Supervisor: Prof. Michael Kemper Second Supervisor: Dr. Erik Van Ree Table of Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 Chapter I – Salafism in the Post-Soviet North Caucasus ..................................................... 4 Dagestan ................................................................................................................................ 5 Chechnya and Ingushetia ..................................................................................................... 8 Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia ............................................................... 9 The First War ...................................................................................................................... 11 The Second War .................................................................................................................. 14 Chapter II: Towards a Global Doctrine .............................................................................. 18 Radicalising the “Moderates” ............................................................................................ 18 Imarat Kavkaz ..................................................................................................................... 25 Sochi and the Counter-Insurgency .................................................................................... 34 Chapter III - Syria and the Demise of the Caucasus Emirate ........................................... 38 North Caucasians in Syria .................................................................................................. 38 Why Islamic State? ............................................................................................................. 41 What next for the Nomadic North Caucasians? ................................................................ 44 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 46 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 48 Glossary of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... 54 Introduction On 20 December 2014, a video was posted to YouTube in which Rustam Asilderov and Arsanali Kambulatov, two leading members of the Dagestani Vilayat of the regional militant group the Caucasus Emirate (CE) declared a bayat (oath) to the leader of the Islamic State (IS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.1 On the surface, the departure of these two figures from the ever weakening Caucasus Emirate represented a dramatic shift in the direction of the group. Although the CE espoused a similar world view to that of the IS, the decision of the Dagestani duo to pledge allegiance to a foreign head of state finally confirmed the capitulation of the local agenda of the Islamist militants of the North Caucasus in favour of alignment with a global revolutionary movement pollinating from Syria and Iraq. In reality this action was far from surprising. Since the outbreak of civil war in Syria, North Caucasian militants have flocked to fight for the myriad of Islamist militias and armies in situ, eschewing the domestic jihad for which the CE embodied. Their presence in the Levant has considerably bolstered the military prowess of the factions for whom they fight and in some instances lead. Islamic State is no exception to this. Until his death in March 2016, Tarkhan Batirashvili (better known as Omar al-Shishani), an ethnic Chechen from the Pankisi Valley in Georgia, was a senior commander in IS. His presence acted as a lightning rod for new recruits from the Russian speaking world, particularly for those fleeing persecution in the North Caucasus. Many combatants and prospective warriors have left the Russian Federation for Syria, ultimately crippling the recruitment capacity of the CE. This is in part due to the considerably successful counterinsurgency embarked upon by the Russian authorities over the past decade The paramount nature of security for the 2014 Sochi Olympics resulted in a heavy crackdown of any possible miscreants and malcontents in the region. The law enforcement has since made a concerted effort to remove the head of the snake as soon as it slithers out from its brumation. The death of the first Emir of the CE, Dokku Umarov, in late 2013 considerably affected the militant group’s already waning organisation. His successor, Aliaskhab Kebekov 1 Vatchagaev, Mairbek, ‘The Islamic State Is Set to Replace the Caucasus Emirate in the North Caucasus’, The Jamestown Foundation, (8 January 2015) - http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43246&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid% 5D=786&no_cache=1#.V8Zr4JN968o - Consulted 8 July 2015 1 did not command the same authority as Umarov. His moderate stance on civilian casualties did not sit well with the more hard-line elements in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. The assassination of both Kebekov and his successor, Magomed Suleimanov, in the spring and summer of 2015 brought the CE to it’s knees.2 In June of 2015, the Islamic State announced the establishment of the governorate in the North Caucasus, effectively usurping the mantel of the CE and confirming that the militancy of the region is now but a minor theatre in a larger war.3 Of course the argument could be made that the since adoption of the militant Salafist ideology, the insurgency in the North Caucasus has always been but a small fish in a big pond. The CE itself espoused a fairly analogous philosophy as IS does now. The inauguration of the Caucasus Emirate was a result of the gradual inclination towards Salafi teachings amongst a minority of the Islamic communities of the North Caucasus over several decades. Salafism offered a rejection of modern society, a revolutionary ideology that saw both Communism and market economy Capitalism as being ill conceived for human consumption. For Russia, perestroika did not solely open the gates for sedition and irredentism, it also provided greater access to the teachings of the Quran and investment from the Gulf states which bolstered a burgeoning religious revival. The impact of the two wars fought for the soul of Chechnya in the 1990s and early 2000s was consequential. Animosity towards the Salafi communities had already long existed, before the authorities began to harshly crack down on their proselytising activities. Moderate and influential ideologues who once shunned any notions of jihad like Yasin Rasulov and Anzor Astemirov became heavily ingrained in the development of militant Salafism in a backlash against state sponsored brutality. These “renovationist” characters held great sway over their youthful compatriots and their participation in both the struggle for Chechnya and later the Caucasus Emirate enhanced recruitment and gave theological legitimacy to the cause.4 2 Jocelyn, Thomas, ‘New Leader of Islamic Caucasus Emirate Killed by Russian Forces’, The Long War Journal, (11 August, 2015) - http://www.longwarjournal.org/archive/2015/08/new-leader-of-islamic-caucasus- emirate-killed-by-russian-forces.php - Consulted September 15, 2016. 3 Gambhir, Harleen, ‘ISIS Declares Governorate in Russia’s North Caucasus Region, Institute for the Study of War, (June 23, 2015) – http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-declares-governorate-russia’s-north - caucasus-region– Consulted September 15, 2016. 4 Kurbanov, Ruslan, ‘‘Urban’ and ‘Rural’ Islam in the Caucasus: Modernisation versus Conservation’, Religion, State and Society, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, (2011), p. 351. 2 There is an argument that external investment and the participation of the foreign fighters in the defence of Chechnya is primarily responsible for the delineation from nationalist interests in the region since the early 2000s. This paper will not be arguing such a position. The purpose of this paper is to outline why the global reactionary ideology that the Islamic State embodies has found a particularly potent following in the Northern Caucasus in recent years, much to the detriment of the regionalist movement it has supplanted. It will trace the development of Salafism in the chief republics linked to the violent insurrection against the Russian state and her allies. The diatribe that will be advanced positions the adoption of the IS ideology by Asilderov and his cohorts as both revolutionary pragmatism and co-opting a global movement. The structure and resources of the Caucasus Emirate in the face of an adversary of considerable strength and unnerving ruthlessness meant that it was always going to be ill equipped to fight the long fight. The Islamic State boasts a command of the strategy of propaganda heretofore never seen nor exploited to such an extent. North Caucasians are at the heart of this organisation and therefore it was inevitable that the flag of the IS would fly above Dagestan and Chechnya someday. 3 Chapter I – Salafism in the Post-Soviet North Caucasus The simplistic view of the development of Salafism and the parallel adoption of the notions of jihad in the North Caucasus has too often predominantly been attributed to
Recommended publications
  • Editions De L'universite De Bruxelles
    EDITIONS DE L'UNIVERSITE DE BRUXELLES Ordres et désordres au Caucase EDITE PAR AUDE MERLIN SILVIA SERRANO DANS LA MEME COLLECTION Sport et Union européenne, édité par Jean-Michel DeWaele et Alexandre Hustîng, 2001 Les fédérations européennes de partis, édité par Pascal Delwit, Erol Kùlahci et Cédric Van de Walle, 2001 Un diagnostic géopolitique de l'Europe du centre, Nicolas Bârdos-Féltoronyi, 2001 Fascistes, communistes, paysans. Sociologie des mobilisations identitaires roumaines (1921-1989), Antoine Roger, 2002 Libéralïsmes et partis libéraux en Europe, édité par Pascal Delwit, 2002 Le parti social chrétien. Mutations et perspectives ?, édité par Pascal Delwit, 2002 Démocraties chrétiennes et conservatismes en Europe. Une nouvelle convergence ?, édité par Pascal Delwit, 2003 La Pologne et l'intégration européenne, édité par Jean-Michel De Waele, 2003 Le gouvernement des colonies, regards croisés franco-britanniques, Véronique Dimier, 2004 Les partis politiques roumains après 1989, Sorîna Soare, 2004 Les clivages politiques en Europe centrale et orientale, édité par Jean-Michel De Waele, 2004 Expertise et action publique, édité par Steve Jacob et Jean-Louis Genard, 2004 Les systèmes électoraux aux présidentielles et aux législatives, Thanassis Diamantopoulos, 2004 Social Democracy in Europe, edited by Pascal Delwit, 2005 European Union accession référendums, edited by Jean-Michel De Waele, 2005 Parlement puissant, électeurs absents ? Les élections européennes de juin 2004, édité par Pascal Delwit et Philippe Poirier, 2005 Les partis régionalistes en Europe. Des acteurs en développement ?, édité par Pascal Delwit, 2005 Sport, politiques et sociétés en Europe centrale et orientale, édité par Jean-Michel De Waele et Alexandre Husting, 2005 Faire et vivre le postcommunisme.
    [Show full text]
  • Caucasus Emirates
    Caucasus Emirates The threats against the 2014 Winter Olympics put a spotlight on the Caucasus Emirates, a separatist Islamic extremist group in the Russian Federation loosely aligned with Al Qaeda. Although the Emirates’ purported primary aim is to create a state independent of Russia, its increased incorporation of extremist ideology and anti-Semitism into its mission heighten its inclination for acts of terrorism, while providing fodder for its growth. Founded in 2007 by Doku Umarov, former president of a self-proclaimed Chechen secessionist government, the Caucasus Emirates serves as an umbrella group for a number of smaller extremist and separatist organizations operating out of the Caucasus area, which includes Chechnya and Dagestan. Its stated goal is to create an independent Islamist theocracy in the Muslim-populated areas of Russia. The organization brought together a number of independent groups that had been fighting Russia for independence for decades, but whose leadership had been largely decimated by Russian forces. Although it was founded in 2007, the only emerged as a more active organization with a series of claimed attacks between 2009 and 2011. These attacks included a June 2009 sniper attack on the Dagestan Ministry of the Interior that resulted in three deaths; a September 2009 suicide bombing in Makhachkala, Dagestan that resulted in twelve deaths; the bombing of a train that resulted in 27 deaths and 100 injuries; a March 2010 bomb of the Moscow metro that resulted in 40 deaths and 100 injuries; an August 2010 attack by 60 militants 1 / 4 on a Chechen village that resulted in 6 deaths and 24 injuries; and a January 2011 bombing of the Domodedovo airport in Moscow that resulted in 37 deaths and 180 injuries.
    [Show full text]
  • ON the EFFECTIVE USE of PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 © 2021 Andrew Peek All Rights Reserved
    ON THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 2021 Andrew Peek All rights reserved Abstract This dissertation asks a simple question: how are states most effectively conducting proxy warfare in the modern international system? It answers this question by conducting a comparative study of the sponsorship of proxy forces. It uses process tracing to examine five cases of proxy warfare and predicts that the differentiation in support for each proxy impacts their utility. In particular, it proposes that increasing the principal-agent distance between sponsors and proxies might correlate with strategic effectiveness. That is, the less directly a proxy is supported and controlled by a sponsor, the more effective the proxy becomes. Strategic effectiveness here is conceptualized as consisting of two key parts: a proxy’s operational capability and a sponsor’s plausible deniability. These should be in inverse relation to each other: the greater and more overt a sponsor’s support is to a proxy, the more capable – better armed, better trained – its proxies should be on the battlefield. However, this close support to such proxies should also make the sponsor’s influence less deniable, and thus incur strategic costs against both it and the proxy. These costs primarily consist of external balancing by rival states, the same way such states would balance against conventional aggression. Conversely, the more deniable such support is – the more indirect and less overt – the less balancing occurs.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian-Speaking
    NOVEMBER 2017 ‘RUSSIAN-SPEAKING’ FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, IRAQ AND AT HOME: CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXT FULL REPORT Mark Youngman and Dr Cerwyn Moore Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies Department of Political Science and International Studies University of Birmingham This report was produced out of the Actors and Narratives programme, funded by CREST. To find out more information about this programme, and to see other outputs from the team, visit the CREST website at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/actors-and-narratives/ About the authors: Mark Youngman is an ESRC-funded doctoral student and Cerwyn Moore a Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Birmingham. Disclaimer: This report has been part funded by an ESRC IAA award and part funded by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (ESRC Award: ES/N009614/1). It draws on the existing work of the authors, and supplements their work with original research and ongoing data collection of Russian-speaking foreign fighters.www.crestresearch.co.uk The cover image, Caucasus Emirate, is a remixed derivative ofProposed divisions of the Caucasus Emirate by ArnoldPlaton, under CC BY-SA 3.0. Caucasus Emirate is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. by R. Stevens, CREST. ©2017 CREST Creative Commons 4.0 BY-NC-SA licence. www.crestresearch.ac.uk/copyright CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................4 PART I: ASSESSING THE ‘RUSSIAN-SPEAKING’
    [Show full text]
  • APT28: a Window Into Russia's Cyber Espionage Operations? | Fireeye
    SPECIAL REPORT APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS? SECURITY REIMAGINED APT 28: A Window into Russia’s Cyber Espionage Operations? CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 APT28 TARGETING REFLECTS RUSSIAN INTERESTS ........................................................................................................................................................................ 6 APT28 interest in the Caucasus, Particularly Georgia ........................................................................................................................................................... 7 APT28 Targeting of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) ....................................................................................... 8 APT28 Targeting of the Georgian Ministry of Defense ....................................................................................................................................... 9 APT28 Targeting a Journalist Covering the Caucasus ...................................................................................................................................... 10 APT28’s Other Targets in the Caucasus ......................................................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Caucasian Review of International Affairs (CRIA) Is a Quarterly Peer-Reviewed, Non- Profit and Only-Online Academic Journal Based in Germany
    CCCAUCASIAN REVIEW OF IIINTERNATIONAL AAAFFAIRS Vol. 4 (((3(333)))) sssummersummer 2020201020 101010 EU DEMOCRACY PROMOTION THROUGH CONDITIONALITY IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD JANINE REINHARD EU ENGAGEMENT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN GEORGIA : TOWARDS A MORE PROACTIVE ROLE MEHMET BARDAKÇI RELIGION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS : A CASE STUDY OF 2008 RUSSIAN -GEORGIAN WAR INES -JACQUELINE WERKNER FROM RACKETEER TO EMIR : A POLITICAL PORTRAIT OF DOKU UMAROV , RUSSIA ’S MOST WANTED MAN KEVIN DANIEL LEAHY THE CRISIS OF GAZPROM AS THE CRISIS OF RUSSIA ’S “E NERGY SUPER -STATE ” POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION ANDREY KAZANTSEV EURASIAN BARGAINING , AGRICULTURE , AND THE DOHA ROUND SARITA D. JACKSON WAS KOSOVO ’S SPLIT -OFF LEGITIMATE ? BACKGROUND , MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ICJ’ S ADVISORY OPINION HEIKO KRUEGER UKRAINE : A CHALLENGE FOR U.S., EU & NATO REGIONAL POLICY TAMERLAN VAHABOV ISSN: 1865-6773 www.cria -online.org EDITORIAL BOARD: Dr. Tracey German (King’s College Dr. Robin van der Hout (Europa-Institute, London, United Kingdom) University of Saarland, Germany) Dr. Andrew Liaropoulos (Institute for Dr. Jason Strakes (Analyst, Research European and American Studies, Greece) Reachback Center East, U.S.) Dr. Martin Malek (National Defence Dr. Cory Welt (George Washington Academy, Austria) University, U.S.) INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD: Prof. Hüseyin Bagci , Middle East Prof. Werner Münch , former Prime Technical University, Ankara, Turkey Minister of Saxony-Anhalt, former Member of the European Parliament, Germany Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich, University of Vienna, Austria Prof. Elkhan Nuriyev , Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies under the Prof. Edmund Herzig , Oxford University, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan UK Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam As a Tool of the Kremlin?
    Notes de l’Ifri Russie.Nei.Visions 99 Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin? Marlène LARUELLE March 2017 Russia/NIS Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the few French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European and broader international debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. This text is published with the support of DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) under “Observatoire Russie, Europe orientale et Caucase”. ISBN: 978-2-36567-681-6 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2017 How to quote this document: Marlène Laruelle, “Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin?”, Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 99, Ifri, March 2017. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15—FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00—Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Ifri-Bruxelles Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 1000—Brussels—BELGIUM Tel.: +32 (0)2 238 51 10—Fax: +32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Russie.Nei.Visions Russie.Nei.Visions is an online collection dedicated to Russia and the other new independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan).
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Looming Crisis
    FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE Russia’s Looming Crisis By David Satter Russia’s Looming Crisis By David Satter March 2012 About FPRI - - - Founded in 1955 by Ambassador Robert Strausz Hupé, FPRI is a non partisan,- non profit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests. In the tradition of Strausz Hupé, FPRI embraces history and geography to illuminate foreign policy challenges facing the United States. In 1990, FPRI established the Wachman Center to foster civic and international literacy in the community and in the classroom. FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 19102-3684 Tel. 215-732- -732-4401 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610 • Philadelphia, PA 3774 • Fax 215 Email [email protected] • Website: www.fpri.org Table of Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 1. The Political Situation ........................................................................................................ 3 The Control of the Election Process ............................................................................................ 4 The Economic Key to Putin’s Political Success ....................................................................... 5 A Political Charade ............................................................................................................................ 6 An Election Fraud .............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Volume VIII, Issue 27 JULY 8, 2010
    VOLUME VIII, ISSUE 27 u JULY 8, 2010 IN THIS ISSUE: BRIEFS...................................................................................................................................1 JIHADI VIEWS ON GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL’s RESIGNATION By Abdul Hameed Bakier.........................................................................................3 PKK INTENSIFIES VIOLENCE TO BRING TURKEY INTO CONFRONTATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION Members of PKK By Emrullah Uslu..............................................................................................................4 SALAFI-JIHADIS AND THE NORTH CAUCASUS: IS THERE A NEW PHASE OF WAR Terrorism Monitor is a publication IN THE MAKING? of The Jamestown Foundation. By Murad Batal al-Shishani....................................................................................6 The Terrorism Monitor is designed to be read by policy- makers and other specialists yet be accessible to the general public. The opinions expressed within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of The Jamestown DEFIANT AQIM CHALLENGES NEW REGIONAL COUNTERTERRORIST Foundation. COMMAND WITH DEADLY CROSS-BORDER RAID Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) answered the formation of a Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of this or any multinational counterterrorism center in the southern Algerian town of Jamestown publication is strictly Tamanrasset by ambushing a patrol of Algerian border gendarmes close to Tin prohibited by law. Zaouatine, roughly 40 km from the border with Mali
    [Show full text]
  • Speaking of Suicide Bombers, I Stumbled Across
    Understanding Suicide Terrorist Bombings in Russia PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 155 May 2011 Mark Kramer Harvard University Suicide terrorist bombings have been a frequent phenomenon in Russia over the past decade. The large majority of these attacks have occurred in the North Caucasus— particularly Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia—but many such bombings have also been perpetrated in Moscow, including the powerful explosion inside the international arrivals hall of Domodedovo Airport in January 2011 that killed 37 people and wounded some 180. What lies behind these attacks? Generalizations about the motives of a large group of people are always hazardous, no more so than in this case. Except in the relatively few instances when attempted suicide bombings have been unsuccessful and the would-be attackers have not been killed by security forces, the perpetrators of suicide bombings are not around to reveal why they acted as they did. Some, but not all, of the suicide terrorists in Russia leave video recordings or notes that explain why they took such drastic action. But even when attackers’ posthumous testimony is available, it is often incomplete, deceptive, or obfuscatory. The testimony can be valuable, but in many cases it gives no more than a rough idea of why the attackers wanted to kill and die for their cause. Despite the difficulties of assessing the motives of suicide terrorists in Russia, a few points can be stated with certainty. First, nearly all of the attackers have been of North Caucasus origin or working with terrorist groups based in the North Caucasus. Second, since late 2007 the majority of suicide bombers have been from Dagestan and Ingushetia, although a considerable number of such attacks have still been perpetrated by Chechens.
    [Show full text]
  • 'Muhajirun' from Austria. Why They Left to Join ISIS and Why They Don't Return
    Spring 2020 Nr. 22 ISSN: 2363-9849 ‘Muhajirun’ from Austria. Why they left to join ISIS and why they don’t return. Veronika Hofingera1, Thomas Schmidingerb aScientific Management, Institute for the Sociology of Law and Criminology (IRKS), bLecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Vienna Abstract Article History After the proclamation of the so-called Islamic State in June 2014 thousands of Received Feb 18, 2020 Europeans, including hundreds of Austrian residents, went to fight and live with Accepted Mar 23, 2020 ISIS or other extremist groups in Syria or Iraq. Austria is one of the European countries with the highest per-capita share of foreign fighters. The article gives a Published Mar 27, 2020 broad overview of the situation in Austria: Who are the different groups relevant in this field? How did young people who grew up in Austria become radicalised, and what is their current status? The data from two Austrian commissioned research projects and one EU-funded project are supplemented by the findings of recent research in northern Syria focusing on the current situation of Austrian foreign fighters and their families and supporters in the region. Keywords: Foreign Fighters, ISIS, Islamic State, Austria, Syria, radicalisation Introduction ISIS and other jihadist groups use an old Arabic term for migrant, ‘Muhajirun’, to refer to those who migrated to the ‘Islamic State’ or to other jihadi-controlled territory in Syria. In the self-conception of male and female activists, this term covers both armed foreign fighters, their wives, and various civilian supporters of jihadist groups. The region still has those Muhajirun who did not die in combat or return to Europe, many are detained by Iraqi, Syrian, or Kurdish forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Republic of Tatarstan 15 I
    1 CONTENTS ABOUT AUTHORS 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 INTRODUCTION 10 THE REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN 15 I. POLITICAL ELITE 15 1. Vertical power structure 19 2. Governance model during the period of the President M. Shaimiev 20 3. Governance model during the period of the President R. Minnikhanov 22 4. Security forces as part of a consolidated project 27 5. Export of elites 28 II. PRESERVATION OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY 30 1.The Tatar national movement 30 2. The Russian national movement 34 3. Language policy in Tatarstan 37 4. Results of post-Soviet language policy 47 5. Conclusion 50 THE REPUBLIC OF DAGESTAN 51 I. DAGESTAN ELITES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 51 1. Birth of «clans» 53 2. Adaptation to the growing influence of Moscow 56 3. Mukhu Aliev: attempt to be equidistant from clans 58 4. Elite and the Caucasus Emirate 62 5. Return of the «levashintsy» and attempt at a civil dialogue 64 6. First attempt to eliminate clans 66 II. «EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE» 70 III. PRESERVATION OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY 79 1. National movements and conflicts 79 2. Preservation of national languages 82 3. Conclusion 91 FINAL CONCLUSIONS 93 2 ABOUT AUTHORS Dr. Ekaterina SOKIRIANSKAIA is the founder and director at Conflict analysis and prevention center. From 2011 to 2017, she served as International Crisis Group’s Russia/North Caucasus Project Director, supervising the organisation’s research and advocacy in the region. From 2008-2011, Sokirianskaia established and supervised the work of Human rights Center Memorial’s regional offices in Kabardino-Balkariya and Dagestan. Before that, from 2003-2008 Sokirianskaia was permanently based in Ingushetia and Chechnya and worked as a researcher and projects director for Memorial and as an assistant professor at Grozny State University.
    [Show full text]