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CEPS Policy Brief Policy Studies No Centre for European CEPS Policy Brief Policy Studies No. 68/April 2005 A Spreading Danger Time for a New Policy towards Chechnya Fiona Hill, Anatol Lieven and Thomas de Waal Summary The ongoing conflict in and around Chechnya is helping to feed the wider international jihadi movement, and is endangering the West as well as Russia. The next “soft target” of North Caucasian terrorism could be a Western one. Mutual recriminations over the conflict have badly damaged relations between Russia and the West. While most of the blame for this lies with Russian policies, the Western approach to the issue has often been unhelpful and irresponsible. Denunciations of Russian behaviour have not been matched by a real understanding of the Chechen conflict or a real commitment to help. In their own interest, Western countries need urgently to address the crisis in the North Caucasus. This requires them to recognize the seriousness of the threat, to open a real dialogue on cooperation with Russia rather than simply making criticisms, and to make a serious economic contribution to the region. Thinking ahead for Europe Fiona Hill is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. and has researched, published, and commented extensively on Russian and Eurasian affairs and on international strategic and energy issues. Anatol Lieven is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 1990 to 1996 he was a correspondent for the Times (London) in the former Soviet Union, and covered the first Chechen War as a reporter. Thomas de Waal is Caucasus editor at the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. This paper is reprinted by kind permission of the publisher from A Spreading Danger: Time for a New Policy toward Chechnya, Anatol Lieven (Washington, DC; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005) (http://ww.carnegieendowment.org). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions with which they are associated nor those of CEPS. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which they are associated. Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.be) Contents Relations at an Impasse ............................................................................................................................1 A Broader Problem in the North Caucasus ..............................................................................................1 A Flawed Foreign Response.....................................................................................................................2 The Need for New Perceptions ................................................................................................................3 New Western Approaches........................................................................................................................3 Related Resources ....................................................................................................................................5 A Spreading Danger Time for a New Policy towards Chechnya CEPS Policy Brief No. 68/April 2005 Fiona Hill, Anatol Lieven and Thomas de Waal Relations at an Impasse neighbouring North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkharia, and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. In 2004, Western countries’ dealings with Russia over the war in Chechnya reached an impasse, full of mutual The North Caucasus has a long history of communal strife suspicion and denunciation. If this situation is allowed to that erupted again in the 1990s. The bloodiest episode was continue, any positive Western contribution to the a conflict between ethnic Ingush and Ossetians over a land improvement of conditions in the North Caucasus will dispute that took more than 600 lives in 1992. The region is remain virtually impossible, and the situation there is likely also chronically underdeveloped, with high unemployment to become increasingly dangerous for Russia and the West. and poverty rates, and low average wages and per capita incomes. The principal blame for the tension with the West over Chechnya lies with Russian policy. However, the Western These socioeconomic problems are breeding instability and approach to the conflict has too often been unhelpful and radicalism. Radical Islamist influence has risen since the irresponsible. On the Russian side, first the Yeltsin and then mid- 1990s, when militant groups entrenched themselves in the Putin administrations have grossly mismanaged the region. The growth of militancy has only been Chechnya. The first Russian military intervention, of exacerbated by the heavy-handed reaction of the December 1994, was unnecessary, rash, and brutal. The authorities, who have, for example, closed down virtually second, of October 1999, though more justified, was all the mosques in Kabardino-Balkharia. premature and savagely conducted. As in the first The first modern Chechen war, of 1994-1996, largely intervention, indiscriminate force was too often used. stopped at the borders of Chechnya. Chechen separatists Grozny has twice been bombarded into ruin. The fact that received very little support from their regional neighbours. such action has numerous parallels in Western military Today, this pattern has changed, as demonstrated by direct campaigns does not make it any more acceptable. Ingush involvement in a raid on the Ingushetian city of On the ground, Russian servicemen have committed many Nazran in June 2004 and the participation of Ingush and well-documented atrocities against Chechnya’s civilian members of other North Caucasus ethnic groups in the population. As of 2005, the Russian armed forces have to a terrorist attack on the school in Beslan in September 2004. great extent won the main military campaign in Chechnya, Although reliable data are also hard to come by, much of but this has only led Chechen extremists and their allies to the Chechen rebel movement has clearly adopted a wider resort to larger-scale and more monstrous terrorist attacks radical agenda that goes beyond only independence for on “soft targets” outside Chechnya, including the Dubrovka Chechnya. During and after the war of 1994-1996, a small theatre in Moscow in October 2002 and the school in but influential group of international jihadi fighters based Beslan in September 2004. themselves in Chechnya under the leadership of an Arab with the nom de guerre of Khattab, while home-grown A Broader Problem in the North Caucasus rebel leaders, such as Shamil Basayev, Arbi Barayev, and Movladi Udugov, allied themselves with this group and The problems stemming from the Chechen conflict have began to look to Middle Eastern Islamists for support. broadened. It is no longer accurate simply to talk about “Chechen militants”. The hostage-takers in Beslan included Arabs based in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, alongside Ingush and individuals from other parts of the North Chechen fighters, were associated with an alleged plot to Caucasus. Since defeating the Russian army in the war of launch a terrorist attack in London using the poison ricin. 1994-1996, the Chechen radicals and their international Members of the international jihadi movement have sought allies have had an agenda of undermining Russian rule to exploit the Chechen conflict for their own wider ends, across the whole North Caucasus. just as they have in Palestine, Kashmir, and many other places, and unfortunately, with considerable success. This In recent years, entrenched poverty, corruption, criminality, strategy has been set out by Al Qaeda’s second-in- and ethno-religious divisions in the region have command, Aiman al-Zawahiri, in his pamphlet “Knights strengthened their chances. While the situation in Chechnya Under the Prophet’s Banner”. is slowly improving, things are getting markedly worse in | 1 2 | Hill, Lieven & de Waal Although Russian claims about the importance of the Western media largely failed to report the wave of savage international terrorist element in the Chechen conflict are kidnappings against Russian citizens, including senior often exaggerated, this factor is nonetheless a real and Russian officials, and the establishment in Chechnya of important one. There clearly is now an ideological and international Islamist extremists. Casualty figures in financial link between the Chechen radicals and Chechnya have often been grossly exaggerated by Western international jihadi terrorists, and there is also a journalists and commentators (see box on page 5). These demonstration effect. Terror tactics adopted by jihadis in have in fact reduced markedly in recent years. Chechnya have been propagated by video and the Internet While Chechens complain justifiably of the very high level and adopted elsewhere, including in Iraq. This link with of official and unofficial criminality and violence in their international jihadi terrorism should be of direct concern to republic, there are also some modest signs of improvement Western governments because they must face the in everyday life in Chechnya. Running water and electricity possibility that the next soft target of North Caucasian are more readily available, checkpoints are much reduced, terrorism could be a Western one. travel is less restricted, and mobile phone usage is now President Putin has provided an opening for a more positive possible in the republic. Western role in the region by informing German None of these improvements suggest
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