Secretary Panetta meets with then–Vice President Xi Jinping of China to discuss ways to advance communications DOD (Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo)
The Effects of 9/11 on China’s Strategic Environment Illusive Gains and Tangible Setbacks
By Marc Koehler
The clear victor of the global war on terror appears to be China.1 —Anatol Lieven
ome Chinese grand strategists China, therefore, would lie within a of U.S. forces into Central Asia, and the are said to have breathed sighs strategic penumbra for a number of years, exploding U.S. military footprint suggested of relief on September 12, 2001. offering it a chance to develop quietly a plans for a more enduring American presence Relations between the United variety of coercive military capabilities in China’s rear areas. It appeared to be too S soon, therefore, for leaders across Eurasia to States and the People’s Republic of China intended to expand its power in East Asia. (PRC) had been heading downhill in the This, in turn, would allow it to pressure pro- resign themselves to the Chinese hegemony months and years leading up to that day, with independence forces on Taiwan and raise that had seemed inevitable before 9/11. increasing prospects for a significant clash. substantially the projected cost to U.S. forces As the second decade of the 21st century But even before the fires at the World Trade that might be called on to react to PRC mili- begins, the global landscape is changing once Center and Pentagon were completely out, it tary provocations in the region. Such, at least, more. China is rapidly expanding a wide was immediately clear—to Chinese experts was the initial thinking among many PRC variety of military capabilities of the People’s and to most of the world—that Washing- experts and international observers. Liberation Army (PLA), which in turn is ton’s strategic focus would be shifting 3,000 But after a year or two, strategists across bringing about a new level of assertiveness miles to the west, away from East Asia and the globe started to have second thoughts. By in PRC foreign policy. Despite the multiyear the Taiwan Strait and onto the mountains the end of 2001, after a handful of U.S. special efforts of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty and deserts of Afghanistan. U.S. strategists operations forces ousted the Taliban regime Organization (NATO) soldiers and civilians, who had been increasingly concerned about in a matter of weeks, global assessments of success in Afghanistan remains in question. China’s rising power would now be engaged U.S. power started shifting. Governments around the clock on what would become throughout the region scrambled to accom- Marc Koehler is a Foreign Service Officer with the known as the war on terror. modate the aggressive and determined entry Department of State.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 91 FEATURES | The Effects of 9/11 on China’s Strategic Environment
U.S. influence in the Middle East is dimin- had identified with Clausewitzian precision During the Clinton years, Sino-Amer- ished after the Iraq invasion. The measurable as the center of gravity of Taiwan’s defense). ican ties continued to be a target of critics in costs to the United States from the war on Later that year, Deng Xiaoping became the both countries. Beijing’s coercive population terror include at least $1 trillion and more first communist Chinese leader to visit the control policies were attacked by Christian than 6,000 U.S. dead; less quantifiable are the United States. His pragmatism and apparent groups while organized labor raised concerns global costs to the U.S. reputation and soft moderation impressed U.S. audiences, spark- over goods produced by PRC prisoners for power. But at the same time, U.S. alliances ing popular support for enhanced bilateral sale in U.S. markets. Tibet became a cause with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), ties.3 China’s soft power was growing.4 célèbre in Congress and on college cam- and Australia are robust and expanding, a But Sino-American ties ruptured puses across the country. But in addition to nascent U.S.-India friendship is deepening, severely on June 4, 1989, when PLA troops concerns about human rights, U.S. worries and the U.S. military footprint in Central in and around Beijing’s Tiananmen Square about security issues now became much more Asia remains significant. There are several opened fire on unarmed students and other pronounced. For example, despite intensive drivers of these relationships, the most civilians protesting against corruption diplomacy, the Clinton administration failed important of which is strategic mistrust over and in favor of democracy. Western media to prevent Chinese proliferation of missile China’s intentions. In short, the PLA military coverage of China switched overnight, and nuclear technology to Iran and Pakistan. buildup, coupled with Beijing’s recent foreign portraying the Chinese leadership as bar- Washington imposed sanctions on PRC enti- policy aggressiveness, seems to be driving baric and backward.5 Parliamentarians and ties for violations of international regimes.10 Eurasian nations closer to the United States. nongovernmental organizations expressed PRC strategists assessed that U.S. and How, then, should one assess the impact revulsion at the massacre and demanded Western attacks on Moscow’s human rights of 9/11 on China’s strategic environment? their governments cease business as usual practices had been instrumental in weaken- Ten years after the terror attacks against New with “the butchers of Beijing.” Western ing the foundation of Soviet control, so they York City and Washington, DC, is China governments responded with all instru- worried about the same with regard to China. better off strategically? Or do the gains and ments of national power including canceling They viewed the imposition of sanctions as losses balance out? This article examines existing arms deals, ceasing military-to- part of an effort to “contain” China. Start- these questions, first by outlining the history military exchanges, imposing sanctions on ing in 1985, PRC leaders ordered the PLA of Sino-American relations to illustrate the the regime and travel bans on high-level to downgrade preparations for a major war downward spiral that marked the period up PRC officials, suspending loans and export with the Soviet Union and begin planning to 9/11. Next it discusses the strategic gains credits, and tightening controls on exports of for fighting local, limited wars on China’s that PRC scholars and others thought would military hardware and advanced technology periphery, such as a conflict over Taiwan.11 accrue to China in the immediate aftermath to China.6 U.S. public opinion of the PRC After the 1991 Gulf War, PLA planners of 9/11, and the PLA military buildup that government declined sharply, to this day also began to concentrate on the possibility ensued. The strategic costs to China that never returning to the positive levels that of war with the United States; war games became evident in the years that followed prevailed before 1989.7 against “the American ‘enemy’” became standard.12 The Taiwan Strait Crises in 1995 from the depths of the Korean War to the heights of and 1996 and the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 President Richard Nixon’s groundbreaking visit to China in exacerbated an increasingly antagonistic 1972, Sino-American relations have been complicated relationship.13 Debate about “the China threat” heated are analyzed in the subsequent section. This During the same period, two other up globally. Congress reacted by directing article concludes with an assessment of the global events had significant impacts on the Secretary of Defense to begin submitting situation as of 2011, arguing that ultimately Sino-American relations. First, Taiwan’s annual reports on “the current and future China lost more than it gained in the after- authoritarian regime began to give way to military strategy” of the PRC.14 Congress math of 9/11. representative democracy. In 1989, as PRC also established in 2000 the U.S.-China Eco- authorities unleashed the crackdown in nomic and Security Review Commission to Strategic and Historical Context Tiananmen, Taiwan held its first multiparty “monitor, investigate and submit to Congress From the depths of the Korean War elections, increasing support for Taiwan in an annual report on the national security to the heights of President Richard Nixon’s the United States—especially in Congress.8 implications” of Sino-American trade, and to groundbreaking visit to China in 1972, Sino- Second, the dramatic collapse of communist focus as well on Chinese proliferation prac- American relations have been complicated. regimes in Eastern Europe starting in 1989, tices and restrictions on free speech.15 Con- The shared perception that Soviet power and of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, under- gress also set up the Congressional-Executive was growing, and threatening, brought the cut the strategic rationale for collaboration Commission on Human Rights to “monitor two sides together in the early 1970s and with China. Absent an existential threat human rights and the development of the kept frictions to a minimum for nearly two from the Soviet Union, the ability of the rule of law in China” and to report annually decades.2 Diplomatic ties were established in White House to cite national security con- on these topics.16 1979, which necessitated the termination of cerns to override pluralistic U.S. domestic Against this backdrop, George W. Bush the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty (which Beijing interests eroded.9 entered the White House in 2001 promising
92 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOEHLER to treat China not as the “strategic partner” U.S. backing for Chinese efforts to control annual exercise of submitting an anti-China that his predecessor had talked about, but as its own “terrorists”—ethnic Uighurs living resolution at the annual meeting of the UN a “strategic competitor.”17 Bush was deter- in Muslim-majority regions of western Human Rights Committee;29 and on China’s mined to raise the profile of U.S. allies in China—with the additional benefit of U.S. top concern, Taiwan, the administration Asia while downgrading the role of China.18 attacks against extremists in Afghanistan began to apply diplomatic pressure on Taipei Senior administration officials also departed who were believed to be aiding Uighur not to take symbolic steps toward indepen- from historical practice by intimating greater separatist groups,23 and a generally more dence, such as by holding a referendum on willingness to consider significant arms sales stable relationship with the United States, the question.30 and diplomatic support for Taiwan.19 But these early events in the Bush for Beijing, 9/11 was quickly seen as an opportunity to put administration paled in comparison to what happened on April 1, 2001, when a PLA Sino-U.S. relations “back on the healthy development track” fighter jet attempting to buzz a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane inadvertently crashed which by 2001 was both the largest market America Restrained? A second stra- into the EP-3. The PLA pilot was killed. The for Chinese exports and the largest source tegic benefit that PRC strategists thought EP-3 made an emergency landing on a PLA of foreign direct investment to China.24 would accrue from the 9/11 attacks was that airfield. China released the American aircrew Perhaps sensing an opportunity to shift their chief geopolitical rival, the United after 11 days, but kept the aircraft longer the bilateral relationship into a more positive States, would become mired down in to examine fully the sensitive electronics direction, President Jiang Zemin was among Afghanistan. Soon after 9/11, commentators on board.20 Administration officials were the first world leaders to contact the White in official PRC media expressed expectations furious, which no doubt helped inform the House, sending a telegram on September 11 that Afghanistan would turn into “another decision 3 weeks later to announce the offer and calling President Bush on September 12. Vietnam.” Some argued that this expectation of a significant U.S. arms package to Taiwan. Jiang’s message termed terrorism “a common lay behind Beijing’s expression of support for Asked 2 days later what he would do to scourge” and offered sympathy and condo- the U.S. military response.31 defend Taiwan, President Bush responded, lences to the families of the victims.25 Presi- Moreover, even where it was not “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend dent Bush wrote in his memoirs that Jiang engaged in armed conflict, the United herself.”21 Beijing was stunned. had pledged during his phone call “to help in States was suffering from a fast degradation Thus, three decades after Nixon’s any way he could.”26 of its soft power. Negative attitudes toward strategic breakthrough, Sino-American Chinese support took several forms. U.S. policy among Muslims were already relations were quickly spiraling downhill. Before the year was out, China had voted in high by 2002.32 After the invasion of Iraq On the eve of 9/11, there was little reason favor of four UN Security Council Resolu- in 2003, hostility increased, spreading for for optimism that bilateral relations would tions (UNSCR) dealing with Afghanistan the first time beyond the Middle East to recover anytime soon. and global counterterrorism efforts, includ- Muslim nations such as Indonesia.33 For ing UNSCR 1368, which justified a vigorous influential Chinese scholar Wang Jisi, 9/11 and Strategic Gains for China international response to those who carried director of the Institute of International In the days and weeks after September out the 9/11 attacks. As Beijing had only 2 Strategic Studies at the Central Party School 11, 2001, observers in China and around the years earlier strongly protested U.S. “inter- of the Communist Party, the Iraq invasion world saw the possibility of at least three stra- ventionism” in the 1999 Kosovo campaign, its had resulted in “international isolation” tegic gains accruing to China. first-ever endorsement of U.S. military action of the United States, providing China Easing of Tensions. First, Sino- against another state was seen in Washington with “new, albeit limited, opportunities American tensions quickly relaxed as the as a significant, and welcome, departure from for maneuver. So long as the U.S. image Bush administration began working to build past practice.27 remains tainted, China will have greater an international coalition against terrorism For its moral support and lack leverage in multilateral settings.”34 and PRC officials began stressing a common of obstructionism, Beijing was quickly Strategic Blind Spot. The third benefit interest in fighting terrorism. That China upgraded in status within the Bush adminis- for China flowing from 9/11 involved the was a veto-wielding member of the United tration. The President traveled there within a strategic shift that occurred throughout the Nations (UN) Security Council was also a month of 9/11 and again in February 2002; he U.S. national security community. Indeed, consideration to the extent the administra- would travel twice more before the end of his informed observers termed 9/11 a “miracle” tion was planning to gain global support for second term, including to the 2008 Olympics. and a “heaven-sent opportunity” for Beijing. its military response through UN resolutions. In contrast, no other President had visited Hong Kong scholar Frank Ching wrote For Beijing, 9/11 was quickly seen as China more than once.28 Moreover, by the in 2011 that, “from China’s point of view, an opportunity to put Sino-U.S. relations end of 2003, Washington acted on several the [9/11] attacks were a blessing in dis- “back on the healthy development track” PRC priorities. For example, it declared a guise. . . . China owes a huge debt of gratitude and to halt the steady deterioration in rela- dormant Uighur entity, the East Turkestan to Osama bin Laden.”35 Writing 4 years after tions that had accelerated during 2001.22 Islamic Movement, a terrorist group in the event, Wang Jisi noted that “the readjust- Among the benefits that Beijing hoped for August 2002; despite opposition from Con- ment of the center of gravity of U.S. global were diminished U.S. support for Taiwan, gress, Bush pledged in 2003 not to repeat the strategy has determined that for several years ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 93 FEATURES | The Effects of 9/11 on China’s Strategic Environment to come it will not regard China as its main Significantly, it appears that Beijing could compete toe-to-toe with the United security threat.”36 drastically increased its already high rate of States.54 All Central Asian states quickly Although it is hard to quantify, the fact defense expenditure immediately after 9/11. offered U.S. forces overflight rights, while is that the 9/11 attacks effectively shifted the By some estimates, China’s defense spending Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan focus of U.S. strategists and decisionmak- more than tripled between 2001 and 2011.46 also opened their bases to U.S. troops and ers away from China.37 For example, in Why PRC leaders decided to ramp up spend- aircraft. These states had multiple interests their recently published memoirs, top Bush ing after 9/11 is a matter of debate, although in a robust U.S. presence, but they generally administration officials mentioned China it would appear to be a rational response to shared a desire to see a third global power much less often than their predecessors.38 an assessment that other global actors would present in what had largely been contested The frequency of congressional action on not be paying attention. ground between China and Russia, some- China also dropped significantly. The Senate In any event, China’s expanding mili- thing that allowed Central Asian govern- Foreign Relations Committee held 11 hear- tary capability and booming economy47 seem ments more latitude in balancing against ings on China during 106th Congress (1999– to have emboldened many of its national Moscow and Beijing.55 2000), including on its military buildup, security decisionmakers. PRC diplomats South Asia. U.S. ties to China’s key South Asian ally, Pakistan, deepened right after 9/11. U.S. forces quickly deployed to despite gains they perceived after 9/11, by 2002 PRC observers air and naval bases in the country, albeit also started to focus on strategic setbacks on a small scale to avoid creating political problems for Pakistani President Pervez human rights practices, trade disputes, and were sent across Southeast Asia, Africa, and Musharraf.56 By September 22, Washington security of Taiwan. But no subsequent session Latin America in what multiple scholars had lifted all sanctions imposed since 1990; a of Congress has held even half that number.39 termed a “charm offensive,” seeking to assure month later, it was starting to provide nearly And what did China do with its time in counterparts of China’s “peaceful rise.”48 By $700 million in budgetary support and the strategic shadows? It quickly accelerated 2007, public opinion surveys in Asia showed security assistance.57 On the diplomatic front, and broadened its military buildup, most Beijing was more trusted to wield global President Bush invited Musharraf to the aggressively in pursuit of “the world’s most power than Washington.49 White House in 2002 and to the more pres- active land-based ballistic and cruise missile tigious destination of Camp David in 2003, program”—the military instrument of power Strategic Setbacks during which he declared Pakistan a “major most effective at altering the strategic balance Despite the gains they perceived in the non-NATO ally” and offered a $3 billion aid across the Taiwan Strait and at putting U.S. weeks and months after 9/11, by 2002 PRC package.58 forces in the region at risk.40 In 2002, China observers also started to focus on strategic Despite the initial post-9/11 warmth, was assessed to have 350 short-range ballistic setbacks—setbacks that are evident when U.S.-Pakistani ties cooled as the decade wore missiles (SRBMs) deployed opposite Taiwan,41 examining the reaction of key nations on on. In the last 60 years, the two countries and by 2011, it had 1,000–1,200 SRBMs oppo- China’s periphery. have seen their strategic interests overlap site Taiwan, along with hundreds of other Central Asia. Checked to the north by only when the shared perception of the new longer range missiles targeting U.S. and Russia, to the south by India, and to the east Soviet threat was high. At other times, threat allied bases throughout Asia.42 In other areas, by U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, Beijing perceptions diverged. Islamabad fears India’s it rushed forward production and purchase since the early 1990s had viewed Central Asia superior military power, and its security of fourth-generation fighter jets, modern air as an opening to expand its influence, trade, services have supported Islamic extrem- defenses, conventional and nuclear-powered and access to energy resources.50 It also saw ist networks whose perceived value lies in attack and ballistic missile submarines, a potential threats in the region from growing their ability to launch attacks in Kashmir, range of space-denial capabilities, and the Islamic extremism.51 In 1996, China orga- tying up large numbers of Indian troops in ability to attack U.S. computer networks.43 nized what became known as the Shanghai locations away from the Pakistani border. Since at least 2005, China’s political- Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Islamabad also wants a Pakistan-friendly military goal has been described as the devel- included Russia and the Central Asian states regime to its rear in Afghanistan and sup- opment of antiaccess/area-denial capabilities and was formed primarily to promote secu- ports at least some extremist groups there. to restrict the U.S. freedom of action in the rity cooperation against “extremists and sep- But in the post-9/11 era, state support for western Pacific and threaten U.S. bases in the aratists,” and secondarily to expand trade.52 extremism ensures a clash of vital interests region with missiles capable of overwhelming Hope and fear motivated Central Asian states with Washington. missile defenses.44 China’s broader political- to join the SCO—hope for an active PRC role Pakistan’s support for terrorism affects military strategy, experts argue, includes in a region historically dominated by Russia, China, too. Islamic extremists are angry over “reducing the salience of U.S. power to and fear of Islamic extremism.53 Beijing’s repression of Chinese Muslims,59 support allies in the region, and undercutting But the speed with which U.S. forces and there are indications that some terrorist the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent” crushed the Taliban in the fall of 2001 networks in Pakistan are supporting Uighur so that allies and other regional actors may served as a vivid illustration that the SCO separatists.60 But while concerned, PRC feel compelled, over time, to accommodate was ineffective in comparison, and that strategists remain focused on their larger Chinese interests.45 China still had a long way to go before it interest in South Asia: keeping potential
94 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOEHLER rival India tied down on the subcontinent.61 and provider of security in the broader Junichiro Koizumi announced that his Beijing must perform a delicate balancing Indian Ocean region.”65 nation would provide military support to act. If it gets too close to Islamabad, it drives All of this only added to Sino-Indian U.S. forces in Afghanistan by deploying naval New Delhi into a tighter relationship with tensions. Experts on Asian affairs note that vessels to the Indian Ocean—the first time Washington; too much distance from Islam- the “Chinese are increasingly wary over the since the end of World War II that Japan had abad, however, creates an opening for better growing strategic relationship between the sent troops overseas.71 As the decade wore on, U.S.-Pakistani ties. United States and India, and Beijing has Washington and Tokyo worked productively As for India, U.S. relations with New expressed concern over potential alignments to resolve alliance issues involving U.S. bases Delhi continued to improve during the last in Asia that could result in the ‘encirclement’ in Japan, ultimately taking steps to increase decade, even as Sino-Indian ties deteriorated. of China.”66 At the same time, writes former interoperability and cooperation between After 9/11, New Delhi immediately offered National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzez- Japanese forces and the 40,000-plus U.S. assistance to Washington, including the inski, the China-India relationship itself “is troops stationed there.72 use of its bases for staging operations in inherently competitive and antagonistic.”67 Sino-Japanese ties worsened over the Afghanistan and intelligence on regional The result is that both China and India are same period. Since the 1950s, Beijing has terrorist organizations.62 President Bush rushing to rearm their frontier regions, been consistently wary about the resurgence aggressively sought to deepen ties in pursuit while India is now conducting more military of Japanese power and expanded U.S.-Japan of a “strategic partnership” based on shared exercises with the United States than with military cooperation.73 Flexing its new values and converging geopolitical interests.63 any other country.68 Washington’s ties to muscles, the PLA navy has increasingly His administration signed deals with India India—the world’s largest democracy, second harassed Japanese fishing and oil exploration on civilian nuclear cooperation and on a most populous state, third largest army, and vessels in contested waters over oil and gas defense framework agreement, leading to fourth largest economy—are deepening.69 fields in the East China Sea.74 Japanese views major U.S. arms sales and combined military In contrast, Beijing is paired with a terror- of China have dropped steadily since 1989, exercises.64 Moreover, 2012 strategic guidance exporting Pakistani state in internal turmoil. displaying a growing concern over China’s for the Department of Defense released by The net benefits of this relationship for China rise; a 2009 survey of Japanese elites saw 51 the Obama administration asserts that “the are decreasing.70 percent identify China as posing a threat to United States is . . . investing in a long term East Asia. U.S. ties to its principal Japan.75 In contrast, surveys showed strong strategic partnership with India to support its Asian ally, Japan, expanded rapidly after 9/11. and growing inclination to retain the security ability to serve as a regional economic anchor On September 19, Japanese Prime Minister alliance with the United States.76
U.S. admiral greets Chinese soldiers aboard USS Gravely at Naval Station Norfolk during visit by PLA chief of general staff U.S. Navy (Tom Ouellette) U.S. Navy (Tom
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 / JFQ 95 FEATURES | The Effects of 9/11 on China’s Strategic Environment
As for the Republic of Korea, its reli- military ties, and the first-ever joint U.S.- These actions created the dreaded ance on the United States to deter conflict Vietnamese naval exercises. security dilemma in which an increasingly with nuclear-armed North Korea means U.S. alliances in the region are strong powerful nation finds it is not more secure that bilateral security ties will remain close, and growing. The U.S.-Thai mutual defense because of growing strategic mistrust among anchored by a 1953 mutual defense treaty treaty is six decades old, and the two sides its neighbors, which respond by working to and the presence of 28,500 U.S. troops.77 engage in an average of 40 joint exercises enhance their own security.89 The common Beijing, in contrast, saw its ties to Seoul annually.84 The U.S.-Philippines mutual response of states on China’s periphery has weaken after a series of impolitic moves defense treaty is older, and both sides have been to take steps to balance China’s growing related to ancient Chinese territorial claims. agreed to increases in military exercises and power. Existing U.S. allies (Philippines, After a North Korean submarine torpedoed joint efforts to combat extremist groups.85 Japan, Korea, Australia, and Thailand) and an ROK naval vessel in 2010, killing 46 U.S.-Singapore security ties deepened steadily long-term friends (Singapore, New Zealand) sailors, China was the only regional player since the 1990s, and the latter recently have doubled down on their security ties to that refused to condemn the North.78 South expanded its naval base to accommodate Washington by looking for ways to build up Korean favorable views on China dropped to U.S. Navy vessels.86 U.S.-Australia ties are the U.S. presence inside their borders and 38 percent in 2010, an 8-year low.79 Among deepest of all. The two nations have fought enhance interoperability with U.S. forces. elites surveyed in 2009, 56 percent identified together in every war since 1900, and Austra- Emerging partners (India, Vietnam) have China as the ROK’s principal threat; only 24 lia has the largest non-NATO contingent in increased the tempo of joint exercises, strate- percent identified North Korea.80 As with Afghanistan. President Obama announced in gic dialogues, and purchases of U.S. defense Japan, South Koreans strongly favor main- November 2011 that U.S. Marines will begin articles. Fence sitters (Central Asian states) taining a security alliance with the United deploying to Australia for 6-month rotations, are not necessarily looking for deeper security States.81 In contrast, China is allied to North with total size of the deployment reaching relations with the United States, but neither Korea, a broken, backward regime whose 2,500 by 2018.87 are they anxious to see the U.S. presence in their region diminish anytime soon. “Few countries, if any, would want to join China in an anti-U.S. alliance,” rues Chinese scholar Wang Jisi.90 Beijing likely would have acted dif- ferently over the last decade if 9/11 had not occurred. It would have wanted to build its
U.S. Marine Corps (Mark Stroud) military power in any case, but might have tried to do so more slowly in order to gain real capability before encountering the pos- sible need to use it. However, the apparent jump in defense spending right after 9/11 suggests that PRC leaders thought they saw an opportunity—and acted on it. If true, then Marines board C-17 Globemaster III in Kyrgyzstan to support Operation Enduring Freedom they lurched forward too soon. Everyone is now watching, and the PLA is not yet pre- pared to go toe-to-toe with any but the small- reckless behavior could pull the region (and Conclusion est of its neighbors. its patron) into an unwanted war.82 Wash- At the end of the first decade of the 21st In sum, Beijing’s actions over the past ington’s ally is a strategic asset; Beijing’s is a century, China’s security environment is not decade led to widespread fear of China’s rise, strategic liability. what Beijing hoped for in 2001. A number the emergence of balancing coalitions by its Southeast Asia. Finally, Beijing’s of tactical benefits did accrue immediately neighbors, and a more complicated security recent resumption of assertive diplomacy after the 9/11 attacks—including a lessening environment than it enjoyed before 9/11. over its disputed claims to the entire South of tensions with the United States—but they China’s crowning as the “clear victor” of the China Sea—and its harassment of U.S. Navy were of limited duration. Most significantly, global war on terror is certainly premature. reconnaissance ships, Vietnamese trawlers, PRC decisionmakers may have assessed, cor- JFQ and Philippine vessels—have “managed to rectly, that other global actors would not be sour relations with virtually every Asian paying close attention to the PLA military notes country and every advanced industrial buildup while war was raging elsewhere. nation.”83 In the last 2 years, widespread They quickly ratcheted up defense spend- 1 Anatol Lieven, “China the Quiet Winner in regional concern over China’s “spiraling ing, leading to significant increases in the War on Terror,” The Australian, August 29, 2011. domestic confidence” has led to expanded quantity and quality of a wide range of PLA 2 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The U.S.-Indonesian military cooperation, the armaments. Concomitantly, China became Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search reestablishment of full U.S.–New Zealand more aggressive in its diplomacy.88 for Security (New York: Norton, 1997), 43.
96 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOEHLER
3 Time magazine named Deng “Man of the available at
“clear,” according to Dr. Krepinevich of the Center 60 Jabin T. Jacob, “The Future of China- 75 Nicholas Khoo, “Fear Factor: Northeast for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments: “China Pakistan Relations after Osama bin Laden,” Future Asian Responses to China’s Rise,” Asian Security 7, has the means to threaten the forward bases from Directions International, August 8, 2011, available no. 2 (2011). which most U.S. strike aircraft operate.” at
98 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu