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THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 34 16-30 September 2009 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-5 As posited in previous re- critical abduction threat; Wardak (where incidents 5-7 Northern Region ports, data indicate that and diffuse AOG relations rates are now on par with Western Region 7-9 AOG have likely expended a which are likely confound- very volatile provinces like large amount of resources— ing authorities. Khost); and another devas- Eastern Region 9-11 manpower and material— In the North, the death of tating suicide attack di- Southern Region 12-13 during August, with Septem- an NGO worker in Jow- rected against IMF in Ka- ber AOG-initiated incidents bul. ANSO Info Page 14 zjan, a large explosives find only mildly increasing from by police in Balkh, and the In the East, Kunar saw the 2008 level of 508 to 578 ongoing problems in Kun- another very violent period in the current year (as of 29 duz dominated the report- and the abduction of a YOU NEED TO KNOW September). Incidents levels ing period. Interestingly, NGO staff in Khost. Se- were also low due the Holy NGO incidents in Kunduz curity issues along High- • AOGs are suffering from re- month of Ramadan. source exhaustion following are lower despite the grow- ways to Jalalabad and record incident levels in August In the West, Herat Province ing conflict, as explained in Asadabd should be noted. • AOG targeting of local GoA/ garners attention, not just for the north section. In the South, AOG con- ANSF persists the recent apparent attempt In the Central region, key tinue to dominate offen- to kill the Water and Energy • Erosion of security in Herat issues this period include sively and Kandahar re- Province Minister, Ismael Khan, but the violent murder of an mains plagued by frequent, also because of increased NGO employee in Kapisa; and very violent, attacks. • Significant explosives find in Balk AOG visibility in Guzara and Province suggests future discord the further deterioration of Injil districts; the worsening, • Probable further shrinking of the humanitarian space NGO DATA & TRENDS ANSO is supported by Four ANSO-recorded NGO incidents occurred during the period in the Northern, East- ern, and Southern regions. And as has been seen continually in areas that can be considered to be experiencing an invasive AOG threat, NGOs involved in providing medical services bore the brunt of incidents, with an NGO clinic in Kandahar being struck by arson and a medical INGO staff member being abducted following a meeting in Khost Province. While no informa- tion exists on the motive for the abduction, because it occurred immediately following a work-related meeting with stakeholders, one could suggest he was targeted for his associa- tion with the NGO, which would be in line with the recent intent demonstrated by at least one AOG, the ‘Haqqani Network’, that is active in the province. Another arson struck an NGO, this time targeting an NGO building in Kapisa. Of note, though, it led to a deliberate fatality when the AOG left a guard bound in the said build- ing and set it ablaze. Lastly, an additional fatality occurred when an INGO staff member was shot dead in a probable personal dispute in Jawzjan Province. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 8 50 This Report Period 0 40 An SVBIED struck an IMF con- voy on 17 September, killing ap- in the north of the city on 27 Sep- 30 proximately eighteen people, in- tember. This AOG tactic will con- 20 cluding six IMF, and wounding tinue to be used due to its per- 10 thirty. There have been a total of ceived success, high profile na- 0 nine suicide attacks recorded in ture, the sheer number of vehicles Kabul this year, which is two in Kabul, and the relative ease of more than in all of 2008. Of con- entering into the city. Seven of the KABUL AOG KABUL ACG cern is that seizures of VBIEDs nine suicide attacks have targeted continue to be reported across the IMF convoys. Excepting the two candidate to less than 50%, then a runoff is city, with one confirmed report on BBIEDs that targeted the Minis- scheduled to occur around 20 October. Addi- 24 September of the discovery of try of Justice and Prisons in Feb- tionally, if there is no second round, then there a vehicle laden with explosives in ruary, the seven suicide bombings is a likelihood that demonstrations may occur District 5 and a further uncon- have killed approximately thirty- due to the large amount of reported fraud; firmed report of another seizure nine civilians and wounded a con- most reports suggest that Kabul would be the servative figure of two-hundred primary location to air any perceived griev- KEY THREATS & CON- and twenty-two. ances. A possible mitigating factor could be CERNS Excluding further possible dis- ‘election exhaustion’, where the long drawn Election demonstrations putes, certified election results out process has turned previously mobilised Complex attacks against high should be released at the end of supporters into lethargic spectators. Separately, profile targets the first week of October. If the the districts of Kabul province remain calm, Abductions current preliminary figures are with no significant ACG or AOG incidents revised downwards for the leading reported in the last two weeks. NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 1 40 A local guard working for an 30 INGO was killed in an arson lished presence in Kapisa and has attack on the organisation’s sub- not received any recent threats 20 office in Hisa-i-Duwumi Kohis- against the organisation or the 10 tan in the early hours of 28 Sep- murdered worker. Although Hisa- 0 tember. The individual died after i-Duwumi Kohistan is currently having his hands and feet tied by experiencing a convergence of a number of assailants prior to AOG ideology towards a more KAPISA AOG KAPISA ACG them setting fire to the building conservative stance, involving with an accelerant, which is be- intimidation threats against Local AOGs, with strong links to the civil war lieved to have been petrol. The ‘foreign’ NGOs, there is at pre- are prevalent in Kohistan I and II, while the motive for both the arson attack sent no indication that the attack majority of attacks occurring against the secu- against the INGO and the killing was performed by AOG. The rity forces in Mahmudi Raqi are claimed by the of the local worker remains un- style of attacks in western Kapisa Taliban or the Haqqani network. Furthermore, known. The INGO has an estab- could be simplistically divided into the provincial capital is also host to arterial relatively small scale ambushes roads linking the IMF military base in Bagram against ANSF or political figures with their operational areas in Tagab and Su- KEY THREATS & CON- in Kohistan I and II and the more robi. The IMF traffic through the district, CERNS sophisticated attacks, mainly therefore, becomes a target for AOG standoff Attacks on security forces, espe- IEDs, against IMF and ANSF in attacks. Although attacks on IMF remain rare, cially in Tagab and Nijrab Mahmudi Raqi. The reason for maintaining at least a 200 metre distance from Electoral related violence the different style of attacks and IMF and ANSF convoys will significantly re- Rockets, IEDs, and mines targets is that different AOGs are duce the chances of NGO collateral exposure operating in the different areas. to IED attacks. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 1 PA RW AN 50 This Report Period 0 Parwan is generally considered 40 safe for NGO operations, with gradual increase in AOG activity 30 the caveat that (based on reports each month since June. Recent 20 from NGOs) few or no interna- incidents include an AOG attack 10 tional staff work outside of Cha- on an ANP vehicle and an IED 0 harikar. Parwan has experienced a detonation next to a government training facility. While this inci- dent does not indicate a trend in PARWAN AOG PARWAN ACG KEY THREATS & CON- CERNS this area, NGOs should take note NGOs. In contrast, Ghorband and Shinwari of the potential for AOG target- Attacks on security targets, host active networks of ACG, which is prob- especially in the area of Ba- ing related to a perceived associa- lematic given that NGOs must travel through gram Airbase tion with the government. these districts to reach Bamyan Province. NGO-targeted criminal abduc- According to local sources and (When travelling in Ghorband, NGOs are ad- tion authorities, the districts of Cha- vised to utilise low-profile transportation and Irregular IEDs targeting harikar, Jabaulsaraj, Salang and ANSF in the Ghorband Valley to travel through without stopping and during Sayed Kheil are the more secure daylight hours only). districts in this province for NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 The notion that Gizab remains in 30 has a complete absence of GoA AOG control has been illustrated 20 authority. In recent months, a in the past week by ANSF road 10 blocks near Tamazan Village, ap- number of companies performing 0 proximately 25 kilometres south construction work have received of Nili. The roadblocks are re- intimidation letters warning them to leave the area; however, this portedly stopping people from DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI ACG travelling to the area.
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