Russia and European Missile Defenses Reflexive Reset?

NATO (Thorsten Bohlman) NATO SACEUR and Chairman of NATO military committee visit missile defense exhibition Russia and European Missile Defenses Reflexive Reset? By STEPHEN J. CIMBALA he U.S.-Russian “reset” the Russian government and military leader- reach agreement with the United States and appeared to be in free fall in ship on missile defenses and nuclear arms NATO over the future of missile defenses in December 2011 as a result of control is driven by realistic fears and/or Europe.1 Accusing the United States and the T both foreign and domestic resistant forces in Russian domestic politics. Alliance of undermining Russia’s security, policy issues that had dampened enthusiasm It then discusses the possibility that aspects Medvedev censured Washington for its for further momentum. Among the forces of Russian public diplomacy on missile unwillingness to provide a legal guarantee resisting progress on nuclear arms control defenses consist of a “reflexive control” or that the Obama administration’s European was the issue of missile defenses. The fol- other influence operation, directed at both Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to Euro- lowing discussion examines European (and foreign and domestic audiences. The article pean missile defenses would not be directed other) missile defenses from the Russian then performs data analysis to determine the against Russia.2 The outgoing Russian presi- perspective, with obvious implications for viability of Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear dent presumably spoke with the approval current and future U.S. and North Atlantic deterrents, including scenarios that assume of the current prime minister and probable Treaty Organization (NATO) policies. The antimissile defenses are available. future president Vladimir Putin. article first considers whether the outlook of Facing an imminent election in Russia Russian Rethinking that might have prompted his tougher line Medvedev Stokes Fears. On November with respect to national security issues, Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor 23, 2011, then–Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev outlined a number of responsive of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State Medvedev issued a somber address in which measures that Russia would take if the United University–Brandywine. he declared that Russia had been unable to States and NATO continued to stiff Russia 10 JFQ / issue 68, 1 st quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu CIMBALA on missile defense talks. First, Russia would to meet exigent and prospective threats to include use of the media and other sources develop capabilities for “the destruction of its security from conflicts near or within its to influence public and leadership opinion information and control means of the missile borders, including terrorist attacks.8 Besides in other countries and in one’s own state. defense system” deployed in Europe, meaning, growing a more professional military for low- In addition to these two major categories of in plain English, cyberwar. Second, the protec- and mid-intensity wars, Russia must prepare information operations, one might argue tion of Russian facilities for strategic nuclear for a world in which major powers and others for a separate and specifically “cyber” aspect weapons and launchers would be increased. can exploit the information highway for mili- including “the use of military and surrogate Third, nuclear strategic ballistic missiles tary purposes.9 As Jacob W. Kipp has noted: computers to disrupt command and control” would be equipped with new countermea- in countries in conflict with Russia.15 Timothy sures to overcome U.S. and NATO ballistic If the strategic nuclear arsenals have been the L. Thomas, U.S. expert on Russian informa- missile defenses. Fourth, Russia might deploy backbone of deterrence and strategic stability tion warfare, explains: advanced attack systems in its western and for the last half century, it appears that they southern districts capable of striking elements are no longer sufficient to set the general line If an information warfare element under con- of the U.S. and NATO missile defense system, of relations in part because of the reduced sideration is a machine-driven, data-proces- including Iskander ground-to-ground missiles threat perceptions of each side, but also sor component (computers, sensors, satellites, in the Kaliningrad exclave.3 Fifth, Russia might because other military capabilities have taken reconnaissance-strike systems, etc.) then the suspend further cooperation on arms control on greater importance.10 category under consideration is information- and disarmament, and, according to Medve- technical. Electronic warfare would also be dev, “There might be grounds for our country These other military capabilities an element in this field. If the IO element to withdraw from the New START [Strategic include, according to Dr. Kipp, nonstrategic is a human-based, data processor compo- Arms Reduction Treaty].”4 As Medvedev nuclear weapons, missile defenses, con- nent (the brain, which can be influenced or spoke, doubtless the Russian General Staff was ventional systems for prompt, long-range manipulated by propaganda, psychotronics, loading his PowerPoint file with even more offensive strikes, and military transformation nonlethal weapons, or special pharmaceuti- talking points for future briefings. in conventional armed forces driven by devel- cals according to the Russian paradigm), then Although it was apparent that some opments in C4ISR (command, control, com- the issue under consideration is information- of Medvedev’s rhetoric was intended for munications, computers, intelligence, surveil- psychological. Thus, psychological operations domestic political consumption, it would lance, and reconnaissance).11 The United (PSYOPS) are an element of this field.16 be mistaken to infer that his démarche was States, having mastered the information tech- mainly or entirely campaign fodder. Russia’s nology revolution and applied it to military Of course, the actual conduct of military political and military leaders have, from their affairs in the most comprehensive manner, operations or the prewar management of perspective, genuine security needs and con- has arguably provided its commanders the crises can involve both aspects of informa- cerns that are evoked by the U.S. and NATO military-strategic equivalent of a trump card tion operations as defined above. The point missile defense plans.5 For example, although in information-based warfare. The Russian is to understand why and how Russia might the Duma had previously cautioned against military leadership has also sought to exploit be using what the United States would call jettisoning the entire reset process over the electronic spectrum and cyberspace for “influence operations” or the Russians missile defenses, the first deputy chairman of military advantage, as Russia’s war against information-psychological operations to com- the Duma’s foreign affairs committee, Leonid Georgia in August 2008 demonstrated. In that pensate for military-technical deficiencies in Slutsky, warned of inevitable connections: conflict, attacks on Georgian government and hardware, software, and command-control- other Web sites appeared to have been well communications “connectivity.” The biggest success of this new chapter in coordinated with Russian kinetic force opera- If Russia is sincerely concerned about Russian-U.S. relations was the signing of tions, including suspiciously coincidental the possibility of U.S. full-spectrum domi- the New START treaty. But this treaty links timing of starts and stops in activity.12 nance by means of offensive and defensive strategic offensive weapons to missile defense. In addition, Russian military thinking force modernization, network-centric warfare, But the American administration, acting in about information operations (IO) and infor- and enhanced C4ISR, then it follows that Rus- circumvention of all agreements, is now trying mation warfare is quite sophisticated and has sia’s better strategic moves include both dip- to deploy systems near Russian borders that roots in Soviet-era discussions of topics such lomatic forestalling and manipulation, as well threaten our strategic nuclear deterrence as electronic warfare, reconnaissance-strike as substantial investment in military modern- forces.6 complexes, and camouflage and concealment, ization. However, Russia needs to nest these among other subjects.13 Russian military forestalling-manipulation and modernization Additional Challenges for Russia. In writers distinguish between the information- initiatives within a broader geostrategic and addition to the relationship between nuclear technical and the information-psychological diplomatic strategy that fits into present, and offensive retaliatory forces and antimis- aspects of warfare and military operations.14 arguably future, reality. sile strategic defenses, there is the fact that Information-technical aspects have to do with Reflexive Control? An undiplomatic strategic nuclear deterrence per se is but one equipping the force with digital products and finger-pointing by Putin against Secretary element in the Russian geopolitical security neutralizing the enemy’s information systems of State Hillary Clinton over demonstrations calculus.7 Russia faces the need to modern- by means of electronic, cybernetic, or kinetic in Russia in December 2011 was an obvious ize its conventional military forces in order attacks. Information-psychological aspects effort at distraction and buck-passing.17

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