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Diverging Voices, Converging Policies: the Visegrad States' Reactions to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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Diverging Voices, Converging Policies: the Visegrad States' Reactions to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Diverging Voices, Converging Policies: The Visegrad States’ Reactions to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Jacek Kucharczyk and Grigorij Mesežnikov (eds.) DIVERGING VOICES, CONVERGING POLICIES: THE VISEGRAD STATES’ REACTIONS TO THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT HEINRICH-BÖLL-STIFTUNG Diverging Voices, Converging Policies: The Visegrad States’ Reactions to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Edited by Jacek Kucharczyk, Grigorij Mesežnikov Commissioned by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Diverging Voices, Converging Policies: The Visegrad States’ Reactions to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Edited by Jacek Kucharczyk and Grigorij Mesežnikov Commissioned by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung offices in Prague and Warsaw Printed in Warsaw, 2015. Publisher: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Co-publishers: Europeum – Institute for European Policy (Czech Republic), Institute of Public Affairs (Poland), Institute for Public Affairs (Slovakia), Political Capital Policy Research & Consulting Institute (Hungary) Copy editing: Evan Mellander Layout and cover image: Kateřina Kubánková Copyright to the original image on the cover page: VGstockstudio/Shutterstock This material is licensed under Creative Commons “Attribution- NonCommercial 4.0 International” (CC BY-NC 4.0). For the licence agreement, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and a summary (not a substitute) at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode. The findings and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. ISBN: 978-80-906270-2-4 (Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Prague, Opatovická 28, Praha 1, 110 00, Czech Republic) 978-83-61340-29-4 (Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Warsaw, ul. Żurawia 45, IIIp., 00-680 Warsaw, Poland) 978-80-86993-13-3 (Europeum – Institute for European Policy, Rytířská 539/31 Praha 1, 110 00, Czech Republic) 978-83-7689-250-4 (Institute of Public Affairs, ul. Szpitalna 5 lok. 22, 00-031 Warsaw, Poland) 978-80-89345-55-7 (Institute for Public Affairs, Baštová 5, 811 03, Bratislava, Slovak Republic) 978-963-9607-10-1 (Political Capital Policy Research & Consulting Institute, Futó utca 47-53., 1082 Budapest, Hungary) CONTENTS FOREWORD 7 INTRODUCTION 9 The Visegrad countries have a stake in the success of a pro-European Ukraine Jacek Kucharczyk, Grigorij Mesežnikov CZECH REPUBLIC Domestic political context since 1989: Russia as a dividing element in Czech society 14 Petr Kratochvíl, Věra Řiháčková Foreign policy and external security: The diverging trajectories of domestic actors 25 vis-a-vis the Russian-Ukrainian conflict Věra Řiháčková Trade and energy – the conflict’s limited impact on the Czech economy 37 Helena Schulzová HUNGARY Domestic political context since 1989: Hungary, Russia, Ukraine 52 Lóránt Győri, Bulcsú Hunyadi, Attila Juhász, Péter Krekó Hungarian foreign policy and the crisis in Ukraine 69 Botond Feledy Hungary and Russia in economic terms – love, business, both or neither? 83 Ada Ámon, András Deák POLAND The long shadow of the Kremlin: Polish domestic reactions to the 102 Russian-Ukrainian conflict Jacek Kucharczyk, Aleksander Fuksiewicz Back to basics? Polish foreign policy and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict 115 Agnieszka Łada, Łukasz Wenerski Consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict for the Polish economy 130 and energy sector Łukasz Wenerski, Andreas Speiser SLOVAKIA Slovakia’s response to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: 146 Domestic socio-political aspects, parties’ stances, public opinion Grigorij Mesežnikov, Oľga Gyárfášová Slovakia’s foreign policy towards the Russian-Ukrainian conflict 161 Alexander Duleba Economics and energy in Slovak-Russian relations in the context of the 175 Russian-Ukrainian conflict Juraj Mesík THE V4 IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 195 Diverging voices, converging policies Jacek Kucharczyk, Grigorij Mesežnikov AFTERWORD 207 The V4 reassembled – but to what end? Jacek Kucharczyk, Grigorij Mesežnikov ABOUT THE AUTHORS 212 FOREWORD The annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the launch of a hybrid war against Ukraine was Russia’s answer to the revolution triggered by Euromaidan. The conflict continues to pose fundamental chal- lenges for the European Union, and raises the question of whether the EU will maintain its commit- ment to the political and economic consolidation of those of its Eastern neighbours which aim to make sovereign choices based on the rule of law and democracy. Although the EU has reacted to the conflict in a unified manner by imposing sanctions on Rus- sia, statements made by certain European political leaders have undermined the public perception of European unanimity. Officials of the Visegrad countries, for instance, have been divided on certain aspects of the conflict. In order to provide answers to the question of what narratives underlie the differing reactions of individual Visegrad countries, we asked our partner organisations to systematically analyse how these countries have dealt with the conflict in the light of historical experience, and with respect to public opinion, economic relations, energy- and foreign policy. We would like to express our gratitude to the publication’s editors and authors for their efforts and commitment. We hope that its findings will stimulate further critical and constructive debate on the perspectives and positions of the Visegrad Group and its role within the EU. Eva van de Rakt Irene Hahn-Fuhr Director Director Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Prague Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Warsaw Prague and Warsaw, December 2015 7 INTRODUCTION The Visegrad countries have a stake in the success of a pro-European Ukraine JACEK KUCHARCZYK – GRIGORIJ MESEŽNIKOV The present publication is a modest attempt to analyse the diverse impacts of the Russian-Ukrainian military and political conflict on the V4 countries – on their domestic political developments, foreign policies, economies and energy policies. The conflict, which broke out in spring 2014 and affected international relations and the security environment in Europe and beyond, has several dimensions, both domestic and international. The first dimension is domestic, intra-Ukrainian, mainly related to the country’s social transfor- mation, democratisation and internal reforms. After the USSR collapsed and Ukraine declared inde- pendence, the country embraced a post-Soviet oligarchic model of transition from socialism to capital- ism – a model that undermined its socio-economic and human potential. Today, under the weight of dramatic events and the appalling consequences of external aggression, Ukraine has opted for a dif- ferent, liberal-democratic model of transformation, with the prospect of participation in the project of European integration. Almost ten years after the false dawn of the Orange Revolution, the events of 2013–2015 have been a breakthrough for the process of systemic political and socio-economic change, for the character and destiny of the independent Ukrainian state, its position in international relations and its participa- tion in European integration processes. At the same time, these events have also affected the lives of ordinary Ukrainians in unprecedented ways. Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in November 2013 sparked mass protests among the Ukrainian public in Kyiv and other cities, which the Ukrainians themselves called the “Revolution of Dignity”. State power, repre- sented by Ukraine’s openly pro-Russian head of state, initially responded with brutal violence against the participants of protest rallies, and later (in January 2014) by adopting repressive laws which de facto changed the nature of the political regime from democratic to authoritarian. Ukraine’s citizens refused to accept such a dictate. Another important dimension of the conflict concerns bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations. The conflict seems to have radically changed not only the relations between the two countries, but first and foremost the relations between two nations with longstanding experience of mutual interaction and coexistence, as well as many linguistic and cultural affinities. The rapid pace of events in Ukraine has brought to light the diametrically opposing views and attitudes of political elites and substantial seg- ments of the two countries’ populations concerning their future coexistence. The culmination of the violent clashes in Kyiv, accompanied by the shooting and killing of pro- democratic and pro-European protesters by members of special police units at the end of February 9 2014, resulted in President Yanukovych’s decision to flee the country, subsequent Russian military aggression in Crimea, the annexation of part of Ukraine’s sovereign territory, and the launch of a separatist rebellion in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions inspired and supported by the Russian Federation. When looking at the outcome of the power struggle in Kyiv in February 2014, as well as the events unfolding currently, it must be concluded that the main motivation for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was the Kremlin’s disagreement with Ukraine’s shift towards the West. Implementation of the democratic reforms that would lead to the entrenchment of a liberal-democratic regime of the Western type in Ukraine and Ukraine’s progress on the path of European integration (from the initial signing of the Association Agreement to the gradual accession process with the prospect of full EU membership) were perceived by Russia’s leadership as a threat to its own power inside the country as well as
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