The Transatlantic Partnership and Relations with Russia
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Reconstructing a Reunited Cyprus
Report-The day after-2 ENG:Layout 1 1/21/09 2:33 PM Page I The day after II Reconstructing a reunited Cyprus By PRAXOULA ANTONIADOU KYRIACOU ÖZLEM OĞUZ FIONA MULLEN PCC Paper 1/2009 Report-The day after-2 ENG:Layout 1 1/21/09 2:33 PM Page II Institutt for fredforskning International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Hausmanns gate 7, NO-0186 OSLO, Norway Tel. +47 22 54 77 00 Fax +47 22 54 77 01 Email: [email protected] Web: www.prio.no PRIO encourages its researchers and research affiliates to publish their work in peer-reviewed journals and book series, as well as in PRIOʼs own Report, Paper and Policy Brief series. In editing these series, we undertake a basic quality control, but PRIO does not as such have any view on political issues. We encourage our researchers actively to take part in public debates and give them full freedom of opinion. The responsibility and honour for the hypotheses, theories, findings and views expressed in our publications thus rests with the authors themselves. Disclaimer As a piece of independent research, the opinions and terminology contained in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the British High Commission, which funded the research. Views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of any companies or organizations with which they may have professional connections. © International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). -
Working Papers 41 (2003)
A Hole in the Wall? Dimensionalism and the EU’s “New Neighbourhood Policy” Hiski Haukkala Researcher The Finnish Institute of International Affairs [email protected] http://www.hiskihaukkala.net Working Papers 41 (2003) Ulkopoliittinen instituutti (UPI) – The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Ulkopoliittinen instituutti, FIIA) was established in 1961 on the initiative of the Paasikivi Society and it is an independent think tank maintained by the Foundation for Foreign Policy Research. FIIA’s mission is to produce high-standard, analytical information on international relations required in foreign policy decision-making and to assist in the formation of informed and critical public opinion. It accomplishes this mission by organizing research projects on timely topics, maintaining national and international research networks, and arranging lectures, seminars and conferences. Key research findings are published in the form of books and reports. FIIA also publishes Ulkopolitiikka, a quarterly review in Finnish, and The Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, an annual publication in English. FIIA maintains a library which is at the disposal of anyone interested in international relations and foreign policy. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs Mannerheimintie 15 A FIN-00260 Helsinki tel. +358 9 4342 070 fax +358 9 4342 0769 http://www.upi-fiia.fi ISBN 951-769-145-9 ISSN 1456-1360 Ulkopoliittinen instituutti Helsinki 2003 Contents Introduction 1 The EU Enlargement as a Process of Inclusion and Exclusion 4 A Hole in the Wall? Dimensionalism and the EU’s Quest for Stability 11 Conclusions 19 Introduction1 The successive rounds of enlargements are a factor shaping the European Union. -
The Growing Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia’S Policies Abroad
02 BLITT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2011 10:25 PM RUSSIA’S “ORTHODOX” FOREIGN POLICY: THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN SHAPING RUSSIA’S POLICIES ABROAD PROF. ROBERT C. BLITT* TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction ................................................................................364 2. The Russian Orthodox Church’s Foreign Policy Mandate ......................................................................................365 3. Russian Foreign Policy and Disregard for the Constitutional Obligations of Secularism, Separation, and Nondiscrimination .............................................................367 3.1. The Ideological Centrality of Orthodoxy in Russian Foreign Policy as Expressed through Euphemism ...................... 368 3.1.1. The Role of “Spirituality" in Russia’s National Security Strategy .................................................................. 368 3.1.2. A Note on Culture as a Synonym for Orthodoxy ......374 3.1.3. “Spiritual Security” & “Spiritual Revival” ..............377 3.2. Putting Rhetoric into Practice: The Ascendancy of “Spirituality” in Russia’s Foreign Policy ....................................380 3.2.1. Russian Orthodox Church-Ministry of Foreign Affairs Working Group .........................................................380 3.2.2. Russkiy Mir Foundation: A Chimera State-Church Foreign Policy Tool ................................................................383 3.2.3. Support for Days of Spiritual Culture .....................390 3.2.4. Facilitating an Exclusive -
Foreign and Domestic Discourse on the Russian Arctic
Foreign and Domestic Discourse on the Russian Arctic Ieva Bērziņa The strained relations between the West and Russia regarding influence in Ukraine may lead to an increase in tension in other regions. The Arctic may become a potential zone of conflict due to its rich natural resources, new transportation routes, military significance, and unsolved territorial issues. The aim of this paper is to identify the governmental discourse of Russia’s top officials describing Russia’s state policy on the Arctic for foreign and domestic audiences. The paper focuses on the period from 2013 till 2015 when tensions in the relationship between Russia and the West increased due to the crisis in Ukraine. The units of analysis are public statements by senior officials of the Russian Federation in speeches and reports in the media. The major finding is that the Arctic should serve in Russian-Western rapprochement rather than becoming the next geopolitical hot spot. Introduction: the regulatory framework of Russian Arctic discourse This article aims to identify how Russian senior officials are communicating Russia’s policy on the Arctic, the main guidelines of which are defined in several documents. The basic documents that the Russian government mentions as being the key decisions on Arctic operations (Government of the Russian Federation 2015) include: Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and beyond (2008, September 18); The Development Strategy of the Russian Arctic and national security for the period until 2020 (2013, February 20); State Program of the Russian Federation ‘Socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period till 2020’ (2014, April 21); Regulations on the State Commission on the Development of the Arctic (2015, March 14); and The Northern Sea Route Comprehensive Development Project (2015, June 8). -
On Thin Ice? (Mis)Interpreting Russian Policy in the High North Roderick Kefferpütz
No. 205/February 2010 On Thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North Roderick Kefferpütz limate change in the Arctic is expected to make the ice cap dwindling to a record-low minimum extent the region a lot busier as new strategic of 4.3 million square km in September 2007.2 resources become available. The Russian C These developments open up an array of intractable Federation is a key player in this context, having put challenges, including threats to biodiversity and the forth a comprehensive Arctic strategy. Russian policy traditional way of life of autochthon communities in towards the so-called High North, however, is the Arctic region. Of particular danger to global oftentimes not seen in its entirety and has received a environmental stability, however, is the threat to low- plethora of criticism in the Western media and foreign lying coastal regions posed by rising sea levels. This policy community. This paper aims to contribute to a would not only have immense political, environmental better understanding of Russian actions in the High and social consequences; the economic effects would North by providing a succinct overview of Russian also be tremendous. According to Allianz financial policies in the region and identifying the fundamental services, a rise of half a metre by the middle of this rationale behind them. The paper concludes that century could put at risk more than 28 trillion dollars’ Russia’s Arctic policy is not only a lot more nuanced worth of assets in the world’s largest coastal cities.3 In but also not very different from the policies conducted addition, increasing temperatures in this volatile region by other riparian states. -
Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008
= :88.&8*47,.&=43+1.(9=.3=:,:89=,**2a= 439*=9=&3)=251.(&9.438=+47=_ _=39*7*898= .2=.(-41= 5*(.&1.89=.3= :88.&3=&3)=:7&8.&3=++&.78= &7(-=-`=,**3= 43,7*88.43&1= *8*&7(-=*7;.(*= 18/1**= <<<_(78_,4;= -.0+2= =*5479=+47=43,7*88 Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress :88.&8*47,.&= 43+1.(9=.3=:,:89=,**2a=439*=9=&3)= 251.(&9.438=+47=__= 39*7*898= = :22&7>= In the early 1990s, Georgia and its breakaway South Ossetia region had agreed to a Russian- mediated ceasefire that provided for Russian “peacekeepers” to be stationed in the region. Moscow extended citizenship and passports to most ethnic Ossetians. Simmering long-time tensions escalated on the evening of August 7, 2008, when South Ossetia and Georgia accused each other of launching intense artillery barrages against each other. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not respond to a ceasefire appeal but intensified their shelling, “forcing” Georgia to send in troops. On August 8, Russia launched air attacks throughout Georgia and Russian troops engaged Georgian forces in South Ossetia. By the morning of August 10, Russian troops had occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border. Russian troops occupied several Georgian cities. Russian warships landed troops in Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia region and took up positions off Georgia’s Black Sea coast. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, serving as the president of the European Union (EU), was instrumental in getting Georgia and Russia to agree to a peace plan on August 15-16. -
Annual Report 2006 101 Staff List 2006 (Staff Who Left in 2006 Are Listed in Grey Italics)
Annual ReportAnnual 2006 PRIO Annual Report 2006 101 Staff List 2006 (Staff who left in 2006 are listed in grey italics) Director Sabrina Ramet Doreen Kuse Information Stein Tønnesson Gregory Reichberg Bethany Lacina Knut Sindre Åbjørsbråten Jan Ketil Rød Eric Neumayer Agnete Schjønsby Research Staff Øystein H. Rolandsen Magnus Öberg Martin Austvoll Kaushik Roy Marcelo Ochoa Editorial Staff Pavel Baev Sven Gunnar Simonsen Taylor Owen John Carville Morten Bergsmo Inger Skjelsbæk Roger Petersen Glenn Martin Helga Malmin Binningsbø Endre Stiansen James Pugel Marit Moe Kaja Borchgrevink Håvard Strand Rebecca Roberts Naima Mouhleb Marit Brochmann Trude Strand Bruce Russett Halvard Buhaug Kaare Strøm Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel Library J. Peter Burgess Henrik Syse Astrid Suhrke Olga Baeva Jørgen Carling Pinar Tank Jennifer Ziemke Odvar Leine Jeffrey Checkel Anne Thurin Indra de Soysa Torunn Tryggestad Administration Kendra Dupuy Ola Tunander Visiting Scholars Lars Even Andersen Jon Elster Henrik Urdal Vera Achvarina Lene Kristin Borg Scott Gates (CSCW Director) Hilde Henriksen Waage Trond Bakkevig Kai Robert Braaten Camilla Gjerde Hanne Fjelde Eystein Emberland Kristian Skrede Gleditsch Advisers Stein Erik Horjen Andrew Feltham Nils Petter Gleditsch Joachim Carlsen Pablo Kalmanovitz Damian Laws Kristian Berg Harpviken Ingeborg Haavardsson Kristoffer Lidén Svein Normann Wenche Hauge Gina Lende Nihara Ranjan Nayak Lorna Quilario Sandberg Håvard Hegre Maria Victoria Perotti Martha Snodgrass Helga Hernes Research Assistants Paul Roe Matilde Perez Herranz -
Comparative Connections a Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations
Comparative Connections A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations China-Russia Relations: Mounting Challenges and Multilateralism Yu Bin Wittenberg University China-Russia economic relations were “reset” on New Year’s Day 2011 when the 1,000-km Skovorodino-Daqing branch pipeline was officially opened. The pipeline, which took some 15 years from conception to completion, will transport 15 million tons of crude annually for the next 20 years. The low-key ceremony marking the launch of the pipeline at the Chinese border city of Mohe was followed by several rounds of bilateral consultations on diplomatic and strategic issues in January. In March and April, Moscow and Beijing sought to invigorate their “joint ventures” – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) forum – at a time when both Moscow and Beijing feel the need for more coordination to address several regional and global challenges and crises. Fifth round of China-Russia Strategic Security Talks Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo visited Moscow on Jan. 23-25 to attend the fifth round of China-Russia Strategic Security Talks with his Russian counterpart Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev. Chinese media reported that Dai had an “in-depth exchange” of views with the Russians on “important international and regional issues of common concern.” The talks were initiated in 2005 and the first round of consultations took place in Beijing in December 2009, when Russia and China signed a protocol on strategic security cooperation. The next round is scheduled to be held later this year in China. There were several major issues for this round of the bilateral security talks. -
Russia in East Central Europe: Means of Pressure and Channels Of
Pavel Baev F Russia in East Central Europe: Means of Pressure and Channels of Influence* June 2016 *With the support of DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy), French Ministry of Defence, under “Observatoire Russie, Europe orientale et Caucase” Table of Contents oui pour alignement justifié INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 4 NEW GEOPOLITICS OF THE “FRONTLINE ZONE” WITH RUSSIA ................................................................. 6 RUSSIAN ENERGY POLICY IN ECE: A BROKEN TOOL? .... 9 Gazprom’s pipelines, prices and promises ............... 9 Nuclear energy track ............................................... 11 RUSSIAN EXPORT OF CORRUPTION AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT ........................................................ 14 From buying friends to cultivating malcontents ...... 14 The art of propaganda war ...................................... 17 RUSSIAN “HARD SECURITY” DESIGNS FOR EAST CENTRAL EUROPE .................................................. 20 Experimenting with military pressure in the Baltic theater .................................................................... 20 Post-Crimea reconfiguration of the Black Sea theater .................................................................... 23 The nuclear threat and the missile defense irritant . 25 CONCLUSION: THE SHIFTING INTERPLAY OF DIRTY POLITICS AND MILITARY RISKS .............................. 28 Author Dr Pavel K. Baev is a Research Director and Professor at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo -
The Search for Common Ground
EURASIAN SECURITY The Search for Common Ground Policy Perspectives May 2011 IERES • THE INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN, RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN STUDIES PONARS Eurasia is a global network of social scientists that seeks to promote scholarly work and policy engagement on transnational and comparative topics within the Eurasian space. PONARS Eurasia is based at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. Edited by Alexander Schmemann and Cory Welt PONARS Eurasia The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University 1957 E Street, NW, Suite 412 Washington, DC 20052 Tel: (202) 994-6340 www.ponarseurasia.org © PONARS Eurasia 2011. All rights reserved. Cover images: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad delivers a speech during the Caspian Sea leaders summit in Tehran, Iran (2007). (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi) U.S. Vice President Joe Biden gestures during his speech at Moscow State University (2011). He told the audience that Washington supports Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko) Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon listen to a facility officer while touring the Soviet-built Okno (Window) complex in Nurek, 30 miles southeast -
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION in CYPRUS 24Th February 2013 (2Nd Round)
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN CYPRUS 24th February 2013 (2nd round) European Elections monitor Nicos Anastasiades is the new President of the Republic of Cyprus Abstract : Corinne Deloy The leader of the Democratic Assembly (DISY), Nicos Anastasiades, also supported by the Demo- Translated by helen Levy cratic Party (DIKO) was elected to the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus in the second round of voting on 24th February 2013. He won 57.48% of the vote ahead of former Healthcare Minister (2011-2012) Stavros Malas (Progressive Workers’ Party, AKEL), who won 42.52% of the vote. Turnout totalled 81.58% - 9.26 points less in comparison with the second round of voting in the Results previous election on 17th and 24th February 2008. 2nd round Results of the Presidential Election on 17th and 24th February in Cyprus Turnout: 83.14%% (1st round) and 81.58% (2nd round) It is obligatory to vote in Cyprus) No. of votes % of votes No. of votes % of votes Candidates won won won won (1st round) (1st round) (2nd round) (2nd round) Nicos Anastasiades (Democratic Assembly, 200 591 45.46 236 965 57.48 DISY) Stavros Malas (Progressive Workers’ Party, 118 755 26.91 175 267 42.52 AKEL) George Lilikas (Movement for Social-Demo- 109 996 24.93 cracy, EDEK) Giorgos Charalambous (People’s National 3 899 0.88 Front, ELAM) Praxoula Antoniadou Kyriakou (United 2 678 0.61 Democrats, EDI) Makaria-Andri Stylianou 1 898 0.43 Lakis Ioannou (People’s Socialist Move- 1 278 0.29 ment LASOK) Solon Gregoriou 792 0.18 Kostas Kyriacou 722 0.16 Andreas Efstratiou 434 0.10 Loukas Stavrou 213 0.05 Source : http://www.elections.gov.cy/English/Islandwide “I publicly congratulate Nicos Anastasiades. -
NEGOTIATIONS OVER DIVIDED CYPRUS March 2014
NEGOTIATIONS OVER DIVIDED CYPRUS March 2014 Negotiations over Divided Cyprus March 2014 Page 2 Negotiations over Divided Cyprus Table of Contents I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 3 II. The Limits of Federal Reunification ................................................................................. 6 A. Fraying Parameters .................................................................................................... 6 B. Measures of Lost Confidence ..................................................................................... 9 C. Hopes of a Gas Windfall Fuel Divisions .................................................................. 10 D. A Conflict That Has Partly Solved Itself .................................................................. 12 E. The Reality: Exhaustion ........................................................................................... 13 III. Finding an Alternative Settlement ................................................................................. 14 A. A Greek Cypriot Rethink .......................................................................................... 16 B. Turkish Cypriots Lose Faith ..................................................................................... 19 C. Turkey’s Need to Reach Out ..................................................................................... 20 D. Greece Engages ........................................................................................................