US-Russia Relations
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CONGRESSIONAL PROGRAM U.S.-Russia Relations: Policy Challenges in a New Era May 30 – June 4, 2017 Berlin, Germany Copyright @ 2017 by The Aspen Institute The Aspen Institute One Dupont Circle, NW Washington, DC 20036-1133 Published in the United States of America in 2017 by The Aspen Institute All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Pub #17/015 ISBN: 0-89843-668-0 U.S. Russia Relations: Policy Challenges in a New Era May 30 – June 4, 2017 The Aspen Institute Congressional Program Table of Contents Rapporteur’s Summary Matthew Rojansky ........................................................................................................................................ 3 Demands on Russian Foreign Policy and Its Drivers: Looking Out Five Years (2017-2022) Dmitri Trenin ............................................................................................................................................. 11 Putin’s Image and Russian National Interests Elizabeth Wood .......................................................................................................................................... 19 What would Kennan say about Putin's Russia? Slawomir Debski ........................................................................................................................................ 25 The Big Aim for the Big Deal: Building a Stable Peace and a Conflict Resolution Mechanism in Eastern Europe Mykhail Minakov ....................................................................................................................................... 29 Nuclear Weapons Issues and Strategic Security: Understanding Russian and American Motivations Driving Policy Decisions Linton Brooks ............................................................................................................................................. 33 Nuclear Weapons Issues and Strategic Security: Understanding Russian and American Motivations Driving Policy; The Future of the INF Treaty Sergey Rogov ............................................................................................................................................. 39 U.S.-Russian Relations: Policy Challenges in a New Era Thomas Graham ......................................................................................................................................... 59 The Light and Dark Sides of the Trump Administration Dmitry Suslov ............................................................................................................................................. 63 Russia’s Role in the U.S. Elections: The Case for Caution George Beebe ............................................................................................................................................. 69 1 Russian Cyber Operations: Four Realities, Two that Can Change Bruce McClintock ...................................................................................................................................... 75 Did the Sanctions Work? Sergey Aleksashenko .................................................................................................................................. 81 Russia’s Economy Under Sanctions & Weak Oil: Surviving, But Far From Thriving Christopher Weafer .................................................................................................................................... 87 Friend or Foe, Putin's Making the Most of Trump Jill Dougherty ............................................................................................................................................ 93 The Entitled: Why the Kremlin Had Such Big Expectations From a Trump Presidency Maxim Trudolyubov ................................................................................................................................... 95 A Permanent State of Sanctions? Proposal for a More Flexible EU Sanctions Policy Toward Russia Sabine Fischer ........................................................................................................................................... 99 Conference Agenda .................................................................................................................................. 107 Conference Participants ............................................................................................................................ 115 2 U.S.-Russia Relations: Policy Challenges in a New Era Rapporteur’s Summary Matthew Rojansky Director, The Kennan Institute, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Setting the Scene Russians, in turn, were described as obsessed with protecting their vulnerable security and From May 30 to June 4, 2017, a bipartisan group sovereignty. One participant called this the “June, of fourteen members of Congress convened in 1941 complex,” a reference to Moscow’s Berlin, Germany for an in depth analysis of Russia preoccupation with preventing another costly and U.S.-Russia relations, under the auspices of the surprise attack and near defeat like it experienced in Aspen Congressional Program. The members were World War II. For this reason, Russians are joined by more than a dozen of the world’s leading unwilling to recognize another world power as experts on topics ranging from conventional and leader or hegemon, developing an alternate narrative nuclear security to economics and media. They also in which Russia, as the perennial underdog, leads the heard from current and former senior officials of the resistance against mightier nations, and punches European Union, Germany, and Russia, and they above its weight, aiming to secure recognition as a met directly with counterparts from the German coequal with the United States on the global stage. Bundestag. This resistance is sanctified by the authorities’ Participants were well aware of the historic emphasis on traditional, Orthodox Christian values, significance of holding this meeting in Berlin, which, they argue, western countries have largely particularly at a moment of such high tension in abandoned. relations between East and West, with considerable Where Americans saw Russian aggression and risks for global security. Members noted that in violation of basic international norms in Ukraine, Berlin, history was all around them. The discussion, Russians described a necessary counter-offensive recognizing the lingering effects of the Soviet against hostile European and American intervention Union’s collapse on today’s Russians, paid to pull Ukraine into an anti-Russian alliance. especially close attention to the example of Weimar Russian leader Vladimir Putin himself has talked Germany, a former great power whose leaders and about the vital importance of securing Russia’s population felt humiliated and insecure in the Black Sea Fleet base in Crimea, where he said he aftermath of World War I. would be willing to welcome NATO ships as A Difficult Period in visitors, but never to be welcomed by NATO—a reference to the Alliance’s 2008 Summit Declaration U.S.-Russia Relations that Ukraine “will become” a NATO member. The From the outset of the discussion, it was clear Kremlin has developed a historical and ideological that U.S.-Russia relations are at a difficult and even narrative about Crimea as the cradle of Russian dangerous low point. Russians and Americans Orthodoxy to justify the policy that if Ukraine goes approached the main points of difficulty with West, it goes without Crimea. radically divergent narratives. Russians described Russians and Americans saw the crisis in Syria Americans who enjoyed unrivaled prosperity and in similarly divergent terms, with agreement only on security as a dominant power, and saw themselves as the need to combat terrorism and to stem the the proverbial “City on a Hill” and the self- humanitarian catastrophe. Likewise, Russians appointed “slayer of dragons” from fascism and offered little in response to the outrage and concern communism to terrorism. Russians also bemoaned expressed by U.S. participants about the Kremlin’s the lack of a peer competitor to balance U.S. power. alleged cyber, information, influence and other 3 operations aimed at U.S. and European elections. including recognition of Russia’s sphere of Instead, Russians drew a moral and geopolitical “privileged” interests or influence in the post-Soviet equivalence with their own idea that Washington has space or its coequal status as a world power. engaged in a relentless drive for “regime change” Nonetheless, Russians argued that even if they abroad, especially in the former Soviet space. cannot “win” in a traditional zero-sum confrontation with Washington, they are determined not to accept Not a New Cold War further surrender, diminishment or defeat. Despite the divergence of U.S. and Russian What Can Now Be Done? narratives, the litanies of past grievances, and the recurrence of “tit for tat” approaches, members Reflecting their deep concern about rising noted the many respects in which the current conflict tension between Moscow and Washington, scholars with Russia was not merely a repetition of the Cold offered only a limited roadmap for the U.S.-Russia War. As one scholar cautioned, “if you accept the agenda in the foreseeable future. Russians who paid Cold War analogy, you’ll be looking for things that close attention to U.S. politics were especially aren’t there.” concerned that Washington’s mood was hardening against improvement of relations, and that therefore On the positive side of the ledger,