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CTC Sentinel 7 MARCH 2014 . VOL 7 . ISSUE 3 Contents The War of Jihadists Against FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The War of Jihadists Against Jihadists Jihadists in Syria in Syria By Nelly Lahoud and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi By Nelly Lahoud & Muhammad al-`Ubaydi REPORTS 6 The Finnish Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria By Juha Saarinen 10 The Narco of Narcos: A Profile of Fugitive Mexican Druglord Rafael Caro-Quintero By Malcolm Beith 13 The Caucasus Emirate: From Anti-Colonialist Roots to Salafi-Jihad By Derek Henry Flood 17 The Evolution of the Ethnic Baluch Insurgency in Iran By Chris Zambelis 21 A Profile of the Informal Anarchist Federation in Italy By Francesco Marone 25 Recent Highlights in Political Violence 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Rebel fighters after seizing the Aleppo headquarters of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant on January 8, 2014. - AFP/Getty Images n february 2, 2014, al- bound by organizational ties to it and is Qa`ida released a statement not responsible for the ISIL’s actions.”2 declaring that “it has no connection” with the “group” This article discusses the context of the Ocalled the Islamic State in Iraq and the statement, its significance, its impact Levant (ISIL).1 The statement further on the jihadist landscape and concludes highlighted that al-Qa`ida was not by assessing its potential consequences responsible for founding the ISIL and on Ayman al-Zawahiri’s leadership. It About the CTC Sentinel was not privy to the deliberations that finds that al-Zawahiri’s once symbolic The Combating Terrorism Center is an led to its establishment. That is why, the leadership over various jihadist groups independent educational and research statement continued, “The ISIL is not is now undermined, and the ISIL has institution based in the Department of Social a branch of al-Qa`ida, the latter is not clearly emerged as a rival of al-Qa`ida. Sciences at the United States Military Academy, The article also finds that the Syrian West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses arena, and potentially the Iraqi the Center’s global network of scholars and 1 Tanzim Qa`idat al-Jihad – al-Qiyada al-`Amma, “Bayan landscape, will serve as the war of practitioners to understand and confront bi-Sha’ni `Alaqat Jama`at Qa`idat al-Jihad bi-Jama`at jihadists against jihadists as a result contemporary threats posed by terrorism and al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-`Iraq wa-al-Sham, Markaz al- of the public schism between the ISIL other forms of political violence. Fajr li-al-I`lam,” Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, Febru- and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). This is not ary 2, 2014. For consistency, this article uses “al-Qa`ida” about “near enemy” or “far enemy,” but instead of “Qa`idat al-Jihad.” For the possible nuance be- is equivalent to suicide or, in jihadist The views expressed in this report are those of tween the two names, see Nelly Lahoud, “The Merger of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, parlance, martyrdom in concert. Al-Shabab and Qa`idat al-Jihad,” CTC Sentinel 5:2 (2012), the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. footnote #6. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are by Nelly Lahoud. 2 Ibid. 1 MARCH 2014 . VOL 7. ISSUE 3 The Context of the Statement leaked the letter in June, one cannot it, to the authority of the ISI.9 U.S. and The ISIL is not a new group that recently help but wonder whether he lent a Iraqi forces killed Abu `Umar and Abu emerged on the scene. It is the same helping hand to al-Jazira when the audio Hamza in April 2010, and Abu Bakr al- group that until April 2013 called itself of the letter was leaked in November. Baghdadi assumed the leadership of the the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which ISI as Abu `Umar’s successor. Ayman al-Zawahiri had considered to be The Significance of the Statement a branch of al-Qa`ida and had publicly The statement marked the first time that Two serious implications, however, praised on numerous occasions.3 Yet a al-Qa`ida publicly disowned a jihadist resulted as a consequence of this pledge. public dispute emerged in April 2013, group. To be sure, the leadership of The first concerns the very notion when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader al-Qa`ida has on numerous occasions of declaring an “Islamic state”: this of the ISI, unilaterally proclaimed the dissociated itself from attacks entails elaborate conditions, including founding of the ISIL by declaring a characterized by indiscriminate killings, providing security to the populace merger between his group and that of JN particularly those that targeted Muslim residing in the territory of the “state” in Syria. The merger came as a surprise civilians.6 Yet at no point did al-Qa`ida and making jihadists accountable to to the leader of JN, Abu Muhammad al- publicly rebuke a jihadist group by good governance, an accountability Julani, who quickly rejected it, publicly name. that the ISI could hardly deliver, not least given the occupation of Iraq by The ISIL’s defiance of al-Qa`ida is not U.S. forces at the time. That is why “The statement marked new, however, and although it was internal communiqués showed that the first time that al- not made public, captured internal some religious scholars considered the communiqués authored by al-Qa`ida ISI to be unlawful,10 and some jihadist Qa`ida publicly disowned a leaders demonstrated the rift that the leaders considered Abu Hamza and Abu jihadist group.” Iraq-based group has caused in the `Umar to be “extremists,” “repulsive,” jihadist world. Disagreements began as and “lack[ing] wisdom.”11 For the same early as 2005 when the group was still reason, Usama bin Ladin mocked al- called “al-Qa`ida in Mesopotamia” and Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) explaining that “we were not consulted” under the leadership of Abu Mus`ab for wanting to declare an Islamic state about the merger.4 Before long, in June al-Zarqawi. The latter’s relentless in Yemen,12 and urged Somalia’s al- 2013, al-Zawahiri intervened, annulling attacks against Shi`a in Iraq alarmed al- Shabab not to go that route.13 Indeed, the merger and therefore the very Qa`ida’s central leadership, prompting al-Qa`ida’s recent statement disowning concept of the ISIL, and appointed Abu al-Zawahiri and `Atiyya al-Libi7 to send the ISIL does not admit that it represents Khalid al-Suri, a member of the Syrian al-Zarqawi gentle reminders that it was a “state”; instead, it refers to it as the militant group Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, not the general public, but the Americans “group” that calls itself a “state.” The to serve as an arbitrator between the and their Iraqi collaborators, who criticism is made more apparent when two groups.5 should be the target of his attacks.8 The the statement derisively remarks that situation took a turn for the worse when “we do not hasten to declare emirates Al-Zawahiri’s intervention was in the in late 2006 al-Zarqawi’s successor, and states…that we impose on people, form of a private communiqué to the Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, pledged then declare whoever disapproves of leaders of the ISI and JN, but it was allegiance to Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi’s such entities to be a rebel (kharij) [against leaked to al-Jazira as a typed letter. newly formed group, the “Islamic State whom it is lawful to fight].”14 When the ISI continued to operate of Iraq” (ISI), thereby submitting the under its new name, the ISIL, and “army of al-Qa`ida,” as Abu Hamza put The second serious and related debates among jihadists surrounding implication pertains to Abu Hamza’s the authenticity of the letter ensued, 6 See, among others, Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Tawjihat oath to Abu `Umar when he pledged an audio statement of the same letter, `Amma li-al-`Amal al-Jihadi,” Shabakat Shumukh al- that “I hereby enlist under your with the unmistakable voice of al- Islam, September 13, 2013. direct leadership 12,000 fighters who Zawahiri, was leaked to al-Jazira in 7 In addition to being one of the public faces of global November 2013, leaving no doubt as jihad until he was killed in August 2011, the declassi- 9 Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, “Inna al-Hukma illa li-llah,” to its authorship. While it is not clear fied Abbottabad documents show that many of Bin La- November 10, 2006. The ISI was announced on October whether al-Zawahiri intentionally din’s communications were done through `Atiyya. His 15, 2006. real name is Jamal Ibrahim Ishtiwi al-Misrati and is also 10 Harmony Document SOCOM-2012-0000014. All 3 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Tawhid al-Kalima hawla Kalimat known by two aliases: Abu `Abd al-Rahman and `Ati- Harmony documents can be accessed at the following al-Tawhid,” Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, April 2013. yyatullah (`Atiyya is short for the latter). He was born in URL: www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmo- 4 Abu Muhammad al-Julani, “Hawla Sahati al-Sham,” 1970 in Misrata, Libya, pursued Islamic religious studies ny-program. A document can be queried by entering the Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, April 2013. in Mauritania, then joined jihad in Algeria. He went to identification code into the search field. 5 “Al-Zawahiri Yulghi Damj ‘Jihadiyyi’ Suriya wa-al- Afghanistan in the late 1990s and was killed in a drone 11 Harmony Document SOCOM-2012-0000011, p.
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