march 2014 . Vol 7 . Issue 3

Contents The War of Jihadists Against

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The War of Jihadists Against Jihadists Jihadists in Syria in Syria By Nelly Lahoud and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi By Nelly Lahoud & Muhammad al-`Ubaydi

Reports 6 The Finnish Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria By Juha Saarinen 10 The Narco of Narcos: A Profile of Fugitive Mexican Druglord Rafael Caro-Quintero By Malcolm Beith 13 The Caucasus Emirate: From Anti-Colonialist Roots to Salafi-Jihad By Derek Henry Flood 17 The Evolution of the Ethnic Baluch Insurgency in Iran By Chris Zambelis 21 A Profile of the Informal Anarchist Federation in Italy By Francesco Marone

25 Recent Highlights in Political Violence 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

Rebel fighters after seizing the Aleppo headquarters of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant on January 8, 2014. - AFP/Getty Images n february 2, 2014, al- bound by organizational ties to it and is Qa`ida released a statement not responsible for the ISIL’s actions.”2 declaring that “it has no connection” with the “group” This article discusses the context of the Ocalled the Islamic State in Iraq and the statement, its significance, its impact Levant (ISIL).1 The statement further on the jihadist landscape and concludes highlighted that al-Qa`ida was not by assessing its potential consequences responsible for founding the ISIL and on Ayman al-Zawahiri’s leadership. It About the CTC Sentinel was not privy to the deliberations that finds that al-Zawahiri’s once symbolic The Combating Terrorism Center is an led to its establishment. That is why, the leadership over various jihadist groups independent educational and research statement continued, “The ISIL is not is now undermined, and the ISIL has institution based in the Department of Social a branch of al-Qa`ida, the latter is not clearly emerged as a rival of al-Qa`ida. Sciences at the United States Military Academy, The article also finds that the Syrian West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses arena, and potentially the Iraqi the Center’s global network of scholars and 1 Tanzim Qa`idat al-Jihad – al-Qiyada al-`Amma, “Bayan landscape, will serve as the war of practitioners to understand and confront bi-Sha’ni `Alaqat Jama`at Qa`idat al-Jihad bi-Jama`at jihadists against jihadists as a result contemporary threats posed by terrorism and al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-`Iraq wa-al-Sham, Markaz al- of the public schism between the ISIL other forms of political violence. Fajr li-al-I`lam,” Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, Febru- and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). This is not ary 2, 2014. For consistency, this article uses “al-Qa`ida” about “near enemy” or “far enemy,” but instead of “Qa`idat al-Jihad.” For the possible nuance be- is equivalent to suicide or, in jihadist The views expressed in this report are those of tween the two names, see Nelly Lahoud, “The Merger of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, parlance, martyrdom in concert. Al-Shabab and Qa`idat al-Jihad,” CTC Sentinel 5:2 (2012), the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. footnote #6. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are by Nelly Lahoud. 2 Ibid.

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The Context of the Statement leaked the letter in June, one cannot it, to the authority of the ISI.9 U.S. and The ISIL is not a new group that recently help but wonder whether he lent a Iraqi forces killed Abu `Umar and Abu emerged on the scene. It is the same helping hand to al-Jazira when the audio Hamza in April 2010, and Abu Bakr al- group that until April 2013 called itself of the letter was leaked in November. Baghdadi assumed the leadership of the the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which ISI as Abu `Umar’s successor. Ayman al-Zawahiri had considered to be The Significance of the Statement a branch of al-Qa`ida and had publicly The statement marked the first time that Two serious implications, however, praised on numerous occasions.3 Yet a al-Qa`ida publicly disowned a jihadist resulted as a consequence of this pledge. public dispute emerged in April 2013, group. To be sure, the leadership of The first concerns the very notion when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader al-Qa`ida has on numerous occasions of declaring an “Islamic state”: this of the ISI, unilaterally proclaimed the dissociated itself from attacks entails elaborate conditions, including founding of the ISIL by declaring a characterized by indiscriminate killings, providing security to the populace merger between his group and that of JN particularly those that targeted Muslim residing in the territory of the “state” in Syria. The merger came as a surprise civilians.6 Yet at no point did al-Qa`ida and making jihadists accountable to to the leader of JN, Abu Muhammad al- publicly rebuke a jihadist group by good governance, an accountability Julani, who quickly rejected it, publicly name. that the ISI could hardly deliver, not least given the occupation of Iraq by The ISIL’s defiance of al-Qa`ida is not U.S. forces at the time. That is why “The statement marked new, however, and although it was internal communiqués showed that the first time that al- not made public, captured internal some religious scholars considered the communiqués authored by al-Qa`ida ISI to be unlawful,10 and some jihadist Qa`ida publicly disowned a leaders demonstrated the rift that the leaders considered Abu Hamza and Abu jihadist group.” Iraq-based group has caused in the `Umar to be “extremists,” “repulsive,” jihadist world. Disagreements began as and “lack[ing] wisdom.”11 For the same early as 2005 when the group was still reason, Usama bin Ladin mocked al- called “al-Qa`ida in Mesopotamia” and Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) explaining that “we were not consulted” under the leadership of Abu Mus`ab for wanting to declare an Islamic state about the merger.4 Before long, in June al-Zarqawi. The latter’s relentless in Yemen,12 and urged Somalia’s al- 2013, al-Zawahiri intervened, annulling attacks against Shi`a in Iraq alarmed al- Shabab not to go that route.13 Indeed, the merger and therefore the very Qa`ida’s central leadership, prompting al-Qa`ida’s recent statement disowning concept of the ISIL, and appointed Abu al-Zawahiri and `Atiyya al-Libi7 to send the ISIL does not admit that it represents Khalid al-Suri, a member of the Syrian al-Zarqawi gentle reminders that it was a “state”; instead, it refers to it as the militant group Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, not the general public, but the Americans “group” that calls itself a “state.” The to serve as an arbitrator between the and their Iraqi collaborators, who criticism is made more apparent when two groups.5 should be the target of his attacks.8 The the statement derisively remarks that situation took a turn for the worse when “we do not hasten to declare emirates Al-Zawahiri’s intervention was in the in late 2006 al-Zarqawi’s successor, and states…that we impose on people, form of a private communiqué to the Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, pledged then declare whoever disapproves of leaders of the ISI and JN, but it was allegiance to Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi’s such entities to be a rebel (kharij) [against leaked to al-Jazira as a typed letter. newly formed group, the “Islamic State whom it is lawful to fight].”14 When the ISI continued to operate of Iraq” (ISI), thereby submitting the under its new name, the ISIL, and “army of al-Qa`ida,” as Abu Hamza put The second serious and related debates among jihadists surrounding implication pertains to Abu Hamza’s the authenticity of the letter ensued, 6 See, among others, Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Tawjihat oath to Abu `Umar when he pledged an audio statement of the same letter, `Amma li-al-`Amal al-Jihadi,” Shabakat Shumukh al- that “I hereby enlist under your with the unmistakable voice of al- Islam, September 13, 2013. direct leadership 12,000 fighters who Zawahiri, was leaked to al-Jazira in 7 In addition to being one of the public faces of global November 2013, leaving no doubt as jihad until he was killed in August 2011, the declassi- 9 Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, “Inna al-Hukma illa li-llah,” to its authorship. While it is not clear fied Abbottabad documents show that many of BinLa- November 10, 2006. The ISI was announced on October whether al-Zawahiri intentionally din’s communications were done through `Atiyya. His 15, 2006. real name is Jamal Ibrahim Ishtiwi al-Misrati and is also 10 Harmony Document SOCOM-2012-0000014. All 3 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Tawhid al-Kalima hawla Kalimat known by two aliases: Abu `Abd al-Rahman and `Ati- Harmony documents can be accessed at the following al-Tawhid,” Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, April 2013. yyatullah (`Atiyya is short for the latter). He was born in URL: www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmo- 4 Abu Muhammad al-Julani, “Hawla Sahati al-Sham,” 1970 in Misrata, Libya, pursued Islamic religious studies ny-program. A document can be queried by entering the Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, April 2013. in Mauritania, then joined jihad in Algeria. He went to identification code into the search field. 5 “Al-Zawahiri Yulghi Damj ‘Jihadiyyi’ Suriya wa-al- Afghanistan in the late 1990s and was killed in a drone 11 Harmony Document SOCOM-2012-0000011, p. 1. `Iraq,” al-Jazira, June 9, 2013. It should be noted that strike in Pakistan on August 22, 2011. 12 Harmony Document SOCOM-2012-0000019, pp. 19, Ahrar al-Sham is part of the Islamic Front (al-Jabha al- 8 See the captured letters authored by Ayman al-Zawa- 23. Islamiyya), one of the largest coalitions of militant groups hiri and `Atiyatullah al-Libi to Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi. 13 Harmony Document SOCOM-2012-0000005. operating in Syria under the banner of Islam. Ahrar al- These are available at www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawa- 14 “Bayan bi-Sha’ni `Alaqat Jama`at Qa`idat al-Jihad bi- Sham was a signatory to the charter that the Islamic hiris-letter-to-zarqawi-original and www.ctc.usma.edu/ Jama`at al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-`Iraq wa-al-Sham, Front released in November 2013. posts/atiyahs-letter-to-zarqawi-original. Markaz al-Fajr li-al-I`lam.”

2 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 constitute the army of al-Qa`ida.” Did a strong presence in the eyes of their the schism to years of scheming by “the the ISI cease to be under the leadership enemies, strategically-driven groups RAND Corporation” and similar think- of al-Qa`ida in 2006, and, indeed, did the are willing to present a unified front tanks to create a “good” al-Qa`ida and pledge by Abu Hamza effectively submit and avoid airing the dirty laundry of a “bad” al-Qa`ida, a plot which time Bin Ladin’s authority to al-Baghdadi? other groups in public. Those driven by has now come to divide jihadists.21 At Bin Ladin had admitted al-Zarqawi’s sectarian or pedestrian differences are times, the forum contributions reached group into the fold of al-Qa`ida in willing to sacrifice strategic objectives a certain level of vulgarity that saw al- December 2004, and because the leader and rush to air their grievances with Julani getting cursed,22 and numerous of the “Islamic state” is meant to be amir other groups for the sake of purifying references gently criticizing al-Zawahiri al-mu’minin (Leader of the Faithful) to the creed or upstaging their competitors. and calling on him to renege on his whose political authority all Muslims Yet it is evident that the ISI had long decision.23 must submit, the argument can be made been testing the limits of al-Qa`ida’s that al-Qa`ida transferred leadership to leaders. In an internal communiqué The online divide among members the ISI—at least technically. Put simply, dated early 2011, the American jihadist put those overseeing the forums in a “state” (like the ISI) is meant to have Adam Gadahn advised the leadership an unenviable position. Of the three authority over an organization (like al- that “it is necessary that al-Qa`ida websites considered to be reliable Qa`ida), not the other way around. publicly announces that it severs its by jihadists, Shabakat al-Fida’ al- organizational ties with the Islamic Islamiyya bore the brunt of the dispute Of course, Bin Ladin never pledged State of Iraq, and [to make known] that and has been accused of siding with allegiance to al-Baghdadi, but because the relationship between its leadership JN.24 The other two forums (Shabakat Bin Ladin did not go public and and that of the State [i.e., ISI/AQI] Shumukh al-Islam and Shabakat Ansar discredit the declared state, it became a have not existed for several years, and al-Mujahidin) had been experiencing fait accompli since the gravity of declaring that the decision to declare a State was technical difficulties, and were suffering a state was swept under the carpet. Now taken without consultation with the from intermittent shut downs.25 Rarely that Bin Ladin’s successor, al-Zawahiri, leadership, and this [ill-considered] in the history of jihadist websites did went public, disowning the “group” that innovation (qarar ijtihadi) led to divisions forum administrators intervene to calls itself a “state,” zealous members among jihadis and their supporters remove contributions by members; loyal to the ISIL are reminding jihadist inside and outside Iraq.”17 It is as if yet since the beginning of the public leaders of the (technical) landmines that Gadahn’s 2011 letter served as a draft divide between the ISIL and JN, not they had managed not to step on since for al-Qa`ida’s recent statement. only have they removed postings by 2006. One such member posted that members, but they have also removed when Abu Hamza made his pledge, he Impact on the Jihadist Landscape articles by pundits whose analyses and effectively subordinated the authority The broader jihadist reaction to the contributions in support of jihad had of Bin Ladin to the leadership of the ISI. public dispute between al-Qa`ida and for years animated discussions on the In other words, as the successor of Bin the ISIL initially translated into fierce forums.26 Ladin, al-Zawahiri is in no position to debates and quarrels on jihadist forums, be giving orders to “amir al-mu’minin al- the likes of which have never been 18 Baghdadi”; instead, he should be taking observed. Some, but not all, pundits 21 Yaman Mukhaddab, “al-Qa`ida al-Tayyiba wa-al- 19 them. The posting was removed three adopted a diplomatic approach. Some Khida`bi-al-Iiham,” Shabakat Shumukh al-Islam, times by forum administrators, which called on both sides to unite, but their January 10, 2014; Yaman Mukhaddab, “Harbu al-Fi’at 15 led the author to post it on JustPaste.It. language betrayed the group with wa-al-Jama`at,” Shabakat Shumukh al-Islam, January 20 which they sided; others attributed 15, 2014. Also see his article in support of the ISIL: Ya- Why did it take so long for al-Qa`ida man Mukhaddab, “Fa-Ya-Layta Qawmi Yaqra’un … `An to disown the ISI/ISIL publicly if the dam and Brian Fishman eds., Self-Inflicted Wounds: Dawlatu al-Amali Atahaddath,” January 9, 2014. problems began in 2005 and worsened Debates and Divisions Within Al-Qa`ida and its Periphery 22 Abu Shadia, “Ikhsa’ fa-lan Ta`duwa Qadraka,” Sha- in 2006? To put this in a broader (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2010), bakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, January 9, 2014. This essay context, it is useful to remember that pp. 100-131. was quickly removed by the forum administrator. some jihadist groups, such as al-Qa`ida, 17 Harmony Document SOCOM-2012-0000004, p. 8. 23 This is from a letter addressed to Ayman al-Zawahiri are driven by strategic considerations, 18 Abu Shadia, “Da`wa Muwajjaha li-Abi al-Fadl Madi and authored by Muhammad al-Zuhayri, who is de- while others, such as the ISI/ISIL, ila Munazara Maftuha,” Shabakat Shumukh al-Islam, scribed as the poet of al-Qa`ida, on Shabakat al-Fida’ al- are driven by sectarian differences January 10, 2014. Islamiyya, February 10, 2014. The letter was removed. 16 and pedestrian disputes. To project 19 Nasir al-Qa`ida, “Ham wa-`Ajil li-Ansar al-Muja- 24 See the numerous postings on Shabakat al-Fida’ al- hidin,” Shabakat Shumukh al-Islam, January 13, 2014. Islamiyya, including the ones posted on March 9, 2014, 15 Abu Mustafa al-Anbari, “Khadhaltum al-Dawla al- Pundits are not ordinary forum members who contrib- many of which have been removed by forum administra- Islamiyya,” Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, accessed ute their reactions to events; instead, they are established tors. January 22, 2014. writers who contribute analytical essays and are referred 25 It is possible that they actually shut themselves down 16 See Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction to on jihadist websites as great writers or contributors to avoid serving as the broadcasters of jihadist disputes. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 140- (Kibar al-Kuttab). 26 In addition to the examples listed in the previous foot- 143; Nelly Lahoud, Beware of Imitators: Al-Qa`ida through 20 See, for instance, the interventions by Abu al-Fadl notes, see for instance what is a fairly neutral contribu- the Lens of its Confidential Secretary (West Point, NY: Com- Madi that were designed to be neutral, yet it was clear tion by Husayn bin Mahmud, “Kashf al-Litham `amma bating Terrorism Center, 2012), pp. 41-54; Brynjar Lia, that he supported JN: Shabakat Shumukh al-Islam, Jan- Yajri fi al-Sham,” Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, Janu- “Jihadi Strategists and Doctrinarians,” in Assaf Mogha- uary 9, 2014. ary 9, 2014.

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Before long, what began as a public Raqqa. The geographical importance The Saudi cleric `Abdallah al-Mhisni dispute in April 2013 has since of al-Raqqa cannot be exaggerated: its claimed on his Twitter account that, developed into a bloody conflict that proximity to the border with Turkey prior to his death, al-Suri had told him is tearing apart the ISIL and JN and makes it critical for the flow of foreign that the ISIL had threatened to send five their respective supporters.27 It is fighters; its economic prospects are suicide bombers to kill him,38 although not clear which side initiated the assured given that it holds oil reserves the ISIL denied any responsibility.39 transgression: although the ISIL has and the Euphrates River runs through received the lion’s share of criticisms it; and it is also in the middle of five The assassination of al-Suri created in the mainstream media,28 it is also strategic provinces (Aleppo, Hasaka, shock waves in the jihadist world. In the case that statements by the ISIL Dayr al-Zur, Hums and Hama), hence his eulogy, JN leader Abu Muhammad in early January 2014 suggested that serving as a focal point for military al-Julani remarked that al-Suri fought members of the group were being expansion. The ISIL has admitted that the Syrian regime some 30 years ago, harassed, imprisoned and constrained it was behind al-Hadrami’s killing, which suggests that he may have in their movements by other militant justifying it on account of his apostasy been a member of the Syrian Muslim groups in Syria.29 Regardless of which (radda). The ISIL’s statement did not Brotherhood that bore the wrath of side transgressed first, the public provide supporting details.33 JN claims Hafiz al-Assad’s regime in the 1980s, statements by JN and the ISIL leaders that al-Hadrami had been duped into particularly in Hama.40 Al-Julani also (released in February and March pledging allegiance to the ISIL, but reported that al-Suri knew Bin Ladin 2014) suggest that the differences when al-Zawahiri made his judgment in and al-Zawahiri well, in addition to between the two groups are no longer favor of JN and when “he saw for himself “his jihad companion Shaykh Abu reconcilable. The audio statement by the crimes and torture of the innocents Mus`ab al-Suri,” the renown jihadist Abu `Abdallah al-Shami, a member of [ordered] by the [ISIL] governor of al- strategist.41 In a phone conversation JN’s consultative council,30 and the Raqqa [as a form of punishment] for from prison in Jordan, the Palestinian- response by the ISIL’s spokesperson, even the most minor and dubious errors born ideologue Abu Qatada al-Filastini Abu Muhammad al-`Adnani al- and pettiest causes, he returned to JN almost choked from distress as he Shami, released in early March left no dissociating himself from ISIL.”34 The described the importance of al-Suri room for mediation.31 The language of ISIL now controls al-Raqqa. and the respect he commanded in the “brotherhood” and “unity” that both jihadist world, believing that his death groups initially strived to maintain is The second key event that further was the worst “that has devastated us now replaced by accusatory vocabulary unleashed JN’s wrath was the killing since [the killing] of Bin Ladin.”42 littered with terms such as “liars,” of one of the leaders of Ahrar al-Sham, “betrayers,” and “enemies.”32 Abu Khalid al-Suri, in February 2014. It is perhaps because of al-Suri’s Al-Zawahiri nominated al-Suri to serve jihadist pedigree that al-Julani From the perspective of JN and its allies, as arbitrator in the disputes between thought he would receive the support two key events seem to have detonated the ISIL and JN. In January 2014, al- of jihadist leaders when he gave the their anger. The first is the kidnapping Suri released a public statement in ISIL an ultimatum, threatening that and killing of Abu Sa`d al-Hadrami, which he accused the ISIL of “crimes if the group refused to respond within the leader of JN in the province of al- and erroneous practices in the name five days of his statement and “did of jihad.”35 He further decried the way not cease to burden the umma [Islamic 27 The protagonists on the battlefield are many, but the in which he believed the ISIL was community] with this ignorant and main ones consist of the ISIL (supported by Katibat al- degrading those who have “liberated belligerent mindset and eradicate it Muhajirin led by Abu `Umar al-Shishani) on the one the country,” behaving as if it was even from Iraq, you know too well that hand, and JN and its seeming allies (the Islamic Front a real state while other groups were hundreds of virtuous brothers in Iraq 36 43 coalition, particularly the group Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh mere “platoons.” Soon thereafter, a await a signal to [remove you].” Al- 37 al-Mujahidin, and smaller militant groups). suicide bomber assassinated al-Suri. 28 Muhammad al-Najjar, “Abu Qatada Yuhajim Tan- 38 `Abdallah al-Mhisni, February 23, 2014, available at zim al-Dawla wa-Yu’ayyid Muhlat al-Nusra,” al-Jazira, 33 The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, “Bayan al- www.twitter.com/mhesne. February 27, 2014. See also Abu Qatada al-Filastini, “Ma Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-`Iraq wa-al-Sham – Wilayat al- 39 The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, “Bayan ba`da al-Muqaraba {Rabi` al-Mujahidin} … Waqi` wa- Raqqa Hawla ma Tashhaduhu al-Madina min Ahdath,” Mawqif al-Dawla al-Islamiyya min Maqalat al-Muftarin,” Amal,” Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, February 2014. Shabakat Shumukh al-Islam, January 13, 2014. March 1, 2014, available at www.justpaste.it/elax. 29 See, for example, “Nida’ mina al-Dawla al-Islamiyya 34 See the statement by the ISIL, posted January 13, 40 Abu Muhammad al-Julani, “Laytaka Rathaytani,” fi al-`Iraq wa-al-Sham,” Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, 2014, and the statement by Jabhat al-Nusra, “Raddan Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, February 24, 2014. January 4, 2014. `ala I`tiraf Jama`at al-Dawla bi-Qatli al-Sheikh Abi Sa`d 41 On the importance of Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, see Bryn- 30 Abu `Abdallah al-Shami, “La-Tubayyinannahu li-al- al-Hadrami,” January 15, 2014. jar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: the Life of al-Qaida Strate- Nas wa-la Taktumunahu,” March 3, 2014, available at 35 Abu Khalid al-Suri, “Risalat Munasaha min al-Sheikh gist Abu Mus`ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia University www.youtube.com/watch?v=njlyCHa-q7Y. Abu Khalid al-Suri,” Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, Jan- Press, 2008). One tweet by a certain Abu al-Bara’ al-Zah- 31 Abu Muhammad al-`Adnani al-Shami, “Thumma uary 16, 2014. rani reported that Abu Khalid was in fact the brother of Nabtahilu fa-Naj`alu La`natu Allahi `ala al-Khadhibin,” 36 Ibid. Abu Mus`ab al-Suri. See Abu al-Bara’ al-Zahrani, Feb- March 7, 2014, available at http://ia801306.us.archive. 37 The ISIL reportedly sent three suicide bombers on the ruary 24, 2014, available at www.twitter.com/Braa73. org/35/items/al_adnani/nabtahil.mp3. mission. For details, see Abu Yazan al-Shami, “Qissat 42 Abu Qatada al-Filastini, February 27, 2014, available 32 Such terminology is used by both al-Shami and al- Istishhad al-Sheikh Abi Khalid al-Suri,” February 2014, at www.youtube.com/watch?v=gem3m2bgGAA. `Adnani. available at www.justpaste.it/eiv5. 43 Abu Muhammad al-Julani, “Laytaka Rathaytani,”

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Julani miscalculated: the ISIL did not the foreign fighters in Syria appear to it was. Al-Zawahiri seems to have come begging, and days later a member be siding with the ISIL.47 overestimated the degree of his of JN’s Consultative Council, Abu influence. `Abdallah al-Shami, reneged on the Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Dilemma threat, complying with the urging of It is not clear if al-Zawahiri’s statement Jihadist groups around the world “scholars such as Abu Muhammad al- on February 10, 2014, and addressed are starting to take a position vis- Maqdisi and Abu Qatada al-Filastini,” to “our people in the Levant” amounts à-vis the Syrian jihadist scene, and who called for an end to the jihadist to a mea culpa. In it, he is at pains every group that does not condemn in-fighting in the Levant. Al-Shami reaching out that “we were addressing the ISIL is seen as undermining al- announced that JN would limit its all of you as brothers…and that the Zawahiri’s position, at least indirectly: actions to reclaiming the territory the brotherhood we share through Islam AQAP has taken a neutral stance; two ISIL usurped from JN and “to repelling is stronger than all the organizational Sinai-based groups, Majlis Shura al- the aggression of the ISIL.”44 bonds that are transient and subject to Mujahidin: Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis and change.”48 Regardless, al-Zawahiri’s Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, declared their From the perspective of the ISIL, it sees inability to exert decisive authority support to the ISIL;52 from his prison itself as the only credible jihadist group over the dispute between the ISIL and cell in Jordan and in an audio recording in Syria. Notwithstanding the jihadist JN has led to an unprecedented level of posted on YouTube, the Palestinian credentials of JN, the alliances it has public criticism against him on jihadist jihadist ideologue Abu Muhammad al- formed with Ahrar al-Sham of the Islamic forums. One forum member questioned Maqdisi initially criticized, somewhat Front has cast doubt on its commitment if al-Zawahiri can exert authority of any diplomatically, the ISIL for having to global jihad. In fairness to the ISIL, kind, lamenting: “Jihad was orphaned “rejected the order/judgment (amr) of while the charter of the Islamic Front is after you departed [Bin Ladin], and our brother Ayman,”53 but later the keen to emphasize the Islamic character we [the jihadists have all become] jihadist website Minbar al-Tawhid wa- of its program, it is committed to a orphans!!”49 Others accused al-Zawahiri al-Jihad released a statement “at his [al- nationalist agenda, focusing specifically of having “admitted the legitimacy of Maqdisi’s] urging” asserting that only on Syria as the “nation” and precluding Sykes-Picot,”50 one of the worst charges those statements released on al-Minbar any commitment to global jihad.45 More of which a jihadist leader could be should be considered reliable;54 Abu disturbing from a jihadist perspective accused. Sykes-Picot represents the 1916 `Iyad al-Tunisi, the leader of Ansar al- are leaked documents that are said agreement between the United Kingdom Shari`a in Tunisia, released a statement to detail the internal organization of and France in which they carved out supporting both groups;55 Abu Bakar Ahrar al-Sham. These documents reveal their respective spheres of influence in Ba`aysir, the leader of Indonesia’s that Ahrar al-Sham seeks to establish the Middle East in anticipation of the Jama`at Ansar al-Tawhid, released a “communication with external parties” fall of the Ottoman Empire, eventually statement from prison calling on all that include states and “liaise with leading to its division into nation- jihadists to unite in Syria;56 a statement foreign embassies” and even work “with states. signed by 20 scholars, including Abu the security intelligence of neighboring Mundhir al-Shanqiti,57 has endorsed the countries.”46 To be fair to al-Zawahiri, the ISIL;58 a group of jihadists in Khorasan, declassified Abbottabad documents If these documents are authentic, it revealed that Bin Ladin did not have 52 Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin: Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis, would be understandable for a jihadist much authority over the actions of “Bayan min Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin hawla ma Yah- 51 group to question whether the banner regional jihadist groups either. The duth fi Syria,” February 2, 2014. The support of Ansar of jihad under which JN is said to be main difference is that Bin Ladin was Bayt al-Maqdis was given in an audio statement by Abu fighting has been compromised by able to keep the jihadists’ dirty secrets Usama al-Misri, posted January 23, 2014, at Shabakat al- its alliance with groups espousing in hiding and therefore maintain an Fida’ al-Islamiyya. a nationalist agenda. The ISIL’s aura of dignity to his leadership in 53 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, March 2, 2014, available concern is further supported by the the jihadist world, however symbolic at www.youtube.com/watch?v=QAjX4Z445eo. many accounts that suggest that JN 54 Minbar al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, March 12, 2014. Sev- and other Syrian militant groups 47 See, for example, the account by Abu Mujahid al- eral jihadist websites, including Shabakat Shumukh al- are not as welcoming of muhajirun Shishani, “Hawla al-Mu’amara didda al-Dawla al-Is- Islam and Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, reposted the (foreign fighters) in their midst and lamiyya,” three parts, March 2014. The first two parts announcement. are keen to preserve an ansar (local/ can be accessed at www.justpaste.it/fursan-t-sha and 55 Abu `Iyad al-Tunisi, “Bayan Nusra wa-Ta’yid li- Syrian) membership. Indeed, most of www.justpaste.it/fursan-t-sha2. Ikhwanina al-Mujahidin bi-al-Sham,” Shabakat al-Fida’ 48 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Nida’ `Ajil li-Ahlina fi al- al-Islamiyya, January 15, 2014. Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, February 25, 2014. Sham,” Minbar al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, February 10, 56 Abu Bakar Ba`aysir, “Risala min Amir Tan- 44 “La-Tubayyinannahu li-al-Nas wa-la Taktumuna- 2014. zim Ansar al-Tawhid fi Indonesia,” March 10, hu.” 49 Ibn al-Dira, Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, January 2014, available at www.ansharuttauhid.com/read/ 45 See, for example, the Charter of the Islamic Front, 10, 2014. publikasi/404/#sthash.OJULQLP7.dpuf. “Mithaq al-Jabhat al-Islamiyya al-Suriyya,” Shabakat 50 Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, available at www.al- 57 Abu Mundhir al-Shanqiti is a legal scholar whose Ansar al-Mujahidin, November 2013. fidaa.org/vb/showthread.php?t=94883. writings are posted on the renowned jihadist website 46 Qisam, “al-Adilla wa-al-Barahin `ala ma Hadatha 51 See Nelly Lahoud et al., Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Minbar al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, which is devoted to jiha- fi al-Sham laysa Fitna,” Shabakat Shumukh al-Islam, Ladin Sidelined? (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism dist ideological materials. January 23, 2014. Center, 2012). 58 “Bayan al-Ukhwa al-Imaniyya fi Nusrat al-Dawla al-

5 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 supposedly in al-Zawahiri’s backyard, examines the potential impact of has endorsed the ISIL;59 and the jihadist The Finnish Foreign Fighter returning militants on the domestic website Shabakat Shumukh al-Islam Contingent in Syria radical Islamist scene in Finland. released a statement in support of the The article finds that approximately ISIL and counseled JN, whose current By Juha Saarinen 15 foreign fighters from Finland stance “does not please God,” to change have joined the conflict in Syria as its ways.60 Abu Muhammad al-Qawqazi, the historic mobilization of foreign combatants, and that the broad appeal the leader of the Caucasus Emirate, fighters1 joining the civil war in Syria of the Syrian conflict, the growth of the released a video statement appealing to has affected many countries with radical Islamist scene in Finland and the all jihadists from the Caucasus fighting little to no previous history of Muslim relative ease of traveling to Syria are the in Syria to avoid getting involved in foreign fighting, including Finland. In main factors behind this mobilization. this fitna (sedition) and not be misled March 2014, the Finnish Security and The majority of the Finnish fighters by those who claim to be on the right Intelligence Service (FSIS) stated that have reportedly joined jihadist groups, path.61 He addressed the leaders of both over 30 individuals had traveled to increasing the possibility that returning JN and the ISIL and called on them to Syria, approximately half of whom left to fighters will have a domestic impact. compromise through dialogue to end take part in the conflict as combatants.2 While the terrorist threat level in this fitna and accept the judgment of The majority of Finnish foreign fighters Finland may increase in the future either the “general leadership or a have sought to join “radical Islamic” as a result of the mobilization, a more Shari`a court.”62 AQIM and al-Shabab groups,3 and they have reportedly joined immediate concern is that returning have not yet weighed in on the dispute. factions loyal to Jabhat al-Nusra and foreign fighters—and perhaps those still the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant abroad—will seek to further expand the A coup is not what one would envisage (ISIL), as well as Kataib al-Muhajirin.4 radical Islamist scene, strengthen the happening in the jihadist world, but The FSIS is concerned about this jihadist strand within it, and increase this is a new era for jihadism. unprecedented mobilization, as well as the connections between Finland’s own the prospect of radicalized and battle- radical community and more developed Nelly Lahoud is Associate Professor at hardened jihadists returning to Finland ones abroad. the Combating Terrorism Center in the from Syria.5 Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Explaining the Mobilization Military Academy, West Point. This article examines the factors that The Syrian civil war is the first conflict may have contributed to Finnish with a notable involvement of Finnish Muhammad al-`Ubaydi is a research Muslim participation in the Syrian Muslim foreign fighters. Prior to the war assistant at the Combating Terrorism war. Additionally, it compiles publicly in Syria, there were few cases of Finnish Center and monitors Arabic jihadist available data on the Finnish foreign Muslim foreign fighters,6 although it is websites. fighter contingent, focusing on four difficult to analyze this trend—or lack publicly known fighters. Lastly, it thereof—because little public attention The viewpoints expressed in this article was paid to it prior to 2012.7 In addition do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. 1 For Thomas Hegghammer’s definition of a foreign to Syria, a small number of Finnish 8 Army or the Department of Defense. fighter as an agent “who 1) has joined, and operates with- fighters have traveled to Somalia, in the confines of, an insurgency, 2) lacks citizenship of while other parts of the Horn of Africa 9 10 the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, region and Yemen are also rumored 3) lacks affiliation to an official military organization, destinations. One potential foreign and 4) is unpaid,” see Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise fighter was detained by Georgian 11 of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization authorities en route to Chechnya. Islamiyya,” Shabakat al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, January 24, of Jihad,” International Security 35:3 (2010/11), pp. 53-94, 2014. 57-58. 6 In September 2011, FSIS director Antti Pelttari stated 59 Jam` min Mujahidi Khurasan, “al-Munasara al- 2 Paula Ropponen, “Supo: Syyrian taistelut vetävät that the overall number of Finnish foreign fighters was Khurasaniyya li-al-Dawla al-Islamiyya,” Shabakat joitakin puoleensa magneetin lailla,” Aamulehti, March “relatively small, not in the dozens.” See “Supo: Terrorist al-Fida’ al-Islamiyya, March 3, 2014. This statement is 5, 2014; Tuomas Portaankorva (@TPSupo), “Matkusta- Fighters Have Tried to Enter Finland,” Helsingin Sanomat signed by several jihadists whose identities are not well neita yhteensä yli 30, aseelliseen toimintaan pyrkijöitä n. International Edition, September 22, 2011. known (at least to these authors); however, the media puolet.,” Twitter, March 12, 2014. 7 Juha Saarinen, “The History of Jihadism in Finland wing that released this statement, Mu’assasat al-battar 3 “Violent Extremism in Finland – Situation Overview and an Early Assessment of Finnish Foreign Fighters in al-I`lamiyya, was founded by a group of members of the 2/2013,” Finland Ministry of the Interior, August 26, Syria,” Jihadology, November 21, 2013. jihadist website Shabakat Shumukh al-Islam and later 2013. The reports do not clarify whether Finnish foreign 8 “Finnish Security and Intelligence Service Annual Re- merged with al-Ma’sada Foundation, the media produc- fighters only joined Kataib al-Muhajirin before it merged port 2012,” Finnish Security Intelligence Service, March tion group for the same website. with two other groups in Spring 2013 and changed its 1, 2013. 60 “Bayan Ham: al-I`lan `an Mawqif Shabakat Shumukh name to Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa-al-Ansar or whether the 9 Kristiina Markkanen, “Suomalainenkin separatisti al-Islam min al-Ahdath al-Jariya fi al-Sham,” Shabakat group’s older name was used erroneously. saattaa taistella Somaliassa,” Helsingin Sanomat, May 6, Shumukh al-Islam, March 10, 2014. 4 Jarkko Sipilä, “Supo: Syyrian suomalaisjihadisteissa 2010. 61 Abu Muhammad al-Qawqazi, “Risalatu Nush li-Mu- muhii terrorismimongelma,” MTV, March 5, 2014. 10 Heidi Vaalisto, “Kaksi suomalaista kuollut Syyriassa,” jahidi al-Sham,” March 19, 2014, available at www.you- 5 “Violent Extremism in Finland – Situation Overview Ilta-Sanomat, August 2, 2013. tube.com/watch?v=p8V5lTAQ9jE. 2/2013”; “Security Police Eyeball Fighters Returning 11 Mika Parkkonen, “Finn Arrested in Georgia Wanted 62 Ibid. from Syrian Conflict,” YLE, January 10, 2014. to Join War in Chechnya,” Helsingin Sanomat Internation-

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No Finnish Muslim foreign fighters organizations” in Syria.17 Similarly, Notably, Finnish authorities cannot have been publicly reported in either the recently published FSIS annual legally prevent individuals from Afghanistan or Iraq.12 report for 2013 stated that there is traveling abroad, as foreign fighting an “increased willingness of persons and joining a terrorist group are not Why have so many Finnish fighters residing in Finland to take part in the criminalized under Finnish terrorism traveled to Syria?13 First, the radical organizations’ armed activity in legislation.24 This loophole leaves the humanitarian crisis in Syria and acts the region.”18 of violence by the regime, including the “Finnish authorities cannot alleged use of chemical weapons, have While this does not necessarily mean caused widespread outrage among the that all or even most of the Finnish legally prevent individuals global Sunni Muslim community. The fighters are jihadists,19 or even from traveling abroad, as widespread online dissemination of Muslims,20 the significant growth propaganda highlighting the suffering of the Finnish radical Islamist foreign fighting and joining scene in the past few years is a key a terrorist group are not prerequisite for the mobilization to “The majority of Finnish Syria. During previous mobilizations criminalized under Finnish fighters are young Sunni of European Muslim foreign fighters to terrorism legislation.” Afghanistan and Iraq, Finland’s radical Muslim men who were Muslim community was virtually either born in Finland non-existent.21 By 2013, however, the number of radicalized individuals Finnish authorities with limited means or moved there at a very residing in Finland numbered in to stop or limit the flow of foreign young age.” the hundreds, according to Finnish fighters out of Finland and into Syria.25 security officials,22 increasing the Additionally, Turkey has functioned as probability that radicalized individuals a convenient logistical hub for Finnish will travel abroad for foreign fighting and other European fighters.26 Thus far, of Syrian civilians encourages Finnish or encourage others to do so. The scale Ankara has largely been either unwilling Muslims to travel to Syria.14 The appeal of the mobilization to Syria suggests the or unable to prevent European foreign of the Syrian conflict has crossed jihadist strand has grown in par with fighters from entering Syria, and rebel ethnic boundaries and attracted non- the wider radical Islamist community. groups and criminal entrepreneurs radicalized Muslims, greatly widening operating near the Syrian-Turkish the pool of potential foreign fighters.15 Lastly, traveling to Syria from Finland border facilitate foreign fighters’ entry is relatively quick and inexpensive.23 to Syria.27 Second, the conflict in Syria has resonated particularly strongly among 17 “Violent Extremism in Finland – Situation Overview The Finnish Contingent and Individual the radical Islamist community in 2/2013,” p. 9. Fighters in Syria 16 Finland. In August 2013, the Finnish 18 “Finnish Security Intelligence Service Annual Report According to various publicly available Interior Ministry reported that out of 2013,” p. 6. statements and reports, the majority the 20 or more Finnish individuals in 19 It is currently not known exactly how many Finnish of Finnish fighters are young Sunni Syria, a majority are “jihadist travelers” Muslims were radicalized before traveling to Syria. The Muslim men who were either born in who intended to join “radical Islamic strong presence of various Islamist groups in Syria may Finland or moved there at a very young have allowed the jihadist faction to attract individuals age. Although the Finnish contingent who do not share their views. includes ethnic Finns who have 28 al Edition, September 19, 2006. 20 There are reports of Finnish mercenaries—i.e., in- converted to Islam, most of them come 29 12 Saarinen. dividuals with military training and/or experience who from various ethnic backgrounds. 13 This question is all the more pertinent since, accord- travel to Syria to become soldiers of fortune. Although ing to government reports and recent comments by they differ from foreign fighters as they are paid for their Little is known about why individual Finnish security officials, there is no organized recruit- services, it is not entirely clear whether these individuals fighters have decided to travel to Syria, ment organization or network in Finland. See “Violent are included in the Finnish authorities’ estimate on Finn- but the FSIS has stated the motives of Extremism in Finland – Situation Overview 2/2013”; ish combatants in Syria. Antti Honkamaa, “Supo: Yli 30 lähti Suomesta sotimaan 21 In 2010, there were reportedly only a handful of 24 “Security Police Eyeball Fighters Returning from Syyriaan – ‘mukana kantasuomalaisia,’” Ilta-Sanomat, radicalized individuals in Finland with connections to Syrian Conflict.” March 5, 2014. international terrorist organizations. See “Supo: Terrori- 25 Ibid. 14 “Suomesta lähtenyt nuoria taistelijoiksi Syyriaan: iskulla ei yhteyksiä Suomeen - tarkkailussa kourallinen 26 Most Finnish fighters reportedly traveled to Syria via ‘Kun aamulla lähtee, illalla on jo ase kädessä,’” Ilta-Sano- henkilöitä,” YLE, December 12, 2010. Turkey. See Sipilä. mat, March 1, 2013. 22 “Supo: Suomesta lähdetty Syyrian taisteluihin, sadoi- 27 Thomas Hegghammer, “Syria’s Foreign Fighters,” 15 It is not known, however, whether any Finnish Shi`a lla epäilyttäviä yhteyksiä,” Aamulehti, March 1, 2013. Foreign Policy, December 9, 2013. Muslims, who comprise approximately 10-15% of the 23 According to the FSIS, there have been rumors of 28 Husein Muhammed, “Suomalaisia Syyrian sodassa,” Finnish Muslim population, are fighting in Syria. individuals taking instant loans to finance their jour- Maailman Kuvalehti, February 2013; Jukka Huusko, “Is- 16 “Finnish Security Intelligence Service Annual Report ney and arriving in Syria within 24 hours. See Tommi lamistit väittävät suomalaisen kuolleen Syyrian taistelu- 2013,” Finnish Security Intelligence Service, March 5, Nieminen, ”Espoolainen nuori mies lähti salaa Syyrian issa,” Helsingin Sanomat, February 22, 2014. 2014. sotaan,” Helsingin Sanomat, June 9, 2013. 29 Nieminen; Honkamaa.

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Finnish foreign fighters vary between reportedly returned home to Finland to travel to Syria in a public meeting nationalist,30 jihadist and humanitarian already,42 with combat experience,43 in the Raqqa area.52 He stated in the causes.31 Some of the fighters while others travel between Finland video that he decided to travel to Syria radicalized before leaving,32 and some and Syria repeatedly.44 after witnessing Muslims being killed may have received prior training in around the world, especially in Syria by terrorist camps or during previous Only four fighters have been identified the Bashar al-Assad regime.53 His goal fighting abroad.33 Despite rumors of by Finnish media to date, although none for arriving in Syria was to bring back Finnish fighters traveling to Syria in by their legal name.45 In addition to the caliphate.54 It appears likely that groups,34 the FSIS insists most fighters these reports, the author has collected “Abu Mansour” is “Muhammad,” since have either traveled to Syria alone or data from social media on a few Finnish they share similar appearances and with a friend.35 In one case, however, a fighters in order to build more detailed motivations for fighting in Syria, and fighter brought his family.36 profiles. This should not be viewed as both profiles identify with the ISIL. a comprehensive sample of the entire Not much is known about the Finnish contingent. “Marwan” was a young convert to fighters’ activities in Syria, or how Islam, born around 1993, from Turku. many are currently active. Finnish One of these individuals has His mother was Finnish and his father fighters have been reported or rumored been identified by the media as was from Namibia.55 Before leaving in and around Raqqa,37 Idlib and “Muhammad.”46 He moved to Finland for Syria, he had recently finished his Aleppo.38 It was recently reported that from Somalia with his family in 1993 compulsory military service in Finland Jabhat al-Nusra, the ISIL and Kataib when he was two-years-old.47 He grew and expressed a desire to study Islam al-Muhajirin have all attracted Finnish up in Finland, where he received his foreign fighters.39 education.48 He lived in Espoo before “The most recent Finnish traveling to Syria via Turkey in December At least two Finnish citizens have 2012, where he joined a radical Islamist casualty is ‘Abu Anas al- been killed in Syria,40 and the FSIS group in the north,49 and later identified Finlandi,’ who reportedly believes there may be more Finnish himself on social media as a member casualties.41 Some fighters have of the ISIL operating near the Syrian- fought for the ISIL. He was Turkish border. “Muhammad” is still killed in a battle between active in Syria, but it is not known if he 30 Although individuals with a pre-existing connection the Free Syrian Army and to the conflict area—either in the form of citizenship in has combat experience. Since November the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions— 2012, he has occasionally shared ISIL the ISIL in February 2014.” should be considered as rebels rather than foreign fight- and other jihadist propaganda on his 50 ers, it is not entirely clear whether such individuals have social media accounts. He is allegedly 51 traveled to Syria or if they are included in the Finnish au- not interested in returning to Finland. 56 thorities’ estimate of Finnish combatants in Syria. abroad. He traveled to Syria via 31 “Violent Extremism in Finland – Situation Overview In December 2013, the Middle East Turkey with his wife during the summer 2/2013.” Media Research Institute reported on a of 2012, when he joined an unidentified 32 Aishi Zidan, “Rami tyhjensi huoneensa ja taistelee nyt Finnish jihadist, “Abu Mansour,” who rebel unit in northern Aleppo— 57 ehkä Syyriassa,” Helsingin Sanomat, October 27, 2013. answered questions about his decision allegedly with other Finns. He was 33 Nieminen. reportedly killed in a clash between 34 “Huoli heräsi: Militantti anti-fasistinen liike kas- 42 Rydman. Syrian rebels and Syrian government 58 vamassa Suomessa,” Talouselämä, January 13, 2014; 43 ”Supo: Syyriasta palaavien jihadistiveteraanien forces in Aleppo in June 2013. It is ”Suomesta lähti taistelijoita Syyriaan,” Turun Sanomat, määrä kasvaa,” Savon Sanomat, March 5, 2014; Rop- likely that the Facebook profile of a August 30, 2012. ponen; Honkamaa. man from Turku, who had been fighting 35 Tuomas Portaankorva (@TPSupo), “Ei nyt suoraan. 44 Nieminen; “Security Police Eyeball Fighters Return- in the Idlib area in March-April 2013, Meidän muutamasta kymmenestä ei isoja ryhmiä saa. ing from Syrian Conflict.” belongs to “Marwan.” No information Yksin ja kaverin kanssa useimmiten,” Twitter, January 45 This article purposely provides pseudonyms for indi- is available about his background, 13, 2014. vidual fighters. Being a member of a terrorist organiza- age, when he traveled and what group 36 Heikki Kauhanen, ”Suomalainen kaatui Syyriassa – tion or traveling abroad to take part in a civil war are not with which he fought, although he is uusia lähtijöitä kymmenittäin,” Turun Sanomat, August considered crimes in Finland. Facebook “friends” with at least two 1, 2013. 46 Nieminen. 37 “Finnish National Fighting with Al-Qaeda in Syria: 47 Ibid. 52 “Finnish National Fighting with Al-Qaeda in Syria: I I Have Come to Establish the Caliphate in the Levant,” 48 He studied at a vocational school, but it is not clear if Have Come to Establish the Caliphate in the Levant.” Midle East Media Research Institute, December 11, 2013. he graduated. 53 Ibid. 38 Sipilä; Kauhanen; Nieminen. 49 His family believes there were other Finnish fighters 54 Ibid. 39 Sipilä. in the group. See Nieminen. 55 “TS: Finnish Volunteer Killed in Syrian Conflict,” 40 Tatu Airo, “Supo: Ainakin kaksi Suomen kansalaista 50 His behavior on social media suggests he had at least YLE, August 1, 2013. kuollut Syyrian sodassa,” Aamulehti, March 5, 2014. partly adopted a jihadist worldview prior to his depar- 56 Ibid. 41 No fighters, however, have returned to receive medi- ture to Syria. On a phone call with his sister, he stated 57 His wife had a baby two weeks before the man’s death. cal care for injuries sustained in Syria. See “Syyriassa he wanted to help Muslims who were being killed by the See ibid. haavoittuneita taistelijoita ei ole vielä hoidettu Suomes- al-Assad regime. See ibid. 58 He was the first reported Finnish casualty in the Syr- sa,” YLE, January 10, 2014. 51 Ibid. ian conflict. See Kauhanen.

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Finnish foreign fighters: ISIL-linked Finland’s radical Islamist scene. There The threat is made all the more acute jihadists “Abu Anas al-Finlandi” and are several ways, however, that Finnish by reports that jihadist groups in Syria “Muhammad.” His account has been foreign fighters may pose a threat have trained fighters to undertake inactive since April 2013. domestically. domestic plots when they return to their home country.74 Even if they choose not “Rami,” born around 1992 to a First, returning fighters—particularly to attack Finland, they could attempt Finnish mother and a father from an those who fought for jihadist groups— to attack targets in other Scandinavian unidentified Arab country, lived in may seek to participate in domestic countries or in Europe. Helsinki before traveling to southern terrorist plots. While only a small Turkey in July 2013.59 Although he has minority of returning foreign fighters Second, returning fighters may reportedly denied being in Syria, his generally participate in domestic seek to expand the Finnish radical mother believes he has traveled there.60 attacks, they tend to be more capable Islamist scene. While the domestic He grew up and was educated in Finland, than those without foreign fighting radical Islamist community in Finland converting to Islam as a teenager.61 Prior experience.68 To date, there have been continues to grow regardless of the to his conversion, he had problems at Syrian conflict,75 the returning foreign school, suffered from alcohol abuse, “The threat is made all the fighters are likely to further increase its and had exhibited criminal behavior.62 size: past evidence suggests that jihadist Before traveling abroad, he had asked more acute by evidence that veterans will enjoy an elevated status the imam at his local mosque about jihadist groups in Syria among more radical Muslims76 and traveling to Syria.63 they may seek to promote their adopted have trained their fighters ideologies and agendas within it by The most recent Finnish casualty is to undertake domestic radicalizing others.77 Returning foreign “Abu Anas al-Finlandi” (who was fighters will also likely strengthen most likely born around 1993),64 who plots when they return to the jihadist strand within the radical reportedly fought for the ISIL. He was their home country.” Islamist scene. According to recent killed in a battle between the Free reports, there are indications of an Syrian Army and the ISIL in February emerging multi-ethnic jihadist network 2014, according to a Twitter account in Finland,78 which has connections to linked to the ISIL.65 There are few no jihadist attacks or plots in Finland.69 jihadist groups operating in conflict details about his profile, but reportedly The current Finnish government areas abroad.79 he is a Finnish convert to Islam from threat assessment states that “Finland the Helsinki area.66 According to his is not a primary target for violent Additionally, returning fighters may Facebook page, he resided in Espoo radical Islamist or other terrorist attempt to recruit radical or more and traveled to Aleppo in late 2013, organizations” and the terrorist threat moderate Muslims residing in Finland reportedly via Turkey.67 is considered low.70 Nevertheless, the for foreign fighting or domestic domestic terrorist threat in Finland is operations.80 There have already been The Potential Domestic Impact of Returning gradually changing,71 and the Syrian reported cases of returning fighters Foreign Fighters conflict will undoubtedly accelerate its recruiting others in Finland to fight The lack of information about the evolution. Although the FSIS argues in Syria.81 Moreover, Finnish jihadist Finnish fighters’ motivations for that returning foreign fighters do not fighters do not necessarily need to traveling to Syria and their activities pose an imminent threat,72 the threat of return to constitute a threat through in the country make it difficult to returning foreign fighters is reflected radicalization and recruitment efforts. estimate the impact they may have on in the current threat assessment, which Those foreign fighters-cum-jihadists states that “it is difficult to predict the who opt to continue fighting for

59 He cleaned out his room, meticulously deleted the threat posed by radicalized individuals jihadist groups may try to promote 73 electronic trail of his travel arrangements, and disap- or small groups.” peared to Turkey. See Zidan. 74 For example, see Michael Schmidt and Eric Schmitt, 60 Ibid. “Syria Militants Said to Recruit Visiting Americans to 61 Ibid. Attack U.S.,” New York Times, January 9, 2014; Ruth 62 After his conversion, he became a devout Muslim, Sherlock and Tom Whitehead, “Al-Qaeda Training Brit- turned away from Western culture and social mores, and 68 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I ish and European ‘Jihadists’ in Syria to Set Up Terror started meticulously studying Islamic dietary laws. See Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice Cells at Home,” Telegraph, January 19, 2014. ibid. between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Po- 75 Honkamaa. 63 The imam opposed the idea of traveling to Syria, lead- litical Science Review 107:1 (2013). 76 Nieminen. ing Rami to change mosques before his departure. See 69 Two incidents were erroneously attributed to al- 77 Particularly those among the disenfranchised and ibid. Qa`ida in the summer of 2011. See Saarinen. alienated second and third generation Finnish Muslims 64 Huusko. 70 “Finnish Security Intelligence Service Annual Report who neither identify with their parents’ culture nor with 65 Doula News English (@Doula_news2), “Abu Anas 2013.” Finnish society. finlandi killed by the fsa, may Allah swt accept them,” 71 Ibid. 78 Sipilä. Twitter, February 19, 2014. 72 Ropponen. 79 Honkamaa. 66 Huusko. 73 “Finnish Security Intelligence Service Annual Report 80 Rydman. 67 Ibid. 2013.” 81 Nieminen.

9 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 radicalization, inspire domestic plots, Conclusion The Narco of Narcos: A and recruit foreign fighters among Finland has seen an unprecedented Profile of Fugitive Muslims residing in Finland from mobilization of Muslim foreign fighters abroad. as a result of Syria’s descent into civil Mexican Druglord Rafael war. While there is some information on Caro-Quintero Lastly, the sizeable Finnish contingent the composition of the Finnish foreign in Syria may also transform Finland into fighter contingent, it is often too generic By Malcolm Beith a more visible and appealing target for and vague—since not enough data on foreign recruiters and groups.82 Foreign individual fighters is available—to the release of Rafael Caro-Quintero terrorist organizations have tried to provide a thorough analysis of the from a Mexican prison in August 2013 recruit within Finland in the past,83 causes of the mobilization or the was a blow to U.S.-Mexico relations, the and there have been unsubstantiated domestic impact of returning fighters. reputation of the Mexican justice system, rumors of foreign recruiting of Finnish A deeper analysis would require further and the drug war. Caro-Quintero had Muslims to participate in the Syrian information on what groups the fighters been imprisoned since 1989 for drug civil war.84 For example, two figures have joined, what originally motivated trafficking, murder, and perhaps most associated with the UK-based al- them to travel to Syria, and how the importantly the abduction, torture and Muhajiroun have been publicly linked fighters perceive themselves in relation killing of Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, an to the radical Islamist scene in Finland to the conflict in Syria. agent for the U.S. Drug Enforcement recently. Omar Bakri Mohammad was Administration (DEA).1 When Caro- reported to know Finnish fighters Naturally, the most serious threat to Quintero was freed in August 2013—a in Syria and Somalia,85 and Anjem Finland is from returning fighters who federal court overturned his sentence Choudary’s visit to Helsinki in March may have the intent to commit domestic because he had been tried in a state court 201386 raised concerns about the terrorist attacks, although Finnish rather than a federal one—the U.S. State potential formation of Sharia4Finland.87 authorities do not find that likely. The Department offered a $5 million reward There is no data, however, to suggest extent of this threat, however, may for information leading to his arrest, that either has played any role in the increase when fighters return from while the Mexican Attorney General’s mobilization of Finnish foreign fighters, Syria, so it should not be discounted. Office also issued a new warrant for his or in facilitating their entry into Syria. A more likely outcome, however, is the apprehension.2 further expansion of the radical Islamist 82 Particularly as radicalized Finnish foreign fighters scene in Finland and increasing jihadist Whether Rafael Caro-Quintero still has bring with them information on the radical Islamist activity within it. Returning fighters clout in the Mexican cartel underworld scene in Finland, and can act as nodes between the Finn- may seek to radicalize, inspire and is uncertain. Born in La Noria, Sinaloa, 3 ish radical Islamist scene and foreign individuals or recruit vulnerable Finnish Muslims. on October 3, 1952, he is widely groups. See ibid. Finland may also increasingly become considered to be one of the godfathers 83 Hizb Allah, al-Shabab, Hizb ul-Islam, al-Qa`ida and a target for foreign jihadist recruiters. of the Mexican drug trade; upon his Ansar al-Islam are known to have had supporters and Consequently, Finnish authorities release from prison, one Mexican supporting activity in Finland. Al-Shabab supporters should continue to closely monitor newspaper referred to him as the “narco 4 have been particularly active in Finland in recent years. Finnish fighters who have returned and of narcos.” Yet he is 61-years-old, and See Saarinen. those still abroad—particularly if they the Mexican drug trafficking landscape 84 A member of the Muslim community in Turku stated identify with jihadist groups operating has changed immensely since the days in an interview that there are individuals in Finland who in Syria—and also adopt more stringent when he was in charge. Rather than one are recruiting people to fight in conflicts taking place measures to respond to the foreign or two cartels controlling operations, abroad. He stated he knew at least four people in Turku fighting trend among Finnish Muslims. the situation is far more fluid today, who had recently left to become foreign fighters in Syria with numerous groups and upstart and Yemen. See Vaalisto. Juha Saarinen is an Assistant Researcher organizations controlling production 85 Kari Ahlberg, “Radikaali muslimisaarnaaja Liba- at the Finnish National Defence and distribution. nonissa Yle uutisille: Syyriassa kymmenittäin suomal- University’s Department of Strategic aistaistelijoita,” YLE, October 29, 2013. and Defence Studies and a Partner at This article reviews Caro-Quintero’s 86 Laura Halminen, “Radikaali muslimisaarnaaja esiin- the Finnish Middle East Consulting rapid rise in Mexico’s drug underworld, tyi Helsingissä,” Helsingin Sanomat, March 28, 2013. Group. His research focuses on political reveals his significant ties to the 87 The “Sharia4” are anti-Western, radical Islamist violence, armed conflict and violent non- Sinaloa Federation, and attempts to groups promoting the implementation of Shari`a law. state actors in the Middle East. He holds dissect his activities since his release While they do not openly encourage violent forms of Is- Master’s degrees in Middle East and lamist activism among their supporters, they are often Central Asian Security Studies from St. 1 Catherine Sholchet, “U.S. Puts New Bounty on Mexi- linked with radicalization, violent extremism and foreign Andrews University and International can Drug Lord Caro Quintero,” CNN, November 6, 2013. fighting. There are Sharia4 groups operating at least in Relations from the London School of 2 “Narcotics Rewards Program: Rafael Caro-Quintero,” Belgium and the Netherlands, where they are linked Economics. U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Nar- with foreign fighter mobilizations. See Pieter Van- Os cotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, undated. taeyen, “Belgium’s Syria Fighters – An Overview of 2012 3 “Quien es Rafael Caro Quintero?” Milenio, September and 2013 (II),” Jihadology, January 25, 2014; Samar Ba- 8, 2013. trawi, “The Dutch Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria,” 4 “Quien es Rafael Caro Quintero?” Terra Mexico, Au- CTC Sentinel 6:10 (2013). gust 9, 2013.

10 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 from prison in August 2013. It finds murder.9 He was also accused of at the same time.14 It is a feat that has that Caro-Quintero’s importance distributing tens of thousands of tons not been duplicated by any other major today is likely mostly symbolic given of marijuana throughout Mexico and cartel figure.15 his age and apparent lack of influence into the United States.10 Upon his arrest in drug trafficking operations in recent in 1985, shortly after the killing of Of all the Sinaloa Federation’s senior years. It is possible, however, that Caro- Camarena, Caro-Quintero was charged leaders, Esparragoza Moreno is the Quintero still has clout when it comes with murder and sentenced to 40-years one who appears to have suffered the to the money laundering side of cartel in a Mexican prison. least pressure from the recent years operations. of law enforcement operations. Ismael Significant Ties “El Mayo” Zambada’s son, Vicente, A Rapid Rise In recent years, in part due to his is currently on trial in Chicago, and In the 1980s, Caro-Quintero was imprisonment but also as a result of the dozens of Sinaloa cartel lieutenants considered a pioneer. He allegedly Guadalajara Cartel’s apparent demise, have been arrested or captured.16 Drug oversaw operations for the Guadalajara Caro-Quintero has remained off the capo Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel Villareal Cartel at Rancho Bufalo, a vast radar. In June 2013, shortly before was killed in a 2010 shootout with marijuana plantation in the northern Caro-Quintero’s release from prison, the Mexican military,17 while Arturo Mexican state of Chihuahua with an the U.S. Treasury Department released Beltran Leyva (also known as “El annual production value of roughly $8 information on him and his primary Barbas”) was killed in a bloody raid billion.5 In its prime, the Guadalaraja associates, which linked Caro-Quintero on a Cuernavaca apartment complex Cartel was the only drug trafficking closely to Juan Jose Esparragoza Moreno in December 2009;18 his brother organization in Mexico, with a (also known as “El Azul”), an alleged Alfredo (also known as Mochomo) is in corruption network that spanned the high-ranking member of the Sinaloa prison.19 Edgar Valdez Villareal (also Federation.11 known as “La Barbie”) is in a Mexico “Caro-Quintero’s residence City prison awaiting extradition.20 The link is significant since it alleges “El Mayo” is still free, but Joaquin was named as the location that Caro-Quintero still has criminal “El Chapo” Guzman Loera, the most- where DEA agent ties to one of the men widely believed wanted trafficker in the world, was to be a likely successor to the throne captured on February 22, 2014, Camarena was tortured of the Sinaloa Federation. Throughout countering conspiracy theories that the and killed.” his life, Esparragoza Moreno has kept Sinaloa Federation was being protected a low profile and moved horizontally by the Mexican authorities.21 and vertically between both the Juarez and Sinaloa cartels, effectively The U.S. Treasury Department country. Headed by Miguel Angel utilizing his role as an adviser to considers top Sinaloa figure Felix Gallardo, the Guadalaraja Cartel “stay in the background,” as one U.S. Esparragoza Moreno and Caro-Quintero was responsible for forging the ties to official explained.12 Indeed, in many to be “long-time trafficking partners.”22 Colombian drug trafficking networks press releases issued by the Mexican that exist to this day. By the age of 29, government that list the country’s 14 Olga R. Rodriguez, “Juarez Drug Gang Forms Alli- Caro-Quintero had reportedly amassed most-wanted drug traffickers, ances to Control Border,” Associated Press, February 13, a fortune of $500 million, 36 houses and Esparragoza Moreno is often left 2005. 13 some 300 companies in the Guadalajara out. At one point in the late 1990s he 15 Ibid. 6 area. was thought to be both a high-ranking 16 “Consolida al Chapo Guzmán la muerte de Nacho member of the Juarez Cartel and a high- Coronel, señalan datos oficiales,” La Jornada, August 15, An indictment issued in the Central ranking adviser in the Sinaloa cartel. 2010. District of California in June 1989 The cartels’ relationship at the time was 17 “Muere Arturo Beltrán Leyva en Morelos al enfrentar named Caro-Quintero as a member considered to be fluid and disorganized, a elementos de la Armada,” La Jornada, December 17, of the now defunct Guadalajara allowing Esparragoza Moreno to utilize 2009. 7 Cartel. Caro-Quintero’s residence his diplomatic and strategic skills to 18 “Detienen a El Mochomo, brazo derecho del Chapo was identified as the location where position himself in both organizations Guzmán,” La Jornada, March 22, 2008. DEA agent Camarena was tortured and 19 “Muere Arturo Beltrán Leyva en Morelos al enfrentar 8 killed. The U.S. Treasury Department a elementos de la Armada.” identified him as the “mastermind” 9 “Treasury Sanctions the Network of Drug Lord Rafael 20 “Dos testigos protegidos, La Barbie y un militar impli- behind Camarena’s abduction and Caro Quintero,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, June caron a los tres generales,” La Jornada, May 19, 2012. 12, 2013. 21 See “U.S., Mexico Hunt Elusive ‘El Chapo,’” Wash- 10 U.S.A. v. Rafael Caro-Quintero. ington Times, January 14, 2010; Michael Martinez and 5 “El gran decomiso en el rancho El Bufalo, de Caro 11 “Treasury Sanctions the Network of Drug Lord Rafael Catherine Shoichet, “3 Reasons Why ‘El Chapo’ Arrest Quintero,” El Universal, August 9, 2013. Caro Quintero.” Matters,” CNN, February 22, 2014; Malcolm Beith and 6 “Quien es Rafael Caro Quintero?” Terra Mexico, August 12 Personal interview, U.S. official, September 2013. Jan-Albert Hootsen, “The Rise and Fall of El Chapo,” 9, 2013. 13 This is based on the author’s observations of Mexican Vocativ, February 24, 2014. 7 U.S.A. v. Rafael Caro-Quintero, Central District of Cali- government press releases regarding organized crime 22 “Caro Quintero Organization,” U.S. Department of the fornia, 1989. between the years of 2007-2012. It is not clear why Caro- Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, June 2013, 8 Ibid. Quintero is often left off these lists. available at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanc-

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It also named several companies, all quantities of illicit cash; agricultural Still in Pursuit located in the vicinity of Guadalajara in enterprises and real estate tend to Caro-Quintero’s brother, Miguel Angel, central Mexico, as belonging to Caro- provide cover for much larger quantities was extradited to the United States Quintero as fronts for illicit activity.23 of illicit funds).25 in 2009 and charged a year later for This is significant in that it indicates conspiring to import marijuana and he may still be involved in the drug Also notable is the number of racketeering. He was sentenced to 17 trafficking business in some way, even companies designated as connected to years in prison in Denver in 2010.31 As a if only with respect to financial ties. Caro-Quintero by the U.S. Treasury result, it is not likely that the authorities Regardless, the financial networks of Department’s Office of Foreign Assets will feel the need to apprehend Rafael Control (OFAC). Sanctions have Caro-Quintero to break down a family been placed on some 20 companies, network. However, given that the “The U.S. Treasury suggesting that Caro-Quintero still Mexican Supreme Court has overturned Department considers top maintains a network through which to the lower court’s decision to set him launder his money, rather than simply free, not to mention the fact that Sinaloa Sinaloa figure Esparragoza having a few outlets through which to leader Guzman claimed to have recently Moreno and Caro-Quintero keep movable cash.26 spoken with him,32 it is likely that Mexican authorities will continue to to be ‘long-time trafficking Whereabouts Unknown assist the United States in seeking his partners.’” Where exactly Caro-Quintero is located capture.33 may be the clue to deciphering how much influence he still has in the drug It is also quite likely that in light of business.27 Shortly after his release Sinaloa leader Guzman’s declarations, Mexico’s drug traffickers are perhaps from prison, and following the U.S. U.S. authorities may decide that Caro- the most important element of their illicit announcement regarding information Quintero still has clout in the drug activity. As the drug trafficking patterns leading to his capture, the Mexican trafficking world and put pressure on shift and products change, and focus Attorney General’s Office (PGR)— Mexico to re-arrest him. One former moves from marijuana production to which disagreed with the court decision DEA official recently told the El Paso Times heroin, for example, the money continues to set him free—released a so-called red that ruling out Caro-Quintero as the “jefe to flow and needs to be laundered. notice, alerting Interpol to his status de jefes” (boss of bosses) was impossible and officially designating him as an given the influence he had in the past.34 Money laundering is likely Caro- international fugitive.28 The Mexican This indicates that at least some in the Quintero’s relevance in the Mexican authorities admit they do not know his U.S. intelligence community continue to drug trade today. It is unlikely, given whereabouts. “We had him and then he view Caro-Quintero as a serious threat. his many years of imprisonment, that escaped [our grasp],” Mexican Attorney With that in mind, it is highly unlikely he has any influence in the business of General Jesús Murillo Karam said that Caro-Quintero will spend the rest drug trafficking itself—in spite of dated shortly after Caro-Quintero’s release.29 of his days living quietly in the hills of reports that he retained clout while his home region of Sinaloa. imprisoned.24 Caro-Quintero, however, has reached out to the authorities himself. In Malcolm Beith is a freelance journalist The Caro-Quintero-affiliated companies late 2013, he sent a letter to Mexican and author of The Last Narco: Inside the named by the U.S. Treasury Department President Enrique Pena Nieto asking Hunt for El Chapo, the World’s Most include real estate ventures, gasoline that Mexican authorities not bow to Wanted Drug Lord. A former general retailers and agricultural businesses, U.S. pressure. He has already served his editor at Newsweek International, he indicating that money laundered by time, he claimed, saying that his family has also written for Foreign Policy, The Caro-Quintero is not small in quantity does not deserve more “persecution.”30 New Statesman, The Sunday Times and (in some instances regarding the Foreign Affairs, among other publications. Mexican drug cartels, the U.S. Treasury He has just completed a Master’s Degree Department has named smaller in War Studies from the University of businesses, even daycare centers, as 25 “Caro Quintero Organization.” Glasgow. money laundering fronts, and these 26 Ibid. quite clearly can only sustain smaller 27 If he is located in a large cartel-ridden city like Gua- dalajara or Culiacan, it is likely he remains connected to 31 “Miguel Angel Caro-Quintero Pleads Guilty to Traf- the drug world and its leadership. If he is in the hills of tions/Programs/Documents/20130612_caro_quintero. ficking Massive Amounts of Marijuana from Mexico to Sinaloa, however, then he probably has little influence. pdf. the United States,” U.S. District Attorney’s Office in the 28 “Emite Alerta a Interpol Para Buscar a Caro Quinte- 23 Ibid. District of Colorado, October 23, 2009. ro,” Terra Mexico, October 1, 2013; Jan-Albert Hootsen, 24 In 1989, the Washington Post reported that the drug 32 “Controversia por las supuestas confesiones de el “Where in the World is Rafael Caro Quintero?” Vocativ, kingpin had taken over entire cellblocks and remodeled Chapo en el helicoptero,” Univision, February 25, 2014. October 4, 2013. them to his satisfaction; he reputedly also directed fam- 33 “Mexican Supreme Court Overturns Decision that 29 “A Caro Quintero ‘lo teníamos y se nos fue’: Murillo ily members to redistribute his assets while incarcer- Freed Drug Lord,” CNN, November 7, 2013. Karam,” Proceso, September 7, 2013. ated. For more details, see Dolia Estevez, “U.S. Treasury 34 Diana Washington Valdez, “‘Chapo’ Guzman Likely 30 “Caro Quintero envía carta a Peña Nieto,” Milenio, Tracks Secret Bank Accounts of Top Mexican Kingpin,” Had Financial Help from Older Drug Lords, Ex-Investi- December 3, 2013. Forbes, December 5, 2013. gator Says,” El Paso Times, March 10, 2014.

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The Caucasus Emirate: believed to have been nominally under fighters from Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa-al- the control of Doku Umarov at the time Ansar displaying the Caucasus Emirate From Anti-Colonialist of its release, concerned itself with logo in Syria,9 geography no longer Roots to Salafi-Jihad global jihadist grievances rather than entirely defines pan-Caucasian Salafi- narrower local issues traditionally jihadism, nor are those of Chechen origin By Derek Henry Flood emphasized by Islamic militant groups necessarily driving this movement. in the North Caucasus. Dagestan today on october 21, 2013, a lone suicide is arguably much more of a hotbed of How Separatism Turned to Emirate Building bomber from Dagestan boarded a bus insurgency than Chechnya itself, and the The Caucasus Emirate is an in Volgograd, Russia, and detonated ascendency of Dagestani Salafist fighters ideologically Salafist outfit inhabiting an explosive device that killed six may indicate a play for primacy within what has been historically a haven of people.1 Media outlets quickly noted the Caucasus rebel umbrella faction. Sufi orders in the North Caucasus.10 It that the attack occurred both outside emerged from the failed insurrections the restive North Caucasus and before On July 2, 2013, Doku Umarov, the that Chechens launched against Russian the Winter Olympic Games in February Caucasus Emirate’s late amir, issued a federal forces in two distinct conflicts 2014. Less than two months later, on video statement threatening the Sochi beginning in late 1994. December 29, 2013, a suicide bomber Olympics, adding that he approved of entered Volgograd’s principal railway attacks on civilians.7 Although the 2014 Chechen separatism gained momentum terminal and blew himself up, and the Winter Olympic Games came and went in the immediate aftermath of the following day another suicide bomber without incident, they were under threat chaotic Soviet collapse. In March 1992, in Volgograd detonated explosives on a throughout their duration. Russian the Republic of Chechnya refused to trolleybus. The consecutive bombings President Vladimir Putin pledged that sign the proposed federative treaty put killed a total of 34 people and created the most expensive Olympics the world forth by then-President Boris Yeltsin.11 further apprehension regarding security had ever seen—taking place on the fringe Chechen rebel leaders subsequently in not just Sochi, but across southern of a war zone—would be thoroughly declared independence from Moscow— Russia.2 protected by an impenetrable “ring of the only one of Russia’s 89 republics steel” comprised of Sochi’s inherent and regions to make a genuine attempt Notably, none of the suspected physical geography combined with at formal secession. attackers were ethnic Chechens.3 On an estimated 60,000-man security January 18, 2014, Vilayet Dagestan, force and majority Orthodox Christian The Chechen forces during the first a constituent militant group of the populace.8 Russo-Chechen war in 1994 were led Salafist-oriented Caucasus Emirate,4 by former Soviet Air Force General released a 49-minute video claiming This article examines the causal Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was initially responsibility for December’s double factors that led to the rise of the a secular nationalist. The second war bombings in Volgograd.5 The statement Caucasus Emirate, how the fight for in 1999 was principally helmed by by Vilayat Dagestan,6 which was an independent, post-Soviet Chechnya President Aslan Maskhadov, a moderate morphed into a much wider struggle for Sufi who fought under a primarily ethno- 1 “At Least 6 Killed in Attack by Female Suicide Bomber an Islamic emirate governed by Shari`a nationalist hue somewhat reluctantly in Russia – Official,” RIA Novosti, October 21, 2013. across the North Caucasus, and how the imbued with localized Islamism as a 2 “Islamist Group Claims Volgograd Attack, Threatens conflict in the Caucasus has awkwardly way to frame Chechen separatism in 12 Sochi Olympics,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, intersected with the ongoing internecine part to satisfy his Islamist peers. January 20, 2014. jihadist battles in Syria in ways that its Maskhadov had to contend with the 3 Post-Soviet militancy in the North Caucasus began original leadership never intended. The very real ascendancy of Salafism (often with the Chechen war for secession from the Russian article finds that while for many years Federation starting in December 1994. For many years, militancy in the North Caucasus was 9 For an example of branding in Syria, in a Jaysh al- the war in the North Caucasus was focused almost solely centered on an anti-colonial rebellion Muhajirin wa-al-Ansar video of Salah al-Din al-Shishani on Chechnya and ethnic Chechens. As the ideology of po- rejecting Russian rule with varying posted on the Shaminfo.tv channel on YouTube, al- litical violence in the region shifted from ethno-national- degrees of Islamist characteristics, Shishani can be clearly seen wearing an “Imarat Kavkaz” ist to religio-political, the conflict gradually metastasized Caucasian Salafism has supplanted shirt beginning at 0:33. See “Appeal to the Muslims to envelop many of the neighboring republics and their any one particular brand of ethnic of Syria [from the] Mujahideen of the Caucasus Emir- attendant myriad ethnic groups. nationalism as the chief ideological ate,” July 30, 2013, available at www.youtube.com/ 4 The self-declared Caucasus Emirate is referred to al- current among fighters. With Caucasian watch?v=hoZDxCw5bvk. ternately by its endonym “Imarat Kavkaz” when translit- 10 John Russell, Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radi- erated into Latin script. It was led by Doku Umarov until ticular attacks. See Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Formation of calism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 176-177. his death, which was announced on March 18, 2014, al- Khasavyurt Jammat Reflects Influx of New Funds and 11 Chechnya was initially joined by Tatarstan in refus- though the date of when he died is not known. Recruits,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 17, 2014. ing to sign the federative treaty, but the quietist Muslim 5 “Islamic Group Claims Volgograd Attacks and Threat- 7 “Caucasus Emirate Leader Calls On Insurgents To Tatars did not wage war over the idea and reached a com- ens Sochi Visitors,” Associated Press, January 19, 2014. Thwart Sochi Winter Olympics,” Radio Free Europe/ promise with Moscow. See Matthew Evangelista, The 6 Vilayat Dagestan is a “province” of the Caucasus Emir- Radio Liberty, July 3, 2013. Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? ate which is then subdivided among communal militant 8 James Brooke, “Can Terrorists Penetrate Ring of Steel (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2002), p. 96. groupings known as jama`ats. The larger jama`ats are Around Sochi Olympics?” Voice of America, January 31, 12 John Russell, Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radi- then further divided in small cells who carry out par- 2014. calism (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 180-181.

13 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 referred to as “Wahhabism”) because mid-1996, Usama bin Ladin cited the member of the nationalist camp to a the schism between nationalists and war in Chechnya three times in a list longstanding amir of the Islamist one. Salafists had grown ever wider in the of grievances of the global Islamic wake of Russia’s killing of Dudayev on community. Although the first war was During the evolution of the Caucasus April 21, 1996.13 largely nationalist in tone, it began to Emirate, the locus of jihad, however, attract roving Arab Salafist fighters moved from Chechnya to Dagestan21 As Russian forces successively such as Ibn al-Khattab. Al-Khattab’s and somewhat lesser so to the republics eliminated these original nationalist infamy gained from fighting Russian of Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. leaders, the insurgency began to take troops in Chechnya helped to establish During the second war in Chechnya, on a distinctly Salafist tone embodied links between the jihad in the North Moscow escalated its “Chechenization” by increasingly erratic men like Shamil Caucasus and Saudi Arabia. As Russian policy by co-opting former Chechen Basaev. Basaev was much more apt forces killed both nationalist and nationalist rebels—chief among them to work alongside transnational Arab Islamist rebel actors throughout the Akhmad Kadyrov, Chechen President jihadists like the notorious Saudi early 2000s, the Islamists—who were Ramzan Kadyrov’s late father—which commander Umar ibn al-Khattab who far less likely than the nationalists to exploited fissures within the insurgency led foreign fighters in Chechnya in negotiate with the Kremlin—would come in an effort to regain control of Chechnya ambushes against Russian military to helm the rebellion and eventually through local clients, in lieu of directly columns and their local proxies.14 steer it away from Chechen nationalism negotiating with rebel leaders.22 The and toward Islamism.18 Putin government later infused large As hopes for a separate Chechen state sums of capital to help rebuild Grozny, began to fade, the nationalist movement When Doku Umarov—a nationalist who which was shattered by well over wilted away in all but name with many of later cloaked himself in Salafism—took a decade of war.23 Chechnya, under its most prominent surviving members control of the unrecognized Chechen the repressive grip of the Kremlin- fleeing for the safety of the West and Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) in June appointed President Kadyrov, has swapping fatigues for suits and ties.15 2006, the fight for Chechnya was undergone a significant transformation gradually subsumed into a broader in recent years, particularly evident Although the conflict was relatively struggle. Umarov began reaching in the once Stalingrad-like republican obscure to Western audiences in the out to militant groups in other parts capital of Grozny, which now maintains 1990s, Chechnya was a key node of of the North Caucasus. In October the architectural air of a nouveau global jihad in the pre-9/11 era. Before 2007, he declared the establishment riche oil center. As Ramzan Kadyrov eventually ending up in Afghanistan, of the Caucasus Emirate19 comprised consolidated his rule over Grozny and several of the 9/11 hijackers and plotters of six “vilayats” (provinces) which its environs, and as Salafism spread were drawn into the operational side were subdivided into “jama`ats” on the Chechen republic’s eastern and of violent global jihad in hopes of (communities) representing insurgents western flanks, militancy in the North joining the battle for Chechnya, which from the republics spanning across the Caucasus became far less concentrated, was portrayed as a righteous fight bulk of what is now the North Caucasus with a host of different militant actors between oppressed Muslim believers Federal District20 from the shores of the asserting their credentials. and infidel Russian troops.16 Vitriolic Caspian Sea in coastal Dagestan to Sochi audio sermons and video propaganda on the Black Sea. Umarov was an adept Moreover, the struggle for the North tailored for Arabic-speaking audiences survivor, transforming himself from a Caucasus long predates the largely portraying the war against Russian nationalist-hued Chechen wars of the forces in Chechnya as analogous to the gia, August 18, 2002. 1990s. Chechens, Avars, Circassians 1980s jihad in Afghanistan circulated 18 Umar ibn al-Khattab was killed on March 20, 2002. and other ethno-linguistic groups firmly in the Persian Gulf region in late 1999 See “Obituary: Chechen Rebel Khattab,” BBC, April 26, resisted Russian expansionism during 17 and the early 2000s. As early as 2002. Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was killed in Doha, Qa- the czarist period until at least 1864 tar, on February 13, 2004. See “Russia ‘Behind Chechen when the Russians declared victory in 24 13 Lawrence Scott Sheets, Eight Pieces of Empire: A 20- Murder,’” BBC, June 30, 2004. Ruslan “Hamzat” Ge- the Caucasian wars. Led most notably Year Journey Through the Soviet Collapse (New York: Ran- layev was killed in Dagestan on February 28, 2004. See dom House, 2011), p. 172. “Chechen Rebel Field Commander Ruslan Gelayev Killed 21 Zakir Magomedov, “Dagestan: Russia’s Hottest Spot,” 14 Brian Glynn Williams, Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and in Dagestan Mountains,” RIA Novosti, March 1, 2004. Open Democracy, March 8, 2014. the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder (London: Aslan Maskhadov was killed in Tolstoy-Yurt, Chechnya, 22 James Hughes, Chechnya: From Past to Future (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 163-166. on March 8, 2005. See Musa Muradov and Sergey Mash- Anthem Press, 2005), pp. 283-284. 15 For example, Akhmed Zakayev, who served as Presi- kin, “Aslan Maskhadov Killed,” Kommersant, March 9, 23 Maria Golovnina, “Tsarnaev Homeland Chechnya: dent Maskhadov’s prime minister, sought exile in Lon- 2005. Shamil Basaev was killed in Ingushetia on July 10, Rebuilt from War, Ruled by Fear,” Reuters, May 1, 2013. don. See Sam Jones, “MI5 Warns of Plot to Assassinate 2006. See “Mastermind of Russian School Siege Killed,” 24 Russia’s victory in the 19th century Caucasian wars Chechen Refugee in UK,” Guardian, April 1, 2012. Ilyas CNN, July 11, 2006. can be said to have begun with the capture of Imam Akhmadov, Maskhadov’s foreign minister, sought exile 19 “The Official Version of Amir Dokka’s Statement of Shamil by czarist forces in 1859. See Robert D. Crews, For in Washington, D.C. See Matthew Brzezinski, “Surreal- Declaration of the Caucasian Emirate,” Kavkaz Center, Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central polik,” Washington Post Magazine, March 20, 2005. November 22, 2007. Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 16 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton 20 “Medvedev Creates New North Caucasus Federal pp. 12, 74. The conflict was largely concluded five years & Co., 2004). District,” Free Radio Europe/Radio Liberty, January 20, later with the surrender and expulsion of the Circas- 17 Personal observation, Saburtalo district, Tbilisi, Geor- 2010. sians to the Ottoman Empire in May 1864. See Walter

14 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 by Imam Shamil, a dynamic Avar from was executed by a young Ingush man.29 Caucasian ethnicities are joining the village of Gimry in present-day Chechens are no longer necessarily and even heading foreign fighter central Dagestan,25 North Caucasian the key players in a conflict that arose contingents in a non-contiguous Sufis waged a 25-year-long holy war from the ashes of their own national war theater far from their contested against Russian forces that is still liberation struggle. The October 21, homeland.35 Until recently, Chechen invoked to the present day.26 In the 19th 2013, attack in Volgograd was allegedly violence was focused almost exclusively century rebellion against the Russian carried out by Naida Asiyalova from on symbols of the Russian state and, conquest of the Caucasus, the perception Gunib, Dagestan, whose husband was to a somewhat lesser extent, Russian of religious difference between invading an ethnic Russian convert to Islam,30 civilians. Despite Umarov’s infusion Orthodox Russians and indigenous while the December 29 and 30 attacks of boilerplate jihadist rhetoric Muslim Caucasian groups was a rallying were launched by a pair of young into some of his public statements cry among different ethnic groups who Dagestani men named Asker Samedov shared Islam as a binding factor across and Suleiman Magomedov.31 Moreover, “The presence of Chechen mountains and valleys. Today, the after acknowledging Umarov’s death symbolically significant Gimry is an on March 18, 2014,32 the Caucasus and other Caucasian area of Salafist influence in Dagestan Emirate announced his successor as fighters in Syria has been located at a strategic crossroads between Aliaskhab Kebekov (also known as Ali Makhachkala and the mountainous Abu Muhammad), an ethnic Avar from ideologically problematic border with Chechnya where Russian Dagestan.33 Kebekov became the first for their peers in the federal forces began a crackdown in the non-Chechen rebel to lead the widening lead up to the Olympics.27 insurgency in the North Caucasus. North Caucasus and led to division among emigrant Non-Chechens, such as Vilayat From Chechnya to Dagestan and Beyond Dagestan, have had the most dire While the Caucasus Emirate has steeped jihadists on the ground in effect on Russian security as of late. itself in the language of transnational Syria.” By executing the Volgograd bombings, Salafi-jihadism for several years, the Dagestani jihadists threatened events appearance of the “Imarat Kavkaz”—as in Sochi asymmetrically by attacking the endonym of the Caucasus Emirate is civilian targets outside their historical known among jihadists—brand in Syria since the formation of the Caucasus areas of operation. The bulk of North may mean that rhetoric has become Emirate in 2007, the liberation of Caucasian militants’ attacks in recent reality among the freelance diaspora Chechnya remained one of his central history have occurred in the republics militants. The presence of ethnic aims, rather than fighting conflicts adjacent to Chechnya or the occasional Chechen fighters and commanders outside the region. Yet Syria has been mass casualty attack on symbolic locales along with other Caucasian militants a sea change for the Caucasus Emirate, in Moscow. in Syria was probably not the result which has belatedly endorsed freelance of a top-down hierarchical decision- participation of fighters in the war.36 Part of what the Volgograd incidents making process made in the mountains indicate is that although a Chechen of southern Chechnya or western Several prominent “Chechen” Salafi- had remained at least the titular head Dagestan, but of jihadists who went jihadis fighting in northern Syria—most of this increasingly decentralized to Syria partly out of its free-for-all notably Omar al-Shishani,37 a military insurgency, militants from other opportunistic jihadist environment.34 leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and disenfranchised republics and regions the Levant’s (ISIL) northern sector— are increasingly the ones carrying out For the first time in the post-9/11 are in fact Georgian nationals known attacks. The 2010 Moscow metro attacks period, there is incontrovertible as Kists. Georgia’s small community of were carried out by a pair of Dagestani evidence that Chechens and other Kists migrated south from Chechnya women,28 and the Domodedovo attack

BBC, May 13, 2010. 35 Personal interviews, wounded foreign fighters, Richmond, The Circassian Genocide (London: Routledge, 29 “Russia Jails Four Over 2011 Domodedovo Airport Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, November 2001; personal 2013), p. 87. Bombing,” BBC, November 13, 2013. observations, North-West Frontier Province, Pakistan, 25 Imam Shamil’s birthplace, then part of the Avar 30 “Russians Hunt for Husband of Suicide Bomber,” March 2007; Sebastian Smith, Allah’s Mountains: The Khanate—then a tributary to the Ottoman suzerain in Associated Press, October 22, 2013. Battle for Chechnya (London: I.B. Tauris and Co LTD, Istanbul—was subsumed into the Russian Empire in the 31 “Suicide Bombers in Southern Russia’s Volgograd 2006), p. XXXIV; Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Chechens Caucasian wars of the mid-19th century. Terrorist Attacks Identified,” Itar-Tass, January 30, Fighting in Syria Complicate a Complex Conflict,” The 26 Maria Antonova, “Top Russian Islamist Calls for 2014. National, May 3, 2013. Attacks on Sochi Games,” Agence France-Press, July 3, 32 “Caucasus Emirate’s Emir Dokku Abu Usman Mar- 36 Vatchagaev, “Chechen Insurgency Leader Doku Um- 2013; Henry Ridgwell, “150 Years After Defeat, Sochi tyred, Insha’Allah. Obituary,” Kavkaz Center, March 18, arov Tells Chechens Not to Fight in Syria”; Vatchagaev, Olympics Divide Native Circassians,” Voice of America, 2014. “Caucasus Emirate Leader Discusses Chechens in Syria February 19, 2014. 33 “Ali Abu-Muhammad (Kebekov Aliaskhab Alibula- in New Video.” 27 Emil Souleimanov, “Mopping up Gimry, ‘Zachistkas’ tovich),” Kavkaz-Uzel, March 18, 2014. 37 Personal interview, Georgian Ministry of Foreign Af- Reach Dagestan,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, April 16, 34 Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Chechen Insurgency Leader fairs analyst, Tbilisi, Georgia, October 30, 2013; Murad 2013. Doku Umarov Tells Chechens Not to Fight in Syria,” Batal al-Shishani, “Syria Crisis: Omar Shishani, Chechen 28 “Three Moscow Metro Bombing ‘Organisers’ Killed,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 29, 2013. Jihadist Leader,” BBC, December 3, 2013.

15 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 and Ingushetia and settled along the the porous borderlands of Turkey’s in particular has a two-fold problem— Alazani River in northeastern Georgia’s southern provinces.42 Chechen and its own Kist population has had a few Pankisi Gorge beginning in the 1830s.38 other Caucasian participation in commanders depart its territory to Starting in late 1999, the Kists began to the Syrian jihad represents a major wage jihad in Syria while it still hosts host Chechen refugees fleeing the war in shift in the Islamist currents in the refugees who trekked to Georgia in late southern Chechnya’s Itum-Kale district. North Caucasus itself. Chechens 1999 and who may be vulnerable to from outside the North Caucasus radicalization.46 Indeed, the presence of Chechen and can opportunistically slip across the other Caucasian fighters in Syria has Turkish-Syrian border to wage jihad In addition, a small number of Sunni been ideologically problematic for their and gain valuable battlefield experience. Azeris from Azerbaijan have also been peers in the North Caucasus and led to Russia has tightened its grip on traveling to northern Syria via Georgia division among emigrant jihadists on Chechnya, and the Kadyrov regime has and Turkey—both of which have visa- the ground in Syria. Omar al-Shishani consolidated its rule on Grozny and its free regimes for Azerbaijani nationals.47 pledged bay`a (loyalty) to the ISIL, which environs, making Syria an attractive On a recent visit to Azerbaijan, Turkish is led by the Iraqi jihadist commander destination for now.43 Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in November stated that Ankara is struggling to 2013.39 Another Georgian Kist jihadist Doku Umarov wavered on his position control its 566-mile border with Syria leader named Salah al-Din al-Shishani vis-à-vis Syria, which created space and will not be monitoring Azeris disagreed with Omar al-Shishani. for an influx of fighters into the unless intelligence on specific suspects Salah al-Din had pledged bay`a to the northern Levant. Perhaps out of sheer is provided in advance by the Azeri Caucasus Emirate under the leadership pragmatism, Umarov came around to government.48 of Umarov in order to keep the Jaysh endorsing Chechen fighters flowing al-Muhajirin wa-al-Ansar faction into Syria in a bid to remain relevant Conclusion operating financially and politically among his followers.44 Although Although Russian and local authorities independent within Syria, while also Umarov and his aides never altogether have made gains in securing Chechnya trying to avoid fitna (sedition).40 Omar abandoned their evolved form of after years of all out war, religio- al-Shishani has taken up a highly visible Chechen nationalism now branded political violence has not only continued role that has won him adulation within in Salafist speak, as militancy has unabated in neighboring republics, but the ISIL while it has been battling both ramped up in Dagestan and Kabardino- has in fact escalated in recent years. regime forces and comparatively less Balkaria the localized jihad in the North Russian counterinsurgency strategy extreme Salafist and other rebel groups Caucasus is far less Chechen-centric and lacks a significant hearts-and-minds in northern Syria.41 increasingly globalized Islamist in tone, component aimed at deradicalization. although this is not evident in terms of The Russian leadership relies instead Although a minute figure in absolute operational capacity thus far. on relentless hard power kinetics numbers estimated to be in the paired with some economic incentives hundreds, Chechens and other The Russian president has publicly parceled out to local power brokers. Caucasians from across the diaspora raised his concern about the possibility This has made Grozny relatively safe as well as the Russian Federation of veteran jihadists returning to the but has done nothing to resolve the continue to trickle into Syria via southern tier of the Russian Federation longstanding question of who or what from Syria’s front lines, stating: “they power should rightfully rule the North 45 38 Personal observations, Birkiani, Georgia, October will not vanish into thin air.” The Caucasus in the minds of its diverse, 30, 2009; George Sanikidze, Empire, Islam, and Politics in Syria effect is one that worries a host of indigenous peoples. Central Eurasia (Sapporo: Hokkaido University, 2007), governments aside from just Moscow. pp. 264-266. The scenario of fighters returning from While militants from the Caucasus 39 A Russian-language website promoting foreign fight- the Syrian battlefield is a concern not Emirate did not manage to breach the ers in Syria claimed Omar al-Shishani pledged an oath to only for the Russian Federation, but heavy security detail surrounding the al-Baghdadi based on the latter’s religious legitimacy as also for the South Caucasus region and Sochi Olympic Games, that does not an ascribed descendent of the Prophet Muhammad. See EU states that host Chechen refugee mean that the threat to overall Russian “Omar al-Shishani Swears [allegiance to] Abu Bakr al- diasporas with direct connections to the security is diminished, as evinced by Baghdadi,” Fisyria.com, November 21, 2013. 1990s anti-Russian insurgency. Georgia the attacks in Volgograd. The cycle 40 Somewhat similarly to Omar al-Shishani, Salah al- Din al-Shishani said his decision was based not out of a 42 “7 Chechens Detained on Turkey’s Syria Border,” To- 46 Personal interview, Georgian Ministry of Foreign Af- clash of personalities but rather on the grounds of Salafist day’s Zaman, February 18, 2014. fairs analyst, Tbilisi, Georgia, October 30, 2013. ethics and that he and his fighters will pledge a newbay`a 43 Personal interviews, Duisi and Tbilisi, Georgia, Octo- 47 “Davudoglu Suriyaya geden azerbaycanlılardan only when there is a sole amir for all of Syria once jihad- ber 27, 2013 and October 30, 2013. danısdı,” Azerbaijan News Service Press, February 19, ist groups are united under a single banner. See “Amir 44 Vatchagaev, “Chechen Insurgency Leader Doku 2014. Salahuddin Shishani’s Appeal Following the Meeting Umarov Tells Chechens Not to Fight in Syria”; Mair- 48 Abu Yahya al-Azeri, a well-known Azeri amir who of Commanders of the Mujahideen Jaish al-Muhajireen bek Vatchagaev, “Caucasus Emirate Leader Discusses was a confidant of Omar al-Shishani’s in Jaysh al-Muha- wa’Ansar,” Shamtv.info, December 25, 2013. Chechens in Syria in New Video,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, jirin wa-al-Ansar, was killed fighting in Hama on Sep- 41 “Joy at the Arrival of the Brothers Sheikh Omaral- August 15, 2013. tember 13, 2013. See “Azerbaijani Citizen aka Abu Yahya Shishani,” Abu Ubayda al-Tunisi YouTube channel, 45 Alissa de Carbonnel, “Russia Fears Return of Fight- Killed While Fighting Against Government Forces in February 16, 2014. ers Waging Jihad in Syria,” Reuters, September 23, 2013. Syria,” Azerbaijan Press Agency, September 16, 2013.

16 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 of violence emanating from the North the landscape of violent resistance in Caucasus is likely to continue as The Evolution of the Ethnic Sistan-Baluchistan today is obscured Salafism rises in popularity coupled Baluch Insurgency in Iran by the presence of numerous, albeit with the heavy-handed tactics of the seemingly overlapping, factions. These Kremlin’s security apparatus. The By Chris Zambelis include Harakat Ansar Iran (Movement Caucasus as a whole, along with the of the Partisans of Iran, HAI)4 and Jaish wider Russian Federation, will still iran touted the february 2010 capture al-Adl Iran (Army of Justice, JAA)—the have to contend with the likelihood of Jundallah (Soldiers of God)1 leader two most active insurgent detachments of jihadists returning from Syria and Abdelmalek Rigi as the death knell for to emerge in the post-Jundallah milieu— perhaps Iraq. the ethnic Baluch insurgency plaguing among others. its southeastern province of Sistan- Unexpectedly, Umarov’s initial Baluchistan (also known as Iranian This article will examine the latest hesitance notwithstanding, the Baluchistan). Since emerging in 2003, trends in ethnic Baluch militancy in Caucasus Emirate is currently the Jundallah-led insurgency primarily Sistan-Baluchistan and the impact officially present in Syria at least in targeted members of the Iranian security of extremist Salafist ideologies on terms of a visual brand, although its services and other symbols of Iranian shaping ethnic Baluch resistance to fighters are more so functionally under authority. It eventually widened its Iranian rule. It finds that the specter the banner of Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa- targets to include civilians. Attacks by of the late Rigi continues to weigh al-Ansar. In his final years as the Jundallah claimed hundreds of lives. heavily on ethnic Baluch militancy amir of the Caucasus Emirate, Doku The group’s violent campaign was in Iran. A reading of the discourse, Umarov was increasingly viewed as a derived from its self-declared objective symbolism, and iconography that figurehead,49 devoid of much charisma, of defending ethnic Baluch and Iranian appear on the social media platforms or a spokesman, rather than a genuinely Sunni Muslims from state repression. operated by these factions and their effective operational leader. The vilayets The dramatic events surrounding devotees reflects a deep reverence for that comprise the Caucasus Emirate Rigi’s capture continue to be shrouded the late Rigi and Jundallah. There is also appear to be increasingly autonomous in with intrigue.2 Rigi was executed in evidence to suggest a significant degree nature. In this context, it is conceivable June 2010, following a trial in which of operational connectivity between the that the fight for the violence-plagued he pleaded guilty to all of the charges now-defunct Jundallah and the new republics of the North Caucasus will leveled against him.3 generation of ethnic Baluch insurgents. no longer necessarily be dominated by This connectivity is evident in terms of Chechen leadership nor Chechen aims. A spate of terrorist attacks and other the composition of the aforementioned incidents of violent militancy in Iran in organizations and the tactics and Umarov had proclaimed that the 2012, attributed to ethnic Baluch rebels, targeting philosophy employed by the Caucasus Emirate is but one part of recast a light on the situation in Sistan- current cohort of fighters. a larger worldwide jihadist realm. Baluchistan. Jundallah’s seeming At present, the center of gravity for demise has given way to a new wave of Festering Grievances many aspiring Caucasian jihadists has ethnic Baluch insurgents. In contrast A consideration of the place of ethnic shifted to northern Syria. Within the to the height of Jundallah’s campaign, Baluch in Iranian society is essential North Caucasus, the epicenter of jihad in understanding the roots of violent has long since shifted away from war- 1 Iran forced down a Kyrgyzstan Airways flight reported unrest in Sistan-Baluchistan Province. weary Chechnya, with more aggressive to be en route from Dubai to the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek Iran’s ethnic Baluch population Dagestani jama`ats now taking the lead. when they learned that Rigi was on board. Iranian of- endures widespread poverty and The appointment of Aliaskhab Kebekov ficials claimed that Rigi’s itinerary included a meeting underdevelopment. Sistan-Baluchistan, as the new amir of the Caucasus jihad—to with U.S. officials at Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. See where the majority of ethnic Baluch replace the late Umarov—demonstrates “High-Profile U.S. Official Was Waiting for Rigi in -Ma reside, is one of Iran’s poorest and least the final transition from a once Chechen- 5 nas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan,” AhlulBayt News Agency, developed regions. The Sunni faith centered rebellion to genuine Salafi- February 28, 2010. jihad in the North Caucasus. 2 There is a great deal of speculation surrounding the 4 Harakat Ansar Iran has since announced a merger events leading up to Rigi’s capture. For more background, with another obscure ethnic Baluch militant organization Derek Henry Flood is an independent see Meir Javedanfar, “Was Rigi’s Arrest by Iran Staged?” known as Hizb al-Furqan to form Ansar al-Furqan. See security analyst with an emphasis on MENA, PBS Frontline, February 24, 2010. Also see Chris Zam- “Important Announcement: Merger of Hizbul-Furqan Central Asia and South Asia. Mr. Flood is belis, “Political Theater or Counterterrorism? Assessing and Harakat Ansar Iran,” Harakat al-Ansar, December a contributor to IHS Jane’s Islamic Affairs Iran’s Capture of Jundallah Leader Abdelmalek Rigi,” 7, 2013. Analyst and guest commentator for BBC Terrorism Monitor 8:13 (2010). 5 Notable communities of ethnic Baluch and other Sunni Arabic, His past work has appeared online 3 Rigi was found guilty of 79 criminal charges, including minorities, including ethnic Baluch, ethnic Persians, and with CNN, the Christian Science Monitor founding and leading a terrorist organization, murder others, inhabit Iran’s eastern provinces of North Khoras- and numerous other publications. and attempted murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, nar- an, South Khorasan, and Razavi Khorasan, in addition to cotics smuggling, and collusion with hostile foreign forc- other locations across Iran. See Ali Mamouri, “Iranian es such as the intelligence services of the United States, Government Builds Bridges to Sunni Minority,” al-Mon- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Israel. itor, December 1, 2013. Significantly, ethnic Baluch mili- 49 “Deaths, Blast in Russia’s South Trigger Terrorism See Nazili Fatahi, “Iran Executes Sunni Rebel Leader,” tants and other Sunni-centric Islamist extremists often Sweep,” RIA Novosti, January 9, 2014. New York Times, June 20, 2010. reference the plight of Iranian Sunni believers across the

17 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 of most Iranian Baluch places them at and-file. Iran’s repressive approach two Basij officers dead and a number odds with the Islamic Republic’s Shi`a toward its ethnic Baluch minority also of civilians injured.15 The attack identity. The localized ethnic and tribal undermined Jundallah’s capacity to represented the first suicide bombing identities of ethnic Baluch, who share operate. since a December 2010 attack claimed cultural and kinship ties with fellow by Jundallah at the same mosque, which ethnic Baluch minority populations in After a brief respite, Rigi loyalists and claimed at least 40 lives.16 HAI has since neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan, other ethnic Baluch militants appeared are also a source of contention.6 Iranian to marshal their ranks.11 Indications that “There is little ambiguity Baluch are also subjected to widespread a resurgence of organized and sustained repression by the Iranian security ethnic Baluch-led militancy was on the about the centrality of forces and local institutions. Sistan- rise began to manifest in late 2011. For radical Salafism within Baluchistan is located along one of the example, HAI reportedly formed around world’s busiest narcotics trafficking December 2011, although its exact date the latest current of ethnic corridors7 and adjacent to Pakistan’s of creation is unclear.12 JAA reportedly Baluch militancy.” own southwestern Baluchistan organized sometime in mid-2012.13 Province—a region simmering in a Both groups claimed responsibility for decades-long nationalist insurgency led a multitude of attacks across Sistan- by Pakistani Baluch—and Afghanistan’s Baluchistan against members of the claimed responsibility for a string of southwestern Nimroz Province.8 Iranian security services, particularly attacks, including small unit ambushes Consequently, the Iranian government the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) tends to treat the region as a security (IRGC) and its elite Quds Force, Basij and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive threat. militias, police and border guards, as Device (VBIED) attacks against Iranian well as symbols of the Iranian state, security forces. Baluch Militancy Reborn political and clerical leaders, and soft Despite successfully executing a series of civilian targets such as Shi`a mosques. HAI was reportedly co-founded and led attacks to avenge its leader’s execution, In most respects, the tactical and by an obscure Baluch militant referred Jundallah’s violent campaign weakened operational character of HAI and JAA to as Abu Yasir Muskootani until by the end of 2011.9 The capture and activities bore Jundallah’s signature. his death.17 Notably, the group refers subsequent execution of Rigi in 2010 to the late Rigi as its spiritual amir struck a major blow to Jundallah. The HAI claimed responsibility for an (commander).18 HAI’s spokesman, Abu arrest and killing of scores of other October 19, 2012, suicide bombing in Hafs al-Baluchi, is described as a friend Jundallah fighters, including members the port city of Chabahar in Sistan- of the late Jundallah leader but not a of Rigi’s immediate family and the Rigi Baluchistan. The assailant, who was previous member of Jundallah, as well tribe,10 helped deplete the group’s rank- reportedly targeting the Imam Hussein as a co-founder of HAI.19 Mosque, detonated his explosives- country. For example, see Sons of Sunnah Iran, located at laden vest outside the mosque after he Despite their shared goal of fighting www.sonsofsunnah.com. was denied entry into the premises by the Islamic Republic and mutual 14 6 Karlos Zurutuza, “Inside Iran’s Most Secretive Re- Iranian security forces. The attack left reverence for Jundallah, the presence gion,” Diplomat [Tokyo], May 16, 2011. of numerous ethnic Baluch militant 7 Amin Ahmed, “New Routes of Heroin Smuggling refers to the former Jundallah (and many of its successor factions in the wake of Jundallah’s Emerging, Says INCB,” Dawn, March 5, 2014. factions) as the “Rigi Clan” or “Rigi Group.” See “Jundal- demise apparently encouraged rivalry 8 Umar Farooq, “The Battle for Sistan Baluchistan,” lah, Iran’s Sunni Rebels,” Reuters, July 16, 2010; “Rigi and dissension. These cleavages may Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2013. Group Sets Up Den Near Iran Border,” Press TV, March have stemmed from possible regional 9 For example, Jundallah claimed that its July 15, 2010, 3, 2011. and tribal disputes. This is not without twin suicide bombings against Zahedan’s Grand Mosque, 11 Muhammad Dhahir Baluch was announced as Rigi’s precedent, as there are indications which left upwards of 30 dead, was revenge for Rigi’s replacement to head Jundallah. There is little evidence, that regional and tribal dynamics capture and execution. See “Iran to Mete Out Justice in however, to suggest that Jundallah remains functional Zahedan Blast,” Press TV [Tehran], July 17, 2010. in any substantive form. See “Iranian Rebels Pick New 15 Ibid. 10 The Rigi tribe is considered one of Sistan-Baluchistan’s Leader,” al-Jazira, February 28, 2010. 16 Ibid. largest tribes. There are indications, however, that the 12 Hussein Kirmani, “Harakat Ansar Iran ‘Responsible 17 “HAI Council Announcement: Martyrdom of Abu late Jundallah leader failed to earn much support among for Suicide Bombings in Chabahar’?” Deutsche Welle Per- Yasir Muskootani and Selection of New Emir,” Harakat the wider tribe. Nevertheless, Iran has frequently singled sian, October 20, 2012. al-Ansar, May 7, 2013. out the role of Rigi’s immediate family and clan mem- 13 Sajid Hussain, “The Other Jihad,” The News Interna- 18 The late Rigi is lionized by Harakat Ansar Iran and bers, along with members of the broader Rigi tribe, in tional, December 11, 2013. Also see Nima Abdelkah, “The its successor faction Ansar al-Furqan. In a public mes- Jundallah’s activities. For example, Abdel Ghafoor Rigi, Army of Justice and the Threat of Sunni Islamist Militan- sage posted on its network of official websites and social one of the late Jundallah leader’s brothers, executed the cy in the Sistan-Baluchistan Province of Iran,” Terrorism media outlets, Abu Yasir Muskootani boasted that the group’s first suicide attack—the first such attack in Iran’s Monitor 11:23 (2013). “students of our emir Abdel Malek Baluch are still alive.” history—in December 2008. For more background, see 14 “Suicide Bomber Kills Two at South Iran Mosque,” See “Speech by Emir Abu Yasir Muskootani on the Eve Amineh Soghdi, “Baluch Celebrate Rebel’s Arrest,” In- Reuters, October 19, 2012. The attack was part of what of Our First Successful Operation,” Harakat al-Ansar, stitute for War and Peace Reporting, March 10, 2010; HAI called its “Operation Ra’ad (Thunder) 1” campaign. April 16, 2013. Sonia Ghaffari, “Baluchistan’s Rising Militancy,” Middle See “Announcement: The Beginning of Operation Ra’ad,” 19 “Abu Hafs al-Baluchi and His Role in the Jihad in Bal- East Report 39:250 (2009). Consequently, Iran frequently Harakat al-Ansar, November 13, 2012. uchistan,” Harakat al-Ansar, May 19, 2013.

18 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 and ideological disagreements also for the November 2013 assassination There is no conclusive evidence to impacted Jundallah on multiple of a public prosecutor in the city of suggest that HAI and JAA coordinate levels.20 HAI addressed this issue in Zabol located in the northeastern operations. Significantly, despite HAI’s an announcement declaring solidarity part of Sistan-Baluchistan near Iran’s announced mergers with fellow ethnic with another shadowy fellow militant border with Afghanistan.29 The group Baluch militant organizations, they organization, Sepah-e-Sahaba Iran called the attack an act of retaliation have yet to reference JAA. Both groups (Soldiers of the Companions Iran, SSI).21 for the execution of the aforementioned seem to operate in overlapping spaces in HAI also refuted reports of discord prisoners.30 Sistan-Baluchistan, and both attracted among the numerous insurgent factions members of the former Jundallah to as a ploy by the Iranian intelligence JAA reportedly formed after their ranks. HAI’s penchant for suicide services to discredit their cause.22 In a Rigi’s capture and the subsequent bombings in urban areas set it apart further attempt to unify the rank-and- fragmentation of Jundallah. It is led from other militant organizations.36 file, in December 2013 HAI announced by Abdulrahim Mulazadeh, who The austere geographic characteristics its formal merger with another murky uses the pseudonym Salah al-Din of Sistan-Baluchistan, coupled with militant group known as Hizb al- al-Farouqi. JAA is also alleged to the prevalence of local tribal identities Furqan23 (Party of the Criterion,24 HAF) include former members of Jundallah and rivalries, may explain the lack of to form Ansar al-Furqan (Partisans of within its ranks.31 Some observers broader cooperation between HAI and the Criterion, AF).25 Since its merger have claimed that former Jundallah JAA and other ethnic Baluch insurgent with HAF, HAI operates under the fighters simply renamed their factions. banner of AF. group JAA.32 Iran stated that JAA represented “remnants” of Jundallah,33 Along with conducting attacks, the new Much like HAI, JAA has been implicated and that it exploits the Iran-Pakistan generation of ethnic Baluch militants in a series of terrorist and insurgent- frontier to enter Pakistan’s Baluchistan places a greater emphasis on advancing style attacks. In February 2014, JAA Province as a sanctuary. Iran believes its campaign in the virtual domain. In abducted five Iranian soldiers outside that JAA is holding the five Iranian contrast to the new generation of ethnic the village of Jakigur along the Iran- soldiers abducted in February 2014 on Baluch militants, Jundallah’s online Pakistan border in Sistan-Baluchistan.26 Pakistani soil.34 JAA’s purported use presence was fairly limited.37 The most JAA killed 14 Iranian border guards and of Pakistani territory as a safe haven significant extremist organizations injured five others in an October 2013 provoked a sharp response from Iranian maintain an assortment of online social ambush against a border checkpoint authorities, who threatened to deploy media platforms, including officially in the town of Rustak near the city of troops inside Pakistan and Afghanistan managed websites, blogs, along with Saravan located along the Iran-Pakistan to free the abducted soldiers and to root YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, border in Sistan-Baluchistan.27 In out other threats affecting its frontier and Google+ pages.38 retaliation, Iranian authorities executed territories.35 16 ethnic Baluch men on charges ranging In an effort to reach a wider audience, from terrorism to narcotics trafficking.28 many of these platforms contain JAA would later claim responsibility 29 “Armed Group Claims Iran Prosecutor’s Killing,” al- material in Persian, Arabic, and Jazira, November 7, 2013. English. In addition to broadcasting 20 Audun Kolstad Wiig, “Islamist Opposition in the Is- 30 Ibid. official statements and related lamic Republic: Jundallah and the Spread of Extremist 31 Mehdi Jahantighi, “Iran News Agency Claims Border commentary, ethnic Baluch insurgents Deobandism in Iran,” Norwegian Defense Research Es- Attack Rebels Backed by USA, Israel,” Fars News Agen- exploit social media’s force-multiplier tablishment (FFI), July 2, 2009, pp. 30-34. cy [Tehran], October 27, 2013. potential by showcasing videotaped 21 “Harakat Ansar Iran Announce Cooperation with 32 Hussain. Sipah-e-Sahaba,” Harakat al-Ansar, April 16, 2013. 33 “Judiciary: Saturday Terrorist Attack Done by Rem- 36 Based on their history of attacks, some observers sug- 22 Ibid. nants of Rigi Group,” Fars News Agency, October 27, gest a clear tactical and operational distinction between 23 See the official website of Hizb al-Furqan at www. 2013. HAI and JAA. See Galen Wright, “Tracking Insurgent hezbulfurqan.blogspot.com. Also see Hizb al-Furqan’s 34 “Iran, Pakistan Form Committee to Free Abducted Activity in Southeast Iran,” Open Source IMINT, De- official Facebook page at www.facebook.com/hezbul- Guards,” Press TV, February 23, 2014. cember 14, 2013. furqan1. 35 Katharine Houreld, “Pakistan Warns Iran Not to 37 For a sampling of the former Jundallah’s video and 24 In general terms, the reference to al-Furqan (the Cri- Send in Troops After Guards Kidnapped,” Reuters, Feb- online presence, see www.youtube.com/user/taftaanba- terion) refers to the belief of the Qur’an as the standard ruary 18, 2014. Iran’s threats come despite its participa- loch. upon which to judge right and wrong. tion in numerous bilateral exchanges designed to foster 38 For the official Ansar al-Furqan (formerly known as 25 “Important Announcement: Merger of Hizbul-Furqan enhanced security cooperation with Pakistan. Iran and Harakat Ansar Iran) blog, see www.ansariran1.blogspot. and Harakat Ansar Iran,” Harakat al-Ansar, December Pakistan concluded a bilateral cooperation agreement to- com. For the official Ansar al-Furqan YouTube page, 7, 2013. ward preventing and combating organized crime, terror- see www.youtube.com/user/ansariran1. For the official 26 “Iran, Pakistan Form Committee to Free Abducted ism, narcotics trafficking, and other threats confronting Ansar al-Furqan Twitter page, see www.twitter.com/ Guards,” Press TV, February, 23, 2014. both countries. In light of recent events, Iran and Paki- AnsarIran_eng. For the official Jaish al-Adl Iran blog, 27 “Iran Pursuing Saravan Terrorist Attack: Deputy stan established a joint working body to secure the re- see www.jashuladl.blogspot.jp. For the official Jaish al- FM,” Press TV, January 3, 2014. lease of the abducted Iranian soldiers under the auspices Adl Iran Twitter page, see www.twitter.com/jaishuladl. 28 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Violence Returns to Sistan-Bal- of the Iran-Pakistan Joint Border Commission. See “Iran, Jaish al-Adl Iran also operates Edalaat News, located uchistan Province,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Pakistan Form Committee to Free Abducted Guards,” at edaalatnews.blogspot.co.uk. For the official Hizb al- November 7, 2013. Press TV, February 22, 2014. Furqan blog, see www.hezbulfurqan.blogspot.com.

19 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 footage of alleged attacks. While it In contrast, there is little ambiguity for the expansion of these ideas. The is difficult to determine the precise about the centrality of radical Salafism geopolitical implications of this trend number of organized insurgents within the latest current of ethnic Baluch should not be understated, especially operating in Sistan-Baluchistan, militancy. The rhetoric and discourse of in the context of Iran’s resilient alliance the ability to air videotaped footage groups such as HAI and JAA are replete with the Bashar al-Assad regime, of alleged battlefield successes and with anti-Shi`a polemics and hardline the ongoing conflict in Syria, and the other forms of propaganda can serve Salafist tones.42 HAI and JAA often refer expanding regional proxy war featuring to amplify the strength and resolve to the Islamic Republic as the Safavid rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia. In this of the insurgency in the eyes of its regime, in reference to the Safavid regard, the return of violent militancy sympathizers, as well as in the eyes dynasty that ushered in Iran’s turn to to Sistan-Baluchistan in its current of Iranian and international public Shi’ism. They also frequently refer to form may signal the start of a new and opinion. Shi`a believers as rawafidh (rejectionists), increasingly dangerous front in an a pejorative label frequently used expanding war of regional proxies. Salafist Discourse and Dogma by Salafist extremists against Shi`a Notwithstanding its Islamist-themed Muslims.43 Yet it is the global focus of The deteriorating security situation in namesake and its Sunni rank-and- the commentary, especially in regard to neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan, file, Jundallah rejected any association events in places such as Syria, Iraq, and especially in the context of the with radical Islamist and particularly Lebanon, that illustrates the hardline impending withdrawal of U.S. forces Salafist extremism.39 The late Rigi at Salafist undercurrents driving ethnic from Afghanistan in 2014, further one point framed Jundallah’s struggle Baluch militancy in Iran today.44 In this complicates an already difficult set of as a fight for freedom and human rights regard, Iran’s support for the Ba`athist dynamics affecting Sistan-Baluchistan for a people under siege by a repressive regime in Syria, Hizb Allah in Lebanon, and potentially other locations along regime.40 Ultimately, Jundallah began and the Shi`a-led government of Nuri Iran’s eastern frontier. The further to frame its mission in the context of al-Maliki in Iraq serves to vindicate the destabilization of Iran’s eastern a struggle to defend Sunni Muslims in claims of ethnic Baluch militants that neighbors is sure to transcend borders Iran. Yet it was Jundallah’s incremental Iran and its regional Shi`a allies are in the form of accelerated refugee flows, resort to sectarian-imbued rhetoric waging a campaign to destroy what they arms, narcotics, and human trafficking, against Shi`a Islam and its use of believe to be true Islam. and the spread of violent political and suicide bombings that raised questions religious militancy. Iran’s oppressive about the creeping influence of radical Conclusion posture toward Sistan-Baluchistan over Islamist ideologies within Jundallah. The influence of radical Islamist and, in the years has been largely attributed These trends appeared to lend credence particular, hardline Salafist ideologies to its security-centric treatment of to Iran’s claims associating Jundallah among ethnic Baluch militants is the region. Growing unrest along its with groups such as al-Qa`ida and the likely to remain an important driver frontier will almost certainly compel Taliban despite doubts to the contrary. of events in Sistan-Baluchistan in the Iran to maintain its hardline methods of Iran also accused a combination of foreseeable future. The heightened control. Yet it is precisely this strategy foreign powers—including its rivals sectarian tensions that crystallized that has helped to feed the grievances the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel, around the greater Middle East in fueling armed rebellion in the region. and the United Kingdom—of supporting recent years provide a fertile ground Barring a major turn of events, Sistan- ethnic Baluch militancy.41 Baluchistan will continue to fester in 42 This point is illustrated by a statement attributed to the months and years ahead. purported Harakat Ansar Iran member Nasser Baluchi: 39 Jundallah also referred to itself as the People’s Resis- “If you think our jihad has anything to do with national- Chris Zambelis is a senior analyst tance Movement of Iran (PRMI) in an apparent effort to ism, you are wrong. Our Jihad is for Islam. And we will specializing in Middle East affairs with create distance from reports alleging that it harbored an hit the Shi`a wherever they are, whether in Iran, Syria, Helios Global, Inc., a risk management extremist sectarian agenda. or Iraq, it makes no difference to us. Our umma has no group based in the Washington, D.C. 40 The late Rigi went as far as to pen open letters to U.S. borders.” See “Why We Fight?” Harakat al-Ansar, April area. The opinions expressed here are President Barack Obama, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki- 16, 2013. the author’s alone and do not necessarily moon, and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo- 43 Hardline Salafists tend to consider Shi`a Muslims reflect the position of Helios Global, Inc. gan in November 2009. In each of the individually tai- (and adherents of other Muslim denominations) as her- lored letters, Rigi made a plea on the behalf of a besieged etics or apostates. Iranian Baluch population he claims to be defending. 44 The importance of global events to the new generation The letters are available at www.ostomaan.org/articles/ of ethnic Baluch militants is demonstrated in the follow- news-and-views/4462. ing statement published by Harakat Ansar Iran: “What 41 William Yong and Robert F. Worth, “Toll Rises From is Harakat Ansar Iran?? We are mujahidin of the Ahlus Twin Suicide Bombings at Iranian Mosque,” New York Sunnah of Iran, our aims are to: 1. Protect the oppressed Times, July 16, 2010. Curiously, Iran sometimes blames Sunni minorities of Iran against their Shi`a government. Pakistan for encouraging unrest in Sistan-Baluchistan 2. Strike at the head and heart of Shi’ism, Tehran and Province even though both countries share a history of Qum so as to stem the destruction they spread amongst actively collaborating to suppress Baluch nationalism in Ahlus Sunnah worldwide (like in Syria and Iraq). 3. Es- the region. See “U.S., Pakistan Spy Agencies Lead Jaish tablish Shari`a in our lands. 4. Regain Iran for the Mus- ul-Adl,” Press TV, November 5, 2013. lims, with the help of Allah [God].”

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A Profile of the Informal was convicted three times for various Furthermore, the FAI has established crimes, including bank robberies.5 ties with foreign groups, especially Anarchist Federation in in Greece, and has become a model of Italy The view of insurrectionary inspiration for extremist groups and anarchism inspired by Bonanno’s individuals around the world. By Francesco Marone work has spread from Italy and has been developing in the transnational The Informal Anarchist Federation (FAI) in the last 25 years, Italian anarchist movement since the 1980s, The Informal Anarchist Federation insurrectionary anarchists have been partly due to translations of Bonanno’s (Federazione Anarchica Informale, responsible for dozens of attacks in the writings.6 Overall, the connection of FAI)10 is a loose network of individuals country and abroad.1 This trend was long this contemporary movement with the and small temporary “affinity groups” underestimated by Italian authorities main intellectual currents of classical (gruppi di affinità) based on personal and analysts,2 partly because the anarchism is rather weak. In general, relationships. There is still little public attacks were not lethal. Nevertheless, anarchism emphasizes practice over information about the network. The insurrectionary anarchism is recognized theory. Insurrectionary anarchism, FAI officially appeared in December as a current security concern in Italy. It however, has taken this position to 2003 when it claimed responsibility for has become the most dangerous form the extreme. Violent “direct action” two rudimentary bombs placed outside of domestic non-jihadist terrorism in here and now is considered essential. Romani Prodi’s private residence in the country.3 Furthermore, in many Contemporary insurrectionary Bologna, in north-central Italy.11 Prodi respects, Italy represents the birthplace anarchists have been critical of other twice served as prime minister of Italy of a new threat that has spread to other anarchists. On the one hand, they (1996-1998, 2006-2008), and he was countries. have rejected the struggle for reforms president of the European Commission and mass organizations and have at the time of the attempted attack. In Contemporary insurrectionary opposed issue-based activism. They December 2003-January 2004, a letter anarchism is an extremist tendency have expressed a profound critique bomb campaign called “Operation Santa within the anarchist movement. of any other movements that fail to Claus” was carried out against several It emphasizes the practice of take immediate direct action. On the European Union representatives, senior revolutionary insurrection through other hand, insurrectionary anarchists officials and institutions. The targets illegal and violent “direct action.” In direct their critique at any “formal included the president of the European Italy, the insurrectionary anarchist organization.”7 Commission for the second time,12 the movement has combined different radical causes and interests, including: This article examines the rise of the presented different opinions on the degree and extent of anti-authoritarianism, anti-capitalism, most important network within this violence. Some of these militants, however, were in favor anti-imperialism, anti-militarism, anti- movement, the Informal Anarchist of killing “the guilty,” while sparing the life of “innocent clericalism, the struggle against the Federation (FAI), and its escalation of people.” The document was called “Four Years” (“Quat- judicial and prison system, radical violence culminating in the attack on an tro anni”), a reference to the network’s first four years of 8 environmentalism and Sardinian Italian nuclear executive in May 2012. life. English translations of the text are available on the 4 separatism. In the last decade, the FAI has been internet. See also Marco Imarisio, “Nomi in codice Qui- able to sustain an intense campaign Quo-Qua. ‘Giusto ferire una segretaria se serve a uccidere One of the most influential ideologues of violence. In particular, a series of il padrone,’” Corriere della Sera, December 18, 2009. of contemporary insurrectionary bombs and letter bombs, often directed 10 The Informal Anarchist Federation (FAI) is not to be anarchism is the Italian activist Alfredo against high-profile targets, have confused with the historic Italian Anarchist Federation Maria Bonanno (born 1937). Bonanno is caused concern and alarm. The network (also FAI), associated with the International of Anarchist best known for his essay Armed Joy (La gioia has yet to cause any deaths, but some of Federations (IAF/IFA). In December 2003, the Italian 9 armata), an incendiary pamphlet written their attacks were potentially lethal. Anarchist Federation promptly denounced “the serious in Italy in 1977 (and later banned) during and infamous nature of attributing this kind of facts [the the so-called “Years of Lead” marked 5 Corrado Barbacini, “L’anarchico Bonanno arrestato first acts of violence] to initials alluding to the monogram by left-wing and right-wing terrorism. dopo una rapina,” Il Piccolo, October 7, 2009. of FAI.” See FAI Press release, December 28, 2003. In the early 1990s, Bonanno proposed 6 In general terms, the Italian anarchist movement 11 Vittorio Monti, “Bologna, esplosioni sotto casa Prodi,” coordination between Mediterranean historically had a relevant transnational dimension, es- Corriere della Sera, December 22, 2003. See the FAI com- insurrectionary anarchists, especially pecially in the United States. See, for example, Davide muniqué, “Open Letter to the Anarchist and Anti-Au- from Italy, Greece and Spain. Bonanno Turcato, “Italian Anarchism as a Transnational Move- thoritarian Movement” (“Lettera aperta al movimento ment, 1885-1915,” International Review of Social History anarchico ed anti-autoritario”), December 21, 2003. Eng- 1 Such attacks include sabotage, arson, bombings, and 52.3 (2007). lish translations are available on the internet. assaults, among others. 7 Leonard Williams and Brad Thomson, “The Allure of 12 The letter bomb exploded in the hands of Prodi at 2 See Marco Boschi, Criminologia del terrorismo anarco- Insurrection,” Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies his home in Bologna. The bomb, however, was a small, insurrezionalista (Rome: Aracne, 2005). 1 (2011). amateurish device and was not capable of causing sig- 3 “2012 Report to Parliament on the Activities of the Po- 8 The perpetrators of this crime were apprehended in nificant damage. Prodi was not hurt. See Vittorio Monti, lice Forces, the State of Public Order and Security, and September 2012 and convicted in November 2013. “Una gran fiammata. Ma io resto sereno,” Corriere della Organized Crime,” Italian Ministry of the Interior, 2013, 9 In 2007, the FAI released the “transcription” of a Sera, December 28, 2003; Sergio Stimolo, “La moglie: ha p. 10. clandestine meeting held among eight anonymous mem- spento tutto e mi ha tranquillizzata. Il Professore: non 4 Boschi. bers of the network in December 2006. This discussion avevano intenzione di uccidere,” Corriere della Sera, De-

21 march 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 3 president of the European Central flexible at the same time.”23 The group (Solidarietà internazionale). These were Bank,13 Europol,14 Eurojust,15 the is explicitly “not democratic.”24 already existing groups, operating at president16 and the vice-president17 the local level in the cities of Bologna, of the European People’s Party, and Second, the FAI is “anarchist” because it Genoa, Rome and Milan, respectively. a British member of the European wants the “destruction of capital and the As a whole, these four groups were Parliament.18 The FAI claimed state.”25 It radically opposes “any Marxist responsible for at least 16 rudimentary responsibility for these attacks. All of cancer” since “it crushes the possibility bombs and letter bombs in the years the letter bombs were sent from Bologna of a free society and just substitutes one 1999-2003.31 Over time, other Italian in the space of a few days.19 dominion with another.”26 groups and cells have joined the FAI. At present, the actual number of FAI In December 2003, the FAI released Third, the FAI is “informal” because it militants in Italy is unknown,32 but an important “open letter” in which intends to adopt a kind of organization recent estimates range from 50 to 250 the new group introduced itself.20 that is “capable of preventing people.33 The FAI aimed to be “a center-less, the creation of authoritarian and chaotic and horizontal organization,” bureaucratizing mechanisms.”27 The The Italian FAI has ideological and in this way “reflecting the view of authors of the open letter pragmatically solidarity ties with Greek anarchist the anarchist society [they] struggle observed that classic clandestine groups,34 particularly with the for.”21 According to these militants, “to structures, typical of Italian left-wing Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (CCF),35 a conciliate organization and theoretical/ terrorism (in particular, the notorious revolutionary anarcho-individualist practical debate with the anonymity Red Brigades), can be undermined by group that emerged in 2008.36 In of groups/individuals is possible infiltrators and informants: “on the particular, these ties were confirmed through a widespread dialogue based contrary, the informal organization is in June 2012 when an important Italian on actions.”22 formed of groups and individuals that police operation against insurrectionary do not know one another.”28 Moreover, anarchists occurred. Eight people were In their view, the FAI is first a unlike full-time terrorists, “whoever arrested and 24 suspected militants, “federation” because of “its widespread takes part in the FAI is a militant only including six Greek CCF members, horizontal structure”: “relationships when preparing and carrying out an were investigated. On that occasion, inside the federation are stable and action.”29 Therefore, the adoption of a Italian investigators stated that there horizontal structure seems to be based was a “proven connection” with “Greek on both ideological and pragmatic anarchist movements.”37 Around 2011, cember 28, 2003. reasons. the FAI also promoted the development 13 The letter bomb sent to Jean-Claude Trichet was inter- of an International Revolutionary cepted and defused in Frankfurt, Germany. See Giuliana The FAI members accept a “pact of Front (Fronte Rivoluzionario Ferraino, “Due libri bomba a Trichet e all’ Europol,” Cor- mutual support” based on three key Internazionale, FRI), apparently an riere della Sera, December 30, 2003. points: “revolutionary solidarity” with effort of coordination between like- 14 The letter bomb was intercepted and defused in The arrested or fugitive comrades; self- minded militant groups. Hague, Netherlands. See ibid. organized “revolutionary campaigns”; 15 The letter bomb was intercepted and defused in The and “communication between groups 31 Boschi, pp. 33-40, 112-113. Hague, Netherlands. See Giusi Fasano, “Eurojust: nuovo and individuals” through actions 32 See Maurizio Piccirilli, “Terrorismo, l’allarme degli pacco bomba, stesso volantino,” Corriere della Sera, De- and through the channels of the 007: ‘Anarchici pronti a nuovi attacchi,’” Il Tempo, May 30 cember 31, 2003. movement. In this sense, the internet 24, 2012. 16 The letter bomb sent to Hans-Gert Pöttering was represents an important opportunity 33 “Federazione anarchica informale (Fai). 10 anni di vita opened by an assistant at his European Parliament office, for communication and propaganda. e 40 azioni rivendicate,” La Stampa, May 11, 2012; Flavio and the letter caught fire. No one was hurt, however. See Haver, “Pronti ad azioni da jihad. Il rapporto sugli anar- Giuseppe Sorcina, “Un pacco bomba contro il capogrup- In its early years, the FAI was composed chici,” Corriere della Sera, June 5, 2012. po del Ppe,” Corriere della Sera, January 6, 2004. of four known groups, expressly 34 Giusi Fasano, “Genova, quella pista sul terrorismo 17 The letter bomb sent to José Ignacio Salafranca Sán- mentioned in the 2003 open letter: che porta in Grecia,” Corriere della Sera, May 14, 2012; chez-Neyra was intercepted at his European Parliament Cooperative of Hand-Made Fire and Ilaria Giupponi, “Anarchici, l’asse italo-greco,” Lettera office and defused. See ibid. Related Items (Cooperativa Artigiana 43, May 13, 2012. 18 The letter bomb sent to Gary Titley was opened by Fuoco e Affini), July 20 Brigade (Brigata 35 George Kassimeris, “Greece’s New Generation of Ter- his wife at his Manchester office and caught fire. It did 20 Luglio), Five C’s (Cellule contro il rorists, Part 2: The Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (CCF),” not cause significant damage. See ibid.; Ian Black, John Capitale, il Carcere, i suoi Carcerieri e le Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35:9 (2012). Hooper and David Ward, “Manchester MEP Among Let- sue Celle) and International Solidarity 36 For example, in the 2011 FAI statement entitled “Do ter Bomb Targets,” Guardian, January 6, 2004. Not Say That We Are Few” (“Non dite che siamo pochi”), 19 Giusi Fasano, “C’ è una cellula che agisce in città,” Cor- 23 Ibid. the references to “the sisters and brothers of the Con- riere della Sera, December 30, 2003; Giusi Fasano, “Una 24 Ibid. spiracy of Cells of Fire” are frequent and extremely fa- ventina di sospettati ma non c’ è un ‘regista,’” Corriere 25 Ibid. vorable. English translations of the text are available on della Sera, January 6, 2004. 26 Ibid. the internet. 20 “Open Letter to the Anarchist and Anti-Authoritar- 27 Ibid. 37 “Anarchici informali, arresti in tutta Italia. ‘Vicini al ian Movement.” 28 Ibid. gruppo che sparò ad Adinolfi,’” Corriere della Sera, June 21 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 13, 2012; “Terrorismo, operazione del Ros contro gli anar- 22 Ibid. 30 Ibid. chici. Arresti in tutta Italia,” La Repubblica, June 13, 2012.

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In recent years, several groups have No one was hurt in the attacks. In power company controlled by the used the FAI brand name to claim March 2010, a letter bomb sent to the aerospace and defense conglomerate responsibility for their own attacks in Northern League (Lega Nord) party Finmeccanica. He was shot in the knee Spain, Greece, the United Kingdom, headquarters injured a mailman.44 In by a man who was waiting for him Russia, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, December 2010, letter bombs exploded outside his home, as an accomplice Indonesia and other countries.38 In in the Swiss and Chilean Embassies in stood ready with a motorbike on which May 2012, two months before the start Rome and two people were seriously the two then made their escape. Adinolfi of the Olympic Games in London, hurt; a third letter bomb sent to the was hospitalized after the attack and insurrectionary anarchists under the Greek Embassy was defused.45 In March required surgery to his leg. Fortunately, banner of the FAI claimed credit for two 2011, a mail bomb seriously injured an his condition was not serious.50 sabotage attacks on railway signals near officer at the barracks of the Folgore Bristol which caused severe delays and parachute brigade in the Tuscan city of The attack sparked fears of terrorism the cancellation of services.39 On that Livorno46 and another device exploded in the country, especially in the climate occasion, the FAI in the United Kingdom at the headquarters of Swissnuclear, of an economic recession and social announced their intention to “use the Swiss nuclear industry association, tension. “Kneecappings” (gambizzazioni) guerrilla activity to hurt the national wounding two employees.47 In December were a trademark practice of the Red image and paralyze the economy” during 2011, a letter bomb sent to the Deutsche Brigades,51 the left-wing terrorist group the Olympics.40 Other sabotage and Bank chief executive was intercepted that carried out a campaign of violence arson attacks were claimed in the name in Frankfurt,48 while another letter aimed at destabilizing Italy in the 1970s of the FAI in southwest England.41 bomb seriously injured the director and the early 1980s, culminating in the of Equitalia, the state tax-collection kidnapping and killing of former Italian In Italy, after the 2003-2004 “Operation agency, in Rome.49 All these actions Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. Santa Claus” letter bomb campaign, were explicitly claimed by “cells” and anarchist militants associated with “nuclei” associated with the FAI. The On May 11, 2012, a four-page letter the FAI were responsible for several 2010-2011 letter bombs revealed an claiming responsibility for the assault threatening actions, bombs and letter improvement in bomb-making skills, was delivered to Italy’s Corriere della bombs against political and economic at least compared with the amateurish Sera newspaper.52 “We have crippled institutions, diplomatic offices, military devices of the 2003-2004 campaign. Adinolfi,” said the note, which accused bases, police stations, corporations, the Ansaldo Nucleare executive of being temporary staffing agencies, banks, tax The 2012 Attack on Nuclear Executive one of “those most responsible, along collection agencies, newspaper offices, Roberto Adinolfi with [former conservative minister universities, immigration detention In 2012, there was a qualitative leap Claudio] Scajola, for the return of centers and other targets. in this campaign of violence. For the nuclear energy to Italy.”53 Adinolfi was first time, anarchist militants under called “one of the many sorcerers of the In particular, in December 2009 a the banner of the FAI shot a person. atom” and a “grey assassin.”54 In the rudimentary bomb partially exploded On the morning of May 7, 2012, in the anonymous authors’ view, “State and at night at Bocconi University, a northwestern port city of Genoa, two science, capitalism and technology are prestigious private university in masked men “kneecapped” Roberto only one thing, one single Moloch.”55 The Milan,42 while a letter bomb was sent Adinolfi, the chief executive of attack was claimed by the previously to an immigration detention center Ansaldo Nucleare, an Italian nuclear unknown “Olga Nucleus” of the FAI/ in the northeastern town of Gradisca 43 d’Isonzo, on the border with Slovenia. 44 Michele Focarete and Gianni Santucci, “Esplode pac- 50 Giusi Fasano, “Spari al manager. ‘Come le Br’ Un co per la Lega. Busta con proiettile al premier,” Corriere gruppo minacciò: colpiremo,” Corriere della Sera, May 38 The 2011 FAI statement “Do Not Say That We Are della Sera, March 28, 2010. 8, 2012; Erika Dellacasa, “La moglie: non è grave. Siamo Few” presented a list of 37 cells and nuclei in Greece, 45 Rinaldo Frignani, “Pacchi bomba alle ambasci- stati fortunati,” Corriere della Sera, May 8, 2012. Mexico, Chile, Russia, Peru, the Netherlands, England ate. Rivendicazione degli anarchici,” Corriere della 51 See, for example, James Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, and Italy. Sera, December 24, 2010; Rinaldo Frignani, “Bomba “Kneecapping,” in C. Gus Martin ed., The SAGE Encyclo- 39 Shiv Malik, “Anarchists Claim Responsibility for all’ambasciata, non è esplosa per un caso,” Corriere della pedia of Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publica- Railway Signalling Sabotage in Bristol,” Guardian, May Sera, December 28, 2010. tions, 2011), pp. 329-330. For an overview, see Donatella 25, 2012. 46 Michele Bocci, “Pacco bomba ai parà della Folgore. della Porta, Il terrorismo di sinistra (Bologna: Il Mulino, 40 Ibid. Grave un ufficiale, firma anarchica,”La Repubblica, April 1990). 41 Shiv Malik, “Anarchist Group Claims it Started Blaze 1, 2011; Michele Bocci and Franca Selvatici, “Bomba alla 52 “The Mark of Life. Toward an Imaginative Way to De- at Police Firearms Training Centre,” Guardian, August Folgore, firma anarchica,”La Repubblica, April 2, 2011. stroy the Existent” (“Il marchio della vita. Cercando una 28, 2013; Brian Whelan, “Bristol Arson Attack Linked 47 Christian Hartmann, “Two Hurt in Parcel Bomb at via immaginifica alla distruzione dell’esistente”), May to Anarchist Terror Network,” Channel 4 News, August Swiss Nuclear Lobby,” Reuters, March 31, 2011. 11, 2012, available at http://media2.corriere.it/corriere/ 28, 2013. 48 Nicholas Kulish, “Letter Bomb Sent to German Bank pdf/2012/olga_110512.pdf. 42 Andrea Galli, “Dinamite alla Bocconi. ‘Azione de- Chief,” New York Times, December 8, 2011; Fiorenza Sar- 53 Ibid. In June 2011, however, Italians rejected the re- gli anarchici,’” Corriere della Sera, December 17, 2009; zanini, “Bomba alla Deutsche Bank spedita da anarchici turn of nuclear power in a popular referendum. “Pacco bomba, paura alla Bocconi. Rivendicazione anar- italiani,” Corriere della Sera, December 9, 2011. 54 Ibid. chica,” Corriere della Sera, December 16, 2009. 49 Massimo Lugli, “Pacco bomba a Equitalia, ferito il 55 Ibid. The name of Moloch, an ancient deity, is likely 43 Grazia Maria Mottola, “Nel mirino il centro immigrati direttore generale. Gli anarchici: siamo stati noi,” La Re- used figuratively to designate a system that requires ter- delle coop rosse,” Corriere della Sera, December 17, 2009. pubblica, December 10, 2011. rible sacrifices.

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FRI. “Olga” is an explicit reference merciless satisfaction for the shooting: dominant and the dominated” and to Olga Ikonomidou, an imprisoned “In a wonderful morning in May I acted, to oppose the “techno-industrial member of the CCF.56 and in the space of a few hours I fully system.”66 In particular, the aim of enjoyed my life. For once I left fear and the 2012 attack on Adinolfi was to The leaflet expressed a striking craving self-justification behind and defied the “throw sand in the clogs of this mega- for violence: unknown.”61 machine in the space of a second.”67 The nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, Despite not liking violent-style Cospito, as an “anti-organization triggered their actions.68 In the end, rhetoric, it has been with a certain anarchist,”62 denied the involvement of Cospito exhorted other individuals to pleasantness that we armed other people in the assault: “I want to strike without the “need for clandestine ourselves, with pleasure that we be absolutely clear: the FAI/FRI Olga infrastructures,”69 suggesting that small loaded the magazine. Grasping Nucleus is only Nicola [Gai] and I. No groups or even lone individuals should the pistol, choosing and following one else took part in this action or helped conduct attacks on their own initiative the target, coordinating mind and and independently. This is in line with hand were necessary steps, the the “open letter” published by the FAI logical consequence of an idea of “Cospito exhorted in December 2003. justice, the risk of a choice and other individuals to at the same time a confluence of On November 12, 2013, the court jailed enjoyable sensations.57 strike without the Cospito and Gai for a total of 20 years ‘need for clandestine for shooting the nuclear power chief. On September 14, 2012, Italian security Cospito was sentenced to 10 years and forces detained two known anarchists, infrastructures,’ suggesting eight months in prison, and Gai to nine Alfredo Cospito and Nicola Gai, and that small groups or years and four months. Prosecutors charged them with the May 7 attack. had requested jail terms of 12 years Both men were from the northwestern even lone individuals and 10 years, respectively. The court city of Turin.58 They were kept in custody should conduct attacks on added the aggravating circumstance based on evidence from surveillance of the “purpose of terrorism” (finalità cameras, wiretaps and from analysis of their own initiative and di terrorismo). In other words, the judge the leaflet claiming responsibility for independently.” recognized that the attack on Adinolfi the attack.59 was part of a political project that “advocates the armed struggle as a A fast-track trial (giudizio abbreviato) means to subvert the basic structures of against Cospito and Gai began in Genoa or planned it. Nobody knew about our the State.”70 on October 30, 2013. More than 100 project.”63 Gai confirmed this point.64 In radical anarchists gathered in front their communiqués, both men described According to many reports, however, of the courthouse to show solidarity in detail how they planned and carried investigators do not believe in Cospito’s with the two suspects.60 Both Cospito out the attack against Adinolfi in Genoa. and Gai’s solitary claim of responsibility and Gai presented—and tried to read—a In all probability, this public description and are searching for other accomplices hand-written declaration to the court. served propaganda purposes: the two and supporters in northern Italy.71 In In particular, in his declaration Alfredo insurrectionary anarchists wanted particular, investigators suspect that Cospito, the gunman and leader of to show how “easy” it was to conduct the two anarchists from Turin were the “Nucleus,” claimed responsibility attacks.65 helped by a partner in Genoa.72 for the attack, displaying from the very beginning a personal feeling of The general mission of the two anarchist militants was to “knock down” the 66 Ibid. 56 They said, “We have taken the name of a CCF [Con- “order of civilization” characterized 67 Ibid. spiracy of Cells of Fire] sister of ours, Olga Ikonomidou, by the “differentiation between the 68 Ibid. because the heart of the FAI/FRI lies in the consistency 69 Ibid. and strength of the ‘Imprisoned Members’ Cell of the 61 See Alfredo Cospito’s written declaration, October 30, 70 Motivation report of the sentence pronounced against CCF.’” See “The Mark of Life. Toward an Imaginative 2013, available at www.ilsecoloxix.it/rw/IlSecoloXIX- Cospito and Gai (filed on February 19, 2014), quoted in Way to Destroy the Existent.” WEB/genova/allegati/20131013_rivendicazionecospito. Marco Preve, “L’agguato ad Adinolfi atto sovversivo,”La 57 Ibid. pdf. Repubblica, February 20, 2014. 58 Erika Dellacasa, “Adinolfi, arrestati due anarchici,” 62 Ibid. 71 Massimo Numa, “Attentato ad Adinolfi, al via il pro- Corriere della Sera, September 15, 2012; “Two Men Held 63 Ibid. cesso. Gli imputati: ‘Abbiamo agito da soli,’” La Stampa, for Attack on Ansaldo Executive,” Corriere della Sera, 64 See Nicola Gai’s written declaration, October 30, October 30, 2013. September 14, 2012. 2013, available at www.ilsecoloxix.it/rw/IlSecoloXIX- 72 Katia Bonchi, “Attentato Adinolfi, condanna per Cos- 59 Public Prosecutor’s Office of Genoa, Provisional De- WEB/genova/allegati/20131013_rivendicazionegai.pdf. pito e Gai. Il giudice: ‘Non due fanatici ma segmento di tention Order (Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale 65 In Cospito’s words, “There’s no need for a military progetto sovversivo,’” Genova24, February 19, 2014; di Genova, Fermo di indiziato di delitto), September 13, structure, a subversive association or an armed gang Marco Numa, “Adinolfi, c’era un basista. E ora è caccia ai 2012. in order to strike. Anyone armed with a strong will can complici,” La Stampa, September 16, 2012; Marco Preve, 60 Matteo Indice, “Anarchici in aula, Genova si blinda,” think the unthinkable and act consequently.” See Cos- “Si stringe il cerchio sul basista. Sei nomi nel mirino degli Il Secolo XIX, October 30, 2012. pito. inquirenti,” La Repubblica, September 18, 2012.

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Conclusion February 6, 2014 (SYRIA): A Jabhat In 2012-2013, Italian authorities Recent Highlights in al-Nusra suicide bomber in an arrested a number of insurrectionary Political Violence explosives-laden truck attacked the anarchists.73 After this wave of gates of a Syrian prison in Aleppo, arrests, Italy’s intelligence agencies February 1, 2014 (LEBANON): A allowing rebels to enter the facility. subsequently declared that the FAI car bomb killed four people in Hizb The rebels then freed hundreds of was now in “operational stasis.”74 Allah’s stronghold of Hermel, located prisoners. The suicide bomber was Nevertheless, the threat posed by this in eastern Lebanon. Jabhat al-Nusra, later identified as Abdul Waheed network remains “potentially extended an al-Qa`ida affiliate, claimed Majeed, a British citizen of Pakistani and multiform.”75 In fact, in April 2013 responsibility. – The National, February 1; descent. – AP, February 7; Telegraph, February FAI militants claimed responsibility al-Jazira, February 1 7; Telegraph, February 12 for two letter bombs sent to the La Stampa newspaper in Turin and a private February 2, 2014 (GLOBAL): Al- February 8, 2014 (SYRIA): The Islamic investigation agency in Brescia, near Qa`ida released a statement declaring State in Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) Milan.76 While the attacks did not result that it has “no connection” with the chief for Dayr al-Zur, Abu Dajana, in any casualties, they demonstrate that Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant was killed during clashes with Jabhat the network is still active.77 (ISIL), effectively disowning the group al-Nusra. Abu Dajana, a Libyan, was that used to be known as the Islamic considered a top military commander. Insurrectionary anarchism remains State of Iraq (ISI). According to the – al-Arabiya, February 8 a dangerous threat to Italy. These statement, “al-Qa`ida announces it is militants have a proven record of using not linked to the Islamic State in Iraq February 9, 2014 (YEMEN): A car homemade bombs against civilian, and the Levant, as it was not informed bomb exploded outside the Yemeni government and military targets. of its creation…[and] did not accept Oil Ministry in Sana`a, killing at least Their tactics are relatively simple it.” It further said that the ISIL is “not three people. – CNN, February 9 and inexpensive, involve less risk, a branch of al-Qa`ida, has no links to and can cause significant damage. it, and [al-Qa`ida] is not responsible February 10, 2014 (IRAQ): The Islamic Insurrectionary anarchist groups for its acts.” The statement comes after State of the Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have also encouraged their followers al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri killed 15 soldiers part of an army to conduct decentralized attacks, ordered the ISIL to disband and return unit in Mosul, Ninawa Province. The which can limit law enforcement’s to Iraq in November 2013. In the unit was providing security for an effectiveness. It is just a matter of November message, al-Zawahiri said oil pipeline that runs from Iraq into coincidence that all of these acts of that Jabhat al-Nusra is al-Qa`ida’s Turkey. According to Iraqi officials violence have not caused fatalities representative in Syria. The ISIL, cited in the New York Times, the ISIL thus far.78 however, continues to operate in Syria militants drove up to the army unit in defiance of al-Zawahiri’s orders. “in more than a dozen sport utility Dr. Francesco Marone is a Research Fellow – AFP, February 3; RFE/RL, November 8 vehicles…They beheaded five soldiers, in Political Science at the University of shot nine dead and hanged one on a Pavia, Italy. He was a Visiting Fellow at February 3, 2014 (LEBANON): A wall, torturing him to death.” The Aberystwyth University, Wales. suicide bomber wounded at least two New York Times further pointed out that people while traveling in a passenger the attack revealed that the ISIL “has van in Choueifat, south of Beirut. moved beyond Anbar Province, west The target of the attack was not of Baghdad, where it controls Falluja immediately clear. – Los Angeles Times, and parts of Ramadi, and extended its February 3 reach into territory throughout the country.” – New York Times, February 11; AP, February 4, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A February 11 73 See, in particular, Fiorenza Sarzanini, “Dieci arresti suicide bomber killed at least nine per gli attentati degli anarchici,” Corriere della Sera, June people near a restaurant in Peshawar. February 10, 2014 (IRAQ): A 14, 2012. – The News International, February 4 roadside bomb struck the convoy of 74 “2012 Report on Security Intelligence Policy,” Italy’s Iraqi parliament speaker Osama al- Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic, Feb- February 5, 2014 (PAKISTAN): Nujaifi, Iraq’s most senior Sunni ruary 2013, p. 34. Unidentified gunmen opened fire Arab politician, in Mosul, Ninawa 75 Ibid. on a vehicle carrying a local Taliban Province. Al-Nujaifi was not injured 76 Simone Traverso, “Bombe anarchiche, rivendicazione commander in North Waziristan in the attack. – AFP, February 10 al Secolo XIX,” Secolo XIX, April 12, 2013; Meo Ponte, Agency of the Federally Administered “Pacchi bomba, la firma degli anarchici Fai. ‘Giornalisti, Tribal Areas. The commander and his February 10, 2014 (IRAQ): An nostro primo obiettivo,’” La Repubblica, April 13, 2013. three bodyguards were killed. – Dawn, instructor training other militants 77 “2013 Report on Security Intelligence Policy,” Italy’s February 6 on suicide bombings accidentally Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic, Feb- detonated an explosives belt at a ruary 2014, p. 43. militant camp north of Baghdad, 78 See “‘Gli anarchici? Solo per caso non hanno ucciso,’” killing himself and 21 other militants. Corriere della Sera, February 22, 2012. The militants all belonged to the

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Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. February 12, 2014 (PAKISTAN): singled out male residents. According – New York Times, February 10 Unidentified militants executed nine to CNN, “The gunmen, who arrived members of an anti-Taliban militia on in the village riding in trucks and February 10, 2014 (SOMALIA): A car the outskirts of Peshawar. – Los Angeles on several motorcycles, opened fire bomb injured Ahmed Omar Mudane, Times, February 12 and hacked male residents they had the deputy security commander of assembled in the village square. They Lower Shabelle region, in Mogadishu. February 13, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A moved door to door in search of male – Daily Star, February 10 bomb killed 12 Pakistani policemen residents who were hiding.” – CNN, on a bus in Karachi. Tehrik-i-Taliban February 18 February 11, 2014 (GLOBAL): U.S. Pakistan claimed responsibility. – Wall Defense Intelligence Agency Director Street Journal, February 13; Dawn, February 14 February 16, 2014 (PAKISTAN): Lieutenant General Michael Flynn told The Pakistani Taliban’s Mohmand the Senate Armed Services Committee February 13, 2014 (YEMEN): A wing announced that they executed that “the current instability in Syria car bomb exploded outside Sana`a 23 Pakistani paramilitary soldiers presents a perfect opportunity for Central Prison in the Yemeni capital. held captive since 2010. The faction al-Qa`ida and associated groups After the explosion, heavily armed said that they decided to execute the to acquire these weapons [of mass militants attacked the prison, killing soldiers in retaliation for continued destruction] or their components. seven people and freeing 29 inmates. security operations against Islamist While Syria’s stockpiles are currently The escapees include 19 convicted militants in Pakistan. – Washington Post, under the control of the regime, the al-Qa`ida prisoners. According to February 16 movement of these weapons from their the Associated Press, “Yemen has current locations, for disposal or other witnessed major jailbreaks in the past February 16, 2014 (EGYPT): A bomb reasons, drastically increases the risk that have fueled militancy, including ripped through a bus carrying South of these weapons or their components one in February 2006 when 21 al- Korean tourists in the Sinai Peninsula, falling into the wrong hands. There Qa`ida militants dug a tunnel and killing three tourists and their is also the very real possibility that fled the intelligence prison in Sana`a. Egyptian bus driver. – AP, February 16 extremists in the Syrian opposition Many of those who fled at that time could overrun and exploit chemical are now the group’s most wanted and February 16, 2014 (TUNISIA): and biological weapons storage dangerous men…” – AP, February 13 Militants at a fake checkpoint killed facilities before all of these materials four people in northwest Tunisia, 30 are removed.” – National Journal, February February 13, 2014 (SOMALIA): A miles from the Algerian border. – AP, 12; Defense Intelligence Agency, February 11 remotely-detonated bomb struck a February 16 United Nations convoy just outside February 11, 2014 (GLOBAL): U.S. Mogadishu’s international airport. February 18, 2014 (PAKISTAN): National Intelligence Director James The blast killed at least seven Somalis. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan fighters Clapper told the Senate Armed The United Nations said that none of its attacked an army vehicle near Services Committee that there are an staff were injured. Al-Shabab claimed Peshawar, killing a senior officer. estimated 7,500 foreign fighters from responsibility. – Reuters, February 13 – Reuters, February 18 50 different countries currently in Syria. According to Clapper, among February 14, 2014 (SYRIA): A car February 19, 2014 (YEMEN): these foreign fighters are “a small bomb exploded outside a mosque in the Suspected al-Qa`ida in the Arabian group of al-Qa`ida veterans who have southern Syrian village of Yadouda, Peninsula (AQAP) militants gunned aspirations for external attacks in killing dozens of people. – AP, February down a well-known ultraconservative Europe, if not the [U.S.] homeland 14 Islamist in Hadramawt Province. itself.” – National Journal, February 12 The Islamist had previously called February 14, 2014 (SOMALIA): A on AQAP to leave his town due to an February 11, 2014 (MALI): The United Nations report warned that increase in drone strikes as a result Movement for Unity and Jihad in “systematic abuses” by the Somali of their presence, which endangered West Africa (MUJAO) said that they government have allowed weapons civilian lives. – AP, February 19 kidnapped a team of Red Cross workers to be diverted into the hands of al- who were reported missing in Mali Shabab militants and warlords. The February 19, 2014 (NIGERIA): on February 8. They were reportedly report even alleged that one key Suspected Boko Haram militants kidnapped on the road between Kidal adviser to the Somali president had launched a major attack on the and Gao. – al-Jazira, February 11 planned weapons deliveries to al- northern Nigerian border town of Shabab. – BBC, February 14 Bama. During the attack, the militants February 11, 2014 (EGYPT): Militants reportedly used bombs and attacked detonated explosives at a gas pipeline February 15, 2014 (NIGERIA): a Nigerian army tank. At least 60 in the Sinai Peninsula, causing Suspected Boko Haram militants people were killed. – BBC, February 19; pipeline technicians to halt the flow dressed in military uniforms attacked AFP, February 20 of gas while they extinguished the the Christian farming village of Izghe resulting fire. – AP, February 11 in Borno State, killing at least 106 people. The militants specifically

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February 19, 2014 (LEBANON): Two bombs. A total of nine militants died February 24, 2014 (PAKISTAN): suicide bombers detonated explosives- in the assault. – AP, February 21 Unidentified gunmen killed a top laden vehicles near the Iranian commander in Tehrik-i-Taliban cultural center in Beirut, killing at February 22, 2014 (LEBANON): A Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan least four people. One of the bombers suicide bomber in an explosives-laden Agency of the Federally Administered was a Palestinian. – Reuters, February 20 vehicle killed at least three people at a Tribal Areas. The commander, military checkpoint in Hermel, located identified as Asmatullah Shaheen, February 20, 2014 (GLOBAL): A near the Syrian border. The area is a was gunned down as his car passed United Nations report found that the stronghold of Lebanese Hizb Allah. through Dargah Mandi, three miles leadership of some al-Qa`ida affiliates Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qa`ida’s affiliate northwest of Miranshah. – Reuters, is seeing a generational shift from in Syria, claimed responsibility. February 24 older members to men in their 30s and – CNN, February 22 40s. According to the report, “younger February 25, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): commanders and fighters have a February 23, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bomber killed nine people different perspective on international A large number of Taliban insurgents at a hotel in Uruzgan Province. – BBC, affairs, have the potential to generate killed at least 21 Afghan soldiers at February 25 propaganda that chimes with their an army outpost in Kunar Province. generation more easily, and can – Wall Street Journal, February 23 February 25, 2014 (IRAQ): A car also challenge their own leadership bomb exploded in Baghdad’s Karrada on tactics and targets.” The report February 23, 2014 (IRAQ): A bomb district, killing at least 15 people. – al- also found that while al-Qa`ida has exploded on a highway between Jazira, February 25 lost “its former strength…the ideas, Baghdad and Mosul, killing three inspiration and networks generated police and four detainees who had February 25, 2014 (SYRIA): Abu by al-Qa`ida continue to reverberate.” been captured during a raid. – AFP, Muhammad al-Julani, the head of – BBC, February 20 February 23 Jabhat al-Nusra, warned the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) February 20, 2014 (UNITED STATES): February 23, 2014 (SYRIA): A that it would be driven from Syria if Ahmad al-Darbi, a long-held Saudi suicide bomber killed Abu Khalid it did not accept mediation by clerics. captive at Guantanamo Bay, pleaded al-Suri, a rebel leader with ties to The ISIL is suspected of assassinating guilty to terrorism charges. As part al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Khalid al-Suri, a prominent al- of the plea deal, his sentence may be in Aleppo. Although no one claimed Qa`ida emissary who was killed by a limited to 15 years, although he is responsibility, suspicion fell on the suicide bomber on February 23. Jabhat expected to testify against Abd al- Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant al-Nusra is al-Qa`ida’s affiliate in Rahim al-Nashiri, who is charged with (ISIL). According to the BBC, “Al-Suri Syria, while al-Qa`ida has disowned orchestrating the attack on the USS Cole was reportedly sent to Syria by al- the ISIL. – BBC, February 25 in 2000. – Miami Herald, February 20; AP, Qa`ida to end the infighting between February 20 the ISIL and other rebel groups.” February 26, 2014 (UNITED Eyewitness accounts suggest that KINGDOM): A court in the United February 20, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): five men entered the headquarters Kingdom sentenced Michael Adebolajo A suicide bomber killed a security for Ahrar al-Sham in Aleppo and to life in prison without parole for guard at a hospital in Kabul. – AP, opened fire, with one of the assailants killing off-duty British soldier Lee February 20 detonating a suicide bomb. The attack Rigby on a London street in May killed six other fighters from Ahrar 2013. Adebolajo admitted that he was February 20, 2014 (LEBANON): al-Sham, in addition to al-Suri. – BBC, inspired by al-Qa`ida. His accomplice, Gunmen killed Abdel Rahman February 24 Michael Adebowale, was sentenced Youssef, a military commander from to life with a minimum of 45 years in the Alawite minority, in Tripoli. February 24, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A prison because of his younger age and – Reuters, February 20 suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated lesser role in the attack. – AP, February explosives outside the Iranian 26 February 21, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): Consulate in Peshawar, killing two Three militants planning a suicide Pakistani paramilitary soldiers. The February 26, 2014 (SYRIA): The bombing in Kandahar Province were attack was claimed by Mast Gul, who, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant killed when the bomb exploded according to Dawn, was “once acclaimed (ISIL) said that Christians in the city prematurely. A child was also killed in Pakistan for his role fighting Indian of Raqqa, which it controls, will have in the blast. – UPI, February 22 rule in Kashmir.” Gul’s spokesman to pay taxes and hold religious rituals told Reuters that they will “continue indoors. – AFP, February 26 February 21, 2014 (SOMALIA): to target Iranian installations and A group of al-Shabab militants the Shi`a community everywhere.” February 27, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide wearing military fatigues attacked – Dawn, February 24 bomber drove an explosives-laden the presidential palace in Mogadishu, vehicle into the guesthouse of a killing at least two government prominent pro-government tribal officials. The attack involved two car shaykh in Haditha, Anbar Province.

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The chief, Shaykh Saeed Fleih al- CTC Sentinel Staff Osman, was killed in the attack, along with six of his militiamen. – AP, Editor-in-Chief February 28 Erich Marquardt Senior Editor, CTC February 27, 2014 (SOMALIA): A suicide bomber drove an explosives- Editorial Board laden vehicle into a café popular with COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. members of the Somali security forces Department Head in Mogadishu, killing at least 12 people. Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Most of the dead were Somali soldiers. Al-Shabab claimed responsibility. COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. – CNN, February 27; Reuters, February 27 Deputy Department Head Department of Social Sciences (West Point) February 28, 2014 (SYRIA): Fighters from the Islamic State in Iraq and MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. the Levant (ISIL) retreated from the Director, CTC key Syrian town of Azaz in the face of growing tension with rival rebel factions. The ISIL had controlled Azaz, a strategic town near the Turkish border, for five months. According to the Washington Post, “The exit came a day ahead of a deadline issued by Jabhat ­al-Nusra, the official al-Qa`ida Contact affiliate in Syria, for ISIL to cease Combating Terrorism Center confronting rival rebels or face a new U.S. Military Academy war. Commanders speculated that 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall the ISIL fighters, who have resisted West Point, NY 10996 previous attempts at mediation, chose Phone: (845) 667-6383 to pull out from Azaz to reinforce Email: [email protected] strongholds elsewhere in preparation Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ for further conflict.” – Washington Post, February 28 * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383

support The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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