Book Reviews Book Reviews Timothy Snyder, The Red Prince: The Secret Lives of a Habsburg Archduke. New York: Basic Books, 2008. 344 pp. Reviewed by Piotr S. Wandycz, Yale University The Red Prince is more than a biography of the little known Wilhelm Habsburg (1895–1948). Timothy Snyder, a prominent Yale University historian, weaves the story of the archduke and his family into the rich canvas of European history. Were it not for a most impressive array of sources and a scholarly apparatus, the book could almost qualify as a vie romancée. This is legitimate because the house of Habsburg oc- cupied for centuries several thrones in Europe as well as brieºy that of Mexico. Wil- helm’s father thought of extending his dynasty’s domain into Poland and the Balkans, and he trained his sons to be future rulers of these countries. Wilhelm identiªed him- self with the Ukrainians. In ten chapters with catchy titles (Gold, Blue, Green, Red, Grey, White, Lilac, Brown, Black, Orange), Snyder describes the life and activities of this eccentric indi- vidual, somewhat unbalanced and politically naive, starting with a happy childhood in a villa on the Adriatic and ending with his death as a Western secret agent in a So- viet prison. In previous writings Snyder has shown a talent for large synthetic analysis, as in The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), and for biographical studies, notably in Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). In both of these books he raised broad and pertinent ques- tions. Snyder is fascinated by, among other things, the phenomenon of split national allegiance in families of East-Central Europe. Indeed the brother of Wilhelm, a Ukrai- nian colonel, was a Polish colonel and patriot. The story of the Red Prince is told against the background of Wilhelm’s family, which contained a number of colorful and eccentric individuals. Snyder does not shun from recounting family gossip and scandals. Some details may appear superºu- ous and of marginal importance for the main story, but they add color to a study that is not only a good read but a genuine contribution to a little known aspect of East Eu- ropean , indeed European, history. Given the scope of this book and the variety of stories included, it is surprising that the number of minor errors and slips is so small. Most of them have no direct bearing on the biography of the archduke. Still, it might have been better if Snyder Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 11, No. 2, Spring 2009, pp. 117–166 © 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 117 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.2.152 by guest on 27 September 2021 Book Reviews had not tried to include so much material, especially historical background and inter- national politics. Some of his statements are oversimpliªed and inexact. The presenta- tion of the Cossacks in history and a characterization of post-Versailles Europe are cases in point. During World War I, Wilhelm underwent a transformation from an Austrian ofªcer increasingly interested in his Ukrainian soldiers to a potential Ukrainian mili- tary and political leader—Vasyl Vyshyvanyi. A Ukrainian crown, however, proved a mirage, and German policies in Ukraine prevailed over Habsburg plans. With the end of the war and the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Wilhelm be- came involved in intrigues of reactionary “white international” circles based in Ger- many and pursued Ukrainian mirages. His pronounced anti-Polish stance led to a break with his father. Wilhelm’s postwar wandering took him to Spain, where he tried some business operations, and then to Paris, where he led the life of a homosexual playboy while still pursuing the will-o’-the-wisp of Ukrainian statehood and Habsburg restoration. Snyder devotes a long chapter ªlled with juicy details to this somewhat sordid phase of the archduke’s life. Eventually, Wilhelm became enmeshed in a ªnancial scandal and had to ºee France to avoid prison. Humiliated and disoriented, he found refuge in fas- cism, anti-Semitism, and bizarre dreams of a fascist Ukraine supported by Nazi Ger- many. With the outbreak of the war in 1939, Wilhelm donned a German uniform, but the Germans did not use him even as a political pawn. He managed, however, to re- ceive compensation for the family estate in Poland conªscated by the Nazis. The estate’s rightful owner, Karol Olbracht, who insisted on his Polish nationality, was dis- possessed and imprisoned. Olbracht’s Swedish-born wife joined the Polish under- ground. Wilhelm, always somewhat erratic in his views, grew disenchanted with Nazi policies, especially vis-à-vis Ukraine, and engaged in anti-Nazi espionage. After the occupation of Austria by the Four Powers in 1945, Wilhelm supported democracy and settled in the British Zone of Vienna. Always restless and insouciant, he began to work with his Ukrainian friends for Western intelligence against the So- viet Union. Soviet foreign intelligence agents in Vienna had an easy task of kidnap- ping him and taking him to a prison in Kyiv. There he died of tuberculosis after nearly a year in captivity. True to form, the Soviet government denied his death. In the ªnal chapter, titled “Orange: European Revolution,” Snyder discusses the fall of Communism and the rise of a new Europe. Wilhelm, who had embodied the Habsburg connection to Ukraine, did not live to see it happen. But Otto Habsburg, the pretender to the throne, was active in the Council of Europe and stressed the im- portance of Ukraine. Snyder makes the point that for the ªrst time not only a Ukrai- nian state but an Austrian nation emerged. He insists that present-day Ukraine is “the test of the viability of that modern political form, the nation-state,” and wonders about its survival in Europe. Snyder draws some interesting parallels between the Habsburg monarchy and the European Union and between the former Ukraine and the United States. His conclusions, though not always convincing, are stimulating and 118 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.2.152 by guest on 27 September 2021 Book Reviews thought-provoking. This is also true for the connection he makes between the turbu- lent, bizarre, and politically marginal activities of Wilhelm and the larger issues. A certain nostalgic tone to the ruminations in the ªnal chapter comes out clearly in the wistful, moving, and beautifully written epilogue. Reading it, I was reminded of the French saying tout passe, tout casse, tout lasse (everything passes, everything breaks, everything grows weary). ✣✣✣ Slawomir Cenckiewicz and Piotr Gontarczyk, SB a Lech Walësa: Przyczynek do biograªi [The SB and Lech Walësa: A Contribution toward a Biography]. Warsaw: Instytut Pamièci Narodowej, 2008. 750 pp. Reviewed by Michael Szporer, University of Maryland University College “If Lech Walësa—the head of NSZZ Solidarnonb, the legendary leader of the march to freedom in the 1980s and then president of Poland in 1990–1995—could not free himself of the burden of the past, what can one expect of the tens of thousand of oth- ers who maintained compromising contacts with SB, and now hold high governmen- tal posts?” ask Slawomir Cenckiewicz and Piotr Gontarczyk in their widely debated book. The authors concede that TW (short for tajny wpólpracownik; i.e., secret infor- mant) Bolek, who is widely assumed to have been Walësa, broke contacts with the Se- curity Service (SB) in 1976. They acknowledge that alleged contacts after Walësa gained visibility as the leader of Solidarity were dubious, at least some clearly doctored in an attempt to discredit him in the eyes of his friends, the Roman Catholic Church, and the international community, even sabotaging his chances for the Nobel Prize in 1982–1983. In the 1980s, Walësa’s ªle consisted of 43 volumes, including tapes and ªlm, and many of the critical documents supplement the book. One would expect that the SB attempted to pressure Walësa by resurrecting the Bolek ªle, ªrst when he joined the Coastal WZZ (Free Trade Union) in 1978 and subsequently at critical moments of his activities as the leader of Solidarity—before and after the signing of the Gdañsk Accords, during the heyday of Solidarity, and be- fore and after the martial law. One would expect an elaborate disinformation cam- paign directed at Walësa, his family, and friends, as well as around-the-clock surveil- lance to neutralize his activities without physically harming him, for fear that a physical attack would have implicated the regime of Wojciech Jaruzelski. One can even speculate, as Walësa’s conªdant during the 1980 Gdañsk shipyard strike, Zenon Kwoka, did in an interview, that the Communist regime would have been more reluc- tant to come to agreement with Solidarity if it had thought it could not control Walësa. Nonetheless, even though the Gdañsk opposition was meticulously moni- tored, there is no evidence that the Communist regime ever controlled Walësa, steered the 1980 strikes, or guided other historically critical events in which he participated. Cenckiewicz and Gontarczyk do not entertain the question of whether SB pres- sure affected Walësa’s decisions or signiªcantly changed the course of modern history. 119 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.2.152 by guest on 27 September 2021 Book Reviews They make a strong case for a cover-up, especially after the so-called ªrst lustration as- sociated with the “Macierewicz List” that made Walësa’s early collaboration public (al- though other leading Gdañsk workers were already aware in August 1980 of Walësa’s earlier contacts and even debated whether to keep him as leader shortly after the sign- ing of the accords).