Italian Foreign Policy: the More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same

Transatlantic Take Photo: J.S. Photographer Italian Foreign Policy: The More Things Change, The More They Stay The Same. By Maria Elena Gutierrez For a long time, Italy struggled with a fundamental it possible for Germany to accept the deployment of discrepancy between its ambition to be considered the Pershing II missiles. But, a few months later, the one of the great powers of Europe and its quite “Sigonella incident”, during which Italian and U.S. meager capabilities. Victory in World War I seemed forces were engaged in a dangerous confrontation in for a brief time to give it status as a major player, but the Sicilian airbase, underlined Italy’s friendly relations fascism proved to be the ultimate example of the with Arab powers despite an implied misalignment tragic contradiction between goals and resources. with the United States. Similarly, Italy joined the “coalition of the willing” during the Iraq War, but Having learned the hard way, post-1945 Italy has its forces were strictly confined to peacekeeping been a fundamentally peaceful, constructive actor roles. More recently, in 2014 it joined the other EU in Europe and the world – a strong advocate of countries in approving sanctions against Russia over multilateralism, the UN system, NATO, and the the Ukraine crisis, but in 2016 started objecting to European project. At the same time, it was never their continuation. the perfect Atlanticist, preferring to develop its own version of Ostpolitik with a Mediterranean In the end, however, while “running with the hare flavor. Thus, Italy emerged as a vocal supporter of and hunting with the hounds” has never been alien to détente in the Cold war, while leaving ample space Italian politics (there is even a unique, non-translatable for industrial partnerships with the communist bloc. expression, cerchiobottismo, to describe this political It was ready to entertain a friendly relationship with style), the country’s fundamental foreign policy Israel while flirting with the Arab countries to the options (EU and NATO) were never challenged point of reaching informal agreements with the because these pendulum swings never reached Palestinian Liberation Organization. extremes. Its balancing acts also took place in a context of consensus on most foreign policy issues. In a way, like Rudyard Kipling’s Kim, Italy could From the mid-1970s onward even the Communist well have been described as “the little friend of all Party, then the largest in the West accepted NATO the world.” It has proved faithful to this profile also and EU membership. And in the Berlusconi era, all in more recent years, as its governments performed international missions and treaties were approved by complex balancing acts whenever fundamental the center-right and center-left major parties. choices had to be made. For example, during the “Euromissile crisis” of 1983, Italy played a crucial Some basic elements, however, seem to have changed role in supporting the U.S. position, thus making after the 2018 elections. The new governing coalition, Transatlantic Take between the two parties that had most visibly Moreover, there has been a toning down of the distanced themselves from the consensus on foreign inflamed discourses that shaped the initial profile of policy, has appeared to challenge the fundamental the governing coalition. As a result, the behavior of loyalties that no one had dared to discuss in the the current government in the international arena previous half-century. shows remarkable continuity with the recent past, including the constant recourse to balancing acts The Lega was an outlier within the center-right among conflicting loyalties and diverging priorities. coalition when it voted against the Italian intervention Among these is the recurrent idea that developing in Kosovo in 1999, and when it openly flirted with a small-scale “special relationship” with the United the idea of an “Italexit” all the while developing ties States may help Italy balance the dominant Franco- with the European German core of EU politics. This was the case extreme right. As The behavior of the with Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s attempt in for the Five Star current government the 2000s to position Italy as part of the pro-U.S. Movement (M5S), “ in the international “new Europe” and not of the Franco-German “old its platform was arena shows remarkable Europe.” During the presidency of Barack Obama, openly critical of continuity with the Italy’s center-left governments constantly relied on NATO and the EU, his administration’s criticism of the EU austerity and its ideological recent past.” policies favored by Germany to advocate more refusal of the growth-focused approaches in the EU. So, even “liberal order” and globalization included strong taking into account its neo-populist flavor, there is criticism of the euro system nothing unusual in the current sympathy between the administration of President Donald Trump Does this mean that we are about to see fundamental and the M5S-Lega government, which was evident shifts in Italy’s foreign policy? Will the prevalent during the visit of Moavero to the United States last neo-sovereignist rhetoric of the current majority month. translate into fundamental changes? Or, will it only be lip-service to the benefit of the domestic political The lifting of the EU sanctions against Russia looms market? large among the few foreign policy priorities evoked in the government’s official platform. There is Looking at the behavior of the government led by nothing particularly new about this since the point Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte suggests that there was constantly raised by the center-left governments will not be a major disruption. since 2016. On the other hand, the threat to use Italy’s veto power on this subject, often raised by The first important step towards moderation and Interior Minister and Lega leader Matteo Salvini, continuity was the choice as foreign minister of never materialized. Enzo Moavero Milanesi, an establishment figure and former EU official who served as a minister in earlier Regardless of his government portfolio, Salvini plays governments. This choice was clearly the result of a major role in foreign policy through his style of strong pressure from President Sergio Mattarella, communication. Among his utterances during a whose role in shaping Italy’s international profile (as recent visit to Israel, mostly through social media, in the case of his predecessor, Giorgio Napolitano) was one that qualified Hezbollah as a “terrorist should not be underestimated. If anything, a clear entity.” This was in contrast with the usual Italian lesson from the last 20 years is that the presidency, prudence on the subject and led some observers far from being a merely ceremonial institution, to conclude that the government may move closer is a feature of the constitutional order that plays a to the U.S.-Israeli position. But a few days later, in powerful political role. contradiction to this Moavero confirmed that Italy is considering the re-establishment of full diplomatic G|M|F 2 Transatlantic Take relations with the Assad regime, after having already Council on the renewal of sanctions against Russia, substituted the administrative staff that had been left Salvini said that this was an ultimate weapon that at the embassy in Syria after 2012 with diplomatic had to be used sparingly and that only fundamental personnel. economic policy matters would warrant this. The tense Italian relationship is now, paradoxically, This priority of economic issues also represents a with the EU, and in particular with its Franco- major limit to the emergence of any kind of Populist German core. Anti-Macronism has become recently International that includes the current government. more popular than Merkel-bashing and there have While it may flirt with Central and Eastern European been divergences between the two countries over the governments on immigration issues, it is clearly Libyan crisis. But there are no major differences on not finding any solidarity among them in its fight traditional foreign policy themes in this, but rather against restrictive economic policies advocated by another instance of the prevalence of domestic Germany and northern EU members. political concerns over purely international ones. In light of all this, a stalemate is the most likely If there is a constant core to Italy’s foreign policy, outcome in the tug of war between the Italian beyond its pendulum swings and apparent government and the EU institutions. The costs of a contradictions, it is to be found in this prevalence major breakup with the EU would be only too clear and especially in the subordination of foreign policy to the Lega electorate, which is still predominantly to economic policy. based on the northern middle classes. In fact, increased trust in the euro has been detected by polls The current situation may just be another case of “It’s in recent months in contrast with the Europhobic the economy, stupid.” Many foreign observers tend to rhetoric that was a trademark of the Lega and M5S underestimate the economic hardships experienced during the 2018 elections campaign. According to by Italy in the last two decades. After a decade of a December 2018 survey, the share of respondents sluggish growth starting in 1998, Italy suffered a that considered the euro a positive factor reached 64 double-dip recession between 2008 and 2014, lasting percent in Italy, the same level as in Germany. longer than in the rest of Europe (except Greece). The slow recovery between 2015 and 2017 was followed Under the current conditions, Italy will no longer be by a dismal 2018, whose second half will probably a driving force toward further European integration, signal a new recession. but it will not become a force for disintegration. The determinant of this is in its structural weakness Not surprisingly, the major concerns of Italians have much more than in its changing political climate.

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