“Let the Matter Drop:” the Canadian Department of External Affairs’ Response to the Death of Raoul Léger

“LET THE MATTER DROP:” THE CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS’ RESPONSE TO THE DEATH OF RAOUL LÉGER

GRANT C. DOHERTY

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FUFILLMENT OF THE REQUIRMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY

NIPISSING UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES NORTH BAY, ONTARIO

Author’s Declaration Page ...... iii

Acknowledgements ...... iv

Abstract ...... v

Introduction ...... 1

I: The Case of Raoul Léger ...... 11

II: The Cold War and Canadian Foreign Policy ...... 27

III: Canada Economic Interests ...... 35

Conclusion ...... 47

Bibliography ...... 51

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I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this Major Research Paper.

I authorize Nipissing University to lend this thesis or Major Research Paper to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

I further authorize Nipissing University to reproduce this thesis or dissertation by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

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Acknowledgments

This MRP is indebted to Robin Gendron for first introducing me to Léger’s case, and secondly for his unyielding commitment to see me through with this project. His advice and guidance throughout the year made the completion of this paper possible.

I also owe great thanks to Hilary Earl whose constructive criticism over the course of the year fine tuned my writing process and forced me to revisit the rules of writing.

I would also like to thank Mark Crane for guiding my writing style from that of an undergraduate student to a graduate student in Methods I.

I owe much to my parents Paul and Gail Doherty for their full support and encouragement to pursue my interest in history.

There are many family, friends, and Department of History faculty members who contributed to this MRP who I am indebted to. However, any errors, misrepresentations, or omissions are the sole ownership of the author.

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Abstract

In July 1981, Canadian lay missionary worker Raoul Léger was killed by

the Guatemalan Army. Léger’s death received publicity in Canada, and

the Canadian government was pressured to hold the Guatemalan

government accountable. However, the Department of External Affairs

learned the Léger was acting as a guerrilla collaborator in the Guatemalan

civil war. Léger’s case is interesting, as it allows for various interpretations of Canadian foreign policy to be tested. What influenced

Canadian foreign policy? economic interests or human rights? Hard interests or values? This MRP examines the degree to which human rights, the Cold War, and Canadian economic interests influenced the way in which the DEA reacted to Léger’s death arguing that despite the image of

Canada as a proponent of liberal internationalism, the driving influence of

Canadian foreign policy, were economic concerns.

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Introduction

In July 1981, Guatemalan security forces killed over a dozen individuals, including Raoul Léger a lay missionary from Bouctouche, New Brunswick in a counter insurgency raid. With Guatemala in the midst of a civil war, the Guatemalan government claimed that the deceased had taken their own lives as they were surrounded by the Guatemalan army but the intense firefight that was broadcast on

Guatemalan television undermines the claims of suicide. There is much controversy surrounding Léger’s death. In the wake of his death, Canadian media immediately adopted the headline, “saint or subversive?” to describe Léger, questioning the accuracy of the Guatemalan government’s official position on Léger as a guerilla collaborator.1 As the case of Léger death became highly publicised in Canada, the

Canadian government was pressured to take action and investigate the circumstances surrounding Léger’s death to protect the rights of a Canadian citizen killed abroad. Surprisingly, the case of Raoul Léger has been only examined in a

2002 National Film Board of Canada documentary directed by Renée Blanchar entitled Raoul Léger, the Elusive Truth.2 It has not attracted any academic interest or study.

The case of Léger is interesting. It offers a direct window into the nature of

Canadian foreign policy at the apex of the Cold War and Canada’s relations with

Guatemala because it highlights links between the Cold War, Canadian political and economic interests, and human rights in the making of Canada’s foreign policy.

Examining the Canadian Department of External Affairs’ (DEA) response to Léger’s

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 Man Alive, CBC, Nov. 22, 1981 2 National Film Board. Raoul Léger, The Elusive Truth. 2002. Directed by Renée Blanchar.

! ! 2 death enables us to test different understandings or the relative influence of various factors on Canadian foreign policy in the early 1980s. Was Canadian foreign policy influenced by values or interests; i.e. trade and economic interests or human rights?

In 1948, Canada signed the United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Rights and

Freedoms” and, by 1957, was viewed by some as a ‘defender of peace’, with a foreign policy that was reflective of the values of Canadian Prime Minister Lester B.

Pearson.3 As well, Canadian foreign policy can be alternatively viewed as nothing more than an extension of Canadian economic interests, devoid of Pearson’s values of freedom, tolerance, and equality.4 What is it that shaped Canadian foreign policy?

By examining the case of Raoul Léger with an eye to such questions, this MRP will offer an original assessment of Canadian foreign policy toward Guatemala in the early 1980s.

Scholars have generally categorized Canadian foreign policy along three lines.

The first draws on the idea of liberal internationalism, that Canada is a middle- ranking power among nations working to promote the maintenance of a peaceful world order. 5 The idea of liberal internationalism is prevalent in the popular

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 3 For instance historian Michael K. Carroll discusses the Suez Crisis as the origin of Canada’s myth as a peacekeeper with its roots in Pearson’s foreign policy guided by Liberal internationalism, essentially a values based system. See Michael K. Carroll, Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67 (Toronto: UBC Press, 2009). 4 Michael Hart takes issue with the paradigm of academia that believes “trade and economic policy form at best a minor part of Canada’s external relations and occupied very little of the time and energy of ministers and officials in the Department of External Affairs.” Instead, Hart argues that Canadian foreign policy “was more a matter of foreign economic policy than anything else!.” In Hart’s evaluation of Canadian foreign policy, the major influence is economic interests rather than values, such as human rights. See Michael Hart, “External Affairs and Canadian External Trade Policy, 1945-1982.”In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009 ed. Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011). 5 Liberal internationalism is arguably the most prevalent paradigm used to examine Canadian foreign policy. Its roots can be found as early as Lester B. Pearson’s days as an official within the Canadian Department External Affairs during the 1950s. Liberal internationalism promotes the liberal values of

! ! 3 imagination of Canada’s place in the world and remains one of the most common paradigms used by academics to examine Canadian foreign policy, often referring back to the ‘golden age’ of diplomacy in the 1950s and 1960s under Canadian diplomat and Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson. According to the ideas of liberal internationalism, Canada, as a middle-ranking power, tried to spread its liberal ideals of equality, freedom, and tolerance through direct intervention, which ranged from foreign aid to direct military intervention, such as the example of Canada’s peacekeeping operations through the United Nations. Essentially, liberal internationalism focuses on values and international institutions rather than other

Canadian interests. Under this paradigm, it is easy to see how Canadian media linked Léger’s death as a Canadian missionary with the paradigm of liberal internationalism. The second paradigm, a product of the post war era as the cultural and economic boundaries between Canada and the United States began to fade, examines Canada as a satellite state of the United States and Canadian foreign policy as dominated by or subordinated to American political and economic interests, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. Through this categorization of Canadian foreign policy, American hegemonic power trumped independent Canadian foreign policy.

The third and more recent theme has examined Canada as a principle power, acting as a leader among nations, pursuing its own national interests actively with few

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! freedom, equality, and tolerance. Erika Simpson summarizes Pearson’s guidelines for liberal internationalism as the guiding influence of Foreign policy in the following terms: Canada should “play a role as a middle power on the international stage, seek every opportunity to mediate conflict in order to secure international peace, support international institutions and consistently act in order to promote internationalism and collective security, and employ flexibility and quiet diplomacy in its interactions with other nations.” Essentially, liberal internationalism is a value-based paradigm of Canadian foreign policy, where Canadian interests are not the main influence behind foreign policy development. See Erika Simpson, "The Principles of Liberal Internationalism According to Lester Pearson." Journal of Canadian Studies 34, no. 1 (1999): 85.

! ! 4 concerns about the constraints of American hegemony.6 This school of thought privileges strategic, economic, and political factors over values when attempting to understand Canadian foreign policy. Essentially, the debate is centred on interests vs. values, or idealism vs. realism as far as foreign policy is concerned. This MRP will argue that it was hard economic interests that influenced Canadian foreign policy, not idealistic values.

While there has been little academic inquiry into Canadian-Guatemalan relations, there are a few works which examine the broader context of Canadian-

Latin American relations during this period of the Cold War. By July 1981, Canada had established interests in Latin America. The Canadian banking industry had begun pursuing lucrative business opportunities in Guatemala as early as the late nineteenth century, while Canadian engineering and mining industries expanded rapidly in the area throughout the twentieth century.7 Scholars examining Canadian foreign policy from the perspective of Canada as a principle power have done so based on Canadian economic interests in the region. They argue that Canada was a rising principle power throughout the 1980s, seeking to maintain and expand its bilateral relationships with Latin American nations, in light of the turbulent 1970s with

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 6 There are multiple sources available to provide an adequate demonstration of these three themes. While they may be dated, for a concise explanation of each theme see David Dewitt and John Kertin, Canada as a Principle Power: A Study of Foreign Policy and International Relations (Toronto: John Wiley, 1983), Michael k. Hawes, Principle Power, Middle Power, Or Satellite State? Competing Perspectives in the Study of Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: York Centre for International and Security Studies, 1984) and the more recent work by Maureen Appel Molot, “Where Do We, Should We, Or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature,” International journal of Canadian Studies, no. 1 (1990):77-96. 7 For example, Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles discuss the role of Canadian industry in the area in their monograph Southern Exposure: Canadian Promoters in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1896-1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). For a discussion of the banking industry in the region, see Michael Kaufman, “The Internationalizing of Canadian Bank Capital (with a Look at Bank Activity in the Caribbean and Central America),”Journal of Canadian Studies 19, no 4. (1984-85):61-79, as well as the monograph by Duncan McDowell, Quick to the Frontier: Canada’s Royal Bank. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993).

! ! 5 the Nixon Shock and the Trudeau government’s “Third Option policy” to expand trade with countries beyond the United States.8 Canadian foreign relations with Latin

America have also been defined as neorealist. According to neorealist theory, the foreign policy of a state is limited by the constraints of the international system and is characterised by the primacy of geo-political interests rather than values.9 This is an argument made by political scientist Brian Stevenson. Stevenson’s argument is that

Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America faced domestic pressures from nongovernmental organizations to intervene, and eventually join the Organization of

American States, and internationally, the United States has “played a key role in constraining Canadian foreign policy in the region.” 10 In the case of Canadian foreign policy, the limiting factor of the international system is often regarded as the hegemonic power of the United States both politically and economically. Neorealist

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 8 The Nixon Shock refers to a series of economic measures taken by American President Richard Nixon in 1971. They were largely protectionist, and left Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau concerned over Canada’s trading relationships with the United States. As a result, Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp published the “Third Option” in 1972, which advocated for seeking new bilateral relationships elsewhere (particularly in Asia), and a reduction of economic and cultural relations with the United States. See J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 55, 158. One such scholar who makes this argument is political scientist James Rochlin. While he has authored several articles, his main work is the monograph Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America (Victoria: UBC Press, 1994), 227. According to Rochlin’s analysis of the early 1980s and Latin America, Canada was a budding principle power at the time. Rochlin argues that Canada rose “from a distant observer, albeit with some important economic interest, to that of full partnership in the America’s.” Essentially, as Canada went through the twentieth century, it’s economic interests that were established early influenced its foreign policy to become a principle power, with the prime example of Canada eventually joining the Organization of American States, which it had originally demonstrated little to no interest in. See also, “Aspects of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin Central America, 1974-1986.” Journal of Canadian Studies 22(1986): 5-26, “The Political Economy of Canadian relations with Central America,” North/South: Canadian journal o Latin America and Caribbean Studies 13 (1988): 45-70, and “The Evolution of Canada as an Actor in Inter-American Affairs,” Millennium 19 (1990): 229-248. 9 Neorealist theory differs from realism and realpolitik by its insistence on the role of the international system as a constraint on states instead of focusing solely on the importance of power politics as the primacy of international relations. 10 Stevenson’s argument depicts Canada’s role within the liberal international system, with neorealist influence as the international structure is represented as a constraint on Canadian foreign policy. See Brian Stevenson, Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism” A Foreign Policy Analysis (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000).

! ! 6 international relations theory, as well as the image of Canada as a principle power in the region, are two political science analyses that can be tested to understand what influenced Canadian foreign policy in the case of Raoul Léger: interests or values?

There is another perspective of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin

America that can be used to characterize the foreign policy approach in the case of

Raoul Léger’s death. As already stated, Canada had long established economic and strategic interests in Latin America by the time of Léger’s death. What was the policy toward the region? While the DEA had acknowledged and pursued favourable bilateral relationships with Latin American during the second half of the twentieth century, there was a complete lack of unified foreign policy planning within the department. According to Alan Gotlieb, the Canadian Ambassador to Washington from 1981 to 1989, his colleague Klaus Goldshlag, a high ranking official behind

Trudeau’s foreign policy development, believed “in the Caribbean we had interests but no foreign policy.”11 Canadian foreign policy in the Caribbean and Latin America was often undefined beyond the intention to protect and preserve Canadian economic interests.12 Since this study examines what influenced Canadian foreign policy in Latin America, it can also asses policy toward Guatemala specifically: was this a case of interests without policy?

The historical context of Raoul Léger’s death is important to understand the

DEA’s reaction to his case. By the time Léger arrived in Guatemala in 1979, the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 11 As cited in Alan Gotlieb, The Washington Diaries, 1981-1989 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2006), 179. 12 This is an argument that was developed by historians Greg Donaghy and Bruce Muirhead in their article “Interest but No Foreign Policy: Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean, 1941-1966.” American Review of Canadian Studies 38 no. 3 (2008): 275-294. Donaghy and Muirhead focus more so on the Caribbean; however their argument can also be expanded to cover Latin America as a whole, including Guatemala during the early 1980s.

! ! 7 country was in the midst of a civil war that had been raging since 1960 which did not end until 1996. In 1960, the military dictatorship in Guatemala had launched a war on its own people, mainly targeting the indigenous Mayans of the countryside, labeling them “guerilla fighters.” At the heart of the Civil war was the issue of land reform which first came to prominence in 1954. In Guatemala’s first democratic election, military officer Jacob Arbenz, was elected president. Arbenz was a self- proclaimed socialist who sought extensive land reform and the redistribution of wealth in Guatemala as he came to office in an attempt to end the social and economic inequalities that plagued the state. With the help of the CIA, the

Guatemalan army overthrew Arbenz and a new anti-communist regime under

Castillo Armas was placed in power by the military Junta. What ensued was a violent struggle for political power, as the Guatemalan army sought to maintain the status quo, while poor Guatemalans, mostly indigenous Mayans, sought political, financial, and land reforms. In total, over 200,000 Guatemalans were killed in the 30 year conflict, 83 percent of whom were of Mayan descent.13 For the next 35 years, violent conflict occurred between the anti-communist regimes of the Guatemalan government and socialist armed resistance groups in favour of land and economic reform. By 1980, the Guatemalan army was faced with four organized armed resistance movements that posed a threat to the stability of the government:

Organización Revolucionario del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA), Unidad Revolucionaria !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 13 The Guatemalan civil war was partially launched over the fear of socialist land reforms, as the poor agrarians sought land reform against the government. For instance, the United Fruit Company was one corporation that lost valuable land and investments if the land reforms of Jacob Arbenz, who democratically took power in 1954, were to go through. The Mayans were the descendants of the indigenous population of Central America, who were initially conquered by the Spanish Conquistadors during the seventeenth century. Mayans were typically peasant farmers in the countryside, and began to oppose the social and economic inequality of Guatemala in the 1950s when Arbenz was elected to office.

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Nacional Guatemalteca, Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, and Partido

Guatemalteco del Trabajo.

The Guatemalan civil war was an issue of great importance to the United

States government and scholars argue that the 1950s saw the beginning of

American supported anti-communist dictatorships in Guatemala. As the Cold War unfolded, the United States equated the rising violence in Guatemala with the war against communism.14 By the early 1980s, the American commitment to aid the

Guatemalan army in the civil war was escalated. According to Stephen G. Rabe,

American President Ronald Reagan and his foreign-policy team saw the world in apocalyptic terms, and as a result, “waged violent Cold War in Central America! fueled by a willful ignorance about Latin America,” which informed the Reagan administration’s (1981-1989) decision to kill Central Americans.15 Reagan ushered in a new era of foreign policy, marking a shift from his predecessor, President Jimmy

Carter (1977-1981). Carter’s policies changed the Cold War as he advocated for détente and launched initial efforts to limit U.S. funding to regimes openly committing human rights violations, such as Guatemala. 16 Throughout the 1980s U.S.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 14 One paradigm used to categorize American foreign policy in this period is the pluralist interpretation. The pluralist interpretation of American foreign policy is an idea of historian Steven J. Randall who argues that the historiography of U.S.-Latin American relations can be described with three reoccurring themes; ideology, questions of national security, and economics as the motives for U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. While each of these motives are discussed in varying levels of importance, the most prevalent methodological approach taken by historians is a liberal, pluralistic interpretation of U.S. Latin American relations. This liberal, pluralist stream, according to Randall, comes into conflict with the corporatist model, which places primacy of U.S. policy making on economics, and the place of the corporation in the modern state, in a corporate, capitalist society. It is this pluralist stream that dominates the academic debate. See Stephen J. Randall, “Ideology, National Security, and the Corporate State: The Historiography of U.S. Latin American Relations,” Latin American Research Review 27, no. 1 (1992): 206. 15 Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War In Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 156-159. 16 According to David F. Schmitz, Carter’s policies succeeded in “providing legitimacy to an alternative view of America foreign policy, and opening up the discussion to more than just the concerns of the

! ! 9 presidential election, Reagan targeted Carter’s foreign policy, blaming his “emphasis on human rights for the loss of Nicaragua and Iran, renewed society adventurism, and the decline of American power and prestige in the world.”17 What resulted was the proclamation of the Reagan Doctrine to renew the Cold War. However, Scholars remain divided about the Reagan administration’s motivations for the Regan Doctrine ranging from a new imperialism to a period of transition in American foreign policy with the abandonment of containment.18 The Reagan administration was concerned that communism was infiltrating Central America, the United States’ backyard.

In July of 1981, Raoul Léger was killed as a combatant in the Guatemalan civil war while portrayed as a martyr by Canadian media outlets. His death is unique, as it reveals various factors that influenced Canadian foreign policy in Latin America.

This MRP argues that in the specific case of Léger’s death, Canadian foreign policy was influenced by hard economic interests, not the bi-polar Cold War political climate or the perception of Canada as the champion of liberal internationalism. This is not to say that the image of liberal internationalism is nothing more than a defunct myth, devoid of any influence over Canada foreign policy in this case. By 1981, the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Cold War and containment.” David F. Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships. (: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 194. It is also important to note, however, that the effectiveness of Carter’s policies as well as his ‘cooling of the Cold War’ remains a much-debated topic amongst scholars. 17 Schmitz, 194. 18 For instance, Greg Grandin argues Reagan’s renewal of the Cold War was much more than the renewal of an ideological war against communism, but a more militaristic approach to the ‘new imperialism’ that was already deeply entrenched within U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America. Grandin credits American economic interests for Reagan’s focus on Latin America as the political climate of 1980 “created perfect storm of resurgent American Expansionism.” Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006) 181. However, political scientist James M. Scott views the policy of Reagan as a transition in American foreign policy, rather than a pattern of continuity. Scott argues the Regan Doctrine “represented the abandonment of containment, marking a shift in American foreign policy that had been established since the Truman administration. James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 2.

! ! 10 public imagination had adopted liberal internationalism as the defining point of

Canadian identity in international relations. The ideal of liberal internationalism may have pressured the Canadian government to address the case of Raoul Léger, however it did not influence the development of foreign policy objectives nor shape the outcome of the DEA’s reaction to Léger’s death. Human rights issues were addressed only to relieve domestic pressure from the Canadian public rather than as an influence on Canadian foreign policy. Liberal internationalism may be a myth, but by 1981, it is a myth that had developed considerable clout with the imagined

Canadian identity. Canada had economic interests in Latin America, human rights were an important issue in Guatemala during the 1980s, and the United States held considerable geo-political interests in Guatemala during this period. Even so, the case of Raoul Léger reveals that the primary influence behind Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America was realistic hard economic interests rather than idealistic values of liberal internationalism or the geo-political climate of the Cold War.

Canadian economic interests, as small as they may have been in Guatemala, far outweighed human rights issues.

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I: The Case of Raoul Léger

Many Canadians have long believed that Canada is a defender of the liberal world, exemplified by the image of the Canadian soldier adorned with the blue

United Nations peacekeeping helmet spreading Canadian values of equality, freedom, and tolerance.19 Raoul Léger is a good example of liberal internationalism at work, spreading the values of liberal internationalism. Who was Raoul Léger?

Born to a strict Catholic family in Bouctouche New Brunswick, Léger was one of five siblings. He first ventured to Guatemala in 1979 at the age of 27 as a lay missionary with La Société des Missions-Étrangères, a church group based out of Montréal. His initial missionary work was to aid the poor peasant farmers near Concepción, a small village in the north-west region of Guatemala by providing much needed food and medical supplies and participating in various labour assignments in the village. After an incident in 1980 where four Guatemalans who were close to Léger were murdered by the Guatemalan army he became more immersed in the civil war.20

Léger was forced to flee the country due to threats to his life from unknown sources.

After only a few weeks, he returned to Guatemala, this time as more than a lay missionary. Léger returned to Guatemala City in early 1981 on faith driven decision, according to his parents, and resided in the house of Commandant Antonio, one of the leaders of ORPA, an organized armed resistance group, as a printer, information that was unavailable to the DEA in the immediate weeks after Léger’s death. Léger’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 19 This is not unanimously accepted by academics and the Canadian public. For instance, historian Eric Wagner views the idea of Canada as a ‘peaceable nation’ based in its role with peacekeeping as nothing more than a myth. According to Wagner, peacekeeping was not seen by Canadian planners as part of the Canadian commitment to impartial, humanitarian values, but rather as “complementary to the strategic interests of Canada and NATO.” See Eric Wagner, “The Peaceable Kingdom? The National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping and the Cold War.” Canadian Military Journal 7 no. 4 (2007): 45. 20 National Film Board, Raoul Léger, The Elusive Truth. 2002. Directed by Renée Blanch.

! ! 12 return had unfavourable timing for his safety, as 1981 was a heightened year of violence in the Guatemala civil war. According to Gaspar Ilom, aka Rodriquo

Asturias, the Commander in Chief of ORPA, Léger was killed in a raid on

Commandant Antonio’s house on 26 July 1981, along with the remainder of the printing team with whom he was working.21 . The raid on Commandant Antonio’s house, where Léger was killed, was part of the 1981 scorched earth campaign of the Guatemalan army.

In the weeks following Léger’s death the Canadian government was on the receiving end of domestic pressure to hold the Guatemalan government accountable for the death of one of its citizens.22 Some in Canada associated Léger with the growing human rights atrocities that were occurring daily in the Guatemalan civil war. 23 Canadians worried that their government had done little to hold the

Guatemalan government to account after Léger’s body was exhumed in September

1981 from the mass grave in which it had initially been buried and returned to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 21Alongside the renewed commitment by the Regan Administration to aid the Guatemalan Army, 1981-1982 witnessed the implementation of future Guatemalan president Efrain Rios Montt's scorched earth campaign, which was one of the most violent military campaigns against the armed resistance groups in the civil war. It is also important to note that the Canadian government did not have full knowledge of Léger’s involvement with OPRA at the time. In an interview with Gaspar Ilom in the National Film Board, Raoul Léger, The Elusive Truth. 2002. Directed by Renée Blanch. 22Man Alive, CBC, Nov. 22, 1981. Accessed at http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/society/religion- spirituality/their-christian-duty-canadian-missionaries-abroad/saint-or-subversive.html 23 J.B. Crowe, telegram to GENV, January 11, 1980. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 34387 File 45-GTMLA-13 pt. 1). Author Unknown, Briefing on Guatemala Human Rights, December 17, 1979. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 34387 File 45-GTMLA-13 pt. 1). Frances Arbour, Executive Secretary for Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, Letter to Don Jamison of DEA, December 1, 1978. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 34387 File 45- GTMLA-13 pt. 1). Lucie Pepien, letter to Mark MacGuigan from the Canadian advisory Council on the Status of Women. February 19, 1981. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 34388 File 45- GTMLA-13 pt. 2). Author Unknown, “Mission Society Seeks Body of Slain Worker,” The Globe and Mail, August 7, 1981. Ross Orkland, “Guatemalan Version of Canadian’s Death Challenged by Priest,” The Globe and Mail, August 5, 1981. Authour Unknown, “ Death and Acusations,” The Globe and Mail, August 10, 1981. And Man Alive, CBC, Nov. 22, 1981. Accessed at http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/society/religion-spirituality/their-christian-duty-canadian- missionaries-abroad/saint-or-subversive.html.

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Canada for a proper burial.24 According to documents from within the DEA the

“Canadian public” pressured the Canadian government to conduct or request a formal investigation into the death of Léger.25 Nevertheless, such an investigation was far from desired within the ranks of the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

This excerpt from a letter on 15 September 1981 reveals the concerns of an official within the DEA:

[t]he Media and government critics would have a field day especially if we could not produce for one reason or another conclusive evidence that Léger was indeed involved in politically subversive activities in Guatemala. Even if we were able to produce such evidence, we would likely be criticized vociferously not only for accepting as accurate a Guatemalan accusation but for seeming to justify an arbitrary shooting of Léger.26

Essentially, as the circumstances surrounding Raoul Léger’s case unfolded within the DEA, any plan to address the Léger case was regarded by its officials as a lose- lose situation. Pressure from human rights organizations and activists left the

Canadian government cornered and no politically safe exit strategy.27

The Guatemalan civil war had begun in 1960, and the death of Léger was not the first time its atrocities had attracted attention. The Canadian government was consistently pressured to hold the Guatemalan government to account for human rights violations well before Léger’s death: however, personnel within the DEA had

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 24The theme of this 15 minute investigative report on Léger’s case was highly critical of the Canadian government’s inaction when it was believed by the program that it was duty bound to protect the rights of Léger. Man Alive, CBC, Nov. 22, 1981. Accessed at http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/society/religion-spirituality/their-christian-duty-canadian- missionaries-abroad/saint-or-subversive.html 25 Man Alive, CBC, Nov. 22, 1981. Accessed at http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/society/religion-spirituality/their-christian-duty-canadian- missionaries-abroad/saint-or-subversive.html 26Letter to EXTOTT from author unknown, “Léger Case,” September 15, 1981. (Library and Archives Canada, RG 25 Volume 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4) 27

! ! 14 varying opinions on the Canadian government’s ability to pressure the Guatemalan government over human rights issues. In a confidential briefing for the 1980

Canadian diplomatic mission of Ambassador Charland to Guatemala, Charland was instructed to hold the Guatemalan government accountable, to ease public pressures at home without damaging potential economic opportunities in these terms:

This can be done in a positive way by stressing that in view of the depth of our concern about the violence and our substantive trade, commercial, and aid interest, Canada seriously wishes to assist in working with Guatemala to develop effective means of improving the situation and protecting human rights which has become a potential impediment to the broadening and solidifying of our bilateral relations.28

The key passage in this excerpt is the very end. The emphasis is not placed on raising human rights issues as a genuine concern, but rather to remove domestic pressures which were seen as impeding the growth of a mutually beneficial economic relationship. Prior to the death of Léger, DEA officials had already decided that other strategic interests were to supersede human rights violations in

Guatemala. The debriefing kit offered to Charland for his 1980 visit was clear; improve opportunities for a bilateral relationship with Guatemala. Human rights issues were discussed in a manner, which highlighted the issues “related to trade and industrial development and development assistance among others” to reach the overall objective to “promote Canada’s interests in broadening and deepening our bilateral trade and commercial relationship.”29 Human rights issues were addressed

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 28 Author unknown “Visit to Guatemala for Ambassador Claude T. Charland,” July 20-24, 1980. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 8656, File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 3) 29 Author unknown “Visit to Guatemala for Ambassador Claude T. Charland,” July 20-24, 1980. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 8656, File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 3)

! ! 15 only to relieve domestic pressure from the Canadian public rather than as an influence on Canadian foreign policy.

The DEA was reluctant to push the case of Léger on the grounds of human rights. The Guatemalan government correctly asserted that Raoul Léger was a guerrilla collaborator in the civil war, and that he was not a simple missionary worker in the wrong place at the wrong time.30 It is not clear that Léger was a devout communist or if his motive for collaborating with guerilla forces was based in his faith and the pursuit for social justice, but it is obvious he was not an innocent victim but an active agent of the civil war. While this was an accusation that the Canadian government did not accept publicly, the government had its own perception of

Léger’s political inclinations. At the time of Léger’s death, there seems to be little evidence that the Canadian government fully understood or at least acknowledged

Léger’s level of involvement as a printer of anti-government propaganda with OPRA.

It was not until late September 1981 when the DEA began to receive more specific information from Guatemalan sources regarding the Léger’s death.31 According to a document from within External Affairs, the DEA had received its own information from Dr. Charles Goude, a close friend of Léger and self-confessed guerrilla collaborator, that Léger was actively supporting the guerrillas.32 The source was

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 30 G. Cooney, Telegram to EXTOTT, “Subject: Raoul Joseph Léger,” September 1, 1981. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25 Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). This telegram discusses the early accusations placed on Léger by the Guatemalan government, as well as initial interest to gain access to an official report of the events leading to Léger’s death from Guatemalan authorities. 31 Clark McArthur, Report, “Assessment of Threat,” 30 September 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25 Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 32 Initial information from Dr. Goude was first mentioned in 30 September 1981 Clark McArthur, Report, “Assessment of Threat,” 30 September 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25 Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). The information was latter substantiated in June of 1982, Clark McArthur, Letter to ETTOT, “Léger Case”, June 18, 1982(Library and archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 8656, File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt 5). Dr. Goude was also interviewed in National Film Board. Raoul Léger, The Elusive Truth. 2002. Directed by Renée Blanchar.

! ! 16 significant, as Goude was a Canadian and seemingly the only non-Guatemalan source available to the DEA to gauge Léger’s involvement in the civil war. Léger’s involvement in the civil war was not only an accusation put forward by the

Guatemalan government, but an accusation that could be proven by Canadian sources. As the DEA became increasingly concerned that Léger was indeed a guerilla collaborator, officials worried that the image of Canada would suffer at a time when the DEA was striving to maintain its bilateral relationship with the Guatemalan government. At the same time as the case of Raoul Léger’s case was unfolding, accusations were also raised over Canadian involvement with neighbouring Belize.

The accusation that Léger was a subversive guerilla printer/fighter was not taken lightly by the DEA. By the mid 1970s, there were no fewer than 54 Canadian

NGOs and religious groups working in various nations in Latin America, and the federally funded Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) picked up the tab for 17% of all NGOs expenditures in the region, such as La Société des

Missions-Étrangères.33 Canadian NGOs and church groups were an influential part of the Canadian public’s perception of Canada’s liberal internationalism, and they were closely associated with the human rights critique of the Guatemalan civil war.

The Canadian government was more than aware of the influence of Canadian NGOs and Church groups. An accusation that revealed that Léger was funded by the

Canadian government, an accusation that was not denied by the DEA, would not only offend the Guatemalan military, but also the American government which was renewing the Cold War battle by January of 1982.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 33 James Rochlin, Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994), 96.

! ! 17

This raised the possibility that the Canadian government could be accused of providing funding and support, even indirectly to the enemies of the Guatemalan government. One document from the DEA files states, “if it could be demonstrated that the Canadian government, through CIDA, had funded any such activities!” it would be disastrous.34 The demand of the Canadian government, in response to domestic pressures, was for the Guatemalan government to provide a report on the circumstances surrounding Léger’s death. However, there was a fear that such a report would not focus on the death of Léger specifically, but rather “in response to our representations and to Canadian criticism, might provide us with a report not only about the circumstances of involvement of Léger in Guatemala, who had received CIDA funding, and demand to know why Canadian government was financially supporting subversive groups.” 35 The DEA acknowledged the link between CIDA funding and Canadians who were accused of supporting guerilla fighters in the civil war. The DEA was reluctant to pursue the Léger case on the grounds of human rights as an innocent victim of the civil war, as the outcome could lead to a very embarrassing situation for the Canadian government.

This was a realistic fear. In a meeting only months after Léger’s death, on 11

November 1981 the Guatemalan President lectured Canadian diplomats that

Guatemala had unfortunately had a tradition of maintaining relations with friendly countries, even through such friendly countries supported local subversive elements.

The summary of the meeting reads, “we were almost fearful at this point that the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 34 Author unknown, Letter to EXTOTT, “Léger Case,” Sept 14, 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 35 Author Unknown, Letter to EXTOTT, “Léger Case,” Sept 14, 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4) .

! ! 18

President would mention Canada by name in this connection, but he refrained from doing so.” 36 While the Guatemalan president may have refrained from directly mentioning Canada by name, the implication was clear. Concern for the image of

Canada was a high priority, and it was becoming a growing reality that CIDA was partially funding most Canadian NGO and church group activities in Guatemala.

The DEA was fearful that Léger’s case had the potential to open investigations into the activities of other Canadian citizens operating in Guatemala at time. A year after Léger’s death the DEA was in a better position to consider and draw conclusions regarding Léger’s level of involvement in the Guatemalan civil war. What had initially been regarded as a single threat to the image of Canada was becoming a growing problem as new information surfaced. In a telegram from Chargé d’Affaires Clark McArthur to the DEA office in Ottawa on 16 June 1982, the following was stated:

FYI in review of our files and diaries here in preparation for visit of inspection team we believe that in past year five CDNS including Léger have been deeply involved in guerilla movements here; there is evidence linking two others to similar activities; and while we lack sufficient data for any categorical statement there is possibility that yet another two may have been involved. This does olryqnot [sic] include five CDN nuns whose names appeared on an army quote death list unquote in Jan/82. To the best of our knowledge, GTMLN authorities are aware of or have suspicions concern [sic] all but two of the numbers noted above. In circumstances, to press for previously requested official report on Léger could risk opening Pandora’s box of alleged CDN involvement.37

As the case of Léger unfolded, it was increasingly clear that the Guatemalan government was becoming suspicious of Canadian operations in Guatemala, as well

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 36 Author Unknown, Letter to EXTOTT, “Meeting with President Lucas 10 Nov,” 11 November 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 37 Chargés d'Affaires McArthur, Telegram, Léger Case, June 16, 1982(Library and Archives Canada RG 25 Vol. 18545 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt 5).

! ! 19 as the Canadian government’s role in financially supporting Canadian communist subversives operating in the civil war though CIDA. As far as DEA officials were concerned, there was much to be lost if information such as this was found to be true by the Guatemalan government. Pressuring for an investigation on the grounds of human rights violations left many DEA officials to predict an undesirable outcome for the Canadian government.

As events unfolded, incorporating human rights into the DEA’s response was becoming more of a balancing act for the Canadian government. It was important for the DEA to prevent the Léger case from damaging the relationship with Guatemala as human rights were far from the main influence of Canadian foreign policy development. Canadian ambassador to the United States, Adam Gotlieb’s perceptions of Trudeau’s foreign policy highlights the link between ‘interest with no foreign policy’ in the region. In a excerpt from his dairy, Gotlieb states:

After about sixteen years I still find Trudeau unfathomable. He champions human rights at home but supports authoritarian regimes abroad and has no use for dissidents. He believes the Soviets can do no wrong but has steadily increased Canada’s financial support for NATO. He proclaimed for years that foreign policy is an extension of the national interest and ends up a tiers-mondiste. He champions the little states and weaker ones yet subscribes to nineteenth-century notions of Great Power spheres of influence.38

This diary entry highlights the atmosphere within the DEA at the time of Léger’s death, which was only months prior to this entry. As far as corresponding with the initiatives pursued by the DEA towards Canadian foreign policy objectives in

Guatemala, it is an accurate assessment of Trudeau’s perception of human rights in

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 38 Adam Gotlieb, The Washington Diaries 1981-1989 (McClelland and Steward, 2006), 13.

! ! 20

Canadian foreign policy as a realist.39 As will be seen from the events after the death of Raoul Léger, the main influence behind foreign policy development towards

Guatemala remain unchanged – Canadian economic interests superseded human rights.

In September 1981, the Canadian Department of External Affairs was in full damage control. Plaguing the DEA was also Belize’s newly gained independence.

The Guatemalan government was becoming increasingly suspicious of Canadian cooperation with Belize which was linked with the human rights critique of the

Guatemalan government. Gaining its independence from the UK in September 1981,

Belize inherited a three hundred year old territorial dispute with Guatemala. As this dispute heightened, Guatemala feared an attack by Belize which it suspected

Canada would support. In a DEA document from 21 September 1981, the same day

Belize gained independence, a concern was raised by a DEA official as to the importance of assuring Guatemala that such allegations were false. 40 Seven days later, in a hastily planned meeting between Canadian diplomats and the Guatemalan foreign minister, the Canadian delegation wondered if “it [was] our intention to participate in the invasion of Guatemala?”41 The response was an emphatic no, as

Chargé d’Affaires McArthur explained “I was distressed to hear such suggestions from him, as I was equally distressed to read in local papers, hear on Guatemalan

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 39 Trudeau’s foreign policy guidelines often objected with liberal internationalism, as Trudeau believed no nation should interfere with the individual sovereignty of another state, leaving direct intervention over internal matters not an acceptable part of Canadian foreign policy. A perfect example of this is the case of Canadian-Cuban relations. See Robert Wright, Three Nights in Havana: Pierre Trudeau, Fidel Castro, and the Cold War World (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2007), 88-95. 40 Author unknown, telegram, “Belize Security Declaration,” 21 September 1981 (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 41 Letter to EXTOTT from MacArthur, “Call on GTMLN Foreign Minister,” Sept 28th, 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4).

! ! 21 radio, and TV of suggested Canadian involvement of this type in Belize.”42 The threat of Canadian cooperation with a Belize defence force, and invasion of

Guatemala was one issue that damaged the Guatemalan government’s perception of Canada in this period.

As time elapsed and both the Belize issue and the case of Raoul Léger’s death unfolded, it became increasingly apparent to the DEA that despite their best efforts, the image of Canada had been negatively affected. Of primary concern was the avoidance of raising human rights with the Guatemalan government. The Belize issue and the Léger case, “have combined recently to change the Guatemalan perception of Canada and Canadians.”43 Furthermore, “it will no longer be possible to sustain our protective colouring of somewhat politically disinterested, uninvolved people whose major preoccupation with Guatemala was trade.”44 Essentially, the

DEA attempted to act disinterested in the human rights issues. A failure to preserve a level of disinterest only reveals the true importance of human rights as a motive for

Canadian foreign policy which had placed human rights interest at the bottom of the spectrum, and the recent Belize issue and death of Léger were making it increasingly difficult for the Canadian government to remain separated from the human rights debate in Guatemala. As both issues became points of contention in the bilateral relationship between Canada and Guatemala, the DEA was ever more

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 42 Letter to EXTOTT from MacArthur, “Call on GTMLN Foreign Minister,” Sept 28th, 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4) . And author unknown, Letter to EXOTT, “Conversation with Castillo Valdez/GTMLA,” Sept 28, 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4) . 43 Author Unknown “Subject: Staffing – Canadian Embassy in Guatemala,” November 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 44 Author Unknown “Subject: Staffing – Canadian Embassy in Guatemala,” November 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4).

! ! 22 concerned that the Guatemalan government would believe that Canada held anti-

Guatemalan sentiment due to the issues raised by the civil war.

While the DEA was distancing itself from human rights in Guatemala with the

Guatemalan government, the same cannot be said about the Canadian government’s actions at home. Pierre Trudeau portrayed human rights as an important issue, giving the impression that human rights were important to the construction of Canadian foreign policy. This, of course, was not true. Rather, the

DEA went to great lengths to exaggerate the role of human rights as an influencing factor for foreign policy development. At the thirty-sixth United Nations delegation in

December 1981, three resolutions were voted on, each considering action against

Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala for ongoing human rights violations. The

Canadian delegation was instructed to vote in favour of the Guatemalan resolution with the knowledge that the United States, who was supporting the Guatemalan army at the time, would veto the resolution. In a memorandum from 2 December

1981, it was stated that the UN is the only vehicle available to the Canadian government to effectively discuss the human rights issues in Guatemala, demonstrating to one degree a debate within the DEA.45 As part of the DEA’s overall commitment to exclude direct intervention on human rights issues, the only case in which Canada would show its discontent with Guatemala’s human rights record was an un-passed resolution, balancing the pressure from both the Guatemalan government and the Canadian public.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 45 D.M.M., Memorandum for the Minister: U.N. Resolution on Human Rights: el Salvador, Guatemala, and Chile. 2 December 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 34388 File 45-GTMLA-13 pt. 2).

! ! 23

This example supports an argument made by political scientist Kim Richard

Nossal that human rights have seldom been a major concern for the DEA or the

Canadian government as far as foreign policy has been concerned. The Canadian government has demonstrated a reluctance to raise human rights issues at the cost of strategic interests. Accordingly, “case studies of Canada’s relations with human rights violators suggest that Ottawa’s policies are motivated by conceptions of

Canada’s “strategic” interests.”46 There are examples during the 1980s in which

Canada did take a strong position toward human rights violators such as Uganda or

Sri Lanka, however in these instances there were no strategic concerns present.

Essentially, human rights seemed to be nothing more than a public relations tactic in the specific case of Guatemala. Guatemala is one of the cases that demonstrates

Canadian policy makers were more concerned with strategic interests than human rights, contrary to the liberal internationalism paradigm within academia. In a region that Canada had no consolidated foreign policy, the ad hoc method of determining favourable objectives by the DEA involved a process of elimination, and human rights was superseded by the so called “strategic concerns” in the region even though the Canadian government presented a public façade of concern for human rights issues in the region.

There is yet another aspect of Raoul Léger’s case that incorporates human rights into the way in which the DEA reacted. While the Canadian media lamented numerous stories of human rights violations associated with the Guatemalan civil

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

46 Kim Richard Nossal, “Cabin'd, Cribb’d Confin’d?: Canada’s Interest in Human Rights.” Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy ed. Robert O. Mathews and Cranford Pratt (Montréal: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 1988), 53.

! ! 24 war, Raoul Léger’s death added a new dimension – the death of a Canadian citizen.

The Canadian Constitution was adopted in 1982 however the Charter of Rights and

Freedoms was never intended to extend to Canadian citizens beyond Canada’s borders. Much of the belief surrounding the DEA’s inaction over the case of Léger stems from the criticism that the Canadian government was bound to protect the rights of a Canadian citizen abroad, something the Canadian government is neither legally nor morally obligated to do.

Aside from the case of Léger and the Belize issue, the DEA was concerned about Guatemalan perceptions of Canada. As the civil war continued throughout

1981, entering its most violent episode, Canadian diplomats began to fear for their safety in Guatemala. Political kidnappings were everyday news in Guatemala, and the DEA felt Canadian officials were particularly susceptible. As the case of Léger began to unfold unfavorably for the DEA, it was believed that the Guatemalan government was becoming agitated with Canadian diplomats, and was suspected of a recent string of death threats targeted at Canadian diplomats. Files from within the

DEA provide no evidence of such a tie. Instead, the accusation was raised as the death threats seemed to be related to the timing of the exhumation of Léger’s body. 47 As the Guatemalan government became ever more concerned over

Canada’s growing disapproval of its human rights record, and as tensions grew over the Léger case and other issues, death threats toward Canadian officials escalated.48

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 47 Author Unknown, letter to EXTOTT, “Security Personnel Assessment of Threat,” October 1, 1981 (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 48 The death threats described by the DEA were phone calls made against Canadian DEA officials. However, there were no threats made by name, leading some officials to believe that the threats were

! ! 25

The initial Canadian response to these threats was to pressure the

Guatemalan government to provide a larger security force to protect Canadian diplomats and government workers. These requests, however, went unanswered.

What is interesting about this issue is how closely linked it is to the case of Raoul

Léger. For instance, in a document from 1 October 1981, it was stated that “letter threats were delivered under initials except that to Picard, whose full name has been mentioned widely in local press in connection with Léger exhumation, there is reasonable probability of relations to this case and/or to cancellation of Buffalo demo flight.” 49 Some DEA officials speculated about the origins of the threats. One scenario proposed that the “threats emanated from GOVT or groups associated with

GOVT and lack of police protection is reinforcement of this.”50 The Léger case was believed to have further eroded other aspects of the Canadian/Guatemalan relationship. The following excerpt outlines the mindset of Canadian diplomats in

Guatemala at the time:

with respect to 3(c) there are a number of issues which have arising in the past two months in CDA/GTMLA affairs which could be seen through some GTMLA eyes as unfriendly. In assessing these it should be kept in mind that in this country issues or differences meant to be viewed in black and white terms. Greys are seldom important. The common approach is quote you are either with me or against me unquote; there is no/no place for fence sitting.51

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! a scare tactic and held no real danger. Author Unknown, letter to EXTOTT, “Security Personnel Assessment of Threat,” 1 October 1981 (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2- GTMLA pt. 4). 49 Author Unknown, letter to EXTOTT, “Security Personnel Assessment of Threat,” 1 October 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 50 Author Unknown, letter to EXTOTT, “Security Personnel Assessment of Threat,” 1 October 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 51 Author Unknown, letter to EXTOTT, “Security Personnel Assessment of Threat,” 1 October 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4).

! ! 26

The DEA’s policy of attempting to maintain a low profile over human rights issues backfired as it was nearly unavoidable in Léger’s case. Even so, the preferred tactic remained to avoid any direct political conflict with Guatemala over human rights. If human rights influence Canadian foreign policy, it certainly was not in the case of

Guatemala. Human rights founded on the principle of liberal internationalism did have a certain level of influence Léger’s case, but it is clear that it was not a major influence behind the DEA’s development of foreign policy objectives in response to

Léger’s death.

! ! 27

II: The Cold War and Canadian Foreign Policy

While liberal internationalism is an important theory used to examine and categorize Canadian foreign policy, a second paradigm examines Canada as a satelite, constrained by the geo-political realities of the international system.52 This interpretation holds that American hegemony dominated international relations of the period, and Canada had little control over its own foreign policy which was governed by Cold War interests in the region. 53 To what degree did Cold War ideology supported by the American hegemon influence Canadian foreign policy? Concerning

Latin America, there is a similar school of thought, particularly among political scientists who view Canadian foreign policy under neorealist international relations theory. If Canadian foreign policy was constrained by the geo-political context of the

Cold War in the region it would be erroneously assumed that Canada would have been unable to preserve its own interests. One issue that could account for this perspective is the lack of coherent and unified foreign policy objectives for the region as a whole, as already highlighted as ‘interests with no foreign policy.’54 A lack of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 52 Author Unknown, letter to EXTOTT, “Security Personnel Assessment of Threat,” 1 October 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 53 This is an argument that first emerged in the post-war era. There are several historians that hold this view, however of the now older generation. For instance, Donald Creighton, and Stephen Clarkson are critical of past government for allowing the loss of Canadian sovereignty, particular with regards to economics. See Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1947 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1976), and Stephen Clarkson, ed. An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1968). 54 Once again, this is an idea developed by Greg Donaghy and Bruce Muirhead to describe Canadian foreign policy in the Caribbean between 1941-1966, however their argument can also be used to describe Canadian foreign policy towards Guatemala in the early 1980s. As well, Muirhead is also one of the scholars to oppose the arguments of Stevenson and Creighton over Canada’s loss of economic sovereignty in the post-war era. While it is unrelated to the topic of this MRP, it gives a foundation for Muirhead’s general perspectives of Canadian foreign policy and economic and political sovereignty. See Greg Donaghy and Bruce Muirhead “”Interests but No Foreign Policy”: Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean, 1941-1966,” American Review of Canadian Studies 38 no. 3 (2008): 275-294, and Bruce Muirhead Dancing Around the Elephant: Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

! ! 28 congruent policy, however, should not be mistaken for subordination of Canadian foreign policy to the bi-polar world of the 1980s Cold War.

As authors Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse argue, Canada was far from the bi-partisan state, subordinated by American Cold War policy as accused by

Canadian nationalists. Rather, Canadian Cold War policy was clearly partisan as a belligerent, dispelling part of the Pearsonian myth of Canada as a ‘peaceable kingdom.’ Canadian officials did not share the same sense of an “evangelical mission” as their American counterparts, but “their suspicion of the Soviets was as deep, and perhaps had begun earlier.”55 According to the post-revisionist view, from the very beginnings of the Cold War Canada held its own independent stake in the ideological conflict with communism. Canada was not a puppet to the US, but instead was a state with similar ideological concerns about the spread of communism. Canada’s conduct of the Cold War is one aspect used by critics of the

‘American puppet’ argument, which led to a continental system. Instead “every step along the way was taken to protect Canadian national interests, as the Ottawa elite understood them, and as far circumstances permitted.”56 The myth of Canada as a

‘peaceable kingdom’ with a foreign policy influenced by liberal internationalism is proven false when examining Canada’s independent interest in the Cold War.

In his monograph, Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism, A

Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968-1990, political scientist Brian Stevenson argues that the Canadian government had little interest in Guatemala between 1980-1984, however the DEA’s reaction to the case of Raoul Léger, coupled with the objectives

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 55 Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994, 136. 56 Whittaker and Marcuse, 137.

! ! 29 pursued prior to his death, demonstrate this not be the case.57 Prior to the death of

Léger in 1981, Canada had sought to improve an already strong bilateral trading relationship with Guatemala, seeking out opportunities for both Canadian industry and finance. According to Stevenson, the Canadian “government’s complete ignorance during 1980-1981 of the conflict brewing in central America and its limited involvement during 1982 can be attributed to three factors.” First, Stevenson argues

Canada had no bilateral interests in the region as trade was small and Canadians had traditionally shown little interest in the region; second, Canadian opposition to

U.S. foreign policy only occurred when Canadian interests were at stake; and third,

Canada had believed that the U.S. had legitimate strategic interest in the region.58

However, as documents from the DEA reveal, the Canadian government believed that vital interest such as mining investments and petroleum developments were at stake in the specific case of Guatemala, and efforts were taken to preserve and improve a Canadian/Guatemalan economic relationship. The idea of a region with

‘interests with no policy’ can be used to correct Stevenson’s approach. As the approach taken by the DEA seemed to be rather ad hoc, the only way to get a true understanding of foreign policy objectives in the region would be a thorough

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 57 Stevenson, Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism, A Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968- 1990 (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 142. Stevenson describes this era as a period “from indifference to limited involvement,” however his analysis seems to steam from the public speeches of Mark MacGuigan, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, as well as interviews with reporters, with little (no) reflection on the CDEA internal correspondence from Library and Archives Canada. While Stevenson may be correct to state that the Canadian commerce with Latin America was relatively small, that does not explain his conclusions about it being an area of little interest when compared to the source base from LAC. Especially after acknowledging the Trudeau governments desire to ‘Canadianize ‘ and find alternative trade partners after the Nixon shocks of the 1970’s his conclusions are drawn a little too quick. 58 Stevenson, 142.

! ! 30 examination of the correspondence from within the DEA, rather than looking for broad foreign policy plans, which were just not available in the region.

The three factors used to explain the Canadian government's ‘ignorance’ of

Central America are based on the concept of neo-realist international relations theory, as the bi-polar political climate imposed a constraint on Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America. However, the arguments of historians such as

Whitaker and Marcuse challenge Stevenson’s thesis. To what degree was Canadian foreign policy constrained as a middle power in a bi-polar world? Did Canadian interest really differ from American interest? Then Secretary of State for External

Affairs Mark MacGuigan described the Canadian government’s ability to oppose U.S. foreign policy in the context of the Cold War as such:

In my view, given the global and bilateral issue with which we had a strong stand with Reagan, we could not afford to challenge the United States frontally on fundamental East-West questions unless our own interest demanded it. We could, and I often did, take the U.S. to task for its lack of adequate consultation with its allies, but, when all was said and done, Canada’s East-West interest were substantially identical with those of our southern neighbour.59

As Canadian planners formulated foreign policy in the context of the Cold War they did so with interests that were parallel to those of the United States, not as a state constrained by American hegemonic power as argued by Stevenson. In fact, Cold

War ideology was not a constraint on Canadian foreign policy towards Guatemala.

On the contrary, Canadian officials seemed to share the same desire for political stability in the region as their American counterparts. The Reagan administration was concerned with the stability of the Guatemalan government as part of their

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 59 Mark MacGuigan, An Inside Look at External Affairs During the Trudeau Years: The Memoirs of Mark MacGuigan, ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002), 121.

! ! 31 evangelical Cold War mission. Opposed to the idea of Canada as a more restrained combatant of the Cold War, the Canadian government also favoured the stability of the Guatemalan government, albeit for different reasons.

Regardless, there is little indication that the DEA’s reaction to Léger’s death was in any way overly constrained by the bi-polar world of the 1980s. Canada’s status as a middle power helped to create the image of a more peaceable nation than the United States. When Canadian interests were in line with American Cold

War policy, the DEA would do little to protest American policy in the region. In the case of Central America however, there was a disagreement between Canadian and

American politicians on the method to best address the political instability of the region. Political scientist James Rochlin attributes this to a simple explanation – the use of different analysts. According to Canadian reports, the “regional turmoil was fundamentally linked to North-South disparities rather than to Moscow’s international ambitions.”60 While published after Léger’s death, in 1983, the report on Canada’s

Relations with the Caribbean and Central America unsurprisingly came to much different conclusions than the American counterpart, The Kissinger Report.

Canadian analysis views the political instability in the region in the following terms:

Many of the problems are a result of economic structures, rooted deeply in the past, which cannot respond adequately to powerful and frequently adverse international economic forces.61

This example demonstrates independence in Canadian foreign policy in the region, however the Canadian government similarly desired the same political stability sought by the Americans. Canadian foreign policy towards Guatemala was not

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 60 Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 115. 61 Canada, Canada’s Relations with the Caribbean and Central America. Report to the House of Commons (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1983), 10-11. As cited in Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 115.

! ! 32 constrained by American interests, but had the same desired outcome for political stability for the military Junta as the Reagan administration.

There have been instances in which Canadian foreign policy seems to have run counter to American strategic interests during the Cold War, such as the Korean

War, the Vietnam War and the case of Canadian-Cuban relations during the 1970’s under Trudeau. Since October 1960, Canada refused to endorse the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. However, little would come of the Canadian-Cuban relationship until Trudeau’s visit in January of 1976, marking the first time a NATO leader had stepped foot in Cuba since 1960. The American media coverage of the

Canadian Prime Minister’s trip to Cuba was critical; however, there was still no reason for concern. The Canadian government had been in dialogue with the Carter administration, which had also sought to relieve U.S. -Cuban tensions. According to

Wright, “as Trudeau himself had anticipated, the agitated reactions of the U.S. Press had little impact in Washington, where it was generally agreed that having a trusted ally at Fidel Castro’s dinner table could only advance American interests.” 62

Essentially, one of the major issues of Canadian Cold War foreign policy that seems to have been so divergent from U.S. strategic interests was regarded as favourable by the Carter administration.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 62 Robert Wright, Three Nights in Havana: Pierre Trudeau, Fidel Castro and the Cold War World (Toronto: Harper Perennial, 2007), 229-230. Wright continues to expand on this point with an example of a subcommittee meeting of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 28. During this committee meeting, the committee chair, Dante Fascell, conveyed a “positive view of the Canada-U.S. relationships throughout the hearings, even when discussing the prime minister’s Cuba visit with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard D. Vine. Trudeau’s decision to follow through with the trip was perfectly reasonable, said vine, given the long lead time, the forceful statements of disapproval the prime minister made on Angola, and the fact that he had gone to great lengths to demonstrate that his being in Havana meant no compromise of Canada’s partnership with the United States.” An excellent analysis of the Canada/Cuba diplomatic relationship is also available in the monograph by John M. Kirk and Peter McKenna, Canadian-Cuba Relations: The Other Good Neighbour Policy (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007).

! ! 33

With a more direct link between the influence of the bi-polar geo-political world of the Cold War and the specific case of Raoul Léger, is the example of

Canadian MP John Crosbie. There are numerous letters sent to the DEA and the

Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan by John Crosbie within the files of the DEA. Crosbie is an interesting case, as he is neither French speaking nor an MP in New Brunswick, the native province of Léger. However, Crosbie was the

Minister of Finance under the short-lived Conservative government of Canadian

Prime Minister Joe Clark (1979-1980), and decided to exploit the death of Léger to criticize the recently re-elected Liberal Party under Trudeau (1980-1984).

In several letters to then Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark

MacGuigan, Crosbie asked about the death of Raoul Léger; “how and why Mr. Léger met his death and what the circumstances were?”63After several insistent inquiries to the DEA, Crosbie received a confidential debriefing on the sensitive nature of

Léger’s case, possibly revealing the potential fallout an official report into Léger’s death on a human rights basis may have for Canadian strategic Interests.64 The response received by Crosbie relayed the failed request for an official report into the events leading to the death of Léger. As well, “apart from the foregoing, there are other aspects surrounding Mr. Léger’s death which we are obliged to treat as

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 63 John C. Crosbie, MP. Letter to Mark MacGuigan, 3 November 1981. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4) 64 The final inquiry made by Crosbie was stated in the following terms: “I write to inquire as to what has been the result of any investigation by your Department, or any other agency, which reference to the death of Raoul Léger of Bouctouche, N.B., which occurred in Guatemala last year. Has there been an Official Inquiry and what was the result? What is the result of any inquiry made by your own department? What action have we taken to indicated our displeasure and disapproval of the Government of Guatemala?” John C. Crosbie, MP Letter to Mark MacGuigan 10 June 1982 (Library and Archives Canada RG 25 Vol. 18545 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt 5).

! ! 34 sensitive!, if you would be interested in obtaining an overview of the case!, our

Chargé d’Affaires in Guatemala has offered to provide you with an oral briefing.”65

Crosbie himself was a conservative and a Cold warrior. Unsurprisingly,

Crosbie accepted the opportunity for an oral briefing, after which he made no further inquiries into the Léger case suggesting he was concerned with Léger’s death hampering the Canadian governments desire to maintain the Guatemalan governments political stability. It is possible that the debriefing revealed the sensitive nature of Léger’s case and the possibility it had to damage Canada’s position as a middle power in the geo-political landscape of the Cold War. In a document from within DEA files, a recommendation was proposed by a DEA official to consider

“revealing facts of the Léger Case! to responsible Members of Parliament so that they will realize that their zeal to make domestic political conflict out of this issues is short-sighted and could have serious repercussions.”66 This recommendation was made in September 1981, months before Crosbie received his de-briefing of the case in June 1982. Crosbie’s letters of inquiry and his sudden loss of interest seem to be in line with Canadian interests in the context of the bi-polar world. Rather than acting as a constraint on Canadian foreign policy, the DEA sought the same political stability in Guatemala in the context of the Cold War as the Americans officials did.

This however, does not fully explain the reaction of the DEA to Léger’s case.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 65 Mark MacGuigan, Letter to John C. Crosbie, 23 June 1982(Library and Archives Canada RG 25 Vol. 18545 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt 5). It also worth nothing that John Crosbie did arrange for an oral briefing in a response on 30 June 1981 which marked the end of any correspondence by John Crosbie concerning the Léger case in the DEA records. See John C. Crosbie, Letter to Mark MacGuigan, June 29, 1982 (Library and Archives Canada RG 25 Vol. 18545 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt 5). 66 Letter to EXTOTT, “Léger Case,” September 15, 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4).

! ! 35

III: Canadian Economic Interests

Prior to Léger’s death, Canadian foreign policy toward Latin America sought to preserve vital Canadian economic interest, while operating under a hegemon, which constrained Canadian foreign policy objectives. While Canadian interests in

Guatemala up to July 1981 were focused on improving Canadian economic opportunities in a growing bilateral relationship, the concerns raised by Léger’s death within the DEA only solidify the argument that the Canadian government believed

Canada did indeed have vital economic interests at stake in Guatemala. In the months immediately following the death of Léger, it had become increasingly apparent that the deteriorating relationship between the two governments over the

Léger case would only harm Canadian economic interest in the region. As already discussed, in the diplomatic mission to Guatemala in 1980 by the Canadian ambassador Charland, a major objective of Canadian foreign policy in the region was to improve Canadian economic opportunities. After the death of Raoul Léger, the emphasis remained on preserving Canadian business opportunities and allowing the diplomatic relationship with Guatemala to ensure future Canadian opportunities in the region. After the death of Léger in the wake of mounting criticism against the

Canadian government for failing to hold the Guatemalan government accountable over human rights issues, the DEA debated the possibility of closing the Canadian consulate in Guatemala. 67 There was pressure to end any formal diplomatic relationship with Guatemala, as a sign of Canada’s discontent with the Guatemalan

Civil War and the human rights violations occurring at the hands of the Guatemalan

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 67 Letter to EXTOTT, “Léger Case,” September 15, 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4).

! ! 36 army. Such a debate highlights the internal conflict with the DEA over the influence of Canadian foreign policy towards Guatemala. Human rights versus trade opportunities, i.e. values versus hard interests.

However, the possible closure of the Canadian consulate in Guatemala, the oldest Canadian diplomatic mission in Latin America, would not come without serious economic and political/diplomatic consequences. At the time of Léger’s death Canadian economic interests in Guatemala were continuing to grow, as

Guatemala “is engaged in or has plans for large scale transportation, communications, hydro, water and sewage development projects that Canadian companies are pursuing.”68 As well, there were prospects for Canadian companies such as Texaco Canada, Bowden Drilling, and Lavelin Petrotech, which were then working in Guatemala in the booming petroleum industry.69 According to the DEA, the facts regarding conflict between pursuing human rights issues in the wake of

Léger’s death was simple; “the Guatemalan economy despite the current political and economic problems remains basically sound.”70 Canadian businesses had the opportunity to participate actively in the ‘sound’ Guatemalan economy, and the closure the Canadian consulate would have detrimental effects upon Canadian economic interests, “the adverse effect with which Canada might have to live for some time.”71 While the DEA acknowledged the ever-growing pressure from the

Canadian public to take action in Guatemala, it was also stated, “the Guatemalans, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 68 Letter to EXTOTT, “Léger Case,” September 15, 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 69 Letter to EXTOTT, “Léger Case,” September 15, 1981(Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 70 Author Unknown “Subject: Staffing – Canadian Embassy in Guatemala,” November 1981. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 71 Author Unknown “Subject: Staffing – Canadian Embassy in Guatemala,” November 1981. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4).

! ! 37 however, will continue to do what they want and have made it known that they don’t really care what others think.”72 By November 1981, the Canadian government was growing increasingly wary of pursing human rights issues with the Guatemalan government at the cost of sacrificing Canadian economic interests.

By the time of Léger’s death, Canada had fostered a long economic relationship with Latin America since the late nineteenth century. As the DEA began to debate how to best address the death of Léger, economic interests were consistently pressing in the minds of the decision makers. Historians Armstrong and

Nelles have thoroughly documented the early business ventures between Canada and Latin America during the late nineteenth century, and that economic relationship continued to thrive throughout the twentieth century. In Particular, one Canadian industry that was deeply involved in Latin America was the Canadian banking sector.

Canadian banks have long established operations outside of Canada’s boarders, and Latin America and the Caribbean were by no means an exception. According to

Armstrong and Nelles, the investments by the Canadian banking industry in the early twentieth century are thoroughly discussed; however, other works reveal that

Canadian banks continued to see Latin America as a lucrative economic opportunity throughout the late twentieth century. Historian Duncan McDowell has published a monograph documenting the history of the Royal Bank of Canada in Quick to the

Frontier. While he offers no discussion of direct investment in Guatemala, McDowell

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 72 Author Unknown “Subject: Staffing – Canadian Embassy in Guatemala,” November 1981. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4).

! ! 38 highlights the continual expansion of the RBC in Latin America throughout the 1960s and 1970s as an important part of the bank’s economic strategy.73

In the specific case of Guatemala, none of the 5 major Canadian banks operated a single branch in the country at the time of Léger’s death. Nonetheless,

Guatemala was of particular importance for Canadian banking interests in the late

1970’s and early 1980s. Michael Kaufman argues, while no Canadian bank had established a branch in Guatemala, it remained “the most important location for

Canadian direct investment in the isthmus.”74 Canadian investments in the region were lucrative when compared to other aspects of the globe. The big five Canadian banks had $23.3 billion in assets in Latin America in 1982 compared to $1.8 billion in

Africa and the Middle East and $12.8 billion in the entire Asia-pacific region.75 The importance of the Canadian banking sector’s interests in Guatemala was by no means lost on the Canadian government. In 1980, just one year before Léger’s death, a Canadian delegation was sent on a diplomatic mission with a number of specific objectives. Among them, was to “discuss with President Lucas Canadian desire to participate in several major development projects that are a priority for the

Guatemalan Government in sectors where Canadian expertise is well established.”76

While there were various talking points listed, such as the Chulac hydroelectric

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 73 Duncan McDowell, Quick to the Frontier: Canada’s Royal Bank. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), 406. In broader terms, historian Peter James Hudson’s article, “Imperial Designs: The Royal Bank of Canada in the Caribbean,” Race and Class 52, no. 1 (2010): 33-48, discusses the imperialistic nature of the Royal Bank’s exploits in the Caribbean during the 1970s with little concern over any issues of human rights or social equality. 74 Michael Kaufman, “The Internationalization of Canadian Banking Capital (With a Look at Bank Activity in the Caribbean and Central America),” Journal of Canadian Studies 19, no. 4. (1985), 79. 75 Edgar J. Dosman, “Hemispheric Relations in the 1980s: A Perspective from Canada.” Journal of Canadian Studies10, no. 4 (1984-85):47. 76 Author Unknown “Visit to Guatemala for Ambassador Claude T. Charland,” 20-24 July 1980 (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 8656, File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 3).

! ! 39 project, railroad rehabilitation, development of petroleum industry, agriculture, hospitals, and roads, the talking points for the meeting also highlighted the importance to “open bridges for better communications,” for Canadian financing. Not only were infrastructure and resource based opportunities available, but the

Canadian government was quick to assert the importance of offering Canadian financing for new economic initiatives.

The debriefing kit provided to Ambassador Charland in 1980 provides insight into Canadian interests in Latin America in the early 1980s. Between 1968 and 1976, there were no less than five ministerial trade missions to the region, and economic growth between Canada and Latin America exceeded 20 percent between 1968-

1976 - far exceeding economic growth with the U.S..77 Political scientist James

Rochlin also notes how Canada had three of the longest running sources of foreign investment in Latin America; Falconbridge in Dominican Republic, INCO in

Guatemala, and Brascan in Brazil.78 The growth of the Canadian investments in the region can be, in part, attributed to the DEA’s goal of securing stable, Canadian friendly investment markets. Such a large growth of government supported Canadian economic interest in Latin America did not fail to draw criticism for perpetuating the state of inequality and social injustice in the region.

Historian Terrance Kadding draws a correlation between increasing violence and economic activity, as well as the causation between the need to develop a secure foreign investment climate during the Guatemalan civil war for the

Guatemalan government. Kadding argues that the military’s primary motivation for

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 77 Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 95. 78 Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 96.

! ! 40 the “escalation and indiscriminate attacks against the Maya and Guerilla presence arose from an imperative to establish a secure investment climate for the

Guatemalan state and investors.” 79 As time elapsed, and the Guatemalan government began to hold more shares in developing natural resource and hydroelectric projects, violence against Mayan inhabitants escalated. There is no better example to contextualize the case of Raoul Léger than the Panzos massacre of 1978. In 1978, INCO had planned to expand its EXMIBAL operation in the Panzos region of Guatemala. However, the Guatemalan army had discovered that a protest was planned by the local Mayans against the expropriation of their land for the mining development. Before they had arrived, the Guatemalan army had set up in the area. Once the protesters gathered, the Guatemalan army murdered 34 unarmed

Mayans. 80 As the Guatemalan government held a 30 percent stake in INCOs

EXMIBAL operations such an event certainly falls in line with Kadding’s argument.

Accounts of the Mayan massacre vary. Was it EXMIBAL security forces who killed them or the Guatemalan army? The level of INCO’s involvement or knowledge of the shooting prior to its occurrence is mere speculation, however atrocities such as this were becoming common knowledge among Canadians who were launching complaints against the Canadian government. In one letter from 27 August 1980,

Reverend Ernie Schibli sent a report to the Canadian Secretary of State for External

Affairs documenting endless travesties from kidnappings to the murder of 30 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 79 Kadding, Terrance. “The Guatemalan Military and the Economics of La Violencia,” Canadian Journal of Latin American & Caribbean Studies 24, no. 47 (1999), 57. Kadding’s argument expands, to discuss the dependence that the Guatemalan government had developed on resource exports, and the need to ensure a stable market for foreign investment under the profit sharing policies of Guatemalan resource extraction with foreign corporations. 80 Catherine Nolin and Jaqui Stephens. “We Have to Protect the Investors: Development & Canadian Mining Companies in Guatemala,” Journal of Rural and Community Development 5, no. 3 (2010),50- 51.

! ! 41 clergywomen at the hands of the Guatemalan army.81 The Canadian government also collected reports from NGOs such as Amnesty International on the situation of death squads and kidnappings of Mayan peasants.82

At the time immediately before the death of Léger, the DEA had also drawn a correlation between the increased acts of violence associated with the Guatemalan

Civil War and the economic initiatives of the Guatemalan Government. While it is not stated in government documents that Canadian business initiatives had anything to do with the human rights violations of the Guatemalan civil war, it is acknowledged that the same industries Canadians were involved in were also those accused of perpetuating human rights violations. In a telegram from 16 May 1980, it was stated that the Canadian officials were aware that the Guatemalan government was

“conducting a terror campaign against Mapuche with the aim of driving them out of their home region and gaining control of petroleum in area.”83 It can be stated that prior to the death of Léger, the Canadian government was making a conscious decision to pursue a beneficial bilateral economic relationship with Guatemala despite its growing knowledge of the atrocities occurring at the hands of the

Guatemalan government.

Overall, it can be stated with certainty that by 1981, Canadian economic interests in Guatemala were not interests that could be ignored by the Canadian government. Aside from the economic prospects for Canadian manufactures and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 81 Letter from Ernie Schibli to Hon. Mark MacGuigan, 27 August 1980. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 34387 File 45-GTMLA-13 pt. 1). 82 “Guatemala Campaign, OAS Testimony, Disappearances and Political Killings in Guatemala,” Amnesty International, International Secretariat Index number AMR 34/48/79. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 34387 File 45-GTMLA-13 pt. 1). 83 Telegram from C. Court OTT EXT to Chargé d'Affaires GTMLA, 16 May 1980. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 34387 File 45-GTMLA-13 pt. 1).

! ! 42 petroleum corporations, there was a growing concern over the operations of INCO`s

EXMIBAL mine in Guatemala after the death of Raoul Léger in the summer of 1981.

Highlighting both the economic interest of Canada in Guatemala and the growing concern of the Guatemalan governments’ perception of Canada is the case of

Canadian mining giant INCO. By 1965, the Guatemalan government had invested with the EXMIBAL nickel mining company, holding 30 percent of its shares with the remaining 70 percent of its shares owned by INCO.84 The Canadian mining industry had allowed Canada to foster an increasingly beneficial diplomatic relationship with

Guatemala, however by 1981 the EXMIBAL investment became an issue of concern for the Department of External Affairs. Just as it is the case with any natural resource, nickel production is based on its price as a resource on the global market, and by

1981, prices had dropped to levels which rendered the EXMIBAL operation unprofitable.

Of primary concern was the image of Canada in Guatemala. Canadian diplomats feared that the case of Raoul Léger, the false allegations of a Canadian supported invasion of Guatemala, and now the decision of INCO to pull out of

Guatemala would be misconstrued as a growing anti-Guatemalan sentiment. In one document from within the Department of External Affairs, it was emphasised that, “it will be important that Guatemalans do not perceive this decision as in some way reflecting an anti-Guatemala move inspired by the government of Canada.”85 The timing of INCO’s withdrawal from the Guatemalan mining industry left something to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 84 Catherine Nolin and Jaqui Stephens, “We Have to Protect the Investors: Development & Canadian Mining Companies in Guatemala,” Journal of Rural and Community Development 3, no. 5 (2010): 40. 85 Author unknown, Letter to EXTOTT, “EXMIBAL,” 26 October 1981. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4).

! ! 43 be desired for the Canadian government. Building upon the issues already surrounding Canada’s image in Guatemala, the Department of External Affairs was growing increasingly concerned with harming the already established economic relationship with Guatemala.

INCO’s decision to pull out of Guatemala, effectively ending the EXMIBAL operation, highlights the convergence of Canadian economic interests and the case of Raoul Léger more directly. While Canadian economic interests were critical, the

DEA relied upon a positive Guatemalan image of Canada, and INCO’s decision to pull out was a possible threat to that image. The DEA’s concern over a negative image of Canada was not based solely on the problems associated with INCOs decision end its EXMIBAL operations, but instead can be seen as a series of events that were of great concern to the DEA. By October of 1981, when it was announced by INCO that operations in Guatemala were to cease, the DEA had already been concerned over the idea that the Canadian government was becoming perceived as anti-Guatemalan, which all came back to the importance of preserving the strategic interest of the region, Canadian economic opportunities and investments.

As tensions continued to mount on the Canadian government to take action in the case of Raoul Léger and the growing human rights atrocities that were a regular occurrence of the Guatemalan Civil War, the Canadian government and the DEA became increasingly reluctant to sacrifice Canadian interests to pursue human rights initiatives. In his analysis of Pierre Trudeau`s stance on human rights historian

Robert Wrights argues that Trudeau was a man of his times. His main objective was to ease Cold War tensions. Essentially, “[t]his meant supporting human rights initiatives wherever they were consistent with détente and, more important, where

! ! 44 they did not unduly antagonize Canada’s main ally, the United States.”86 As well, it became clear during the case of Léger that economics and Cold War policy trumped human rights. This fact is more than evident when examining the 1982 Canadian

Parliamentary Report on Latin America. Within the report, the violence and political instability in Central America alongside the growing human rights issues are outlined.

This by no means marks a shift in Canadian attitudes towards human rights abuses, as Canadian foreign policy had essentially been an extension of Canadian economic policy since the post war era.87 As well, the report highlights the massive growth of

Canadian commerce with Central America, citing a tenfold increase of imports and exports to the region between 1965-1980. The report also highlighted the limits of

Canadian influence in the region by stating, while Canada is regarded as having some influence in the international community, it is not viewed as having the economic or military power to threaten or overwhelm other countries.”88 Furthermore, the report responded directly to many NGOs that advocated for a ban of Canadian trade with nations known to commit human rights abuses by stating, that “trade sanctions should not be used to achieve human rights objectives abroad.”89 The year following the highly publicized case of Raoul Léger’s death, the Standing

Committee on External Affairs and National Defence placed economic interest in a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 86 Wright, 257. 87 This is an argument made by Michael Hart, “External Affairs and Canadian External Trade Policy, 1945-1982.” In the National Interests: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009 ed. Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011), 137. 88 Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Canada’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1982), 7. As cited in Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 111. 89 Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Canada’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1982), 13-14. As cited in Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 112.

! ! 45 higher order of importance over human rights initiatives. Canadian economic interests, as small as they may have been in Guatemala, far outweighed human rights issues.

In March 1982, a new government came to power in Guatemala, a military

Junta led by Effrain Rios Montt, the General responsible for the initiation of the scorched earth campaign of 1981, of which Léger was a casualty. By spring 1982, it was becoming clear that emphasis had to be placed on the improvement and protection of Canadian economic interests and opportunities in Guatemala. In a situation report from April 1982, when the Case of Raoul Léger was still a pressing issue within the DEA, it was stated that Guatemalan economics “remains as the most dynamic and with the greatest potential of any country in CENAM. Accordingly, prospects for CDN exporters remain good [sic].”90 In this as well as numerous other documents from the DEA, the importance of ensuring a favourable relationship between Canada and Guatemala after Léger’s death was discussed with the case of

Canadian manufacturing Giant Bombardier. Bombardier was is the process of negotiating a large contract for Canadian built locomotives with FEGUA, the nationalized Guatemalan railway in 1981. The DEA was emphasizing the importance of ensuring that Bombardier’s interests were largely protected, in light of the growing tensions between Canada and Guatemala.

Even as INCO pulled out of its EXMIBAL operation in 1981, the DEA still sought to preserve Canada’s economic interests in the region. The Canadian banking sector had $22.3 billion in assets in Latin America, Canadian petroleum

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 90,Author Unknown “Memorandum on Guatemala Situation,” November, 1981. (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4).

! ! 46 business were seeking new prospects in Guatemala, Canadian manufacturers such as Bombardier continued to view Guatemala as a potential destination for Canadian exports, and Canadian engineering firms sought to profit from Guatemalan infrastructure projects. More indirectly, the DEA sought to maintain an effective bilateral relationship with Guatemala to aid in the government’s political stability as 40 percent of Canadian oil imports came from Mexico and Venezuela, immediately adjacent to the unstable region of Central America.91 There was much as stake in

Guatemala as far as Canadian economic interests were concerned. As Central

America passed through the 1980s political turmoil would take a toll on Canadian commerce in the region. Exports peaked in 1982, and imports peaked in 1984.92 It was not until the end of the Guatemalan civil war in 1996 that Canadian trade with

Guatemala would again begin to grow.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 91 Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 127. 92 Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 127.

! ! 47

Conclusion

In September 1981, the prevailing opinion within the Department of External

Affairs on how best to address the Léger case was to ignore the issue. It was stated that, “there may be good reason why we should not press for report and instead quietly let the matter drop if we can be so lucky.”93 While this decision was made only months after the death of Léger, the DEA was forced to deal with the case for months to come. Pressure from NGOs, church groups, as well as Canadian media continued to fall upon the Canadian government and the department of external affairs. According to the principle of liberal internationalism Canada was duty bound to hold the Guatemalan government and the Guatemalan army accountable. Under this principle Canada was a nation that upheld the Pearsonian values of tolerance, equality, and freedom in the world stage and the case of Léger was no different.

To quell the growing discontent at home, the Canadian government publicly announced that it had requested a formal investigation into the events surrounding

Léger’s death with the hope and assumption that such a report would never be produced. For over a year after the death of Léger, the Department of External

Affairs and Secretary of State for External Affairs were queried about the status of

Léger’s case. In the summer of 1982 opinions within the DEA had remained strong as officials were “doubtful that renewal of pressure on the new Guatemalan government regime would provide much if anything in way of official report on incident, indeed it could re-open a sore which is almost, is not entirely, healed.”94

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 93 Author unknown Letter to EXTOTT, “Léger Case,” September 15, 1981 (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4). 94Author unknown, Letter to EXTOTT, “Léger Case,” June 16, 1982 (Library and Archives Canada RG 25, Vol. 18544 File 20-1-2-GTMLA pt. 4).

! ! 48

The case of Léger was ignored until it had fallen from the public’s attention, allowing the Canadian government to pursue their main foreign policy objective. As well, the façade of demanding a formal investigation and a report into the circumstances surrounding Léger’s death allowed the Canadian government to carry on the perception that human rights were an important issue within the development of foreign policy.

The case of Léger is interesting. By providing a window into Canadian foreign policy development towards Guatemala, Léger`s case highlights the DEA’s influence behind foreign policy development. The paradigm of Canada as part of the international system, contributing through its long standing commitment to liberal internationalism fails to explain the actions of the DEA. Canadian officials were concerned with human rights, so long as they were in line with Canadian economic and strategic interests. As the Canadian public pressed the Canadian government over human rights violations that occurred in Guatemala, the DEA’s response was misleading. The importance of human rights was a façade of Canadian foreign policy development towards Guatemala in the early 1980s, only acting as a public relations tool rather than demonstrating the true influence behind DEA`s policies.

As well, the paradigm of Canada as nothing more than a satellite state of

American interests in the context of the Cold War also fails to explain the DEA`s reactions to Léger`s case. Canada was not a peaceable as some academics have argued. Stevenson`s neorealist analysis of Canadian foreign policy toward Latin

America places to much emphasis on the constraints of a bi-polar world. Canada was a belligerent in the Cold War. While Canada may not have shared the same level of commitment as the United States did in their battle against communism,

! ! 49

Canada`s commitment within the East-West conflict was arrived at independently.

Canadian Cold War policy in many cases had mirrored American interests. However, this does not make Canada a satellite of American interests. As then Secretary of

State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan stated, “when all was said and done,

Canada’s East-West interest were substantially identical with those of our southern neighbour.” 95 The Cold War was certainly a factor in the minds of DEA officials as they decided on the best course of action to take in Léger’s case, but it fails to be the main influence behind policy development.

What influenced Canadian foreign policy - hard interests or values? As the

DEA reacted to the case of Léger it is clear, hard economic interests took precedence over intangible values. Just as Michael Hartman argues, Canadian foreign policy was essentially an extension of Canadian economic policy.96 Canadian economic interests were paramount in policy development, and shaped the ad hoc manner in which the DEA pursued Canadian ‘interests with no policy.’ The case of

Léger was a political sore, which had the potential to hinder the bi-lateral relationship with Guatemala, and damage the image of Canada, as far the DEA was concerned.

Léger was a Canadian citizen killed in a conflict zone, and any ‘duty’ the Canadian public felt the Canadian government had to hold the Guatemalan government accountable was not shared by the DEA. Canadian mining interests, trading opportunities of Bombardier with Guatemala, and the prospect of Canadian petroleum exploration companies investing in Guatemala were just a few of the hard

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 95 Mark MacGuigan, An Inside Look at External Affairs During the Trudeau Years: The Memoirs of Mark MacGuigan, ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002), 121. 96 Michael K. Hartman, “External affairs and Canadian External Trade Policy, 1945-1982.” In The National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009

! ! 50 economic interests in Guatemala the DEA sought to preserve. The case of Léger reveals that Canadian foreign policy toward Latin America in the early 1980s was primarily influenced by hard economic interests.

! ! 51

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