Racing with Death: The Not-So-Ordinary Happening? of the 1932 Lake Placid Olympic Bobsled Events
P e te r M . HopsiCKERt Department o fKinesiology The Pennsylvania State University, Altoona
D uring the practice sessions fo r the 1932 Olympic bobsled events, Lake Placid) M t. Van Hoevenberg slide endured multiple crashes involving over a dozen athletes. An analysis o fthe slide from inception to construction to competition as well as the resulting management o fthe accidents produces significant historical insight into the administration o f the winter Olympic games. Using David Welky's paradigm suggesting that the analyses o f ordinary Olympic happenings can be used to probe larger issues, this analysis uses the “seemingly m undane” happening o ffacility construction and competition to provide historical insight into an attempt to use the Olympics as a promotional springboard to a host city’s fu tu re commercial success. As the firs t sliding fa cility built in N orth America dedicated tc both an Olympic games andfor future commercial programming, this analysis also provides significant historical insight into modem Olympic issues including the fiduciary conundrum o f building Olympic facilities with
Correspondence to [email protected]. potentially limited post-Olympic commercial possibilities, the sometimes con tentious nature o fa host city’s environmental stewardship and thefin a l location of those facilities as itpertains to thefacilities’ fu tu re commercial success, an d the nationalistic-laden gamesmanship that oft en plays out on these facilities during the administration o fpractice sessions an d Olympic competition that can result in decision-making thatpotentially jeopardizes the safety o f the athlete.
O n F e b ru a ry 2 ,1 9 3 2 , w h ile t r a i n i n g for the Lake Placid winter Olympic games, a German four-man bobsled team shot off the Mt. Van Hoevenberg bob-run at the noto riously tricky Shady Corner. The sled, driven by Capt. Fritz Grau, launched over Shady’s twenty-eight-foot-high wall of ice, “went hurtling into space” at an estimated speed of sixty-five miles-per-hour, fell eighty-five feet into a rock-strewn gully, rolled sixty-five feet farther into brambles and underbrush, and came to a stop near boulders, splintering on a cluster of rocks several feet from the athletes’ “broken and torn” bodies. Grau tumbled several feet further down the mountain than his teammates—far enough that it took rescuers several minutes just to find him. This crash, one o f eight accidents to occur during the pre-Olympic practice period and the second devastating mishap for the German Olym pic team, epitomized several questions nagging the Lake Placid Organizing Committee (LPOC) specific to the Mt. Van Hoevenberg bob-run1—questions of slide location and engineering, of future marketability and commercial success, of civic promotion and in ternational gamesmanship, and of excessive speeds and limited driver experience— ques tions that historian David Welky would suggest stem from the “ordinary” Olympic hap penings of facility construction and subsequent competition. In his article, “Viking Girls, Mermaids and Little Brown Men: U.S. Journalism and the 1932 Olympic Games,” Welky argues that modern Olympic scholarship often con centrates on extraordinary political happenings such as the Black Power demonstrations in 1968, the Munich terrorist attack in 1972, and the American boycott in 1980 (to name a few) and have “ignored the seemingly mundane” analyses of normal Olympic procedures and results. Welky suggests that his analysis of the media coverage of the 1932 summer games in Los Angeles “provides an example of how the ordinary in the Olympics can be used to probe larger issues.”2 The current article, while focusing perhaps on the seemingly “ordinary” Olympic happenings of facility construction and subsequent competition, simi larly provides an example o f how these “mundane” tasks reveal larger issues such as the cultural relationship between a host city’s environmental stewardship and the necessary construction of specific Olympic facilities, the political and fiduciary challenges of con structing these facilities for financial viability after the Closing Ceremonies, and the na tionalistic-laden gamesmanship that often plays out on these facilities during the adminis tration of practice sessions and Olympic competition. From this perspective, the Mt. Van Hoevenberg slide provides a unique historical precedent for investigating the larger issues inherent in the construction of facilities spe cifically for winter Olympic games a n d as perm anent facilities programmed for future commercial success. Its Olympics predecessors did not garner both o f these characteristics at their inception. The Piste de Bobsleigh des Pélerins was constructed for the 1924 Chamonix winter games, but the slide only hosted national events thereafter and closed in 1933. The St. Moritz Celerina Olympic bob-run, considered the oldest in the world, is still in operation. However, it originally opened in 1904, twenty-four years before it would host the winter Olympic games, and as it is constructed of exclusively snow and water, the “ice channels” engineering changes on an annual basis. It is technically not a permanent structure.3 Therefore, an analysis of the LPOC’s decisions pertaining to the design, con struction, and administration of Mt. Van Hoevenberg not only provides “an example of how the ordinary in the Olympics can be used to probe larger issues” but also provides a historic precedent o f the challenges faced by the host city when attem pting to balance the International Olympic Committee’s short-term prerequisite of specific Olympic facilities with strategically planning those facilities for long term, post-Olympic commercial possi bilities and how decisions to those ends can result in contesting conditions that may over look the safety of the athlete. Location. Location. Location. The inception of the Mt. Van Hoevenberg slide began in January of 1928 when the American Olympic Committee (AOC) asked Dr. Godfrey Dewey and the Lake Placid community to consider hosting the 1932 winter games.4 Dewey, president of the elite Lake Placid Club (LPC) and soon-to-be president of the III Olympic Winter Games Committee and member of the executive committee of the LPOC, initially scoffed at the idea citing the obstacles of funding and the difficulties of civic cooperation from various local, state, and national municipalities. Yet hosting the event fell in line with Deweys ultimate goal of making Lake Placid into “Americas St. Moritz” and promoting the LPC “into the premier winter sports center in the U.S. and rival any in Europe.”5 This larger plan took shape as early as 1905 when the LPC began winterizing its facilities. Over the next twenty-seven years, the Club developed a notable winter sports resort reputation by hosting national and international competitions in speed skating, figure skating, cross country skiing, and ski jumping. Hockey, dogsledding, and curling were also available. As George M. Lattimer, compiler of the III Olympic Winter Games Official Report, immod- esdy proclaimed, “Lake Placid suggests winter sports, and winter sports suggest Lake Placid. The two are synonymous.”6 With this long-term goal in mind, Dewey proceeded to “dominate” the administra tion of the III Olympic Winter Games “in the same way he dominated his own Lake Placid Club.”7 According to skiing historian E. John B. Allen, Deweys interest in the Olympics’ ability to generate future commercial prospects for Lake Placid, and more spe cifically the LPC, became the driving force for the hamlet securing the Games— not civic and municipal leaders, although they soon joined the process including Julian J. Reiss, president of the Chamber of Commerce; Willis Wells, supervisor of the Town of North Elba; EB. Guild, president of the Bank of Lake Placid; and William Burdet, prominent Lake Placid businessman and sportsman.8 Dewey quickly found a way to research the hosting of an Olympic games firsthand. He became manager of the U.S. ski team, an alternate on the bobsled team, and the official flag bearer at the Opening Ceremonies of the 1928 winter Olympics in St. Moritz, Switzerland. By the conclusion of this ten-week European research crip, Dewey exuded confidence that Lake Placid could host an Olym pic games whose quality would match any European event.9 Despite this optimism, securing funding for the construction of facilities constantly antagonized Dewey. In his opinion, Lake Placids existing amenities qualified the hamlet to host the Games although he admitted falling short on housing and an adequate bob run.10 This latter structure provided a moving target for Dewey until April of 1930. Un like modern sliding facilities, bobsled runs in the 1930s relied heavily on geographic con siderations. The proper construction site required a mountain slope with a northern or northeasterly exposure to help with snow preservation, as no artificial refrigeration existed for this type of facility at that time. It also required a downhill grade between 4 and 12 percent, with an average of 8 percent, and a total vertical drop of at least 200 meters over the one- to one-and-three-quarter mile-long chute. Speed-enticing straight-aways resembled narrow trenches simply dug into the mountains descending contour while speed-slowing curves were more manmade structures, considerably wider and banked, at times, perpen dicular to the ground. Excavated earth not only supported the curves’ nearly thirty-foot walls o f ice but also created a series o f “man-made ravines” in close proximity to the slide.1' The surrounding high peaks of the Adirondacks provided several possible construc tion sites. After consulting with Stanislaus Zentzytzki, a world famous bob-run engineer from Berlin, Dewey honed in on three—a “nameless mountain” in the Sentinel range four-and-a-half miles east of Lake Placid, Scarface Mountain about the same distance to the west, and M t. Jo approximately six miles to the south. Unfortunately, the two closest sites resided on state forest preserve land protected by a rigid preservation provision that forbade the cutting of trees or the blasting of rock from its natural state. After a time consuming legal battle between the state and the Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks (AfPA) over the constitutionality of building a bob-run on protected state land, the New York State Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the environmental organiza tion. Dewey could not build the Olympic bob-run on either the Sentinel Range or Scarface Mountain.12 Mt. Jo, located on privately owned LPC land, appeared to be the only viable possibility. Mt. Jo, however, never held Deweys interest as a location for the bob-run due to its distance from Lake Placid and its increased construction cost. Furthermore, he worried that building the bob-run at Mt. Jo might be rejected by the Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobogganing (FIBT), which, in turn, might jeopardize Lake Placids abil ity to host the Games at all.13 Prior to the final court decision, Dewey confirmed his negative attitude toward this site when he asked Zentzytzki if the run could be built on M t. Jo “as cheaply as possible . . . with dead wood which would last three or four years instead o f with earth and stone” so that a new bob-run could be built closer to Lake Placid in the future. An obvious negative consideration toward the quality of the site as it per tained to the future financial viability o f the facility, Dewey labored over the final location of the slide as it would be a key component of his ultimate plan to make Lake Placid an international winter sports destination.14 Dewey confirmed his displeasure with Mt. Jo by eventually selecting the northern slope of South Meadow Mountain— later named Mt. Van Hoevenberg— as acceptable. W hile closer to Lake Placid “as a crow flies,” this site remained one mile off the main highway and roughly eight miles from the hamlet. Still, after collaborating with Zentzytzki a second time, Dewey deemed it the best site proxi mate to Lake Placid. Free o f any legal challenge from the AfPA as the construction site was also part of the private LPC’s estate, Dewey began building the slide.15 Yet the analysis o f the facility’s cost against its future economic viability did not end with the commencement of the runs construction. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, then gov ernor o f New York, often did not see eye-to-eye with Dewey on the funding responsibili ties of the state for the bob-run specifically, and the Olympic games generally. Even after the state legislature resolved in January of 1929 to support the efforts of Lake Placid and secure the Games, the liability of the public to fund the bob-run and other Olympic facilities remained uncertain. When Roosevelt threatened to veto $375,000 of state ap propriations to the Olympic executive budget, Dewey warned that this action would be “demoralizing” and might publicly suggest that the Games should not be held at Lake Placid at all. Roosevelt clarified his objection. Citing the depressed economy, he regarded the request as too much money and further felt that providing state funding for a project only needing specific facilities for “about a week or two” and then for only practical local use thereafter set an “unwise precedent.” Dewey shot back questioning the governor’s “good faith” before the state and the world since legislative leaders already resolved to support Lake Placid’s efforts and already approved the additional funding. Only Roosevelt’s pen stood in the way and, adding further pressure, Dewey charged Roosevelt with being “the one man who can seriously jeopardize the very holding of the Games themselves” should he choose to reject the bill. Roosevelt resented the tone of Dewey’s letter. Noting that the 1929 resolution to support the Games indicated “no suggestion that the State would be called on to appropriate any large sum,” he branded Deweys assumption that the state had an “obligation” to spend $375,000 of additional funds on the Games as erroneous. Two days later, Dewey apologized to Roosevelt offering not only remorse but also a detailed explanation of the necessity of the funds and a last-ditch indication that Roosevelts approval of the funding would be “politically much more popular than other wise.” Ultimately, Dewey secured the funding. Roosevelt approved the appropriations just ten months after he approved $125,000 stricdy earmarked for the slide.16 Even the approval of these appropriations did not quell all criticisms of the state’s actions or a concern over the bob-run’s future economic viability. Henry Wade Hicks, secretary of the LPC and, like Dewey, supporter of using public land for recreational purposes (including Olympic facilities), pointed out that the states unwillingness to allow the slide on protected public land and the spending o f $125,000 on a bob-run “o f perma nent value to the entire country” would no doubt require roughly $25,000 more to com plete by the Games and significant yearly funds to maintain. Unhappy with the final location of the bobsled run as it pertained to its future financial viability, Hicks noted how the slide being “eight miles from Lake Placid and eighteen miles from Saranac Lake” instead of being more practically located “five miles between the two places” might “lead to (the bob-run’s) abandonment after the Games.”17 His criticism lacked effect, however, as any discussion related to the final destination of the slide ended when construction began in August o f 1930. Dewey and other state constituents could only hope to reap the future economic rewards of their decisions. In the meantime, Dewey set his eyes on im pressing the world with the Olympic games. Paradoxically, mishaps on the bob-run pro vided significant publicity. Experience Is the Best Teacher Media reports of the aforementioned AfPA lawsuit against the erecting of the bob run on protected state land and the subsequent delays in the slides construction acquainted the American public with the sport— a public that, for the most part, neither had experi ence in bobsledding nor gave it any athletic credibility. Before 1929, not a single techni cally engineered bob-run existed in North America.18 Still, an American team piloted by Billy Fiske (a resident o f Europe for several years) won the bobsled gold medal at the 1928 St. Moritz winter Olympic games.19 Americans may have been familiar with that Olympic victory. Yet at the same time pundits continued to marginalize bobsledding as a sport suggesting that the activity’s lack of required physical prowess made it a “pastime of low order, proving nothing, and requiring no effort other than sufficient proficiency with knife and fork to keep fattened up” and that “no life-long practice is needed” to be a successful bobsledder.20 Dewey, concerned with delays in construction and the public’s unfamiliarity with the sport, pushed forward with rectifying both. Completed in late 1929, the Intervales prac tice bob-run, located just over three miles north o f Mt. Van Hoevenberg down a steep hill near the LPCs Intervals ski-jump, became essential to these ends. Constructed by LPC officials to test American-built sleds, train American drivers and workmen on the run, and generate public interest in the sport, Intervales promoted the importance of building the Olympic slide for the Games. Also designed by Zentzytzki, and considered the first tech- nically engineered bob-run in the Western hemisphere, the half-mile slide provided eight curves and a 10 to 15 percent downgrade. Built strictly as a temporary facility, with no indication of maintaining it after the opening of the Olympic run, the $6,600 project consisted o f only sand and wood covered with snow and four to six inches of ice.21 During its one winter of operation (1929-1930), the Intervales run hosted two major bobsled competitions and proved significant in generating public interest. In fact, the brakeman for the U.S. winner of the 1932 Lake Placid Olympic two-man title, Curtis Stevens, and the driver of the second-place finisher of the four-man bobs, Harry Homburger, received their initial training for these Games on this slide.22 Intervales quickly proved its usefulness in training bobbers and attracting public in terest. As Lattimer observed, “Crowds waited to ride, and crowds thronged the vantage points along the run to watch others ride.” From the perspective of Olympic organizers, this interest suggested the hoped-for popularity of bobsledding, and the potential fiscal viability o f the Olympic facility “many times over.” Yet Olympic officials also received a rude introduction to the inherently dangerous nature of the sport admitting, “During the first and only season of the runs operation, the slide had its quota of accidents.”23 For example, during the first international bobsled competition in the Western hemisphere between teams from Canada and the U.S., reports described the “Dominion” team from the former country either “misjudging the final curve and shooting off the course,” or “turning turtle, throwing the entire team down into the middle of the track.” In both reports, the team withdrew from the competition due to injuries serious enough to send the bobbers to the hospital.24 Participants and spectators ignorant of the sport of bobsled ding may have casually blamed these early accidents on the inexperience of the drivers and excessive speeds, but clear accountability remained elusive. Olympic organizers appeared to take little notice as they continued their efforts to “establish the bobsleigh sport” suc cessfully in the U.S.25 Another strategy to this end required the reduction of restrictions on sled design. At the time, com mon practice dictated that each sliding facility provide bobsleds for all com petitors designed and constructed to match the specific characteristics of their respective slide. The Germans, Swiss, Italians, and Americans all acknowledged this custom.26 W ith this in mind, both Dewey and Daniel J. Ferris, secretary-treasurer of the AAU, suggested that the FIBT rules guiding the engineering o f Olympic bobsleds have “as few restrictions as possible... with the hope ofdeveloping by gradual experiment the best type (of bobsleigh) for the future.” They feared that significant regulation, especially pertaining to limiting the bobs size to a narrow forty-three centimeter gage rather than the desired wider sixty- seven centimeter gage, would decrease the number o f entries at the Lake Placid Olympics and “introduce a considerable element of added danger, with no compensatory advan tages” especially since most o fthe drivers and riders would be inexperienced. “A maximum length, a maximum weight, and a maximum gage wide enough to include most of the racing bobs now in use,” Ferris insisted, would be in “the best interests o f the sport.” Ferris and Dewey ultimately received their wish.27 Free from significant regulation and exemplifying his micro-manager tendencies, Dewey began experimenting with sled designs that complemented Mt. Van Hoevenberg s qualities. In the process, he consulted with Capt. Werner Zahn, a German veteran World War I pilot, an international bobsled champion with over two hundred races in his fifteen- year career, and a scheduled participant in the upcoming Lake Placid Games.26 After purchasing and testing several German sleds on the Intervales slide, Dewey sent word to Zahn detailing “several breakages” in the runners, the steering posts, and the main frames. Dewey took the maner into his own hands building his own bobs and testing them on the Intervales run. In contrast with European sleds with rounded runners built primarily for snow-covered slides, Dewey’s American bobs had flatter, more flexible runners that al lowed more contact between the sled and M t. Van Hoevenberg’s icy surface. Adjustments ro the steering wheel additionally improved the handling.29 Dewey declared his design as “fundamentally different” from any European bob stressing that it “clings to the run more closely, steers with a minim um o f skidding, and rides and controls much more smoothly than any bob I have ever driven.” Confident in his ability to produce the required number o f bobs locally, Dewey snubbed Zahn’s offer to help build sleds for the Olympics but still remained gready interested in receiving the German ace’s impression of his design.30 Zahn in turn dismissed the design of Deweys new sleds as secondary to the skills of the driver. He also expressed concern over the design of the Mt. Van Hoevenberg slide stressing the importance of avoiding serious falls and subsequen t deaths when introducing Americans to bobsledding.31 Zahn solidified Germany’s impressions of American bobs and the slide s design when his country pretentiously brought their own bobs to the Olym pics yet asked Dewey to reserve “without fail, good bobs for (the German team’s) use in case our bobs are not fast enough.”32 Following suit, the Swiss also brought their sleds to Lake Placid. These competitors’ firm decisions to refrain from using Deweys bobs— bobs built with the qualities of the Lake Placid slide in mind—would later be identified as partly responsible for the chaotic practice sessions encountered during the days prior to the Opening Ceremonies.33 Ironically, if the Germans and the Swiss had simply used the American sleds, like the Italians who understood that countries usually build sleds “best fitting to its own run,” perhaps these teams would not have been among the victims in a series of crashes on Mt. Van Hoevenberg.34 The opening of Mt. Van Hoevenberg on Christmas Day in 1930 tested Deweys bob design, continued to provide experience for drivers, and generated valuable publicity for Olympic bobsledding. The mile-and-a-half long track averaged a 10 percent drop, with maximum grades o f 15 percent, and twenty-six curves including two hairpin turns (White- face and Shady Corner) and one S-turn (Zig-zag). In contrast to most European slides, the curves included “pronounced drops” designed to offset the normal loss o f speed in corners. Olympic officials believed this characteristic made for steadier driving and “is o f immea surable assistance to the driver.”35 The bobbers in the 1931 North American and AAU championships and in a novice meet held in February tested the new track and innovative sled design at racing speed— including teams representing Switzerland and Germany. D uring a practice session for these events, Dewey and his “Snowbird” team failed to nego tiate a curve at sixty-five miles an hour and crashed. Dewey limped away and may have later blamed the plaster cast on his left ankle for his poor driving in these championships, finishing fifth in the boblet and sixth in the four-man races. Perhaps this should have heightened Dewey’s awareness to the dangers of the sport and of the slide.36 Yet outside o f practice, no accidents occurred at any o f these races, inciting Lattimer to confidently promote the “technical soundness o f the run’s construction” especially since most of the drivers were “practically without racing experience.”37 Regardless of the slides “technical soundness,” all participants signed a waiver acknowledging the risks o f the sport and “fully and freely assume any injury or damage which may result from such use.” In addition, and in contrast to Lattimer’s confidence, the Lake Placid Olympic Finance Com mittee unanimously approved a motion placing the bulk of the “financial responsibility for injury sustained on the bob-run” on the individual hurt or the club he represented.38 The following winter, the technical merit of the bob-run and the financial culpability of Olympic organizers for injuries sustained on that run would be challenged under an inter national spotlight.
The Bob Sled Run Suicide Club In hindsight, perhaps Lattimer’s admission that the “pre-Olympic practice period was marred somewhat by accidents” understated the drama focused on the bob-run in the weeks preceding the Opening Ceremonies.39 Some factors eluded Dewey’s control. Par ticipation dwindled due to the Great Depression and only seventeen of the sixty-five in vited nations attended.40 Warm temperatures and a lack of snow in the months before the events further complicated the situation making it extremely difficult for any pre-Olym pic training. Last-second snowfall and the opening of the Mt. Van Hoevenberg bobsled run for the first time that winter on January 2, 1932, rekindled hope. However, this snow could not save the AAU bobsleigh championships and the Olympic try-outs scheduled two weeks later as the warm temperatures rendered those meets "impossible.” The de pressed economy and unseasonably warm weather aside, Dewey may have overlooked “Hubert Stevens and his brother [Curtis Stevens], United States reoresentarives in the bcb-sled run at Lake Placid N.Y., approach.ng the dangerous Whiteface curve as they set their first Olym pic recorc on -he first day o f competition. Later, they broke i: again.” Courtesy of t h e 1932/15S0 Lake P i a c id O lymhc, M u s e u m , L ake Fia c i d , N ew Y ork.
correctable factors that contributed to the lack of preparator for both foreign and domes tic Olympic bobsled teams.41 One issue became apparent on January 11 when George W. Martin, referee for the championship meets, cited “considerable confusion . . due to the misrepresentation of some parties purporting :o be candidates for the AAU National bobsleigh champion- ships.” Due to this confusion, he limited practice on Mt. Van Hoevsnberg to only those “properly er tered teams and contestants who have been entered :n writing.”42 Warm weedier forced the rescheduling of this event to January 29 and 31— the same dates as 'he North American Championships. Even a: that later date, concerns of eligibility remained poorly addressed. O n the eve of the rescheduled championships, Ralph J. Ury. chairman of the local AAU registration committee, barred eight U.S. team members from competing due :o a lack of traveling permits. Those barred included Billy Fiske, gold medal driver at the 1928 gam e; Jay O ’Brien, chairman of the American Olympic bobsleigh committee; Eagan F. Edward ; and Clifford B. Gray— together forming a four-mar. crew that would eventually win s gold medal. IncLgnant, Dewey and Martin immediately called Daniel J. Ferris, th e national secretary-treasu rer of the a AU, in an effort to save these very important selection trials for the American Olympic bobsled teams. Ferris, highlighting the necessity of the traveling permits to avoid “the possibility of abuse by those who may be likely to take advantage of expenses on trips,” mailed out the proper forms, immediately correcting the oversight.43 This administrative error did not delay the combined AAU and North American championships a second time, but the consistently poor condition of the bob-run did. While practice sessions for these and the Olympic competitions continued, the warmer weather turned M t. Van Hoevenberg into a “solid sheet o f glare ice” ironically described as being “a little too perfect.” With teams looking on from Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, and Romania in attendance for the now-delayed North American champion ships and the Olympic contests scheduled to begin in eight days, U.S. Olympic hopefuls Raymond Stevens and Webster Payne lost control of their bob on the icy conditions, tossing Payne overboard. Stevens, realizing he had no brake, intentionally upset his sled. Later, future gold medalists Billy Fiske and Jay O ’Brien, the most experienced sledders on the U.S. squad, overturned their bob less than one hundred yards from the start. O ’Brien received a slight injury. These mishaps did not deter the international field from continu ing practice, but the perceived “treacherous” conditions of the slide postponed the cham pionship events one more day.44 While practice continued the next day, January 30, any attempts to hold the AAU and North American championships before the winter games came to a halt. Citing an almost forgotten Olympic rule, the German team protested against the holding of these championships, U.S. tryouts, or any other events besides pre-Olympic practice by Olym pic athletes. The Germans enforced a policy that prevented any races from being held on the Olympic slide for at least eight days prior to Olympic competition. The now officially AAU-sanctioned American bobsledders had little use for their travel permits. Officials postponed the championships until after the Olympics, and committees unhappily picked the U.S. Olympic bobsled teams without formal pre-Olympic trials.45 A sa result, January 1932 ended, tallying no competitive bobsled events at Lake Placid. Limited pre-Olympic practice occurred at the mercy of the weather and policy. Fluctua tions in temperatures and precipitation, often as rain followed by bitter cold, continued to make the slide’s surface ice “too perfect.” With such a hard, smooth veneer, controlling a five-hundred-pound bobsled became an extremely challenging task.46 As the date of the Opening Ceremonies grew ever closer, both foreign and domestic bobsleighers became increasingly impatient with their limited amount of practice time— limitations imposed by the inexperienced local administrators of Mt. Van Hoevenberg. The last day of January shocked those untested administrators into realizing how warm weather, limited practice sessions, and inexperience with the Lake Placid slide came together to create a truly dangerous situation. In front of hundreds of spectators, starting at the half-mile point and testing a prototype German sled known as Fram II, Capt. Werner Zahn and his three teammates “came to grief on the icy bank of Zig-zag turn. Traveling at speeds approaching sixty-five miles per hour, Zahn failed to negotiate the “zag,” shot over the embankment, knocked a chunk o f ice out o f the curve, side-swiped a photographer’s tower, soared fifty feet through the air, and hurtled 110 feet down the wooded mountainside before coming to a sudden stop just short of a sturdy oak. Fram II, shorn of its “rounded steel runners,” lay battered to splinters. The crash knocked all four riders unconscious. Zahn broke his arm; Mehlhorn, the brake, broke his hand; and Rossner found out days later that he fractured his spine. While the other rider walked away from the accident suffering only contusions and scrapes, Zahn and Mehlhorn's Olympics un folded in a jarringly similar fashion to their 1928 Olympic experience. Four years earlier, Zahn and Mehlhorn also crashed during a practice session on the St. Moritz slide, fractur ing Mehlhorns arm and killing the team’s brake. Zahn, uninjured yet stricken by grief, withdrew from those games.47 T he accident did not stop the day’s training session. W ithin two hours the entire one- and-one-half-mile “ribbon of ice” opened for practice. Two American teams piloted by Harry Homburger and Hubert Stevens negotiated the entire slope first through a blinding snow and severe wind. Upon reaching the finish, both drivers quickly adm itted that they braked all the way and “nearly went over the embankments on several occasions.” Deter mining the course “too fast for safety under the prevailing weather conditions,” adminis trators re-closed the top half-mile of the run. The international competitors protested vehemently claiming that this action unfairly denied equal opportunities to practice on the entire slide. The German and Belgian teams made the most vociferous challenges, alleging that closing the course at that point gave the American teams an inequitable advantage as they had experienced the entire run during the current pre-Olympic practice and during the preliminaries for the postponed national championships.48 Local officials held firm on their decision until Jay O ’Brien, chairman o f the Olympic Bobsleigh Committee, joined the international field in their complaint. O ’Brien pointed out that if the same weather and slide conditions existed during the Olympic races, the competitors would have to race “for the first time over a strange course.” Reluctantly, local officials compromised with the sliders allowing all teams to use the full course once before it closed at 1:00 p.m. as long as they braked all the way49 —a directive contrary to Zentzytzki’s “How to Ride a Bob-Sleigh” instructions written specifically for the III Olympic Winter Games that clearly s:ate that one should “never brake on a curve.”50 W ith this restriction, the foreigners “gained little by making the full run” since the sleds never achieved enough speed to come out cf the curves’ troughs or climb up the curves’ banks. Shortly after the slide’s closing, workers started shoveling heavy layers of snow over the ice in an effort to “slow it down” and “minimize the chance of an accident.”31 The next day, still annoyed by the local officials’ “favoritism” and “high handed” administration of tile previous day’s practice sessions, the international bobsled teams presented Dewey with a list o f seven grievances focused on the safety and practice adm in istration of Mt. Van Hoevenberg. The letter demanded that every team receive two prac tice runs each morning, that an electric watch be used for every run, that layers o f snow be placed on the track lefore and after each curve, that a doctor and ambulance always be on site, that practice start at 8:00 a.m. instead of 5:30 a.m., that the entire track be only at the disposal of the Olympians, and, most importantly, that the administration of the course be transferred to Erwin Hachmann of Germany and Albert Mayer of Switzerland— both members of the in:ernational bobsled committee. Dewey immediately conceded these points as well as the bobsled run’s management into the hands o f Hachm ann and Mayer. From that point on, the bobsledders believed that “everything would work like clock work.”52 The smiles on the bobsledders’ faces quickly faded, however, when another crash and a near mishap occurred later in the day even after workmen pounded an extra blanket of snow onto the slide creating a more European-like snow-covered quality. An Austrian boblet driven by Hugo Weinstengel “catapulted up the right angle wall of the Shady Cor ner turn and upset, tossing its occupants to the bottom of the trough.” Weinstengels brake, C ount Baptist Gudenus, limped away with minor injuries. The same day, a Swiss four-man team piloted by Reto Capadrutt broke an axle on their Swiss-made sled during their descent yet miraculously survived the entire ride.53 Capadrutt again avoided catastrophe the next day when he piloted his bob to the brink of Shady Corner, “teetered for a moment at the very top,” knocked a ten-foot slab of ice away then swung down safely into Zig-zag. A short time later, a second German team, piloted by Capt. Fritz Grau, “rocketed” over the twenty-eight-foot wall of ice at seventy miles per hour. They crashed violently sending all four riders to the hospital so badly hurt that authorities refused the risk of moving them from Lake Placid to more sophisticated medical facilities.54 Grau and Brehme sustained concussions and remained in critical con dition for several days with possible fractured spines, skulls, and other shattered bones. Hopmann joined his countrymen in the hospital requiring twenty-one stitches to repair his right calf described as being “stripped of flesh,” while Krotki’s injuries, apart from cuts and contusions to his back, were not serious.55 Twenty minutes later, undeterred foreign and American teams resumed practicing for the upcoming Olympic bobsled events— events predicted to be decisive in the Olympic medal competition.56 Yet the ferocity of this crash clearly intimidated other teams. During a subsequent run, a Belgian team chose to jump out of their sled at the same point as Graus crash rather than suffer an event- ending mishap.57 The next day, February 3, while the triage continued in the Lake Placid Hospital, the Germans lobbied Olympic officials for the ability to reinforce their bobsled team with German-born bobbers living in New York City. They possessed clear evidence for this request. Four Germans still remained in the hospital: Grau and Brehme still in dangerous condition, H opm ann recovering but stable, and Zahn improving rapidly. Rossner, injured in the first German crash, relocated to Saranac Hospital when diagnosed with a broken back. O f the released Germans, only Mehlhorn, his hand in a plaster cast, participated in the Games. Perhaps demonstrating true Olympism and recognizing that the Germans lacked at least five members o f their team, “all the contestants and the international com mittee” agreed to these substitutions.58 Yet emergency personnel received no rest at the days practice sessions as two Swiss cousins, René and Gustave Fonjallaz, crashed their two-man bob on Whiteface curve. René lay unconscious on the ice for five minutes until revived by Gustave. Both men returned to their sleigh and finished the course whereupon they requested the use of an American-made bobsled professing to “never drive a Swiss sleigh with its rope controls” for the remainder of the competition.59 A day later, on Thursday, February 4, 1932, Gover nor Roosevelt officially opened the Olympic Games. T he following day, and despite “evi dent anxiety” on the governors part, his wife Eleanor would brave a ride on Mt. Van Hoevenberg from the half-mile mark with Harry Homburger at the helm.60 Perhaps the First Lady would have excused herself from that opportunity had she been invited to ride the slide a day later, February 6, after a four-man Belgian team crashed. The Belgian team took the sled too high on the massive ice wall o fWhiteface, tipped the top, broke a runner, and tumbled into the track. The driver, Max Houben, and his brake, Louis Van Hege, joined the three remaining hospitalized Germans with a sprained shoulder and a deep gash over the eyes, respectively.61 In contrast to Lattimer’s understatement that the bob-run’s “pre-Olympic practice period was marred somewhat by accidents,” one pundits description o f the previous nine days on Mt. Van Hoevenberg may seem more appropriate. The practice period exempli fied the informal meetings of the “Bob Sled Run Suicide Club.”62 Indeed, eight crashes and three near-crashes occurred between January 29 and February 6, sending over a dozen competitors to the hospital. The excitement of the accidents attracted droves of specta tors— even when the postponed Olympic events concluded after the Closing Ceremo nies.63 An estimated 10,000 spectators filled the grandstands at the Whiteface, Shady Corner, and Zig-zag curves for each heat with an estimated 14,000 attending the first day of the four-man races— roughly twice the seating capacity of the Olympic Stadium and nearly five times the attendance at the Opening Ceremonies and the speed skating events.64 They “planted themselves in the most dangerous places,” the Director o f Physical Educa tion at the Lake Placid Public Schools observed, “and one of the first inquires made by those buying tickets was as to the best place to view the most hazardous chances.”65 The “Suicide Club” would not live up to the crowds expectations, however, recording no crashes during the actual Olympic competitions. The American team won the gold and silver medals in the four-man bobs with Germany’s third team capturing the bronze and Capadrutt’s Swiss team finishing a close fourth. The Americans also won the gold in the two-man bobs. Capadrutt s sled won the silver leaving the bronze for the second Ameri can team. Unlike the pre-Olympic practice sessions, the bobsled events ended simply. The winning bobsleighers gathered at the bottom of the course and received their Olympic diplomas and medals from Dewey. Capt. Werner Zahn, his arm still in a sling, handed U.S. gold medal driver Billy Fiske a large silver bowl known as the M artineau Challenge Cup representative of the bobsledding world championship. In contrast to the boisterous events occurring in the days before the Opening Ceremonies, in contrast to the throngs of spectators gathered at Mt. Van Hoevenberg during the events, only a few quiet words were spoken and the Olympic bobsledding events finally ended.66 Racing with Death Several insights into the “ordinary happenings” of winter Olympics’ administration present themselves when reviewing the 1932 Lake Placid bobsled events from inception to conclusion. First, the final location of the slide resulted from significant politicking an chored by both Godfrey Deweys belief in the future commercial possibilities of the bob run and the forest preservation statutes of the state. Dewey lobbied heavily to have it located proximate to the tourist villages of Lake Placid and Saranac Lake. Yet the states environmental policies protecting the public Adirondack wilderness limited the choices to only a handful of private land locations near these hamlets. Add to this the engineering necessity of slope and exposure, and it appears that the LPOC faced limited options result ing in a final location that was, as Henry Wade Hicks suggested, geographically less than ideal. Eighty years later, however, one finds it difficult to argue against M t. Van Hoevenberg’s success. In addition to hosting a second Olympic games in 1980, the slide hosted the FIBT World Bobsled Championships six times. A new slide, built adjacent to the existing run and opened in 2002, hosted three additional FIBT World Championships in 2003 (mens bobsleigh only), 2009, and 2012.67 This long-term success is in stark contrast to the short-term struggles of the Whisder Sliding Centre built for the 2010 Vancouver Games. This facility remained unable to cover its operating costs in 2011 generating only $578,000 in revenue against $2.76 million in expenses. The slides future remained ques tionable the following year, the same year the 2006 winter Olympics sliding venue in Turin, Italy— Cesana Pariol— closed and was scheduled for dismantling citing its lack of financial viability due to the faltering economy and excessive distance from a major popu lation center.68 Second, evidence of gamesmanship by both the host team and the international field exists and ultimately resulted in a lack of experience on the slide for the athletes. While keeping foreign teams’ access to Olympic facilities “to a legal minimum” is a common ploy among host cities, Dewey and the LPOC could be criticized for compounding the already limited access to the slide due to the “too perfect” ice conditions.69 Ultimately seeking to promote Lake Placid as an international winter sport destination through U.S. victories, Lake Placid organizers at times appeared tactically conservative with practice sessions al lowing U.S. teams to complete their practice runs before closing the course, shortening the course, or applying restrictive conditions, such as “braking all the way,” for the rest o f the field. In return, the international field employed tactics citing “almost forgotten” Olympic rules, calling for European officials to manage the slide, and making demands resulting in the temporary conversion of the slide to a more snow-covered European quality. These latter tactics could be interpreted two ways: the demands could be honest attempts to make the slide safer, or they could be considered strategic attempts to give the slide a more European quality—giving the non-U.S. sleds and drivers an advantage and, therefore, countering the home teams nationalistic agendas. In the end, this gamesmanship may have backfired on both parties as the exchange between Lake Placid officials and the inter national contingent seemed to only worsen the already limited access to the slide due to the poor weather conditions. Third, even though the international cohort had considerable bobsled experience compared to the local bobbers and administrators, the international teams endured the bulk of the accidents at Lake Placid— especially the German team who ironically crashed the most on the German-designed slide. The aforementioned limited practice time on the slide due to poor weather, poor slide conditions, and gamesmanship deserves considerable blame. However, the refusals of the Germans and of the Swiss to use American-made bobs, opting instead to use prototype bobs, sleds with rounded runners, and rope steering controls, also contributed significantly to the chaotic outcome.70 Ultimately, Dewey blamed the German drivers’ stubbornness for their accidents. “Everyone agrees that they were themselves chiefly responsible for these accidents,” Dewey wrote to Zentzytzki, “for they would accept advice from no one, either as regards to their bobs or the run itself.”71 Perhaps the Germans and the Swiss relied too heavily on their past experience with the snow-covered slides of Europe and their past experience with their own bob design un knowingly dooming them to disaster on the icy slopes o f Mt. Van Hoevenberg. Yet Deweys and the LPOC’s inexperience with the building and administration of bobsled facilities cannot be overlooked. The slide itself, with its unique “pronounced drops” in the curves and challenging design, also contributed to the production of crashes through the bobbers’ lack of experience with those testing conditions. Warm weather and Olympic policy deserve further blame. Yet Dewey, who relied on Zentzytzki for the design of the slide but assumed sole responsibility for the construction of it, may have overlooked one clear safety warning from the über-experienced German pilot Werner Zahn. In April of 1930, four months before construction began on the facility, Zahn implored Dewey to build the curves o f the track high enough to make it technically impossible for a bobsled, even if driven incorrecdy, to fly off the slide. Rather, the curve designs should ensure that all accidents result in the bob tilting back into the track spilling its human contents into the trough rather than shooting them into the woods.72 Clearly this was not the case as two German teams were shot into the woods. Perhaps Deweys limited experience with bobsledding and track design resulted in his failure to understand the significance of Zahns safety concerns. This oversight born from inexperience along with the foreign teams’ use of bobs incompatible with Mt. Van Hoevenberg appear to account for a considerable portion of the formula that resulted in the marring of the Lake Placid pre-Olympic prac tice period.73 Finally, it should be noted that underlying all of these administrative and competitive decisions is the desire by the sliding sports culture to maintain a sweet tension between safety and speed—an essential quality of the sport’s contesting conditions. Dewey and the LPOC clearly understood this and the sport’s potential for frequent crashes— an under standing evidenced by the athletes’ requirement to sign waivers releasing the organizers from liability, the ratification o f policy that placed the financial culpability o f any crashes squarely on the bobbers, and the promotion of FIBT rules allowing a maximum of fifteen men per team “in order to replace members of crews injured in accidents.”74 Arguably, organizers did take reactive steps to pacify these risks created by the runs unique design and amplified by the poor weather conditions such as shortening the track, applying snow to the slide, requiring the bobsledders to brake all the way, and even cancelling practice sessions— although, as argued earlier, some o f these actions may be considered forms o f gamesmanship. Similarly, sliding athletes have also understood and accepted the high speeds and dangerous nature of their sport. In contrast to the administrators’ actions, however, sig nificant manipulation of this tension brought defensive commentary by the athletes often hued in the form of risk-taking swagger such as Zahns brazen proclamation after his event-ending accident. “My sail o f 110 feet through the air after cracking up in Zig-zag,” Zahn wrote, “was the greatest thrill of my entire racing career,” further adding, “[y]ou know, we really should have been killed. . . . I feel like a cat with nine Uves.”75 Even the Americans accepted the risks and pursued greater speeds with considerable vigor. J. Hubert Stevens, gold medal driver in the two-man bobs, complained about the slowing of the track with layers of snow during the Olympics contending that such safety precautions made the slide “fit only for old ladies and little children.”76 Sergio Zardini was killed instandy when he failed to negotiate Zig-zag Curve during the 1966 Diamond Trophy four- man championships. The shadow seen below the bobsled is Zardini’s helmet. “M t . V a n H o e v e n b e r g C r a s h T a k e s L ife of Sergio Zardini,” L a k e P l a c id N e w s , 24 F e b r u a r y 1966, p. 1.
Some drivers ultimately exhausted their “nine lives.” In 1939, the Swiss driver Reto CapadrLtt, silver medalist in the two-man bobs at the Lake Placid games, crashed on the S:. Moritz slide, hit his head on a tree, and died from the injuries. Ten years later, Max Houben, a Belgian driver who finished ninth in the Lake Placid games, became the first fatality on the Mt. Van Hoevenberg slide flying over the rim of Shady Corner and suc cumbing to subsequent head and chest injuries. Upon Houbens death, one pundit noted, “Until now, the bobsledders used to scoff at the idea that they were racing with death. They went anymore.”77 Bobbers would be reminded of this omen twice more on the slopes of M t. Van Hoevenberg. In 1955, during the National AAU four-man championships, Franklin “Speed” Beattie “shot off the famed Zig-zag Curve,” landed on rocks, and died of a “crushed chest.” In 1961, slide administrators installed a wooden retaining lip on Zig-zag designed tc prevent sleds from leaving die track. Yet during the Diamond Trophy four-man cham pionships in 1966, Sergio Zardini crashed in that turn. While the sled did stay on the track, Zardini s head was the first thing to hit the wooden safety structure, ripping his helmet away, and killing him instantly.78 Even after its refurbishment for the 1980 winter Olympic games, Mt. Van Hoevenberg continued to accept what one sports writer called “sacrifices.” At the time, the Lake Placid slide held the title as the most demanding bobsled run in the world. During that winter, ar. estimated forty sleds tipped over, most of them in Zig-zag, sending roughly twenty atnletes co the hospital. Given die technical difficulty of the slide, some questioned whether the Lake Placid run was “too fast. ” Those familiar with the sport disagreed arguing that the risk, speed, and danger “make the sport what it is.”79 In the end, Deweys attempt to make Lake Placid and his Lake Placid Club into “Americas St. Moritz” failed to a significant degree. New England remained the primary U S. skiing venue in the 1930s scon to be replaced by the Rocky Mountains.80 Neverthe less, Lake Placid is only one of three venues (St. Moritz and Innsbruck) that have hosted a second winter Olympic games. Further, Lake Placid maintains a national and interna tional reputation as a prominent sliding venue. Yet Deweys and the LPOC’s efforts to secure and administer the Games have largely been overlooked by historians. Currently no book-length monograph devoted to this subject has been written and only a handful of journal anieles, book chapters, and historical encyclopedia entries exist. However, when one carefully considers the actions of Olympic organizers during the 1932 Lake Placid winter Olympic games, one will find evidence that the seemingly “ordinary” happenings of facility construction and subsequent competition management provide significant his torical insight into modern Olympic issues including the fiduciary conundrum of build ing Olympic facilities with potentially limited post-Olympic commercial possibilities, the sometimes contentious nature of a host city’s environmental stewardship and the final location o f those facilities as it pertains to the facilities’ future commercial success, and the nationalistic-laden gamesmanship that often plays out on these facilities during the ad ministration of practice sessions and Olympic competition that can result in decision making that potentially jeopardizes the safety of the athlete.
K e y w o r d s : bobsledding , L a k e P l a c id , w in t e r O ly m pic s
‘Arthur J. Daley, “German Bobsleigh Crashes at 65 Miles an Hour and Four Are Badly Injured,” New York Times, 3 February 193 2 , p. 2 3 [QUOTATIONS]; Harry Cross, “Four Injured As German Bobsled Ends Mile a Minute Dash with Fifty-Foot Leap through Air,” New York Herald Tribune, 1 February 1932, p. 17; A rthur J. Daley, “G erm an Sleigh, at a M ile a M inute, Jum ps O lym pic Bob Run; Four H u rt,” N ew York Times, 1 February .9 3 2 , p. 23. 2David B. Welky, ‘ Viking Girls, Mermaids, and Little Brown Men: U.S. Journalism and the 1932 Olympics,” Journal o fSport History 24 (1997): 24-49. 3Piste De Bobsleigh DesPelerins