BURGAS AIRPORT 18 JULY 2012 HIZBALLAH and the QODS FORCE in IRAN’S SHADOW WAR with the WEST Matthew Levitt Policy Focus 123 | January 2013 HIZBALLAH and the QODS FORCE in IRAN’S SHADOW WAR with the WEST All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2013 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2013 in the United States of America by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Cover photo: CCTV image showing the suspected suicide bomber, center, with long hair and baseball cap, who killed seven people and injured dozens more at the airport in Burgas, Bulgaria, July 18, 2012. Hizballah is believed to be respon- sible. The identity of the suspected bomber is still unknown, but a Michigan drivers license that he carried was a fake. (AP Photo/Bulgarian Interior Ministry) Contents About the Author v Tracking Hizballah’s Militant Trajectory 1 Reassessing Hizballah’s Place in Iran’s Arsenal 2 Iran’s Three-Tiered Terror Campaign 4 “They Want That Guy Done” 5 A “Jumble of Overlapping Plots” 5 Amateur Hour 6 Operation Radwan Continues 9 Conclusion 10 About the Author MATTHEW LEVITT is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he directs the Insti- tute’s Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. Previously, Levitt served in the senior executive ser- vice as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury and before that as an FBI counterterrorism analyst, including work on the Millennial and 9/11 plots. He also served as a State Department counterterrorism advisor to Gen James L. Jones, the special envoy for Middle East regional security (SEMERS). Levitt has taught at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, held fellowships with the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point) and the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Widely published, Dr. Levitt is the editor, most recently, of Policy Focus 107, Obama’s National Security Vision: Confronting Transnational Threats with Global Cooperation. n n n With the permission of Georgetown University Press, this monograph is drawn from Levitt’s forthcoming book Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Georgetown University Press, 2013). n n n The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v HIZBALLAH and the QODS FORCE in IRAN’S SHADOW WAR with the WEST IN JANUARY 2010, the Qods Force—the elite unit of confirmed that the plot should go forward and as soon Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)— as possible. “Just do it quickly. It’s late.”2 decided that it and Hizballah, its primary terrorist But why was the Qods Force, which had earned a proxy, would embark on a new campaign of violence reputation for operational prowess even among its targeting not only Israel but U.S. and other Western enemies, so eager to move forward with an obviously targets as well. Since then, the two organizations have flawed operation? Arbabsiar, for his part, appears been cooperating but also competing to launch attacks to have been a weak character who “wants to be across the globe. What is particularly striking is how important,” as a government-retained psychiatrist amateurish the actions of both organizations have determined, and who was drawn into the plot by his been: targets were poorly chosen and assaults carried cousin.3 The real question is, What was the Qods Force out with gross incompetence. But as the groups brush thinking? off the cobwebs and professionalize their operations, According to the director of national intelligence, this sloppy tradecraft could quickly be replaced by the plot “shows that some Iranian officials—prob- operational success. Indeed, one particularly odd effort ably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—have might have succeeded were it not for the fortuitous changed their calculus and are now more willing to placement of an undercover U.S. government infor- conduct an attack in the United States in response to mant: the case of an Iranian-American used-car sales- real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime.”4 man who pleaded guilty in October 2012 to conspiring Intelligence officials believe that this new calculus dates with Iranian agents to assassinate the Saudi ambassa- back to January 2010 when the Qods Force decided dor to the United States. that it and Hizballah would embark on a new cam- Nevertheless, in some ways Mansour Arbabsiar’s paign of violence focused on Israel along with U.S. and guilty plea raised more questions than it answered. The other Western targets. plea closed the case, but the U.S. and British govern- ments had both already traced the conspiracy back to Tracking Hizballah’s Militant Trajectory its source in Tehran and blacklisted Qods Force com- Hizballah’s anti-Western militancy began in 1983 mander Qasem Soleimani for his role overseeing the with attacks against Western targets in Lebanon, then plot.1 Indeed, U.S. officials knew of the plan early on expanded to include attacks abroad intended to exact and built an airtight case. Not only had Arbabsiar revenge for actions threatening its or Iran’s interests, or tried to hire an assassin who was actually a U.S. Drug to press foreign governments to release captured opera- Enforcement Administration (DEA) informant, but tives. At times, such as the 1992 and 1994 bombings once arrested Arbabsiar quickly confessed to his role in Argentina, Hizballah’s own interests in carrying in the plot and, at the direction of law enforcement, out attacks abroad were magnified by Iran’s interests placed a call to his cousin, a Qods Force handler, in the same. These coincident interests led to joint Gen. Gholam Shakuri. With agents listening, Shakuri operations—such as the 1996 bombing of the Khobar The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1 Matthew Levitt Hizballah and the Qods Force Towers in Saudi Arabia—that leveraged each party’s the two entities pursue their shared “aims against Israel strengths and maximized their combined capabilities. and the United States.”10 Over the course of the always intimate relationship To be sure, Hizballah has engaged in militant, ter- between Iran and Hizballah, the head of the Qods rorist, criminal, and other activities over the years, Force or other senior Iranian leaders might have told from bombings in Argentina and Saudi Arabia to Hizballah to jump and the response would have been plots in Southeast Asia and Africa.11 Its ability to “How high?” In part, this has been a function of the continue to do so at pace, however, was severely con- close alignment between Hizballah’s senior leadership strained by an act of terrorism not of its own mak- and Iran’s clerical regime. Yet how firmly do Hizballah ing. Ironically, al-Qaeda’s attacks of September 11, leaders believe in velayat-e faqih, the Islamic Repub- 2001, proved to be a turning point for Hizballah, the lic’s principle of rule of the jurisprudent? According terrorist group previously responsible for the most to Hizballah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, “the American deaths. Desperate not to be caught in the subject of the velayat-e faqih and the Imamate is at the crosshairs of Washington’s “war on terror,” Hizballah heart of our religious doctrine, and any offense to it is appears to have decided consciously to roll back its an offense to our religion.”5 But the close relationship international operations and keep its efforts to strike also persists because of Hizballah’s dependence on at Israeli targets as focused and limited as possible. Iran for financial, material, and political support. For But while spectacular embassy bombings were put years, Hizballah relied almost exclusively on Iranian on ice, Hizballah continued to target Israeli interests, largesse, which hovered around $100 to $200 mil- infiltrate operatives into Israel to collect intelligence lion a year or more.6 Such generous state sponsorship, and carry out operations, and support Iranian inter- however, came with strings attached that Hizballah, ests such as training Iraqi Shiite militants after the fall as Tehran’s primary pan-Shiite militant proxy group, of the Saddam Hussein regime.12 could not easily ignore. But the February 2008 assassination of Imad Mugh- While it kept up its relentless campaign of military niyah led to the resurgence of Hizballah’s international and terrorist activities targeting Israel, and despite operations arm, which will no doubt regain its former unabated tensions with the West, Hizballah had not potency—especially when paired with Iranian intel- carried out a successful spectacular attack targeting ligence and Qods Force operatives. But as the Islamic Western interests since the Khobar Towers bomb- Jihad Organization (IJO)—now under the command ing. Moreover, Hizballah worked hard under former of Badreddine and Hamiyeh—first set out to avenge military commander Imad Mughniyah to establish Mughniyah’s death, Operation Radwan (named for a measure of independence from Iran. In mid-2008, Mughniyah, who was also known as Hajj Radwan) four months after Mughniyah’s assassination, an Israeli experienced a series of setbacks.