Steel Armor: Blaze of War
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COMBAT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TEAM A-10/GAU-8 LOW ANGLE FIRINGS VERSUS INDIVIDUAL SOVIET TANKS (February - March 1978)
NPS56-79-005 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California COMBAT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TEAM A-10/GAU-8 LOW ANGLE FIRINGS VERSUS INDIVIDUAL SOVIET TANKS (February - March 1978) R.H.S. Stolfi J.E. Clemens R.R. McEachir August 1979 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited •7 Prepared for: A-10 System Program Office Wright Patterson Air Force Base Ohio 45433 FEDDOCS D 208.1 4/2:NPS-56-79-005 r NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California Rear Admiral Tyler F. - Dedman Jark R Rnrct1 nn Superintendent Borsting jjj^J' he r ed he rein P was supported by the A-10 System Program OfficI Wr?nht p fl r 9 ,T r F° r " BaSe Ohio ' The " ' reproduction of allai\ oror'oarpart of thisf"reportt' is authorized. UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Dili Bnlarad) READ INSTRUCTIONS REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFORE COMPLETING FORM NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER t. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NPS56-79-005 S. TYPE OF REPORT ft PERIOD COVERED 4. TITLE (and Subtltlt) Special Report for Period Combat Damage Assessment Team A-10/GAU-8 February - March 1978 Low Angle Firings Versus Individual Soviet 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER Tanks (February - March 1978) B. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf*.) 7. AUTHOR^; R.H.S. Stolfi None J.E. Clemens R.R. McEachin 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS AREA ft WORK UNIT NUMBERS Naval Postgraduate School F 47615-78-5209 and Monterey, California 93940 FY 7621-78-90220 12. REPORT DATE II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS A-10 System Program Office January 1979 Wright Patterson Air Force Base 13. -
The Somali Crisis: Failed State and International Interventions
Istituto Affari Internazionali IAI WORKING PAPERS 12 | 15 – May 2012 The Somali Crisis: Failed State and International Interventions Rossella Marangio Abstract The long-lasting Somali conflict is profoundly linked to the country’s historical development and its socio-cultural specificities. The political milieu and the struggle for power in Somalia reflect the cleavage between tradition and modernity. This rift has led to a legitimacy vacuum, which has made it difficult for the warring parties to find enough common ground for a compromise. Furthermore, external influences, at both regional and international levels, have contributed to the fragmentation of the political arena, due notably to the emphasis on the use of force as the principal tool for acquiring or maintaining power. In this unfolding crisis, regional pressures and rivalries, international interventions, economic and strategic interests as well as piracy, corruption and Islamic extremism all play an interlocking role. In view of this, a new approach to the crisis is badly needed. The EU, in particular, should promote a new strategy based on three components: enhancement of social cohesion through local cooperation programmes, state-building and development. Keywords : Somalia / Civil conflict / Society / European Union / Military intervention / European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia / Piracy / European Naval Force Somalia- Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) / Regional Maritime Capacity Building (RMCB) / African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) © 2012 IAI IAI Working Papers 1215 The Somali Crisis: Failed State and International Interventions The Somali Crisis: Failed State and International Interventions by Rossella Marangio ∗ Introduction The civil war in Somalia has been ravaging the country for two decades. The difficulties in achieving peace have highlighted the powerlessness of the international community. -
Tank Gunnery
Downloaded from http://www.everyspec.com MHI Copy 3 FM 17-12 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL TANK GUNNERY HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY NOVEMBER 1964 Downloaded from http://www.everyspec.com PREPARE TO FIRE Instructional Card (M41A3, M48, and M60 Tanks) TANK COMMANDER GUNNER DRIVER LOADER Commond: PREPARE TO Observe looder's actionr in Cleon periscopes, Check indicotor tape for FIRE. making check of replenisher in. lower seat, close proper amount of recoil oil Inspect coaxial machine- dicotor tope. Clean nd inspect hoatch, nd turn in replenilher. Check posi- gun ond telescope ports gunner s direct-fire sights. Check on master switch. tion of breechblock crank to ensure gun shield operaoion of sight covers if op. stop. Open breech (assisted cover is correctly posi- cable. Check instrument lights. by gunner); inspect cham- tioned ond clomps are Assist loader in opening breech. ber ond tube, and clote secure. Clean exterior breech. Check coxial lenses and vision devices. mochinegun and adjust and clean ond inspect head space if opplicble. commander's direct-fire Check coaxial machinegun sight(s). Inspect cupolao mount ond odjust solenoid. sowed ammunilion if Inspect turret-stowed am. applicable. munitlon. Command: CHECK FIR- Ploce main gun safety in FIRE Start auxiliary Place moin gun safety ING SWITCHES. position if located on right side engine (moin en- in FIREposition if loated If main gun has percus- of gun. Turn gun switch ON. gin. if tank has on left side of gun. If sion mechanism, cock gun Check firing triggers on power no auxiliary en- moin gun hoaspercussion for eoch firing check if control handle if applicable. -
115 Mm, 120 Mm & 125 Mm Tank Guns
CHARACTERISATION OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS ANNEX D 115 MM, 120 MM & 125 MM TANK GUNS The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is an expert organisation working to reduce the impact of mines, cluster munitions and other explosive hazards, in close partnership with states, the UN and other human security actors. Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around 55 staff from over 15 countries with unique expertise and knowledge. bhenkz2) Our work is made possible by core contributions, project funding and in-kind support from more than 20 governments and organisations. photobucket The research project was guided and advised by a group of 18 international experts dealing with credit: weapons-related research and practitioners who address the implications of explosive weapons in humanitarian, policy, advocacy and legal fields. This document contributes to the research of the (Photo characterisation of explosive weapons (CEW) project in 2015-2016. gun main its firing Characterisation of explosive weapons study, annex D – 115 m m, 120 mm & 125 mm tank guns GICHD, Geneva, February 2017 T-90MS-V ISBN: 978-2-940369-65-2 Tank Russian The content of this publication, its presentation and the designations employed do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) regarding the legal status of image: any country, territory or armed group, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. All content remains the sole responsibility of the GICHD. Cover CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 4 TANK GUNS 6 High Explosive Tank Gun Ammunition 8 TANK GUN CASE STUDIES 11 Brief Descriptions 11 CASE STUDIES 13 Case Study 1 13 Case Study 2 17 Case Study 3 21 Case Study 4 24 Case Study 5 26 Annex D Contents 3 INTRODUCTION This study examines the characteristics, use and effects of tank guns and tank projectiles. -
The Syrian Conflict: a Systems Conflict Analysis
The ARK Group is a network of stabilisation and conflict transformation The Syrian conflict: consultancies that provides research- KDF Documents informed analysis and policy recommendations, as well as evidence- A systems conflict analysis based interventions in conflict-affected states on behalf of public and private sector clients. Working with and through local communities, we seek to understand and then mitigate the negative effects of conflict and instability to enhance community safety and promote human security, development and economic opportunity. Cover © Lens of a Young Damascene Back-cover © Lens of a Young Damascene ARK Group DMCC February 2016 The Syrian conflict: A systems conflict analysis ARK Group DMCC February 2016 ARK is a consultancy company specialising in the provision of policy-relevant research and the design and management of conflict prevention and transforma- tion programmes to prevent and mitigate instability and promote positive social change and development. For more information about ARK or this paper, please contact: [email protected]. Copyright © 2016 ARK GROUP DMCC CONTENTS 4 Acronyms 5 Acknowledgements 6 Executive summary 8 Introduction 8 Understanding the Syrian conflict 10 Analytical framework and report structure 11 What is a systems conflict analysis? 11 How to read this report 3 12 Brief contextual overview 16 Stakeholders analysis: conflict actors and interests 16 Local stakeholders: pro-regime 19 Local stakeholders: pro-opposition 22 Local stakeholders: the Islamic State in Iraq and the -
KV-IV in Bolt Action
KV-IV in Bolt action Points: Inexperienced (650 points) includes 15 crewmen and 1 commissar Damage Value: 10+ (Heavy Tank) Options • Spotter +10 points • Four man rocket reload crew + 28 points Weapons Hard point Weapons Range Shots Pen Special Rules Bow Bow MMG 36” 5 - Team, Fixed, forward arc Forward turret Medium Anti Tank Gun 60” 1 +5 Team, Fixed, forward, right, left arcs, HE(1”) coax MMG 36” 5 - Team, Fixed, forward, right, left arcs rear MMG 36” 5 - Team, Fixed, right, left arcs Forward sub turret Vehicle flame throwers 12” D6+1 +3 Team, Fixed, Forward, right, left arcs, Flamethrower Pintel HMG 36” 3 1 Team, Fixed, Flak Deck MG turret Twin MMG 36” 10 - Team, Fixed, Right arc Deck MG turret Twin MMG 36” 10 - Team, Fixed, Left arc Midships turret Twin heavy Howitzer (36”-84”) 2 HE Team, Fixed, forward, Left, right arcs, 72” Howitzer HE(4”) Rear MMG 36” 5 - Team, Fixed, Left Right arcs Pintel HMG 36” 3 1 Team, Fixed, Flak Midships sub Light Anti Tank gun 48” 1 +4 Team, Fixed, forward, right, left arcs, turret: HE(1”) Coax MMG 36” 5 - Team, Fixed, Left Right arcs Rear MMG 36” 5 - Team, Fixed, Left Right arcs Deck MG turret Twin MMG 36” 10 - Team, Fixed, Right arc Deck MG turret Twin MMG 36” 10 - Team, Fixed, Left arc Rear turret Medium Anti Tank Gun 60” 1 +5 Team, Fixed, rear, right, left arcs, HE(1”) coax MMG 36” 5 - Team, Fixed, rear, right, left arcs rear MMG 36” 5 - Team, Fixed, left, right arcs Katyusha Multiple launcher (12”-72”) 1 HE Team, Fixed, rear, right, left arcs, HE(3”) Special Rules Slow: maximum move of 6 inches Poor turning circle: instead of pivoting 90 degrees the front of the tank can be moved up to 3 inches to the left or right when the tank pivots. -
Fighting Vehicle Technology
Fighting Vehicle Technology 41496_DSTA 60-77#150Q.indd 1 5/6/10 12:44 AM ABSTRACT Armoured vehicle technology has evolved ever since the first tanks appeared in World War One. The traditional Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) design focuses on lethality, survivability and mobility. However, with the growing reliance on communications and command (C2) systems, there is an increased need for the AFV design to be integrated with the vehicle electronics, or vetronics. Vetronics has become a key component of the AFV’s effectiveness on the battlefield. An overview of the technology advances in these areas will be explored. In addition, the impact on the human aspect as a result of these C2 considerations will be covered. Tan Chuan-Yean Mok Shao Hong Vince Yew 41496_DSTA 60-77#150Q.indd 2 5/6/10 12:44 AM Fighting Vehicle Technology 62 and more advanced sub-systems will raise the INTRODUCTION question of how the modern crew is able to process and use the information effectively. On the modern battlefield, armies are moving towards Network-Centric Warfare TECHNOLOGIES IN AN (NCW). Forces no longer fight as individual entities but as part of a larger system. Each AFV entity becomes a node in a network where information can be shared, and firepower can Firepower be called upon request. AFVs are usually equipped with weapon Key to this network fighting capability is the stations for self-protection and the communications and command (C2) system. engagement of targets. Depending on By enabling each force to be plugged into the threat, some are equipped with pintle the C2 system, information can be shared mount systems for light weapons (e.g. -
REGULATION of the Contest «Master-Gunsmith»
REGULATION of the contest «Master-Gunsmith» 1 I. General provisions 1. General control on the preparation and conducting of the international contest for the best repair platoon of rocket artillery armament "Master - Gunsmith", held in the framework of “the International Army games in 2020" (further Competition) is assigned to the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. Official language of the contest is Russian. 2. The composition of the teams participating in the Competition are: - the head of the Competition team; - the representatives of the Competition team in the weapons repair platoon– 15 persons: - the platoon commander – 1 person; - the repair squad (of small arms and means of close combat) - 3 persons (a squad leader, a master, a driver- mechanic); - the repair squad (of the artillery and tank weapons) – 3 persons (a squad leader, a master, a driver-electrician); - the repair squad (of the artillery armament) – 8 persons (second in command of the platoon – a squad leader, a senior master, a master – 3 persons, a mechanic, a driver-electrician, a driver-turner); - the trainer – 1 person. 3. The competition is held in five stages: - the first stage is "the Competition on repair of the 122 mm towed howitzer D- 30A"; - the second stage is "the Competition on repair of 23 mm antiaircraft gun ZU- 23"; - the third stage is "the Competition on repair of 122 mm combat vehicle of the Multiple Launch Rocket System BM-21 "Grad"” - the fourth stage is "the Armory biathlon. Relay"; - the fifth stage is "the Final relay of the repair platoons". -
The Military Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War and Options for Limited U.S
Number 30 August 2013 Forces loyal to Syria's President Bashar al-Asad ride in a tank in the al-Mansoura area of Aleppo’s countryside, June 2, 2013 | Reuters BREAKING THE STALEMATE: THE MILITARY DYNAMICS OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AND OPTIONS FOR LIMITED U.S. INTERVENTION KENNETH M. POLLACK INTRODUCTION he tragedy of Syria roils on with no end in sight. It nags at our collective conscience and threatens American interests. Many Americans would like to see it ended. Yet our diplomatic efforts are so moribund as to have T become a cruel joke to the Syrian people. There is a growing recognition that the Syrian civil war is now dominated by its military dimension, and until there is a breakthrough on the battlefield, there will be no breakthroughs at the 1 negotiating table. Unfortunately, that seems a distant prospect. Both sides remain convinced that they can defeat the other in combat, and both are terrified that losing will mean their physical destruction. For the foreseeable future, however, it is unlikely that either has the capacity to vanquish the other, although they can certainly make important tactical gains. Both would need considerable assistance to win outright but neither side is ready to trust their lives to the other’s promises, whether spoken or written. Consequently, bringing an end to the conflict in Syria must start with changing the military dynamics of the conflict. As long as the current conditions persist, the war will drag on. Americans have understandably shown little appetite for another Iraq- or Kenneth M. Pollack is Afghan-style commitment of ground forces to the Middle East. -
MS Owen-Smith. Armoured Fighting Vehicle Casualties
J R Army Med Corps: first published as 10.1136/jramc-123-02-03 on 1 January 1977. Downloaded from J. roy. Army med. Cps. 1977. 123,65-76 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLE CASUALTIES * Lieutenant-Colonel M. S. OWEN-SMITH, M.S., F.R.C.S. Professor of Surgery, Royal Army Medical College THE war between the Arabs and Israelis in October 1973 resulted in the most extensive tank battles since World War n. Indeed in one area involved they were claimed to be the most extensive in Military history, exceeding the 1600 tanks deployed at El Alamein. In.association with these battles some 830 Israeli tanks and about 1400 Arab tanks were destroyed. The Israelis have recorded data on the wounded from this war in a number of articles and presentations. The most striking figure is that just under 10 per cent of all injured suffered burns. Virtually all these burns occurred in Armoured Fighting Vehicle (A.F.V.) crews. The problems I want to discuss are: a. Does the total incidence of burns from major tank battles create a definite departure from previous experiences and must we, therefore, include this figure in pre- planning for conflict in N.W. Europe? . guest. Protected by copyright. b. Does the present range of anti-tank weapons pose a greater threat to tanks and, crew than those of 30 years ago? c. Is there such an entity as " The Anti-Tank Missile Burn Syndrome"? d. What medical lessons can we learn from this war that would benefit the treatment of war wounded in general, and A.F.V. -
Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development Main Report
+ Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457 -8746 Web: http://www.csis.org/burke • Email: [email protected] Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development Main Report Anthony H. Cordesman Martin Klei ber Burke Chair in Strategy Burke Chair Researcher Working Draft, Revised: September 7, 2006 Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. Cordesman and Kleiber: Chinese Military Modernization 9/7/06 Page ii Table of Contents I. ASSESSING CHINA’S ARMED FORCES ................................ ................................ ............................ 1 CAPABILITIES AS AN INDI CATOR OF INTENTIONS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 1 II. UNDERLYING RESOU RCES FOR CHINA’S SEC URITY CAPABILITIES ................................ 3 ECONOMIC TRENDS ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 3 Figure 1: China’s annual GDP growth rates in % (1975 -2006) ................................ ................................ ........................ 4 Figure 2: GDP growth vs. national government revenue growth ................................ ................................ ...................... 5 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................... -
Weapons and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of Somalia
Weapons and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of Somalia About UNIDIR The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an autonomous institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to a variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR’s activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations. This project is part of UNIDIR’s Weapons of Societal Disruption programme, which works towards limits and controls on the weapons that tear the fabric of societies, such as small arms, cluster munitions, landmines and explosive remnants of war. The programme focuses on generating ideas and practical initiatives to address the security challenges related to the illicit flow, uncontrolled accumulation and misuse of various types of weapons and ammunition that threaten public safety, pose risks to society and impede efforts to achieve sustainable development. Note The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors.