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The Return of the Taliban

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The Return of the Taliban Explained The Return of the Taliban Timeline o Anglo-Afghan Wars (1838-42, 1878-80, 1919) 1926: Amanullah declares Afghanistan a monarchy, rather than an emirate, and proclaims himself king. 1933: Zahir Shah becomes king. The new king brings a semblance of stability to the country and he rules for the next 40 years. 1953: The pro-Soviet Gen. Mohammed Daoud Khan, cousin of the king, becomes prime minister and looks to the communist nation for economic and military assistance. He also introduces a number of social reforms including allowing women a more public presence. 1965: The Afghan Communist Party is secretly formed. The group’s principal leaders are Babrak Karmal and Nur Mohammad Taraki. 1973: Khan overthrows the last king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, in a military coup. Khan’s regime, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, comes to power. Khan abolishes the monarchy and names himself president. The Republic of Afghanistan is established with firm ties to the USSR. 1975-1977: Khan proposes a new constitution that grants women rights and works to modernize the largely communist state. 1978: Khan is killed in a communist coup. Nur Mohammad Taraki, one of the founding members of the Afghan Communist Party, takes control of the country as president, and Babrak Karmal is named deputy prime minister. They proclaim independence from Soviet influence and declare their policies to be based on Islamic principles. At the same time, conservative Islamic and ethnic leaders who objected to social changes introduced by Khan begin an armed revolt in the countryside. 1979: American Ambassador Adolph Dubs is killed. The United States cuts off assistance to Afghanistan. A power struggle between Taraki and Hafizullah Amin begins. Taraki is killed on Sept. 14 in a confrontation with Amin supporters. The USSR invades Afghanistan on Dec. 24 to bolster the faltering communist regime. 1989: The U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union sign peace accords in Geneva guaranteeing Afghan independence and the withdrawal of 100,000 Soviet troops. 1992: The Mujahadeen and other rebel groups, with the aid of turncoat government troops, storm the capital, Kabul, and oust Najibullah from power. Ahmad Shah Masood, legendary guerrilla leader, leads the troops into the capital. 1995-96: Newly formed Islamic militia, the Taliban, rises to power on promises of peace. Timeline o Sept. 11, 2001 2011:U.S. forces overtake a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and kill al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden 2013: The Afghan army takes over all military and security operations from NATO forces. May 2014: Obama announces timetable for significantly reducing U.S. troop sizes in Afghanistan by 2016 In September 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo named Zalmay Khalilzad as the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, a newly created envoy with the mission of securing a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Mullah Baradar released. February 2020: U.S. and Taliban sign agreement on a peace deal that would serve as the preliminary terms for the U.S. withdrawal from the country by May 2021. November 2020: U.S. announces plans to cut U.S. troop size in half — down to 2,500 by January — days before Biden was inaugurated April 2021: Biden announces aim to complete U.S. troop withdrawal by 9/11. July 5, 2021: U.S. leaves Bagram airfield without telling the base’s new Afghan commander. Aug 10, 2021: White House says Taliban takeover “is not inevitable” following the U.S.’ speedy withdrawal from the country. Aug 15, 2021: The Afghanistan government collapses as the Taliban takes over Kabul. August 19, 2021: Mullah Baradar reaches Afghanistan. India in Afghanistan 2011: India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement. Why did the US ‘abandon’ Afghanistan? Has Taliban changed? Remembering Mohammed Najibullah Pakistan’s Role China’s policy shift. Why is Afghanistan difficult to conquer? Should we trust the Taliban? .
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