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The Nixon Doctrine and U.S. Relations with the Republic of Afghanistan, 1973–1978 Stuck in the Middle with Daoud

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The Nixon Doctrine and U.S. Relations with the Republic of Afghanistan, 1973–1978 Stuck in the Middle with Daoud The Nixon Doctrine and U.S. Relations with the Republic of Afghanistan, 1973–1978 Stuck in the Middle with Daoud ✣ Gregory Winger Introduction On 17 July 1973 the citizens of Kabul woke to the sounds of their govern- ment being overthrown. Residents tuning in to the radio for information were greeted by the sound of martial music occasionally interrupted by a gruff voice stating, “This is an announcement of the military government of Afghanistan. Stay off the streets and do not interfere with the soldiers.”1 By mid-morning, the monarchy that had for centuries stood as the political keystone of Afghan governance no longer existed. Instead, Prince Mohammed Daoud Khan, the former prime minister and strongman who had governed Afghanistan from 1953 to 1963, again occupied the seat of power. Officials in Washington who were monitoring events in Afghanistan found surprisingly little to discuss about the reports from the U.S. embassy in Kabul. After the chaotic 1960s, when the United States had become em- broiled in intractable conflicts abroad while enduring social upheaval at home, President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger had plotted a new course for U.S. foreign relations that would avoid the pitfalls of the recent past. They aimed to mitigate the volatility of the Cold War through the process of détente while also reducing Washington’s foreign commitments. As such, the U.S. response to the 1973 coup in Kabul was not formulated in the bowels of the White House or Foggy Bottom: rather, it had been de- cided four years earlier on the island of Guam. The Nixon Doctrine reflected the administration’s recognition of the limits of U.S. power in the wake of 1. “Attempted Coup—Sitrep 3,” Cable No. 05197, from U.S. Ambassador Robert Neumann (Kabul) to Department of State, 17 July 1973, in Digital National Security Archives (DNSA), Washington, DC, Item AF00016. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 19, No. 4, Fall 2017, pp. 4–41, doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00763 © 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 4 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/jcws_a_00763 by guest on 02 October 2021 The Nixon Doctrine and U.S. Relations with the Republic of Afghanistan Vietnam and the need to place U.S. foreign policy on a sustainable basis through the use of regional proxies. Following the 1973 coup in Afghanistan, the United States invoked the Nixon Doctrine as the basis for U.S. relations with the Daoud regime. Aware of Soviet sensitivities about Afghanistan, the United States—through careful engagement and in collaboration with partners such as Iran—was able to respond successfully to Daoud’s desire to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The resulting shift in Kabul’s foreign policy toward true non- alignment marked a triumph for the Nixon Doctrine and the measured appli- cation of U.S. power. However, this success proved to be short-lived. Although the Nixon Doctrine was effective in aiding Daoud’s move toward nonalign- ment, the limits of détente in the Third World—and, in particular, the un- willingness of the USSR to abide by U.S. gains in Kabul—set in motion a process that eventually cost both Daoud his life and Afghanistan its political independence. Afghanistan in the Cold War Geography has shaped Afghanistan’s relations with the outside world for cen- turies. Wedged between the Russian Empire and British India, Afghanistan’s foreign policy developed as a quest to preserve its independence by balancing its powerful neighbors.2 The British withdrawal from India in 1947 presented an existential threat to Afghanistan, which was deprived of a counterweight to the USSR. This fear of unchecked Soviet influence was particularly acute in light of Moscow’s postwar actions in Iran and Eastern Europe.3 However, the nascent Cold War offered a solution to Afghanistan’s balancing problem. The United States possessed a keen interest in countering Soviet advances with- out threatening Afghan sovereignty. In 1946 the Afghan government began to submit aid requests to Washington, seeking to deepen U.S. involvement in Afghanistan.4 Over the following decades, the United States provided sig- nificant aid, including a comprehensive development program known as the Helmand Valley Authority (HVA).5 2. Tom Lansford, A Bitter Harvest: U.S. Foreign Policy and Afghanistan (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), p. 77. 3. Ibid., p. 76. 4. Ibid., p. 81. 5. Nick Cullather, “Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 89, No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 512–537. See also Leon Poullada and Leila Poullada, eds., 5 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/jcws_a_00763 by guest on 02 October 2021 Winger Nonetheless, U.S. willingness to help Afghanistan remained limited. Despite Kabul’s persistent requests, Washington refused to supply arms to Afghanistan for fear of angering Pakistan, a key Cold War ally that shared a disputed border with Afghanistan. The dispute stemmed from the Durand Line, which placed a significant portion of the Pashtun tribal area inside Pak- istan. The Pashtun Afghan majority rejected the Durand Line as a legacy of British imperialism, thus fueling numerous crises between Afghanistan and Pakistan.6 Washington’s willingness to provide arms to Pakistan but not Afghanistan created a double standard that irked Afghan officials. Follow- ing a clash in 1955 when the Pakistani military used U.S.-made arms against Afghan forces, Prime Minister Daoud lodged a grievance with the United States.7 In response, the State Department submitted a formal complaint to the Pakistani government but took no real action to punish Islamabad.8 Frus- trated by Washington’s limp response, Daoud invited the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin to visit Kabul.9 Although fear of the USSR is what first drove Afghanistan to look to the United States for support, U.S. reluctance to supply arms to Kabul nudged Afghanistan back toward the Soviet camp.10 Unlike Washington, Moscow had no qualms about supplying arms to Kabul. When Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Afghanistan in 1955, they offered Daoud the equivalent of $100 mil- lion in aid, the largest offer ever made to Afghanistan and the largest sum provided by the USSR to a non-Communist country.11 By supplying mili- tary equipment and training, the Soviet Union gained considerable influence in the Afghan military establishment.12 When Afghan officers were sent to the USSR for training, they were required to take classes in Marxism and the history of the international Communist movement. Although many officers returned to their home country jaded after encountering pervasive racism and The Kingdom of Afghanistan and the United States: 1828–1973 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). 6. Robert McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); and Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003), p. 29. 7. Rasanayagam, Afghanistan, pp. 29–30. 8. Lansford, Bitter Harvest, p. 101. 9. Ibid., p. 101. 10. Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), pp. 88–93; and Poullada and Poullada, eds., Kingdom of Afghanistan, pp. 178–192. 11. Samuel Butterfield, U.S. Developmental Aid: Achievements and Failures in the Twentieth Century (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), p. 42. 12. Lansford, Bitter Harvest, p. 102. 6 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/jcws_a_00763 by guest on 02 October 2021 The Nixon Doctrine and U.S. Relations with the Republic of Afghanistan disrespect for Islam, some were persuaded by the ideology and formed a Com- munist cell within the Afghan military.13 After the Soviet aid announcement, the United States attempted to rec- tify its earlier missteps. President Dwight Eisenhower visited Kabul in 1959.14 Eisenhower realized that Afghan-Soviet ties were too strong to be completely severed and that the United States should instead focus its energies on restor- ing balance to Afghanistan’s foreign policy.15 This goal could be achieved by manipulating the Afghan government’s mistrust of its northern neighbor. Specifically, Kabul’s own desire to maintain the pretense of balance afforded the United States greater potential influence than was warranted by actual U.S. involvement.16 Although Daoud was adept at playing the Cold War game, his relentless pursuit of the Pashtun issue succeeded only in corroding relations with Pak- istan, eventually spurring Islamabad to cut off all trade with Afghanistan in the early 1960s. Domestically, Daoud’s efforts to modernize Afghan society offended religious conservatives and vested political interests. In 1963, faced with royal opposition and economic distress stemming from the closure of the Pakistani border, Daoud was forced to resign as prime minister.17 Daoud’s departure in 1963 heralded a new era in Afghan governance known as the “Democratic Experiment” based on the Westminster model of democracy. Afghanistan had a legislature, but King Zahir Shah served as the chief executive and central government figure.18 In reality, the Democratic Experiment was a chaotic system that U.S. Ambassador Robert Neumann described as an arrangement in which real power was held by none but ev- eryone was kept busy and confused.19 The military was increasingly drawn 13. Jeffery Roberts, The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. 212. 14. Rasanayagam, Afghanistan,p.36. 15. This appreciation for true nonalignment over Soviet leanings became a key component of Ameri- can engagement with the Third World during the Kennedy era. See Robert Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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