DOCSLIB.ORG

September - October 2014 Issue: III No: V 2

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
September - October 2014 Issue: III No: V 2 Afghanistan Post 2014: The Pashtun Factor Wagah Attack: Reviving Terrorism India’s Act East Policy US Rebalance to Asia: An Assessment and many more …. Published By : Vivekananda International Foundation 3, San Martin Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi – 110021, [email protected], www.vifindia.org Contents Imperatives of Defence Modernisation and EDITOR’S NOTE 3 - Indigenisation 59 CENTRE STAGE - Vice Admiral (Retd) Raman Puri Afghanistan Post-2014: the Pashtun Factor ECONOMY 4 - Prabhat P. Shukla A Perspective on India’s Approach to the G20 Summit 2014 NATION 62 - Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand & Sobha Menon Swachh Bharat Is Not Mardi Gras 103 14 - Dr M N Buch NEIGHBOURHOOD DEBATE Wagah attack: New Groups Reviving 107 Terrorist Activities in Pakistan 69 Foreign Archaeological Collaborations and India’s Security Concerns 21 - Gaurav Dixit - Dr Dilip K Chakrabarti EVENTS DIPLOMACY Vimarsha on Teacher’s Day 74 India’s ‘Act East’ Policy: A Perspective 25 Book launch: “Decoding India’s Defence - Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand & Dr. Rahul Mishra procurement: An Analysis of Defence 76 Procurement Procedure 2013” US Rebalance to Asia – An Assessment 33 79 - Dr. Harinder Sekhon Round Table on PM Modi’s US Visit Visit of Vietnamese Prime Minister to India Round Table on Cyber Security 80 and the Evolving Intensification of Strategic RTD on China-India Ties Post Xi Visit 84 Partnership 41 Vimarsha – Bahudha in the Post 9/11 - Maj Gen (Retd) P K Chakravorty 86 World DEFENCE Talk by UK’s Secretary of State for Defence, India-China Boundary: Border Line, Claim Rt. Hon. Michael Fallon MP 88 Line and the Line of Actual Control 46 - Lt. Gen (Retd) Gautam Banerjee VIVEK : Issues and Options September - October 2014 Issue: III No: V 2 Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in the articles published in the e-journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation Editor’s Note With repeated ceasefire violations by Pakistan, increased incursions along the India-China border and the urgent need to enhance India’s military capabilities in consonance with its growing stature as a global power, the nation has been looking forward to the appointment of a competent and fully devoted Defence Minister to take up the challenges. In his latest cabinet expansion cum reshuffle, Prime Minister Narendra Modi appropriately responded to this sentiment and assigned this onerous task to Manohar Parrikar, a highly qualified technocrat with impeccable integrity and administrative experience as the Chief Minister of Goa. Parrikar is not only acclaimed for his honesty but also his ability to take bold and fast decisions on critical issues. In his first interaction with the media back in his home state, Parrikar, equally reputed for his plain speaking, aptly observed that most of the defence deals executed during the previous regime had got "stuck" due to lobbying, vested interest and kickbacks involved. He also underlined the need to remove procedural bottlenecks to ensure that the procurement process is not affected. With a full-fledged Defence Minister at the helm of affairs, one sincerely hopes that issues such as procurement and indigenization, critical to further enhancing the capability of our armed forces as they face manifold challenges, would be taken up on a priority basis. In this issue, Ambassador Prabhat Shukla looks at the Pashtun Factor in the Afghanistan Post-2014 scenario while eminent civil servant M N Buch critically analyses the Swachh Bharat campaign and suggests concrete measures to make it more effective. Dr Dilip K Chakrabarti cautions us on the ever growing foreign archaeological collaborations. There are equally interesting and informative articles on a host of critical issues confronting the nation. We hope you enjoy this edition. K G Suresh Back to Contents VIVEK : Issues and Options September - October 2014 Issue: III No: V 3 CENTRE STAGE Afghanistan Post-2014: the Pashtun Factor - Prabhat P. Shukla* here is an effort among Afghanistan has kept out of Indo- some western commentaries Pakistan affairs. T – taken up and amplified by the Pakistanis - to try and project Two, the fight is between the situation in Afghanistan as a Afghanistan and Pakistan, and proxy war between India and has its own logic, going back to the Pakistan. The drumbeat of this dispute over the Pashtun issue, thesis grows as the draw-down of with Baluchistan also steadily in western forces from Afghanistan focus. It has acquired an draws near. Such a view sounds additional facet in recent years, strange to Indian ears, for we were since Afghanistan has no interest labouring under the belief this last in becoming any other country’s decade that it was a straight, “strategic depth” – indeed, deeply though covert, fight between the resents the idea, and rejects the US and Pakistan. Pakistani military push behind the concept. And that is how, moreover, people like Negroponte and Mullen Three, Afghanistan has become a projected it too – and you would battleground indeed, between expect them to know. However, it Pakistan [aided occasionally by is important to understand the outside powers] on the one hand, reality of what is happening in and the USSR, the US, and Afghanistan, and for that, the Afghan nationalism by turns. narrative must begin some And four, and most important, decades back. there is a coded message behind To anticipate the conclusions of this analysis. The message is that this essay: one, the fight is not Pakistan is going to continue to between India and Pakistan. Ever meddle in Afghan affairs, and seek since 1947, India has kept out of once more to inject the Taliban, in Afghan-Pakistan affairs, and their newest iteration, into Afghanistan, and no one should * Prabhat P. Shukla Distinguished Fellow, VIF VIVEK : Issues and Options September - October 2014 Issue: III No: V 4 oppose this. India is simply British authorities from the 1920’s shorthand for the fact that all the onwards. By 1944, when it was neighbours of Afghanistan – Iran, clear that the British were to the Central Asians, and countries withdraw from India, the Kabul like India and Russia – are authorities asked the British concerned at the ceaseless Government in London to allow sponsorship of terror and extreme the Pashtuns in British India to groups by Pakistan. If they oppose choose to accede to Afghanistan or Pakistan, that becomes a proxy opt for independence as well; war. instead, they were only given the choice to accede to India or The Afghans themselves want Pakistan. The number of none of this Pakistani registered voters was a fraction of interference, but the total that is also The number of registered population, and voters was a fraction of the conveniently even among them, total population, and even skipped over. The the support for truth is, if Pakistan among them, the support for accession to Pakistan was accession to does not promote barely above 50 percent. The Pakistan was the extremist hill tribes, who are in the barely above 50 Islamic groups, centre of the fighting today, percent. The hill were not allowed to vote there will be no tribes, who are in because they were not push-back from the the centre of the Afghans or considered part of the administered territories. fighting today, anybody else; it is were not allowed to entirely vote because they emblematic that in all this lofty were not considered part of the talk about avoiding a proxy war, administered territories. the Pakistanis refrain from mentioning anything about their Pakistan showed its militant solemn, repeated – and repeatedly colours within a few months of its broken – promises of non- independence – it sent “raiders” in interference. September 1947 to the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir The history of the face-off is well- [violating the stand-still known: Afghanistan never agreement it had signed earlier accepted the Durand Line which with the state] from the Pashtun divided Pashtun from Pashtun, areas. Already, as early as 1947, and this was made clear to the VIVEK : Issues and Options September - October 2014 Issue: III No: V 5 Pakistan was seeking to portray had taken a high-profile position this operation as an Islamic on the Pashtun question. The call campaign, a jihad. Afghanistan to jihad was given practical shape was opposed to the use of the by a Pakistani, Naseerullah Pashtun tribes for this purpose, Babar, himself a Pashtun, who and the Afghan ulema responded was then serving as the Inspector- with a fatwa denying that there General of the Frontier Corps. It was any need for a jihad against was he who advised Zulfikar Ali the Indians and denying any Bhutto that the solution to the religious sanction for the Pashtun problem lay in campaign. This was done in the overwhelming Afghan irredentism context of preventing Pakistan by using the Islamic card. He from exercising influence over the sprang some of the important mountain tribes in the North-West Islamic leaders from Kabul, whose Frontier Province, which was not names read like a who’s who of the Pakistani territory in their eyes. anti-Soviet war of the 1980’s: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, The subsequent two decades saw Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmed frequent tensions over the Shah Massoud, Noor Mohammed Pashtun question between the two Mohammedi, and others. At this countries, and even saw a limited stage, the Islamists were not all skirmish in 1963. As a result of Pashtuns – the heavy reliance this last, King Zahir Shah particularly on Ghilzai Pashtuns dismissed his Prime Minister and was to come later, under Gen Zia- cousin, Mohammed Daoud Khan. ul-Haq. But the idea of using In turn, Daoud overthrew the Islam as a weapon to blunt the King a decade later in 1973, and Pashtun nationalist issue both thus began a new era in South internally and vis-à-vis Asian history – not only because it Afghanistan was born at this time.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Pashtunistan: Pakistan's Shifting Strategy
    AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN PASHTUN ETHNIC GROUP PASHTUNISTAN: P AKISTAN ’ S S HIFTING S TRATEGY ? Knowledge Through Understanding Cultures TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER May 2012 Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? P ASHTUNISTAN : P AKISTAN ’ S S HIFTING S TRATEGY ? Knowledge Through Understanding Cultures TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER About Tribal Analysis Center Tribal Analysis Center, 6610-M Mooretown Road, Box 159. Williamsburg, VA, 23188 Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? The Pashtun tribes have yearned for a “tribal homeland” in a manner much like the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. And as in those coun- tries, the creation of a new national entity would have a destabilizing impact on the countries from which territory would be drawn. In the case of Pashtunistan, the previous Afghan governments have used this desire for a national homeland as a political instrument against Pakistan. Here again, a border drawn by colonial authorities – the Durand Line – divided the world’s largest tribe, the Pashtuns, into two the complexity of separate nation-states, Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they compete with other ethnic groups for primacy. Afghanistan’s governments have not recog- nized the incorporation of many Pashtun areas into Pakistan, particularly Waziristan, and only Pakistan originally stood to lose territory through the creation of the new entity, Pashtunistan. This is the foundation of Pakistan’s policies toward Afghanistan and the reason Pakistan’s politicians and PASHTUNISTAN military developed a strategy intended to split the Pashtuns into opposing groups and have maintained this approach to the Pashtunistan problem for decades. Pakistan’s Pashtuns may be attempting to maneuver the whole country in an entirely new direction and in the process gain primacy within the country’s most powerful constituency, the military.
    [Show full text]
  • Les Nouvelles D'afghanistan
    Trente-troisième année N°139 Décembre 2012 (4ème trimestre) 6 Euros Les Nouvelles d’AFGHANISTAN spécial ISSN 0249-0072 ISSN Afghanistan-Pakistan Editorial Les Nouvelles d’Afghanistan SOMMAIRE N°139 Afghanistan et Pakistan deux destins indissociables d’une histoire commune Dépasser les malentendus par Pierre LAFRANCE 3 Pourquoi tant d’acharnement ? par Zia FARHANG 12 On sait qu’une des clefs du problème afghan se trouve au Pakistan. Nous Les ambitions du Pakistan en Afghanistan avons donc décidé d’ouvrir dans ce numéro le dossier des relations entre le par Homayoun Chah ASSEFY 15 Pakistan et l’Afghanistan. Dossier bien délicat. Pierre Lafrance montre dans son étude approfondie de la préhistoire de ces relations, combien les siècles La Ligne Durand par Léa MÉRILLON 18 ont fait bouger les peuples et les dynasties, au point que Pakistan et Afghanis- tan sont héritiers d’une histoire commune, tout en se disputant une partie de Survol des relations économiques cet héritage. Ah qu’il est difficile d’être frères sur des terres si voisines ! afghano-pakistanaises Notre dossier n’épuise pas le sujet. Bien d’autres aspects auraient pu être par Daood MOOSA 20 étudiés : par exemple les relations entre tribus pachtouns des deux côtés de la Les relations indo-pakistanaises frontière. Certes, la ligne Durand est le fait d’un arbitraire colonial. Mais il serait et l’Afghanistan intéressant d’étudier s’il y a des différences entre les Pachtouns d’Afghanistan par Olivier BLAREL 23 et ceux qu’on appelle Pathans côté pakistanais. Nous pourrons compléter ce dossier dans nos numéros à venir.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cooperation Between China and Afghanistan Under the “Belt and Road Initiative”
    International Relations and Diplomacy, June 2018, Vol. 6, No. 6, 359-368 doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.06.005 DDAVID PUBLISHING The Cooperation Between China and Afghanistan Under the “Belt and Road Initiative” YAN Wei Northwest University, Shaanxi, China Afghanistan is a neighboring country to China. The Afghanistan issue has had an important impact on China’s national security. Since the establishment of the new Afghan government in 2001, China has been committed to promoting Afghanistan’s economic, social, and security reconstruction, and has invested heavily resources in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. The main cause of the Afghan problem is that the Afghan government lacked enough resources and can only rely on the foreign powers’ aids. Afghanistan eventually loses its independence, and triggers interference in big powers. At present, Afghanistan still has not escaped this predicament. Near 50% of the Afghan government’s revenue comes from foreign aids. In 2013, the “Belt and Road Initiative” proposed by China provided opportunity for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Afghanistan, as the crossroads of the land Silk Road and the heart of Asia, has become more prominent in its geopolitical status for “Belt and Road Initiative”. By participating “Belt and Road Initiative”, Afghanistan can help to activate its own economic vitality and promote the cross-border trade. It has changed the situation that Afghanistan is highly dependent on external aids. This helps to solve the problems of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Keywords: China, Afghanistan, Belt and Road Initiative The Rise of Afghan Problem: From the Cross of Silk Road to Buffer State From a geographic perspective, Afghanistan is a crossroads of Asia (Carter, 1989) and the hub of the ancient Silk Road.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan: Operations in North Waziristan Agency, By
    scholar warrior Pakistan: Operations in North Waziristan Agency ALOK BANSAL Pakistan has been going through tumult and despite Nawaz Sharif winning a resounding victory in 2013, the prospects of his government lasting five years have started looking bleak. The withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan by end 2014 is likely to create huge turbulence in the territories along the Durand Line. Civil-military relations are looking quite tenuous, the media is being muzzled, the chimera of talks with the militants is finally over and operations in North Waziristan have eventually started. The elections of 2013, which were held under the shadow of Taliban guns, had indicated support for right wing political parties and, consequently, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) came to power in Islamabad, while the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf (PTI) of Imran Khan formed a government in Peshawar. Both political parties believed that the Taliban could be talked into shunning violence. Accordingly, the government went out of its way to talk to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), despite the TTP challenging the writ of the government in different parts of the country and targeting security installations and personnel. As a result, the killing of Hakeemullah Mehsud, the dreaded TTP leader in a drone attack by the US was protested by the government and viewed as a deliberate attempt by the US to derail the talks with the TTP. The death of Hakeemullah was a major blow to the TTP, but in his successor Fazlullah, they have found an experienced and even more shrewd and radical leader.
    [Show full text]
  • Produced by the Human Security Centre Lead Author
    1 Human Security Centre – Written evidence (AFG0019) Produced by the Human Security Centre Lead Author: Simon Schofield, Senior Fellow, In consultation with Rohullah Yakobi, Associate Fellow 2 1 Table of Contents 2. Executive Summary .............................................................................5 3. What is the Human Security Centre?.....................................................10 4. Geopolitics and National Interests and Agendas......................................11 Islamic Republic of Pakistan ...................................................................11 Historical Context...............................................................................11 Pakistan’s Strategy.............................................................................12 Support for the Taliban .......................................................................13 Afghanistan as a terrorist training camp ................................................16 Role of military aid .............................................................................17 Economic interests .............................................................................19 Conclusion – Pakistan .........................................................................19 Islamic Republic of Iran .........................................................................20 Historical context ...............................................................................20 Iranian Strategy ................................................................................23
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan Courting the Abyss by Tilak Devasher
    PAKISTAN Courting the Abyss TILAK DEVASHER To the memory of my mother Late Smt Kantaa Devasher, my father Late Air Vice Marshal C.G. Devasher PVSM, AVSM, and my brother Late Shri Vijay (‘Duke’) Devasher, IAS ‘Press on… Regardless’ Contents Preface Introduction I The Foundations 1 The Pakistan Movement 2 The Legacy II The Building Blocks 3 A Question of Identity and Ideology 4 The Provincial Dilemma III The Framework 5 The Army Has a Nation 6 Civil–Military Relations IV The Superstructure 7 Islamization and Growth of Sectarianism 8 Madrasas 9 Terrorism V The WEEP Analysis 10 Water: Running Dry 11 Education: An Emergency 12 Economy: Structural Weaknesses 13 Population: Reaping the Dividend VI Windows to the World 14 India: The Quest for Parity 15 Afghanistan: The Quest for Domination 16 China: The Quest for Succour 17 The United States: The Quest for Dependence VII Looking Inwards 18 Looking Inwards Conclusion Notes Index About the Book About the Author Copyright Preface Y fascination with Pakistan is not because I belong to a Partition family (though my wife’s family Mdoes); it is not even because of being a Punjabi. My interest in Pakistan was first aroused when, as a child, I used to hear stories from my late father, an air force officer, about two Pakistan air force officers. In undivided India they had been his flight commanders in the Royal Indian Air Force. They and my father had fought in World War II together, flying Hurricanes and Spitfires over Burma and also after the war. Both these officers later went on to head the Pakistan Air Force.
    [Show full text]
  • 'Pashtunistan': the Challenge to Pakistan and Afghanistan
    Area: Security & Defence - ARI 37/2008 Date: 2/4/2008 ‘Pashtunistan’: The Challenge to Pakistan and Afghanistan Selig S. Harrison * Theme: The increasing co-operation between Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces against Punjabi domination could lead to the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan and the emergence of a new national entity: an ‘Islamic Pashtunistan’. Summary: The alarming growth of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Pashtun tribal region of north-western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan is usually attributed to the popularity of their messianic brand of Islam and to covert help from Pakistani intelligence agencies. But another, more ominous, reason also explains their success: their symbiotic relationship with a simmering Pashtun separatist movement that could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a new national entity, an ‘Islamic Pashtunistan’. This ARI examines the Pashtun claim for an independent territory, the historical and political roots of the Pashtun identity, the implications for the NATO- or Pakistani-led military operations in the area, the increasing co-operation between Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces against Punjabi domination and the reasons why the Pashtunistan movement, long dormant, is slowly coming to life. Analysis: The alarming growth of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Pashtun tribal region of north-western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan is usually attributed to the popularity of their messianic brand of Islam and to covert help from Pakistani intelligence agencies. But another, more ominous reason also explains their success: their symbiotic relationship with a simmering Pashtun separatist movement that could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a new national entity, ‘Pashtunistan,’ under radical Islamist leadership.
    [Show full text]
  • Loya Jirgas and Political Crisis Management in Afghanistan: Drawing on the Bank of Tradition by Scott S
    SPECIAL REPORT NO. 457 | SEPTEMBER 2019 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org Loya Jirgas and Political Crisis Management in Afghanistan: Drawing on the Bank of Tradition By Scott S. Smith Contents The Modernity of a Tradition ......3 History and Paradoxes of Loya Jirgas ....................................4 Decisions and Modalities ........... 6 The Present Era of Consultative Loya Jirgas ........... 13 Conclusion and Recommendations ...................... 15 Delegates assemble at the Consultative Peace Loya Jirga in Kabul on April 29, 2019, to discuss an approach for achieving peace with the Taliban. (Photo by Omar Sobhani/Reuters) Summary • Loya jirgas, though rooted in tra- • The post-2001 political order is • Since 2010, three “traditional” ditional Afghan practices, are es- founded on two loya jirgas: the or “consultative” loya jirgas—so sentially modern political institu- 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga, called because of the inability to tions that are convened to address which legitimized the post–Bonn call together loya jirgas in accord- problems of great national impor- Agreement interim government; ance with the strict provisions set tance. Loya jirgas have almost al- and the 2004 Constitutional Loya out in the 2004 constitution—have ways endorsed the decisions of Jirga, which ratified Afghanistan’s been convened on an ad hoc ba- the national leader. current constitution. sis by Presidents Hamid Karzai and • Since 1915, no loya jirga has been • The 2004 constitution included Ashraf Ghani. convened under the same mo- specific provisions for convening • Should a loya jirga be required to dalities, yet they have in common future loya jirgas: the majority of resolve an electoral crisis or ratify their national composition, their delegates are to be selected from a new political order following a attempts to demonstrate broad in- among district councils.
    [Show full text]
  • Great Game to 9/11
    Air Force Engaging the World Great Game to 9/11 A Concise History of Afghanistan’s International Relations Michael R. Rouland COVER Aerial view of a village in Farah Province, Afghanistan. Photo (2009) by MSst. Tracy L. DeMarco, USAF. Department of Defense. Great Game to 9/11 A Concise History of Afghanistan’s International Relations Michael R. Rouland Washington, D.C. 2014 ENGAGING THE WORLD The ENGAGING THE WORLD series focuses on U.S. involvement around the globe, primarily in the post-Cold War period. It includes peacekeeping and humanitarian missions as well as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom—all missions in which the U.S. Air Force has been integrally involved. It will also document developments within the Air Force and the Department of Defense. GREAT GAME TO 9/11 GREAT GAME TO 9/11 was initially begun as an introduction for a larger work on U.S./coalition involvement in Afghanistan. It provides essential information for an understanding of how this isolated country has, over centuries, become a battleground for world powers. Although an overview, this study draws on primary- source material to present a detailed examination of U.S.-Afghan relations prior to Operation Enduring Freedom. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. Cleared for public release. Contents INTRODUCTION The Razor’s Edge 1 ONE Origins of the Afghan State, the Great Game, and Afghan Nationalism 5 TWO Stasis and Modernization 15 THREE Early Relations with the United States 27 FOUR Afghanistan’s Soviet Shift and the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Discovering the Kite Runner Calum Kerr
    Discovering The Kite Runner Calum Kerr Part One: Writing the York Notes on The Kite Runner In 2008, when I was working part time at a university teaching a range of English Literature and Creative Writing subjects, an opportunity arose to write a full academic textbook on twentieth- century literature. Although my application was not accepted, it led to another offer—writing the York Notes study guide for The Kite Runner, by Khaled Hosseini, which I agreed to do. I had heard of The Kite Runner, which had been published with some fanfare back in 2003, and had also been aware of the press coverage when the film was released in 2007. When I started to read The Kite Runner for the first time, little did I know that it would be the first of at least seventeen complete read-throughs. The first read-through of a book you are going to write about should be the same as the first read-through of any book. You let it take you on its journey, you ride the highs and lows, and you let it sweep you along its emotional trail to its ending. This had been true for my first reading ofThe Kite Runner, which I found to be a hugely affecting read, with every twist in the tale of Amir and his family catching and carrying me. Although I knew I was going to have to read it more times, now with a more critical eye, I first sat down to research the book to see what academic material might have been written about it that could inform my understanding and my writing of the York Notes.
    [Show full text]
  • The Future of Peace in Afghanistan Is Rooted in Lessons from the Past
    The future of peace in Afghanistan is rooted in lessons from the past Introduction Since the late 1970s, Afghanistan has suffered a series of devastating wars that have taken their toll on the country. Several forms of government have been attempted in Afghanistan since its independence from the British in 1919, from constitutional monarchy to republic, to democratic republic with a communist touch, to a totalitarian Islamic emirate, and finally to American imported democracy. However, these governments have not been able to rule the multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural State without resorting to war, infighting and atrocities. With the parties involved in the present day Afghan war ready to sue for peace, a sustainable, inclusive governance plan has to be set in place, in order to avoid repeating mistakes of the past. Unfortunately it would seem that, to this date, conflict, political turmoil and instability have become the norm in Afghanistan. A multitude of actors have arisen, both national and international, and reaching any type of consensus in the short term would be nearly impossible. As each actor promotes and propagates its own agenda, the battle for control and influence continues, leaving nothing but continuous state of confusion in its wake. Coup d’état, Revolution and Foreign Invasion The Saur Revolution and the assassination of Afghanistan’s first President Mohammed Daoud Khan is considered the starting point of the country’s contemporary troubles. When Daoud Khan bloodlessly overthrew the Afghan monarchy in 1973, he installed a republican regime that was seen as reformative and progressive, yet frictions with the communist parties eventually led to his assassination by members of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
    [Show full text]
  • The Durand Line: Its Historical, Legal and Political Status
    Iftikhar Ahmad Yousafzai * Himayatullah Yaqubi ** THE DURAND LINE: ITS HISTORICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL STATUS Abstract Durand Line is the name of the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan which was established in 1893 as a result of an agreement between the British Indian Government and Amir Abdur Rahman, the then ruler of Afghanistan. The treaty was confirmed in 1905, 1919 and 1930 by successive Afghan rulers. But in 1947 at the time of the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent and, subsequently, after the creation of Pakistan, Afghanistan began to raise objections and refused to recognize it as the international frontier between the two countries. It challenged the validity of the Durand line on several grounds. It claims that the territory up to river Indus was once part of the Afghan Empire and since their rightful dominion. However, the Government of Pakistan always repudiates its claim on every international forum. This paper aims at analysing the historical, legal and political status of the Durand Line. The objective is to examine factual evidences to prove whether it is the established international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan or otherwise. Historical Background Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are, comparatively late-comers to the comity of nations. During different phases of their history they remained parts of different empires. Afghanistan remained part of the Indian, Persian and Central Asian empires in different times of its historical evolution. Sometimes, it remained divided between different empires. Pakistan, for most part of its history, remained part of the successive Indian empires. Throughout the Mughal period, Pakistan remained an integral part of it while Afghan territories remained divided between Persia and Mughal India.
    [Show full text]