Introduction Leaders of any communist state have to keep a watchful eye on certain scandal hot-spots. As Kamiski (1992: 179) points out, such events exert pressure on the state, causing it to respond and reform. Scandals may erupt as a result of social, economic or political demands voiced through rebellious manifestations of society, political activism of the diaspora or in programs on foreign radio stations. Considering that during the communist era in Romania – for several reasons – collective confrontation with the regime was a rare phenomenon, such outbursts were perceived as real scandals. This statement pertains to society at large, to the diaspora and, eventually, to the "broader outside world". An analysis of mass protests from this scandal perspective might be useful for several reasons. It assumes an exploration of the strategies employed not only by strikers or protesters, but also those embraced by the institutions under attack. The case studies contained herein show that in the aftermath of such events, the communist state employed a tactic of large-scale scapegoating in order "to face its face". The book further analyses the anatomy of the process, the internal resistance it faced, and the circulating counts of indictment. The matter is all the more interesting, as there is empirical data indicating that the process of scapegoating folded upon the hierarchical layers within the party nomenklatura as well. According to Rychard (1993: 12), in Poland, "spontaneous changes" were more common than "planned reforms". The author identifies two types of spontaneous changes: "violent changes characteristic of social riots and revolts", and "'everyday' changes accompanying various adaptation processes by way of which people try to modify the centralized system" (Rychard, 1993: 12). Adopting Rychard’s terminology, the Ceauescu regime might be described as a period when we were dealing more with planned reforms and various adaptation processes, than with spontaneous changes via "social riots and reforms". It is worth noting that until late 1970s, the scandalousness of Ceauescu’s actions in the international arena contributed to the visibility of the reforms (from above) that were implemented in Romania. I am referring here to the instances when the norm offender is represented by the Romanian powers-that-be, while the Soviet leaders could be regarded as being the norm audience. Scandals over the first type of spontaneous changes in Romania constitute the focus of this book. In my interpretation, the late-communist and present perceptions of the extremely repressive character of Ceauescu’s rule in the 1970s and 1980s are linked to the high level of scandalization provoked by the dynamics of strikes and revolts as well as by the low number of these. Contribu- ting to this narrative is also the so-called "dramatic climax" (see Kurczewski, 10 Introduction 2009b) of the 1989 revolution – i.e. the execution of Ceauescu. After 1989, what also worked in favor of this interpretation was the lack of comparative studies between Romania and other former socialist countries. This discoursive consciousness regarding the high level of repression during the Ceauescu regime and the "normality" of a low number of mass protests contesting his rule should be further analyzed in the context of its reception of the development of mass movements in other former socialist countries. As such, by comparison, the evolution of the Solidarity trade union movement in Poland is framed as – by all means – spectacular, yet also an evolution pertai- ning to a certain level of "normality" and linked to this country’s history of social protest. Therefore, what we are witnessing is that, within the mainstream Romanian historical discourse, the absence or occurrence of political protest (i.e. of "spontaneous changes") is retrospectively used to account for the respective repressive or less repressive character of the communist regime in question. Thus, the vicious circle goes as follows: the low number of protests contributed to the intensity of scandals over mass protests, and the scandalousness of these acts further contributed to the depiction of the regime as highly repressive. Whereas, the mode in which social change during communism occurred via "planned reforms" has not been researched, or the modality in which the scandalousnesness of several moves of the regime on the international political arena has contributed to the visibility and legitimacy of these moves. The next element which stands out with respect to the scandals over mass protests during the Ceauescu regime is the complete ritualization of their dynamics. At first sight, the scandal rituals in late communism appear even to be more integrated than those emerging in post-communism – see, for example, the evolution of disclosure scandals in Mica (2008b; 2009b), and the discussion about the context and impact of these scandals on the reinforcing of the signifi- cance of certain values in society in Kurczewski’s (1995) work. In this latter case, the frustration of rituals of admittance and attribution of fault also bear upon the (perceived) role of scandal in society. Scandal rituals in Ceauescu’s era, as will be shown, unfold according to Turner’s (1975) model of social drama and Braithwaite’s (1992) theory of reintegrative shaming – thus manife- sting a great dramaturgical potential. This element leads us to rituals of acknow- ledgement of guilt and self-criticism. The importance of public apology in recent Romanian history stems from the fact that self-criticism has been widely employed in the communist context as "late" as the 1980s. The presence of self-criticism might be taken as the anthropological core of the mechanisms of communist regime self-preservation. When it comes to the early post-communist period, the phenomena of public Introduction 11 apology are moderated at best, while we witness a proliferation of discourses of public criticism and distribution of guilt/fault. Regarding the late communist period, we notice that what Garfinkel (1956) has termed as status degradation ceremonies have become institutionalized. These degradation ceremonies were meetings of degradation and stigmatization, which quite often also included a component of public apology by the offender. The investigation of these meetings with the tools of legal anthropology and ethnomethodology indicate that they have evolved in the genre of moots (see the parallel with Gibbs’ (1963) hearings in the Kpelle moots, for example), and – as stated – they have employed processes that recall Braithwaite’s reintegrative shaming. Thus, they were composed of rituals of distribution of fault and rituals of admittance of guilt/fault respectively. Such moots have been employed in several scenarios – ranging from illegal immigration to participation in mass protests; as well as at different levels – from the factory level to that of the party. They have played an investigative and reconciliatory role alike. To a certain degree it can be claimed that the prevalent discourse in the field of Romanian transitional justice delays the treatment of these public appologies and acts of admittance of guilt/fault as real sociological phenomena. They are either poked fun at or (at best) reported in a way that points to their contrafactual character. The sociological analysis is rendered superfluous by the assumption that they had been staged. At this point in the discussion, I would risk the hypothesis that, as in the case of the low number of mass protests, the proliferation of such rituals of public apology during the Ceauescu era is considered "normal", and for this reason their analysis is impeded from emerging. Thus, I had decided to investi- gate the shaming practices in the dynamics of the party moots on mass protests which followed the outburst of such like scandals, and to leave other elements in the dynamics of communist scandals aside. Besides investigating the ritualization of party moots on mass protests, the book is concerned with two phenomena connected to scandals during the Ceauescu regime: convergence and contamination. The former is a notion borrowed from literature on moral panic (Hall and Jefferson, 1991; Hall et al., 1994), whereas the latter follows the work of Adut (2005; 2008) on scandals. The purpose of the book is twofold. Firstly it seeks to document the emergence of these phenomena in connection with the so-called scandals over mass protests. Secondly, it poses an inquiry into the types of mechanisms backing contamination and convergence. An analysis of published accounts on the cases in question, and proceedings of party meetings held subsequent to scandals over mass protests, leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis: the dyna- mics of convergence and contamination are dependent on the outcome of three 12 Introduction interrelated phenomena: attribution of fault, admittance of one’s guilt/fault and moot bullying. I analyze four case studies: the Jiu Valley strike (1977), the Braov revolt (1987), the Timioara events (15-21 December 1989), and the miners’ march on Bucharest (June, 1990). As stated, I am primarily interested in the dynamic of the moots [luri in discuie] – a deliberative assembly for the administration of justice or for the informal settlement of disputes – held after scandals resulting from mass protests. The topic is covered in part IV – The Ritualization of Party Moots during the Ceauescu Regime (Jiu Valley 1977 and Braov 1987) and partly in part V – Scripts of Other Cases of Convergence in Reply to Scandals over Mass Protests (Timioara 1989 and Bucharest 1990). Case study 1: The Strike – Jiu Valley: In early August 1977, about 35,000 miners from Jiu Valley went on strike after the promulgation of a law reducing the retirement age. The delegates sent to the Valley were taken hostage by the miners who called for Ceauescu to come in person. The first secretary arrived on the third day of the strike. Case study 2: The Revolt – Braov: On 15 November 1987, in Braov, local elections for the Popular Councils were supposed to take place.