FEASIBILITY STUDY REFERENCE FEASIBILITY STUDY REFERENCE SYSTEM ERTMS FinalSYSTEM Report ERTMS DigitalisationFinal Report of CCS (Control Command and Signalling) and MigrationDigitalisation to ERTMS of CCS (Control Command and Signalling) and Migration to ERTMS European Railway Agency - 2017 23 OP European Railway Agency - 2017 23 OP 14 AUGUST 2018 14 AUGUST 2018 FEASIBILITY STUDY REFERENCE SYSTEM ERTMS Contact ANDRÉ VAN ES Arcadis Nederland B.V. P.O. Box 220 3800 AE Amersfoort The Netherlands Our reference: 083702890 A - Date: 2 November 2018 2 of 152 FEASIBILITY STUDY REFERENCE SYSTEM ERTMS CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 9 1.1 EU Context of Feasibility Study 9 1.2 Digitalisation of the Rail Sector 9 1.3 Objectives of Feasibility Study 11 1.4 Focus of Feasibility Study 11 1.5 Report Structure 12 2 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 13 2.1 Methodology 13 2.2 Scope Addition 15 2.3 Wider Pallet of Interviewed Parties 15 2.4 Timeframes 19 3 INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGERS 20 3.1 Findings and Trends Infrastructure Managers 20 3.2 Reasons for Replacing Non-ETCS Components 28 3.3 Short-Term versus Long-Term 31 4 OPERATING COMPANIES 33 4.1 Dutch Railways (NS) 33 4.2 DB Cargo 35 4.3 RailGood 36 4.4 European Rail Freight Association 37 4.5 Findings and Trends Operating Companies 38 5 RAIL INDUSTRY SUPPLIERS 40 5.1 Supplier 1 40 5.2 Supplier 2 41 5.3 Supplier 3 42 5.4 Supplier 4 42 5.5 Supplier 5 42 Our reference: 083702890 A - Date: 2 November 2018 3 of 152 FEASIBILITY STUDY REFERENCE SYSTEM ERTMS 5.6 Findings and Trends Suppliers 43 6 RAILWAY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES 46 6.1 EULYNX 46 6.2 Shift2Rail 48 6.3 Findings and Trends Railway Industry Development Initiatives 50 7 NON-RAIL INDUSTRY SOURCES OF INSPIRATION 51 7.1 Automotive: AUTOSAR 51 7.2 Aviation: IMA 52 7.3 ICT-Sector 52 7.4 Findings and Trends Non-Rail Industry Sources of Inspiration 54 8 EUROPEAN UNION 55 8.1 EU DG Move 55 8.2 ERA 55 8.3 EU Legislation 60 8.4 European Regulation on Lingua Franca in Railway Sector 64 8.5 Findings and Trends European Union 64 9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 66 9.1 Infrastructure Managers, Operating Companies, and Suppliers 66 9.2 Role European Union 69 9.3 Conclusion 70 10 RECOMMENDATIONS 72 10.1 Work towards a Standardised CCS-System 72 10.2 Consider Onboard ETCS as Part of Trackside 76 10.3 Support Training of Workforce 76 10.4 Stronger Mandates and More Resources for ERA 77 11 APPENDIX A LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 79 12 APPENDIX B REFERENCES 85 13 APPENDIX C INVENTORY INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGERS 97 13.1 United Kingdom 97 13.2 Switzerland 104 13.3 Germany 110 13.4 France 116 Our reference: 083702890 A - Date: 2 November 2018 4 of 152 FEASIBILITY STUDY REFERENCE SYSTEM ERTMS 13.5 The Netherlands 120 13.6 Denmark 124 13.7 Belgium 129 13.8 Italy 132 13.9 Norway 136 13.10 Australia, New South Wales 141 13.11 Australia, Queensland 147 14 APPENDIX D BACKGROUND SUPPLIERS 150 14.1 AngelStar (Mermec & Stadler) 150 14.2 Bombardier 150 14.3 CAF 150 14.4 Siemens and Siemens Alstom 151 14.5 Thales 151 COLOPHON 152 Our reference: 083702890 A - Date: 2 November 2018 5 of 152 FEASIBILITY STUDY REFERENCE SYSTEM ERTMS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Safety is a key issue in rail transport. The backbone for safe train operation is formed by the Control Command and Signalling (CCS) systems. Currently there are more than 20 signalling systems across the European Union, each based on their respective initial rail philosophies and national requirements. Trains used by a national rail company must be equipped with at least one system but sometimes more, just to be able to run safely within that one country. Each system is stand-alone and non-interoperable, and therefore requires extensive integration and engineering effort, driving total delivery costs up, for cross-border traffic. This restricts competition and hampers the competitiveness of the European rail sector vis-à-vis other modes of transport by creating technical barriers to international journeys. The ERA has launched a study to get an overview of the overall situation of existing interlocking, block systems and traffic management systems, their expected remaining useful life and plans to replace/renew them, as well as of the ambitions of the railways in terms of functionality and architecture for their future CCS-systems (excluding ERTMS). This will assist the ERA in its mid-term and long-term strategic reflection to further improve the conditions for the ERTMS deployment, and on the evolution of the rest of the CCS- system. As digitalizing CCS- and TMS-systems oftentimes go hand-in-hand with ERTMS-rollout and as the ERA indicated the ultimate goal of the feasibility study was to help the ERA in its mid-term and long-term strategic reflection to further improve the conditions for the ERTMS deployment, it may be considered that this feasibility study was, at least in part, also intended to research whether the non-ERTMS systems (interlocking, block systems, and traffic management systems) posed some sort of impediment to the deployment of ERTMS. Were they (part of) the reason for the slow rollout of ERTMS across the Member States? Through interviews with a selection of Infrastructure Managers, Operating Companies, and Suppliers, as well as desk research into the current CCS-systems of 10 countries, EU policies and legislation, EU development initiatives, and inspiration from non-rail industry sectors, the following subquestions were researched: 1. What is the current situation surrounding interlocking and TMS? Which problems are encountered with regard to these systems and what is done to solve these? 2. What are the relevant future strategies with regard to CCS and TMS? 3. Which actions can be proposed to the ERA that are relevant at EU level in terms of coordination and standardisation activities and beneficial to facilitate the migration to ERTMS, in order to facilitate the objective of the SERA? The inventory showed a range of country-specific CCS-systems. We have identified digitalisation programmes in all surveyed countries. Some of these have nearly been completed already, others have a farther horizon. The commonalities in these plans include that significant parts of the CCS-system have reached the end of their technical or economic lifespan. All Infrastructure Managers are implementing, have plans to implement, or consider implementation of digital-based CCS-systems, often including the implementation of ERTMS. In order to facilitate interoperability, the current patchwork of country-specific CCS-systems and TMS-systems need to interface. However, as pretty much all (series of) current CCS- components are unique and designed for a specific application in a specific country by the Suppliers that once produced these components and the interfaces between the different components of different Suppliers are tailormade, this means that the interfaces are expensive to specify and build. In short, it is not a technological matter, but an organizational, judicial and consequently an economic issue. In fact, none of the stakeholders mention that non-ERTMS systems (interlocking, block systems, and traffic management systems) in theory pose some sort of impediment to the deployment of ERTMS (or interoperability). ERTMS and digital CCS-systems comprise a silent revolution in train safety and railway operation. The ICT- based technology commands a different way of thinking. A lack of sufficient knowledge in this CCS-field (as there are too few people skilled in a digital view of its problems and possible solutions) poses difficulties for the Governments and Infrastructure Managers to oversee the risks of implementing completely new, digital CCS-systems. This results in the natural reaction to lean towards ‘the safe option’ and to continue thinking along the lines of what one knows and can oversee. As a consequence: Our reference: 083702890 A - Date: 2 November 2018 6 of 152 FEASIBILITY STUDY REFERENCE SYSTEM ERTMS • They chose (unwittingly) for a patchwork of quick, short-term solutions. This choice is also based on lower initial costs. • They translate one-on-one the national, analogue train safety philosophy into ETCS. Driven by that, it seems hard for governments and Infrastructure Managers to let go of the national, trusted CCS-systems. This again has the following consequences: • The patchwork of quick short-term solutions hampers the development in the long run. Cheap but fast development may result in troublesome deployment and a shorter than expected lifespan in the long run. • Instead of one ETCS system, each country develops its own ‘ETCS dialect,’ which is in direct conflict with the goal of swift cross-border traffic of a Single European Railway Area. As described, currently many choices are made with a short-term focus. Moreover, often they are not made across the entire system of trackside and rolling stock onboard systems, which means that the European Union cannot subsidise the entire system but due to its legislation can fully subsidise public Infrastructure managers for trackside while only partly subsidising private Operating Companies for the onboards. Furthermore, for Operating Companies there is no stimulant pull to gain from other benefits such as cost reduction or capacity increase. This way business cases for these separate onboard and trackside investments will not become profitable and investments are curtailed, averted or postponed. Finally, all the parties have different drivers for replacing CCS-systems, which generates difficulties to have all head in the same direction towards the same common goal. In answer to these conclusions, the following recommendations have been discussed in a workshop with amongst others ERA, European Commission, DG Move, UIC, several NSAs, EULYNX, Siemens, TÜV Rheinland, ERTMS Users Group, SBB, and SNCF.