DOCSLIB.ORG

UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Presidential Cabinet

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Presidential Cabinet UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Presidential Cabinet Formation as Leadership Strategy in Asian Democracies A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Dong Seong Lee Committee in charge: Professor Samuel Kernell, Chair Professor Stephan Haggard Professor Megumi Naoi Professor Kaare Strøm Professor Jong-Sung You 2015 © Dong Seong Lee, 2015 All rights reserved. The Dissertation of Dong Seong Lee is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Chair University of California, San Diego 2015 iii DEDICATION To my parents who have made this journey possible iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page…………………………..……………….………………….…………... iii Dedication……………………………………………….………….……….…………... iv Table of Contents…………………….…………………………….……….………...…. v List of Figures……………………………...….………………………………..….…… vii List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………. ix Acknowledgments…………………………………………………..……………..….… xi Vita…………………………………………………………………..………………..... xiv Abstract of the Dissertation...………………………………………………….….……. xv 1. The Politics of Presidential Cabinet Formation in Asian Democracies…...................... 1 1.1. Why Cabinet Formation in Presidential Systems?................................................... 6 1.2. Organization of the Dissertation............................................................................ 18 2. A Theory of Cabinet Formation in Presidential Democracies….................................. 26 2.1. Presidential Goals and Cabinet Appointments...................................................... 26 2.2. Trade-off in Cabinet Appointments....................................................................... 28 2.3. Literature Review…………………....................................................................... 31 2.4. Theory…………….………………....................................................................... 38 2.5. Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………… 54 3. The Patterns of Presidential Cabinet Formation in Asian Democracies....................... 59 3.1. Case Selection and Data……………………......................................................... 59 3.2. Measurement.......................................................................................................... 63 3.3. Method: Modeling Presidential Cabinet Formation……….................................. 74 3.4. Empirical Research………………….................................................................... 75 3.5. Discussion………………...................................................................................... 84 3.6. Acknowledgements ………………....................................................................... 86 4. Quality of Bureaucracy and Ministerial Choice in Presidential Democracies............. 90 4.1. Delegation Mechanism in Democratic Government ............................................. 93 4.2. Executive Control of Bureaucracy in Presidential Democracy: Presidential Appointment as Administrative Strategy......................................................... 98 4.3. Comparative Perspective…………..................................................................... 101 4.4. Empirical Analysis…………………................................................................... 123 4.5. Empirical Results………………………............................................................. 133 v 4.6. Discussion……………........................................................................................ 140 4.7. Acknowledgements………………...................................................................... 141 5. Presidential Policymaking Strategy and Portfolio Allocation in South Korea........... 151 5.1. Patterns of Portfolio Allocation in Korea…........................................................ 153 5.2. Presidents, Party Membership, and Portfolio Allocation………………………. 156 5.3. Empirical Analysis……………........................................................................... 164 5.4. Empirical Results………………………............................................................. 169 5.5. Discussion…………………................................................................................ 175 6. Conclusion………...................................................................................................... 180 7. Appendix………......................................................................................................... 189 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Percentage of Nonpartisan Ministers and Percentage of Cabinet Reshuffling in Asian Presidential Cabinets................................................................................... 12 Figure 2.1: Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with Party Systems on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments................................ 46 Figure 2.2: Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with Presidential Popularity on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments.................. 49 Figure 2.3: Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with the Presidential Electoral Cycle on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments.... 52 Figure 2.4: A Model of Cabinet Formation in Presidential Democracies........................ 54 Figure 3.1: Share of Nonpartisan Ministers within Twenty-one Presidential Administrations from Four Asian Democracies........................................................ 68 Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of President's Legislative Contingent and Predicted Share of Nonpartisan Cabinet Members.................................................................................. 79 Figure 3.3: Marginal Effect of Legislative Fragmentation on Nonpartisan Share across Range of President's Legislative Contingent............................................................. 81 Figure 3.4: Marginal Effect of Presidential Popularity on Nonpartisan Share across Range of President's Legislative Contingent………………………….…………………... 83 Figure 4.1: Share of Nonpartisan Ministers with Civil Service Backgrounds in Twenty- one Presidential Administrations from Four Asian Democracies............................. 91 Figure 4.2: Delegation Mechanisms under Parliamentary and Presidential Democracy.. 94 Figure 4.3: Relationship between Bureaucracy Quality and Share of Ministers with Civil Service Backgrounds Among All Professional Ministers in the Cabinet............... 134 vii Figure 4.4: Marginal Effect of Bureaucratic Quality and Predicted Share of Professional Ministers with Civil Service Backgrounds……….……………............................. 138 Figure 4.5: Average Marginal Effect of Coefficients from Model 2.............................. 140 Figure 5.1: Marginal Effect and Predicted Probability of Nonpartisan Appointments.. 173 Figure 5.2: Marginal Effect and Predicted Probability of Copartisan Appointments…. 174 viii LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1: Number of Cabinets and Number of Types of Cabinets in Latin American and Asian Presidential Democracies…………………………...................……………... 9 Table 2.1: Constitutional Powers of Popularly Elected Presidents by Country in East Asia............................................................................................................................ 36 Table 2.2: Citizens' Trust in Political Parties as a Political Institution in East Asia........ 48 Table 3.1: Twenty-one Presidential Administrations from Four Asian Democracies...... 60 Table 3.2: Share of Subtypes of Nonpartisan Ministers in Four Asian Presidential Systems…………………………………………………………………………….. 65 Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables…………..…… 73 Table 3.4: Expected Signs of Estimated Coefficients of Variables……………….……. 76 Table 3.5: Results from Extended Beta-Binomial Models of Cabinet Formation……… 77 Table 3.6: Results from Panel Fixed Effects Models of Cabinet Formation…………… 78 Table 4.1: Factors Affecting Appointment Mechanisms for Civil Service Control....... 123 Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables........................ 129 Table 4.3: Bureaucratic Quality and Presidential Choice of Professional Ministers, Univariate Regression Analysis.............................................................................. 135 Table 4.4: Bureaucratic Quality and Presidential Choice of Professional Ministers, Multivariate Regression Analysis……………………………………..…............. 137 Table 5.1: Copartisan and Nonpartisan Ministers in Executive Ministries across Five Administrations: Percent (Number) of Ministers………………………..……...... 154 Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables........................ 169 Table 5.3: Expected Signs of Estimated Coefficients of Variables................................ 170 ix Table 5.4: Logit Analysis of Minister Type, Policy Area of Post, and President's Legislative Support.................................................................................................. 171 Table A1: Sources for the List and Profile of Cabinet Ministers in the East Asia Cabinet Minister Data Set..................................................................................................... 189 Table A2: List of the Title of Cabinet Members Included in the Analysis..................... 189 Table A3: Sources of Independent and Control Variables in the East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set...................................................................................................... 192 Table A4: A list of
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Government Formation and Minister Turnover in Presidential Cabinets
    Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 Government Formation and Minister Turnover in Presidential Cabinets Portfolio allocation in presidential systems is a central tool that presidents use to deal with changes in the political and economic environment. Yet, we still have much to learn about the process through which ministers are selected and the reasons why they are replaced in presidential systems. This book offers the most comprehensive, cross- national analysis of portfolio allocation in the Americas to date. In doing so, it contributes to the development of theories about portfolio allocation in presidential systems. Looking specifi- cally at how presidents use portfolio allocation as part of their wider political strategy, it examines eight country case studies, within a carefully developed analytical framework and cross- national comparative analysis from a common dataset. The book includes cases studies of portfolio allocation in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the United States, Peru and Uruguay, and covers the period between the transition to democracy in each country up until 2014. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of political elites, executive politics, Latin Amer ican politics and more broadly comparative politics. Marcelo Camerlo is Researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Uni- versity of Lisbon (ICS- UL), Portugal. Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo is Associate Professor in the Department of Polit- ical Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA. Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 Routledge Research on Social and Political Elites Edited by Keith Dowding Australian National University and Patrick Dumont University of Luxembourg Who are the elites that run the world? This series of books analyses who the elites are, how they rise and fall, the networks in which they operate and the effects they have on our lives.
    [Show full text]
  • Cabinet Reshuffles and Prime Ministerial Power
    Cabinet Reshuffles and Prime Ministerial Power Jörgen Hermansson and Kåre Vernby ***VERY PRELIMINARY “IDEAS-PAPER”*** Abstract This paper contains some ideas about how to transform a paper we wrote together in Swedish for an anthology on Swedish governments 1917-2009. There, we point out that reshuffles are problematic when used as an indicator of prime-ministerial power/dominance over the cabinet. In the future, we wish to expand our critique. In this “ideas paper”, however, we only briefly outline our critique. We will argue that there exist at least two problems inherent in using the frequency of reshuffles as an indicator of Prime-ministerial power over the cabinet. The first we call the “problem of proxying”, which arises because scholars implicitly use the frequency of reshuffles as a proxy for the political experience of the ministers surrounding the PM. Specifically, the frequency of reshuffles is thought to be inversely related to the political experience of ministers. The second problem we call the “problem of selection bias”, which arises because of the failure to properly specifying the possibility of a bi-directional causal relationship between prime-ministerial power and cabinet reshuffles. We will try to argue that these are serious problems for those who wish to use the frequency of cabinet reshuffles as a measure of prime ministerial using historical data and examples from the Swedish history with parliamentarism. 1 Introduction While the formation and collapse of cabinet governments has been a mainstay of political science for more than 50 years, the recent decade has seen a growing pre- occupation with cabinet reshuffles.
    [Show full text]
  • PM Modi Rejigs Cabinet
    PM Modi Rejigs Cabinet July 9, 2021 In a major shake up of his Council of Ministers almost midway through his second term, Prime Minister Narendra Modi oversaw the swearing-in of 43 Ministers (new and seven promotions to Cabinet rank) and dropped 12 Ministers (seven Cabinet and five Ministers of State) In news: Cabinet reshuffle attempts inclusion, political messaging Placing it in syllabus: Governance Dimensions What is Cabinet Reshuffle and How is it done? Minister : Appointment, Functions and Powers What is a Cabinet? Types of Ministers Difference between Cabinet and Council of Ministers Constitutional Position of both Content: What is Cabinet Reshuffle and How is it done? In a cabinet reshuffle or shuffle a head of government rotates or changes the composition of ministers in their cabinet, or when the Head of State changes the head of government and a number of ministers. Cabinet reshuffles happen in parliamentary systems for a variety of reasons. Periodically, smaller reshuffles are needed to replace ministers who have resigned, retired or died. Reshuffles are also a way for a premier to “refresh” the government, often in the face of poor polling numbers; remove poor performers; and reward supporters and punish others. Minister : Appointment, Functions and Powers The Government of India exercises its executive authority through a number of government ministries or departments of state. A ministry is composed of employed officials, known as civil servants, and is politically accountable through a minister. Two articles – Article 74 and Article 75 of the Indian Constitution deal with the Council of Ministers. Appointment: Article 75 mentions the following things: They are appointed by the President on the advice of Prime Minister They along with the Prime Minister of India form 15% of the total strength of the lower house i.e.
    [Show full text]
  • France: Government Reshuffle
    France: Government reshuffle Standard Note: SN06973 Last updated: 4 September 2014 Author: Rob Page Section International Affairs and Defence Section Manuel Valls, the Prime Minister of France, has reshuffled his Cabinet following criticism of the Government’s austerity policies by Arnaud Montebourg, the Economy Minister. Montebourg’s place in the Cabinet has been taken by Emmanuel Macron, a leading pro- business figure. This note explains the events leading to the reshuffle, and provides an overview of how the new cabinet has been received. This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual. It should not be relied upon as being up to date; the law or policies may have changed since it was last updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professional advice or as a substitute for it. A suitably qualified professional should be consulted if specific advice or information is required. This information is provided subject to our general terms and conditions which are available online or may be provided on request in hard copy. Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing with Members and their staff, but not with the general public. Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Political background 3 3 Reshuffle 4 4 Reaction 5 2 1 Introduction Manuel Valls, the Prime Minister of France, has reshuffled his Cabinet following criticism of the Government’s austerity policies by Arnaud Montebourg, the Economy Minister. Montebourg’s place in the Cabinet has been taken by Emmanuel Macron, a leading pro- business figure.
    [Show full text]
  • Portfolio Allocation As the President's Calculations: Loyalty, Copartisanship, and Political Context in South Korea
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Repository@Nottingham Portfolio Allocation as the President's Calculations: Loyalty, Copartisanship, and Political Context in South Korea Don S. Lee University of Nottingham [email protected] Accepted for publication in the Journal of East Asian Studies on 22 February 2018 Abstract How do the president's calculations in achieving policy goals shape the allocation of cabinet portfolios? Despite the growing literature on presidential cabinet appointments, this question has barely been addressed. I argue that cabinet appointments are strongly affected not only by presidential incentives to effectively deliver their key policy commitments but also by their interest in having their administration maintain strong political leverage. Through an analysis of portfolio allocations in South Korea after democratization, I demonstrate that the posts wherein ministers can influence the government's overall reputation typically go to nonpartisan professionals ideologically aligned with presidents, while the posts wherein ministers can exert legislators' influence generally go to senior copartisans. My findings highlight a critical difference in presidential portfolio allocation from parliamentary democracies, where key posts tend to be reserved for senior parliamentarians from the ruling party. Key Words: President, Presidential System, Minister, Cabinet Appointment, Portfolio Allocation, South Korea, East Asia 1 Existing research on cabinet formation in presidential systems has offered key insights on the chief executive's appointment strategy. According to the literature, presidents with limited policy making power tend to form a cabinet with more partisan ministers in order to reinforce support for their policy program (Amorim Neto 2006).
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact and Effectiveness of Ministerial Reshuffles
    House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee The impact and effectiveness of ministerial reshuffles Second Report of Session 2013–14 Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes and oral evidence Written evidence is contained in Volume II, available on the Committee website at www.parliament.uk/pcrc Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 13 June 2013 HC 255 [Incorporating HC 707-i to vii, Session 2012-13] Published on 14 June 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £0.00 The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to consider political and constitutional reform. Current membership Mr Graham Allen MP (Labour, Nottingham North) (Chair) Mr Christopher Chope MP (Conservative, Christchurch) Paul Flynn (Labour, Newport West) Sheila Gilmore MP (Labour, Edinburgh East) Andrew Griffiths MP (Conservative, Burton) Fabian Hamilton MP, (Labour, Leeds North East) Simon Hart MP (Conservative, Camarthen West and South Pembrokeshire) Tristram Hunt MP (Labour, Stoke on Trent Central) Mrs Eleanor Laing MP (Conservative, Epping Forest) Mr Andrew Turner MP (Conservative, Isle of Wight) Stephen Williams MP (Liberal Democrat, Bristol West) Powers The Committee’s powers are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in Temporary Standing Order (Political and Constitutional Reform Committee). These are available on the Internet via http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmstords.htm. Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/pcrc.
    [Show full text]
  • Post-Communist Romania: a Peculiar Case of Divided Government Manolache, Cristina
    www.ssoar.info Post-communist Romania: a peculiar case of divided government Manolache, Cristina Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Manolache, C. (2013). Post-communist Romania: a peculiar case of divided government. Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, 13(3), 427-440. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-448327 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur (Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden see: Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de Post-Communist Romania 427 Post-Communist Romania A Peculiar Case of Divided Government CRISTINA MANOLACHE If for the most part of its post-communist history, Romania experienced a form of unified government based on political coalitions and alliances which resulted in conflictual relations between the executive and the legislative and even among the dualist executive itself, it should come as no surprise that the periods of divided government are marked by strong confrontations which have culminated with two failed suspension attempts. The main form of divided government in Romania is that of cohabitation, and it has been experienced only twice, for a brief period of time: in 2007-2008 under Prime-Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu of the National Liberal Party and again, starting May 2012, under Prime Minister Victor Ponta of the Social Democratic Party.
    [Show full text]
  • Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy Reconsidered
    PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY RECONSIDERED A Dissertation by YAO-YUAN YEH Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chair of Committee, Alexander C. Pacek Committee Members, Ahmer Tarar Michael T. Koch Harland Prechel Head of Department, Robert Harmel August 2014 Major Subject: Political Science Copyright 2014 Yao-Yuan Yeh ABSTRACT The purpose of this dissertation is to add to the understanding of democratic consolidation, and to address a debate within this topic: Is presidentialism harmful to democratic consolidation? I argue that presidentialism induces higher levels of political violence (attitudinally and behaviorally). Unlike parliamentary and semi- presidential systems, which offer mechanisms to alter the incumbent government through legislative responsibility, such as a vote of no confidence or a government reshuffle, when there exist mismatched policy expectations between the public and the government, or when the public dissatisfaction with the government is high, pres- idential systems do not have this mechanism to change the government composition and the president is empowered to govern until the next election. Even in the case that the public's discontent toward the president is high, there exist almost no mech- anisms except for her own resignation and an impeachment to remove her from her office. However, a voluntary resignation and an impeachment are rarely occurred in the history, and thus, the expectation of the public regarding whether their grievances can be resolved and addressed is more difficult to be fulfilled in presidential democ- racies. Therefore, using and considering violence as a mean to address their political and social problems becomes a more viable option in presidential democracies.
    [Show full text]
  • Democratic Institutions Under Autocracy Erin A. York Submitted In
    Democratic Institutions Under Autocracy Erin A. York Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy under the Executive Committee of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2020 © 2020 Erin A. York All Rights Reserved Abstract Democratic Institutions under Autocracy Erin A. York This dissertation is about the function of borrowed democratic institutions in autocratic contexts, theorized to provide an arena of limited political competition between the regime and political outsiders. Despite existing explanations for how such institutions benefit the autocrat, there is much that remains unknown about their function in practice. I explore how the regime and opposition manipulate institutional features to their benefit in three papers. In the first, I show that systems of executive oversight create opportunities for the opposition to serve constituents and increase their support base. In the second, I find evidence that regime control over executive appointments is used to limit effectiveness of that opposition activity. In the third, I find that the regime’s authorities over the legislature create distributional distortions in its favor – but that other coalition members can also benefit. I address these topics using empirical analysis of novel data sources gathered during extensive fieldwork in Morocco, as well as theoretical modeling of institutional characteristics. Autocratic regimes are notorious for their opacity, and previous research has been limited by data accessibility; for the research presented here, I collect and analyze a vast database of legislative actions using techniques in webscraping and text analysis in order to obtain a more systematic understanding of legislative behavior and executive response.
    [Show full text]
  • The Dynamics of Democracy in the Middle East
    Special Report The dynamics of democracy in the Middle East March 2005 The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St, London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The Economist Intelligence Unit delivers its information in four ways: through its digital portfolio, where the latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London New York Hong Kong The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St The Economist Building 60/F, Central Plaza London 111 West 57th Street 18 Harbour Road SW1Y 4LR New York Wanchai United Kingdom NY 10019, US Hong Kong Tel: (44.20) 7830 1007 Tel: (1.212) 554 0600 Tel: (852) 2585 3888 Fax: (44.20) 7830 1023 Fax: (1.212) 586 0248 Fax: (852) 2802 7638 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.eiu.com Electronic delivery This publication can be viewed by subscribing online at www.store.eiu.com Reports are also available in various other electronic formats, such as CD-ROM, Lotus Notes, online databases and as direct feeds to corporate intranets. For further information, please contact your nearest Economist Intelligence Unit office Copyright © 2005 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Chapter (PDF)
    CHRONOLOGY 2 Burundi President Pierre Buyoya announces cabinet reshuffle and gives up defence portfolio. France Pierre Bérégovoy appointed Prime Minister. 3 Albania Sali Berisha, leader of Democratic Party, elected Presi- dent by People's Assembly. 5 Germany Extreme right-wing parties make significant gains in state elections in Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein. Peru President Alberto Fujimoro suspends constitution and dis- solves parliament. 5-6 Italy Inconclusive general election leads to resignation of Presi- dent Francesco Cossiga. 6 Yugoslavia EC recognises independent Bosnia-Hercegovina, fol- lowed by USA on 7 April. Zaïre National conference suspended on 19 Jan. resumed, adopts sovereign status on 17 April. 7 EC European Parliament passes resolution effectively approving Maastricht Treaty. Thailand Supreme Commander of armed forces General Suchinda Kraprayoon appointed Prime Minister Yugoslavia UN Security Council recommends full deployment of UN protection force in Yugoslavia. 9 UK Conservative Party led by John Major wins fourth consecutive term of office in general election. 10 Iran First round of voting to elect new parliament. Australia Ruling Australian Labor Party humiliatingly defeated in 11 by-election. 13 Brazil Major cabinet reshuffle by President Fernando Collor de Mello in response to corruption scandals. 14 Czechoslovakia President Vaclav Havel announces intention to seek further presidential term. Afghanistan President Najibullah removed from power. 15 Ethiopia Ceasefire signed by Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front and Oromo Liberation Front. Libya Mandatory UN sanctions come into force. Vietnam National Assembly unanimously approves new constitu- tion. 16 Malawi President Hastings Banda dissolves National Assembly and announces legislative elections. 24 Afghanistan Majority of mujahideen groups agree three-stage plan for transfer of power following fall of Najibullah.
    [Show full text]
  • Jordan's Cabinet Re-Re-Shuffled
    COUNTRY REPORT Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. JORDAN MONA KOEHLER-SCHINDLER Jordan’s cabinet re-(re-)-shuffled DR. MANUEL SCHUBERT IMKE HAASE A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORMS IN JORDAN? FEBRUARY 2017 At a time of deteriorating economic condi- Notables/Senate, whose members are ap- tions and security challenges Prime Minis- pointed by the monarch, and the 130-seat www.kas.de/amman ter Hani Mulki, appointed by HM King Ab- House of Deputies, whose members are dullah in May last year, conducted a re- popularly elected. However, the House of shuffle to his cabinet on 15 January 2017. Deputies has little power to initiate laws The changes were approved by a Royal alone, as the Senate needs to pass any pro- decree and are affecting major portfolios. posals made by the Deputies. The King has It is the second re-shuffle to Mulki’s cabi- the power to dissolve the House of Deputies net after less than seven months in office at any time. An independent judicial branch and includes six new ministers: The Minis- is guaranteed by the Jordanian constitution try of State for Prime Ministry Affairs, the and consists of civil, religious and special Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of For- courts, with informal tribal courts still being eign Affairs and Expatriates, the Ministry used, primarily in rural areas. of Education, the Ministry for Legal Affairs and the Ministry of Youth. Internal rivalries and the repercussions of Karak Changes to the Jordanian political land- scape are not uncommon and happen reg- According to official statements, the recent ularly.
    [Show full text]