UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Presidential Cabinet Formation as Leadership Strategy in Asian Democracies A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Dong Seong Lee Committee in charge: Professor Samuel Kernell, Chair Professor Stephan Haggard Professor Megumi Naoi Professor Kaare Strøm Professor Jong-Sung You 2015 © Dong Seong Lee, 2015 All rights reserved. The Dissertation of Dong Seong Lee is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Chair University of California, San Diego 2015 iii DEDICATION To my parents who have made this journey possible iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page…………………………..……………….………………….…………... iii Dedication……………………………………………….………….……….…………... iv Table of Contents…………………….…………………………….……….………...…. v List of Figures……………………………...….………………………………..….…… vii List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………. ix Acknowledgments…………………………………………………..……………..….… xi Vita…………………………………………………………………..………………..... xiv Abstract of the Dissertation...………………………………………………….….……. xv 1. The Politics of Presidential Cabinet Formation in Asian Democracies…...................... 1 1.1. Why Cabinet Formation in Presidential Systems?................................................... 6 1.2. Organization of the Dissertation............................................................................ 18 2. A Theory of Cabinet Formation in Presidential Democracies….................................. 26 2.1. Presidential Goals and Cabinet Appointments...................................................... 26 2.2. Trade-off in Cabinet Appointments....................................................................... 28 2.3. Literature Review…………………....................................................................... 31 2.4. Theory…………….………………....................................................................... 38 2.5. Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………… 54 3. The Patterns of Presidential Cabinet Formation in Asian Democracies....................... 59 3.1. Case Selection and Data……………………......................................................... 59 3.2. Measurement.......................................................................................................... 63 3.3. Method: Modeling Presidential Cabinet Formation……….................................. 74 3.4. Empirical Research………………….................................................................... 75 3.5. Discussion………………...................................................................................... 84 3.6. Acknowledgements ………………....................................................................... 86 4. Quality of Bureaucracy and Ministerial Choice in Presidential Democracies............. 90 4.1. Delegation Mechanism in Democratic Government ............................................. 93 4.2. Executive Control of Bureaucracy in Presidential Democracy: Presidential Appointment as Administrative Strategy......................................................... 98 4.3. Comparative Perspective…………..................................................................... 101 4.4. Empirical Analysis…………………................................................................... 123 4.5. Empirical Results………………………............................................................. 133 v 4.6. Discussion……………........................................................................................ 140 4.7. Acknowledgements………………...................................................................... 141 5. Presidential Policymaking Strategy and Portfolio Allocation in South Korea........... 151 5.1. Patterns of Portfolio Allocation in Korea…........................................................ 153 5.2. Presidents, Party Membership, and Portfolio Allocation………………………. 156 5.3. Empirical Analysis……………........................................................................... 164 5.4. Empirical Results………………………............................................................. 169 5.5. Discussion…………………................................................................................ 175 6. Conclusion………...................................................................................................... 180 7. Appendix………......................................................................................................... 189 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Percentage of Nonpartisan Ministers and Percentage of Cabinet Reshuffling in Asian Presidential Cabinets................................................................................... 12 Figure 2.1: Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with Party Systems on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments................................ 46 Figure 2.2: Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with Presidential Popularity on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments.................. 49 Figure 2.3: Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with the Presidential Electoral Cycle on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments.... 52 Figure 2.4: A Model of Cabinet Formation in Presidential Democracies........................ 54 Figure 3.1: Share of Nonpartisan Ministers within Twenty-one Presidential Administrations from Four Asian Democracies........................................................ 68 Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of President's Legislative Contingent and Predicted Share of Nonpartisan Cabinet Members.................................................................................. 79 Figure 3.3: Marginal Effect of Legislative Fragmentation on Nonpartisan Share across Range of President's Legislative Contingent............................................................. 81 Figure 3.4: Marginal Effect of Presidential Popularity on Nonpartisan Share across Range of President's Legislative Contingent………………………….…………………... 83 Figure 4.1: Share of Nonpartisan Ministers with Civil Service Backgrounds in Twenty- one Presidential Administrations from Four Asian Democracies............................. 91 Figure 4.2: Delegation Mechanisms under Parliamentary and Presidential Democracy.. 94 Figure 4.3: Relationship between Bureaucracy Quality and Share of Ministers with Civil Service Backgrounds Among All Professional Ministers in the Cabinet............... 134 vii Figure 4.4: Marginal Effect of Bureaucratic Quality and Predicted Share of Professional Ministers with Civil Service Backgrounds……….……………............................. 138 Figure 4.5: Average Marginal Effect of Coefficients from Model 2.............................. 140 Figure 5.1: Marginal Effect and Predicted Probability of Nonpartisan Appointments.. 173 Figure 5.2: Marginal Effect and Predicted Probability of Copartisan Appointments…. 174 viii LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1: Number of Cabinets and Number of Types of Cabinets in Latin American and Asian Presidential Democracies…………………………...................……………... 9 Table 2.1: Constitutional Powers of Popularly Elected Presidents by Country in East Asia............................................................................................................................ 36 Table 2.2: Citizens' Trust in Political Parties as a Political Institution in East Asia........ 48 Table 3.1: Twenty-one Presidential Administrations from Four Asian Democracies...... 60 Table 3.2: Share of Subtypes of Nonpartisan Ministers in Four Asian Presidential Systems…………………………………………………………………………….. 65 Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables…………..…… 73 Table 3.4: Expected Signs of Estimated Coefficients of Variables……………….……. 76 Table 3.5: Results from Extended Beta-Binomial Models of Cabinet Formation……… 77 Table 3.6: Results from Panel Fixed Effects Models of Cabinet Formation…………… 78 Table 4.1: Factors Affecting Appointment Mechanisms for Civil Service Control....... 123 Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables........................ 129 Table 4.3: Bureaucratic Quality and Presidential Choice of Professional Ministers, Univariate Regression Analysis.............................................................................. 135 Table 4.4: Bureaucratic Quality and Presidential Choice of Professional Ministers, Multivariate Regression Analysis……………………………………..…............. 137 Table 5.1: Copartisan and Nonpartisan Ministers in Executive Ministries across Five Administrations: Percent (Number) of Ministers………………………..……...... 154 Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables........................ 169 Table 5.3: Expected Signs of Estimated Coefficients of Variables................................ 170 ix Table 5.4: Logit Analysis of Minister Type, Policy Area of Post, and President's Legislative Support.................................................................................................. 171 Table A1: Sources for the List and Profile of Cabinet Ministers in the East Asia Cabinet Minister Data Set..................................................................................................... 189 Table A2: List of the Title of Cabinet Members Included in the Analysis..................... 189 Table A3: Sources of Independent and Control Variables in the East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set...................................................................................................... 192 Table A4: A list of