TRIM COMPANY FOCUS Nov 13, 2013 Matahari Putra Prima Hyper growth
Strong growth outlook We initiate MPPA with a Buy and 19% upside on the back of 1) MPPA’s largest store network implies it will be the prime bene ciary of growth in modern retail grocery outside Java, implying it can grow faster than other hypermarkets, 2) Strong growth outlook with EPS CAGR (2013 16E) of 25% on the back of 23% revenue CAGR and margin expansion, and 3) Strong balance sheet with potential upside in dividend payout.
Matahari Putra Prima opened its fi rst Plenty of upside for modern retail grocery business outside Java hypermart in 2004. It divested its department store business in 2010 to Currently only 14% of total grocery value in Indonesia is modern grocery retail, focus wholly on hypermarket business. far below neighboring countries such as Philippines (25%), Thailand (42%), and Malaysia (53%). We expect MPPA to grow aggressively at ~20 stores per year in coming three years, most of which will be in outside Java market which has lower BUY Rp2700 sales per store but higher pro t per store. Currently stores in Java contribute 66.5% of revenue but 44.9% of operating pro t. Hypermart currently has ~2.6x as many Initiate Coverage stores as its competitors outside Java as its competitors have been mainly focused in Java market. Share Price Rp2,275 Sector Consumer Strong balance sheet Target Price Rp2,700 (19%) We estimate the company’s EBITDA to net interest expense ratio to be 11.4x in Prev. TP 2014E with only 9 days of cash cycle, implying the company has a healthy FCFF generation, particularly from 2015 onward. We believe there is some upside risk to Stock Data our dividend payout ratio of 30%, which implies a 0.5% dividend yield. Reuters Code MPPA.JK Bloomberg Code MPPA.IJ On the ground visit Issued Shares (m) 5,378 We visited three hypermarkets: Hypermart, Carrefour, and Lotte. We found that Mkt Cap (Rpbn) 12,369 there is potential upside in margins from selling own brands as we noticed many Average Daily T/O (m) 11.4 owned brands in Carrefour and Lottemart but less in Hypermart store. Hypermart 52 Wk range Rp3,150 / Rp900 store feels more luxurious and easier to navigate, but could improve by adding a canteen in their store and by having more promotions or lower prices. Major Shareholders: Valuation: DCF based target price of Rp2,700 (19% upside) PT. Multipolar Tbk. 50.3% We use DCF valuation method with a WACC of 11.0% to arrive at our target price of Prime star Investment Pte. Ltd. 26.1% Rp2,700. Current price implies 27x PE but we believe the company’s strong growth Public 13.6% justi es such valuation. MPPA trades at 2014 PEG of 1.08x to fall to 0.9x in 2015. Forecast & Rating Consensus Year end 31 Dec 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E EPS 13E 14F Consensus (Rp) NA NA Revenue (Rpbn) 8,909 10,868 11,968 14,761 18,361 TRIM VS Cons (%) NA NA Revenue Growth (%) 4.3 22.0 10.1 23.3 24.4 Stock Price EBITDA (Rpbn) 309 365 730 933 1,192 EBITDAGrowth (%) (10.5) 18.4 99.7 27.9 27.8
Volume Price Core net pro t (306) 184 382 460 598 3,500 90,000,000 80,000,000 3,000 EPS Growth (%) (98.2) (159.9) 108.2 20.4 29.9 70,000,000 2,500 60,000,000 ROAE(%) (4.8) 3.9 9.5 10.4 12.3 2,000 50,000,000
1,500 40,000,000 DPS (Rp) 482 9 10 21 26 30,000,000 1,000 20,000,000 Div Yield (%) 21.2 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.1 500 10,000,000 P/E (x) (39.9) 66.7 32.0 26.6 20.5 - - P/BV (x) 2.2 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.4
1/9/2013
3/9/2013
5/9/2013
7/9/2013
9/9/2013 11/9/2012 11/9/2013 EV/EBITDA (x) 41.2 30.5 17.0 13.1 10.2 Sebastian Tobing [email protected] TRIM Company Focus Nov 13, 2013
Hypermarket business is on hyper growth mode Given strong economic growth outlook of 5 6% GDP growth in the next ve years, increasing urbanization rate, and increasing labor force, disposable income is forecasted by EIU to grow signi cantly with 2012 17E CAGR of 11.8%. This in turn implies potential growth of 5.8% CAGR (2012 17E) in food expenditure and 15.3% in non food expenditure. Not only Indonesia has a healthy population growth at 4% CAGR (2009 12), Indonesia’s middle income group has also grown at a strong pace of 13% CAGR (2009 12) while its’ high income group grew at 12% CAGR (2009 12). Indonesian USD140bn retail market (source: EIU), approximately USD97bn is grocery retail, of which only USD14bn or 14% of total grocery value is modern grocery retail. Hypermarkets currently has 24% of the modern grocery retail business, with the remaining shared by convenience stores (36%) and supermarkets (39%).
Figure 1. Urbanization and increase in labor force in Indonesia
Source: EIU
Figure 2. Indonesia’s disposable income and growth in consumer
Source: EIU
Figure 3. Expenditure per Capita/Month
High Income >475
Middle Income 74 475
Low Income <74
Source: Company, Central Bureau of Statistics, and Mark Plus
2 TRIM Company Focus Nov 13, 2013
Figure 4. Modern retail grocery as % of total retail grocery
Vietnam 4% Indonesia 14% Philippines 25% Thailand 42% Taiwan 44% Malaysia 53% Hong Kong 62% China 63% Singapore 71% USA 84%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
Source: company and Euromonitor
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Management strategy
In the middle of aggressive expansion Since selling its department store business back in 2010 to focus on hypermart, MPPA has accelerated annual store opening from 5 stores in 2010 to 15 17 per year in 2011 12. This year, we expect MPPA to open 19 new stores (11 new stores opened up to end of Oct13) and expect a pace of ~20 new stores in the next three years, similar to management’s guidance.
Figure 5. MPPA’s number of Hypermart stores and growth rate in 2013 16
21% CAGR 2013-16E 300 255 250 235 215 195 200 175 150 150 120 99 100 80 63 51 50
0 2010201120122013E2014E2015E2016E2017E2018E2019E2020 E
Source: Trimegah, company, and Euromonitor
Figure 6. MPPA’s number of Hypermart stores and growth rate in 2013 16
MPPA's Hypermart revenue Market share
40.0 60.0% 35.0 50.0% 30.0 40.0% 25.0 20.0 30.0% 15.0 20.0% 10.0 10.0% 5.0 - 0.0% 2010201120122013E2014E2015E2016E2017E2018E2019E2020 E
Source: Trimegah, company, and Euromonitor
Most of the new stores will be opened outside Java, which are usually smaller in area and revenue but higher in pro tability, mostly due to lower labor and rental costs. Stores in Java currently contributes approximately 66.5% of revenue but only 44.9% of operating pro t while stores outside Java contributes 42.5% of revenue but 55.1% of operating pro t. As the proportion of stores outside Java grows, we expect the average area per store to be smaller, revenue per m2 to decline but operating pro t per m2 to grow.
MPPA owns three distribution centers that supplies to all of its store locations. Having its own distribution center helps improve supply chain which in turn help reduce working capital requirement.
4 TRIM Company Focus Nov 13, 2013
Thriving and gaining market share There are four major companies competing in hypermarkets in Indonesia from largest to smallest: Carrefour (majority owned by CT Trans group), Hypermart (MPPA), Giant (Jardine group’s Dairy Farm), and Lottemart (Lotte group from Korea). As of Sep13, Hypermart has the largest number of stores in Indonesia overall and particularly outside Greater Jakarta and outside Java, while Carrefour has the largest number of stores in Greater Jakarta. Since 2007, Hypermart has gained signi cant market share while Carrefour has lost market share. We believe this is due to: 1) Hypermart’s aggressive expansion in under penetrated markets outside Greater Jakarta area, particularly outside Java, and 2) Carrefour slowing down its expansion as new ownership (Trans group) had little experience in retail business.
We expect Hypermart to continue its aggressive expansion outside Java as it aims to be the rst mover in many cities
Figure 7. Number of stores per company
Greater Jakarta Other Java Outside Java Total 100 89 90 82 80 13 70 39 60 30 49 50 4 40 28 15 30 20 20 39 30 7 10 22 6 - 7 HypermartCarrefourGiantLottemart
Source: MPPA
Figure 8. Market share versus competitors
Source: MPPA
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Carrefour and Lottemart usually own larger stores (7000 8000m2) versus MPPA’s slightly smaller (averaging 6,809m2 per store in 2012) format. We expect MPPA’s average store size to decline as it opens more stores outside Greater Jakarta area. From the perspective of items sold in their stores, MPPA focuses more on food items, which implies it competes more directly with Giant. Only 26% of Hypermart’s sales is non food versus 45% for Carrefour.
Figure 9.
Hypermart Carrefour Food, 26%
Food, 45%
Non-Food, Non-Food, 74% 55%
Source: MPPA
Initiatives that could drive improvement in margins and upside in revenue growth Despite signi cant increase in market share in the past ve years, we believe there is still potential upside that make us con dent in our projection of 23% hypermart revenue CAGR in 2013 16E and operating margin increase from 4.5% in 2013 to 4.7% in 2016E. 1) Further expansion outside Java. Outside Java areas are still under penetrated and more pro table. As MPPA continues to expand in outside Java, we believe operating margin could grow from 4.5% in 2013E to 4.7% in 2016E. 2) Selling more non food items. There is upside to revenue growth and margins if MPPA sells more non food items in Hypermart stores. While we think MPPA is unlikely to reach the 45% non food contribution to Carrefour’s sales, there is certainly room for higher non food contribution from currently 26% for MPPA. 3) Selling more own labeled products, which have higher margins . Currently only 3.5% of Hypermart sales is its own labeled products. Although we do not have the gure for MPPA’s competitors, we noticed more own labeled products on Carrefour and Lotte’s shelves. Outside Java is where the opportunity lies
Figure 10. MPPA’s hypermart locations as at end of Sep13 (total 89 stores)
Source: Population Census 2010, BPS
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Figure 11. Map of Hypermart stores and sales contribution
Source: MPPA
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Takeaways from on the ground visits
We visited Hypermart, Carrefour, and Lotte mart in southern Jakarta on 7 Nov. Takeaways: Carrefour is more crowded, but to be fair, Hypermart location that we visited in Kemang village is fairly new. Lottemart that we visited has been in Ratu Plaza was a store that Lotte mart acquired two years ago from Makro group. We feel the Hypermart store we visited is more luxurious compared to Carrefour and Lottemart. Hypermart store is also easier to navigate due to larger signs and better grouping and On The Ground arrangements of items. In short, the shopping experience felt better in Hypermart despite shorter aisle – we estimate Hypermart’s aisle to be about 2.2m wide versus Carrefour and Lottemart’s 2.7m. The Visit Hypermart store that we visited also feels cleaner than Carrefour and Lottemart’s. Lottemart does have larger number of cashiers at 27 cashier counters versus Hypermart’s 16 cashier counters and Carrefour’s 20 cashier counters. We believe Hypermart can improve by adding canteens in their hypermarts. We noticed a canteen with sitting area near cashier counters in Carrefour that sells freshly made traditional food and snack. We also noticed a canteen in Lottemart that we visited that sells Korean food, inline with its identity as a Korean retail chain.
Figure 12. Hypermart, Carrefour, and Lottemart’s entrances
Source: TRIM Research
Figure 13. Hypermart, Carrefour, and Lottemart’s entrances
Source: TRIM Research
8 TRIM Company Focus Nov 13, 2013
Promotions in the store Carrefour has most attractive promotions (discounted items) given the variety and as they are easily found, situated right at the center of the store. Hypermart has less promotion and not as strategically placed as Carrefour. Lottemart’s promotion is much harder to nd and less attractive as Carrefour and Hypermart.
Upside from selling own brand We noticed that Carrefour and Lottemart have own branded items, mostly those that people buy often i.e. sugar. Carrefour and Lottemart also promote their own branded items heavily. We have not noticed any own branded items in Hypermart, which we think an opportunity for the company. Own brand should result in higher margin, particularly as the store would not have to spend heavily on promotion.
Figure 14. Hypermart stores are neat with nice big signs
Source: TRIM Research Figure 15. Carrefour store was less neat, while Lottemart store was harder to navigate
Source: TRIM Research
Quick price survey on 10 popular items We surveyed 10 items that we reckon to be popular brands and to be basic needs that people often buy i.e. laundry detergent, toothpaste, sugar. We then rank the Hypermart, Carrefour, and Lottemart from 1 to 3 for every item with 1 being cheapest and 3 being most expensive. Hence, the lower the sum means the cheaper the store. Our survey shows that Lottemart is the cheapest with 17 points and being the cheapest for 5 items while Carrefour in the middle with 19 points and Hypermart the most expensive with 24 points, being the cheapest for only 1 item.
9 TRIM Company Focus Nov 13, 2013
We will be watching prices more closely in coming months in case Hypermart prices become too expensive and drive customers away. Currently we do not believe there is public perception that one is cheaper than another. Note that our survey is done at one location for each hypermarket store, i.e. it may not be re ective of overall trend. To be fair, the Hypermart store we surveyed is located in Kemang village, a new mall with captive market (located within an apartment complex) with rental rate that is likely to be higher than the Carrefour location (Blok M area, an old shopping complex) and Lottemart location (Ratu Plaza, also an old shopping complex). All are located in Jakarta.
Figure 16. Price survey in three Hypermarket stores
Hyper Car Lotte Hyper Car Lot Hyper Carre Lotte Barang Description mart refour Mart mart refour temart mart four Mart (Rp) (Rp) (Rp) (USD) (USD) (USD)
Rinso antinoda 900g Laundry Detergent 16,000 16,650 15,500 1.4 1.5 1.4 2.0 3.0 1.0 Sania 2 liter Fried oil 21,975 21,550 23,500 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.0 3.0 Kopi Kapal Api 165g Coffee 10,925 9,490 10,300 1.0 0.8 0.9 3.0 1.0 2.0 Lux bar wake me up 85g Soap 2,325 2,500 2,400 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 3.0 2.0 Pepsodent White 120g Toothpaste 5,100 4,690 5,200 0.4 0.4 0.5 2.0 1.0 3.0 Dancow Enrich Instant 400g Milk Powder 35,575 37,450 34,200 3.1 3.3 3.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 Indomie goreng Instant Noodle 1,965 1,650 1,600 0.2 0.1 0.1 3.0 2.0 1.0 Daging ayam boiler (per kg) Chicken meat 39,900 31,750 29,800 3.5 2.8 2.6 3.0 2.0 1.0 Daging sapi giling (per kg) Beef 108,850 78,000 74,600 9.6 6.8 6.5 3.0 2.0 1.0 Gula lokal Sugar 13,800 12,900 13,300 1.2 1.1 1.2 3.0 1.0 2.0 24.0 19.0 17.0 Source: TRIM Research
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Risk
Delays in store openings may lead to lower than expected revenue growth Revenue growth might be lower than projected if there are delays in store openings, which in turn may be caused by construction delays, some of which might not be within management control (particularly if the company rents space in malls owned by third party).
Margin could be lower if there is sudden downturn in purchasing power Although we are optimistic in Indonesia’s long term economic outlook and potential growth in purchasing power, there could be short term downturns that may cause MPPA’s margins to fall in the near term, which would negatively affect our earnings projections.
Rental risk MPPA does not own any land asset. It rents space for all of its stores. Although rental rate has been consistently ~3% of sales and company has a long term deal with most landowners that ties rental rate at 2.5 2.8% of sales, there is a risk the rental cost could increase in the future. Note that we think the company majority owner (Lippo Group)’s expertise in property helps MPPA in dealing with landowners (some of MPPA’s stores are located in malls owned by the group).
Competition risk There are currently four major hypermarket businesses including MPPA’s Hypermart. There is a risk that other hypermarket businesses, i.e. Carrefour, Giant, or Lottemart become signi cantly more aggressive, which pose risk on revenue growth and margin projections.
Salary cost risk There is a risk that MPPA’s revenue growth may lag salary cost growth if minimum wage is increased signi cantly. MPPA has ~10,000 employees, most of whom are employed in the stores. This could have temporary negative impact on margins.
11 TRIM Company Focus Nov 13, 2013
Financials
We expect MPPA to build 21/30/25 stores in 2014/15/16E while average revenue per store to stay roughly
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opened per year decline. We estimate revenue to grow by 23/24/22% in 2014/15/16E that translates to core EPS growth of 20/30/25% in 2014/15/16E which implies an EPS CAGR (2013 16E) of 25%.
MPPA has a healthy balance sheet with net debt to EBITDA of only 0.3x in 2013E and EBITDA to net interest expense of 2x in the same year. Given its strong balance sheet, the company should be able to give higher dividend payout (or perhaps in the form of another special dividend) versus our assumption of 30% dividend payout. Note that net debt to EBITDA temporarily went up to positive territory in 2011 as the company gave out Rp2.6tr dividend post divestment of Matahari Department Store in 2010.
Figure 17. Revenue drivers and earnings estimates
2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Revenue drivers Number of stores 51 63 80 99 120 150 175 195 215 235 255 New stores built in the year 5 12 17 19 21 30 25 20 20 20 20
Average Revenue per store 133 130 120 122 122 127 131 133 135 137 Revenue per existing store 152 133 133 134 135 137 138 140 141 142 Revenue per new store 52 119 66 66 67 68 68 69 70 70
Total revenue 8,545 8,909 10,868 11,968 14,761 18,361 22,316 25,657 28,710 31,823 34,995 Hypermart revenue 7,747 8,365 10,380 11,884 14,671 18,266 22,214 25,549 28,595 31,700 34,864 Others 798 543 488 84 89 95 101 108 115 123 131
Gross pro t 1,867 1,558 1,898 2,090 2,577 3,206 3,896 4,480 5,013 5,556 6,110 EBITDA 345 309 365 730 933 1,192 1,443 1,645 1,832 2,022 2,214 Operating pro t 54 (220) 280 539 672 845 1,038 1,206 1,364 1,527 1,697 Pretax pro t 57 164 267 565 669 853 1,050 1,214 1,384 1,539 1,703 Core net pro t (124) (306) 184 382 460 598 746 869 997 1,112 1,235 Core EPS (24) (57) 34 71 86 111 139 162 185 207 230
Revenue growth (%) 4.3 22.0 10.1 23.3 24.4 21.5 15.0 11.9 10.8 10.0 EBITDA growth (%) 10.5 18.4 99.7 27.9 27.8 21.1 14.0 11.4 10.3 9.5 Operating pro t growth (%) 507.9 227.0 92.7 24.7 25.8 22.9 16.2 13.1 12.0 11.1 Core EPS growth (%) 136.7 159.9 108.2 20.4 29.9 24.8 16.5 14.7 11.6 11.1 Source: TRIM Research
We expect MPPA to maintain its cash cycle at around 9 days in the foreseeable future. The company has three distribution centers in Tangerang (Greater Jakarta), Cibitung (West Java), and Surabaya (East Java). Currently 59% of items sold went through its own distribution centers. We expect this number to rise in the future as company plans to open another distribution center in 2014.
Figure 18. EBITDA to net interest expense (x)
EBITDA to net interest expense (x)
30.00 24.6 25.00 21.1 20.00 17.7 17.4 14.8 15.00 12.8 11.4 10.00
5.00 2.0 0.6 0.9 - 201120122013E2014E2015E2016E2017E2018E2019E2020E Source: TRIM Research
12 TRIM Company Focus Nov 13, 2013
Figure 19. Cash cycle
Cash Cycle 10.0
9.5
9.0
8.5
8.0
7.5 2013E2014E2015E2016E2017E2018E2019E2020E
Source: TRIM Research
Figure 20. Product ow from MPPA’s distribution centers
Source: MPPA
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Valuation
We use DCF valuation method to arrive at target price of Rp2,700, implying a 17% upside. We initiate the stock with a Buy with the following reasons: 1) MPPA’s largest store network implies it will be the prime bene ciary of growth in modern retail grocery in outside Java, implying it can grow faster than other hypermarkets, 2) Strong growth outlook with EPS CAGR (2013 16E) of 25% on the back of 23% revenue CAGR and margin expansion, and 3) Strong balance sheet with potential upside in dividend payout. Multiple valuation with 27x 2014PE is high versus market’s 14x 2014PE but the company’s strong growth justi es such valuation. MPPA trades at 2014 PEG of 1.08x to fall to 0.9x in 2015. We examined Carrefour’s 60% stake sale to CT group (Chairul Tanjung) in Nov 2012. The 60% stake was sold for USD750m, implying USD1.25bn value for the whole Carrefour Indonesia. This further implies value of USD22m per store. If we apply the same value to MPPA’s Hypermart stores (89 stores as at end of Sep13), we arrive at hypothetical fair value of Rp2,871 using Carrefour’s transaction as comparison.
Figure 21. WACC and DCF calculations
Column1 Column2
Risk free rate 7.5% Market premium 5.0% Beta 1.00 Debt rate 10.0% Debt proportion 30.0% Tax rate 25.0% Equity cost of capital 12.5% Debt cost of capital 7.5% WACC 11.0% LT growth rate 5.0%
Description 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E EBIT (1 tax) 633 778 904 1,023 1,146 1,273 1,405 1,528 1,642 1,759 1,881 Depreciation and Amortisation 348 406 439 469 494 517 536 536 537 537 537 Changes in non cash Working Capital 27 (52) (24) (5) (29) (19) (18) (21) (16) (17) (18) Capex (949) (812) (674) (674) (674) (674) (674) (537) (537) (537) (537) FCFF 59 320 645 812 936 1,096 1,249 1,506 1,626 1,743 1,863 29,564 Discounted FCFF 53 260 472 535 556 586 602 654 635 614 9,380 707 Total discounted FCFF 14,346 Net cash (debt) (25) NAV 14,321
# of shares 5,378 NAV / share 2,663
Target price after rounding 2,700 Upside 19%
Source: TRIM Research
14 TRIM Company Focus Nov 13, 2013
Figure 22. Hypothetical value of MPPA shares based on sale value of Carrefour’s 60% stake to CT in Nov 2012
Ownership sold 60%
Value for 60% USD mn 750 Total value USD mn 1,250 Number of stores 82 as at end of Sep13 Value per store 15 Number of Hypermart stores 89 as at end of Sep13 Hypothetical value per store USD mn 15 Total MPPA EV USD mn 1,357 Total MPPA EV Rp bn 15,466 MPPA's net cash (debt) (25) end of 2014 projection MPPA's hypothetical fair value Rp bn 15,441 MPPA's hypothetical fair value Rp/share 2,871 based on Carrefour's store sale value Source: TRIM Research Figure 23. Comparison versus other listed retail companies Company name Ticker Price 2013 PE (x) 2014 PE (x) 2015 PE (x) Modern Internasional MDRN IJ 860 54.0 41.9 31.0 Sumber Alfaria Trijaya AMRT IJ 520 32.3 25.2 19.7 Ace Hardware Indonesia ACES IJ 620 23.9 19.9 16.7 Mitra Adiperkasa MAPI IJ 4950 19.5 15.8 12.2 Matahari Department Store LPPF IJ 11400 28.7 21.0 16.5 Average 31.7 24.8 19.2 Matahari Putra Prima MPPA IJ 2275 32.0 26.6 20.5 Source: Bloomberg Hypothetical value of MPPA shares based on sale value of Carrefour’s 60% stake to CT in Nov 2012
Company background and ownership Matahari Putra Prima opened its rst department store in 1958 in Jakarta. The company opened its rst department store outside Jakarta in 1980 and went public in 1992 to fuel further expansion. In 2004, the company opened its rst Hypermart store. Aggressive expansion resulted in 10 Matahari department stores, 4 Kids2kids stores, 13 Hypermarts, 4 Cut Price stores, and 1 supermarket by 2005. The company decided to divest Matahari Department Stores for Rp7.2tr in 2010 as management decided to focus on hypermart business. Following the divestment, company opened 12 new Hypermart stores in 2011 and 17 new Hypermart stores in 2012.
Matahari Putra Prima is owned by Lippo group through its listed holding companies: Multipolar (MLPL IJ) and Star Paci c (LPLI IJ) . Temasek also owns a signi cant market share (26%) in MPPA.
Figure 24. MPPA ownership
17%
Multipolar (Lippo group)
Star pacific (Lippo group)
50% Prime Star Investment Pte Ltd (Temasek) 26% Public
6% Source: MPPA
15 TRIM Company Focus Nov 13, 2013
Income Statement (Rpbn) Balance Sheet (Rpbn)
Year end 31 Dec 2010 2011 2012E 2013F 2014F Year end 31 Dec 2010 2011 2012E 2013F 2014F
Revenue 8,909 10,868 11,968 14,761 18,361 Cash and Deposits 1,795 2,916 386 565 637 % growth 4.3 22.0 10.1 23.3 24.4 Accounts and notes 35 43 41 56 68 Gross Profi t 1,558 1,898 2,090 2,577 3,206 Inventories 1,266 1,671 1,777 2,230 2,774 Opr Profi t (220) 280 539 672 845 Other Current Assets 523 455 501 618 769 EBITDA 309 365 730 933 1,192 LT investment & LT 884 0 - - - % growth (10.5) 18.4 99.7 27.9 27.8 Net Fixed Assets 1,644 775 966 1,228 1,575 Net Int Inc/(Exp) 60 (46) (7) (36) (25) Other long term Asset 4,162 2,365 3,949 4,042 4,223 Gain/(loss) Forex - - - - - Total Assets 10,308 8,225 7,621 8,738 10,047 Other Inc/(Exp) 384 (12) 27 (2) 8 Account Payable 1,290 1,422 1,561 1,998 2,428 Pre-tax Profi t 164 267 565 669 853 ST Debt 779 537 362 362 362 Tax (44) (29) (141) (167) (213) Other Current Liabilities 891 757 833 1,027 1,278 Minority Int. 15 19 - - - LT Debt 1,494 1,280 228 228 228 Extra. Items - - - - - Other LT Liabs 171 383 422 521 648 Core net profi t (306) 184 382 460 598 Total Liabilities 4,625 4,379 3,406 4,136 4,943 % growth (98.2) 110.0 92.2 18.4 27.5 Minority Interest 50 0 - - - Shareholder's Equity 3,113 603 603 603 603 Retained earning & other 2,520 3,242 3,611 3,998 4,500 Cash Flow (Rpbn)
Year end 31 Dec 2010 2011 2012E 2013F 2014F Key Ratio Analysis
Core net profi t (306) 184 382 460 598 Year end 31 Dec 2010 2011 2012E 2013F 2014F Depr/Amort 234 275 191 262 348 Pro tability Others (664) (472) - - - Chg in Opr Ass&Liab 895 347 (66) (46) 27 Gross Margins (%) 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 CF's from Oprs 157.7 334.0 507.4 675.5 972.7 Op Margins (%) (2.5) 2.6 4.5 4.6 4.6 Disposal of Fixed Assets 14.5 90.3 - - - EBITDA Margins (%) 3.5 3.4 6.1 6.3 6.5 Capex (492) (382) (700) (755) (949) Net Margins (%) (3.4) 1.7 3.2 3.1 3.3 Others 648 3,106 - - - ROE (%) (5.4) 4.8 9.1 10.0 11.7 CF's from Investing 171 2,814 (700) (755) (949) ROA (%) (3.0) 2.2 5.0 5.3 6.0 Dividens paid (2,591) (47) (55) (115) (138) Stability Change in ST Borrowing - - (175) - - Current Ratio (x) 1.2 2.9 2.8 2.4 2.3 Net Chg. in LT Borrowing 1,102 50 (1,052) - - Net Debt/Equity (x) 0.40 0.47 0.14 0.13 0.12 Net Chg. in capital stocks - (2,420) (0) - - Int Coverage (x) 0.9 (1.3) (3.0) (11.4) (14.3) Others (2) (772) (1,054) 372 187 Ef ciency CF's from Financing (1,491) (3,190) (2,337) 258 49 A/P days 64 58 58 60 58 Net Cash Flow (1,162) (41) (2,529) 178 73 A/R days 1 1 1 1 1 Cash at BoY 3,955 1,795 2,916 386 565 Cash at EoY 4,303 2,761 376 633 802 Inventory Days 63 68 66 67 67 Free Cashfl ow 650 716 1,207 1,430 1,922 Cash at EoY 4,303 2,761 376 633 802 Free Cashfl ow 650 716 1,207 1,430 1,922
Interim Result (Rpbn) Capital History
3Q12 4Q12 1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 Date
Sales 2,998 2,897 2,640 2,807 3,263 18-Dec-92 IPO @ Rp7,150 Gross Pro t 543 454 419 433 513 Operating Pro t 77 (49) 40 56 141 Net Pro t 78 67 63 159 99 Gross Margins (%) 18.1 15.7 15.9 15.4 15.7 Opr Margins (%) 2.6 (1.7) 1.5 2.0 4.3 Net Margins (%) 2.6 2.3 2.4 5.7 3.0
16 TRIM Company Focus Nov 13, 2013 Technical Corner
Gina Nasution [email protected]
• MPPA formed a white candle yesterday with strong volume. This week we think MPPA is likely to rebound and will test strong resistance at level 2,475 (R1) with support at level 2,175 (S2) • In December, we think there could be pro t taking as Stochastic Oscillator shows bearish signal. If MPPA could not break the strong resistance level at 2,475, it is likely to come back down to support level of 2,025. • Looking further ahead, we expect MPPA to form double top formation in the next six months to reach resistance level of Rp2,725. • 6m technical target price: Rp2,725.
Support Resistance
S1 S2 R1 R2 2,175 2,025 2,475 2,725
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