Relations Between Nazi Germany and

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Alternative title Notes and Documents - United Nations Centre Against ApartheidNo. 12/76 Author/Creator United Nations Centre against Apartheid; N'dumbe, A. Kum'a Publisher United Nations, New York Date 1976-05-00 Resource type Reports Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) South Africa, Germany Coverage (temporal) 1976 Source Northwestern University Libraries Description This issue explores the influence of Nazi Germany on the development of the ideology of apartheid in South Africa. Format extent 19 page(s) (length/size)

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http://www.aluka.org NOTES AND DOCUMENTS*

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS* No. 12/76 May 1976 RELATIONS BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND SOUTH AFRICA Their influence on the development of the ideology of apartheid by A. Kum'a N'dumbe /Note: the author of this study, Mr. A. Kum'a N'dumbe, teaches history, political science and German at Lyons University II, France. He is a member of the International Committee on the History of the Second World War and the author of several studies and articles on the foreign relations of Hitler's Germany. The opinions expressed i nhe stfdy are those of the author.! SNorthwestern tJniest .... ILIIVOi%- UnlVersity Lbrary l JUL 2 6 1976 76-96475 /. * All material in these notes and documents may be freely reprinted. Acknowledgement, together with a copy of the publication containing the reprint, would be appreciated.

INTRODUCTION After the 1918 Treaty of Versailles, Germany drew back within Europe, abandoning its former African colonies to France, the United Kingdom and South Africa, which then began to administer them as Mandated Territories. Germany never accepted that expulsion from the African continent, an expulsion which it regarded as an injustice. From the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, throughout the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) and until the collapse of the Nazi Reich in 1945, the Germans never ceased to denounce what they called "the theft of the colonies" and to claim "the restitution of their stolen African possessions". Planning the establishment of a world empire dominated by Hitler's Germany, the Nazis no longer claimed the mere restitution of the former German colonies, as the Weimar Republic had done, but planned a new redrawing of the map of Africa, a complete restructuring of the continent after the war, and thus, the creation of a German colonial Reich, the "Mittelafrikanisches Kolonial-Reich". This huge empire was to have an essentially economic role, its political and military functions being secondary. Completely tropical, completely territorial and completely colonial, it was regarded as a "natural economic extension of Europe". It was from Mittelafrika that the African economy was to be completely oriented towards European needs. To achieve that end, Europeans would be called upon not to diffuse their efforts in debilitating competition aimed at creating zones of influence, but to regroup their efforts around Nazi Germany, then mistress of Europe. One community would then be created, Eurafrica, the purpose of which would be to meet European needs for raw materials and colonial markets. The African's function was to be limited to providing the manpower necessary for the smooth functioning of Eurafrica. Deprived of his political, economic and social rights, he was to serve a Fascist colonialist r6gime whose concepts were to be reflected in South Africa's policy of apartheid some years later. This plan, which was to be carried out in the event of a complete or partial victory by Hitler's Germany and the Axis countries, gave a special place to South Africa. Union of South Africa The newspapers of Nazi Germany had always shown great respect and admiration for South Africa's racist policy, particularly when it was embodied by elements of the extreme right of the Nationalist Party. Oswald Pirow, for example, a member of the Nationalist Party who occupied various ministerial posts in the Government, including that of Minister of Defence, was described by the Nazi press as "Minister of defence of the white race". 1/ The headlines of some newspapers praised 1/ Rassenpolitische Auslandskorrespondenz (RAK) No. 7/1937 p. 6 cf. Also Deutsch.-Afrikaner of 15 May 1937. I... and publicized segregation in South Africa, for example: "Racist ideology is on the march: South African draft laws against the mixing of the races"; 2/ "The racist concept of South Africa: the Native Laws Amendment Act 1937"; 3/ "The foreigner speaks.: South Africa respects the frontiers prescribed by nature" 4/, or, again: "Minister Pirow on white domination". 5/ In the 1920s and 1930s, South Africa's racist policy was further elaborated. For its future consolidation, its die-hard partisans counted on two essential factors: the assumption of power by the extreme right, represented by the Nationalist Party and later by the United Party, and the presence of Nazi Germany in Africa. Once in power, the racists would attempt to determine the course of the history of the entire continent. "The Minister, Mr. Pirow, affirmed," according to RAK, "that the role of Africa in world politics ... would depend almost entirely on whether the white man maintained his domination ... South Africa would recognize that, in the final analysis, political equality would correspond to social equality. And social equality would lead to a race of bastards. To recognize those facts is to determine the current policy of South Africa, which in future will remain the policy of the country." 6/ Through the coalition of the Nationalist Party and the South African Party on 23 February 1933, barely a few weeks after Hitler's assumption of power in Germany, the notorious racists were installed in power in South Africa. The two parties merged a year later by creating the United Party on 5 December 1934. Hertzog, the Prime Minister, was a declared partisan of Nazi Germany. During the Second World War, he was to state: "In considering the future relations between blacks and whites in South Africa, the nationalists would welcome a new division of Africa if Germany could reign over a territory in central Africa (Mittelafrika) stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean. They would regard that German territory as a welcome barrier against other concepts of racial policy." 7/ Thus, while South Africa relied on Nazi Germany, Nazi Germany in turn relied on South Africa. The relations between the two countries were, in that regard, revealing. 2/ RAK No. 2/1940 p. 3. 3/ RAK No. 4/1938 p. 3. L/ Ibid., p. 15. 5/ RAK No. 7/1937 p. 6. 6/ RAK No. 7/1937 p. 6. 7/ Sfidafrika-Bericht 26 September 1940; AA-Bonn Pol x f. 240626.

I. RELATIONS BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA Economic relations The economic relations between the two countries would be essentially commercial. Completely integrated into the economic circuit of the large British family, South African trade with Germany was of little importance before the First World War. It was not until the assumption of power by fascism in the two countries that, as of 1934, a clearing agreement for the promotion of trade exchanges was concluded. 8/ That agreement set forth the different categories of goods to be traded between the two countries, fixed the over-all rate of exchange which was to serve as a basis for each country, established banking facilities, the modalities of payment and sureties, terms of credit, and so on. The agreement was to be renewed in December of each year, and that was done six times. Each time, Hitler's Germany, which wished at all costs to make a breach in the sterling area, proposed an increasingly high over-all exchange figure, but the South Africans, who were linked economically to the United Kingdom, endeavoured, on the contrary, to lower that same figure, aware that they had to respect British interests. Thanks to those agreements, Hitler's Germany played a prominent role, sometimes even a monopolistic role, in the sale of several articles needed by South Africa. It improved its position until it became the main purchaser of South African products after the United Kingdom, and the third largest supplier to the Union of South Africa after the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 9/. The balance of trade between the two countries stabilized in 1934. If the break-through of Nazi Germany, so actively desired and encouraged by Nationalist circles, had rather strict limits, it was essentially for two reasons: German-British antagonism and the predominance of British interests, on the one hand, and the Jewish problem, on the other. Predominance of British interests In Europe, Hitler vainly tried to make a sure ally of the United Kingdom with which he would be able to reach an understanding with a view to carving up the world. The United Kingdom, however, did not meet Hitler's demands and became the main adversary to be eliminated as quickly as possible. South Africa remained a British preserve. Of the six main industrial sectors in South Africa during the 1930s, namely mining, the iron industry, the metallurgical industry, the chemical industry, the cement industry and the paper industry, the mining industry was by far the most important. Moreover, it was generally the shareholders in the mining sector who created the other industrial sectors which often had considerably less capital. In 1936, for example, mining products constituted more than 8/ Fcr the texts of those agreements, cf. DZA-Potsdam AA 68747 f. 13 et seg. AA-Bonn Ha-Pol Wiehl 43/3 (Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany). 9/ Die Handelsbeziehungen mit der Sidafrikanischen Union BA-Koblenz R 7 VI/378 (Central Archives of the Federal Republic of Germany at Koblenz).

-4- 80 per cent of South African exports. In the mining sector, the gold industry was the most influential. It was controlled by 10 large corporations which themselves controlled more than 140 other corporations, either 100 per cent or through a majority holding. The other mining sectors were controlled by 20 other corporations in which the shareholders were often gold companies. The five other industrial sectors were controlled by only 14 corporations which, however, had more or less direct relationships with the mining corporations. The headquarters of those corporations were either in the United Kingdom, generally in London, or in South Africa, generally in . Only one corporation, specializing in the mining of non-precious metals, particularly copper, the South Afrika Copper Co. Ltd., had its headquarters in New York. Of the 30 corporations engaged in the mining industry, only 10 were involved exclusively in the gold industry. Of those 10, seven had their headquarters in London and only three in South Africa. The capital of those corporations varied between £4 million and £13 million, while the companies with headquarters in South Africa itself, apart from the diamond corporations whose capital varied between £5 million and £10 million, had capital ranging only between £0.5 million and £2 million. We can deduce from this that, in the gold industry, the corporations with headquarters in London were not only more numerous but had far greater capital than those with headquarters in South Africa. Even if the London corporations did not directly control the iron, metallurgical, chemical, cement and paper sectors, they influenced them indirectly, particularly since the 14 non-mining corporations generally had less than £2 million in capital. The Jewish problem The general conclusion that can be drawn from this brief analysis is that economic interests in South Africa were closely linked to British interests and were intermingled with them through multiple holdings. Because South African and British interests were so intimately linked and dependent on each other, South Africa sought to impose obvious limits in its negotiations with the Reich, regardless of what its sympathies for Hitler's Germany might have been. Besides that British factor, a racial factor also came into play. South African Jews boycotted trade relations with Nazi Germany. Now, those Jews played a decisive role in the South African economy. A study on South African Jews, prepared by the Legation of Hitler's Germany at Pretoria, reads: "Jews who are particularly successful such as Sir George Albu, the two Beit brothers, Sir Lionel Philipps (Philipp L~wenberg), Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, Sir ... Michaelis, who are all among the leading pioneers of the South African economy, are of German origin." 10/ 10/ Judenfrage in Siidafrika, report dated 30 November 1936 by the German Legation, BA-Koblenz R 43 II 1424 a/15 f. 26 et seq. I...

Indeed, some of the names mentioned in that report can be found at the head of the largest South African mining corporations. The Central Mining and Rand Mines group, with a capital of £4.4 million, was presided over by F. R. Philipps, M.C.; the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd., with a capital of £9.8 million, was presided over by Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, M.P., who at the same time headed the group which had a monopoly in diamonds, the Consolidated Mines, with a capital of £5 million. Sir Ernest Oppenheimer was thus Chairman of three of the largest mining corporations. The General Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd., with a capital of £2.7 million, had Sir George M. Albu as Chairman, and so on. These examples explain why the Jewish factor was as important as German-British antagonism in preventing the rapid development of trade between Hitler's Germany and South Africa. This economic background, characterized by antagonisms between Nazi and anti-Semitic Germany, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and South African Jews, on the other, would determine the over-all relations between the two countries. It will also provide an understanding of the evolution of the apparently contradictory political relations between those two partners, which were sometimes said to be "natural partners". Diplomatic and other relations Nazi Germany established diplomatic relations with the Union of South Africa at the level of a Legation at Pretoria and five Consulates at Bloemfontein, Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Windhoek (SWA). During the Hitlerian period the Legation was headed by Ministers Plenipotentiaries Wiehl, until July 1937, and Leitner, up to the end of diplomatic relations in 1939. The Union of South Africa was represented in Berlin by a Legation headed by Minister Plenipotentiary S. F. N. Gie, and by a Consulate at Hamburg. In addition to these diplomatic relations at the highest level, there were others. While the German Legation reported directly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, the Ausland Organization (AO) reported exclusively to the Nazi Party (NSDAP). As such, it directed cells not only in Sruth West Africa, but also in South Africa. In South Africa itself, the name of the cell was "Landesgruppe der Union von Sidafrika der AO/NSDAP - Pretoria". That cell was dissolved only in 1937 while the party agencies established in South West Africa had been dissolved in 1934. There were also German clubs and associations in South Africa, while, at Munich, the Union of South Africa was represented at the German Academy by the "Sildafrika Ausschuss der Deutschen Akademie, Minchen". By far the most important body after the Legations was the Germany-South Africa Society. In Germany, it was called "Deutsch-ndafrikanische Gesellschaft e.V., Berlin" and in South Africa "Afrikaans-Duitse Kultuur-Unie, Pretoria". Established in 1933, its principal promoters were, in Nazi Germany, Alexander Prentzel, chief of the industrial potash group, and, in South Africa, who, immediately after its establishment, made the Society a donation of 10,500 Reichsmarks. Mr. Gugelmeier, the President of the Society, was also the President of the association of savings and discount banks, whose commercial aims were determined by the composition of its membership. The following is an account of a meeting of the Society held on 4 December 1934: I...

"About 30 men were present at the meeting held on 4 December in the trade and industry building; first, there were representatives of the exportoriented industries, including the steel corporation (Stahlverein), Siemens, Orenstein and Koppel Demag, and also representatives of the Reichsbank, the central association of the Deutsche Bank, the banking profession and the Commerzbank." ll/ The Society promoted exchanges between the two countries, encouraged business and study trips, facilitated visits by white South African students to Hitler's Germany through fellowships - frequently offered by the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) - organized conferences on bilateral relations and dances, showed films, and had a library which specialized in the problems of both countries. The conferences attracted such a large public that it surprised even the organizers, and the South African students organized in the Afrikaans Nasionale Studentebond contributed to that success. Moreover, it should be noted that 26 per cent of the South African students studying abroad between 1922 and 1933 went to Germany, while 24 per cent went to the United Kingdom and 20 per cent to the United States, etc. 12/ Eminent South African politicians such as Verwoerd and Strydom, who were Prime Ministers of South Africa after the war, studied in Germany. It is interesting to note the following remark concerning Verwoerd: "Verwoerd studied in Hamburg, Leipzig and Berlin from 1924 to 1928. At that time he was said to have had very close relations with National Socialist circles in Germany. Inter alia, he waw said to have inherited his anti- Semitism directly from the racist Hitlerian theoreticians." 13/ When Pirow visited Hitler in November 1938, he was given a hero's welcome by the Germany-South Africa Society, which held a large banquet for 80 people. Its report dated February 1939 contained the following statement: "The reaction to the work of the Society recorded in both the German and the South African press was very encouraging." 14/ One reason why South African students went to Nazi Germany to study was that Nazi Germany had established German schools in South Africa itself. In 1936, there were eight German schools in South Africa, at East Lcndon, Hermannsburg, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Kroondal, Paarl, Pretoria and Weynberg-Vlakte, and three in South West Africa, at Karibib, Lfideritzbucht and Windhoek. ll/ Report of Kurt Weigelt, Director of the Deutsche Bank, quoted in: E. Czaya, Der deutsche Imperialismus in Stid und Siidwestafrika, Berlin 1967, p. 244. 12/ Afrika-Post, Pretoria, 9 December 1960, p. 17 et seq. 13/ R. Italiander, Die neuen Minner Afrikas, Dfisseldorf, 1960, p. 175. 14/ Arbeitsbericht der Deutsch-Siidafrikanischen Gesellschaft, February 1939, AA-.Bonn Ha-Pol Wiehl, Siidafrika 1938-1943 (Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bonn, FRG). I...

Fascist organizations The Fascist organization "Broederbond" (league of brothers), was created in 1918 and existed publicly until 1924, when it went underground. Its essentially racist programme called for the strict separation of whites and blacks, the separate development of the two communities, and the absolute supremacy of whites over blacks. The Broederbond was in touch with the German Nazi Party and, in 1934, one year after Hitler came to power, Count von Durckheim Montmartin was sent to South Africa by the Nazis to discuss with the Broederbond the possibility of changing the status quo so that South Africa could side with Germany in the event of a world conflict. 15/ In 1944, this organization had about 2,672 members, 8.6 per cent of whom were in the South African administration and 33.3 per cent of whom were in the teaching profession. Moreover, the most important Nationalist leaders such as Malan, Hertzog, Plessis, Verwoerd, etc., were members of it. After the war, in 1948, 60 members of Broederbond stood as Nationalist candidates. 16/ The position of Prime Minister Hertzog was, moreover, well known. In a conversation with Hertzog, van Rensburg, another Fascist leader, said: "If I have to make a selfdiagnosis, I could only call myself a race-conscious Afrikaner, with tendencies which many people today would regard as 'fascistic'." The Prime Minister replied with a smile: "Well, well, possibly we have far more in common than most people would believe." 17'/ Speaking of German National Socialism, Hertzog said that it was "suited to the moral and religious outlook of the Afrikaner; indeed, he considered that the constitution of the old Free State Republic was based on it." 18/ The "Greyshirts" was another Fascist organization and regularly manifested its open anti-Semitism. In the belief that the Jews constituted "an insoluble element in every national life", it organized anti-semitic demonstrations which frequently coincided with the arrival of immigrants fleeing from Nazi Germany. Such was the case when, on 27 October 1936, 600 Jews disembarked in Cape Town from the Stuttgart. The militant activities of the Greyshirts were appreciated by the leaders of the Nationalist Party. In a letter dated 25 October 1937 addressed to the "Greyshirts", F. C. Erasmus, the Secretary of Malan's Nationalist Party, wrote: "My party is glad to give expression to the sincere appreciation of the useful work done by the Greyshirts in one important aspect, viz. that they have very pertinently drawn the attention of the people to the Jewish problem ... We consider that a service has here been done to the nation which deserves recognition and perpetuation." 19/ 15/ B. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, London, 1964, pp. 44-45. 16/ Ibid., p. 48. 17/ Ibid., p. 57. 18/ Ibid., p. 58. 19/ B. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, London, 1964, p. 64. ...

-8- The following year several Greyshirt leaders joined the ranks of the Nationalist Party. Another Fascist organization, known as the "South African Gentile National Socialist Movement", led by Johannes von Strauss von Moltke, already appealed to German fascism because of its name. This movement's established objective was to destroy: "the perversive influence of the Jews in economics, culture, religion, ethics, end statecraft and to re-establish European Aryan countrol in South Africa for the welfare of the Christian peoples of South Africa". 20/ Subsequently, Moltke also joined the Nationalist Party and ultimately became its leader in South West Africa. Other organizations came into being later, Oswald Pirow's "New Order" and, most important, the "Ossewa Brandwag" (OB) which signified "Ochsenwagen Brandwache" (Ox-wagon Brigade) and which was to be the para-military organization of the Fascist elements in South Africa during the war. Organizations in South West Africa (Namibia) The Germans in South West Africa had always been organized in order more effectively to safeguard their interests vis-a-vis the South African administration and the Boer farmers in the Territory. However, it was really in 1924 that a general organization was formed, including practically all the Germans and the various spheres in which they lived or worked: it was called the "Deutscher Bund fur Sidwestafrika". In 1928, the German organizations in the fields of sport, singing an4 music, hunting and defence, etc. joined the Deutscher Bund. National Socialism took root quite early in South West Africa and the Nazi Party (NSDAP) was so well organized in the Territory that cells of the Party were in existence there long before Hitler came to power. This was partly due to the activities of Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, one of the leaders of NSDAP in Germany. Bohle had lived in South Africa, where he had studied, and had then spent some time in South West Africa where he had established NSDAP cells before returning to Germany. Once in Germany, he had gradually risen to the highest ranks of the Party. The important NSDAP department dealing with foreign affairs, the "Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP" (AO/NSDAP), was placed under his direction and, in 1937, he was appointed Secretary of State of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Germans in South West Africa were extremely proud of Bohle's rise in politics and identified themselves with their former political leader who was now at Hitler's side. Apart from the cells of the Party, there were other organizations which were all dependent in one way or another on the Deutscher Bund and therefore on AO/NSDAP. The most important were: Nationalsozialistische Arbeitskameradschaft, which protected the interests of craftsmen, Verband Deutsche Berufsgruppe, Kulturverein, Kriegskameradschaft, etc. As soon as Hitler came to power, the German organizations all adopted the "principle of the Fhrer". That did not mean that all the Germans in South West Africa were members of NSDAP. Schwietering, the Fihrer of the Deutscher Bund was, however, able to write to General von Epp, chief of the Colonial Office (KPA) on 1 June 1939: 20/ Ibid., p. 65. I...

"Your Excellency may rest assured that, as far as the Bund is concerned, nothing has ever been done to impede the dissemination of National Socialist ideas or the strengthening of NSDAP. On the contrary, I have done my best to promote the current developments as far as possible. Of my ten chief collaborators, eight are currently members of the Party." 21/ Another letter from a Nazi leader stated: "Our aim is to din the Hitlerian programme into the heads of the Germans here. We want to force them to fight for the return of South West Africa to Germany. We will achieve that aim by calling those who do not think or act like us traitors." 22/ 21/ E. Bennet, Hitler Over Africa, London 1939, P. 160. 22/ Deutsche Afrika-Post, Johannesburg, 24 June 1936. I...

-10- II. NAZI IDEOLOGY AND SOUTH AFRICAN RACIST POLICY The Nazi policy of racial segregation Racial segregation was to constitute the foundation of Nazi colonial policy, in co- ordination with South Africa. Such segregation was to have political, social and economic aspects. In the Nazi colonies, the blacks would have had no political role to play other than that of carrying out orders given by the white authorities. The Nazi Government would have allowed Africans to participate in matters concerning them only in so far as problems specifically related to their localities were concerned. They would have been kept out of matters concerning the white community and the local administration. Indeed, as a Nazi colonial expert stated, there was no question of Africans participating in the destiny of their country, but "of gradually placing the natives' tribal organizations at the service of the general administration". 23/ To that end: "the traditional chiefs and leaders will become the executing organs for the directives of the German authorities. Where such organs of authority do not yet exist, they must be gradually constituted." 24/ All power was thus to remain concentrated in,-the hands of the whites. In such a traditional colonial structure where dominators and dominated would live together, places of entertainment and public places in general would have some areas reserved for whites and others set aside for blacks. "For the theatre, entertainment and leisure, places reserved for blacks must be arranged." 25/ With regard to the Christian religion, considered to be the religion of whites, "The conversion of the natives to Christianity and the conscious extension of the Christian religion among those natives who have not yet been converted are to be rejected. However, where the natives are already Christians, efforts must be made to group them together in their own communities under t1e guidance of their own black priests." 26/ 23/ R. Asmis, "Grundlagen und Ziele der kfinftigen deutschen Kolonialverwaltung", in Deutscher Kolonial Dienst No. 9/1940, p. 131. 24/ Ibid. 25/ Bechthold, "Kolonialproblem und Rassenfrage", in Volkischer Beobachter, 24 January 1939. 26/ R. Asmis, "Deutsche Eingeborenenpolitik in den tropischen Kolonien", in Deutscher Kolonial Dienst No. 6/1941, p. 82. I...

-11- As regards education, the Nazis planned to build: Vgovernment schools, in order to enable the largest possible number of natives to learn to read and write". 27/ However, such learning was to be reduced to its simplest expression. There would have been no question of giving extensive training to the blacks, who would not only have had no access to university or even secondary education but would also not have been entitled to study "European subjects". 28/ Sexual segregation would have been strictly imposed. An act drawn up for that purpose stipulates that: "Members of (non-white) populations in the German colonies who engage in sexual relations with a white woman shall be sentenced to death. In attenuating circumstances, they shall be liable to confinement in houses of correction or prison with compulsory hard labour." 29/ For the same "offence", the penalty incurred by a white man could not exceed two months' imprisonment and would often have been limited simply to transfer to another colony or repatriation to the metropolitan country. Economic segregation was to make the Africans the constructors of an economy whose benefits would accrue basically to the whites. By means of appropriate property legislation, the homes of white people would be separated from those of blacks. Whites would live in the economic centres, while blacks would be moved out to surrounding areas and would have to travel to the centre each day and leave it immediately at the end of the day. They would thus constitute a labour supply which could be moved from one place to another at any time, all the more so since the blacks would not have been entitled to own land, such rights being reserved exclusively for whites. In the view of some Nazis, "it would be better to create native reservations from the outset ... as in South Africa". 30/ Nazi laws and South African laws At this point, it would be quite interesting to compare a number of Nazi colonial bills with South African acts or bills, in order to get a true picture of the degree of affinity between the two regimes as regards African policy. When Nazi experts themselves drew parallels with South Africa, they maintained that they would not make the same mistakes as the Union of South Africa and would thus avoid finding 27/ R. Asmis, Grundfragen, op. cit., ibid. 28/ cf. Bechthold, op. cit. and Hecht, op. cit. 29/ Kolonialblutschutzgesetz, BA-Koblenz R 2/4965. 30/ E. Haber, op. cit., p. 109. Io.

-12- themselves caught up one day in insoluble contradictions. They would have had the advantage of analysing South Africa's mistakes in order to achieve more successfully what the whites in South Africa had been aiming at for a long time. However, our comparison will be quite limited, since the German bills did not cover details of everyday life, but left it to the future governor to adapt the general concepts to the situation prevailing in his territory. Employment The Nazis had designed a "Arbeitsbuch", 31/ an employment book, for their colonies. This book was compulsory for Africans. The book was divided into three parts, giving information on the employment, taxation and health of its possessor. In South Africa, 'ievery African who has attained the age of 16 years must be in possession of a Reference Book". 32/ As opposed to the book envisaged by the Nazi system, the South African reference book is not kept by the head of the firm until the employment contract expires, but must always be carried by every African. On the matter of age, the two acts correspond. The German order stipulated: "Article I, paragraph 1. For the employment of workers and on the instructions of the governor, an employment book shall be introduced for all male (non-white) workers who have reached the age of 16 years and are to be given employment". 33/ As for the conditions governing the recruitment of workers and the entries to be made in the employment book, the Bantu Land and Trust Act 1936, as supplemented by later acts, gave precise instructions: "When an African has been recruited for employment and has entered into a contract to work in a town, he may not take up employment in that town unless his Reference Book contains an endorsement that he is 'permitted to proceed to' that town 'for the purpose of taking up employment' with a named employer ... Every person who is authorized to employ an African must, throughout the period of such employment, within the first seven days of each month, make the appropriate entry in such African's Reference Book to indicate that he is still in his employ." 34/ 31/ Verordnung Uber das Arbeitsbuch der Eingeborenen und Gleichgestellten Fremden in den Kolonien, BA-Koblenz R 2/4982. 32/ For the various South African acts cited here, cf. Rubin, Leslie, Apartheid in Practice, United Nations, New York 1971. Here, cf. Bantu Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act 1952, No. 67, article 15. 33/ Erlass zur Durchfiihrung der Verordnung iaber das Arbeitsbuch ... BA- Koblenz R 2/4982. 34/ Bantu Regulations, No. R 1892, chap. 6, art. 5, of 3 December 1965. I.

-13- The German order stipulated: "Paragraph 1. The entrepreneur (Fhrer of the establishment) must require the worker to hand over his employment book immediately on taking up employment and must keep this book carefully. (...) "Paragraph 8. The entrepreneur must immediately enter in the specified sections of the employment book, the information provided for that purpose, and show the entries made in the book to the office of the district to which he belongs. "Paragraph 9. The entrepreneur must hand over the employment book, with the entries duly made, to the worker, who shall be obliged to retain the book as soon as his employment contract is terminated." When the German order refers to male workers, this of course means blacks, since whites in the Nazi colonies were not to be workers but "FThrers" in all fields of activity in which they were involved. Certain kinds of work which were deemed 'degrading" would not have been done by whites, a feature not restricted to German colonization, since all colonial countries acted thus. In South Africa, the Conciliation Act 1924 already dealt with this problem and in, its modern form, this act can be summed up as follows: "The Minister of Labour, acting on the recommendation of the Industrial Tribunal (which consists of five white members appointed by him) may at any time (a) reserve any specified class of work for white persons only; (b) prescribe the percentage of Africans permitted to be employed by any employer; (c) prohibit any employer from replacing white employees by African employees." 35/ With this structure, disputes were settled automatically. The Nazis did not provide for industrial conciliation boards in the colonies, and the Conciliation Act 1924 concerned disputes between whites alone. The right to strike was not to be recognized in German colonies. Even if the law did not say so explicitly, this was an obvious fact, in particular when one considers the nature of the decree on the employment book and the order governing its application. In South Africa, "It is unlawful for an African worker to take part in a strike for any reason whatsoever." 36/ Real estate Two Nazi decrees on real estate in the colonies were drawn up: the "Verordnung des Fihrers und Reichskanzlers betreffend die Rechte an Grundstcken 35/ Industrial Conciliation Act No. 28 of 1956, arts. 17 and 77. 36/ Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act No. 48 of 1953, art. 8. I.e. in den Deutschen Kolonien" and the "Verordnung iiber das Liegenschaftsrecht in den Deutschen Kolonien". 37/ These two decrees were to permit whites to purchase land and to guarantee their rights by registration of their land in the property register. The decrees did not grant the same right to blacks, who were thus denied individual access to real estate ownership. Nor did the reservations to be allocated to black groups enjoy any real guarantees, since the governor could requisition them at any time and resettle the blacks elsewhere. The Native Lands Act 1912, the Urban Areas Act 1923 and other acts stipulate that: "No African is entitled as of right to acquire freehold title to land anywhere in South Africa; nor is it the intention of the present Government ever to grant such rights to the African, even in his own Bantu areas." 38/ In addition to this, "Any municipal council may, with the approval of the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, at any time, require all African residents in the municipal area who do not own land and are not employed there to leave the area, although they have resided there continuously for 50 years." S_/ Marriage and sexual relations The "Kolonialblutschutzgetz" Act was to govern marriages and extramarital sexual relations between different racial groups in the colony, and the envisaged penalties were extremely harsh. The act stipulated that: "In the German colonies, extramarital sexual relations between persons who, under paragraph 2 (white - non-white) are not entitled to contract marriage, shall be prohibited". The Kolonialblutschutzgesetz thus corresponds to the following provisions of the 1957 Immorality Act. "An unmarried man who is obviously in appearance or by general acceptance and repute a white person and who attempts to have sexual intercourse with a woman who is not obviously in appearance or by general acceptance and repute a white person is guilty of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment with compulsory hard labour for not longer than seven years, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the court that he had reasonable cause to believe, at the time that the alleged offence was committed, that she was obviously in appearance or by general acceptance and repute a white person." 40/ 37/ Verordnung des Fihrers und Reichskanzlers betreffenc die Rechte an Grundstcken in den Deutschen Kolonien, BA-Koblenz R 22/2367, f. 44 sq. 38/ Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945, art. 6; and Government White Paper on the Tomlinson Report U.G. No. 61 of 1955. 39/ Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945, art. 2. 40/ The Immorality Act No. 23 of 1957, art. 1, 16 and 22. Ie..

-15- For their part, the Nazis required the death penalty for the black man, but in the case of the white man, called only for expulsion from the colony and possibly a prison sentence. Administration and jurisdiction The text of two German laws will be studied: the fundamental law of the colonies, or Reichskolonialgesetz and the decree concerning jurisdiction over non-whites, or Verordnung iber die Gerichtsbarkeit fMr die Eingeborenen und die ihnen gleichgestellten Fremden in den Deutschen Kolonien. 1/ In the colony, the governor was simultaneously the political chief for the blacks and the highest judicial official. Paragraphs 12 and 14 in particular of the judicial act permitted the governor to delegate his judicial powers to the tribal chiefs, who depended entirely on him and whom he could dismiss at any time. Among other things, he was given the right to annul any judgement made with respect to a black if that judgement did not please him. Under paragraph 12 (2), the Governor could modify or quash judgements having force of law if the general welfare of the indigenous population, the interests of colonial policy or any other considerations so required. In quashing a judgement, he could decide the case himself or order a new trial. If need be, he could refer the case back to an indigenous judge or indigenous court of second instance. The administrative and judicial intentions were similar in many respects to those of a 1927 South African act and to the Bantu Authorities Act: "A Bantu Tribal Authority (part of the system which purports to ensure 'Bantu control over Bantu areas') consists of a Chief or headman and a number of councillors. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development may, at any time, depose any Chief or headman and cancel the appointment of any councillor. A Bantu Affairs Commissioner may veto the appointment of any person chosen as a councillor by the Chief or headman. The Minister or any one of a number of white officials may, whenever they choose, attend any meeting of any Bantu Tribal Authority and take part in the deliberations. A commissioned police officer may attend such meetings whenever he pleases; any ordinary policeman may do so when he has received the necessary instruction from a commissioned police officer." These few examples are amply sufficient to demonstrate the extent to which the Nazi colonial system would have resembled the consolidated segregationist policy of South Africa. The essential difference, however, lies in the fact that Nazi Germany was unable to achieve its ambitions in Africa and that its entire colonial concept remained purely theoretical. As to South Africa, it would in time merely intensify the establishment of its structures for discrimination and racial exploitation. 41/ Verordnung Uber die Gerichtsbarkeit fiir die Eingeborenen und die ihnen gleichgestellten Fremden in den Deutschen Kolonien, 17 August 1940, BA- Koblenz R 22/2368 f. 359 et.se. I..

Conclusion The Nazi ideology and the ideology of apartheid in South Africa are based on the same fundamental principles. In Hitler's Germany, the theory of the specificity and purity of the race led to the ostracism of the Jews and justified their genocide. In South Africa, the same theory, called apartheid or racial segregation, made blacks a subhuman species, condemned to serve the whites. Here, the genocide consists of dosing murder by various means and maintaining the percentage of the non-white population at a "reasonable" rate. In South Africa, it was unprofitable, if not absurd, to exterminate the blacks. Black South Africans, on the contrary, constitute the cheap manpower indispensable for an economy exclusively serving the white man. In Africa, the cohabitation of German nazism and South African racial segregation would have permitted control of the black world, its conditioning and its reduction to slavery in a more modern form. The Nazi leaders counted on close collaboration with South Africa, while the South African leaders, whether they were of German origin, had studied in Germany or merely had affinities with the Reich, hoped to see Nazi Germany establish a colonial empire and to have it as a neighbouring African power. The two countries hoped that by co-operating, they would install a fascist anti-black system in Africa, in regions where other colonial powers with more flexible ideologies, and thus other colonial methods, would have been systematically excluded. The Second World War ended in a total defeat of Nazi Germany. The South African racists, particularly politicians like Malan, Strydom and Verwoerd, had remained fairly cautious throughout the war. After 194o-1941, when Nazi Germany began to suffer great military reverses, even its most diehard supporters began to show a certain reserve which did not fail to exasperate the Nazis. With respect to Verwoerd, the German secret agent Trompke cabled Berlin on 10 August 1943: "The party press is extremely reserved with regard to Germany since the military reverse. 0 L recommend a frank explanation with the editor-in-chief Verwoerd." 42/ Only the Ossewa Brandwag, the paramilitary branch, remained actively on the side of Hitler's Germany until the end of the war. During the war, the Ossewa Brandwag continued to demand for South Africa "A Christian-national and socialist political regime and the proclamation of a republic of workers on the basis of national-socialism". 43/ As to the others, there was "no hope as regards the constitutionalist Malan or the 42/ Telegram of 10 August 1943, AA-Bonn DtS Afrika 1939-1943, f. 240969. 43/ Statement by the Ossewa Brandwag of 4 October 1940, AA-Bonn StS Afrika 1939-1943 f. 240640. I... -17 ambitious Louw or Strydom". 44/ Trompke himself explained the attitude of the politicians Who supported Nazi Germany: "The nationalist leaders will probably not attempt to seize power until they are convinced that England will suffer a fatal blow." 45/ Throughout the war, those who supported the Nazis had been out of power. They called for South Africa's neutrality during the war, so as not to fight Nazi Germany and to deprive England of important sources of supply and appreciable military bases. The pro-English supporters in the Government prevailed; Hertzog had to resign to give way to Smuts, who aligned South Africa on the side of the United Kingdom. Smuts did not remain in power long. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the white fascists and racists agreed to stop mentioning anti-Semitism and national-socialism in their electoral programmes. The password of the post- war period was "the black peril", a platform around which fascists and racists rallied. The racists prepared a new programme in December 1947 in which they declared: "The policy of our country should encourage total apartheid as the ultimate goal of a natural process of separate development ... Realizing that such a task can best be accomplished by preserving and safeguarding the white race, the Nationalist Party professes this as the fundamental guiding principle of its policy ... the Bantu in the urban areas should be regarded as migratory citizens not entitled to political or social rights equal to those of the whites. The process of detribalization should be arrested." 46/ In 1948, Malan took power to apply the criminal policy of apartheid; he was followed by Strydom in 1954, Verwoerd in 1958 and Vorster in 1961. It is not only their programme, but their very names that are linked to Hitlerian fascism. 44/ Telegram of 6 August 1940 AA-Bonn Pol X Stidafrika-Deutschland f. 240611. 45/ Note by Bielfeld of 8 October 1940, AA-Bonn StS Afrika 1939-1943, f. 24- 19. 46/ Bunting, B. The Rise of the South African Reich, London, 1964.

-18 ANNEX Abbreviations AA-Bonn: Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Bonn, Federal Republic o,Germany BA-Koblenz: Central Archives of the Federal Republic of Germany at Koblenz MFA: Ministry (Minister) of Foreign Affairs RAK: Rassenpolitische Auslandskorrespondenz (Nazi journal) SWA: South West Africa, currently Namibia