European Footprints in Southern Africa

W B (Ben) Vosloo

W B (Ben) Vosloo – Wollongong, May 2015 ------INDEX Page

Preface iii

Introduction 1

Part I : The Colonial Period 12

1. The Portuguese Influence 13 2. The Dutch Influence 20 3. The Influence of the Boer Republics 37 4. The British Influence 48 5. The German Influence 66

Part II : The Post-Colonial Period 74

6. Post-Colonial Old South Africa 75 7. Post-Colonial New South Africa 116 8. Post-Colonial Former BLS Protectorates 134 9. Post-Colonial Former British Central Africa 139 10. Post-Colonial Former Portuguese Africa 150 11. Post-Colonial Former German South-West Africa 158

Part III : Evaluation 162

12. The Plight of Sub-Saharan Africa 163 13. South Africa’s Exceptionalism 175 14. Prospects 188 i

About the Author

Ben Vosloo was born in the Empangeni district, Natal, 4 November 1934. After completing his schooling in Vryheid, he went to the University of Pretoria where he majored in political science and economics taking the BA and MA degrees with distinction. After serving as a teaching and research assistant, he obtained a Ph.D. degree in 1965 at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

On his return to South Africa, Dr Vosloo began his long association with the reform process in the fields of constitutional change, educational reform and economic development. He served as Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Stellenbosch for 15 years. He was inter alia member of two direction- setting Commissions: the Erika Theron Commission concerning constitutional reform and the De Lange Commission on educational reform. He published widely in academic and professional publications in the fields of management science, political science and development issues. He held offices as a founding member of a number of academic and professional associations such as the S A Political Science Association, the S A Institute for Public Administration and the S A Institute of International Affairs. During his academic career, Prof. Vosloo received several meritorious scholarships and academic awards.

Ben Vosloo started his “second” career in 1981 when he was appointed as the founding Managing Director of the newly formed Small Business Development Corporation. He steered the SBDC to its successful track record and its unique position of prominence as a private sector led development institution (1981 to 1995). In recognition of his work, Dr Vosloo was made Marketing Man of the Year (1986), Man of the Year by the Institute of Management Consultants of Southern Africa (1989), given the Emeritus Citation for Business Leaders by the Argus Newspaper Group (1990) and the Personnel Man of the Year by the Institute of Personnel Managers (1990), named as one of the Business Times Top Five Businessmen (1993) and by “Beeld” as one of South Africa’s Top 21 Business Leaders in the past 21 years (1995). He acted as co-author and editor of a trend-setting publication Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth (HSRC Publishers, Pretoria 1994) and was awarded an Honorary Doctorate by the University of Pretoria in December 1995.

In 1996 Ben Vosloo started his “third” career. He initially served as a business consultant on strategic policy matters and later became involved in export marketing in the USA, Canada, Europe and Asia. He obtained permanent resident status in Australia in the category “Distinguished Talents” and eventually became an Australian citizen in 2002. He is now retired and resides in North Wollongong, NSW.

iii

Preface

Since pre-historic times communities and societies have been exposed to external influences. It came in the wake of migrations, conquests, trade, cultural exchange and also social and physical integration. For much of recorded history over the past two millennia, forces of imperialism where one tribe, race or nation explicitly by force majeure took control over others, was part of existential socio-cultural reality. It took the form of major movements of people, belief systems and cultural practices. Large parts of the world today bear the traces of past empires – influencing the lives of millions of people.

The legacies of empires cover a wide field, ranging from material things like buildings, roads, harbours and railroads to potent immaterial things like religions, languages, frames of mind, systems of law, manners and hobbies, conventions and cultural traditions. The human race itself was subjected to several forms of physical mutation by the imperial experience: mulattos and meztizos, Coloureds, Creoles and Eurasians. Their offspring produced remarkable artists, athletes, geniuses and saintly heroes – but also pirates and thugs.

Writing about a specific region, in this case the southern parts of Africa, creates a specific set of challenges: the complexity of the interaction of influences, the kaleidoscopic changeability of events and the choice of a valid frame of reference in terms of which the available information can be interpreted. Economic historians such as David Landes and Niall Ferguson emphasise the importance of the interaction of natural endowments (geography, broadly speaking) and human action (socio-cultural history). This is what Ferguson called “economic history’s version of the nature-nurture debate”. A persuasive case can be made for the importance of such ‘given’ natural factors as the mean temperature, humidity, soil quality, proximity to the sea, latitude and mineral resources. But there is also strong evidence that human factors (socio-cultural traits) play an even more crucial role. Human inputs include such elements as institutions, demography, traditions and cultural ways of doing things like working, governing, building, travelling, playing, courting, raising children, schooling, training and even making war.

A major problem facing all analysts of communities and societies is access to reliable information. In some countries reliable, updated demographic or socio-economic statistics are unavailable. Even recorded history may be skewed or incomplete. Then there is the problem of ‘the eye of the beholder’ which brings in an element of ‘selective perception’. John Adams, one of America’s ‘founding fathers’, famously wrote in 1770: “... Facts are stubborn things, and whatever our wishes or our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence”.

What kind of information qualifies as facts and how do we distinguish them from opinions? To answer these questions people often reach for statistics or figures. But there are many good reasons to treat statistical information released by politicians, journalists and public agencies with a healthy dose of scepticism. We know that it is very costly to collect reliable statistics on demographic categories such as population size, ethnic composition, education levels, etc. When you throw in macroeconomic data such as GDP, per capita income, unemployment, inflation rates and growth rates it is important to realise that there are huge gaps not only in the iv

accuracy of measurement, but also on the reliability of the measures themselves. Economic data series are not only technically complex but difficult to collect. Inflation measures are highly controversial and the measurement of GDP and per capita income does not adequately measure informal sector or ‘unrecorded’ activities. We all know that figures don’t lie but that men figure. It is a challenge to safeguard the presentation or interpretation of facts from spin, misinformation, propaganda, half truths, distortions, bias, etc. It is hard to avoid looking at events and trends from a particular point of view and harder still to present our observations and opinions in a fair and balanced way. Nevertheless, we should continue to strive to respect the objective truth as supported by facts and evidence.

Is it important to know about our human history with its emphasis on our cultural legacy? Shouldn’t we limit our focus to natural history with a universal perspective on the past and an emphasis on the story of planet Earth rather than that of humanity? The time scale of natural history covers more than 13 billion years from the ‘big bang’, about 4.5 billion years of the formation of planet Earth, and only a couple of hundred thousand years during which the biological and chemical make-up of homo sapiens evolved. Within such a broad time-scale, human beings are reduced to a minor, undistinguished and essentially marginal role. The further you go back in time, the more insignificant is the role of human beings relative to that of nature.

Without negating the importance of understanding the underlying forces of natural history, it is more than crucial to understand the social and cultural context of our lives. To understand our place in the world around us requires not only a better insight into the laws of nature but also a better grasp of the socio-cultural reality within which we have to live our lives. We need to understand the influences from the past that have shaped the lives we live today. We have to select those influences that were sound and good and use them as foundations for building our future.

The emergence of European civilisation is a perfect example of the formative effects of cross- cultural building blocks. The importance of its classical heritage on the development of Western civilisation can hardly be over-emphasised. First, is the legacy of the Greek city-states as the cradles of democracy by allowing citizens to govern themselves and pioneering reliance on empirical observation and rational analysis in order to establish truth and validity in the affairs of men and to enhance their understanding of the relationships between material things. Without this frame of mind philosophy and science would have remained in the realm of superstition and ignorance. The ancient Greeks produced some of the first scientists, philosophers and historians and their art and building styles are still copied today. Aristotle is generally recognised as the founder of Western science. He pioneered a rational approach to understanding the world based on observing and recording evidence. Greek philosophers like Archimedes recognised the value of experimenting and Euclid, the father of geometry, pioneered the measurement of lines, curves and surfaces. Second, was the Roman Empire’s implementation of Aristotle’s idea that the law must be supreme as a standard of good behaviour rather than force, passion or personal power. Thus law came to occupy a central place in the Roman scheme of things as ius civile (customary law), ius gentium (law of peoples where one or both parties were non-Romans) and ius naturale (higher standards of natural law). The tradition of the supremacy of law laid the foundation for constitutionalism and the v

protection of human rights, including property rights, against the exercise of arbitrary power. Non sub homine sed sub Deo et lege. Many modern languages are descended from Latin, the Roman language. Our alphabet was invented by the Romans. Several European countries like Germany, the Netherlands and France have laws that are based on Roman law. London, Paris and several German cities were founded by the Romans. Third, on top of the Greco-Roman belief in the supremacy of man’s rational intellect and the highly honoured place of law in the Roman scheme of things, came the Judaic-Christian monotheistic religion with its idea of a transcendent omnipotent God as the source of all ethical rules. It paved the way for Christian ethics which assigned pride of place to the sovereign and inviolable individual conscience in place of group pressures and fads. The ethical message of Christianity became the dominant moral force of Western civilisation.

Most of the research for and writing of this manuscript was done during the period 2010 to 2012. During this time the kaleidoscope of peoples in Southern Africa has shifted and changed. Like many other parts of the world they also had to contend with the fall-out of the global financial crisis that started in 2008 and particularly with the tribulations of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The sad decline of socio-economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe has also put all the countries in the area under added pressures. The effects of strife and economic decline in one country inevitably spill over onto its neighbours: thousands of refugees, increased pressure on joblessness, reduced trade and investment and a loss of confidence in a better future. Southern Africa may even stand at the cusp of a new era of external influence as a result of the decline of the colonial powers of the West and the rise of new sources of power and influence in the East. New footprints will make their appearance.

A wide variety of sources were used in the preparation of this manuscript: books, electronic sources, official publications and personal observations. The author was born at Mtunzini and was raised in Kwa Zulu/Natal. His academic education as a political economist was received at the University of Pretoria and Cornell University in the USA. He served as a Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Stellenbosch for around 15 years and then became the founding Managing Director of the Small Business Development Corporation, which was transformed into Business Partners after 15 years. The author has lived most of his life in some part of South Africa: Zululand, Natal, Pretoria, Stellenbosch and Johannesburg. He has travelled widely in all African countries south of the equator. Although he settled in Australia in 1998, he has maintained a keen interest in and a sense of concern about the wellbeing of the peoples of Southern Africa.

A special word of thanks goes to my wife, Madalein, for typing and assisting with proof-reading my longhand written manuscript. As per usual, she not only endured long periods of time- consuming writing, but also served as a sounding board to weed out verbosity and to enhance clarity. The author must take sole responsibility for the remaining shortcomings in the final product.

Wollongong, May 2015 1

Introduction

The history of civilisations tells the story of the amazing progress of humankind, from the Stone Age to the Space Age. An examination of this history is a look at the processes that created the world we live in: the ideas, institutions and capabilities associated with modernity. Details of human migration and settlement patterns over the pre-historic millennia are very patchy. Our knowledge of this period relies heavily on approximation, probabilities and conjecture, derived from limited, if not shaky, evidence. There are no written records. We have to rely on piecemeal research by palaeontologists, archaeologists, biologists, anthropologists and linguists. New fossil finds and the fragmentary nature of the evidence means that theories of human evolution are continually updated and sometimes changed. Dates can only be approximate and the older the remains are, the less precise the dates are likely to be.

(For an authentic general introduction to human pre-history, see Peter Bogucki, The Origins of Human Society, Blackwell Publishers, Massachusetts, 1999, pp.1-204)

Human Prehistory

The timeline of planet earth and the appearance of the first living organisms is said to have begun billions of years ago. In the course of millions of years various supercontinents were formed, which ultimately fragmented by way of tectonic movements into the continents we know today. The first hominids (human-like primates) are said to have made their appearance in eastern and southern Africa around 7 million years ago. Probably the biggest prehistory mystery of all relates to how the human race began. Did humans evolve, millions of years ago, from the human-like primates called hominids? So far, no one has found the proverbial ‘missing link’.

Over the past few decades several palaeontologists, including Leakey and Broom, discovered fossils of homonoidea at various sites in eastern and southern Africa which date back to around 3 to 6 million years ago. The first homonids that were associated with handmade stone tools, Australopithecus robustus date back to around 2.6 million years ago. Subsequently the evolutionary path of homonoidea was identified: homo habilis, homo erectus, homo sapiens and homo sapiens sapiens (around 200,000 to 15,000 years old). Although the evolutionary path is a topic of heated debate; the important evolutionary trends in the various successive hominines species were that brains became bigger and bipedallism was attained. Their evolutionary progress was also associated with an adaptable stone technology: the weight and careful shaping of the edges of their distinctive hand tools, whether pointed or oval and suitable as butchery tools. Their larger brains apparently had more to do with the acquisition of complex social skills and the ability to seek better habitats. This enabled the early humans to penetrate much of the habitable world: Africa, the Middle East, South and South East Asia and Europe. The human diaspora to different regions of the world brought in its wake the development of a divergence in physical types, presumably due to environmental factors and to isolation. Physical anthropologists distinguish four categories of homo sapiens – the Caucasoid (or Indo-European), Negroid, Mongoloid (Asiatic, Amerindians and Polynesians) and Australoid (Australian Aborigines). 2

(See Hammond-Tooke, D., The Roots of Black South Africa, Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 1993, p.23)

During the last 800,000 years, planet earth experienced several Ice Ages interspersed with warmer periods of about 10,000 years, known as interglacials. The Ice Ages were periods of exceptional cold away from the equator. Ice sheets advanced from the top of the northern hemisphere. With much of the earth’s water locked into ice sheets, sea levels fell and by doing so exposed land bridges which connected major land areas and present-day islands into larger continental land masses. As the ice retreated, climatic changes influenced the distribution of plants and animals as well as the migration patterns of early humans. The human species today is the product of this long process of adaptation to the varied conditions created by the periodically advancing and retreating Ice Ages.

It is not clear whether all of today’s humans evolved in one area of Africa and then spread gradually across the world or whether modern humans evolved separately in different parts of the world. It is clear however that by 75,000 years ago there were modern humans across the Middle East, Asia and Europe. They used their skills to adapt to each new place, using local materials to make clothes and dwellings, to cultivate plants, to herd animals and to fish.

It should be noted that natural barriers such as mountains, deserts, coastlines and rivers played an important role in defining the unique cultures that developed in specific areas. Sedentary groups adapted differently in accordance with environments they were living in. Hence different innovations developed in different parts of the world such as the Middle East, the Nile Valley, the Indus Valley, the Yellow River Valley and Mesopotamia. As settlements developed into towns, specialised skills emerged: tool and weapon makers, potters, brick makers, spinners and weavers, etc. In time, trading between communities became common and important.

Modern humans were late arrivals in western Europe, replacing the Neanderthal populations only from about 35,000 years ago. The Neanderthal people, a sub-species of homo sapiens, flourished in Europe and western Asia. They lived from about 120,000 years ago to the last glacial period. Neanderthals appeared to have had larger brain cavities than modern humans. The Cro-Magnon people were the first modern people to live in Europe around 40,000 years ago. Their remains were found in several European caves, including the British Isles. Hundreds of caves in France and Spain show remarkable levels of cultural expression in the form of highly decorated paintings.

The early Europeans were skilled in making things: framed homes, using flint or bone to make tools, containers, works of art, skin clothing, etc. A campsite could be used by members of the same tribe or group for many centuries. During the Ice Age, 30,000 to 12,000 BC, ice sheets had pushed down from the north making areas such as Scandinavia, Siberia and northern Britain unfit for human habitation. Much of Spain, Greece and the Balkans were covered in forests whereas the area north of the Black Sea in Russia was vast grassland. People had to devise different tools, hunting techniques and social skills to suit these varied living conditions. They learned how to track and hunt animals that live in herds, such as reindeer. This gave them a rich source of hides, meat and antlers.

The first Americans probably came from the extreme northern tip of Asia, which is now Siberia, when the two continents were connected by a land bridge. From the cold, bleak north, they moved south in search of better weather and more plentiful food. The earliest evidence of humans in these areas dates back to between 15,000 and 12,000 years ago – as far south as Chile. Some rock paintings in Brazil though, have been dated to around 32,000 years ago. Their origins remain a mystery.

At the end of the Ice Age, there was a massive change in the world’s climate. In much of Europe, Asia and North America, the sea levels rose and caused flooding in flat areas near the sea. Large areas of land were lost around coastal areas. But the warmer weather also transformed the landscape, vegetation and brought more plentiful sources of food. Better fed and housed than their ancestors, Europeans had time and opportunity to develop more advanced tool making skills, more children survived to become adults and the population began to spread. Like the Europeans, the people of Asia took advantage of the better conditions. They were healthier than earlier and their population began to increase.

Around 11,000 years ago, a group of people in the Middle East began to produce their own food by farming. It gave people a measure of control over their food supply. They could settle in one place and build stronger and more comfortable dwellings than before. The first farmers lived at the eastern end of the Mediterranean (now Palestine, Israel, Syria and Turkey) and the upland region north of the River Tigris in what now form parts of Iran and Iraq. The area is known as the Fertile Crescent and because of its higher rainfall grasses such as wheat and barley grow there naturally. The locals gathered seeds and knew which types produced the best grain. At the same time they also started to tame and herd the wild sheep and goats. These animals provided milk, wool as well as meat. People also started to keep horses, pigs and cattle. Towns like Jericho were built and trade developed in grain, tools, pottery and furniture. As farming methods spread further afield, other regions also began producing their food in a similar way. Surplus food was used to trade for goods produced in other areas.

The first pottery was probably made around 10,500 BC. Pots were made from clay which was dug from the ground. They could be made in a variety of shapes and sizes and were used to hold liquids as well as dry foods. The earliest pots so far discovered came from Japan, from where knowledge of pottery may have spread to China, then to the Middle East, Europe and Africa.

The spread of civilisation also led to the growth of conflict and warfare over raw materials and the control of disputed areas. Warfare was one of the main factors that spurred the development of technical skills such as metal-working: iron replacing bronze, replacing copper, replacing wooden weapons. In time exploration across land and sea became a major force in increasing opportunities and fortunes.

(P. Brooks, W. Fowler and S. Adams, Civilizations, Exploration and Conquest, Annes Publishing Limited, London, 2001, pp.12-66 See also The Times Complete History of the World, 8th edition, edited by Richard Overy, Tomes Books, London, 2010, p.30-40)

The African Archaeological Record

The African archaeological record shows that from around the 10th millennium BC onwards, human settlements began to spring up near lakes and rivers, from the Rift Valley and the Sudanese Nile Valley in the east, across what are now the central and southern Sahara regions, to the Senegal River in the west. At the time, conditions in large parts of Africa were wetter than they are today.

According to Hammond-Tooke’s research, about six or seven thousand years ago, Africa was inhabited by the ancestors of the four main categories of indigenous inhabitants: the Khoisan (‘San’ and ‘Khoikhoi’), the Pygmies of the equatorial forests, the Caucasoid ‘Hamites’ and the numerically preponderant Negroes. The Hamites appear to have entered Africa from the north east in the late Stone Age era (their languages are distinctly related to the Semitic languages), but the other three evolved out of older African stock. Recent research indicates that the Khoisan and Pygmies are in fact derived from Negroid stock and are evolutionary adaptations to different environments – open grasslands, in the one case, and equatorial forests in the other.

The Negro physical type rose in the narrow savannah belt north of the equatorial forest at a time when the southern Sahara enjoyed much more rain than it receives today. They followed a hunter-gatherer style of life, living on the forest margins, but later became associated with the domestication of plants and animals. They adopted the cultivation of crops (sorghum and millet) in the light woodland savannah from Senegal to the upper Nile. The forest food crops grown in Africa were mainly of South East Asian origin – the banana, yam and coco-yam. Only in the 16th and 17th centuries AD, were maize and cassava introduced from the Americas.

The Negro communities north of the equator spoke dialects belonging to two main ancient language groups: the Eastern Sudanic languages spoken to the north of the equatorial forest (from the Nile to Lake Chad) and the Western Sudanic, spoken to the west of the lake. In sharp contrast, the Negro communities south of the equator developed what is today called the ‘Bantu’ languages. During the Iron Age, the people living south of the equatorial forests, probably in the savannah highlands of Katanga (Zambia) and the region of the Great Lakes to the east, spoke closely related Bantu languages.

It is believed that several major waves of population migration and settlement took place in southern Africa. In the vanguard of these migrants were the hunter gatherers known as the San groups who left evidence of their extensive area of occupation throughout the sub-continent in rock paintings and engravings. Their presence in the sub-continent could date as much as 10,000 years ago, but they were gradually concentrated in the arid regions along the west coast of southern Africa. The original San migrants were followed by other hunter-gatherer population groups around 2,000 years ago who moved southwards from West and Central Africa driven by growing numbers and their need for more land. With them they brought domesticated animals. These groups, known as Khoi or Khoekoe, could have reached the western Cape as early as AD 200.

During the Iron Age, the period between AD 300 and AD 1000, further waves of migrants moved south from Central and East Africa. With them they brought domesticated animals and plants as well as knowledge of pottery making, mining and metal working. These Iron Age migrants settled over a wide area covering the Transvaal, Natal, the Highveld and the eastern Cape. These groups were mainly Bantu-speaking Negro tribes. By the 13th century, the early Iron Age migrants began to diverge into those of the 19th century chiefdoms. The Nguni groups (mainly Swazi, Zulu and Xhosa) settled in the higher rainfall belt along the eastern seaboard between the escarpment and the sea. The Sotho groups occupied the central plains, west of the escarpment (North Sotho or Pedi, West Sotho or Tswana and South Sotho around Lesotho). The Venda and Tsonga tribes occupied the north-eastern regions, closer to what is today known as Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

The expansions of the Khoekoe pastoralists and the Bantu-speaking cultivators encroached on the hunting grounds of the San, many of whom retreated to the mountainous regions of the Drakensberg and the Cederberg in the western Cape. In time, they were driven into the arid, desert regions along the west coast.

Most of Southern Africa’s inland plateau, ringed by the escarpment that runs parallel to the coast, receives a rainfall of less than 20 inches per year tapering off to less than 5 inches in the west. In the east the rainfall reaches up to 40 inches per year, producing sub-tropical vegetation along the Natal and Transkei coastlines. Throughout both regions droughts are frequent and devastating and may last as long as a decade. Hence the inland regions could only support small, dispersed populations of hunter-gatherers. Much of the coastal regions could support domesticated animals, but tsetse flies and other bearers of livestock diseases made pastoralism hazardous in the tropical lands of the north-east. For humans, malaria was a constant menace. Throughout Southern Africa, agriculture was constrained not only by irregular rainfall but also by the poor quality of the soil.

South Africa’s first farming communities appear to have been established by the end of the 3rd century, cultivating millet and a variety of other plants. By the 5th century populations were established in scattered villages of pole and thatch dwellings. Their technology included the smelting and working of iron and copper, the manufacture of pottery, the carving of bowls and dishes from soapstone and the carving of bone and ivory. Salt was extracted from alkaline mineral springs by evaporation in soapstone dishes. Some form of trading contacts with the east coast is suggested by the presence of Indian Ocean sea-shells at several inland sites.

(For a more detailed description of pre-colonial societies in Southern Africa see David Hammond-Tooke, The Roots of Black South Africa, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg, 1993, pp. 23-44)

The Arrival of European Explorers and Traders

The discovery of the compass by the end of the 13th century enabled seafarers to undertake long voyages out of sight of land. The first Europeans to navigate their way along the West Coast of Africa were the Portuguese, searching for a sea route to the Far East. Bartholomew Diaz de Novaes set out in August 1487 from Portugal. En route, he touched points along the African 6

continent never before seen by Europeans and after he turned Cabo Tormentoso (Cape of Storms) he landed at what he called Rio de Infante (Mossel Bay) and triumphantly returned home to report that it is possible to round the southern tip of Africa. The first business expedition to the East was led by Vasco da Gama who left Lisbon in 1497 with four ships. After several months he reached the port of Mozambique where he encountered Muslim traders. His small fleet progressed northwards where he discovered a thriving Arab port at Mombasa. At Malindi he employed a Hindu pilot to take him across the Arabian Sea to Calicut in India.

In 1581 Jan Huygen van Linschoten was the first Dutchman to complete a return voyage to India. Then in 1595, Cornelis and Frederik de Houtman also completed a successful return voyage and thus started the Dutch involvement. Soon the need arose for a halfway station where the sailors, desperately affected by scurvy, could find fresh fruit and vegetables.

By the 1650s, the Dutch were the world’s leading trading nation. The Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) was the world’s largest trading enterprise with a strong trading post in Jakarta (Batavia). In 1652, Jan van Riebeeck established a refreshment station at Cape Town. Apart from the area around Cape Town, Europeans initially had limited contact with the African interior. There were few natural harbours and much of the coast was either dry desert or wet jungle, making access hazardous.

From the 1760s onward, Europeans made determined efforts to explore the interior of Africa. The major rivers of the Niger and Nile were mapped by the British and the French explored the Sahara Desert and reached Timbuktu, a city which became famous as a trade centre and a centre of learning since the 1300s. Still later in the 1800s, the Scotsman David Livingstone, who was a missionary and a doctor, explored the Zambezi River and travelled the continent from east to west. He was followed by the American adventurer, Henry Stanley, who explored the Great Lakes region and then sailed down the last unknown river in Africa, the River Congo. Both Livingstone and Stanley are thought to have paved the way for the European colonisation in their “scramble for Africa” in the late 19th century.

The Slave Trade

The first slaves were shipped out of Africa by the Arabs more than 1000 years ago. Some local rulers grew rich by selling captured enemies into slavery. The first organised transport of slaves to the Americas was undertaken by Spanish traders in 1518 to work in the gold mines of South America under the conquistadores. The Portuguese used African slaves on their sugar plantations in the Atlantic islands of Madeira, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and the Azores. But as the Portuguese set up sugarcane production in their new acquisition of Brazil, the market for slaves was established. By 1550 Brazil was the world’s largest exporter of sugar and the largest importer of slaves.

Other European nations soon joined in: British, Swedes, Danes, Spanish, French and Dutch. These trading nations built over 30 slave forts in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) alone. The “triangular trade” as it was known, involved slave-ships leaving European ports for west Africa with rum, guns, textiles and other goods to exchange for slaves, who were then transported 7

across the Atlantic to be sold to plantation owners, the ships then returning with sugar and coffee.

It is important to note, however, that the pernicious trade could not have existed without the support of African chiefs and traders. Slaves were brought to the coastal trading forts by African agents or collaborators. Many of the slaves sold to the European traders were men and women captured in battles between tribes – like the Asante and the Acan in the Gold Coast.

By the mid-18th century, Britain was the biggest slaving nation. Ports like Bristol, Liverpool and London thrived as a result. In Britain, many important people were involved in the slave trade: the royal family, the Church of England and politicians like William Gladstone – himself the son of a plantation owner. Since there was no slavery in Europe or in England, people were largely ignorant of its nature and scale – not unlike the Germans vis-à-vis the holocaust in Germany. It became the task of the abolitionists to expose the shameful reality of the trade to an ignorant public.

During the period 1701 to 1810, millions of Africans were sent to the Americas: estimates of the numbers involved vary between 7 million up to 20 million. In the early 1800s it was abolished in Europe, in 1833 in England and in the 1860s in Portugal. The Arabs continued the trade until 1873, when the last remaining slave market in Zanzibar was closed. (See The Economist, “Breaking the Chains”, February 24th, 2007, pp.55-57)

The Colonial “Scramble for Africa”

In November 1884, the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, convened a conference on Africa in Berlin, ostensibly intended to ensure free trade in Africa. The real purpose of the conference was to “define the conditions under which future territorial annexations in Africa might be recognised – in effect, a charter for the partition of Africa into spheres of influence based on nothing more legitimate than their effective occupation.

Historian Niall Ferguson describes the course of events in the following terms: “Across Africa the story repeated itself, chiefs hoodwinked, tribes dispossessed, inheritances signed away with a thumbprint or a shaky cross and any resistance mown down by the Maxim gun.” (Empire – How Britain Made the Modern World, Penguin Books, 2004, p.239)

Ferguson goes on to describe how one by one the nations of Africa were subjugated – the Zulus, the Matabele, the Mashonas, the kingdoms of Niger, the Islamic principality of Kano, the Dinkas and the Masai, the Sudanese Muslims, Benin and Bechuana. By the beginning of the next century, the carve-up was complete. The British had all but realised Rhodes’ vision of unbroken possession from Cape to Cairo. Their African empire stretched northwards from the Cape Colony through Natal, Bechuanaland, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and southwards from Egypt, through the Sudan, Uganda and Kenya. Tanganyika, the German possession, was the only missing link. The Germans had South West Africa (Namibia), Cameroon and Togo. Britain had also acquired the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria in West Africa as well as the north of Somaliland. But West Africa was mostly in French possession. From Tunis and Algeria in the 8

north, downwards through Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Niger, Chad, the French Congo and Gabon, the greater part of West Africa was in French hands. Their only eastern possession was the island of Madagascar. Besides Mozambique and Angola, Portugal remained an enclave in Guinea. Italy acquired Libya, Eritrea and most of Somaliland. The Belgian King owned the vast territory of Congo. Spain had Rio de Oro. Africa was almost entirely in European hands, and the lion’s share belonged to Britain.

The European Settlement at the Cape

The Dutch set up a refreshment station at the Cape in 1652 and then started occupying the surrounding areas. But for several decades before the Dutch settlement at the Cape was established, various European seafarers used landing posts along the surrounding coasts as a stop over for water and meat supplies. The British, the biggest colonists of all history, arrived first in 1795, but more permanently in 1806 when they drove out the Dutch occupiers and started the Anglicisation of the bulk of Southern Africa. Each wave of colonists brought in their wake their own customs, institutions, languages, practices, knowledge and other cultural attributes.

Over several centuries thousands of passengers and crew aboard Dutch, English, French, Portuguese, Scandinavian and other trading vessels stopped first at Cape Town and later on at other port cities. The Cape was a linchpin in all European shipping networks connected to Asia. Cape Town became the key point of entry for European and Indian Ocean world influences. The trading vessels brought in thousands of migrants from many parts of the world. These included VOC officials, soldiers and artisans from the Netherlands, Germany, Scandinavia and the Baltic; passing crewmen and passengers from across the Atlantic world; slaves from Mozambique, Madagascar, India, Sri Lanka, Java, Bali, Sulawesi and other Indonesian islands; and exiles and convicts from Asian trading posts. Some were temporary sojourners, but many stayed permanently and their descendants became a permanent part of the settler population. In many ways Cape Town became one of the most racially and culturally diverse ‘melting pots’ of the colonial era.

In today’s world a traveller by air over Southern Africa, from Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique to Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and South Africa would notice many visible traces of the colonial past. Most visible would be the large cities with their chequerboard layout, port cities with their bustling trading infrastructure, railway and road networks, electric power stations and transmission lines, large dams and irrigation networks, communication towers and discs, large mine dumps and open-cut mines, fenced-in farmland covered with European cattle and sheep breeds, skyscrapers and housing estates, large sports arenas, numerous soccer and rugby playing fields, demarcated nature reserves, large hospitals and cemeteries, shopping centres, churches and cathedrals, many school buildings and university campuses. Less visible, but very real in its impact, are the constitutional principles, financial practices, scientific methods, education standards, language facilities, communication channels, legal standards, technologies and the multitude of cultural ways of doing things.

A Conceptual Framework for Analysis

Was the colonial influence in Southern Africa good or bad – beneficial or not – for the developments that took place in the region during the subsequent centuries? Much depends upon the conceptual framework within which this important question is analysed – and upon the value judgments introduced by the analyst. In social science terms, there is no universally accepted theory of ‘development’. It is not possible to encompass the lives, cultures and diverse circumstances of the majority of the people of the world in one set of concepts and propositions. Nevertheless, even if universally valid generalisations are questionable, many helpful things can be said about ‘developmental’ issues and ‘progress’ at various levels of abstraction.

In the preface to his provocatively titled Civilisation – The West and the Rest, Penguin Books, 2011, historian Niall Ferguson asks the question: “Just why, beginning around 1500, did a few small polities on the western edge of the Eurasian landmass come to dominate the rest of the world, including the more populous and in many ways more sophisticated societies of Eastern Eurasia?” (ibid, p.xv). In his introductory chapter, Ferguson explains what he meant by referring to the dominant position of the Western empires: “In 1500 the future imperial powers of Europe accounted for about 10 percent of the world’s land surface and at most 16 percent of its population. By 1913, eleven Western empires (including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) controlled nearly three-fifths of all territory and population and more than three-quarters (a staggering 79 percent) of global economic output” (ibid, p.5). Ferguson goes on to say that “... most of the world is now integrated into a Western economic system in which ... the market sets most of the prices and determines the flow of trade and division of labour ... but government is intervening to try to smooth the business cycle and reduce income inequality ... As for non-economic institutions, there is no debate worth having ... universities are converging on Western norms ... the same is true of the way medical science is organized ... Most people now accept the great scientific truths revealed by Newton, Darwin and Einstein ... and they reach eagerly for the products of Western pharmacology at the first symptom of influenza or bronchitis ... Only a few societies continue to resist the encroachment of Western patterns of marketing and consumption, as well as the Western lifestyle itself ... More and more human beings eat a Western diet, wear Western clothes and live in Western housing. Even the peculiarly Western way of work – five or six days a week from 9 until 5, with two or three weeks holiday – is becoming a kind of universal standard. Meanwhile, the religion that Western missionaries sought to export to the rest of the world is followed by a third of mankind ... even atheism pioneered in the West is making impressive headway ... With every passing year, more and more human beings shop like us, study like us, stay healthy (or unhealthy) like us and pray (or don’t pray) like us ... Only in the realm of political institutions does there remain significant global diversity, with a wide range of governments around the world resisting the idea of the rule of law, with its protection of individual rights, as the foundation for meaningful representative government ...

So it is not ‘Eurocentrism’ or (anti-)’Orientalism’ to say that the rise of Western civilization is the single most important historical phenomenon of the second half of the second millennium after Christ. It is a statement of the obvious. The challenge is to explain how it happened...” (Op.cit, pp.7-8) 10

The explanations offered by Niall Ferguson lie in six identifiable complexes of institutions and associated ideas and behaviours:

“1. Competition – a decentralization of both political and economic life, which created the launch-pad for both nation-states and capitalism. 2. Science – a way of studying, understanding and ultimately changing the natural world, which gave the West (among other things) a major military advantage over the Rest. 3. Property rights – the rule of law as a means of protecting private owners and peacefully resolving disputes between them, which formed the basis for the most stable form of representative government. 4. Medicine – a branch of science that allowed a major improvement in health and life expectancy, beginning in Western societies, but also in their colonies. 5. The consumer society – a mode of material living in which the production and purchase of clothing and other consumer goods play a central economic role, and without which the Industrial Revolution would have been unsustainable. 6. The work ethic – a moral framework and mode of activity derivable from (among other sources) Protestant Christianity, which provides the glue for the dynamic and potentially unstable society created by apps 1 to 5.” (Op.cit. p.13)

Ferguson concedes that it was not just Western superiority that led to the conquest and colonisation of so much of the rest of the world. It was also the fortuitous weakness of the West’s rivals. Western Europe became more effective administratively and militarily because it was more competitive in the political and economic spheres. The colonist-settlers established a different system of property rights, disease control, weaponry, productive output, education, technology – a set of norms, behaviours and institutions – that enabled them to exploit the opportunities offered by the colonial territories.

In the globalised modern world, there is a growing consensus, also among social scientists, that a number of things are required to happen to the culture, institutions, values and organisation of a society on its way from the predominance of subsistence village level agriculture and traditional lifestyles to urbanised, more prosperous, rationalised society. It is usually referred to as the process of ‘modernisation’. It normally refers to a process of change that involves economic growth associated with certain psychological and sociological changes in individuals and in societies.

Economic growth is normally associated with higher levels of need satisfaction (eg. food, housing, education, health care, etc.). Development in the Sociological and Psychological sense, has to do with a set of complex changes in the organisation of society and in the individual person’s perspective on his/her society: movement from identification with primary groups and values to secondary groups and values; with social norms that assign status not only on ascriptive (or inherited) conditions but also on achievement (or functional) conditions. Modern society also requires a different sort of political order, eg. a system that provides mechanisms devised to reconcile and co-ordinate the efforts of diverse groups within the framework of a more inclusive nation state. 11

It is important to avoid the pitfalls of reaching conclusions based on ethnocentric assumptions. Progress does not mean, per definition, a process of change from a traditional agrarian society to a ‘modern’, industrial (or even ‘post-industrial’) urbanised society. Development and progress is not a unilinear process because it can take many different forms. But the concept of development cannot escape certain requirements related to the economic, social and psychological wellbeing of the bulk of the members of society. It requires that for a transformation from A to B to qualify as ‘development’, the change must bear positive fruit for the people involved: improvement of their ability to solve the problems they are confronted with and to improve the quality of their lives. It requires that the process of change or transformation must bring in its wake more widespread provision of food, shelter, clothing, health care, training and education. It also requires the reduction of domestic violence and inter-group conflict, the expansion and protection of civil rights, as well as effective political participation in the governance of a stable society.

Part I

The Colonial Period

1. The Portuguese Influence 2. The Dutch Influence 3. The Influence of the Boer Republics 4. The British Influence 5. The German Influence

1. The Portuguese Influence

Although Portugal was the smallest and poorest of Europe’s imperial powers, its role in Southern Africa cannot be underestimated. With a head start of one and a half centuries, Portugal acted as a trailblazer for other colonial powers. It managed to hold on to large tracts of colonial territory, Angola and Mozambique in Africa and Brazil in South America from the fifteenth century until the 1970s. The other colonial powers, particularly the Dutch and the British, followed in the wake of the Portuguese, learning from their seafaring skills and driving them from their trading posts in South-East Asia and the Far East.

Prince Henry ‘the Navigator’ who reigned from 1394 to 1460 set up a school for navigation at Sagres in 1419 which assisted in the development of strong and manoeuvrable caravels and reliable compasses which assisted its early explorers to navigate the stormy Atlantic Ocean and beyond. Starting with voyages to Madeira and the Azores they sailed along the West African coast until Bartholomew Diaz sailed around the Cape as far as Mossel Bay on the east coast in 1488. Vasco da Gama reached India in 1500 and thus opened the trading route between the Far East and Europe. Over the following decades Portuguese sailors continued to explore the coasts of Africa and East Asia, establishing forts and trading stations as they went. By 1571 a string of outposts connected Lisbon to Nagasaki. Threatening disputes between Portugal and Spain were settled by the Treaty of Tordesilhas in 1494 which divided the world outside Europe into an exclusive duopoly between the Portuguese and the Spanish along a north-south meridian, 1500km west of the Cape Verde Islands. This meant that for much of the 16th century the Portuguese fleet served as the dominant force in the Indian Ocean. Using fortresses on the islands of Mozambique and Mombasa, Madagascar and Mauritius, it succeeded in maintaining Portuguese hegemony in the Indian Ocean. Goa was used as the headquarters of Portuguese rule in India. Their trading network extended to Malaysia, Java, China and Japan. Not only did they dominate the trade between Asia and Europe, but also much of the trade between different regions of Asia. Jesuit missionaries such as the Basque Francis Xavier, followed the Portuguese traders to spread the Roman Catholic religion, but with mixed success.

In time, the Portuguese opened up the spice trade with the ‘Spice Islands’ in the Moluccas. They contested the Ottoman Empire’s control of the spice trade by penetrating the Persian Gulf in 1515 and dominated the southern Persian Gulf for the next hundred years. With the regular maritime route linking Lisbon to Goa since 1947, Mozambique became a strategic point to build a fort and a hospital.

In terms of the Treaty of Tordesilhas, Portugal’s control of Brazil was safeguarded against the Spaniards, but not against the French and the raids of French privateers. As a result around 1503 the first Portuguese commander was sent to patrol the Brazilian coast and to establish the first colonial towns, Sao Vicente (1532) and Sao Paulo (1554). Vast stretches of land were donated in the form of hereditary captaincies to grantees rich enough to support settlement. Each grantee was expected to build settlements, administer justice and carry the costs of colonisation. Only a few recipients were successful as sugar cane planters and managed to maintain alliances with natives. These sugar cane farms demanded intensive labour which would ultimately be met by the slave trade. The city of Rio de Janeiro was founded in 1567. 14

In 1581 King Philip II of Spain was crowned also as Philip I of Portugal, uniting the two empires under Spanish Habsburg rule in a dynastic Iberian Union. Philip undertook to keep the empires legally distinct. Spanish trade networks were opened to Portuguese merchants which were particularly lucrative for Portuguese slave traders who could now sell slaves in Spanish America. On the other hand Spain dragged Portugal into its conflicts with the English, the French and the Dutch – all of whom were beginning to establish their own overseas empires. In its war with Spain, the English started to capture Portuguese ships. At the same time Dutch merchant seamen such as Cornelius de Houtman started to gather as much information as possible about the Portuguese trading routes to the Spice Islands. This led to the establishment of the Dutch East India Company and the English East India Company around 1600 and 1602. The Dutch dismantled the Portuguese monopoly in the East Indies. The Spanish trading posts in the West Indies were more difficult targets. The Dutch-Portuguese war lasted from around 1597 until 1663. The Dutch gradually captured the Spice Islands, Malacca, Colombo, Ceylon and Cochin. They expelled the Portuguese from the Japanese waters and ended their pre-eminent position in Asia.

The imperial union between Portugal and Spain ended in 1640. Portugal lost its foothold at Bombay and Tangier to England, but hung on to Brazil and Luanda. Between 1650 and 1770 Brazil became a spectacular growth point with the population expanding at a rate of 750 percent. Major discoveries of gold and diamonds were made in Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso and Goias. It also brought prosperity to Portugal.

In 1808 Napoleon invaded Portugal and banished the royal court of Portugal to Brazil. In 1822 Brazil declared its independence so that Portugal was forced to turn the focus of its aspirations back to its outposts in Africa. Portuguese explorers pressed into the hinterland of Angola and Mozambique with the object of connecting their two colonies. However, this plan clashed with the British aspirations to build a Cape to Cairo connection.

The Portuguese Slave Trade

The first reference to slave-catching activities in the mountains of the central Sahara is found in the writings of Herodotus dating back to the mid-first millennium BC. It appears that slaving and slave-trading were already in progress throughout the sub-Saharan savannah. Slavery was achieved by a process of the wide dispersion of captives. Throughout the whole northern half of Africa the slave trade received considerable impetus from the rise and spread of Islam. It is claimed that the prophet Muhammad lived his life in a slave-raiding, slave-owning and polygamous society in which it was customary for the men of defeated groups to be put to the sword and for women and children to be taken as slaves by the victors. (See R. Oliver, The African Experience – From Olduvai Gorge, to the 21st Century, London, 1999, pp.132-147)

Fresh sources of supply were found among the black peoples to the south of the Sahara. Specialised cavalry operations were developed to capture slaves. Thousands of women and children were taken as slaves after their men were killed. It was an utterly traumatic process in which individuals were snatched from their homes and kindred amid scenes of horror and 15

violence and carried into the unknown, where further hardship awaited all but the most fortunate. The Muslim slave-traders concentrated more upon the export trade of the Red Sea, which became the main source of African slaves reaching Arabia and the lands surrounding the Persian Gulf. Along the Indian Ocean coast of Africa, a series of maritime city states developed where wealthy Swahili citizens owned slaves that were captured or bought from peoples in the interior. During the late medieval and early modern times many black slaves were transported to Madagascar.

“The oldest directions of the slave trade were those which crossed the Mediterranean, the Isthmus of Suez and the Red Sea from classical times onwards. The Muslim era saw a great increase in the trade from north-eastern Africa into south-western Asia. In later medieval times the African entrepôts of this trade proliferated southwards down the Indian coast, while its points of delivery extended eastwards to western India, Bengal and South East Asia. But the most dramatic increase in the intercontinental trade came with the opening of the Atlantic coast of Africa by European seafarers in the middle of the fifteenth century. The Portuguese were the first to arrive, and they maintained a near monopoly for a century and a half before they were joined by the British and the French, the Dutch and the Danes.” (See R. Oliver, op.cit., p.140)

By the end of the 17th century, stimulated by the plantation agriculture in Brazil and the West Indies, Atlantic shipments had increased to about 30,000 a year and by the end of the 18th century they reached nearly 80,000. During the same period the trans-Saharan trade may have risen from about 5,500 to about 7,000 slaves a year and the Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade may have risen to about 4,000 slaves a year. A total of around 12 million Africans were shipped to the New World. (See R. Oliver, op.cit., p.145)

The Atlantic coast of Africa was virgin territory for slave traders. Before the Portuguese, no one else from the outside world had established more than a passing contact. But at most of their ports of call, the Portuguese found a commercial infrastructure already in existence which was capable of supplying them with viable cargoes of slaves – and of distributing European goods, mainly textiles, metals and hardware, which they brought in exchange. In Senegambia and on the Gold Coast, they traded with the same Dynla merchants who supplied the caravans of the Western Sahara. Both in Benin and the Niger delta there was an established system for the marketing of slaves brought down the rivers from the interior. In the Kongo kingdom on both sides of the Congo River, there was a large distribution network which brought captives down to the coast.

New research has shown that at the height of the Atlantic slave trade, most slaves originated as war captives. The causes of warfare appear to have been essentially local as a result of inter- ethnic conflict. The beaches between Badagry and Whydah in Dahomey became known as the ‘Slave Coast’. Fully one-third of the around twelve million slaves who crossed the Atlantic between the 15th and the 19th centuries came from Africa south of the equator, between the Cameroon estuary and the Kunene. Overwhelmingly they came from captives taken on the frontiers of the Kongo kingdom. Later the Mbundu and Yaka tribes turned the tables by taking slaves from the Kongo which they exported down the Kwanza valley to Luanda where 16

Portuguese traders were already settled at the nucleus of what was to become the colony of Angola.

According to Roland Oliver, the Portuguese came closer than any other Europeans of the slave- trading period to direct involvement in the process of enslavement. From Luanda they built a series of forts up the Kwanza valley, of which the garrisons became the military overlords of the local Mbundu chiefs from which they levied annual tribute of so many slaves. From their coastal bases the Portuguese also regularly sent African trading agents (‘pombeiros’) to buy slaves at the interior markets. The Atlantic slave trade differed sharply from the rest of the slave trade within Africa in that two-thirds of those transported were males. Plantation owners of the New World were prepared to pay more for men than for women and children.

Portugal extended its slave trade as far as the coasts of China. Many of the Chinese slaves brought to Portugal were children and many were shipped to the Indies. Chinese prisoners were brought to Portugal where they were sold as slaves. They were preferentially prized compared to Moorish and black slaves. Even children, kidnapped in China, were brought to Portugal and sold as slaves. The Portuguese preferred Chinese as domestic or household workers. Goa, Manila and Malacca were the major ports from where slaves were shipped out. In 1624 the King of Portugal issued a decree forbidding the capture of Chinese slaves. The ban on Chinese slavery was again issued in 1724.

For over a century Portugal enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the African seaborne trade. They imported thousands of slaves annually to Portugal where close to 10 percent of the population was constituted by black African slaves.

Portugal’s African Colonies

The Portuguese landed on the coast of today’s Angola around 1482 – ten years before the opening of a sea route to America. For centuries the Portuguese hardly ventured into the interior. After 1836 larger numbers of immigrants from Portugal arrived, but the total number of whites remained small. By the time the Portuguese colonial rule ended in 1974, the white population numbered around 400,000, mulattos around 100,000 and blacks more than four and a half million.

For generations the economy remained under developed. Slavery was the main activity and the main income resources were limited to timber, a few cereals, fishing and sugar cane. More recently large deposits of minerals were discovered: diamonds, iron ore, zinc, phosphates, petroleum and natural gas.

As in Portugal itself, the Portuguese were slow to introduce liberal concepts related to elected democratic government. There was more talk of a ‘Pan-Lusitanian’ community, united by the spiritual links peculiar to the Portuguese culture, human ‘brotherhood’, equality before the law – all incessantly epitomised by the slogan: ‘one state, one faith, one civilisation’. The pragmatic Portuguese also discarded the hated word ‘colony’ and replaced it with ‘province’ in the hope of giving their overseas territories the same status as the mother country – more or less as ‘ultramar’ components of the motherland. However, in practice, a hierarchy of status existed 17

with ‘indigena’, the natives of the Negro race and subject to tribal customs at the bottom, ‘assimilados’, ‘mulattos’ higher up and whites on top. To be an ‘assimilado’ a person had to be over eighteen, speak Portuguese, be of good character, have performed military service and be earning enough for his family. Not many blacks were able to meet these conditions.

Paul Nugent, a professor of Comparative African History at the University of Edinburgh, describes the Portuguese colonial policies in the following terms: “The ideologues of empire asserted that whereas the British and French imperial visions were underpinned by racism, they alone were genuinely interested in a creative fusion of peoples and cultures. The theory was that Portugal and its colonies would blend together to the mutual benefit of both sides ... (the Portuguese) ... envisaged a one-way process in which the colonised would eventually become acculturated. The Portuguese model, which was deeply imbued with the kind of social Darwinism which had lost ground elsewhere in Europe, explicitly denied that Africans had anything meaningful to contribute.” (See Africa Since Independence, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, N.Y., 2012, p.12)

Nugent quotes the conclusions of Gerald J. Bender published in Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality (London: Heinemann, 1978, pp.3-9), to the effect that the Portuguese envisaged a three-stage assimilation process: the destruction of traditional societies, followed by the inculcation of Portuguese culture and finally, the integration of ‘detribalised’ and ‘Portuguesised’ Africans into Portuguese society. To support this argument, Bender quoted a categoric statement made by Marcello Caetano (who later became Prime Minister of Portugal) when he was Colonial Minister during the mid-1940s: “The blacks in Africa must be directed and moulded by Europeans but they are indispensable as assistants to the latter. I do not affirm this out of prejudice – I merely formulate an observation ... The Africans by themselves did not know how to develop the territories they have inhabited for millennia, they did not account for a single technical discovery, no conquest that counts in the evolution of Humanity, nothing that can compare to the accomplishments in the areas of culture and technology by Europeans or even by Asians.” (Quoted in Nugent, op.cit., p.16)

Only a small proportion of the indigenous population of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe managed to rise above the ‘indigena’ level to become ‘assimilados’, whose ranks were for the most part confined to individuals of mixed parentage.

Nugent describes the situation obtaining in 20th century Portuguese Africa as follows: “The reality of non-assimilation bore important implications in Portuguese Africa by virtue of the mercantilist policies pursued by the Salazar dictatorship. The African peasantry was obliged to cultivate cotton, to sell it at below the world market price and then to purchase Portuguese cloth at inflated rates. In crude economic terms, these policies were extremely successful. Under conditions of rigid protectionism, the Portuguese textile industry underwent steady expansion. The flip side was, however, the progressive impoverishment of the peasantry in Mozambique and Angola, whose ability to grow sufficient food was threatened by the labour requirements of cotton cultivation.” (Nugent, op.cit., p.17)

The Decline of Portuguese Colonial Influence

Long before the emergence of the de-colonisation drive towards the middle of the 20th century, the Portuguese colonial empire was subjected to a number of significant internal pressures: the small size of the Portuguese population, the unpopularity of settlement in the colonies and the lack of economic pull-factors or stimulants within the colonies.

Portugal’s influence in its colonies was continuously hampered by the small size of the Portuguese population. Exploration and conquest was an enterprise driven by the nobility. The common people never participated enthusiastically in colonial escapades. To induce Europeans to move to Africa the Portuguese government resorted to releasing ‘degradados’ – convicts – from prison in exchange for accepting exile in Africa. Thus Angola gained a reputation as a Portuguese penal colony. The Portuguese who were settled in the colonies were mostly male with the result that many ‘Afro-Lusitanians’ were born to African mothers. The European populations of Portugal’s African settlements remained small.

The three centuries of slave trading removed the incentive of settlers to engage in other kinds of economic activity. The economies of Angola and Mozambique remained highly related to the export of slaves for many generations. The traders themselves generated huge profits which they invested elsewhere. Slavery was only ended in 1878 after it was abolished in 1858. The inherent corrupt nature of the slave trade which dominated the colonial administration for such a long time, inhibited the emergence of an honest, efficient and civic-minded administrative culture.

The economic infrastructure in the form of codified and transparent commercial law, reliable banking services, investment security, surveyed land, competitive retail outlets, etc., was not sufficiently developed to spur economic development. It did not offer a significant market for manufactured goods.

After World War II, Portugal’s leader, Antonio Salazar, expanded efforts to retain Portugal’s colonies at a time when other colonial powers were beginning to withdraw from their colonies. In 1961 Portuguese troops were overpowered by Indian troops in Goa and Salazar was faced with growing anti-colonial forces in Portugal’s African colonies.

In response to growing anti-colonial pressures, Salazar ruled in 1961 that differentiation would no longer be allowed among those subject to Portuguese sovereignty. All people would henceforth enjoy equal rights and the principle of a multi-racial society would be recognised. But there was no reference to the idea of universal suffrage. The governors of the Portuguese colonies remained under direct control of Lisbon. A consultative assembly was created where the races intermingled, but it was too little too late.

The rise of Soviet influence in Africa during the Cold War and the growing unpopularity of Portuguese colonial rule led to growing guerrilla warfare which led to the collapse of Salazar’s Estado Novo in Portugal. The National Salvation Junta which came to power initiated the ‘Carnation Revolution’ which involved the end of colonial wars and Portuguese withdrawal from 19

its African colonies. This prompted a mass exodus of Portuguese citizens from Angola and Mozambique, creating over a million Portuguese refugees, the ‘retornados’.

In Angola and Mozambique civil wars broke out. Communist governments were formed by incoming rebel groups which were backed by the Soviet Union, Cuba and other communist countries. Fighting against them were domestic opposing groups supported by Zaire, South Africa and the United States. Eventually, after much bloodshed, the countries gained independence in 1974.

Legacy

Most former colonies of Portugal now have Portuguese as their official language and together with Portugal now form the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). With the vast area of Brazil included, this community now covers 10,742,000km2 or 7.2 percent of the Earth’s landmass. Today Portuguese is one of the world’s major languages, ranked sixth overall with approximately 240 million speakers around the globe. It is also the seventh most widely used internet language and on Wikipedia it currently has the ninth largest number of articles published. Portugal and Brazil are leading a movement to have Portuguese accepted as one of the official languages of the United Nations.

Bibliography

Arnold, G. (2005) Africa – A Modern History, London: Atlantic Books Ferreira, E de S (1974) Portuguese Colonisation in Africa – The End of an Era The Unesco Press Meredith, M. (2012) The State of Africa – A History of the Continent Since Independence, Simon & Schuster Nugent, P. (2012) Africa Since Independence, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, N.Y. Oliver, R. (1999) The African Experience, Phoenix Press, London Van Dijk, L. (2006) A History of Africa, Tafelberg, Cape Town SBS World Guide (2008) Sixteenth Edition

2. The Dutch Influence

In April 1652 a group of around 90 Europeans employed by the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) occupied the area around Table Bay in order to set up a refreshment station for their commercial fleet carrying the spice trade between East India and Europe. At the time the spices – including black pepper, cloves, nutmeg, cinnamon and mace – were essential for flavouring and preserving food. For centuries these commodities had come overland from Asia to Europe along the Spice Road. But with the Portuguese discovery of the sea route to the East Indies via the Cape of Good Hope, attractive new business opportunities opened up as Dutch merchants gradually succeeded to wrest control of the lucrative Asian spice trade from Portugal and Spain early in the 17th century.

It is significant to note that from the beginning of the 17th century to the start of the French Revolution in 1789, the United Provinces of the Netherlands rose in commercial prominence to become a predominant trading power in the world – despite its small land area and the limited size of its population. But its commercial prowess was in large measure driven by its success in financial innovation: the Amsterdam Exchange Bank (Wisselbank) in 1607, the first limited liability joint-stock trading company and the biggest corporation of its era, and also the first stock market (Beurs) where the shares of the company could be bought and sold in 1608. The financial institutions represented by company, bourse and bank provided the triangular foundation for a new kind of economy. (See Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money – a Financial History of the World, Allen Lane, London, 2008, pp. 127-136)

The 17th century is often described as the Golden Age of the Dutch Republic. Its merchants were the most successful businessmen in Europe and the VOC was the world’s largest trading corporation. It operated under a charter from the States-General (the Dutch government) and was given sovereign rights in and east of the Cape of Good Hope. By mid-century it was the dominant maritime power in south-east Asia with its fleet numbering some 6,000 ships totalling around 600,000 tons and manned by around 48,000 sailors.

The object of the VOC’s directors, called the Heeren XVII (Lords Seventeen), for the establishment of the refreshment post at the Cape was to obtain fresh food for shipping fleets and to treat scurvy-stricken seamen – not to establish a costly, expansive new colony. A fort was built, a small number of ‘free burgers’ (employees released from their contracts) were given small pieces of farm land and slaves were imported to work on property and on ‘free burgher’ farm land. In time a growing number of slaves were brought from the East to work as masons, carpenters, tailors, cooks and other trades. The Cape slaves came from diverse linguistic, religious and social backgrounds. A few came from African territories, but more from Madagascar and still more from Indonesia, India and Ceylon – including a large minority of Muslims. From 1711 onwards, there were more slaves than free burgers in the colony. There were always three to four times as many male as female slaves.

Initially the slaves were exclusively employed by the VOC, but in time as more settlers were given farm land, the wealthy wheat and wine growers in nearby districts also acquired slaves to work on their farms and in their households. Stock farmers in more remote rural districts 21

employed only a small number of slaves together with Khoikhoi herders. By the end of the Dutch colonial rule at the Cape towards 1800, there were 25,000 slaves in the colony, compared to around 22,000 European settlers.

According to Hermann Giliomee’s assessment in New History of South Africa (2007), the most important influences exercised by the first European immigrants were Roman-Dutch law, the Reformed Christian Religion, early capitalism as well as two opposing contradictory concepts of society: the one an egalitarian tendency emanating from Europe; the other, hierarchical tendencies and practices the VOC had developed in running its colonies in the East. It should be added that these perceptions and attitudes, in time, found expression in the community and race relations prevalent at the Cape.

In addition, the Dutch connection brought in its wake a wide ranging impact on the social, economic, cultural, intellectual and political life in what is today called South Africa which lasted more than 350 years. This influence is still carried along by more or less 4 million descendants to this day and is highly visible in all spheres of life.

(See Karel Schoeman – Die Suidhoek van Afrika – Geskrifte oor Suid-Afrika uit die Nederlandse Tyd 1652-1806, Protea Boekhuis, Pretoria, 2002, for more than a hundred contemporary writings about the Cape during the Dutch colonial period)

The French Huguenots

When van Riebeeck landed at the Cape, his entourage, which included a few women and children, were mostly soldiers and petty officials of the VOC. They were mainly Dutch but partly German in nationality. These early colonists also brought with them the values, skills, knowledge, institutions and life styles that they acquired in the countries where they were born and raised.

When Simon van der Stel took over as governor in 1679, the Cape had gradually transformed from a refreshment post to an agricultural colony. By then the population was still small: 287 officials, 87 ‘free‘, 55 women, 117 Dutch and ‘mixed’ children, 30 ‘white’ labourers and 191 slaves. Van der Stel initiated programmes to expand the settlement by making new grants of land around Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, though only a handful of immigrants came from the Netherlands. Special efforts were made to bring orphaned girls from the Netherlands to increase the number of women – but without much success.

The situation changed when in 1688 and 1689 a total of around 200 French Huguenots came to the Cape and were settled as family units. These settlers were Calvinist Protestant Christians who fled persecution in France by the Catholic authorities under the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Although they represented only about one-quarter of the ‘free burghers’ in the Cape at the time, the French Huguenots exerted an important influence in view of their settlement as family units – not as single males. In order to enhance the process of assimilation, the French Huguenots were settled in several districts: Stellenbosch, Drakenstein, Franschoek, Paarl and Wagenmakersvallei (today’s Wellington).

The French Huguenots should be considered as the founders of the viticulture and wine industry in South Africa. They also enhanced the productivity of wheat cultivation. They were allowed to bring their own parson, Pierre Simond, and their own schoolmaster, Paul Roux. Their Calvinist principles and religion made a deep imprint on the values and lifestyles of the local colonists. Famous Voortrekker leaders such as Piet Retief and Sarel Cilliers were direct descendants of the Huguenots. Today there are dozens of French family names in circulation in the family trees of South Africans.

By 1793 there were 13,830 burgers (4,032 men, 2,730 women and 7,068 children) in the Cape colony. These were miniscule numbers compared with the scale of European settlement in the Americas by that time, but their enterprising and innovative influence soon became incalculable.

Innovative Impact

Van Riebeeck and his successors intended that the free burgers should practice intensive agriculture along Dutch lines, but lacking adequate and skilled labour, intensive agriculture was not successful. Some became artisans and traders in Cape Town, catering to the needs of visiting French, English and Scandinavian ships as well as to the Dutch fleets that stopped at the Cape each year. Those remaining on the land acquired larger holdings and became mixed farmers, producing grain and wine but also pasturing sheep and cattle beyond the limits of their land grants. This activity foreshadowed the later frontier pushing done by the ‘trekboere’.

The immigration of Germans was less heralded than the French but considerably more important in numerical terms. During the Dutch-controlled colonial period, as much as 15,000 Germans settled in the Cape. Many were employees of the VOC as soldiers, officials, tradesmen and a large number became private teachers.

The Cape settler community led a modest life, away from urban civilisation and the centres of culture and learning. A relatively small population was spread over a large geographical area so that regular church and school attendance opportunities were limited. By 1800 the total European-descent population of around 22,000 was spread over four stretched out districts: Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet – an area larger than the Netherlands and Belgium combined.

Exclusivity in Social Identity and Race Relations

Although race as a distinct legal category did not manifest itself in South African political life before the 19th century, 17th century Europeans appear to have been keenly conscious of the correspondence between differences in biological characteristics such as skin pigmentation and differences in culture. The early modern Europeans considered themselves as being heirs to and beneficiaries of a superior civilisation and religion. Charles Boxer, a historian of European colonialism found that Portuguese, Spaniards, English, French and Dutch were all convinced that a Christian European was ipso facto superior to members of another race. (See Charles Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, London, Hutchinson, 1965, p.233)

Giliomee describes how some people in Europe and the Cape sought to find Biblical sanction for their prejudices: the legends on Noah’s curse on Canaan and the children of Ham were used as justification for racial slavery and servitude. During the 17th century, Europeans attempted to justify the slavery of Africans by associating Ham with black people. In Shakespearean England, stereotypes about blacks being sinful, lustful and murderous abounded, but the same imagery also applied to Jews. The Dutch also deemed Africans to be godless and licentious heathens: people fundamentally different from Europeans.

(For a comprehensive survey of the European society in the 17th century, see Karel Schoeman, Patrisiërs en Prinse – Die Europese Samelewing en die Stigting van ‘n Kolonie aan die Kaap, 1619-1715, Protea Boekhuis, Pretoria, 2008)

The prejudices the early colonists brought with them were those typical of their age. Indigenous blacks were considered as ‘heathen’ and ‘inferior’ in contrast to their own ‘Christian’ and ‘superior’ European identity. In these matters they were paralleled by the history of colonists in other parts of the world: by British colonists in Virginia or New England, Jamaica or Trinidad and later in Australia and New Zealand; by Spanish colonists in Mexico, Peru and elsewhere in Latin America; and by Portuguese colonists in Angola, Mozambique, Goa and Brazil. To this day Brazilians struggle to deal with the vestiges of race discrimination in their society in the face of a comprehensive programme of ‘affirmative action’ or ‘reverse discrimination’.

From the perspective of the indigenous locals, the colonists were considered as ‘intruders’ that came across the sea to occupy and invade their land and to take away their livestock and hunting grounds. The intruders were visibly different, spoke different languages, practised a different religion, followed a different lifestyle and value system, and, carried different weaponry.

From the earliest encounters between the indigenous and intruding groups, a pattern of differentiated group identities emerged which, in time, became the hallmark of community and race relations. Group loyalties based upon race, ethnic identity, language, caste and religion started to emerge that resulted in conflict patterns. Disparities between ‘us’ and ‘them’ started to emerge as patterns of solidarity which was further complicated by the introduction of growing numbers of slaves. Although the VOC in the Netherlands impressed upon the Cape authorities to promote peaceful and harmonious relations with the indigenous peoples, the relatively small number of settlers succeeded in imposing themselves in a culturally dominant position.

Race – even as resting on subjective human sentiment and not entirely discreet as a result of early examples of miscegenation – became a basis of social differentiation on account of the instant recognition of variance in skin pigmentation, hair structure and facial characteristics. But racial identity only became pronounced as the socio-cultural setting became more multi- racial. A set of stereotypes, usually pejorative, developed amongst colonisers as well as amongst the subjugated.

The introduction of slavery had an important impact on social stratification at the Cape. Hermann Giliomee in The Afrikaners – Biography of a People, Tafelberg, 2005, p.12, states that: 24

“It transformed the social ethos of society by defining freedom and the status hierarchy. High status belonged to those who were free, kept slaves and did not have to work with their hands. To be a servant doing manual work in the employ of someone else carried the connotation of slave status, which the burghers at the Cape did everything possible to avoid... Almost unobtrusively the institution of slavery took a grip on social and economic life.”

According to Giliomee, the Cape also acquired influences from trading stations in the East: especially Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Batavia (Java). It was common for Dutchmen assigned to trading posts in the East to develop liaisons with Eastern women. The offspring born out of these associations were considered part of the European community – as was Simon van der Stel who became governor at the Cape in 1679. It was claimed that almost everyone with some pretentions to status in Batavia, keenly aspired to the role of a slave owner who abstained from manual labour. Other characteristics acquired from Batavia included the power that officials wielded, the strict company etiquette, the impotence of the church as an institution, the defective education, the conspicuous consumption, the dependence on slave labour, the use of Malay and Portuguese as lingua franca in the early decades and the introduction of the office of Fiscal to maintain law and order. Also transmitted were subtler influences from Batavia such as ‘the pace-of-life’, graces, aristocratic attitudes mixed with the technology, fashions and the Christian cultural traits of European society.

Slaves in private ownership were generally better off than those owned by the VOC. They were better clothed and better educated. The VOC slaves were housed in the ‘Slave Lodge’ where they were educated in the Reformed catechism. Some private slave owners kept up to twenty slaves, but the average number was three adult slaves who lived in close interaction with the slave- owning families. Slaves out of Africa and Madagascar were valued less because of their limited communication skills. Malayan slaves were in higher demand for their trade skills. Slaves born at the Cape were in higher demand still because they were less likely to escape than the imported ones.

Children born out of European-slave interbreeding were colloquially called ‘Bastaarden’ (or ‘Basters’). Although marriages between burghers and slaves were officially forbidden extra- marital associations were common, particularly involving slave women with soldiers, sailors and burghers. In terms of Roman law, the child of an extra-marital union acquired the status of the mother. Commissioner Van Reede determined that children born from extra-marital relationships could be trained as tradesmen and ‘set free’ at the age of 25.

The ‘Baster’-children did not easily fit into any of the major groupings at the Cape as a result of existing prejudices, some individuals nevertheless became successful and wealthy. By the end of the 18th century there were more than 2,000 ‘Basters’ who were recognised as baptised Christians. Some ‘Basters’, such as Adam Kok, moved northwards across the Gariep (Orange) River and collected remnants of scattered Khoikhoi groups to form new communities, such as the ‘Griekwa’.

(See Johan de Villiers, “Die Nederlandse Era aan die Kaap” in Fransjohan Pretorius, ed. Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika – Van Voortye tot Vandag, Tafelberg, Kaapstad, pp.51-53)

J.A. Heese’s genealogical research has revealed that around seven percent of Afrikaner families have a non-European ancestor (See J.A. Heese, Die Herkoms van die Afrikaner, 1657-1857, Kaapstad, Balkena, 1971). Since there was more than twice as many men than women during the first seventy-five years, marriages between white men and fair-skinned non-European women did occur. Most liaisons occurred outside wedlock resulting in large-scale miscegenation in the form of casual sex, especially in the slave lodge frequented by local European men as well as the thousands of sailors and soldiers who came to the Cape. Many of their descendants were absorbed into the community. Males of non-European origin also entered the ‘white society’. Burgher status was not racially exclusive and access through birth, marriage or purchase enabled at least some descendants of freed slaves to obtain burgher status. Identity was based on a pragmatic mix of status, honour and networking.

In time, as more prominent racial, cultural, ethnic and economic class distinctions emerged, these social identities became a fertile seedbed for inter-group cleavages and conflict. The different groups varied in terms of the links binding their members together but in most cases their solidarity depended on such factors as an awareness of a common culture, a common ancestry, a shared historical experience and a common language. The degree to which individuals were bound to cultural or sub-cultural groups by common loyalty, was like loyalty itself, a matter of degree.

Based on systematic social history research involving several leading South African and international historians, a publication edited by Nigel Warden, Cape Town: Between East and West, Jacana Media, Pretoria, 2012, provides a thematic focus on the complex interaction of social identities during the Dutch colonial period at the Cape. It describes the cultural landscape in the Cape Colony with a sharp focus on the interaction of VOC officials, the free burgher society and its under classes, south-east Asian convicts, Chinese exiles, slaves from Batavia, India, Madagascar and Africa as well as a constant stream of thousands of soldiers, sailors and passengers who crowded the streets of Cape Town. It positions the Cape in the wider context of the Atlantic and Indian oceans and explores its complex connections with Europe, Asia and Africa. It shows how the Cape settlement was shaped by forces beyond its immediate geographical confines, being part of a wide network of interchanges of people, goods and ideas across continents and oceans.

The wide array of descendants of the early settlers at the Cape drew from the cultural repertoire of their homelands to build new identities. This is particularly true for slaves and their descendants who formed around 40 percent of the permanent population at the Cape throughout the 18th century. Various contributors to Nigel Warden’s 2012 publication show how distinctive slave linguistic, cultural and religious beliefs were manifested in the colony. Men and women constructed their identities with whatever resources they had and adapted themselves with a high degree of innovation and flexibility.

After the defeat of the VOC in the period 1795-1806, much was to change in the Cape colony. New ideas about a particular type of British colonial respectability entered the social and cultural environment. Some locals consciously adapted themselves to this. Others deliberately rejected it. They came to identify themselves more consciously as locals as the process of local self-fashioning continued. 26

The South African Dutch speaking group, which gradually morphed into Afrikaans-speakers, essentially emerged as a result of the confluence of people originating not only from the Netherlands but also Germany, France, Britain and an admixture of slaves. This biological and cultural synthesis created a new ethnic group that considered themselves as resolutely indigenous and which gave rise to one of the first nationalist movements on the African continent as well as a language of their own. It is the only African language that contains the name of the African continent in its appellation - Afrikaans. Today hardly any Afrikaans- speakers are foreign-born.

The factor of race (regardless how imperfectly defined), being the most ‘visible’ determinant of identity and group affiliation, acted from the earliest encounters between the various population groups as a differentiator of cultural values, economic interests and social status. In consequence certain ‘group images’ were stereotyped. These identification patterns were reinforced by military hostilities and by folk beliefs and practices. In time the differentiation based on race or colour was formalised in the occupation, religious and political structures. Racial separation, buttressed by legal and social barriers formed the basis of ‘apartheid’ policies in South Africa – the Dutch word for segregation.

Impact on Indigenous Peoples

The two main indigenous peoples living in the Cape area at the time were the San (‘Bushmen’) and the Khoikhoi (Khoekhoen). The ‘Bushmen’, as the San were colloquially called, were the descendants of the original settlers in Southern Africa. They were hunter gatherers who were constantly at odds with grazier tribes, such as the Khoikoi – and later with the colonists.

In 1688 the first major attack by Bushmen on colonist herdsmen took place in the Drakenstein district which led to an ongoing war against the Bushmen. Soldiers were garrisoned in the Drakenstein and arrangements were made to strengthen their defences with freeburgher commandos. Mountain passes were patrolled and sporadic violent conflicts occurred. In 1739 and again in 1754 commandos were mobilised to confront the marauding Bushmen.

Periodic stock theft and commando reprisals continued as the inward migration of the colonists expanded into the Roggeveld, Hantam, Nuweveld and Sneeuberg regions. On both sides of the conflict many people were killed but in 1774 around 500 Bushmen were killed and members of their families imprisoned. By 1795 these conflicts declined as the surviving Bushmen retreated northwards to areas around the ‘Gariep’ (Orange) River and beyond.

The Khoikhoi (or Khoekhoen), colloquially known as the ‘Hottentotten’, were essentially graziers, herding cattle and sheep. They were also in constant battle with marauding Bushmen since ancient times, but soon also came into conflict with the ‘trekboer’ colonists. Inter-tribe battles also took a heavy toll, but the heaviest toll on their numbers was taken by several waves of smallpox epidemics: in 1713, 1755 and 1767. The first outbreak of smallpox occurred on 18 April 1713 at the VOC slave lodge in Cape Town. It was thought that the disease was transferred by the washing of passing seafarers. Several travellers, such as Francois Valentijn and Anders 27

Sparrman, reported evidence of large losses of life in the inland regions. According to a census taken in 1805, there were only around 20,000 Khoikhoi left in the Cape Colony.

Traditionally the Khoikhoi were nomadic herders who moved around following the availability of grazing and water supplies. As a growing number of farms were allocated by the authorities to the Cape colonists, conflicts with the nomadic Khoikhoi arose. By 1714 a total of around 400 farms had been allocated for wine and wheat production and an unknown number of farms for grazing purposes. Farms were also issued with grazing licences in specific areas not allocated for occupancy farming. Many Khoikhoi found employment with the farmers as herdsmen and farmhands. Missionary societies established several missionary stations such as Baviaanskloof (later called Genadendal), Elim, Suurbraak, Mamre, Zoar, Wupperthal etc.

Detribalised Khoikhoi gradually became marginalised members of the Cape colonial community. Inter-marriage with colonists occurred and gave rise to the Cape Coloured people of today. Some Khoikhoi intermingled with both slaves and colonists. In 1781 a ‘Corps Bastaard Hottentotten’ and later the ‘Corps Pandoeren’ were created to serve as part of the defence arrangements at the Cape. Khoikhoi elements were also incorporated in the ‘commando system’ in the frontier areas.

(See Johan de Villiers, “Die Nederlandse Era aan die Kaap” in Fransjohan Pretorius, op.cit. pp.47- 50)

Religion and Education

When considering the Dutch legacy in religious matters it is necessary to pay attention to the combined role of the Dutch Bible (Statenbijbel), the Dutch Reformed Church as a social institution, the Calvinist theology as a Protestant religious doctrine and the normative value system derived from these elements of religion. From the 17th century to early in the 20th century, religion and education developed hand in hand. Most efforts to improve educational standards were initiated on community level by church leaders and congregations.

An important milestone in the emergence of standard Dutch (Algemeen Beschaafde Nederlands) was the translation of the Bible from Hebrew and German sources into what was believed to be a non-dialectical Dutch language. Each Dutch province had its own distinct dialect and it took considerable compromise and ‘revisions’ to arrive at standardised grammatical rules and terminology. The province of Holland with its major cities of Amsterdam, Den Haag, Haarlem and Leiden played a predominant role – also on account of not only being the home ground of the financially powerful , but also being the seat of an active cultural life.

When the ‘Statenbijbel’ was finally made available around 1650 it became the most-read book in the Dutch language and it also found its way into the homes of the settlers at the Cape as an expression of written language. In many a family, the Bible was their only book that was readily available. The Dutch Reformed Church, which was based on Calvinist doctrine, was the official denomination at the Cape. In line with Protestant religious principles, any Christian believer could seek God’s grace without anyone as intermediary. The church and its institutions were controlled by the members of the parish and subject to their critical evaluation. 28

The 90 persons that Van Riebeeck brought with him to the Cape included a few women and children but mostly soldiers and petty officials of the VOC, mainly Dutch, with a few Germans. Their prejudices were those typical of their age with indigenous Blacks considered as inferior and ‘heathen’ in contrast to their own ‘Christian’ and ‘superior’ European identity. In these matters they were paralleled by the history of Virginia or the Carolinas, Jamaica or Trinidad and, later, Australia and New Zealand.

The first church congregation was established in 1665 in Cape Town, but the first church was completed only in 1704. The first school was opened in 1663, focussing on religious education, reading, writing and arithmetic. In the inland districts, churches were built in Stellenbosch, Drakenstein, Roodezand, Zwartland, Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet. In most instances the farmers joined forces to hire teachers for their farm schools. Church councils generally played a major role to improve teaching standards. In order to be ordained as a member of the church, one had to be able to read from the Bible. Hence, the underlying principles of teaching and learning were heavily imbued with the predominant Calvinist, Christian theology with its strong Bible-centric focus.

The sparse population spread over a vast area, combined with the scarcity of adequately trained teachers, made the provision of education services extremely difficult. In many instances literacy and numeracy were transmitted within family units. Farm schools offered basic reading, writing and arithmetic courses through the medium of Dutch (English teaching was only introduced early in the 19th century).

Various efforts were initiated by both settler communities and by Dutch church organisations in the Netherlands to maintain close religious ties. Church services were conducted in Dutch and hymns and psalms were sung in Dutch – a practice that was followed until deep into the 20th century when Afrikaans translations were made available. For many generations up to the Second World War, most Afrikaans-speaking scholars of theology preferred to study at Dutch universities such as Amsterdam, Leyden and Kampen. Afrikaans-language universities such as Stellenbosch, Pretoria, Bloemfontein and Potchefstroom tended to appoint Dutch-trained doctorandi as faculty members. It was only after the Second World War that more interaction with British and American universities became more common.

Land Tenure, Town Planning and Building Styles

The entrepôt at the Cape was not intended for colonial settlement. Nevertheless, the cultural landscape of VOC Cape Town was soon covered with an assortment of places, spaces and structures where people lived, worked and entertained themselves. (See Antonia Malan, “The Cultural Landscape” in Nigel Warden, ed. op. cit., pp.1-25)

According to Antonia Malan the conceptual model for late 17th century European town and country planning was formality and symmetry. This pattern was repeated throughout the VOC world with minor adjustments to suit local situations such as topography, location of fresh water and raw materials for building. As described by Antonia Malan, the peculiar traits of the Cape development pattern were practical structures such as a fort, a garden, a hospital, a 29

church, VOC stores and workshops and a cluster of simple dwellings. The public buildings were unremarkable. The main axial street was named ‘Heerengracht’. The original fort was replaced in 1699 with the Castle of Good Hope and areas were set aside as a market for fresh produce (Groente Markt), an outspan for livestock (Boeren Plijn) and a seat for local administration (Burgher Wachthuis). The grid system was used for street layout and for allocating land for dwellings and commercial use based on a system of rectangular blocks and division into lots. Each block had its houses arranged around the outside and facing the street with annexes, outbuildings and backyards tucked behind.

For privately owned farms (plaatsen) and market gardens (tuinland) in Table Valley, the pattern of land allocation was different from house erven as it was premised on ensuring access to water and needing to adapt to the topographical ridges and valleys. The early land grants were of varied extent and asymmetrical shapes. Optimal use was made of the sloping terrain for irrigation and water supplies. Allowance had to be made for reservations (doordrift) between private properties to permit public access to resources such as washing places, grazing and fuel supplies. Gradually new land grants were made and new species of trees such as oaks, pines and poplars were introduced.

Central to the process of transformation of pre-colonial hunter-gathering and pastoral grazing was a system of allocating, granting and registering land in the ownership of individuals. A cadastral system was introduced to register and record property ownership. Three types of land grants were introduced: a lot (erf), garden land (tuinland) and farm (plaats). Land tenure was in the form of freehold grants and transfers – often with special conditions or servitudes stipulated in the registered deeds. Urban town lots were laid out in a chequerboard pattern whereas garden and farm land was more organically fitted to the terrain and water points.

The task of official land surveyors and chart-makers was to measure out pieces of land, demarcate their boundaries, make a diagram of each land parcel, measure and define its extent and give it a numerical designation. Each parcel of land was systematically recorded – including its ownership and the price paid. Little is known about how and why people originally came to be allocated land or how properties were evaluated. Some people owned more than one property or were involved in several property transactions.

Initially building materials at the Cape were limited to stone, shell lime, clay and reeds. Indigenous timber suitable to timber framing was scarce. There was little fuel available to bake bricks or clay tiles. The distribution of wood and thatching reed was controlled. Skilled builders were scarce and single-storey structures predominated. The first substantial dwelling homes reproduced European and Eurasian styles characterised by a ‘groot kamer’ layout associated with a big multi-purpose living room with a hearth (groot kombuis) behind an asymmetrical facade. Wealthy locals and officials preferred the style of the ‘double house’ or ‘heerehuis’ as exemplified by Van der Stel’s Groot Constantia or Vergelegen and the garden property Leeuwenhof.

According to Antonia Malan the single-storey, thatched and gabled ‘Cape’ style that evolved by the middle of the 18th century was the result of a combination of factors: climatic conditions, limited availability of building materials, a desire for symmetry and the social organisation of 30

domestic households. The end result was a symmetrical layout of rooms with a central entrance room (voorhuis) and a large inner room (galdery) at the core of the house. The style became common from the 1760s. The climate had a part in dictating how the layout of dwelling houses became adapted to local conditions. Hot and windy summers and cold, windy and wet winters required effective controlled ventilation and substantial wind- en waterproofing. Further elaborations of the Cape Dutch styles on rural estates in the south-western Cape after the 1750s were linked to increased social stratification and the emergence of a rural gentry. Town houses diverged from their rural counterparts into a plan more suitable for urban spaces: compact double or triple-storey structures which were more fire-resistant with flat, plastered and tarred or red-tiled roofs.

The Development of the Afrikaans Language

A universal feature of language is the development of regional accents, idioms and dialects. Of the around 12 Dutch dialects, the VOC promoted ‘Hollands’, the dialect of the province around Amsterdam where the company’s headquarters were located. The Dutch officials and original settlers that came with Van Riebeeck mostly came from the province of Holland, but others followed from other dialect areas. In time, many immigrants arrived from Germany, France, Scandinavia and Britain. Many slaves were brought from Malaya, the Indonesian islands, India and Madagascar. Finally, indigenous groups also became part of the language community: Khoikhoi (Hottentot), San (Bushmen) and Bantu (Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho, etc.). All members of the language community played a part in the development of a new lingua franca.

It is important to realise that each other-language speaker was expected to understand and communicate in the official language of the Cape which was Hollands. Inevitably their best efforts resulted in some form of ‘broken Hollands’ or a simplified, creolised, restructured form of Dutch which dropped certain inflections and vocabulary items, modified vowel sounds and incorporated loan words from other languages. This dialect – sometimes referred to as a form of ‘pidgin’ Dutch - which originated as a medium of oral communication between burghers and slaves and indigenous employees, in time would become a distinct language – Afrikaans, with its own rich vocabulary, structured grammar and extensive literature.

It is important to realise that each other-language speaker who was trying to speak Dutch (whether German, French, Malayan, Indian or other) brought along the baggage of their own accents, idioms, terminology and expressions. They all contributed to the restructuring process. This process is well described by E.H. Raidt’s remarkable study Afrikaans en Sy Europese Verlede, Nasau Beperk, 1991, p.231: “Dit spreek byna vanself dat – in ‘n spraakgemeenskap soos dié aan die Kaap – taalvariasie ‘n prominente rol gespeel het, veral as ‘n mens in aanmerking neem dat Vroeë Afrikaans uitsluitlik ‘n praattaal was wat nog nie aan direkte normering onderworpe was nie. Taalvariasie op fonologiese, morfologiese en sintaktiese gebied, individuele en groepsvariëteite en variante was aan die orde van die dag ... Die variante is die gevolg van sowel oorgeërfde Nederlandse dialekvorme as die gebrekkige Kaaps-Nederlands van slawe, Khoi-Khoin en immigrante ...”

The restructuring process of the Dutch language continued over several generations, especially in rural areas and farms where the locals were less exposed to what was called ‘Hoog Hollands’. 31

But because the Dutch Statenbijbel was widely read by burgers on the frontier, religion, combined with strenuous efforts of the church, played an important role to preserve the influence of Dutch.

It should be clear that Afrikaans is an off-shoot of the Dutch language which emerged out of the Dutch spoken by other-language speakers. Similarly, the Dutch dialects that were brought to the Cape by the VOC, was itself an off-shoot of earlier Germanic languages. It is no surprise that some Dutch visitors to the Cape in 1750 commented on the ‘broken Dutch’ (verminkte Hollands) spoken by the locals. But even today, almost three centuries later, any educated Afrikaans-speaker can easily understand any piece of written ‘Algemeen Beschaafde Nederlands’. Understanding the various spoken Dutch dialects is a different matter! In South Africa today, Afrikaans is the mother tongue of around six million people and the second language of around another ten million people.

Roman-Dutch Law

Through much of West European history since the beginning of the Christian age, the refined legal concepts of Roman law were combined with local customary law. The process referred to as the ‘reception of Roman law’ reached the Netherlands in the 15th century. By the 18th century this process was formally codified by eminent legal scholars such as Grotius (1583- 1645) and Voet and became formally known as Roman-Dutch law. This legal system and its terminology were applied by the Dutch in their colonies where it has survived to this day.

Today the South African legal system is a hybrid of three distinct legal traditions: a civil law system inherited from the Dutch, a common law system inherited from the British and a customary law system inherited from indigenous Africans. These traditions have a complex interrelationship with the English influence most apparent in procedural aspects and methods of adjudication and the Roman-Dutch influence most visible in its substantive private law.

(See du Bois, F. (ed.), Wille’s Principles of South African Law, 9th ed., Cape Town, Juta & Co., 2007; Pont, D., “Die Reg van die Afrikaner” in Pienaar, P de V. (ed.) Kultuurgeskiedenis van die Afrikaner, Nasionale Boekhandel, 1968)

The relationship between Roman-Dutch law and English law in the current South African legal system is more specifically described by R.W. Lee and D.V. Cowen in the Encyclopaedia Britannica in the following terms: “Constitutional law and administrative law have developed along English lines. The law of procedure and evidence is almost wholly English as is most law relating to business associates and such areas as patents, trademarks, copyright, insurance and maritime operations. On the other hand, criminal law is a combination of elements from Roman-Dutch and English common law sources. In the law of succession, the rules governing the making of wills are English, whereas the substantive law of testamentary and interstate succession is largely Roman-Dutch. The law of persons and the law of property are almost purely Roman-Dutch, and the principles of the law of contract and the law of delict are Roman-Dutch, only mildly influenced by common law.” 32

(See also Verloren van Themaat, “Die Republiek se Staatsreg en sy Historiese Grondslag” in Pienaar, P de V (ed.), Kultuurgeskiedenis van die Afrikaner, op.cit. pp.252-257.)

Government Institutions and Political Participation

Similar to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands is today governed by an elected parliament and a constitutional monarchy. This system gradually evolved since the 17th century, but was briefly interrupted by the Napoleonic occupation early in the 1790s which lasted until Napoleon’s defeat in 1815.

Governmental power was exercised in the Cape by the authorities appointed by the VOC. The governor and Council of Policy, consisting exclusively of senior officials, ruled the Cape, subject to instructions from the Council of Seventeen in Amsterdam and the governor-general in Batavia. The Court of Justice served as judiciary with officials (the majority) and burghers as members – all appointed by the governor. Church ministers were salaried officials and the Church Council was jointly appointed by the governor and the Council of Policy.

Corruption was the way of life in the Dutch East India Company. But competition and conflict arose between the successful settlers and the senior VOC officials (including the governors) who used their official powers to enrich themselves by possession of large blocks of the best arable land, cattle ranches, slaves and use of their official positions to control access to shipping and external markets. This conflict came to a head in 1705 when Governor Willem Adriaan van der Stel exploited a wine concession to his advantage. Sixty-three free burghers signed a petition denouncing the officials and forwarded it to Amsterdam. The officials responded by getting 240 signatures to a counter petition. Eventually the Lords Seventeen dismissed the governor and three other senior officials. It was the first recorded successful civic action in South Africa originated at grass-roots level.

The tensions between the corrupt officials and the burghers again came to a head in the 1770s. In 1774 an official named Hendrik Boers, who had little understanding of the aspirations of the burghers, became Fiscal (Chief Prosecutor). He insisted that the company had the right to recall recalcitrant burghers to its service and to send them wherever it chose. In the first few years of his regime, Boers re-enlisted no fewer than seventeen burghers and dispatched them overseas. After the banishment in 1778 of the eighteenth burgher, Carel Hendrik Buytendach, the burghers felt compelled to contest the use of banishment and what they termed ‘arbitrary despotism’. The main spokesmen for the Patriots were fairly wealthy men from in and around Cape Town. In 1778 leading businessmen at the Cape sent two delegations to the Netherlands appealing not only to the Lords Seventeen, but also to the States-General complaining against the VOC’s trading policies and demanding freedom to trade with foreign ships. More importantly they demanded effective political representation. The burghers asked for seven seats on the Council of Policy and for half the seats on the Court of Justice, instead of the government’s co-opting of burghers to serve on government bodies. They had to be ‘freely elected’ by outgoing burgher members. In addition, they sought a clear definition of burgher rights, the codification of laws and the prohibition of banishment of burghers. The Cape Patriots 33

also complained about the trading activities of officials and the lack of free trade and asked for better prices and the reduction of farm rents.

The historical significance of the Cape Patriots’ petition was the expression of a civic concern for effective political representation, codified laws and an end to the arbitrary exercise of government power. The quarrel became embroiled in the ideological and political struggle in the Netherlands at the time. There supporters of the status quo were confronted by the Dutch ‘Patriots’ – a group of citizens influenced by the American Revolution which started in 1776, and also by the democratic ideas of the Enlightenment.

Unfortunately the petitions and deputations of the Patriots did not achieve much. More burgher representation on the Council of Policy was rejected, but they were granted three additional seats on the Council of Justice. Banishment of burghers was disallowed and burghers were allowed to trade with foreign ships – only after the VOC’s needs had been met. After this brief flourish of activity, the Patriots’ activities in the Western Cape soon fizzled out.

By this time events had taken their own course on the eastern frontier of the colony. The ‘trekboere’ (trekboers - literally trekking or migrant farmers) were essentially pastoralists who had moved beyond the districts of Stellenbosch and Swellendam (1745) to the north-eastern limits of the district of Graaff-Reinet (1786). At each of these outposts (Stellenbosch, Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet), the VOC was represented by a ‘landdrost’ who was a salaried employee. The local administrations of landdrosts were very rudimentary with few officials. Consequently a landdrost was obliged to rely heavily upon the unpaid services of prominent local trekboers known as ‘heemraden’ and ‘veldkornetten’. In each district, six heemraden were appointed by the governor from lists prepared by the existing holders of those offices. Besides administering the affairs of the district, the landdrost and heemraden formed a court of justice with minor civil jurisdiction. In each subdivision of a district, a veldkornet, appointed by the ‘landdrost en heemraden’ was responsible for law and order. This meant that the most prominent trekboers had a major say in the conduct of the local administration.

Over time the trekboer families were spread thinly over a vast area. Leonard Thompson in A History of South Africa, Jonathan Ball, Cape Town, 2006, p.461, reports that in 1793, of the 13,830 burghers in the Cape Colony, only 3,100 were residing in the vast eastern district of Graaff-Reinet and 1,925 in Swellendam district. Stellenbosch had 4,640 burghers and Cape Town only 4,155.

Since it took the trekboers up to three months to travel from Graaff-Reinet to Cape Town by ox wagon (although perhaps three weeks on horseback), life at the frontier demanded self-reliance and determination. Survival in the frontier areas required and spawned people with distinct character traits: independent minded, pioneering, fearless, individualistic, strong-minded, secluded, self-confident, and self-contained. Harsh conditions required tough people. They drew their ideas of life largely from their familiarity with the Old Testament. They lived according to the Calvinist principle of rebellion against suppression. They expected and even demanded a voice in the administration of affairs and representation in decision-making authorities. They rejected an official strangle-hold on their freedom of movement and displayed a deep suspicion against government officials. In some remote frontier areas, the activities of local trekboers 34

verged on lawlessness. There are several well-documented examples of unruly behaviour of uncultured ruffians and outlaw types. But, by and large, the frontier communities did not trek into the wilderness to live lawlessly. They continually requested the authorities to establish churches, schools and judicial offices.

For defence the trekboer farmers formed a co-operative institution, the commando. The VOC had initially used its own military personnel in its operations, but from 1715 onwards, commandos consisted exclusively of civilians. They were dependent on the VOC for their guns and ammunition and, in theory, subject to company control. In practice they operated independently against the San and the Khoikhoi. When indigenous bands attacked burgher property during the 1770s over a wide area north of Graaff-Reinet, large commandos retaliated and killed hundreds of the Bushmen in various campaigns between 1774 and 1795.

Leonard Thompson made the following controversial observation in his History of South Africa, op.cit. p.49: “Commandos exterminated adult hunter-gatherers but made a point of capturing children, and before they disbanded they distributed the children as well as the cattle booty among themselves.” Thompson further reports that by the 1770s the trekboers on the eastern frontier zone started to collide with southwards bound Bantu-speaking Xhosa pastoralists. In 1779 and 1793 major spells of warfare occurred. People were killed on both sides of the conflict, property was destroyed, sheep and cattle changed hands, but the conflict remained unresolved. Since these events strained the relationship between the frontiersmen and the colonial government which was not seen to be offering sufficient protection, prominent trekboers from the district of Graaff-Reinet drove out the landdrost in 1795 and assumed control. The Cape Town government responded by cutting off ammunition supply leaving them exposed to attacks by indigenous tribes.

At this time the Dutch control of the Cape was drawing to a close. Not only was the VOC facing bankruptcy, but the political regime of the Dutch Stadhouder, the Prince of Orange (supported by the Orangist party), was also facing total collapse. In the Netherlands the Patriot movement was crushed in 1787 with the aid of Prussian troops. Large numbers of Dutch Patriots emigrated to other countries, particularly to the newly independent USA. The French Revolution released new tensions in the Netherlands during the early 1790s and in 1795 the French cavalry entered Amsterdam and Dutch revolutionaries proclaimed the Batavian Republic. The Orangist party was routed and the Stadhouder fled to London. All the institutions of the old order were swept away - also the privileges of the nobility. Having fled to London, the Stadhouder, the Prince of Orange, had asked the British government to send an armed force to occupy the Cape and all other Dutch possessions abroad.

In the frontier districts of the Cape the burghers were already stirred by anti-royalist ideas coming out of the American War of Independence which started in 1776 and culminated in 1787. These sentiments were further bolstered by radical ideas coming out of France. There was widespread discontent amongst the burghers about the VOC’s control of trade and the heavy taxes levied. In the frontier areas they were incensed by the lack of protection against the constant harassment by the Bushmen and Xhosa tribesmen. They felt the local landdrost in Graaff-Reinet did not take their grievances seriously enough. These feelings led to the over- 35

throw of the VOC rule in the district of Graaff-Reinet in February 1795, followed by the district of Swellendam in June 1795. Loyalties in the districts of Stellenbosch and Cape Town were divided: some favoured the royalist Orange Party, others the republican revolutionaries. Most people seemed to be confused by the intricate patterns of conflict emerging out of the French Revolution.

In September 1795 a British force occupied the Cape where they encountered a deeply divided white community. Most of the top officials were Orangists (anti-revolutionary and pro-Britain) and most burghers pro-France, pro-revolution and anti-Britain. The British force soon intimidated aspirant revolutionaries. By August 1796 the burgher communities of Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet decided to accept British authority and the rebels soon capitulated thereafter, in 1797. The Cape was returned to the Netherlands which, now a protectorate of France, was called the Batavian Republic. The Cape remained under Dutch control until 1806 when it was again conquered by Britain.

On January 10th, 1806, Governor Jansens signed the whole settlement over to the British. This date marks the beginning of British imperial rule in Southern Africa which lasted for more than a century. But it is important to realise that by this time a Dutch civic temperament that took almost a century and a half to morph into a distinct Afrikaner national identity was already afoot and which remained a prominent factor on the South African political scene for many generations afterwards.

The whole colonial population, descendants of Dutch, German and French Huguenot settlers, was relatively small – no more than around twenty-five thousand in all, scattered across a territory of 100,000 square kilometres. The population also included some 20,000 slaves imported from Africa and Asia as well as thousands of Khoikhoi, aboriginal pastoralists commonly called ‘Hottentots’. The total population of the Cape Colony at that stage was no more than about 75,000.

Bibliography

Coertzen, P. (1988) Die Hugenote van Suid-Afrika 1688-1988, Tafelberg Uitgewers, Kaapstad Couzens, T. (2004) Battles of South Africa, David Philip Publishers, Claremont Davenport, T.R.H. (1977) South Africa – A Modern History, MacMillan, Johannesburg De Klerk, W.J. (1971) Afrikanerdenke, Pro Rege Pers, Potchefstroom De Villiers, J. (2012) “Die Nederlandse Era aan die Kaap” in Pretorius, F. (2012) Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika, Tafelberg, Kaapstad Du Bois, F. (ed.) (2007) Wille’s Principles of South African Law, 9th Ed. Juta & Co, Cape Town Gey van Pittius, E.F.W. Staatsopvattings van die Voortrekkers en die Boere, (1941) J.L. van Schaik, Pretoria Giliomee, H (2003) The Afrikaners – Biography of a People, Tafelberg Publishers, Cape Town Giliomee, H. & Mbenga, B. New History of South Africa, Tafelberg Publishers, (2007) Cape Town 36

Guest, R. (2004) The Shackled Continent, MacMillan, London Harrison, D. (1981) The White Tribe, MacMillan, London Heese, H.F. (2005) Groep Sonder Grense - 1652 – 1795, Protea Boekehuis, Pretoria Johnson, R.W. (2004) South Africa – The First Man, The Last Nation, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg Meredith, M (2007) Diamonds, Gold and War – The Making of South Africa, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Jeppestown Millin, S.G. (1951) The People of South Africa, Constable & Co., London Pama, C. (1983) Die Groot Afrikaanse Familie-naamboek, Human & Rousseau, Kaapstad Pienaar, P. de V. (ed.) Kultuurgeskiedenis van die Afrikaner, Nasionale (1968) Boekhandel, Kaapstad Raidt, E.H. (1991) Afrikaans en sy Europese Verlede, Nasionale Opvoedkundige Uitgewery, Kaapstad Schoeman, K. (2002) Die Suidhoek van Afrika – Geskrifte oor Suid-Afrika uit die Nederlandse Tyd 1652-1806, Protea Boekehuis, Pretoria Theal, G.M. (1917) South Africa, G.P. Putnam’s & Sons, New York Worden, N. (ed.) (2012) Cape Town – Between East and West, Jacana Media, Auckland Park

3. The Influence of the Boer Republics

After the control of the Cape Colony was transferred to Britain, the Dutch influence was carried forward by the Dutch descendants in the era of the Great Trek and the establishment of the Boer Republics in Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Although accurate demographic statistics were not kept, J.A. Heese’s research revealed that in the period prior to 1800, around 37 percent of the burgher population were of Dutch descent, 35 percent of German and 14 percent of French descent. The remaining 14 percent were made up of ancestors who came from Scandinavia, the Baltic, Britain, including around 6 percent who were slaves. (See J.A. Heese, Die Herkoms van die Afrikaner, (1657-1857), op.cit.)

The Great Trek

The era of the Great Trek refers to the period after 1836 when large waves of Cape burghers left the Cape Colony, trekking into the interior as organised groups in order to run their own affairs in their own way beyond British colonial limits. This aspiration provides a good insight into the priorities and principles the Voortrekkers held in great esteem. Herman Giliomee in The Afrikaners – Biography of a People, op.cit. p.144, described the Great Trek as “.. a bold and dramatic response to a survival crisis that had engulfed the eastern and north-eastern districts of the Cape Colony from the mid 1820s to the end of the 1830s.”

Many factors contributed to this large exodus of the Dutch Colony descendants and historians tend to highlight the issues that resonate with their perspective on socio-cultural life. Some emphasize the abolition of slavery but seem to ignore that less than one-fifth of all slaves in the colony were kept in the border regions whence most of the Voortrekker migrants came. Most slave owners lived in the Western Cape and they did not trek. Others focus on the lack of security and government protection against cross-border invasions by Xhosa and Bushmen marauders and the shortage of grazing land. But the massive, orderly and organised exodus was mainly driven by wide-spread dissatisfaction and a sense of alienation and marginalisation. The burghers had a deep mistrust of the British rulers as a result of the replacement of Dutch by English in all spheres of public life: the schools, the courts, public notices, the churches – all aspects of cultural life were restructured to the legal realities of British rule.

Several scouting parties were sent to the interior to investigate the possibilities of settlement there. Gradually small trekker parties left for the northern and eastern trans-Vaal under Louis Trichardt and Hans van Rensburg. Hendrik Potgieter set off in late 1835 and Gerrit Maritz in 1836. Both groups decided to concentrate in the Thaba’Nchu-Vet River area of central trans- Orangia, skirting Griqua settlements north of the Orange River. On 2nd February, 1837, Piet Retief departed from the Grahamstown area and joined scattered cavalcades of hundreds of ox wagons winding their way beyond the boundaries of the colony, trekking with their livestock. Most of these Voortrekkers came from the districts of Uitenhage, Albany, Somerset East, Grahamstown, Cradock, Graaff-Reinet, Beaufort West and even Swellendam, totalling about a quarter of the burghers living in the eastern half of the colony at the time.

Historian Davenport made the following assessment of the significance of the Great Trek: 38

“There is a tradition in Afrikaner historiography which has represented the Trek as a milestone in the development of conscious Afrikaner nationalism, portraying the Voortrekkers as ‘nationally aware Afrikaners’ linking the Age of the ‘Patriotten’ with the age of Paul Kruger. However indemonstrable, in the strict sense, this proposition may be, its existence became of great significance historically in helping to build up the Trek as perhaps the central event in the evolution of an Afrikaner mystique.” (See Davenport, op.cit., p.40)

Squashed between the expansionary pressures of the British Empire and the insecurity caused by the hostility in the scattered tribal areas, the Voortrekkers tried to set up their own Boer republics: Natalia (1840), Orange Free State (1854) and Transvaal (1858). They had to rely on their own resources. They were only prepared to accept the laws and dictates of authorities of their own choosing.

The First Governmental Arrangements of the Voortrekkers

There is a high degree of consensus among historians that the Voortrekkers (pioneers) could be characterised as highly individualistic, disdaining anything that interfered with or threatened each individual’s freedom and way of life. When danger forced them to combine in their commandos, each remained his own man, often coming and going as he pleased. In contrast to the British soldier, who fought for pay, was under orders, wore a uniform, operated in rigid hierarchical battalions, drawing their strength from discipline instilled by close-order drill, the Boers wore no uniforms, drew no pay, provided his own horse and rifle and fought in loosely structured formations. The Boers fought for love of their freedom and the need to survive.

It remains a remarkably peculiar sign of civic consciousness that as soon as the Voortrekkers could assemble across the Orange River, they met to set out the ground rules of the civic life they meant to establish. They arranged ‘volksvergaderings’ (people’s assemblies) which they regarded as the source of authority to approve constitutional arrangements, to elect office bearers and to promulgate codes of law.

The underlying aspirations, principles and priorities of the Voortrekkers are reflected in the first arrangements made by the scattered groups once they crossed the Orange River. They met on 2nd December, 1836, and decided to stipulate the basic outline of their own governmental arrangements: “Op heden den 2 December 1836 een algemene vergadering belegd hebbende, met de mening om door eene algemene volkstem Rechters aan te stellen die voor het algemene best en vrede zullen moeten waken, die ook te gelyker tyd eene Wetgevende Lichaam zullen uitmaken ... tot eene regeringsvorm gekozen zyn geworden die gedurig van tyd tot tyd zich stiptelik zullen houden aan zodanige wetten en regelmenten als door eene algemene vergadering zullen worden vastgesteld”. (Quoted by E.F.W. Gey van Pittius, Staatsopvattings van die Voortrekkers en die Boere, J.L. van Schaik, Pretoria, 1941, p.9)

The significance of this remarkable peoples’ resolution lies in the fact that, on the continent of Africa, it was the first democratically inspired outline ever of the task and responsibilities of governmental arrangements where those empowered were held accountable to the ‘volkstem’ 39

(voice of the people) as expressed by an ‘algemene vergadering’ (people’s assembly) in order to promote ‘het algemene best en vrede’ (the general well-being and peace), on the African continent. In 1836 there were, apart from the American Constitution, which was approved in 1787, hardly any written democratic constitutions available or in operation in the world. The Voortrekkers had no experience or template of constitution making at their disposal. It is clear however that some members of their community must have been familiar with the underlying sentiments of the American War of Independence, the French Revolution and those of the Dutch and Cape ‘Patriotten’. Concepts such as ‘sovereignty of the people’ and that the people should ‘choose their own representatives’. It was indeed a remarkable expression of early democratic ideology in a far corner of the world.

The weakness of the original 1836 arrangements was a degree of confusion between the legislative roles of the role of the ‘Rechters’ (Judges) as a ‘Wetgewende Lichaam’ (Legislature), while at the same time describing the ‘algemene vergadering’ as the source of ‘wetten en reglementen’ (rules and regulations). Perhaps the confusion is due to an unfortunate choice of words or that the peoples’ assembly delegated certain subordinate rule making powers to the ‘Rechters’ who in reality functioned as an executive ‘burgher council’ but subject to the ‘volksvergadering’ (peoples’ assembly).

In April 1837 a new election was conducted. Retief was chosen as ‘Goewerneur’ (called ‘governor’ instead of ‘president’) and Maritz as ‘President-Rechter’ (president-judge). On the same day a ‘Raad van Politie’ (political council) was also elected by the people’s assembly. Although the functions of this council were not defined, they reduced themselves in practice to assisting the Governor who was entrusted with the executive function and as subordinate legislative authority subject to the sovereign authority of the people, and, administering justice. But a new figure had made his appearance in the person of the Governor as head of state. Maritz retained his dual office as Chairman or President of the Council in legislative matters, and landdrost or judge of that body when sitting in judicial capacity. In the latter case the other members of the Raad acted as ‘heemraden’ as in the VOC times.

A striking feature of their first constitutional arrangements was their apparent fear of a one- man government and the arbitrary exercise of power. But at this stage Piet Retief was also the Supreme Commander of the Voortrekker community’s military organisation. In addition, he managed external affairs as head of state and concluded several treaties of peace and friendship with the surrounding tribal chiefs, inter alia with Maroka, Towane, Sikonyela and Moshesh. His last treaty was the fateful one he concluded with Dingaan.

Later in 1837, Retief received a written petition from Piet Uys and 169 other Trekkers in which they refused to submit themselves to any laws made by a few people. The petition warned the Trekkers against being plunged into the same misery from which they had fled. He insisted that at all times, the ‘volkstem’ (people’s voice) should always remain the supreme power and directive and that responsibility must be demanded of the leaders who had to swear allegiance to the people and the resolutions passed by the people’s assembly.

Retief, as Governor, was entrusted mainly with the execution of legislative measures, in practice acting on the advice of the Political Council. The fact that executive, legislative and judicial 40

functions were entrusted to one body reflects the fact that the Voortrekker community were still at the threshold of their political development as a relatively small community still in transit – without offices and officials. As reflected by the later constitutions of the Boer republics, they were patently aware of the principle of the separation of powers. Three independent bodies at the early stage would have required more complex constitutional arrangements which would have been impracticable in such a mobile community.

The Republic of Natalia

The Republic of Natalia’s constitution was an extension of the 1836 and 1837 Voortrekker governmental arrangements. It made provision for an elected ‘Volksraad’ (council of representatives electing its own chairman and meeting every three months). The Volksraad was elected by all burghers possessing fixed property and foreigners resident in the Republic for three years. Apart from being the supreme legislature, the Volksraad was also the highest court of appeal. For the rest the administration of justice was left in the hands of the ‘landdrosten’ and ‘heemraden’, appointed by the Volksraad for one year (as all other officials) after the expiry of which they could be re-appointed.

The military system was based on the same system as obtained in the Cape Colony under the Dutch. All inhabitants between the ages of 16 and 60 could be called up for military service in the event of disturbances or wars, and were commanded by ‘wyksveldkornetten’ and ‘distrikskommandanten’ – the latter appointed by the Volksraad. The supreme military command was in the hands of the ‘Hoofkommandant’ (Chief Commander), appointed by the Volksraad for specific campaigns. Landdrosts also served as collectors of all state revenues and had to submit quarterly statements of account.

The Volksraad was convened four times a year, each session lasting only a few days. Executive authority was vested in a ‘Kommissieraad’ (commission council) consisting of a few members appointed by the Volksraad. Their decisions were subject to ratification by the Volksraad at its first ensuing session. A serious weakness in this system was the omission of a person to act as chief executive to take responsibility for executive functions. The constitution provided for a ‘President van Politie’ with specified functions, but no one was appointed so that the Volksraad took over the executive power collectively. The result was that the Hoofkommandant acted as the head of state and attended the meetings of the Volksraad in an advisory capacity. Hoofkommandant Andries Pretorius in time acquired the rank of ‘Kommandant-Generaal’ and effective head of state.

The Volksraad in Natal claimed jurisdiction of all Trekker communities west of the Drakensberg range, and in 1841 a deputy Volksraad was elected at Mooi River (later Potchefstroom), followed in 1843 by the election of a similar body at Winburg in the later Orange Free State. When Natal was annexed by Great Britain in 1843, the focus of activity moved to the territory north of the Vaal River. The Natal Constitution was transferred to small concentrations of Voortrekkers at Ohrigstad and Mooi River.

The Republic of Natalia’s constitution eventually formed the basis, with minor adaptations, of the constitutions of the Orange Free State and the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek. The Voortrekkers had now established themselves under the flags of their own Boer Republics.

The Orange Free State Republic

The signing of the Bloemfontein Convention on 23rd February, 1854, marks the birth of an independent Republic of the Orange Free State. Leading roles were played by J.G. Groenendaal, a Dutch teacher, and J.M. Orpen, an Irishman. These people, in turn, drew on their knowledge of the American Constitution and the Dutch Constitution of 1848 as well as the ‘Code Napoleon’. But traditional concepts also found their way into the constitution, particularly in regard to the composition of the Volksraad, and the organisation of the judiciary and the military system.

It provided for an elected ‘Volksraad’. All draft bills, except those introduced by the President, had to be published in the Government Gazette for six weeks before introduction for consideration to become law. The Volksraad chose two committees to deal with finance: one to draw up budgets and the other to audit the accounts. Each committee was required to submit reports to the Volksraad for debate and approval. The Volksraad was also empowered to try the President and other senior officials on charges of treason, bribery and other serious crimes. For a conviction a two-thirds majority was required.

James Bryce, the famous British jurist commented as follows on the dominating role of the Volksraad: “The predominance of the legislature is the most conspicuous feature (of their constitution) ... Speaking generally this constitution carries the principle of the omnipotence of the representative chamber to a maximum.” (See J. Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, pp. 381 and 383)

The State President stood at the head of the executive authority and was elected for a five-year term by the registered voters from a panel of candidates nominated by the Volksraad. As head of state he was in control of all state departments and public works and was responsible to the Volksraad for all his actions. He had to submit an annual report, could introduce legislation, take part in discussions, but could not vote in the Volksraad. He was in charge of external affairs and, with the consent of the Volksraad, declared war and made peace, and concluded treaties. Although he had no right to veto legislation, his influence was large. The President was assisted by an Executive Council which was composed of the landdrost of the Capital, the Government Secretary and three members nominated by the Volksraad – usually from the body of the Volksraad. The Executive Council was subservient to the President and served him in an advisory capacity.

The judiciary system revolved around the well-established office of ‘Landdrost en Heemraden’. In civil as well as criminal cases, with limitations on fines and sentences of imprisonment, the landdrost could sit in judgement alone. In cases involving larger amounts or severe sentences of imprisonment, the landdrost had to sit with two heemraden to administer justice. Initially a circuit court consisting of three landdrosten could hear appeals, but this court was later replaced by a High court, consisting of a Chief Justice and two other Judges. Roman-Dutch Law was accepted as the basic law whenever a point was not covered by domestic laws. The military 42

system was based on the traditional commando system with commandants and field-cornets for each district. In times of war the field commandants chose, from amongst themselves, a Commandant-General who received his instructions from the President.

A striking feature of the Free State Constitution was the simplicity of its construction and phrasing. The entire system of government was set out in 62 sections. It clearly defined the duties and powers of each organ of government and any person acting unconstitutionally could be called to account. Extensive powers were conferred on the Volksraad, but the sovereign authority was vested in the Constitution which, in turn, rested on the broad basis of the will of the people. The constitution was very rigid and could only be amended with the approval of three-quarters of the members of the Volksraad in three successive sessions. In the fifty years of its existence, most of the amendments had reference to citizenship and the franchise.

The strong influence of the American Constitution is quite significant. Some sections were taken over verbatim. But its one-chamber structure was an important departure because the country was not a federation. It also provided a more constructive relationship between executive and legislature. As commented by Bryce, “... the American President could not propose, but he could refuse”. The Free State President, in contrast “... could propose but he could not refuse”.

Significantly for the first time in Voortrekker and Boer history, provision was made for a head of the executive branch with clearly defined powers and restrictions. There was also a clear classification of governmental powers with adequate checks and balances between the other branches. In 1885 an additional act was passed which conferred on the High Court the power of testing the laws of the Volksraad in terms of the constitution, but this act was not protected in the Constitution and could be amended or repealed. These flaws were more apparent than real.

The finest eulogy on the Free State Constitution was the following assessment written by James Bryce: “They came as near as any set of men ever have come to the situation which philosophers have often imagined – but which has so rarely in fact occurred – that of free and independent persons uniting in an absolutely new social compact for help and defence and thereby creating a government whose authority has had and can have had, no origin save in the consent of the governed.” (James Bryce, op.cit. pp.360-361)

The Transvaal Republic (ZAR)

The constitutional development in the Transvaal before 1858 was characterised by personal feuds between Voortrekker leaders, inter alia between Andries Pretorius and Hendrik Potgieter. As a result the community split up into a number of camps, each with their own Volksraad: Ohrigstad, Zoutpansberg, Lydenburg, Potchefstroom and Rustenburg. No provision was made for a head of state or other form of executive authority while the Volksraad was in recess. Their system resembled that of the Republic of Natalia. After the death of Potgieter and Pretorius, respectively, a commission was eventually appointed in 1855 with Jacobus Stuart, a Dutchman, as chairman to frame a draft constitution. Ideas were drawn from the Free State Constitution and the American Constitution. After much more strife, the Constitution of the ZAR was approved in 1858, which dealt with the legislature, executive and judicial branches. It was again amended in 1889 and 1896. 43

The legislative powers were again vested in the Volksraad as the highest authority in the land – subject to the condition that the people were afforded a period of three months in which to register their disapproval by way of memoranda before the resolutions of the Volksraad could become law. No court could pronounce on the validity of a law passed by the Volksraad. Candidates for election had to be citizens, between the ages of 30 and 60 years of age, own fixed property, a member of a Protestant Church and a person of good moral character. Members were elected for a period of 2 years and half of the membership was to retire annually. Like the Free State, the Volksraad had two watchdog-committees to control finance matters. Another committee was given the function to classify memoranda submitted by the people according to their subject matter, and to make recommendations thereon. Other ad hoc committees were appointed to report on special matters – an innovative arrangement for that time.

To accommodate the special needs of the growing number of ‘uitlanders’ (foreigners) after the discovery of gold, a ‘Second Volksraad’ was established in 1890. The ‘Second Volksraad’ was empowered, subject to ratification of the ‘First Volksraad’, to legislate in regard to mines, road construction and maintenance, post and telegraph services, protection of patents, inventions and trademarks, exploitation of forests, control of infectious diseases, companies, insolvency, criminal and civil procedure and other matters referred to it by the ‘First Volksraad’. The ‘Second Volksraad’ had 28 members elected by registered voters. Members were elected for four years but half had to retire every two years.

The question of citizenship became an issue after the discovery of gold which caused the influx of waves of gold diggers and fortune seekers. So numerous were the new immigrants (‘uitlanders’) and so different socially and culturally from the pastoral Boers, that they felt not only threatened from without, but also from within, so that in a short time they would become a minority in their own country. In 1882 it was provided that foreigners could acquire citizenship only after five years’ residence. After gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand in 1886, the flood of ‘uitlanders’ became so overwhelming that it was decided to raise the qualifications again by providing for two classes of citizens: - ‘Volkstemburgers’ (citizens who had the national franchise) who could vote for members of the (a) First or Second Volksraad; and, (b) ‘Genaturaliseerde burgers’ (naturalised citizens) who could vote only for members of the Second Volksraad.

Full citizenship was granted to all who had possessed citizenship rights before the act was passed or who acquired it by birth after the act. To become a naturalised citizen it was necessary for an immigrant to be registered with a field-cornet for two years. Naturalised citizens could acquire full citizenship after twelve years. A foreigner therefore had to wait effectively fourteen years before he could gain full franchise. Members of both chambers were elected by secret ballot.

The executive authority was vested in the State President who was responsible to the First Volksraad. All other state officials were subordinate and responsible to him. The State President exercised his powers in conjunction with the Executive Council of which he was the Chairman 44

with a casting vote. The President could dismiss any official except judicial officers and those who were elected to office. The President could take part in the deliberations of the Volksraad but had no vote. He convened the Volksraad once a year and at other times when necessary. He also had to submit an annual report on his activities to the Volksraad and present his annual budget of revenue and expenditure. He was empowered to introduce or bring about the introduction of legislation in consultation with the Executive Council. With the consent of the Executive Council he could proclaim martial law, declare war and conclude peace. All treaties required ratification by the Volksraad. Should the Presidency fall vacant, the Volksraad could appoint a member of the Executive council to act as Vice-President.

The Executive Council consisted of the ‘Kommandant-Generaal’ (elected by the people for 10 years); the state secretary, elected by the Volksraad for four years; and two burgers elected by the Volksraad for three years. The Keeper of the Minutes and the Superintendent of Native Affairs were ex officio members of the Executive Council. The Executive Council was not determined on a party-political basis. It met once a month or at any other time convened by the State President.

The judicial arrangements made provision for a Court of ‘Landdrost’ and four to six ‘Heemraden’ and jurors in each district. A High court was constituted by three landdrosts. The people were expected to approve or reject names of persons ‘introduced’ by the government as landdrosts. Heemraden were appointed by the Court of Landdrost and Heemraden. A High Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and two other Judges, was appointed in 1877. In 1881 the ‘Heemraden’ were abolished.

At the head of the military force stood a ‘Kommandant-Generaal’ elected by the registered voters for a period of five years. In times of peace he stood under control of the State President and Executive Council and was responsible to the Volksraad. In times of war he was assisted by a ‘Krygsraad’ (council of war) of which he was the chairman. In each district a ‘Kommandant’ was chosen by the burghers.

Initially the supervision of towns and cities was entrusted to the landdrosts. After 1886 every town with more than 500 inhabitants could be declared a city with a right to self-government by an elected city council with its chairman acting as mayor. District Councils composed of elected members with the landdrost as chairman were entrusted with road maintenance. Expenses were to be defrayed out of toll fees.

In contrast to the Free State, the ZAR Constitution was extremely flexible. It was accepted that in judicial matters, courts had to accept as law the ordinary resolutions of the Volksraad. The courts could not pronounce on the validity of any resolution of the Volksraad. The position of the State President reflects the traditional deep mistrust of a powerful head of state. The President depended for most of his actions on the consent of the majority of the Executive Council and the Volksraad as well. He could take strong action only with the support of both the Volksraad and the people. He could not veto legislation, but his ability to introduce and defend legislation in the Volksraad strengthened his position. A President who enjoyed the confidence and support of the people could wield considerable power. Party politics did not play a significant role. 45

The sovereignty of the ‘volk’ (the people) was repeatedly emphasized in the Constitution. In this regard it is important to have a clear idea of what the concept ‘volk’ meant to them. ‘Volk’ was understood to mean all the registered burghers, as appear in the following words of President Kruger (1899): “Mijn Constitutie zegt dat het Volk recht heeft om wetten goed of af te keuren. Wanneer ik van het Volk spreek, bedoel ik de stemgerechtigde burgers, waarvan de meerderheid de koningstem uitmaak.” (My constitution provides that the people shall have the right to approve of, or reject, legislation and that majority has sovereignty. When I refer to the people I mean the burghers with franchise – their majority vote is supreme.) The Constitutions of the Orange Free State and the ZAR provide important milestones in the constitutional history of South Africa.

The Settlement of the Interior

During the period 1840 to 1900 the settlement of the interior involved the establishment of numerous towns and villages, the layout of thousands of farms and the construction of roads and bridges to transport people and agricultural products. In the Orange Free State, the Transvaal and the New Republic in northern Natal, in excess of 30,000 farms were demarcated, allocated and registered. Farms had to be stocked with sheep, cattle and poultry and, where suitable, the land had to be cleared and prepared for grain cropping, planting fruit trees and growing vegetables. Farmsteads had to be built. These farms also provided residential and employment opportunities for Black people.

Villages and towns were the centres for trade as well as social and cultural interaction – each with its schools, churches, governmental offices and trading stores. Examples of such towns in the Orange Free State include Bloemfontein, Bethlehem, Odendaalsrus, Kroonstad, Welkom, Boshoff, Winburg, Koffiefontein, Jagersfontein, Springfontein, Reddersburg, etc. In the Transvaal typical examples are Pretoria, Johannesburg, Piet Retief, Ermelo, Amsterdam, Bethal, Middelburg, Witbank, Nelspruit, Witrivier, Louis Trichardt, Pietersburg, Potgietersrust, Nylstroom, Rustenburg, Lichtenburg, Klerksdorp, Potchefstroom, Ventersdorp, etc. In northern Natal the examples are Vryheid, Louwsburg, Paulpietersburg and Utrecht.

Each town represents a fragment of the history of settlement and development. In subsequent years street names and even the names of towns and cities have been changed to suit new political sentiments and priorities. But the past cannot be obliterated, as Wiesel has said: “To live without a past is worse than to live without a future”.

The Demise of the Boer Republics

The Boer Republics became the thorniest problem in the northwards colonial ambitions of the British Empire. Cecil John Rhodes was the chief advocate of intervention in the affairs of the Boer Republics. In 1895, with the collusion of the imperial authorities, he tried to change the government of the Transvaal by coup d’état – the Jameson Raid. Recruiting 500 strong men, ostensibly for the police force of his chartered company, he set them riding with their Maxim guns to Johannesburg where it was assumed that the non-Boer members of the White 46

population would rise in support. But they failed to do so and the raiders were surrounded, arrested and put on trial.

For the British government the problem of the independent Boer republics persisted in exaggerated form when the Transvaal Republic built a railway line to Mozambique and flirted with the idea that Germany could provide protection against the British. By then, the Transvaal was the centre of the gold-mining industry and the main magnet of investment in the whole subcontinent. It was in these circumstances that the British deliberately provoked hostilities.

At the start of the hostilities the British garrisons in the Cape and in Natal numbered little more than 15,000 men. At the end of the Anglo-Boer War, around half a million men and a similar number of animals had had to be brought from several other parts of the world. Once started the war could not be lost without risking the British imperial position world-wide. (See Roland Oliver, The African Experience, op.cit. p.209)

The whole sequence of events associated with the conquest of the Boer Republics is well described by Martin Meredith in Diamonds, Gold and War in the Making of South Africa, Simon & Schuster, London, 2007, pp.8-9: “... In 1871 the prospectors exploring a remote area of sun- scorched scrubland in Griqualand, just outside the Cape’s borders, discovered the world’s richest deposits of diamonds. Britain promptly snatched the territory from the Orange Free State. Fifteen years later, an itinerant English digger, George Harrison, stumbled across the rocky outcrop of a gold-bearing reef on a ridge named by the Transvaal farmers as the Witwatersrand. Beneath the reef lay the richest deposits of gold ever discovered. The gold strike transformed the Transvaal from an impoverished rural republic into a glittering prize.

What followed was a titanic struggle fought by the British to gain supremacy throughout Southern Africa and by the Boers to preserve the independence of their republics. It culminated in the costliest, bloodiest and most humiliating war that Britain had waged in nearly a century. Britain provoked the war expecting it to be over within a few months, but it turned into a gruelling campaign lasting two and a half years; required half a million imperial troops to finish it; and left the two Boer republics devastated...

British military commanders resorted to scorched-earth tactics, destroying thousands of farmsteads, razing villages to the ground and slaughtering livestock on a massive scale. Women and children were rounded up and placed in what the British called concentration camps, where conditions were so appalling that some 26,000 died there from disease and malnutrition, most of them under the age of sixteen. All this produced a legacy of hatred and bitterness amongst Afrikaners that endured for generations.”

Bibliography

Couzens, T. (2004) Battles of South Africa, David Philip Publishers, Claremont Davenport, T.R.H. (1977) South Africa – A Modern History, MacMillan, Johannesburg De Klerk, W.J. (1971) Afrikanerdenke, Pro Rege Pers, Potchefstroom De Wet, C.R. (1902) Three Year’s War, Charles Scribner’s & Sons, New York Doyle, Arthur Conan The Great Boer War, Scripta Africana Edition, 1987 Gey van Pittius, E.F.W. Staatsopvattings van die Voortrekkers en die Boere, (1941) J.L. van Schaik, Pretoria Giliomee, H (2003) The Afrikaners – Biography of a People, Tafelberg Publishers, Cape Town Giliomee, H. & Mbenga, B. New History of South Africa, Tafelberg Publishers, (2007) Cape Town Guest, R. (2004) The Shackled Continent, MacMillan, London Harrison, D. (1981) The White Tribe, MacMillan, London Heese, H.F. (2005) Groep Sonder Grense - 1652 – 1795, Protea Boekehuis, Pretoria Johnson, R.W. (2004) South Africa – The First Man, The Last Nation, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg Meredith, M (2007) Diamonds, Gold and War – The Making of South Africa, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Jeppestown Millin, S.G. (1951) The People of South Africa, Constable & Co, London Oliver, R. (1999) The African Experience, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London Pakenham, T. (1993) The Boer War, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg Pretorius, F. (ed) (2012) Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika, Tafelberg, Kaapstad Raidt, E.H. (1991) Afrikaans en sy Europese Verlede, Nasionale Opvoedkundige Uitgewery, Kaapstad Theal, G.M. (1917) South Africa, G.P. Putnam’s & Sons, New York Thompson, L. (2001) A History of South Africa, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Jeppestown

4. The British Influence

At the beginning of the 17th century, the British Isles had been unremarkable in many ways: economically, culturally, politically and strategically. Yet three hundred years later, Great Britain had acquired the largest empire the world had ever seen. It encompassed forty-three colonies in five continents. It held sway over around one quarter of the world’s land surface and roughly the same proportion of the world’s population – some 444 million people in all lived under some form of British rule.

British colonisation was a vast movement of peoples, unlike anything before or since. Some left the British Isles in pursuit of religious freedom, some in pursuit of political liberty, and some in pursuit of profit. Others had no choice, but went as ‘indentured labourers’ or as convicted criminals. Between the early 1600s and the 1950s, more than 20 million people left the British Isles to begin new lives across the seas. No other country came close to exporting so many of its inhabitants.

An important role was played by voluntary, non-governmental organisations such as evangelical religious sects and missionary societies. All contributed in paving the way for the expansion of British influence. The British came close to establishing the first ‘effective world government’. This was achieved with a relatively small bureaucracy roping in indigenous elites. The use of military force was a key element of British imperial expansion. The central role of the British navy was evident around the world: first in its pirate role and later also as transporter of soldiers to the far ends of the world.

In the course of empire building the British had robbed the Spaniards, copied the Dutch, beaten the French and plundered the Indians, transported many thousands of slaves to the Americas and then led the drive to abolish slavery. Britain led the ‘Scramble for Africa’ and had also been in the forefront of another ‘Scramble’ in the Far East (Malaya and chunks of Borneo and New Guinea) and a string of islands in the Pacific: Fiji, the Cook Islands, the New Hebrides, the Phoenix Islands, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and the Solomons.

For many years this vast British Empire featured on maps of the world hung in schools all over the world, showing its territory coloured an eye-catching red. Not only were millions of people all over the world conditioned by the red-covered state of affairs, but even the British themselves began to assume that they had the God-given right to rule the world – as J.L Garvin put it in 1905 “… an extent and magnificence of dominion beyond the natural”. The extent of Britain’s Empire could be seen not only in the world’s atlases and censuses – Britain was also the world’s banker, investing immense sums around the world. By 1914 the gross nominal value of Britain’s stock of capital invested abroad was £3.8 billion, between two-fifths and a half of all foreign-owned assets. (See Niall Ferguson, 2004, Empire – How Britain Made the Modern World, London: Penguin Books, pp.240-244)

For many generations, the British Empire relied heavily on the export of its people, capital and culture – particularly its language which has become the lingua franca of today’s world. Its 49

influence is still carried along by the predominant socio-economic–political lifestyle of English- speaking countries. It is characterised by its reliance on free enterprise, private ownership, competitive markets, Scottish and English banking, comparatively limited government intervention, a legal system heavily laden with Common Law, representative parliamentary government, constitutional democracy, Protestant Christianity and a pragmatic philosophical orientation.

Winston Churchill gave a more lyrical expression to these sentiments: “What enterprise that an enlightened community may attempt is more noble and more profitable than the reclamation from barbarism of fertile regions and large populations? To give peace to warring tribes, to administer justice where all was violence, to strike the chains off the slave, to draw the richness from the soil, to plant the earliest seeds of commerce and learning, to increase in whole peoples their capacities for pleasure and diminish their chances of pain – what more beautiful ideal or more valuable reward can inspire human effort?” (Ferguson, op.cit., p/xxvii)

The Westminster System

The British system of government dates from the Middle Ages and was gradually transformed from monarchical absolutism, first to limited democracy and eventually to a fully-fledged constitutional democracy based on popular participation. This system became widely known as the ‘Westminster System’ which comprises the following: a hereditary monarch with ceremonial powers as head of state; a parliamentary system of executive power where a prime minister and his cabinet are responsible to a popularly elected parliament within a competitive party system; an independent judiciary, appointed by the head of state as advised by the cabinet; an electoral system based on popular franchise in single member constituencies; public responsibility and accountability by way of free elections at constitutionally based regular intervals; freedom of speech and of political association and activity by individual citizens; and, decision-making by majority vote.

The parliamentary system of executive power has been taken over by all countries that still maintain a constitutional monarchy. But several countries have introduced electoral systems based on some form of proportional representation (e.g. Australia). The unitary system of government has not shown itself to be a suitable answer to the problem of diversity. Also in countries with extensive land areas, such as Australia and Canada, the idea of a centralised unitary state was replaced with a decentralised federal system, such as in the USA. In the case of India, the problem of diversity was dealt with by way of partitioning the pre-independent Indian colony into independent states India and Pakistan. Ireland was also allowed, after a period of violent conflict, to become an independent country, with Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom. The Westminster system as such is based on many constitutional conventions which evolved over several centuries. Even in its classic form it is currently undergoing a gradual transformation to accommodate regional sentiments in Wales and growing national sentiments in Scotland.

South Africa imported the Westminster system when the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910 and it was maintained until 1961 when South Africa became a republic with a presidential 50

system of executive power. However, traditional parliamentary procedures remain intact. The presidential system of executive power was retained in the 1996 constitution of the New South Africa. It was augmented with an elaborate articulation of civil rights, which, in the British tradition, is more generally safeguarded by constitutional conventions.

The British Growth-and-Development Model

Britain was the first industrial nation to come close to the model of a ‘growth-and-development’ society. It had the ability to transform itself and adapt to new things and ways of doing things. In particular, England had the precocity to increase the freedom and security of its people, to open its doors to migrants with knowledge and skills such as Dutch, Jewish and Huguenot refugees. Many newcomers were merchants, craftsmen, old hands of trade and finance and brought with them their network of religious and family connections.

The Industrial Revolution started in Britain, then changed the world and the relations of states to one another. The goals and tasks of political economy were transformed. The world was now divided between “... a front-runner and a highly diverse array of pursuers.” Britain became a commercial power of considerable potential and the principal target of emulation from the beginning of the 18th century. While Germany was still a collection of squabbling Germanic principalities and France was recovering from the turmoil of the French Revolution, the British Empire was streaking ahead. It took the quickest of the European ‘follower countries’ more than a century to catch up – and to surpass. (See Table 1)

Table 1 Estimates of Real GNP per Capita (Selected Countries in 1960 US Dollars)

1830 1860 1913 1929 1950 1970 Belgium 240 400 815 1020 1245 2385 Canada 280 405 1110 1220 1785 3005 Denmark 225 320 885 955 1320 2555 France 275 380 670 890 1055 2535 Germany 240 345 775 900 995 2750 Italy 240 280 455 525 600 1670 Japan 180 175 310 425 405 2130 Netherlands 270 410 740 980 1115 2385 Norway 225 325 615 845 1225 2405 Portugal 250 290 335 380 440 985 Russia 180 200 345 350 600 1640 Spain - 325 400 520 430 1400 Sweden 235 300 705 875 1640 2965 Switzerland 240 415 895 1150 1590 2785 UK 370 600 1070 1160 1400 2225 USA 240 550 1350 1775 2415 3605

(Based on figures provided by David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, Little, Brown and Co., London, 1998, p.2322)

But there is another side of the coin. In the process of ‘making the modern world’, Great Britain exacted a heavy price from the millions of people overpowered by its imperialistic conquest.

The World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban, 2001, adopted a resolution which stated “... colonialism has led to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance ... Africans and people of African descent and people of Asian descent and indigenous peoples were victims of colonialism and continue to be victims of its consequences”.

A recent audio-visual series written and presented by Jeremy Flaxman for the BBC entitled Empire, was introduced with the following commentary: “It was the Empire on which the sun never set, or as some said, on which the blood never dries. At its height Britain ruled over a quarter of the world’s population. Many convince themselves it was Britain’s destiny to do so. Much of the Empire was built on greed and a lust for power. But the British came to believe they had a moral mission too – a mission to civilise the world. These builders of the Empire were bold, they were adventurous, some were ruthless and some were a bit unhinged ... How did such a small country get such a big head?

The British Empire was not just about conquest, and government and chaps in shorts telling foreigners what to do. It was also about money and profit. It began with a few unscrupulous adventurers and it developed into a vast network that spanned the world ...

Off the coast of China, British traders made a fortune from ships freighted with addictive drugs and they helped themselves to the ancient riches of China. Money flowed to Britain from piracy in the Caribbean and from estates worked by slaves taken from Africa. Empire Trade and Empire Theft helped make Britain a capital of money which it still is today.”

Anglicisation

Britain first invaded the Dutch settlement at the Cape in 1795. At this time the distant outpost at the Cape of Good Hope became strategically important for Britain in terms of protecting her sea route to India – particularly in relation to the rise of Napoleon during the turmoil caused by the French Revolution. The Cape was subsequently returned to the Netherlands in 1803 and then re-captured in 1806. But they only took effective formal possession in 1814-1815 at the end of the Napoleonic wars. The second British occupation turned the remote, often neglected, refreshment station of the Dutch East India Company into a fully fledged British colony.

At the time the advance of Britain as a world power bred a conviction amongst Englishmen that what was good for Britain was good for the world. W.W. Bird, Colonial Secretary, wrote in 1822 “… nothing can be right or proper that is not English and to which he is unaccustomed”.

In the Cape the British invasion was resented by the local European-descendant Dutch population. Descendants of an amalgam of primarily Dutch, German and French settlers over a period of five generations since 1652, these white South Africans (later known as Boers), did not speak English and bore no allegiance to the British Crown or the aspirations of the British people. They were highly independent-minded republicans with a strong cultural partiality 52

towards continental Europe. The bulk being established farmers, many were cattle graziers in outlying areas.

The Dutch-speaking colonists were soon confronted with a comprehensive Anglicisation policy. It changed the official language to English in the courts, government offices, postal services, official communications and schools. It introduced the London Missionary Society and versions of British Protestantism. The English authorities even imported Calvinist Scottish clergymen to inculcate pro-British sentiments.

In 1827 the traditional courts of ‘landdrosts’ and ‘heemraden’, and the judicial powers of the field cornets were abolished. Local democracy, as had existed before, suddenly disappeared and was replaced by appointed British officials. The law, and its enforcement, was kept entirely in the hands of what was considered by the burghers as alien authorities who legislated in English.

The most important component of anglicisation involved the immigration of thousands of British settlers to strengthen the British component of the population. The first wave of around 4,000 British settlers arrived in the 1820s, which were located in the border areas of the Eastern Cape. The settlers included parties from England, Scotland and Wales. Most were farmers and artisans – and a sprinkling of professionals – mostly soldiers, teachers and clergy. They were a literate community and they played an important role in the struggle for press freedom, the development of independent thought and pressure for self-government in the Cape Colony. Existing towns in the Eastern Cape were penetrated by the English-speaking settlers, many of whom set themselves up as shopkeepers, businessmen and professionals. Others became farmers in the border region, who, according to historian T.R.H. Davenport in South Africa a Modern History, Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1978, p.31, developed “... the physical and moral toughness and the harder race attitudes common to the inhabitants of turbulent frontier districts, yet helping to bridge the gap between colonial and African society, which warfare had tended to widen, and unobtrusively to weaken the bonds of African society through trade, missionary activities, and, increasingly, the employment of Africans as labourers within the settlement ... Though the settlers’ relationship with the Afrikaner frontiersmen remained harmonious, the 1820 settlers retained a self-awareness which the Huguenots had largely lost. This they were able to do because the Somerset regime sought to replace Dutch by English in all spheres of public life ... British policy was to adjust the cultural life of colonial society to the legal realities of British rule. English, stated the proclamation of 1822, was to be exclusively used in the courts after 5 years. Special incentives were given to teachers who taught through English. In due course, English would also become the sole language of the legislature... British institutions made inroads into the commercial as well as the political and cultural life of the colony. ” Davenport also reports that Afrikaans propaganda caricaturised the English culture as that of “soakers, robbers and reds” – meaning canteen-keepers, shopkeepers and red-coats.

In time additional waves of British immigrants arrived and settled in the province of Natal (the Byrne Scheme of 1849-50 brought some 5,000 English and Scots), around Kimberley after the discovery of diamonds and in Johannesburg following the discovery of gold in 1884. Approximately 400,000 White immigrants entered South Africa between 1870 and 1900, which represented a larger number than the entire 1870 White population of 340,000. They filled most of the available openings in the upper ranks of the labour market. 53

(See , Giliomee, The Afrikaners – Biography of a People, op. cit., p. 185)

After the Anglo-Boer War, Lord Milner, determined to convert the Transvaal into a “thoroughly British” domain where “British interests, British ideas, British education” would prevail, introduced a large-scale immigration of people of British descent. By 1910, the South African population stood at 5,878,000 with 3,956,000 Africans; 1,257,000 Whites of whom about 700,000 were Afrikaners and 557,000 English; 517,000 Coloureds and 148,000 Asians.

The other principal method Milner’s government intended to use in his Anglicisation campaign was to make English the chief medium of instruction in state schools. He ruled that “Dutch should only be used to teach English and English to teach everything else”. English was duly established as the medium of instruction.

In retrospect the Anglicisation policies that came to an end with the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, resulted in establishing the English culture in a predominant position in South Africa. But the triumph of British imperialism came at a huge cost to the lebensraum of the offshoot of the Dutch culture, Afrikaans. It divided the Afrikaans- and English-speakers into two hostile camps and a huge destruction of life and property during the Anglo-Boer War.

The Emancipation of Slaves

It is an irony of history that the same navy that transported millions of slaves to the Americas was also deployed to abolish the slave trade. It was also instrumental in expanding the narcotics trade. Between 1662 and 1807 nearly 3.5 million Africans came to the New World as slaves transported in British ships. That was over three times the number of white migrants in the same period. By 1700, Liverpool was sending 33 shipments a year on the triangular trip from England to West Africa to the Caribbean. John Newton, the composer of the song Amazing Grace, was a captain of a slave ship. In 1840, James Thompson composed his famous song Rule Britannia with its stirring words “Britons never, never shall be slaves”.

By 1770, Britain’s Atlantic empire seemed to have found a natural equilibrium. The triangular trade between Britain, West Africa and the Caribbean kept the plantations supplied with slave labour. The American colonies kept them supplied with victuals. Sugar and tobacco flowed back to Britain, a substantial proportion for re-export to the Continent. The profits from these New World commodities oiled the wheels of the Empire’s move to a new frontier – the Asian commerce.

Anti-slavery sentiments amongst colonists in the USA were first openly expressed as early as the 1680s. The Quakers of Pennsylvania were speaking out against it, arguing that it violated the biblical injunction of Matthew 7:12 “… do unto others as you would have others do unto you”. But it was only in the 1740s and 1750s that the ‘Great Awakening’ in America spread such scruples into wider Protestant circles. By the 1780s the campaign against slavery gained enough momentum to sway legislators. Slavery was abolished in Pennsylvania in 1780 – an example followed by a number of other northern states.

In Britain the slave trade was abolished in 1807. Henceforth, convicted slave-traders faced transportation to Britain’s penal colony, Australia. Once the slave trade was abolished, slavery itself could only wither, until in 1833, slavery itself was made illegal in British territory. The slave owners of the Caribbean were compensated with the proceeds of a special government loan. It did not put an end to the trans-Atlantic slave trade or slavery in the Americas. It continued on a smaller scale in the southern United States, but also on a far larger scale in Brazil. All told, around 2 million more Africans crossed the Atlantic after the British ban, most of them to Latin America. However, the British did put in a lot of effort to disrupt this continuing traffic.

A British West African Squadron of 30 warships was sent to patrol the African coast from Freetown with bounties offered to naval officers for every slave they intercepted and liberated. In 1840 the Royal Navy intercepted no fewer than 425 slave ships off the West African coast. The British Parliament made slave trade illegal throughout the empire in 1807, shortly after the re-occupation of the Cape. In 1816 a slave registry was introduced and minimum standards for food, clothing, hours of work and maximum punishments was laid down in 1823, and the compulsory recording and limitation of punishments in 1826. Slaves were set free throughout the British empire under a law of December 1833. This Act allowed for a period of four years’ apprenticeship for domestic slaves before they were free to leave their masters’ service. The Act had been drawn up with West Indian conditions chiefly in mind, and Cape owners felt themselves not only under-compensated for the value of their slaves, but unable to draw the compensation money which was payable only in London. Emancipation took effect in 1838-40.

Racial Differentiation, Segregation and Territorial Partition

Under the Dutch East India Company and under British colonial rule some degree of racial differentiation and segregation was practised in various aspects of societal life. Simultaneously, the forces of integration also operated in many fields without much calculated planning or prohibition. On the social level there had been a fair degree of mixing between the early single male colonists, sailors and soldiers and particularly slave women. Many well-known Afrikaans families have, according to genealogical research, a slave component of at least 7 percent in their ancestry. Today there are in total more than 5 million ‘Coloureds’ (people of mixed descent) with Afrikaans or English family names in South Africa.

During the Dutch colonial period, the conflict between colonists and indigenous groups was largely limited to Khoikhoi and Khoisan groups. To some degree runaway slaves penetrated the Khoikhoi tribes to form semi-nomadic pastoralists, know as ‘Korana’ in the Northern Cape along the banks of the Orange River. Korana society was cattle-based and loosely organised. Access to pasture and hunting grounds were critical to their existence. Cattle-raiding and thieving amongst themselves was common, as well as from any other groups who happened to be within their reach. (See Couzens, T. (2004), Battles of South Africa, Claremont: David Philip, pp.141-157)

During the later stages of Dutch rule, efforts were made to resolve boundary disputes between the Boer frontiersmen and the Xhosa by the Dutch governor of the Cape, Joachim van Plettenberg, in 1780. But his efforts were unsuccessful. Many farmsteads were burned down by 55

the Xhosa and cattle driven away. A commando system was devised by the Boer frontiersmen to retrieve their cattle and a ‘laager’ technique was developed to protect families against enemy forces. It involved drawing wagons in a circle with thorn bushes thrust between the openings. After the Dutch East India Company collapsed in 1798 under a burden of debt, it was only a matter of time for the colony to be captured by the British.

An important geopolitical outcome of British Imperialism is the drawing of territorial frontier lines between various ethnic communities: often rivers, mountain ranges or watershed escarpments. As the colonists moved eastwards and the Xhosa tribes migrated southwards, cross-border conflicts were inevitable. The British colonial powers instituted a ‘track and reprisal’ system to deal with cross-border cattle theft. Continued cattle raids led to a series of frontier wars with the Xhosa.

When the British annexed Natal in 1842 frontier lines were once again drawn between English colonists and the Pondos in the south and the Zulus in the north-east – creating the system of ‘native reserves’ which ultimately became known as ‘homelands’. By 1886 most of the Bantu peoples had been conquered by the British along the eastern seaboard and by the Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal on the central plains.

But the British had a cunning trick up their sleeves. The Colonial government preferred to pretend that their northern border did not exist and kept on annexing inland areas inhabited by the Voortrekkers (Boer pioneers). After the Voortrekkers left the Cape Colony in the 1830s, they established their inland republics in 1840 (Natalia), 1852 (Transvaal) and 1854 (Orange Free State). To cut off any possibility for the Boers to establish any alliances with foreign powers, Natal was annexed by the British in 1842.

Following the discovery of diamonds near the Orange-Vaal confluence in the late 1860s and of gold north of the Limpopo, the British Colonial Office in London developed a strategy to incorporate the Boer Republics in a federal structure. Shepstone was sent to annex the Transvaal in January 1877. The Boer commandos were called up and defeated the British army under Genl. Colley at Majuba to regain the ZAR’s independence in 1880.

The British invented a constitutional smokescreen called ‘suzerainty’ to formally recognise the Boer Republic’s independence, subject to reserving ‘certain portions of sovereignty’ to the British Crown. Gladstone defined these in the Commons as “those which relate to the relations between the Transvaal community and foreign countries”. (See Davenport, op.cit., p.132)

The major European powers were invited by German Chancellor Bismarck to a conference in Berlin (December 1884 to April 1885) to reach consensus on the rules applicable to future expansion of colonial occupation in Africa. What was sought was a cheap way of acquiring African empires, with frontiers that would command mutual recognition, even if occupation was minimal. The instruments to be used were ‘treaties of protection’ with African rulers and ‘charters’ given to specific commercial enterprises.

During the decades that followed the Berlin conference, the partition of African territories into European spheres of influence proceeded unabated. The Western bulge of Africa became France’s sphere of influence. In the south and on the eastern side, Britain ruled. Portugal, Germany, Belgium and Italy also had their portions recognised. (See Roland Oliver (2000), op.cit., pp.199-205)

Within this framework, Cecil Rhodes could proceed with his Kimberley diamonds and Johannesburg gold projects as well as with the British South Africa Company acquisitions north of the Limpopo. When Rhodes became elected Prime Minister in the Cape Colony in 1890, he also added the portfolio of Minister of Native Affairs to his duties. In this capacity he formulated what he called “a Native Bill for Africa”. This involved a programme to divide communal land into four-morgen farms owned on an individual basis, forcing younger sons in each family to seek work. Whites would be barred from buying land in Native areas and natives should not be mixed up with whites. He envisaged that this system would be extended to all areas in the colony and be used as a template for other states in Southern Africa. (See Meredith, M., 2007, Diamonds, Gold and War – The Making of South Africa, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, pp.259-269)

Economic Policies

The discovery of diamonds in 1866 and gold in 1885 provided the first major impetus for South Africa’s economic development. The diamond and gold fields were situated in the undeveloped interior and required heavy capital investment, heavy equipment for deep-level mining, transport infrastructure, large forces of organised labour and adequate management skills to extract, process and market the mineral finds. These factors were responsible for the establishment of a rail system, the opening of coal fields for the generation of electricity, the establishment of urban concentrations, commercial farming and manufacturing interests in the interior. Although the relative importance of the mining sector declined during the 20th century, gold remained the single most important product in the South African economy. Even today, South Africa produces around 40 percent of the world’s gold output and gold remains South Africa’s most important earner of foreign exchange.

During the second half of the 19th century, Cecil John Rhodes acted as the chief impresario of economic development in Southern Africa. There were many other players such as his partner Charles Rudd; his financiers in London, Rothschild Bank, pulling the strings behind the scene; the other Jewish magnates, Barney Barnato, Jules Porges, Sammy Marks, Alfred Beit, Isaac Lewis; the Randlords, J.B. Robinson, Julius Wernher, Adolf Goerz, George Albu, Sigismund Neumann, Lionel Phillips and Percy Fitzpatrick. Some of these magnates were subsequently organised into mining and investment clubs and companies such as Kimberley Central, De Beers Consolidated Mines, Rand Mines, Phoenix Diamond Mining, Consolidated Gold Fields, British South Africa Company, Randfontein Estates Gold Mining, Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company. Behind the scenes Rhodes orchestrated the imperial political accompaniment. He believed what was good for his business interests was good for the British Empire and vice versa.

Large-scale deep-level mining brought major changes to the organisation of the labour force. Skilled and experienced miners were recruited from the coal mines of Cumberland and the tin mines of Cornwall, shaft sinkers came from Lancashire, artisans from the factories of Scotland and England. The foundations were laid for the trade union movement and soon the ‘Uitlander’ (foreign) franchise became a major bone of political contention. Large numbers of Black people were drawn to the mining centres around Kimberley and Johannesburg. Regulations under the Mining Act of 1883 determined that all ‘native’ work in any mine, whether in open or underground workings, shall be carried out “under the supervision of a European .. as his master or ‘baas’”. (See Meredith, op.cit., p.156). Black recruits were required, from 1885, to agree to six- to twelve-month contracts and to be housed in fenced and guarded compounds in order to give mine-owners greater control of their labour force. By 1889 over 10,000 Black mine workers in Kimberley were accommodated in segregated, closed compounds.

The Missionary Societies

The missionary societies were, in effect, aid agencies bringing both spiritual and material assistance to the less developed world. The Society for the promotion of the Christian Gospel (1698) and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (1701) were initially exclusively concerned with the spiritual welfare of British colonists and servicemen posted overseas. By the late 18th century the movement changed its focus to convert indigenous peoples to Christianity.

The London Missionary Society was formed in 1795. In 1799 followed the Anglican Church Missionary Society to “propagate the knowledge of the Gospel among the Heathen”. In the same period Scottish missionary societies were established in Glasgow and Edinburgh – all infused with a strong sense of philanthropy. Missionary stations were developed by the London and the Wesleyan Societies in the Eastern Cape at Bethelsdorp, Port Elizabeth and at Kuruman in Bechuanaland. Dr. John Philip, the head of the London Missionary Society in South Africa and his son-in-law, John Fairbairn, editor of the Eastern Cape’s Commercial Advertiser, exerted strong influence on the formulation of colonial policy and public opinion in England. David Livingstone was sent to Kuruman which became the base of his exploration of the interior of Southern Africa below the Great Lakes.

David Livingstone was an important pathfinder for Britain’s advancement into the interior of Southern Africa below the Great Lakes. He was sent to Kuruman which became the base for his exploratory walks into the interior. He became famous as the first white man to reach the natural wonder on the Zambezi River which he named the Victoria Falls. In a famous lecture at Cambridge University’s Senate House in 1857 he stated that commerce and Christianity should be inseparable as instruments of ‘civilisation’, rather than colonisation. He believed that the commercial development of Africa could coincide with its religious conversion. His personal aim was “to open a path” to the healthy highlands of Central Africa. After Livingstone secured government backing, he embarked upon an expedition up the Zambezi River in order to demonstrate its navigability and suitability for commercial traffic – hoping that it might result in an English colony in the healthy highlands of Central Africa. But reality prevailed as it soon became apparent that the river was not navigable. With that the project to penetrate Africa with commerce, civilisation and Christianity was sunk. Altogether Livingstone spent twenty years criss-crossing the region between the Zambezi, Lake Malawi and the upper Congo. He joined the 58

battle against slavery and kept on trudging through the African jungle in search of the true source of the Nile. He died of malaria at Ilala in May 1873, a Victorian man of iron who did not know how to give up.

Throughout Africa, the missionary societies played a significant role in paving the way for British enculturation. In Southern Africa today, close to 60 percent of black Africans claim to associate themselves with the Christian faith. As stated by Niall Ferguson: “Commerce, Civilisation and Christianity were to be conferred on Africa, just as Livingstone had intended. But they would arrive in conjunction with a fourth ‘C’ – conquest.” (Ferguson, op.cit., p.162)

The Subordination of Black Tribes

The subordination of the many black tribes to British colonial rule took many battles between the ‘red coats’ and the black ‘impis’ that lasted until the final years of the 19th century. The Xhosa and Zulu tribesmen, in particular, were not easy push-overs. Apart from localised conflicts with nomadic Khoikhoi tribes, a major confrontation was building up on the eastern frontier with a large southward migration of Bantu-speaking tribes. On the eastern seaboard were the Xhosa-tribes, forming the southern tip of the Nguni group, being pushed further south by the Nguni-mainstream, the Zulu-tribes occupying areas further north-east along the eastern seaboard. The central highveld regions along the spine of the country, were occupied by Sotho- speaking tribes who were driven westwards by the military powerful Zulu-tribes.

On the eastern border of the Cape Colony the Colonial Office tried in vain to implement a segregation policy (based on the drawing of boundary lines documented in treaties) between the colonists and the black tribesmen. Cattle raids and border conflicts continued. From 1812 to 1852 no less than eight fully fledged border wars were waged between British soldiers and the Xhosa. Eventually, the Xhosa territory called the Transkei was annexed and the Xhosas became British subjects. Sir George Grey, transferred from New Zealand, became Governor of the Cape in 1854 to implement a ‘civilising policy’, which meant westernisation and an end to the traditional ruling power of the chieftains. They surrendered their power in exchange for a monthly salary. Other scattered tribes such as the Basutus and the Griquas were brought under treaty and placed in demarcated ‘reserves’.

The British annexation of Natal in 1843 caused the scattered Boer frontiersmen to trek once more across the Drakensberg mountains into the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. It was now left to the British forces to subordinate the Zulu empire. Under the influence of Theophilus Shepstone the Colonial Office set aside eight ‘locations’ (reserves) to settle thousands of refugees who re-entered Natal after being driven away during the Mfecana-era (the destabilisation of African communities in the period 1780s to 1830s as a result of, inter alia, internecine strife and the conquests of Shaka-Zulu). In 1864 a Natal Native Trust was established to guarantee black occupants’ rights of ownership inside reserve territory. Additional ‘mission reserves’ were created, controlled by missionary societies. (See David Walsh, The Roots of Segregation, Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp.1-30; See also Herman Giliomee et.al., New History of South Africa, op.cit., pp.186-188)

It was decided that the Zulu military power constituted a danger to the federal strategy. Hence, in early 1879 a military campaign was launched against the Zulu. At Isandhlwana the British army under Lord Chelmsford was defeated by the Zulus (800 soldiers killed) and despite a heroic defence of a missionary station at Rorke’s Drift by a handful of soldiers, the campaign failed. Only after reinforcements were mobilised, the Zulus were defeated at Ulundi and the British pride restored. The Zulu King, Cetshwayo, was captured and exiled to Robben Island at the Cape. The Zulu kingdom was divided into thirteen territories under appointed salaried chiefs. One of them was John Dunn, an Englishman who was said to have had 100 Zulu wives. In 1887 Zululand was annexed to the Crown and in 1897 reintegrated into Natal Province.

The Open-ended Frontier of British Imperialism

The British historian, Roland Oliver, who also edited The Cambridge History of Africa, wrote in The African Experience (op.cit.), pp.204-205, that “If Bismarck had been the presiding genius of the first stage of partition, the British prime minister Lord Salisbury was certainly the key figure in the second. His command of the swiftly developing field of African geography was unrivalled ... By 1891 he had achieved a series of bilateral agreements with Germany, France, Portugal and Italy, in which the broad outlines of the ultimate partition were clearly visible. ... Most activity on the ground was in the form of treaty-making or concession-hunting expeditions, which to the Africans were probably indistinguishable from the caravans of explorers and missionaries which had been criss-crossing their territories since the middle of the century. The boundaries still to be decided were those in the far interior, where simple projection inland from coastal spheres no longer produced unambiguous solutions.”

Following the Berlin conference called by Bismarck in 1884 in order to restrain expansionism, the colonial powers sought to protect their commercial interests as competition for markets grew fiercer. They sought frontiers that would command mutual respect – even if occupation was minimal. Commercial enterprises sought monopoly positions by acquiring quasi- governmental powers as Chartered Companies. The partition of Africa seemed to proceed by the enlargement of coastal enclaves until their boundaries touched and then by the projection inland of spheres of interest based upon coastal enclaves. This process was forged by a series of bilateral agreements between neighbouring European claimants. (See Roland Oliver, “The Drawing of the Map” in The African Experience, London, Phoenix Press, 2000, pp.199-212)

The World of Finance and Military Power

During the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in the second half of the 19th century, the entire continent was brought under some form of European control. Roughly a third of it was British. According to Niall Ferguson, the key to the Empire’s phenomenal expansion in the late Victorian period was the combination of financial power and firepower. According to Niall Ferguson’s research most of the huge flows of money from Britain’s vast stock of overseas investments flowed to a tiny elite of, at most, a few hundred thousand people. At the apex of this elite was indeed the Rothschild Bank.

The discovery of diamonds near Kimberley in 1866 and gold near Johannesburg in 1885 introduced a new phase in South Africa’s history. It provided a major impetus for economic growth. The diamond and gold fields were situated in the undeveloped interior and required heavy capital investment: transport infrastructure and heavy equipment for deep-level mining. It also required large manpower resources as well as technical and management skills to extract, process and market the mineral finds. These factors were responsible for the rapid establishment of a rail system, the opening of coal fields for the generation of electricity, the establishment of urban concentrations, commercial farming and manufacturing interests in the interior. All of this happened within a time-span of around two decades. (See Martin Meredith, 2007, Diamonds, Gold and War – The Making of South Africa, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, pp.247-470)

The Maxim gun was an American invention, but Hiram Maxim always had his eye on the British market. He set up a workshop in London and invited the great and the good to demonstrate his new weapon. Lord Rothschild joined the Board of the Maxim Gun Company established in 1884 and his bank financed the merger of the Maxim Company with the Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunitions Company. The Maxim guns were operated by a crew of four and could fire 500 rounds per minute. A force equipped with just five of these lethal weapons could literally sweep a battlefield clear with its hail of .45 inch bullets. The Maxim guns were used in battle against the Matabele, in the Sudan by Kitchener’s expeditionary force at Omdurman on the banks of the Nile, against the Boers (1899-1902) and in the two World Wars of the 20th century. War correspondent, Churchill described the Maxim gun as “… that mechanical scattering of death which the polite nations of the earth have brought to such monstrous perfection”.

Cecil John Rhodes acted in many ways as the impresario of the drama of British Imperial Conquest in South Africa during the second half of the 19th century. Son of an English clergyman, Rhodes came to South Africa at the age of seventeen and proceeded to the Kimberley diamond fields where he soon associated with well-connected financiers and eventually established De Beers Consolidated Mines, the largest diamond miner in the world. He later also established a foothold in Johannesburg’s gold fields and with his ‘Randlord’ associates masterminded the onset of the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).

Cecil Rhodes was also the founder of the British South African Company, mainly financed by the Rothschild Banking group. He secured from the Matabele chief, Lobengula, a concession to develop the gold fields that Rhodes believed existed beyond the Limpopo River. As he wrote to Rothschild in London “... once we have his territory, the rest is easy.” Rhodes merged the Bechuanaland Company with the Central Search Association for Matabeleland to become the United Concessions Company in 1890 with Rothschild as major shareholder. When Lobengula realised that he had been hoodwinked into signing over much more than mineral rights, he resolved to take Rhodes on. Rhodes then responded by sending an invasion force, the Chartered Company’s Volunteers, numbering 700 men armed with a new devastating secret weapon – the .45 inch Maxim gun that could fire 500 rounds a minute. The Rothschilds’ sole worry, according to Niall Ferguson’s research “... was that Rhodes was channelling money from the profitable De Beers Company into the altogether speculative British South Africa Company.” (Ferguson, op.cit., p.225)

Niall Ferguson quotes a grotesque hymn which Rhodes’s men brazenly adapted as their anthem: “Onward Chartered Soldiers, on to the heathen lands, Prayer books in your pockets, rifles in your hands. Take the glorious tidings where trade can be done, Spread the peaceful gospel – with a Maxim gun.” (Niall Ferguson, op.cit., p.226)

The British South Africa Company was given a royal Charter to occupy and develop the region north of the upper Limpopo. Rhodes was well informed about the mineral resources of the Zimbabwe plateau and also about the copper of Katanga. He sent out his concession hunters and they met those of the Belgian King Leopold more or less on the line of the Congo-Zambezi watershed in 1891. In the wake of these endeavours, Southern and Northern ‘Rhodesia’ came into being. Nyasaland (later Malawi) was a shaving from the north-eastern corner of Rhodes’s empire, which Lord Salisbury took under direct imperial control because British missionaries, already established there in David Livingstone’s footsteps, made plain their antipathy to Chartered Company rule.

In the South African diamond and gold fields, Cecil Rhodes also acted as a front man for the Rothschilds. By 1899 the Rothschilds’ stake in De Beers was twice that held by Rhodes. When Rhodes marched into Matabele Land in 1893 with the British South Africa Company’s private invasion force of 700 men, well supplied with Maxim guns, Rothschilds provided the financial backing. In 1895 the Jameson Raid on the Transvaal Republic was masterminded by Rhodes (at the time Prime Minister of the Cape Colony) with full backing of his partners in London, as well as full support from Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies in Gladstone’s cabinet. The only condition set by Chamberlain was reassurance that they were “working for the British Flag”.

The conspirators would be armed with rifles and Maxim guns, purchased in Britain, ostensibly ‘for Rhodesia’, shipped to the Cape, transferred to De Beers premises in Kimberley and then to the conspirators. Once in control of Johannesburg, they would declare a provisional government and dispatch a force to seize the government’s arsenal in Pretoria. The British High Commissioner would then intervene. A new era would begin. (See Martin Meredith, op.cit, pp.311-353)

Jameson’s 100 ‘volunteers’ were recruited in Cape Town from the Duke of Edinburgh’s Volunteer Rifles, a Cape Town regiment. Jameson’s invasion force of 800 men, despite the force of their Maxim guns, were rounded up by Boer forces near Johannesburg. Jameson was arrested and magnanimously released by the Boers for trial in Britain – where he served 3 months in prison and was later knighted. Both Rhodes and Chamberlain kept their interaction discretely secret. The British Parliament set up a committee of inquiry into the Raid that was little more than a sham. Chamberlain himself sat on the committee. As summarised by Martin Meredith “… the Rhodes conspiracy ended as it began: in collusion, lies and deceit”.

Speaking in the House of Commons in May 1896, Chamberlain warned against the possibility of war: 62

“A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged … It would be a long war, a bitter war and a costly war … it would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish … [it] would have been a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise”. Yet, Chamberlain himself was to preside over just such a war within three years when he mobilised the British Empire’s force of 500,000 against 40,000 Boer farmers.

The critics of the war argued that not only was imperialism immoral, it was a rip-off paid for by British taxpayers, fought for by British soldiers, but benefitting only a tiny elite of fat-cat millionaires. Rhodes was depicted as an “Empire jerry-builder who has always been a mere vulgar promoter masquerading as a patriot, and the figure-head of a gang of astute Hebrew financiers with whom he divides the profits”. (Ferguson, op.cit., p.284)

Speaking in the House of Commons, David Lloyd George declared: “A war of annexation … against a proud people must be a war of extermination, and that is unfortunately what it seems we are now committing ourselves to – burning homesteads and turning women and children out of their homes … the savagery which must necessarily follow will stain the name of this country”. (Quoted by Ferguson, op.cit., p.283)

The Conquest of the Boer Republics

The thorniest problem for Imperial Britain in the Southern African region was posed by the independence of the two Boer republics, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The Transvaal, in particular, became the magnet for investment, immigration, migrant labour and railway development in the whole subcontinent. It was the centre of the world’s richest gold mining industry – no longer the home of 30,000 to 40,000 errant Boer farmers. The burghers of the two Boer republics were the descendants of the Dutch-speaking frontiersmen who decided in 1836-1840 to trek on horseback and in wagons beyond the borders of the Cape Colony into the interior. They were dissatisfied with the unrepresentative British colonial government and a growing sense of insecurity in the areas bordering on Xhosa territory. As they saw it, Britain failed to protect them against tribal onslaughts, or let them protect themselves. After 1836 many of them trekked northwards, beyond the Orange River. After military confrontations with the Ndebele and the Zulu and a series of negotiated settlements and treaties, the Boer pioneers established their own self-governing republics in Natal (1842), the Orange Free State (1854) and the Transvaal (1858).

The Boers’ determination to preserve their own way of life in independence clashed with Britain’s grand imperial ambitions. The British Colonial office invoked their policy of pretending that the northern border of the Empire did not exist and kept on annexing areas occupied by the Boer pioneers and claiming their allegiance as “subjects of the British Crown”. The Boer leaders tried in vain to reach negotiated settlements with the British Imperial Powers. By the middle 1870s the British Colonial Office in London developed a strategy to incorporate the Boer republics together with the Cape and Natal colonies into a federal structure. Shepstone was sent to annex the Transvaal in 1877, but after the Boer commandos were called up, they defeated the British army under General Colley at Majuba to regain the ZAR’s independence in 1880. This 63

war is known today amongst Afrikers as ‘die Eerste Vryheidsoorlog’ – the First War of Independence.

The Boer republics now found themselves in the middle of several convergent forces. The diamond and gold fields contained some of the world’s largest deposits of these minerals. From the interior came large flows of migrant black job-seekers. From around the world came a multitude of fortune-seekers – some were pick-and-shovel diggers, others well-connected financial tycoons. From its commanding heights, the British Imperial Government held the trump cards: financial resources and military power. The interaction of forces that played out over the next three decades coincided with the ‘Scramble for Africa’ by the major European powers. In Southern Africa, the United Kingdom gobbled up the lion’s share.

For the British government the Transvaal problem became exacerbated by the possibility of the Transvaal and Orange Free State Boers seeking protection from Germany – particularly after they built a railway line to the Mozambique coast to avoid dependence on the Cape system. In these circumstances the British deliberately provoked hostilities.

At the start of the Anglo-Boer War, the British garrisons in the Cape and Natal numbered little more than 15,000 men. By its end in 1902 half a million men had had to be brought in from several Commonwealth countries. At the end of the war the two Boer republics were completely destroyed, 30,000 farmsteads were burnt down, hundreds of thousands of livestock confiscated, women and children herded into concentration camps where an estimated 27,000 died of malnutrition and disease, around 31,000 Boer ‘combatants’ were held in camps as far afield as Bermuda and Ceylon and only around 17,000 hapless ‘bittereinders’ were forced to lay down their weapons.

For Rhodes, the justification for this destruction was unambiguous: “We are the first race in the world, and the more of the world we inhabit, the better it is for the human race.” He is said to have had a dream of an English Imperial Order along the lines of Jesuit Catholicism.

The person who was left after the war as High Commissioner in Cape Town with the task to continue the Anglicisation of South Africa, was Lord Milner. He is reported to have said, “My participation knows no geographical but only racial limits. I am an imperialist and not a Little Englander because I am a British race Patriot. It is not the soil of England ... which is essential to arouse my patriotism, but the speech, the traditions, the spiritual heritage, the principles, the aspirations, of the British race.” (See Ferguson, op.cit., p.251)

Among the war correspondents who also served as a camp doctor during the Anglo-Boer War, was the later famous creator of Sherlock Holmes, Arthur Conan Doyle. After the war he published a major account of the causes, scope and the course of events during the war under the title The Great Boer War. On the first page of the first chapter, he wrote the following: “Take a community of Dutchmen of the type of those who defended themselves for fifty years against all the power of Spain at a time when Spain was the greatest power in the world. Intermix with them a strain of those inflexible French Huguenots who gave up home and fortune and left their country for ever at the time of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The 64

product must obviously be one of the most rugged, virile, unconquerable races ever seen upon earth. Take this formidable people and train them for seven generations in constant warfare against savage men and ferocious beasts, in circumstances under which no weakling could survive, place them so that they acquire exceptional skill with weapons and in horsemanship, give them a country which is eminently suited to the tactics of the huntsman, the marksman, and the rider. Then, finally, put a finer temper upon their military qualities by a dour fatalistic Old Testament religion and an ardent and consuming patriotism. Combine all these qualities and all these impulses in one individual, and you have the modern Boer – the most formidable antagonist who ever crossed the path of Imperial Britain. Our military history has largely consisted in our conflicts with France, but Napoleon and all his veterans have never treated us so roughly as these hard-bitten farmers with their ancient theology and their inconveniently modern rifles.”

Historian Roland Oliver assessed the Anglo-Boer War with the following words: “The unforeseen price of victory was the forging of an Afrikaner nation strong enough and united enough to win the peace.” (op.cit., p.209). He nevertheless concludes that this war may justly be considered as the concluding act in the European partition of Africa. Many frontiers still remained obscure, but the remaining problems were mostly of a detailed nature. The political map of Africa had been drawn. It was only with the approach of post-colonial independence that African populations as a whole really had to face the full implications of national boundaries and broad based socio-economic development.

Bibliography

Barthrop, M. (1987) The Anglo-Boer Wars 1815-1902, Blandford Press, Dorset Carver, M. (1999) The Boer War, Sidgwick & Jackson, London Davenport, T.R.H. (1977) South Africa – A Modern History, MacMillan, Johannesburg Doyle, Arthur Conan The Great Boer War, Scripta Africana Series, Johannesburg Ferguson, N. (2004) Empire – How Britain Made the Modern World, Penguin Books, London Giliomee, H. & Mbenga, B. New History of South Africa, Tafelberg Publishers, (2007) Cape Town Holt, E. (1958) The Boer War, Putnam, London Landes, D. (1998) The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, Little Brown & Co, London Meredith, M. (2007) Diamonds, Gold and War – The Making of South Africa, Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg Millin, S.G. (1951) The People of South Africa, Constable & Co, London Oliver, R. (2000) The African Experience, Phoenix Press, London Oliver, R. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Africa, Cambridge University Press Overy, R. (ed.) (2010) The Times Complete History of the World, Time Books, London Pakenham, T. (1993) The Boer War, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg Pretorius, F. (ed.) (2001) Scorched Earth, Human & Rousseau, Kaapstad Pretorius, F. (ed.) (2012) Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika, Tafelberg, Kaapstad Schoeman, K. (ed.) (1999) Witnesses to War – Personal Documents of the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902, Human & Rousseau, Cape Town Spies, S.B. & Natrass, G. Jan Smuts – Memoirs of the Boer War, Jonathan Ball Publishers,(1999) Jeppestown

5. The German Influence

The German influence in Southern Africa relates to various stages of European settlement: the Dutch colonial period, the British colonial period and the post 1910 Union of South Africa period. It also relates to the various stages of the history of Germany’s development as a nation state. In view of the Germanic roots of the Afrikaans (South African Dutch) language, the German cultural influence continued to be strong over the course of several centuries: in language, music, political orientations, lifestyle traits, and inasmuch as genes play a role, on behavioural inclinations of a large proportion of Afrikaans speakers. It is asserted that more than a third of Afrikaans speakers carry a large proportion of German genes. (See also “The Genetics of Politics” in The Economist, October 6th, 2012, pp.93-94)

Germany only came into being as a united political entity in 1871 when Otto von Bismarck managed to unite the numerous fragmented despotically governed German speaking principalities into a nation state. Previously, the Germans’ collective solidarity was mainly expressed in terms of the German language and culture. The rivalry amongst the various principalities made foreign intervention in German affairs a permanent fact of life. The German people, on their part, devoted their intellectual energies to their own cultural pursuits and maintained a leading edge in literature, music, philosophy, science and technology. The western and south-eastern parts of the German areas were predominantly Catholic, while the central, northern and eastern areas were strongholds of Lutheranism. There were also significant regional variations of German dialects.

During the 17th, 18th and deep into the 19th centuries, the German areas were overwhelmingly rural and agricultural. Such manufacturing as existed were of the small-scale handicraft variety. The German middle class remained economically weak and remained socially and politically subservient to the traditional feudal type of aristocracy. (See A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History, New York, 1946)

The feuding German principalities had not been able to concentrate on the development of a navy. This had precluded German participation in earlier imperialist scrambles for remote colonial interests. Many German speakers emigrated. It is claimed that close to one million Germans travelled to the Netherlands between 1600 and 1800. As a result a majority of the foreigners who served in the Dutch armed forces were German. Inevitably many thousands joined the VOC as conscripts.

The VOC’s German Soldiers and Officials

The majority of Cape soldiers in the service of the VOC were, in fact, from parts of north-western Europe where some form of the German language was spoken. By 1700, when there were close to 700 soldiers at the Cape, around three-quarters of them were from German areas. The rest were from the Dutch Republic, Scandinavia and Flanders. As noted by Nigel Penn, Dutch speakers at the Cape were not oblivious to German identity. Dutch speakers were quick to mock German-accented and imperfect Dutch. Mentzel, a German soldier at the Cape, recorded that 67

Germans as a whole, were referred to as ‘moffs’ or ‘moffen’ by their Dutch companions – which was not meant to be complimentary.

At the Cape the VOC authorities deliberately tried to expunge the German identity from the soldiers and officials in their service. Nor did the German language serve as a second language at the Cape, despite the presence of so many German speakers in the settler population. Newly recruited VOC soldiers faced a horrific ordeal while awaiting transportation to their eventual postings in Africa or Asia. They were subjected to repetitive drills and parade-ground discipline to create automatic, obedient responses to commands and an exaggerated awe of rank. Nigel Penn describes the next phase of their ordeal in the following terms: “It was the voyage out that formed their real rite of passage. The voyage to the Cape, which took a minimum of three months (though sometimes twice as long), marked their real transition ... During the voyage they would have been subjected to savage beatings and demeaning punishments for the least offence, constant verbal and physical abuse, and exposure to all extremes that the Atlantic could throw at them. They slept in airless, cramped and unsanitary spaces below decks, freezing in the northern seas and sweltering in the equator’s doldrums. Those who did not die of scurvy or other shipboard ailments not infrequently succumbed to melancholy and suicide. ... Failure to understand or execute an order, given in Dutch, would result in punishment and provided a strong incentive to learn VOC Dutch. By the end of the voyage, purged, shaved, beaten and brutalised, they had gained a new identity and a new language.” (See Nigel Penn, “Soldiers and Cape Town Society” in N. Warden (ed.) Cape Town Between East and West, Pretoria, 2012, pp.176-193)

In those days the status of a soldier, in general, was low. This was particularly true of mercenary soldiers and the VOC soldiers fitted this category. They were hired to defend company interests. They were drawn from the ranks of the destitute and impoverished who flooded to the Netherlands in an attempt to find employment. But VOC soldiers were poorly paid and badly treated. They were stripped of individuality, facilitating their absorption into an obedient military unit. Many new recruits were victims of ‘soul catchers’ whilst they waited for their ships. They were advanced food and money while waiting thereby ensuring that a soldier was heavily in debt even before his first salary was paid. After five years of service, a soldier would have earned 540 guilders from which deductions were made for subsistence, uniforms, bedding, etc. – leaving only a mere 13 guilders to his credit. The malpractices are fully documented in the writings of O.F. Mentzel, Life at the Cape in Mid-eighteenth Century, 1784 (Cape Town, 1919). See also Karel Schoeman’s ‘n Duitser aan die Kaap, 1724-1765, (Pretoria, 2004)

Despite the presence of large numbers of settlers of German descent in the Cape, no distinct German community language emerged. According to historian Nigel Penn, this was due partly to the fact that there were few German women to provide marriage partners for German men, partly because the Lutheran religion was not permitted until the 1780s, and partly because the basic training undergone by German recruits was aimed at turning them into Company soldiers rather than German-speaking soldiers. Similarly, the VOC set out to eradicate the distinctive culture of the French-speaking Huguenots at the Cape after 1688.

At the Cape, the VOC’s soldiers formed the largest group of the Company’s servants and they formed a substantial percentage of the town’s inhabitants. In 1652, under Van Riebeeck, the garrison numbered 70 and grew by another 100 within two years. By 1795 the Cape’s defensive forces stood at around 3,600 men. In addition to their military presence, many soldiers performed economic services for the town’s free burghers, using their skills to earn some extra money on the side – remitting part of their earnings back to their regiments as ‘dienstgeld’ or ‘pasgeld’. Some soldiers worked as ‘knechte’ on farms in the country. Some soldiers were posted to Company outposts in the hinterland where they were frequently involved in both trading and agricultural production. Social consequences followed from these military and economic interactions. On completion of their contracts – usually five to seven years duration – many soldiers elected to stay at the Cape and became burghers, or free settlers themselves. Some were able to marry local women. The social and economic contribution of the soldiers to the Cape society was much larger than is commonly assumed.

Educated soldiers were employed as tutors or teachers for the Colony’s settler children. Others found employment as scribes or Company accountants. Soldiers who knew a trade or craft were often exempted from service so that they could practice their trade in the community. In exchange for this privilege, they had to pay 9 guilders a month to the garrison to be shared among the garrison soldiers who were not exempted from military service. The system lent itself to great abuse as officers could pocket ‘dienstgeld’ for themselves. Major instances of military rebellion occurred that were caused by the inequities of the system. It was even claimed that Governor Noodt had pocketed the ‘dienstgeld’ himself. The corruption reached right up to the upper echelons of government and was so prevalent that it had become institutionalised. Ultimately it was the accusers who were punished whilst the guilty prospered. The system was eventually suspended in 1781. The ‘knecht system’ was abolished in 1783 and so the crucial economic role performed by soldier labourers came to an end.

Nigel Penn states that there was not a great deal of difference between the discipline and punishment of soldiers and those of slaves. Desertion of soldiers was common and a steady flow of fugitive soldiers fled into the Cape’s frontier regions where they threw in their lot with fugitive slave gangs. Another option was to desert to foreign ships that were short of crews. Soldiers, like slaves, were not allowed to marry. This led many soldiers to develop connections with less respectable women. The Company Slave Lodge doubled in the evenings as a brothel.

The Integration of Germans into Cape Society

In view of their relative strength in numbers in the early settler community, the Germans and their descendants soon became a significant socio-economic factor. Although they never formed a distinct group separate from the Dutch, they became an important component of the settler community. To this day a very large proportion of Afrikaans speakers in South Africa have family names with German origins – many of them changed to sound more Dutch.

Since most Germans originally arrived as unmarried soldiers or employees of the VOC, they married local Dutch, slave Malay or Khoi wives and were absorbed into the main body of Dutch speakers. Many Germans, especially those from Northern German areas, would have found 69

Dutch very similar to their mother tongue of Plattdeutch. Hence there was little incentive to form a separate subgroup within the local population.

Despite the strong momentum of the forces of integration, there were examples where some groups of German speakers started to develop a network of friends, business associates and relatives who supported one another in their entrepreneurial activities.

Gerald Groenewald provides an interesting case study of how Johann Zacharias Beck, who arrived at the Cape as a soldier in 1715, became a ‘knecht’ in 1719 to a fellow German, Christiaan Maasdorp, an alcohol ‘pachter’ in whose tavern Beck worked. In 1722, Beck married Maasdorp’s step-daughter and became a free burgher. Through his father-in-law, Johann Beck developed good contacts in the alcohol trade of Cape Town and soon successfully bid for several of Cape Town’s wine ‘pachten’ for close to 20,000 guilder – clearly assisted by the economic and social capital he had gained upon marriage into the established ‘pachter’ community. Beck, in turn promoted his fellow Germans by employing Jan Ludwig Leopold from his own hometown as well as his own brother Johann Christoffel who arrived in 1724 as a VOC soldier, but was loaned out as a ‘knecht’ to his brother within a year. Johann Christoffel became a free burgher himself in 1725. He married Anna de Groot – twice widowed after her ‘pachter’ husbands passed away. Anna was the daughter of a German immigrant and her two deceased husbands were likewise Germans. Johann Christoffel Beck returned the favour by standing surety for two additional fellow German ‘pachters’: Maria Coster and Godlieb Opperman. The mother-in-law of Johann Christoffel Beck, Geertruij de With was born Gertrud Witt in Hamburg. In 1685 she married Simon de Groot at the Cape, a man from Wittenberg, Germany. After his death, she married Hendrik Bouman from Dithmarchen. By the time of her death in 1733 her estate was valued at 144,952 guilder. She spent her last years as a rentier, providing loans to 34 entrepreneurs.

The careers of the Becks and the network of Geertruij de With illustrate the importance of links and networks within the German immigrant community. It seems a near universal phenomenon that in immigrant communities in which individuals share the same national, cultural, linguistic and other backgrounds, they tend to support one another and marry within the group. On a small scale a form of ‘chain migration’ was happening. Kinship networks and social capital played an important role. In the case of the Germans, the German language and the Lutheran faith acted as a binding factor. Most German descendants, however, were fully integrated into the White colonial community with a mixed record of successes and failures.

Another example is the ancestor of the author of this manuscript: Johann Johannes (Jan) Vossloh who was born in 1649 in Lippstadt, Westphalia, Germany. At this time, Germany was reeling under the devastating Thirty Years War which ended in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia. The war brought famine, death and destruction in its wake. It is estimated that Germany lost around one third of its population as a result of this devastation. The war started as a religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics but it morphed into a war of total destruction. Damage and losses were extensive and recovery was slow, so that the German regions suffered for several generations from the material consequences of the war. War casualties, disease and famine had under-populated certain areas. As agriculture and livestock sources declined, the oppression of 70

the peasants intensified. Landlords tried to recover from the war by increasing their exploitation of the peasant class. The commercial life of Germany was weakened immensely.

Norman Davies in Europe – A History, describes conditions in Germany after the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) as follows: “Germany lay desolate. The population had fallen from 21 million to perhaps 13 million. Between a third and a half of the people were dead. Whole districts lay stripped of their inhabitants, their livestock, their supplies. Trade had virtually ceased. A whole generation of pillage, famine, disease and social disruption had wreaked such havoc that in the end the princes were forced to reinstate serfdom, to curtail municipal liberties, and to nullify the progress of a century.” (Davies, op.cit. p.568)

Under these conditions Jan Vossloh had more than ample encouragement to seek a better life elsewhere. In those days the most promising prospects lay beyond the nearby border with the Netherlands. Jan Vossloh came to Cape Town around 1689 and served as chief timber cutter for the VOC until he acquired the status of free burgher in 1707. By this time his family name was ‘Dutchified’ as Voslo and sometimes written as Vosselo. His appointment as chief timber cutter ‘baashoutkapper’ was noted in the Minutes of the Council of Policy dd. 22 October 1689. It appears that Jan Voslo became a confidante of the corrupt Governor W.A. van der Stel and that he himself was involved in questionable activities. It is certain that Jan Voslo, in his capacity as the VOC’s chief timber cutter, delivered timber to Van der Stel’s farm at Vergelegen. In return, Van der Stel allowed Jan Voslo to conduct his own private business activities on the side while he was still in the employment of the VOC. He also had several ‘knechten’ (i.e. soldiers) in his service. He transported wheat in his own wagons, probably running a transport business on the side. It is also recorded that Jan Voslo was given ownership of a residential property in Cape Town by Governor W.A. van der Stel. Unsurprisingly, Governor Van der Stel was sacked by the VOC in 1712 after several free burghers laid charges against him for his corruption.

According to available documentary sources, Jan Voslo was reasonably successful as a free burgher. His income tax returns which are on record show that he farmed in the Drakenstein district on the Farm Vossenburg, today’s Foxenburg, near Wellington. In 1722 he sold the farm Vossenburg to his son-in-law, Arnoldus Kruysman, for the amount of 4,000 guilders.

According to available documentary evidence, Johann Johannes Vossloh (the later Jan Voslo) arrived in the Cape as an unmarried man. Dr Anna Boeseken, in her Slaves and Free Blacks at the Cape 1658-1700, pp.83 and 174, refers to a document showing that Jan Voslo, on 20 November 1696, arranged the manumission of the slave woman Helena of Malabar and her two- year old child called ‘Jannetjie’ or ‘Jantje’. Helena of Malabar subsequently had another child called Helena, who was also fathered by him. In Jan Voslo’s 1712 income tax return he refers to ‘Johannes’ and also in his testament of 1719, he bequeathed an amount of 1,000 guilders to ‘Johannes van de Caap’. This Johannes Voslo (‘Jantje’) marries Gerbrecht Herbst on 2 January 1718. Her father was Johann Herbst, born in Bremen, Germany, and her mother was Lysbeth Sanders, a slave woman. Johann Herbst was the supervisor of a VOC farm in the Hottentots- Holland area, who later became a free burgher in the Drakenstein area. On 12 June 1701 another slave woman named Apollonia baptised a son named Casper in the congregation of Cape Town. Both Casper and his mother were beneficiaries in Jan Voslo’s testaments of 1714 71

and 1726. It is assumed that Johannes and Casper as well as Helena were fathered by Jan Voslo with two different slave mothers.

In addition to the three children Jan Voslo fathered with two slave women, there is also reference in the historical sources to two additional children: Maria and Catrijn. Maria was married to Arnoldus Kruysman, a soldier from the town of Mörs, Germany. Kruysman worked for Jan Voslo as a farmer’s ‘knecht’ from 1703. He later became an influential free burgher in the Drakenstein district. It is claimed that when Maria was baptised, the person who stood as witness was Jan Vossloh (Jan Voslo). It is not known for certain who her mother could have been, but some researchers speculate that it could have been a slave woman named Anna Maria Been (Beun) who lived at Klapmuts in the Drakenstein district. After the death of Arnoldus Kruysman in 1722, his widow, Maria, married Arnoldus Basson and after his death she married another soldier turned free burgher, in 1725, by the name of Jan Andreas Dissel from East Friesland. By this time Maria was quite wealthy owning 15 male slaves, large orchards, 100 head of cattle and 600 sheep. In 1719, Jan Vossloh (Voslo) stipulated in his testament that Catrijn, the three-year old daughter of his slave woman, Catrijn of Madagascar, should be set free after his death.

It is clear that Jan Vossloh like many other German immigrants in the early stages, had many liaisons with slave women. Their offspring became the ancestors of many South African families that today form part and parcel of the White community – most of them Afrikaans speaking, but some are English speakers. The descendants of the Vosloos became dispersed over many districts: Ladismith, Somerset-East, Cradock, Queenstown, Cathcart, Port Elizabeth, East London, Joubertina, Willowmore, Humansdorp, Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Vryheid and Empangeni.

The German Settlers of 1857, 1877 and 1883

During the government of George Grey (1854-61) in the Cape Colony, it was decided to bring about closer socio-economic integration of Black and White on the eastern frontier. George Gray proposed to make the Xhosa “... a part of ourselves, with a common faith and common interests, useful servants, consumers of our goods, contributors to our revenue.” He therefore proposed to fill what was called ‘British Kaffraria’ with a ‘considerable number of Europeans’ who would settle among the indigenous Blacks, teach them the Christian religion and the arts of European farming, and give them an understanding of the White man’s law, as well as a vested interest through the grant of individual title.

As described by T.R.H. Davenport, in South Africa – A Modern History, MacMillan, Johannesburg, 1977, pp.101-102, Grey miscalculated the Xhosa reaction. His plan to penetrate tribal territory with white-owned farms and military roads was as widely resented as his plan to substitute European for traditional cultural values. This resentment erupted in the cattle-killing tragedy of 1857, when, following the prophecy of a young girl, Nongqwase, the Xhosa people slaughtered their stock and destroyed their crops in the expectation of an act of revenge by their ancestral spirits on the White man, accompanied by the provision of food from heaven. Sarhili, the Gcaleka paramount chief, persuaded some other Xhosa chiefs to follow his lead. The resultant tragedy led to widespread starvation. The population of the affected Ciskeian chiefdoms fell 72

from an estimated 105,000 to a mere 37,000. Those who died of starvation approximating in number to those who poured into the colony in desperate search of food. The Government provided emergency relief, but also went ahead with the settlement of German immigrants – mainly Crimean veterans and peasants. They were located on the East London-Stutterheim axis, covering some two hundred farms in British Kaffraria on simple military quit-rent tenure. The Xhosa resented this extension of colonial control, coupled with White settlement in areas cleared by the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police.

Britain recruited an army of German mercenaries to mobilise against the Russian incursions into the Crimean area in 1854. By the time these recruits arrived in Britain, the war was already over. The mercenaries were then offered the opportunity of settling in South Africa. About 2,500 of them accepted and were settled in Kaffraria on the eastern fringes of the Cape colony.

In Kaffraria the legionnaires established villages. Few of them were married but some had picked themselves wives in England while Irish girls were imported for others. Not many of the mercenaries remained in Kaffraria and most left for other areas of South Africa or were re- employed by the British as soldiers serving in India. Those who remained in South Africa assisted in establishing German communities and many became teachers or worked for English farmers in the remote frontier areas. Some found employment in small regional towns and villages. In time, they dissipated into the local community and became part of English-speaking South Africa.

After their positive experience in settling German immigrants on the East Cape frontier, the British Colonial government continued to recruit more Germans to settle in the sandy, infertile Cape Flats. They found volunteers who were willing to emigrate to the Cape in the Lüneburger Heide, a sandy area in Northern Germany. The farmers arrived in two groups: one in 1877 and the other in 1883. Without any significant government assistance the settlers faced extreme hardship, but in time managed to turn the sandy soils of the Cape Flats into the vegetable garden of Cape Town. Today, much of the area has been swallowed up by expanding urban development. However, even to this day the Christian congregation of Philippi belongs to the Cape Evangelical Lutheran Church.

Other German Settlements

Throughout its colonial era, pockets of German immigrants settled in different parts of South Africa. In Natal the Bergtheil or Bramsche Colonists settled in New Germany, Westville and New Hanover. In addition a large number of missionary stations were established by the Berlin and Lutheran Missionary Societies: Hermannsburg, Wartburg, Harburg, Paddock, Wupperthal, Mamre, Elim and many others throughout South Africa. The missionaries and their descendants brought their German dialects and cultural habits and skills to the local communities. They built churches and schools all over the country. Their genealogies and family histories are available in several databases and published materials.

General Cultural Influences

The German influence on the development of the Afrikaans culture should not be underestimated. A glance at the family names listed in the telephone directories shows a very large proportion are of German origin. The Afrikaans language, a derivative of the Dutch spoken by the early colonists at the Cape, is essentially a Germanic language. Until the 1990s many Afrikaans-medium high schools offered German language courses as an optional selection. Consequently a large proportion of Afrikaans speakers older than forty years of age, have a basic understanding of spoken and written German. Most educated Afrikaans speakers have a basic appreciation of German classical music, while others have an affinity for German ‘Volksmusik’. More than half of the songs published in the ‘FAK-Sangbundel’, a collection of Afrikaans songs, are translations or variations of German folk songs.

In the academic field, many Afrikaans scholars preferred to pursue their post-graduate studies in Germany. A large number of academics who have been employed by South African universities down the years are German born or German trained. A German geologist, Hans Merensky, not only discovered the diamond deposits along the South African-Namibian coast, but also most of the deposits of industrial minerals, such as platinum, chrome and various phosphates, north of the Vaal River. He established the Hans Merensky Foundation which, after his death, continued to finance the research he initiated in a variety of fields ranging from water and soil conservation, forestry, animal husbandry, medicine, industrial chemistry, mining and engineering. The foundation also provides bursaries for the education and training of students and its farming operations called Westfalia Farms, are the largest producers of organically grown avodaco and mango. The Merensky Technological Services has acquired international acclaim for its ground breaking work.

Bibliography

Davies, N. (1996) Europe – A History, Oxford University Press, Oxford Mentzel, O.F. (1919) Life at the Cape in Mid-eighteenth Century, Cape Town Schoeman, K. (2004) ‘n Duitser aan die Kaap, Protea Boekehuis, Pretoria Taylor, A.J.P. (1946) The Course of German History, New York Worden, N. (1996) Europe – A History, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Part II

The Post-Colonial Period

6. Post-Colonial Old South Africa 7. Post-Colonial New South Africa 8. Post-Colonial Former British BLS Protectorates 9. Post-Colonial Former British Central Africa 10. Post-Colonial Former Portuguese Africa 11. Post-Colonial Former German South West Africa

6. Post-Colonial Old South Africa (1910–1994)

When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, history had given the new country an exceptionally complicated demographic base to start with: one of the most heterogeneous population structures imaginable. Some of the most strongly divisive factors occurring in societies had been combined by the historical course of events within the framework of a single political system: race, ethnicity, religion, class and conflicting nationalisms.

The various population groups - each with its own traditions, institutions and aspirations – were interwoven in a complex pattern of interdependence, particularly in the economic sphere. The most important sections of the population (Black, White, Coloured and Indian) – each with its distinctive ethnic components had over several generations remained distinguishable segments of society on the basis of a modus vivendi of segregation in some form or other – despite a varying measure of integration and overlapping in the social, cultural, religious, biological, geographical, economic and political spheres. The power structure characterised by a Western-oriented system of ordering society economically and politically dominated by the White sections of the population. The economic sphere was largely in the hands of English speakers. The political sphere was dominated by the Afrikaans speakers who have over time shown a strong tendency to preserve their cultural heritages as well as their European biological identity.

During the first few years the aspirations and expectations of the other population groups – Black, Coloured and Indian – were initially relegated into a neglected and subordinate position. These groups being in a strong numerical majority inevitably provided a seedbed for rejection of and opposition to the status quo. No regime could survive in the long run without being acceptable to the decisive majority. An unacceptable regime ultimately loses its basis of legitimacy and can eventually only be maintained by the use of instruments of power.

The history of post-colonial South Africa can be compartmentalised in many ways, but for the purposes of this analysis, which is to trace the impact of cultural influences, the following periods are identified for a closer focus: - 1910 to 1948 as the period predominated by internal quarrels between Dutch descendants (Afrikaners) and British descendants (Anglos) over language and socio-economic status issues with only a marginal concern over the position of Black, Coloured and Indian members of society; - 1948 to 1964 as the heyday of apartheid with the Dutch descendants focussed on reversing the forces of multi-cultural and economic integration by policies of separate development; - 1965-1976 as the period of winds of change involving greater flexibility in internal and external relations; - 1976 to 1985 as the period marked by the unravelling and fall of apartheid and White political domination; - 1986 to 1994 as the period during which the road towards negotiations and the transition to Black majority rule was paved.

The Afrikaner-English Quarrels (1910-1948)

Although the various European influences on the development of South Africa started to combine and merge by 1910, some very distinct traits continued to cast a strong influence within the confines of specific culture-based communities. There are many examples of biological and cultural convergence in the Cape Province and other metropolitan areas. But the bulk of the Transvaal and Orange Free State was still overwhelmingly populated by descendants with deep-rooted memories of the atrocities of Anglo-Boer War concentration camps and the destruction of farmsteads and the slaughtering of their animal stock by the British forces.

The Agricultural Sector

The devastation of the Afrikaner population of South Africa reverberated deep into the next century. By 1900 only 10,000 Afrikaners did not live on farms. But with their farmsteads burnt down, their livestock slaughtered or ‘confiscated’, their savings depleted, they were financially in dire straits. Many flocked to the cities, hoping to find employment in the industries and mines. A quarter was considered to be destitute by 1930. By 1936 more than half of the Afrikaners had urbanised – the large majority struggling to cope in the cities as semi-skilled and unskilled workers. They constituted a growing proportion of urban dwellers: 25 percent of Johannesburg and Cape Town and 50 percent of Pretoria and Bloemfontein. But Afrikaner farmers still dominated the farming sector with more than 80 percent of agricultural production.

After the Anglo-Boer War, people of British and Jewish descent, buttressed by traitors and ‘joiner’ Afrikaners who escaped the destruction of the Anglo-Boer War (accusations have been made that they ‘stole’ livestock and other assets like farm implements from families who where in concentration camps and in commando service), virtually controlled the non-agricultural sectors of South African economic life. It included the banks, factories, retail outlets, accounting profession, legal profession, medical profession, consultancies and a wide array of small and medium businesses. The urbanised Afrikaners formed part of a large pool of unskilled labour and controlled only a very small part of the non-agricultural private sector. Even by 1939 Afrikaners controlled or managed no assets of any significance: no large industrial undertaking, no building society, no regular commercial bank, no consumer association and no company listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. According to Prof. Jan Sadie, of Stellenbosch University, the Afrikaner’s entrepreneurial share in the private sector was as follows: 1 percent in mining, 3 percent in manufacturing and construction, 3 percent in trade and commerce and 5 percent in finance. (See Giliomee, H., The Afrikaners – Biography of a People, op. cit., p. 434)

Responding to the Afrikaner’s sense of being marginalised, a group of Afrikaner leaders founded the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) in Johannesburg in 1918. Its first president, Rev. Jozua Naude, was one of the six ‘bittereinders’ who refused to sign the Vereeniging peace treaty ending the Anglo-Boer War in 1902. The AB was, at first, not a secret organisation and it aimed at the promotion of a healthy and progressive spirit of unity among Afrikaners promoting the welfare of the Afrikaner nation; the cultivation of a national self-consciousness in the Afrikaner; love for his language, religion, land and people; and, the advancement of the interests of the Afrikaner 77

people. By 1928 there were 13 branches with 263 members. In 1929 the AB organised a conference in Bloemfontein attended by around 400 delegates from cultural associations across the country. The conference founded a Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations (FAK) to promote Afrikaans in a co-ordinated way. At the time the recognition of Afrikaans as a language in its own right, was highly controversial. A Johannesburg newspaper, The Star, called it a purely local language “… At best it has to be regarded as a national disability and at worst a national misfortune.” (Quoted by Giliomee, op. cit., p. 401)

Against this background, activists for Afrikaans saw a huge task for themselves. Large numbers of Afrikaners had become anglicised largely due to the absence of Afrikaans-medium high schools and psychological pressures. Many were Anglophiles. Grammatical standards were low and the ‘common parlance’ needed to be modernised and elaborated to meet contemporary needs. All expressions of the Afrikaans culture in literature, song, music, printed media, broadcasting, etc., needed to be upgraded, particularly mother-tongue education. The National Party became the political voice of the struggle for Afrikaans and republicanism.

Because the AB, in time, became a limited membership, closed, secret society, several journalists depicted it as the behind-the-scenes ruling establishment of South Africa during subsequent years. (See Giliomee, op. cit., p. 421-422) There can be no doubt that the organisation was indeed highly influential in Afrikaner circles, but its importance has been blown out of all proportion. The Afrikaner community, like most other culture groups in the world, consists of both ‘clique types’ and ‘independent types’. The Afrikaner community, since its early history, has always encompassed a large – if not overwhelming – proportion of highly individualistic and independent-minded people. W.J. de Klerk described these schools of thought as a contest between ‘verligtes’ and ‘verkramptes’ (broad and narrow mindedness). Leaders always had their hands full to fit these individuals into one tent. The author of this manuscript, although a cultural Afrikaner, never supported the National Party and never joined any closed membership organisation. His own father, although a staunch National Party supporter, was strongly opposed to the Broederbond or any other secret organisation.

There were strong anti-capitalist sentiments in Afrikaner ranks and they were too proud and self-reliant to ask or expect others to help work out their economic salvation. The first Afrikaner-initiated enterprises, Sanlam and Santam, were mutual corporations, investing primarily in low-risk bonds and property. Farmers’ co-operatives founded between 1920 and 1940 were not geared for profits. The National Party, in opposition, periodically propagated the nationalisation of banks and mines – but once in power, never implemented nationalisation policies. One of the most outspoken critics of capitalism in Afrikaner circles was Dr. Albert Hertzog, son of the former Boer general and South African Prime Minister, Genl. Herzog. The other famous name is Bram Fischer who became one of the leaders of the SA Communist Party and a close associate of Nelson Mandela. A large number of Afrikaner intellectuals and trade union leaders continued to express deep reservations about what was considered to be rampant individualism and greed of the capitalist system.

In 1933 the AB executive initiated the start of a savings bank to mobilise the savings of Afrikaners and to finance Afrikaner enterprises. The government refused permission to register 78

a commercial bank. Instead a co-operative was established by some 60 AB members – called Volkskas (Peoples Bank). Barely surviving the 1930s, Volkskas became a regular commercial bank in the 1940s. In the 1990s Volkskas became the cornerstone of a large-scale amalgamation of South African financial institutions: a new bank, Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA) was formed in 1991 swallowing Volkskas, Trust Bank, United Building Society and Allied Building Society. ABSA became the South African bank with the largest market capitalisation and deposit structure. It was subsequently bought by the UK bank, Barclays, and placed under control of an ANC-connected chairperson and an ANC-connected chief executive.

The 1938 centenary celebrations of the Great Trek (the large-scale migration of Boer pioneers into the interior), provided a spur for Afrikaner-based entrepreneurship. A respected church leader, ‘Father’ J.D. Kestell, initiated the idea for the later establishment of the ‘Reddingsdaadbond’ (Rescue Association) to collect funds for financing business enterprises under the slogan “’n Volk help homself” (a people rescues itself). This call soon captured the imagination, not to adopt a ‘charity plan’, but a scheme to finance business enterprises that could employ the Afrikaner poor.

The ‘Eerste Ekonomiese Volkskongres’ (First Economic Congress of the People) met in Bloemfontein in 1939 and decided to launch a ‘rescue yourself’ campaign – shunning the alternative idea of reliance on charity and government handouts. The underlying philosophy was to rope in the capitalist system – ‘volkskapitalisme’ (people’s capitalism) – to assist Afrikaners to obtain a fair share of the economy.

Out of the ‘Volkskongres’ emerged three institutions: a finance house (Federale Volksbeleggings – FVB), a chamber of commerce and an organisation to assist in a ‘rescue action’. The FVB was placed under the auspices of Sanlam and by 1943 around £2 million had been raised to engage in conventional shareholding investments. By the end of World War II, FVB had major investments in fishing, wood, steel, chemicals and agricultural implements. Bonuskor, an investment corporation, was the first Afrikaner company listed on the JSE in 1948.

One of the first loans granted by the FVB was to an Afrikaner entrepreneur, Anton Rupert. Within two decades he would build up the Rembrandt group of companies as a world-scale conglomerate with interests in tobacco, manufacturing, mining, banking, wine production and luxury goods. The Rembrandt conglomerate, led by Johann Rupert, is arguably the most successful enterprise built on South African capital and entrepreneurship.

FVB investment in mining in the early 1950s led to its acquiring control over a mining house, Federale Mynbou (Federal Mining). This company in time became known as General Mining. It ultimately migrated to the London Stock Exchange, acquiring a controlling interest in the Billiton Corporation. In 2001 this mining house merged with Broken Hill Proprietary, the big Australian miner, to become the world’s second largest mining and minerals business.

The 1939 Volkskongres also established the ‘Reddingsdaadbond’ (RDB), an association aimed at assisting development projects. By 1947 the RDB had 381 branches with 67,131 members. Its divisions included culture, farming, the economy, employment for women and for Whites. Even 79

school children were asked to contribute sixpence per month. Its most important contribution was to encourage Afrikaners to support Afrikaner enterprises.

The ‘Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut’ (AHI) which was an association of commercial enterprises, also an off-shoot of the 1939 Volkskongres, published its own journal ‘Volkshandel’ which played an important role as a source of information. During the war fledgling Afrikaans businesses were in competition with larger established English and Jewish controlled businesses that received preferential government treatment in the system of war rationing. Hence business problems became ethnic grievances and spilled over into the political arena. At the next Volkskongres in 1951, it was clear that the poor-White problem had been alleviated and that the Afrikaner people were beginning to find their feet in the urban environment.

Mining and Finance

After the Anglo-Boer War, English speakers (whether of British or Jewish descent) were inevitably by far the most prosperous and in a comparatively strong position to continue their dominance of the economic life of the country, particularly in the non-agricultural sectors of mining and services. As in many parts of the world, Jews were facing obstacles related to anti- Semitic sentiments. Jews were not allowed to settle in the Cape during the Dutch East India Company rule (1652-1795), but the policy changed when the Batavian Republic took over until 1806. When the British took over in 1806 a small number of Jews were allowed and amongst the 1820 settlers was a contingent of 18 Jews setting up home in the eastern reaches of the colony. In 1841 the Jewish community was formally established with the foundation in Cape Town of Tikvath Isreal, the mother congregation of South African Jewry. The original Jewish settlers were mainly merchants and by 1855 their numbers had grown to 170 with an increasing number of traders and hawkers in the hinterland.

The discovery of diamonds near Kimberley brought a number of Jews mainly from England and Germany. Jews traded in diamonds around the world and soon operated mining claims and floated local mining companies. Amongst the most prominent were Barney Barnato, Sammy Marks, Isaac Lewis and Alfred Beit. They were later followed by Ernest Oppenheimer.

The 1880 anti-Semitic pogroms prompted mass emigration from Russia. Some 40,000 Jewish immigrants came to South Africa in the three decades before the First World War, particularly attracted by the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886. The majority settled in the cities but some dispersed as storekeepers and hawkers to the countryside along the transport corridors. The pious Boer families regarded them as the Old Testament’s ‘Chosen People’ and often received them warmly. Many Boers saw a kinship between themselves and the Jews. Jews gravitated towards non-manual occupations and in Johannesburg and Cape Town, Jews settled their own inner city ethnic enclaves. During the Anglo-Boer War most Jews fought with the British forces. After the war they were increasingly embedded in white urban English-speaking society – counting on British goodwill.

In 1930 a ‘quota act’ was passed (with English-speaker support). The Afrikaner community felt that the Jewish Randlords fomented the Anglo-Boer War, incited Blacks against Whites, controlled the press, dominated the mining and financial world and exploited the goodwill of 80

Afrikaners. Anti-Jewish sentiments rapidly gained ground in Afrikaner nationalist mainstream and led to the Aliens Act in 1937, restricting Jewish immigration.

The role of Jews in the economic development of South Africa is quite remarkable. De Beers Consolidated Mines, the largest diamond-mining company in the world, which was set up by Rhodes, was eventually taken over by Jewish interests: the Rothschild Group in London and the Oppenheimer family. The other branch of the vast empire was Anglo American Corporation (AAC). By the 1970s the AAC controlled 1,000 companies in South Africa: mining and industrial companies, and finance and investment companies. Its holdings included three of the top mining houses, six of the top 10 finance houses, the largest investment trust, the second largest property company, the second largest merchant bank, the largest transport company and the fastest growing car company. Minerals represented the core business. In the 1970s, Anglo produced 40 percent of South Africa’s gold, 40 percent of the world’s industrial diamonds and over 30 percent of the world’s gem diamonds. Member companies also produced substantial proportions of South Africa’s vanadium, platinum, manganese, coal and uranium. There were two other non-subsidiary associates: Charter Consolidated, largely responsible for mining finance, and the Minerals and Resources Corporation (MINORCO), a mining investment company.

The Anglo empire spread like an octopus over Southern Africa: diamonds and iron ore in Namibia; copper, nickel and diamonds in Botswana; copper in Zambia; and diamonds in Angola and Zaire. Gold and diamond interests are also held in West Africa in Ghana and Sierra Leone. (See Arnold, G., Africa – A Modern History, London: Atlantic Books, 2005, pp.575-576). Jewish families were also well entrenched in the retail chains like Ackermans, Woolworths, Levisons and Edgars. They were also strongly represented in the legal and medical professions. Many Jews have been mayors of cities and towns.

In 1951 over a third of the 110,000 Jews in South Africa lived in Johannesburg: one in nine of the Whites, one in fifteen in Cape Town and one in forty-six in Durban. Since that time thousands of South Africa’s Jews have emigrated to the USA, Canada and Australia – many before exchange control measures complexified the export of capital resources. Today both De Beers Consolidated and Anglo American Corporation are headquartered in London.

By 1965 English speakers (including Jews), controlled more than 80 percent of the companies in the financial sector, 90 percent in the mining sector and 90 percent in the manufacturing sector. The percentage of English-speaking children who passed the highest school standard was twice as high as that of Afrikaners and there were twice the number of English university graduates in the White community. Afrikaners, who formed nearly 60 percent of the White community, earned only 45 percent of the total White income. As a result of inter-marriage between members of the Afrikaans, English and Jewish communities, the reliability of ethnic-based statistics became increasingly uncertain – and to some people even offensive.

Constitutional Change

The foundations of the Union of South Africa were laid by the South Africa Act of 1909. It was drafted by the National Convention of 1908-1909, embodied in a British imperial statute and 81

took effect on May 31st, 1910. In terms of the Act, the two former British colonial areas (Natal and the Cape of Good Hope) and the two defeated Boer republics (Transvaal and Orange Free State) were merged together with a number of Black communities which had already been absorbed by the White units into the Union of South Africa. The South Africa Act refrained from providing for the franchise and representation of Black South Africans.

At the time, Lord Crewe, at the British Foreign Office said “… These matters must be settled in South Africa itself”, but insisted that the British government would retain responsibility for administering Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. The British Prime Minister, Lord Asquith, speaking in the Commons against proposals by opponents to the Bill to reject the disenfranchisement of non-Whites, said “..any control or interference from outside … is in the very worst interests of the natives themselves …” – deftly ‘passing the buck’ back to the South Africans.

The institutional structure established by the South Africa Act closely followed the Westminster Model: a centralised unitary state with four subordinate provincial governments, the sovereignty of parliament, a parliamentary executive (cabinet system), a bi-cameral legislature, and an electoral system based on the majority vote in single-member constituencies.

The most significant constitutional trends during the first five decades since 1910 involved, first, South Africa’s constitutional status vis-à-vis the United Kingdom, and, second, the various constitutional arrangements which were made with regard to the position of Black, Coloured and Indian population groups. The first trend is merely of historical interest and culminated in South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth and becoming a republic in terms of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1961. Except for terminological and other minor changes, this act was basically a re-enactment of the South Africa Act. The second trend is of major importance for understanding the existing institutional structure in South Africa as well as its concomitant configuration of power.

In as much as the first few decades since unification were dominated by the power struggle between Afrikaans and English speaking segments of the White population, the political focus gradually swung back to the much larger unresolved issues concerning the position of the Black, Coloured and Indian population groups.

The Heyday of Apartheid (1948-1976)

During the period 1910 to 1948, race relations policies were characterised by sporadic and piecemeal segregationist measures without a clear identification of long-term objectives. Inarticulate self-images of White supremacy took strong root in South Africa as it did in other British colonies. In The Making of Modern South Africa, 2012, John Wiley & Sons, Singapore, pp.74-88, Nigel Worden points out that “white supremacy” must be distinguished from “segregation”. But the historical evolution of race relations in all British colonies bears evidence of the interaction of perceptions of White racial superiority and efforts to enforce specific policies of enforced separation in the spheres of work, residence and government. English speakers like to think that segregation must have been an invention of the Dutch, Boer or Afrikaner communities, who were even stupid enough to give segregation a Germanic name 82

“apartheid” which conjures up images of “apart” and “hate”. In reality, however, throughout history, all over the world people have tried, with only limited success, to find a modus vivendi with other groups on the basis of some form of separate existence – despite varying degrees of interaction and overlapping in the social, cultural, religious, biological, economic and political spheres. All over the world people tend to associate with their own kind, but their degree of success depends on the geographic, demographic, economic and cultural environment in which they find themselves. The English like to live in an English-speaking environment, just as the Chinese are concentrated in China, but both English and Chinese have migrated to many other lands to establish new footholds for themselves and their kin. The Boers also tried to establish a foothold for themselves somewhere in the interior of Southern Africa, but they were too few in number to effectively carve out a separate existence for themselves.

During the period 1910 to 1948 race relations policies were characterised by sporadic and piecemeal measures without a clear identification of long-term objectives. The overwhelming majority of Blacks were concentrated in rural areas and consequently largely remained isolated from the mainstream of South African life. But as the forces of economic integration started to operate in many fields, a number of legislative measures were adopted which gave an indication of the subsequent pattern of development:

- the Mines and Works Act of 1911 introducing the statutory colour bar to the economy and the principle of job reservation to labour relations; - the Native Land Act of 1913 setting certain territories aside for exclusive ownership and occupation by Black and White population groups; - the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 introducing residential segregation in urban areas and influx control to regulate the rapid growth of the urban Black population; - the Representation of Natives Act of 1936 removing Blacks from the common voters’ roll in the Cape Province and placing them on a separate roll which was to return three White representatives – it also created a partly elected advisory ‘Natives Representative Council’; - the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 which created a trust for the purchase and development of land for Black ownership and occupation, made specific provision for the acquisition of an additional 7,250,000 morgen; and - the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1945 which defined the powers and duties of urban local authorities with respect to the Black population within their jurisdiction and regulated the acquisition of land by Blacks inside cities or towns.

Segregation and Apartheid

The National Party came to power in 1948 largely on the campaign platform of ‘apartheid’. In a personal interview in 1966, Mr. Paul Sauer, one of the leaders of the Cape Division of the National Party, told the author of this manuscript that he was the originator of this campaign slogan. In essence, ‘apartheid’ is the Dutch word for segregation.

Sarah Gertrude Millin, in her remarkable survey of The Peoples of South Africa (London: Constable, 1953, pp.1-2) explained the background in the following words:

“In 1894 … Rhodes spoke of a separation of black and white and called it a Bill for Africa. 83

He called it a Bill for Africa because he meant it to set a way of life for his all-Red route from Cape to Cairo.

Rhodes’ Bill for Africa – this separate way of life for black and white throughout Africa – is the model followed by every Prime Minister since Union: Generals Botha and Smuts; General Hertzog and Dr. Malan too.

Only General Hertzog and Dr. Malan said Apartheid instead of Separation. Their Nationalist followers supported them on the word Apartheid.

The word Apartheid means Apart-hood. It exactly means separation.”

As a comprehensive policy for the regulation of inter-group relations, this policy programme involved the following: (i) the protection of the political power of the Whites; (ii) the regulation of social and economic relationships between the races; and (iii) the creation of alternative self-governing institutions in their own ‘homelands’ for each major group in accordance with its own traditions and values, and to develop into independent states within their own territories.

The National Party rejected policies of integration that would lead to a majoritarian ‘common society’ on the grounds that the Whites would be swamped politically and culturally by the numerically preponderant Blacks. (See W.J. de Klerk (1971) Afrikanerdenke, Potchefstroom: Pro Rege-Pers)

During the first decade of National Party government the implementation of its policies was characterised by a series of segregationist measures. The most important of these were the following: - the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 which prohibited marriage between Whites and ‘Non-Whites’; - the Immorality Act of 1950 which prohibited carnal intercourse between Whites and ‘Non- Whites’; - the Population Registration Act of 1950 which prescribed that every citizen of the country had to be registered according to fixed criteria as belonging to one of the statutorily defined population groups – ‘White’, ‘Coloured Persons’ (including Asiatics) and ‘Bantu’; - the Group Areas Act of 1950 which created an extensive administrative system instituting separate residential and business areas for the various population groups; - the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951 which removed the names of Coloured voters from the common voters’ roll and provided for representation on a separate roll; - the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 which was passed to authorise the institution of separate public amenities for persons of a particular population group.

Early Black Resistance (1948-1960)

After coming to power in 1948, the NP government appointed a committee to investigate the role of communism in South Africa. The committee reported that communism had become a ‘national danger’ in South Africa. Legislation was prepared to suppress communism and to legalise action against organisations and individuals who promoted communism in South Africa. To avoid action against its individual members, the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) dissolved itself in June 1950, just before the Suppression of Communism Act was passed in 1950. It outlawed membership of a communist party and banned communist publications, such as the New Age. All trade unions were forced to organise membership according to racial categories.

Despite the repressive measures, communist influence penetrated the ranks of the ANC and a secret communist party was established by white communists with a public front called the South Africa Congress of Democrats (SACOD). Several instances of violent clashes with the police occurred on the Witwatersrand during 1950 which paved the way for closer cooperation between the ANC and communist groupings.

A few days before its dissolution, the SACP held a conference on ‘freedom of speech’ in Johannesburg under the chairmanship of James Moroka, the president-general of the ANC. The convention passed a resolution to celebrate May 1st, 1950, as ‘Freedom Day’. Thousands of workers participated in strikes which gave rise to violence in which 18 persons were killed in clashes with the police. The ANC then determined 26 June, 1950, to be celebrated as a ‘Day of Mourning’, coupled with stay-away action by workers.

The NP-led campaign to remove Coloured persons from the common voters’ role to a separate voters’ role for Coloureds, led to the establishment of protest movements such as the Franchise Action Council (FRAC) in Cape Town in February 1951, as well as several stay-away and school boycott actions. Then in July 1951, the national executive committees of the ANC and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) met with members of FRAC to plan joint action against the NP government’s measures. It was decided to set up a planning council to start a campaign against several apartheid measures: pass laws, group areas delimitation, separate representation of voters, the system of Bantu authorities and the suppression of communism.

A letter was directed to the NP government requesting the scrapping of all of these measures or facing a passive resistance campaign along the lines of Gandhi’s in India. The ‘Defiance Campaign’, a country-wide passive resistance action, was started on 26 June 1952. The idea was to swamp government forces with thousands of volunteered contraventions of apartheid measures. The campaign continued until the end of 1952 and around 8,300 volunteers were arrested. Sporadic violence erupted in which 26 Black and 6 Whites were killed – mostly Blacks and Indians. The Law on Public Security providing for heavier penalties, led to a decrease in demonstrations until the campaign was formally abandoned early in 1953.

During the following years the government stepped up its policing presence and its legal authority to declare martial law. A large majority of Blacks remained passive, but the rising anger was expressed in 1955 when the ‘Congress of People’ met at Kliptown football ground, 85

attended by around three thousand delegates from various organisations, where they adopted the ‘Freedom Charter’. Several speakers noted that the road might be long, but that a united democratic front was the only solution.

At the time the NP government became particularly sensitive about the suspected infiltration of the Black Freedom Movement by communist influence. In 1955 the ‘Suppression of Communism Act’ was adopted by parliament and in 1956 the Soviet consulate in South Africa was closed down. In the same year 56 persons were arrested on charges of high treason. Amongst those arrested was the president of the African National Congress, Zulu chief Albert Luthuli. He stayed in prison for nine months, as did most of the others that were arrested.

New outbreaks of violence occurred in 1959 at Pretoria, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Cape Town and Windhoek. Around 18 Blacks were killed in riots and 154 wounded by the police forces. Luthuli was placed under house arrest, but a more militant organisation made its entrance, the Pan African Congress, founded by Robert Sobukwe.

The year 1960 saw an escalation of violence. First, on 24 January 1960, nine policemen were killed at Cato Manor near Durban. Then, on 21 March a dramatic event occurred at Sharpeville in the Transvaal. Sobukwe asked his followers to go to police stations to hand in their identity books as an act of protest against the pass laws. At Sharpeville these instructions were carried out en masse – 3,000 to 4,000 in number, including some individuals who were carrying arms. The 75 policemen present were jumpy after the recent killings of policemen in Natal and they claimed that when some shots came from the crowd panic-stricken policemen opened fire with rifles. The crowd surged back in terror while the firing continued so that some casualties were hit in the back. In total 69 demonstrators were dead and 80 wounded.

The Sharpeville shooting incident soon assumed international dimensions, including a United Nations Security Council Resolution to the effect that the Sharpeville events constituted a danger to world peace. The resolution was passed by nine votes to nil – with two abstentions by Britain and France. In Norway flags flew at half-mast and the Canadian and British parliaments moved motions of disapproval.

On the same day as the Sharpeville incident, 21 March 1960, a demonstration took place at Langa near Cape Town, resulting in 2 dead and 49 wounded. To restore calm all meetings were prohibited whereupon Blacks began burning their identity books. Martial law was declared in eighty districts. On 31 March, 1960, a crowd of around 30,000 Blacks marched through downtown Cape Town.

On 8 April both the ANC and the PAC were declared banned organisations and calm was slowly restored. The state of emergency was lifted on 31 August 1960. But at this time the ANC continued secret plans to start an armed struggle against the South African government. In view of the strong position of the South African army and police, this implied a campaign of sabotage activities.

The idea of the ANC going underground is connected to the ‘M-plan’ – named after its author, Nelson Mandela. It was adopted by the national executive of the ANC as early as 1953. It 86

involved strengthening the ANC at the grass roots level by way of a secret cell structure. The formal architecture of this organisational structure came into being in November 1961 when Umkonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation), or MK, was formed as the military wing of the ANC. The first bombs exploded on 16 December, 1961, just as Albert Luthuli, the ANC’s President, returned from Oslo where he had received the Nobel Peace Prize – awarded to him for fighting against racial discrimination by non-violent methods.

At the first post-Sharpeville ANC conference held in Bechuanaland in 1963, the association between the ANC and MK was openly recognised. The PAC formed its own military wing, Poqo (Going it Alone). While sympathisers from the Liberal Party founded the African Resistance Movement (ARM), also dedicated to sabotage. Poqo’s strategy was aimed at sporadically killing pro-government chiefs and collaborators. It also targeted Whites, including women and children. In April 1963 the offices of Poqo’s leader, Potlako Leballo, were raided by South African security forces. These offices were located in Maseru, Basutoland. Arrests followed and the organisation was completely smashed. MK, on the other hand, conducted its campaign by exploding homemade incendiary bombs at targets of symbolic significance to make Whites see the need for change. MK carried out around seventy acts of sabotage before its leaders were arrested. ARM also carried out a number of sabotage bombings. Hundreds of recruits were despatched overseas for military training.

In 1962 Mandela secretly travelled to Addis Ababa to speak at a conference of African liberation movements. He spoke about the possibility of future mass action campaigns to be organised by the ANC but also about training MK cadres and raising funds to buy arms for guerrilla warfare. Mandela also travelled to London where he met British Opposition leaders. Soon after his return six months later, he was arrested and charged with illegally leaving the country and inciting workers to stay away from work. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

The government passed the Sabotage Act in 1962 which also prohibited the reproduction of statements made by ‘banned’ persons or meetings of ‘banned’ persons participating in meetings of three or more persons. In 1962-63 no less than 152 persons of all races were listed as ‘banned’ persons and several of those were placed under house arrest. By June 1963 over 600 people had been convicted or were awaiting trial under the Act. In May 1963 there followed the General Law Amendment Act or ‘Ninety-Day-Act’ which allowed repeated ninety-day periods of detention without trial or charge and interrogation of detained persons without lawyers present. (R. W. Johnson, South Africa – the First Man, the Last Nation, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Cape Town, 2004, pp.154-156)

In July 1963 the police raided a farm belonging to the SACP in the suburb of Rivonia near Johannesburg. They arrested six members of MK who were all involved in ‘Operation Mayibuye’, a plan for guerrilla insurgency and ultimate invasion with the help of foreign governments. The whole MK archive of hundreds of documents was captured. Mandela was revealed to be the head of MK, as was the fact that many members of MK’s National High Command, including Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki, were communists. All the people involved could now be charged with high treason.

The Rivonia Trial drew wide international attention. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution denouncing South African political trials and, with four abstentions, calling on Pretoria to grant amnesty to all defendants. Defending the position of MK and the ANC, with a five-hour speech, Nelson Mandela became the focal point of the trial. He emerged from the trial as the dominant figure in the ANC and the major leader of the struggle.

The judge in the Rivonia Trial decided to avoid turning the accused into martyrs and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Four of the accused managed to escape from prison. One, Hepple, agreed to testify for the prosecution, and another, Bernstein, was found not guilty. Mandela, Sisulu and the others were sent to Robben Island.

In his statement from the dock (rather than the witness stand) Mandela avoided reference to the advanced stage of MK’s plans for guerrilla warfare. He tried to convey the point that Operation Mayibuye was only a draft not yet a guerrilla warfare blueprint. He admitted that he had helped to form MK and that he had helped to plan its sabotage campaign. He stated that the ANC alliance with the Communist Party did not imply sharing a complete community of interests. He ended his statement with the following words: “I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.” (Quoted in Giliomee et al, New History of South Africa, op.cit. p.339)

Bram Fischer, an Afrikaans speaker who acted as advocate for the accused in the Rivonia Trial, became the leader of the SACP after Rivonia. He went into hiding but was arrested, tried and also sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1964 a bomb exploded at the Johannesburg railway station which killed and maimed many civilians. It was placed by John Harris, a former Liberal Party and ARM activist. Harris was arrested and allegedly appeared in court with broken limbs. He was sentenced to death.

The Rivonia Trial was the high point of the 1960s struggle and a degree of stabilisation followed. The ANC had now established itself as the spearhead of an inclusive African nationalist movement. Mandela and some of his colleagues spent almost two decades at Robben Island prison until he was transferred to Victor Verster prison near Cape Town, where he remained until his release. Mandela followed a long line of charismatic African leaders who spent long years in prison before becoming heads of government: Nkrumah, Kenyatta and Mugabe.

Verwoerd’s Policy Shift

After the first decade of National Party government, the policy emphasis, under leadership of Dr H.F. Verwoerd, shifted from apartheid towards separate development. Dr Verwoerd argued that measures should be designed to be more positively developmental in character in the sense that new and alternative opportunities should be created for all population groups in the social, economic and political spheres. ‘Separate development’ was aimed at two diverging sets of objectives: homeland development for the various ethnic groups within the ranks of the Black population and parallel development for the Coloured and Indian population groups. 88

Dr Verwoerd explained his policies in 1961 to a London audience in the following terms: “We want each of our population groups to control and to govern themselves, as is the case with other Nations ... In the transition stage the guardian must teach and guide his ward. That is our policy of separate development. South Africa will proceed in all honesty and fairness to secure peace, prosperity and justice for all, by means of political independence coupled with economic interdependence.” (Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Cape Town, 2001, p.210)

The early 1960s saw the introduction of several measures and programmes to enhance self- government along ethnic lines. The Bantu Development Corporation was established to promote economic development in the homelands – particularly investment projects in frontier industries located in border areas. Universities were created for various ethnic groups: three for Blacks and one each for Coloureds and Indians. The government argued that they wished to give each ethnic group the opportunity to develop ‘along their own lines’, to ‘develop through the filter of their own culture’ and not to be cut off from their own roots. These thoughts were often expressed in Dr Verwoerd’s ad lib public speeches.

The sentiments expressed by Dr Verwoerd proved to be blown in the wind. The dream of the architects of separate development of the various South African ethnic groups developing separately alongside one another, and alongside the White, Coloured and Indian communities, proved to be a mirage. Given the degree of demographic and economic integration which had taken place by the 1960s, a single South African nationality, embracing all local inhabitants, had become the only practical reality. It proved, in time, to be impossible to unscramble the omelette. Moreover, South Africa was left isolated as the last major country with a racial policy based on White supremacy.

During the 1960s much of the traces of the colonial era had been wiped out. Within a brief period more than 40 new flags had appeared, each symbolising independence under an African government. The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, addressing an all-White parliament in Cape Town, warned that South Africa, too, would have to face the “winds of change”.

The National Party government, under Dr H.F. Verwoerd, responded with a programme to expedite the advancement of ‘homelands’ to independent states: the Transkei, the Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, KwaZulu, KwaNdebele, etc. But these units proved to be superficial and led to the wastage of money, effort and time. The requisite momentum economically, politically and culturally to make it work, was absent. The bulk of the Black population was already living outside the homelands in the ‘White’ cities, towns and farms. Those who could escape ‘influx control’ measures did so in growing numbers and those who remained in the rural areas, aspired to migrate to where the bright lights were.

In March 1966, the National Party under Verwoerd won 126 out of 166 seats in the parliamentary elections with the support of 58 percent of the votes cast – including a substantial share of the English vote. On 6th September 1966, Dr Verwoerd was assassinated on the floor of the House of Assembly by a parliamentary messenger, Dimitrio Tsafendas. It could 89

be said that Verwoerd’s attempts to transform ‘apartheid’ policies to resemble a form of de- colonisation – instead of mere racial segregation – was intended to be a contribution to help his White supporters to think less in terms of biological race issues and more about the different ethnic communities finding a way to co-exist. Dr. Verwoerd often spoke of his vision of a South African Commonwealth of Nations in which the various population groups would co-exist in separate, independent states in a spirit of good neighbourliness (‘buurskap’) founded on two principles: political independence and economic interdependence – similar to the system which Europe, at the time, was in the process of attempting. But, like others, Dr Verwoerd clearly did not have a firm understanding of demographic and economic realities.

Winds of Change (1965-1976)

After Dr. Verwoerd’s assassination in 1965, Mr. John Vorster, the former Minister of Justice, became the Prime Minister. He was the architect of the formidable South African security apparatus. Contrary to expectations, Mr. Vorster presided over a period of greater flexibility in internal and external relations. He adopted what was known as an ‘uitwaartse beleid’ (outwardly directed policy) towards South Africa’s neighbours and to countries further north. He maintained that South Africa was in a position to assist its neighbours with capital, trade and technology. One of the first positive responses came from Malawi’s President Hastings Banda. Then followed contracts with the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritius and even Ghana.

Largely due to strict security surveillance, the period until 1976 was relatively calm. Regard must be had to laws passed in 1963 and amended in 1965 which allowed the police to hold a ‘witness’ in preventive detention for 170 days. They could also restrict the movements and activities of individuals by way of ‘house arrests’ or ‘banning’ from certain areas. There was no recourse to a court of law in respect of the application of these penalties.

These measures earned South Africa the label of ‘police state’, but for most citizens South African life continued to be relatively peaceful. The general standards of living – including those of Blacks – were comparatively high. South Africa’s economy continued to thrive remarkably well. The many industries continued to expand as gold, coal, manganese, chromium, platinum and diamond production continued to climb. From 1960 to 1970 the gross national product increased at an annual rate of around 6 percent.

The intra-White political scene also reflected a changing mood. Within the Afrikaans-speaking community a divide started to show between ‘Verligtes’ (enlightened) and ‘Verkramptes’ (ultra- conservatives). The Verligtes were those who propagated more rapid change in race relations. The majority of English speakers sided with the Verligtes. Gradually rigidity in race relations policies started to make way for more flexibility and pragmatism. In public debates more voices were heard of the need to adapt to new realities and circumstances that could not be dealt with in doctrinal terms. ‘Petty apartheid’ measures of a segregationist nature started to disappear. The various races started to mingle unrestrained in most walks of life: in streets, shopping centres, hotels, restaurants and group area restrictions were increasingly left unenforced. Even multi-racial cricket and rugby teams made their appearance. Laws which remained on the statute books were no longer applied: job reservation, residential segregation, industrial strike 90

action. Wage gaps between Whites and others started to narrow. Black faces started to appear in South African embassies abroad. Multi-racial interaction became common place.

These developments met disapproval from right-wing National Party members. In 1969 Albert Hertzog left the NP to found the ‘Herstigte Nasionale Party’. Neither the new party nor the ‘Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging’ (AWB) formed in 1973 by Eugene Terreblanche, managed to win any seats in Parliament. They remained marginal, extremist factions. This outcome indicated the growing influence of the new generation of Afrikaner intellectuals who took a pro- reform stance against the hardliners. In the 1974 election the Progressives jumped from one seat to seven, including an academic from Stellenbosch, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, a typical example of a new generation of Afrikaners.

On the White political front new policy platforms made their appearance: the Progressive Party which broke away from the United Party in 1959 at first only had one representative in Parliament, Mrs. Helen Suzman. By 1975, the Progressive Party managed to attract more dissident members from the United Party and formed the Progressive Reform Party with 13 of the Assembly’s 171 seats. The new party advocated a federal structure for South Africa based on a multi-racial franchise restricted by educational and income qualifications. They proposed a constitution defining the rights of all citizens and a Supreme Court ensuring the protection of those rights and the rights of minorities.

The political progress of the Bantustans proved to be more problematic than anticipated. Transkei was the first territory to gain independence in 1971 and was followed by several others: Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. A further six Bantustans – KwaZulu, Kwa-Ndebele, Lebowa, Gazankulu, KaNgwane and Qwaqwa – remained self-governing territories.

The ‘outwards policy’ of Prime Minister Vorster also started to explore new venues. In October 1974, Mr. Vorster extended an invitation to African leaders to consider the feasibility of a detente which could end the escalation of violence in the South African region. Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, responded positively and a meeting, the historic Bridge Conference, was held in August 1975, to discuss the future of Rhodesia. At this conference, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, accepted the principle of the transfer of power to the Black population within two years. Mr. Vorster also reaffirmed South Africa’s opposition to communist infiltration in Southern Africa. In this stance, he was supported by Dr. Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State. Mr. Vorster also paid visits to the Ivory Coast, France, Paraguay, Israel, Iran and others.

During the early 1970s, Mr. Vorster was facing increasing disunity in the National Party caucus on the constitutional position of the Coloured population. The National Party’s own organisational structure was based on federal principles which meant that each province had its own leadership and policy-making structure within which the Transvaal usually took a much sterner ‘hardline’ position on most issues compared to the Cape and the other provinces. The Transvaal faction began to question the Cape faction’s interpretation of ‘parallel’ development for Coloureds and Indians which implied that ‘parallel’ lines ultimately fused. The Transvalers insisted that a ‘separate homeland’ should be envisaged for the Coloured population. The Cape 91

faction argued that such an objective was unattainable and inappropriate. This schism was also reflected by the positions taken by Transvaal members of Mr. Vorster’s Cabinet.

On 23 March, 1973, the State President acting on advice of Mr. Vorster’s Cabinet, appointed a Commission of Inquiry tasked to undertake a comprehensive investigation into the position of the Coloured Population in all spheres of life with special reference to ‘hindrances in the different fields which can be identified as obstacles’ (translated in Afrikaans as ‘knelpunte’). The composition of the Commission included Prof. Erica Theron, a retired Professor of Sociology of the University of Stellenbosch, as Chairperson, 16 respected members of the Coloured and White communities and three Stellenbosch-based professors to do most of the spade work: Prof. J. B. du Toit (Sociologist) as Secretary to the Commission, Prof. S. J. Terreblanche (Economist) to act as Convener of the Economics and Labour ‘Working Party’ (‘Werkgroep’) and Prof. W. B. Vosloo (Political Scientist) to act as Convener of the Government and Administration ‘Working Party’ (‘Werkgroep’). The Commission collected its evidence by way of questionnaires, official documents, written submissions, local visits and inspections, commissioned research by academics and experts as well as hearing confidential oral evidence.

After three years the ‘Theron Commission’ completed its Report on 9 April 1976. Of the 22 chapters, 6 chapters were prepared by Prof. S. J. Terreblanche dealing with Socio-Economic issues, while 7 chapters were prepared by Prof. W. B. Vosloo, dealing with ‘Statutory’ and ‘Political’ issues. In the chapter named ‘Political Perspectives’, Prof. W. B. Vosloo, the author of this manuscript, wrote, inter alia, that: “The socio-economic development and rising expectations of the other population groups (i.e. Coloureds, Indians and Blacks) have resulted in their laying claim increasingly to a more effective political say, and they will continue to do so. This implies that the present position of overall control exercised by the Whites over the other population groups cannot and ought not to be maintained indefinitely ... No regime can survive in the long run if it is not acceptable to the decisive majority of the population. An unacceptable regime loses its basis of legitimacy and can eventually be maintained only by the use of instruments of power.” (See paragraph. 21.2(d) of the Theron Commission Report, p.463)

In the light of the opposition of the vast and effective majority of the Coloured population to the existing dispensation and in view of its inherent constitutional anomalies as well as the necessity “... of a constitutional structure in the Republic of South Africa which would as far as possible satisfy the requirements of stability, acceptability, efficiency and justice, it is necessary to consider a number of radical constitutional adjustments as a matter of urgent public interest.” (See op.cit., paragraphs 21.35, 21.36 and 21.37)

In the last of 178 recommendations, the Commission made a recommendation that played a significant ‘kick-start role’ in the subsequent constitutional evolution of South Africa. Recommendation 178 states, inter alia, that “... with a view to the implementation of the proposal above, a committee of experts be appointed to make more detailed proposals in regard to the organisational and statutory adjustments required ... (and that) in the process of constitutional adjustments it be accepted that the existing Westminster system of government will have to be changed to adapt it to the requirements peculiar to the South African plural population structure.” (See, op.cit., paragraph 178, p.519) 92

Despite the rather subdued formulation of these main findings and recommendations, they still evoked dissent from seven members of the Commission who felt it necessary to record their own conclusions and recommendations. They could not be persuaded to face reality.

The day before the Commission’s report was finalised, Proff. Terreblanche and Vosloo were invited by the Prime Minister for ‘afternoon coffee’ at his official residence in Cape Town, Grootte Schuur. They were courteously met by Mr. Vorster, who without much ado, asked what the critical findings of the Commission were. Prof. Terreblanche started with an explanation of how the Coloured population was hampered and obstructed by being saddled with a ‘culture of poverty’. But Mr. Vorster soon interrupted, saying that he understood reasonably well how poverty stood in the way of development and that he was more interested to find out how a way out of this dilemma could be found. He then asked Prof. Vosloo “what have you found?” Prof. Vosloo briefly told him that the current constitutional arrangements had reached a ceiling that could not be removed by any amount of tinkering. When Mr. Vorster asked “what can be done”, Prof. Vosloo responded by saying that the current separate institutions could at most be continued as platforms for community-directed decision making, but that common, national issues had to be decided on common representative platforms. Mr. Vorster was visibly disappointed saying that if we did not have anything more substantial to recommend, he and Mr. P. W. Botha (leader of the Cape section of the NP caucus) could have handled the matter simply by a decision restoring a few Coloured representatives in Parliament.

When the Theron Commission Report was finally formally handed over to Mr. Smit, the Cabinet Minister responsible for Coloured Affairs, it was 15 June, 1976, the day before major riots erupted in Soweto near Johannesburg. The process of constitutional change had entered a new phase.

The author of this manuscript was often asked why he had not endeavoured to submit more detailed recommendations for constitutional change in the Theron Commission Report. His answer invariably was that it would have been a futile exercise. Constitutional change required a more inclusive process. It could not be achieved by separate negotiations between Whites and Coloureds, leaving aside not only the Indians, but the vast majority of Blacks. You cannot perform ‘Hamlet’ with the role of Hamlet left out.

The 1976 Soweto Uprising

Anti-apartheid opposition was particularly strong on the English-language university campuses. The National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) was the most radical voice in society, but not radical enough for some Black students who founded the all-Black South African Students’ Organisation (SASO) under the leadership of Steve Biko. Influenced by the American ‘Black Power’ movement, Biko and his followers developed a ‘Black Consciousness’ (BC) ideology, embracing African, Indian and Coloured students – asserting Black values, Black pride and a Black challenge to all things with a ‘White’ tinge. By 1972, SASO was at the height of its influence and power and it made anything associated with ‘Blackness’ fashionable among the younger urban generation of Blacks. A year later a network of regional youth organisations was formed under the South African Students Movement (SASM), spreading its influence among 93

schoolchildren. Clashes and boycotts started to break out at Black universities, such as Turfloop, Fort Hare and Zululand. Biko and some of his friends were given ‘banning’ orders. Many of the ‘drop-outs’ at the Black universities found teaching jobs in urban schools, including those in Soweto.

In May 1976, SASM held a conference at which the teaching of Afrikaans in schools was denounced. The Afrikaans language was portrayed as a symbol of oppression. On 13 June, 1976, a SASO branch at a Soweto school decided to demonstrate against Afrikaans. An Action Committee was formed under a final-year student, Tsietsi Mashinini, and on the morning of 16 June, thousands of Soweto schoolchildren converged to march towards Orlando Stadium. Police attempted to disperse them, failed and shots were fired. A twelve-year old schoolboy, Hector Petersen, was killed. The uprising spread to several other urban areas and continued for almost a year. By late February 1977, more than 600 people were dead, the majority being schoolchildren. During the riots administrative buildings were burned, ‘collaborators’ with the regime were hounded out and their homes torched. Funerals of victims were turned into protest demonstrations. Municipal beer halls were forced to close and shebeens were smashed. Pictures of the killed youths were shown by the media across the world and became the symbol of the 1976 Soweto uprising.

As a sequence to the Soweto uprising, Steve Biko was arrested on 18 August 1977 and died on 11 September 1977 in Pretoria Central Prison after being beaten in police custody. By October 1977 all BC organisations were banned. Many young men and women fled abroad where they were welcomed by the ANC and PAC cadres. (R. W. Johnson, South Africa – the First Man, the Last Nation, op.cit., pp.163-165)

The Unravelling and Fall of Apartheid (1976-1985)

The year 1976 marks the beginning of a severely troublesome period for the South African government, for its supporters and for society at large. The march of African nationalism stood at South Africa’s doorstep in Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Third world countries predominated the proceedings of the United Nations General Assembly, the Commonwealth and other international organisations. The Liberation Committee set up by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) set up camps for refugees from South Africa and provided them with insurgency and military training. The Soviet Union, China and their allies championed the third world countries against Western imperialism and supplied arms to resistance movements in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia. When the Portuguese left Angola in 1975, the Soviet Union armed and transported Cuban troops to help the MPLA against its rivals. The communist powers also had close links with the ANC and were the main suppliers of arms for military and guerrilla activities. The ANC included communists in its ranks and leadership structure.

The bastion of South Africa’s power and influence was its economy. It was a major producer of a range of valuable minerals: gold, diamonds, platinum, chromium, manganese, copper, iron, uranium, zinc, phosphates, vanadium and coal. South Africa was known to contain vast reserves of those minerals. The South African economy was attractive to British, American, German, French and also Japanese interests. South Africa had developed from an agriculture and mining based economy in 1910 to an economy much stronger in both the agricultural and the industrial 94

sectors in 1950. During this period the GDP increased from £130 million to £1,240 million. During the 1960s, South Africa experienced unprecedented growth levels of 7.4 percent in 1963 and 7.9 percent in 1964. By 1970 growth levels had declined to 5.7 percent, in the 1970s to an average of 3.4 percent and in the 1980s to an average of 1.6 percent.

By 1978, South Africa’s economic boom had come to an end. Inflation was running at over 10 percent. There was a shortage of skilled labour and a net emigration of Whites. New investments declined sharply.

The performance of the homelands was disappointing. No foreign government recognised the independence of Transkei, Bophuthatswana or Ciskei. The homelands with their client rulers were corrupt, inefficient and costly. The Black inhabitants of these territories continued to flock to White cities and farms to seek employment. The Black townships around the major cities became seedbeds of disorder and violence.

In 1977 the United Nations had passed a mandatory embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. American Black activists were beginning to espouse the cause of Black South Africans. As a participant in the US-SA Leadership Exchange Program, the author of this manuscript encountered severe hostility on American campuses and particularly at a meeting organised by the American League of Women Voters at the Yale University campus in 1977. Across the world, South Africans experienced the pressure of isolation campaigns.

After the Soweto uprising in 1976, the ANC’s international standing was enhanced. Oliver Tambo was invited to address the United Nations in 1977, a year which also saw a new wave of MK bomb blasts and guerrilla clashes with security forces. At the time Robben Island prisoners enjoyed improved conditions and could communicate freely with one another. The new, larger exile generation appeared to be less educated than the old one and critical disciplinary problems appeared at their military camps, such as the notorious Quatro, in Angola, which had been infiltrated by criminal gangs and plagued by tribal and factional conflict.

In the early 1980s, the ANC’s popularity within South Africa was enhanced by sabotage operations at Sasolburg, Secunda and at the Koeberg nuclear plant. Bombs exploded in Pretoria and Durban, targeting and killing civilians. These events created a climate of tension and insecurity.

The trade unions gradually acquired a more militant posture. In the late 1970s, two government appointed commissions led by P. J. Riekert and N. E. Wiehahn looked into the position of African organised labour and its involvement in collective bargaining. Riekert recommended that urbanised workers be allowed to stay in the towns permanently with their families. This meant that urban workers were no longer to be regarded as temporary migrant workers, but as a stable group living in ‘White’ South Africa. Thereafter Wiehahn recommended that African workers be allowed to join or form any trade union. In practice it meant formalising the already standardised practice that employers had to negotiate wages with organised Africans.

In 1981 the Labour Relations Amendment Act was passed allowing racially mixed unions. Thereafter Black union membership progressed very rapidly and there was a surge in strike 95

activity with the unions now acting more clearly as the voice of the unenfranchised Black majority. The Riekert and Wiehahn reports were, in effect, a death blow to apartheid. Once Black workers were given the right of permanent residence outside the homelands and to collective bargaining, it was but a small step to the acquisition of full citizenship.

By 1986 African trade unions had dues-paying membership of over one million, spread between two national federations: the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the Council of Unions of South Africa affiliated with the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (CUSA- AZACTU). These two federations not only gave Black workers experience in democratic organisation, but were also sources of worker power. The increasingly militant unions became a central force in the struggle for power in South Africa.

The Information Scandal

In 1978 the National Party government was seriously tainted by scandal. It was revealed that members of the government had misappropriated public funds earmarked for secret propaganda purposes. The scandal tainted cabinet ministers and reflected badly on the Prime Minister, John Vorster. On 28 September 1978, Vorster resigned and the parliamentary members of the NP elected P. W. Botha as their leader and hence as successor to Vorster.

The scandal which brought Mr. Vorster’s career to such an ingloriously abrupt end, originated in Dr. Connie Mulder’s Information Department. This department had been built over several years into a fiefdom of extraordinary proportions on the grounds that a better international image was vital to the country’s survival. This department consumed large amounts of money and had information officers in every embassy abroad. The Auditor-General revealed substantial irregularities in the finances of the Ministry of Information. The Information Scandal became known as Muldergate in the popular press. It appeared that Mulder’s department under directorship of the Rhoodie brothers spent large sums to buy favourable coverage for South Africa in the Western media and to bribe British politicians. In South Africa it launched an English-language paper, The Citizen. It was revealed that exchange control regulations had been broken and it was also claimed that substantial sums of public money had ended up in private pockets. The leakage of this information to the press – even before a proper investigation could begin – forced Mr. Vorster to step down and seriously damaged Dr. Mulder’s reputation and ambitions to become the President. A subsequent investigation into the scandal exonerated Mr. Vorster, but not Dr. Mulder, who thereafter quit politics.

It is certainly a big stain on the reputation of the Vorster government that corrupt elements in its ranks were allowed to squander and loot the South African public’s assets. Large amounts of unaccounted funds spent not only on information services, but also on defence, Black homelands, sanctions busting and a myriad of scams used to divert funds from their alleged use to private accounts in places like Switzerland. (See Martin Plant, “Crime, Corruption and Connections” in Plant and Holden, Who Rules South Africa, Biteback Publishing, London, 2012, pp.271-272)

Martin Plant quotes Judge Victor Hiemstra, speaking at a conference on Public Sector Ethics in 1989 as declaring that: 96

“There is a strange atmosphere in the land, as if people have no faith in the future and consequently want, as soon as possible, to make as much money as possible. By the time they are discovered, so they reason, the whole affair would have collapsed anyway ... an atmosphere of let us eat, drink and be merry for tomorrow we die.” (Plant, op.cit., p.272)

This ignominious turn of events during the final decade of National Party rule, illustrates the validity of the dictum that the end never justifies the means. But P. W. Botha had surrounded himself with a coterie of security and military technocrats in the National Security Council. Faced with a steady border war in Namibia, endless civil disorder in the townships, his ‘total strategy’ against the liberation movements required a ‘national security state’ which gave carte blanche to operatives tasked to ‘save the ship’. In this process the normal decision making apparatus like the NP caucus and the Cabinet was downgraded or sidelined. Botha believed that South Africa now faced a state of acute and permanent crisis as a result of the ‘total onslaught’ against it mounted by communist and radical forces. (See R.W. Johnson, op.cit., p.178) In this crisis atmosphere some misguided eager beavers and opportunists could literally get away with murder.

P. W. Botha’s Reforms (1978-1986)

On the constitutional front, another train of events and modifications brought about a totally new political ball game in South Africa. Following the recommendations of the Theron Commission in 1976, Premier Vorster delegated the task of setting up structures to initiate changes in the existing representative legislative structures to the leader of the national party in the Cape Province, Mr. P. W. Botha, the Minister of Defence. Botha set up a committee which proposed the setting up of a three-parliament system: one each for Whites, Coloureds and Indians. Legislation of matters pertaining to ‘common interests’ was to be presented for consideration to a ‘Council of Ministers’ with the State President at its head. The President himself would be elected by representatives of all three parliaments (although the Whites would have over half of the votes in the electoral college). In this scheme of things, Africans would have no participation. This plan was presented to the electorate during the 1977 general election and the NP was returned with a record majority. But implementation of the reform was postponed.

When P. W. Botha succeeded Vorster as Prime Minister he systematically re-opened the issue of constitutional change. As a first step he abolished the existing ineffectual second chamber, the Senate, replacing it with the President’s Council, an appointed advisory body of White, Coloured and Indian members. Then following successful results in the 1981 general elections, Botha proceeded with preparations for the proposed scheme: a tricameral parliament combined with an executive presidency.

The reforms proposed by Botha alienated a significant part of his traditional support group, the conservative Afrikaners. One of his colleagues, Dr. A. P. Treurnicht became appalled by Botha’s departure from what he considered as Verwoerdian orthodoxy and moved a vote of no confidence in Botha, which he lost. He then quit the National Party and founded the Conservative Party (CP) which was soon joined by the disgraced Dr. Connie Mulder.

A Whites only referendum was held in 1983 which was also backed by the English-speaking community. The PFP, now led by Van Zyl Slabbert, opposed the new constitution on the grounds that it was absurd and unconscionable to exclude Africans from the new dispensation. The ANC, from exile, denounced the entire reform effort and vowed vengeance against Coloured and Indian politicians who participated in the system.

The new constitution came into force in 1984. The new tricameral parliament consisted of three uni-racial chambers: a House of Assembly comprising 178 representatives elected by White voters, a House of Representatives of 85 Coloured members elected by Coloured voters, and a House of Delegates of 45 members elected by Indian voters. Accordingly when joint sessions were held, Whites held a clear majority. A multi-racial cabinet drawn from the three chambers became responsible for ‘general affairs’ such as taxation, foreign affairs, defence, state security, law and order, commerce and industry and African affairs. Uni-racial ministers’ councils became responsible for ‘own affairs’, such as education, health and local government. The State President, elected by a college of 50 White, 15 Coloured and 13 Indian members of parliament, appointed the members of the cabinet and ministers’ councils. He could dissolve parliament at any time and he was also empowered to decide which were ‘general’ and which were ‘own’ affairs. The President was also responsible for the control and administration of Black affairs.

For the first time elected representatives who were ‘non-White’, were included in government decision making. But the new constitution was built on the continued exclusion of the fourth (and numerically dominant) racial group, the Blacks. It also introduced a strong presidential system in place of the previous Westminster model of cabinet government.

The first cabinet appointed by P. W. Botha contained one Coloured and one Indian member. In the first elections only 36 percent of registered Coloured voters and 20 percent of registered Indian voters turned out to vote. The new system merely added to the costs of government by adding additional government departments (eg. education, health and welfare) to those already existing in South Africa and its ten homelands. The hidden heavy cost was the further alienation of the Black population.

The urbanisation of Blacks remained a major problem area for the government. Although urbanised Blacks were already exempted from influx control measures, those domiciled in the homelands could only come to the cities as migrant workers on temporary permits. Although thousands of arrests were made for ‘pass law’ offences, it proved to be impossible to stem the tide.

Facing the new realities the government abolished a raft of laws constituting the apartheid system in 1986. It repealed the ‘pass laws’, bans on multi-racial political parties, bans on interracial sex and marriage, the reservation of particular categories of jobs for White workers. It opened up all business centres in the cities to Black traders and desegregated hotels, restaurants, trains, buses and public facilities. The application of Group Area zoning and occupation was abandoned. Even P. W. Botha himself declared that “South Africa had outgrown apartheid”. (See Thompson, op.cit., pp.220-221)

By the end of 1986. The only parts of the old ‘apartheid’ policies that were still in effect referred to public school education (not private schools), the Land Act and the Group Areas Act that excluded Black people from land ownership outside the Homelands and African townships. Squatter camps on the outskirts of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth were still being removed and the army and police were still being used to patrol townships.

Mounting Foreign Pressure

When he took over from B. J. Vorster in 1978, P. W. Botha could still rely on South Africa’s economic strength to exercise a modicum of leverage over much of Southern Africa. The South African Customs Union integrated Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland into the South African economy. The giant Anglo-American Corporation and its subsidiaries dominated the South African economic scene and also exercised considerable influence in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Namibia. South African railroads and ports dominated commodity transport throughout the region and it could control the supply of oil and electricity to its neighbours. In addition, by 1984 South Africa employed around 300,000 migrant workers from other countries in the region. Their remittances constituted an important source of income to South Africa’s neighbours.

L. M. Thompson reports that South African commandos raided and carried out undercover operations against every one of its neighbours. In addition, South African armed forces continued to occupy Namibia and intervened intermittently in the former Portuguese territories, Angola and Mozambique. It provided support to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or RENAMO) – often acting as a proxy for the United States – who were deeply involved in civil wars to gain control of their countries.

The Botha government also benefited from the coming to power of Margaret Thatcher in the UK in 1979 and Ronald Reagan’s serving as President of the United States (1981-1989). Both Thatcher and Reagan opposed the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State under President Reagan, adopted a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ toward South Africa which meant encouraging the South African government to reform apartheid and refraining from supporting the revolutionary ANC. (See L.M. Thompson, op.cit., pp.224-228)

Responding to growing internal and external pressures, NP policies under P. W. Botha’s leadership did become more pragmatic. ‘Petty apartheid’ measures were progressively relaxed or allowed to be eroded. Realities on the ground took a momentum of their own. Population growth in the homelands, without a commensurate growth in job and income opportunities, led to an unstoppable tide of humans flowing towards the cities. Influx control could not contain this desperate human tide and when it was abolished in 1986, “the flood became a torrent”. (See Johnson, op.cit., p.182)

The political events in the homelands were equally problematic – they were ruled by a corrupt system of political patronage, bribery and brutal police force. Ciskei was ruled by a life President, Lennox Sebe, until he was overthrown in a military coup. The Transkei President 99

Kaizer Matanzima, was plagued by unabating infighting until his successor, Stella Sigcau, was ousted by a military coup in 1988, led by General Bantu Holomisa. Bophuthatswana, the most prosperous and led by Lucas Mangope, was dependent on Pretoria to sustain power. Venda, led by Patric Mpephu, never succeeded in becoming an effective political or administrative jurisdiction. KwaZulu, led by Buthelezi, persistently rejected independent status, but his Inkatha organisation remained grounded in ethnic Zulu foundations and could not compete for a more inclusive support base with the ANC. In time his support base was eroded by the ANC onslaught under Jacob Zuma, appealing to Zulu sentiments.

The ANC held a conference at Kabwe, Zambia, in June 1985, to discuss the situation created by the mass action in the townships and the first attempts reportedly made by the South African government to start negotiations. The conference decided that negotiations were out of the question “until apartheid was scrapped or until it was clear that it would be”. Instead, it was resolved to intensify the armed struggle including attacks on “soft targets”. Oliver Tambo, the ANC President, called on the people “to make the country ungovernable”.

The Road to Negotiations and the Transition to Black Majority Rule (1986-1994)

The road to negotiations and the transition to Black majority rule was paved by the combined effect of many factors. It goes without saying that a crucial role was played by the gradual political awakening and mobilisation of Black political consciousness by the ANC, COSATU, the Communist Party and a long list of Black, Coloured and Indian leaders. But equally important are the factors that influenced decision makers on the White side of politics, creating an atmosphere of tolerance for new ideas or policy options. Even specific events enhanced opportunities or directions of change.

Some of these factors include the following: - the escalation of township violence to unacceptable levels of bloodshed and destruction of public assets; - the impact of international isolation, trade sanctions and financial disinvestment; - the role of influential individuals and organisations; - the role of universities over a long period in producing insights, information and trains of thought; - the collapse of the Soviet Union and the presence of the Reagan-Thatcher alliance; - the emancipation of Namibia; - the change of the guard within the National Party with the demise of P.W. Botha; - the release from prison of Nelson Mandela who held the key to progress in finding a negotiated settlement; - transition to Black majority rule.

Each of these factors played their role in a political drama that unfolded concomitantly in several parts.

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Escalating Township Violence

Whereas the government could impose its version of law and order during the 1950s, the 1960s and early 1970s with reasonable success by arresting dissidents and banning militant organisations, such actions failed to have the same effect in the latter part of the 1970s and more so in the 1980s. A resistance and protest culture pervaded the Black population of South Africa. People from all walks of life became involved in the liberation struggle: students and workers, children and adults, men and women, the educated and the uneducated. The liberation message was conveyed by all means and occasions available: newspapers, pamphlets, paintings, radio and television broadcasts, songs, funerals and community gatherings. An increasing number of Whites, young and old, began to identify with the resistance. (Leonard Thompson, op.cit., pp.221-223)

In August 1983, a thousand delegates of all races, representing 575 organisations – trade unions, sporting bodies, community groups and women’s and youth organisations – founded the United Democratic Front (UDF) to co-ordinate internal opposition to the government. The organisers included people like Popo Molefi, Valli Moosa, Terror Lekota, Archie Gumede, Trevor Manuel and Albertina Sisulu. The conference declared its opposition to homeland and group area policies and endorsed the Freedom Charter. It pleaded for a united struggle in which all democrats regardless of race, religion or colour shall take part together as an all-inclusive movement – ‘on the right side of history’.

During the following years vigorous resistance campaigns appeared in many towns and cities across the country: bus boycotts, strikes, stay-away actions, demonstrations – increasingly including violence. From 1984 onwards numerous incidents of sabotage occurred against government offices, petrol depots, power installations, railroad lines, schools, etc. Hundreds of people were killed in such incidents: some by security force action, others by mob action. Violent clashes erupted between township residents and security forces, and attacks on Black police and local councillors were common. The violence was not limited to actions against government installations or representatives, it also spilled over to Black factions, rival criminal gangs and vigilante mobs. Some activists identified with the UDF, others with the more exclusive Black Consciousness movement, the ANC or Inkatha, a movement led by Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Inkatha represented a Zulu ethnic movement, drawing on the Zulu military tradition. In parts of Natal and around Johannesburg in the Transvaal, Inkatha gangs and supporters of the UDF had many violent confrontations and hundreds of combatants were killed.

At this stage it was clear that neither the ANC nor the UDF had full control over happenings on the ground level. The situation in the townships was too anarchic. The practice of ‘necklacing’ persons accused of ‘collaboration’ or being ‘impimpis’ (informers) was sometimes claimed to be encouraged by Winnie Mandela. It meant burning people to death by putting petrol-filled tyres around their necks and igniting them. The unruly township youth associated with these barbaric deeds appeared to be beyond anyone’s control. Both the ANC and UDF leadership denounced the practice but excused it as an expression of the people’s righteous and uncontrollable anger. These acts were often ordained by ‘people’s courts’. Peter Mokaba’s chants of “kill the farmer, kill the Boer” quickly became a popular slogan.

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During the period 1984 to 1989 violence broke out in virtually every city and nearly every homeland. Commuter buses were boycotted when they tried to increase fares, bloody demonstrations ensued whenever local government councils tried to increase rents. School boycotts and bus boycotts often led to violence. By 1986 the formal machinery of local government had broken down in many parts of the Black townships. Many Black councillors resigned, fearing for their safety.

What is often overlooked, is that the cost of the destruction of public assets and the maintenance of the security apparatus had become so prohibitively high that it became unaffordable to the public purse.

International Isolation, Trade and Financial Sanctions

The South African economy slumped into a snowballing decline in the mid-1980s which eventually resulted in about zero growth in 1991. The main reason for this continuous economic stagnation lies in the concerted efforts in the international arena to isolate South Africa by the imposition of trade embargoes and financial sanctions in the form of freezing loan facilities and capital disinvestment. The relatively open South African economy could hardly survive international isolation, but to be deprived of export markets and to be faced with effective disinvestment campaigns, was tantamount to suffocation of the whole economy. South Africa suffered a serious lack of foreign reserves to pay for imports and a serious investment gap to keep the economy growing. South Africa, in effect, suffered a development gap.

The process of isolating South Africa took on a growing momentum when in 1975 the Portuguese finally departed from Angola and Mozambique. Then in 1980, Ian Smith’s Rhodesia came to an end with the emergence of independent Zimbabwe under Mugabe in 1980. In 1982 the UN General Assembly proclaimed an International Year of Mobilisation of Sanctions against South Africa. In South Africa, the anti-apartheid violence reached a climax in the years 1984-86. In Angola, UNITA supported by South Africa and the USA, waged war against the MPLA, supported by Cuba and the USSR. Three attempts at the United Nations to impose mandatory sanctions on South Africa – in 1985, 1987 and 1988 – were vetoed by Britain and the USA, while France abstained. Altogether there were 45 Western vetoes on South African questions between 1974 and 1988.

Britain had always been the principal source of investment in South Africa and remained so throughout the apartheid years. Its policy was to protect its trade, investments and loan finance; to maintain access to South Africa’s strategic minerals; and, to prevent the mass exodus of those Whites who qualified for British passports (an estimated 800,000) to Britain. In 1980 there were 1,200 British companies in South Africa as opposed to only 350 from Germany and 340 from the USA. In 1982 British private investment in South Africa amounted to US$6,342 million, that from the USA to US$2,800 million and from Germany US$260 million.

Foreign direct investment in South Africa began to tail off following the Soweto riots of 1976, forcing South Africa to increase its foreign borrowing. During the 1980s the disinvestment trend increased, particularly among US companies. Between 1985 and 1989, an estimated more than 500 foreign companies sold their South African holdings and 132 British transnationals did 102

disinvest and another 16 reduced their equity interest. Britain provided approximately 40 percent of all foreign investment - around 80 percent of the European Community total. (See Arnold, op.cit., p.728)

By the end of 1985, disinvestment by American state and local governments had led to US$4,5 billion being withdrawn from companies still involved in South Africa. Then in late 1986, additional sanctions were imposed by Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Scandinavian countries. In 1987 Sweden and Norway imposed full trade embargoes. In October 1986, the US Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, over the President’s veto, to ban new investments, bank loans, to end US-South African air links and to prohibit a range of South African imports. In the six years before the end of 1990, the total net capital outflow amounted to R29.3 billion. The average annual growth rate of the gross national product declined to less than 1 percent. The South African government had run out of viable options.

The Role of Influential Leaders and Organisations

By the mid-1980s a growing number of influential persons in the Afrikaner community came to the conclusion that something drastic had to be done about the emerging internal and external crisis. The domestic violence continued to grow unabated and there was a growing external tide to impose punitive sanctions against South Africa. Various influential individuals in the cultural, religious and economic fields took the initiative to prepare urgent submissions for presentation to the State President. Dr Anton Rupert invited Dr. Jan Steyn, Chief Executive of the Urban Foundation, and Dr. W.B. Vosloo, Chief Executive of the Small Business Development Corporation, to assist in the preparation of a confidential submission to P.W. Botha. At a meeting held at Court House, Johannesburg, a letter was drafted highlighting the urgency of establishing effective political representation for Black citizens as a sine quo non for the survival of White persons in South Africa. The expectation was that P.W. Botha would use a forthcoming National Party Conference in Durban to announce a far-reaching reform initiative. Around the country and possibly also in other parts of the world, expectations were high – but P.W. Botha was not for turning.

At his party meeting on 15 August, 1985, P.W. Botha announced that his government had decided “to cross the Rubicon” – but his speech became a symbol of a lost opportunity – it did not even remotely meet even modest expectations. He literally stuck to his guns and announced that he was not prepared to lead South Africa’s Whites on a road of abdication and suicide. He reconfirmed that Mandela and his friends could only be allowed out of prison if they agreed to renounce violence. The consequence was that a new round of sanctions was proposed which, in turn, provoked more disinvestment. The Chase Manhattan Bank in New York decided to call in a substantial loan to South Africa. Other banks followed suit – refusing to roll over their loans. The result was a collapse in the value of the Rand – falling by 35 percent in 13 days. This collapse had the effect of multiplying South Africa’s foreign debt more than threefold. As capital continued to flow out, the economic growth rate continued to sag, inflation rose to double figures. The South African economy could not sustain itself without foreign trade and investment.

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Soon after P.W. Botha’s Rubicon speech, members of the European Union came under pressure to terminate the import of South African minerals. In response, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Italy (the ‘Troika’), visited South Africa to insist on radical reform. Their meeting with P.W. Botha resulted in a disastrous confrontation but the South African Foreign Affairs department tried to save the day with the presentation of the ‘Westbrook Manifesto’ – a document intended to stave off the intensification of EU boycott action.

By the mid 1980s the ideological foundations of the apartheid policy started to crumble when the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), a major powerhouse of Afrikaner thinking at the time, passed a Synod resolution in 1986 to the effect that membership of the Church would be open to all people, irrespective of race or colour. The Church even formally confessed that it had previously erred in this regard. Even the Afrikaner Broederbond, the inner bastion of Afrikanerdom, circulated a memorandum in 1986 to its branches entitled ‘Basic Political Conditions for the Survival of the Afrikaner’ which mooted the idea that the exclusion of Blacks from the central decision making level, in itself constituted a threat to Afrikaner survival in South Africa. (See H. Giliomee, Die Laaste Afrikanerleiers, Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2012, p.261)

In September 1989 a deputation of South African business leaders under leadership of Gavin Relley, chairman of Anglo American Corporation, visited Lusaka to meet foreign-based ANC leaders, Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki. A year later Pieter de Lange, chairman of the Afrikaner Broederbond, met with Thabo Mbeki, the ANC information director in New York. Then in August 1987 a group of 61 White South Africans, led by Van Zyl Slabbert, former leader of the Progressive Federal Party, went to Dakar, Senegal, where they held talks with 17 members of the ANC. The Dakar session culminated in a joint communiqué expressing unanimous support for a negotiated settlement.

The Role of Universities

South African universities left a deep footprint on development patterns in South Africa. As a result of the peculiar historically moulded cultural pattern, each university was embedded in that cultural pattern in its own unique way.

The English university tradition was mainly represented by the universities of Cape Town, Witwatersrand (Wits), Grahamstown (Rhodes) and Natal. Over the years it produced a long list of scholars who played a major role as bearers of the liberal academic tradition: G.M. Theal, A.H. Murray, Guy Butler, L.M. Thompson, D. Hammond-Tooke, O. Horwood, D.J. Worrall and D. Welsh. These universities also produced a multitude of professionals in the fields of medicine, law, accounting and teaching both in White and other communities. As the medium of instruction was English, scores of Black, Coloured and Indian scholars graduated at the English-medium universities and became prominent members in public and professional life. By far the largest component of South Africans and many Africans elsewhere on the continent graduated from the University of South Africa, one of the largest correspondence universities in the world.

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Lovedale College and the University of Fort Hare are both famous as producers of South Africa’s first westernised and educated African elite. Lovedale College, which is situated near King Williams Town, was set up by the Free Church of Scotland and counts Seretse Khama of Botswana and Thabo Mbeki, later President of South Africa, amongst its students. The University of Fort Hare played a much larger role in the whole of Southern Africa. The most notable among its former students include Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, Robert Sobukwe, Kaiser Matanzima, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Tshekedi Khama of Botswana, Elind Mathu of Kenya and Herbert Chitepo of Zimbabwe.

The Afrikaans universities included Stellenbosch, Pretoria, Potchefstroom and Bloemfontein. These universities were established with financial and cultural support from the Afrikaans- speaking community and offered instruction in the Afrikaans language. Stellenbosch University produced most Prime Ministers in the ‘old’ South Africa including Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog, Genl. J.C. Smuts, Dr. D.F. Malan, Mr. J.G. Strijdom, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd and Mr. B.J. Vorster. Numerous Afrikaans-speaking professionals were educated at these universities as well as many scholars and intellectuals. Afrikaans universities maintained a close connection with the Continental tradition of scholarship, especially the Dutch, German and French traditions, although many Afrikaans-speaking academics were educated at British, American and Scandinavian universities. Although many university educated persons played significant leadership roles in the South African society, the Afrikaans-speaking intelligentsia played a crucial role in shaping the climate of opinion that ultimately enabled and facilitated the remarkably peaceful transition to Black majority rule.

The first major challenge by Afrikaans academics to the National Party policies came in 1955 from a group of professors at Pretoria University. They challenged the removal of Coloured voters from the voters roll. They issued a widely publicised petition. The signatories included Proff. J.N.N. Cloete (Political Studies), E.F.W. Gey van Pittius (Political Studies), Ben Marais (Theology), F.P. Pistorius (Classical Languages), W.A. Kleynhans (Political Studies) and A. Schlebusch (Psychology). Soon afterwards, senior students of the University of Pretoria established the ‘Pretoria Political Study Group’ with the objective of providing a non-partisan forum for the discussion of political issues. The steering committee consisted of H. Serfontein (later journalist), J.C. Kriegler (later Judge) and W.B. Vosloo (later Political Science Professor). Guest speakers were recruited from all shades of opinion including Albert Luthuli (ANC Leader), Dr. Naidoo (NIC Leader), Helen Suzman (Progressive Party Leader), Prof. F.R. Tomlinson and other representatives from a wide spectrum of opinion. Meetings were well attended and paved the way for new directions in the political culture of Pretoria.

The second major challenge to the National Party political establishment came from Stellenbosch University. Proff. S.P. Celliers (Sociology), N.J. Olivier (Anthropology) and J.L. Sadie (Economics), all members of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) initiated a nationwide debate questioning the practical obstacles to the implementation of the policy of separate development. Their initiative was soon followed by the establishment of informal campus-based discussion groups. The modus operandi was to include around 12 informally invited participants at ‘off-the-record’ monthly meetings to discuss current issues with a ‘problem-solving’ frame of mind. Guest speakers included prime ministers, cabinet ministers, business leaders, newspaper editors and religious leaders. The campus participants included 105

academics (some affiliated to political parties or even the Broederbond, but most participants were noted for independent mindedness) who played significant roles as authors, TV commentators and public speakers: Proff. W. Esterhuyzen, W. Jonker, A.H. van Wyk, H. Giliomee, S.J. Terreblanche, H. Rossouw, J. Jeppe, W.B. Vosloo, E. Theron, J.J. Degenaar and F.W. van Zyl Slabbert. Some participants occupied more prominent positions in public life at a later stage.

The influence of the academics was filtered through opinion leaders, civic associations, the media and publications: asking questions, challenging existing orthodoxies and opening up new avenues of thought. Inputs were made in a piece-meal, gradual fashion, encompassing different perspectives which could not be easily ignored. Today there are many people or movements claiming credit for the changes that took place in South Africa. There are many contributing and triggering factors, initiatives and events. Crucial amongst these, were the many inputs by the intelligentsia which contributed to a receptive climate of opinion for policy change and reform.

The Implosion of the Soviet Union in the face of the Reagan-Thatcher Alliance

Gorbachev’s accession to power in the USSR was the first sign that the Russians were eager to end the Cold War with the West. He indicated in his meetings with President Reagan and with Margaret Thatcher that he was willing to co-operate with the West in solving common problems.

As far as Southern Africa was concerned, the first step was to work with the West to find a solution in Angola and Namibia. A deal was reached that the Cubans and South Africans should both leave Angola and that South Africa should withdraw its troops from Namibia. Preparations for elections and Namibian independence were quickly under way.

These events had complimentary effects in that it deprived the liberation movements of their main sources of support. They also removed the concerns on the part of South Africa that the communists were aiming to get a foothold in South Africa as they did elsewhere on the continent. Both sides in the South African conflict now had an interest in solving these problems peacefully and democratically. It became increasingly evident that the South African government could not maintain White supremacy indefinitely. At the same time it was also apparent that the liberation movement could not muster enough effective power to overthrow the NP government. A total victory was not possible for either side without causing untold damage to all South Africans.

It should also be realised that the Reagan-Thatcher alliance played a decisive role in the demise of the socialist mindset in general and of communism in particular as an ideological challenge to representative constitutional democracies. The liberation movement was forced to take a new direction in their visions of a new society in South Africa.

Some degree of support from the USA and the UK was crucial for the survival of P.W. Botha’s government after the ‘Rubicon’ fiasco. President Reagan despatched a letter to Botha, dated 6 September 1985, insisting on reform initiatives which would bring representative Black leaders to the negotiation table “to discuss the elimination of all racial discrimination and the political participation of all groups”. Pres. Reagan specifically requested that leaders in 106

detention should be freed and allowed to participate. Pres. Reagan was kept well informed about the South African situation by Dr. Chester Crocker, Assistant-Secretary of State for Africa, an expert on African affairs.

In October 1985, Margaret Thatcher was presented with a demand from members attending a Commonwealth Meeting in Nassau to introduce comprehensive economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa. She then wrote a letter to P.W. Botha requesting the South African government to receive a deputation representing the members of the Commonwealth – the Eminent Persons Group (EPG). The EPG’s seven members included Obasanju from Nigeria and Malcolm Fraser from Australia. The EPG spent four weeks in South Africa and were also given an opportunity to meet with Nelson Mandela. After their visit the EPG prepared a ‘Concept for Potential Negotiations’, setting out draft conditions on which negotiations could be based, which they presented to all parties concerned. It subsequently appeared that there were two crucial sticking points: the question of renouncing violence on the part of the ANC and the question of the acceptance of an open agenda by the NP government. P.W. Botha appeared to be in no mood to accept an open agenda. The EPG initiative was abruptly scuttled when the South African Defence Force (SADF) exercised commando and air attacks on ANC bases in Harare, Lusaka and Gaborone. Each of these cities was a capital of a Commonwealth country and was visited by the EPG. The surprise attacks executed by the SADF came at a heavy price for South Africa - and nails in the coffin of the P.W. Botha government.

During 1988 Margaret Thatcher’s and Ronald Reagan’s governments stepped up their pressure on the South African government to take their reform initiative forward to its inevitable next stage: negotiations involving the effective leaders of Black South Africans. In May 1988 Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, addressing the Royal Commonwealth Society, explicitly declared “... the sooner white South Africans accept the need for negotiation and change, the greater the odds that change will be peaceful and democratic”. When Margaret Thatcher visited South Africa in 1989, she declared “I do not see how, in the modern world, it is possible to achieve political stability except on a basis where all adults have the vote”. For the White South African leadership, the writing on the wall must have been clear for a considerable time.

The Emancipation of Namibia

A part of the drama unfolded in Namibia. The SWAPO insurgency in Namibia led to the deployment of around 20,000 South African military conscripts along the Namibia-Angola border. At this time Angola was deeply riven by its own domestic rivalry between the communist backed MPLA forces and the US and South African backed UNITA forces. The Soviet Union had transported around 30,000 Cuban soldiers to Angola and supplied them with Russian weapons and advisors, including squadrons of Russian piloted MIG fighters. The USA supplied UNITA with arms (however no jet fighters) and implicitly relied on the South Africans to provide back-up support to UNITA forces from their bases in Namibia. In September 1987 major battles took place along the Lomba river, about 200km from the Namibian border inside Angola, whereupon the Cuban-Angolan forces retreated to Cuito-Cuanavale, about a further 200km north into Angola. A fierce battle was fought at Cuito-Cuanavale. These battles were fought between MPLA forces supported by Cubans and Russians on the one side and UNITA forces 107

supported by around 3,000 South African troops on the other. The battles resulted in a stalemate situation, convincing the South African commanders that further confrontation would be costly in terms of sacrificing soldiers’ lives and armaments. It was thought that the South African White electorate would not be prepared to accept a high casualty rate for such a far-off war with dubious benefits to the public interest. The South African commanders were also informed that major negotiations had been under way following a meeting between Pres. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in 1988 regarding the withdrawal of Russian support for the war in Angola and SWAPO’s military insurgency into Namibia.

Subsequent disclosures confirmed that senior South African diplomats were already conducting discussions with Russian representatives in Havana about the cessation of hostilities in Angola and across the Namibian border. Behind the scenes, however, the Soviet Union continued to provide diplomatic status to the ANC and assisted with the financing of ‘Operation Vula’, a secret internal operation within South Africa. In 1989 an election was held in Namibia to establish a constituent constitutional assembly for Namibia. With strong support from the numerically predominant Ovambo tribe, SWAPO prevailed.

The Demise of P.W. Botha

After the failure of his ‘Rubicon’ speech, P.W. Botha’s role took the form of a desperate holding action. In retrospect the significance of that holding action was that it bought some time for the National Party government until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. These events removed an important player in the Southern African strategic arena.

The retention of P.W. Botha in his role as State President came at a considerable cost. According to several accounts of insiders around his office, Botha became impatient and grumpy – and proved to be a liability to his cabinet. According to F.W. de Klerk’s account, progress towards a negotiated constitutional arrangement was hampered at the time by three considerations: the threat of Black domination in any power sharing arrangement; the numerical preponderance of Blacks over all minority groups; and reluctance to negotiate with the ANC in view of their violent track record and close ties with the South African Communist Party.

These matters were extensively debated in sessions of the Special Cabinet Committee, including the position of the State President in any future dispensation: his powers and term of office. Pik Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a public statement that he would be prepared to serve under a Black president. Behind the scenes, the Special Cabinet Committee in interaction with the Department of Constitutional Affairs, were deeply engaged in exploring constitutional options – including across the board representative Black participation in ‘common’ (national) affairs. This policy framework was approved in August 1986 by a special meeting of the National Party’s Federal Congress which was held in Durban. It meant support for joint decision making and power sharing by all population groups in national affairs and protection of community affairs without fear of domination by other groups.

In the general election of May 1987, the National Party obtained a mandate from its voters to proceed with the implementation of a new constitutional dispensation. It meant that the dismantling of the legal structure of apartheid could proceed more rapidly. By 1988 more than 108

100 apartheid laws were formally scrapped: segregated facilities, pass laws, trade union membership, property ownership, multi-racial political parties, mixed marriages, multi-racial sport, local government participation, etc. The only ‘apartheid’ rules remaining on the statute books at the time were the racial classification of the population. Separate residential areas and separate schools were no longer enforced.

(See F.W. de Klerk, Die Laaste Trek – ‘n Nuwe Begin, Human & Rousseau, Kaapstad, 1998, pp.124-129)

At this stage P.W. Botha appeared to split his efforts between maintaining law and order in the townships and winning the hearts and minds of urban Black people. The National Security Council sat at the top of an elaborate National Security Management System (NSMS) which encompassed eleven Joint Management Centres (JMCs) each covering a particular region of the country. Heading this elaborate structure were successive appointees: Adriaan Vlok, then Roelf Meyer and after him, Leon Wessels. The State President served as chairman of the State Security Council which included representatives of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), senior cabinet members, the chiefs of the Defence Force and the Police Force as well as other co-opted members. The meetings of the NIS were dominated by the politicians. (See Giliomee, Die Laaste Afrikanerleiers, Tafelberg, Kaapstad, 2012, p.275)

To bolster his support base amongst the White voters, P.W. Botha called the general election in 1987 in which he obtained 123 seats in parliament against the 27 seats won by the Progressive Federal Party and the Conservative Party (an offshoot of the National Party) won 22 seats. The National Party attracted 59 percent of the Afrikaans speakers’ vote and 43 percent of the English speakers’ vote, but its overall share of the vote fell from 57 percent in 1981 to 52 percent. During this election campaign it became clear that P.W. Botha had reached the ceiling of his flexibility to the incorporation of Blacks into the South African political decision making system. He was trailing behind the younger vanguard of his party supporters. The younger generation was much firmer in their commitment to see positive changes in the political system. P.W. Botha remained unrelenting in his stance to refuse Black South Africans an effective say in the political system. He made his position clear on 18 August, 1988 when, addressing the National Party’s annual congress in Durban, he said that as far as he was concerned “... I’m not even considering the possibility of black majority government in South Africa”. (See L.M. Thompson, op.cit., p.230)

Nelson Mandela’s Release from Prison

The release of Nelson Mandela from prison had been discussed in the upper-echelons of P.W. Botha’s inner circle of advisers at least since the middle 1980s. When Mandela went to hospital in Cape Town for a medical procedure in November 1985, he was visited by Kobie Coetsee, the Minister of Justice. Mandela later wrote in his memoirs that on his return to goal on 23 December 1985, he came to the conclusion that the struggle could best be pursued further by way of dialogue to avoid both sides being thrown into a dark night of oppression and war, that the enemy forces are resolute and strong but that they were on the wrong side of history ... Hence it was time to talk. 109

(See Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: the Autobiography of Nelson Mandela, Randburg, Macdonald Purnell, 1994, pp.512-513)

Early in 1986 Mandela requested Bizos, his legal representative, to pay him a visit in order to discuss how a basis for further discussions could be found and to inform Oliver Tambo in Lusaka about his plans to start negotiations. Coetsee re-visited Mandela again in February 1986, at the time of the EPG visit. In July 1986 Mandela again contacted Kobie Coetsee asking him to arrange further discussions. Mandela was brought to Coetsee’s official residence in Cape Town where a three-hour discussion took place covering ANC policies with regard to the renunciation of violence to guarantees of minority rights. Mandela requested Coetsee to arrange a meeting with President P.W. Botha.

Mandela had to wait two years before he received a response. In May 1988 a committee of four senior officials were tasked by P.W. Botha to conduct secret discussions with Mandela who had by now been moved to the more congenial environment of Pollsmoor Prison in the Cape Peninsula. Between May 1988 and 11 February 1990, 48 meetings took place between Mandela and one or more members of Botha’s special committee particularly with Neil Barnard, the head of National Intelligence.

In these discussions Mandela confirmed that majority government was a non-negotiable condition, but accepted the need to restrain unlimited Black domination in the new dispensation. Attention was also given to the release of all political prisoners, the return of exiles. In December 1988 Mandela was transferred to the Victor Verster Prison, near Paarl, where he was treated as an honoured guest and could entertain guests as well as being provided with an ‘open’ telephone service. (See Giliomee, 2012, op.cit. p.285)

Discussions with Mandela were from then on conducted by Gerrit Viljoen and Kobie Coetsee. He was told that P.W. Botha agreed to the principle that a new constitution could only be legitimised by a process of negotiation and agreement. Both the government and the ANC needed a formula which would enable each side to convince their own support groups to come to the negotiation table.

Mandela again requested a meeting with P.W. Botha but the sticking point remained, Mandela’s refusal to renounce violence. Eventually Botha relented and a meeting took place on 5 July, 1989, in the presidential residence in Cape Town. They did little more than engage in small talk. Botha’s days in power soon came to an end. After he suffered a second stroke, he resigned as State President on 14 August, 1989. (See Giliomee, 2012, op.cit. pp.286-287)

Transition to Black Majority Rule

On 2nd February 1990, the South African President, F.W. de Klerk, announced in the South African Parliament that he had unbanned the ANC and 33 other black political organisations and announced his determination to end the last vestiges of apartheid. A week later Nelson Mandela was released and on 2nd May 1990 the first negotiations with the ANC took place and the 110

dismantling of apartheid entered its final phase. But it took almost another two years before constitutional negotiations could start in earnest.

At this stage it was clear that the homelands, as bases for the creation of Black independent states, were no longer on the political agenda. The homelands had been established under a number of acts from 1951 to the 1971 Bantu Homelands Constitution Act. Four homelands had been declared independent by South Africa: Transkei (26th October 1976), Bophuthatswana (6th December 1977), Venda (13th September 1979) and Ciskei (4th December 1981). None of these had been recognised as independent by the international community. The other six homelands were Lebowa, Gazankulu, KwaZulu, QwaQwa, KwaNdebele and KaNgwane.

In the early communications between Mandela and P.W. Botha, and later with F.W. de Klerk, the question of the Westminster system with its ‘winner-takes-all’ principle was repeatedly raised. Both Botha and De Klerk emphasized the need to protect minority rights by way of recognising ethnicity as a basis for some form of pluralistic representation. ANC spokespersons rejected ethnicity as a building stone for a new dispensation arguing that it would undermine the rights of the majority by maintaining the power of the oppressive minority. Mandela was fully aware that the reconciliation of these opposing positions would be the most critical task in future negotiations and would require both sides to compromise. (Hermann Giliomee, 2012, op.cit., p.334)

During 1990 and much of 1991 the ANC had its hands full to repatriate thousands of exiles and to establish its own local, regional and national support structures. In July 1991 the ANC held its first conference in South Africa in about 30 years. Ever since 1961, a tight clique of about 55 people had laid out ANC policy. Now it faced the challenge to transform a once secret, illegal movement into a mass political party with a broader and more grass-roots connected management. Nelson Mandela was now formally elected as leader with Cyril Ramaphosa, the trade union leader who had built COSATU and was leader of the United Democratic Front, as secretary-general.

In the following years, violent conflict continued between the Zulu-based Inkatha movement led by Buthelezi and the ANC followers in Natal. Thousands were killed in township violence during the period 1990 and 1991. F.W. de Klerk, assisted by Dr Gerrit Viljoen (a former Professor of Classical Languages) as Minister of Constitutional Affairs, played a decisive role to persuade the White electorate to accept a dramatic paradigm shift in the South African political evolution. He decided to negotiate a peaceful political settlement, while he still controlled the instruments of power to ensure that the process of constitutional change could proceed in an orderly way.

De Klerk and Viljoen advocated power-sharing as a better alternative than either White rule or simple majority rule. In the words of Gerrit Viljoen “… The government does not question that the majority has to govern but does ask whether stability and nation-building – especially in a plural society – can be served best by a majority that rules on its own”. Various surveys showed that the White elite supported, by a wide margin, a mutually acceptable settlement with the ANC as participant. The ANC insisted on a majority based presidential government within a unitary state. Nelson Mandela, who had by now become an international celebrity, held the effective veto power over all constitutional sticking points. 111

In December 1991 an all-party conference, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) met in Johannesburg with representatives of 19 political organisations, including the government. It was boycotted by extreme groups: on the White side by the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and on the Black side by the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). Buthulezi allowed an IFP delegation to take part, but declined to do so himself. The world community indicated willingness to ease sanctions against South Africa.

In the plenary session on the first day, 17 of the delegates endorsed a ‘Declaration of Intent’, setting out the basic components of an interim constitution. It was to provide for universal suffrage, a Bill of Rights including civil and political rights, an independent judiciary with the power to declare legislation invalid, the elimination of the homeland governments and the incorporation of their territories into a new set of provinces. (See L. Thompson, 2001, op.cit., p.245)

Although De Klerk and his chief negotiator, Tertius Delport, endorsed the Declaration of Intent in principle, they insisted on the need to prevent Black domination through the ANC. Drawing on the work of Arend Lijphart, an American political scientist and other authors promoting the idea of pluralist accommodation in heterogeneous societies, the National Party argued that political power in the New South Africa should be shared. Leaders of the two or three most successful parties should take turns as president. The cabinet should include members of those parties and cabinet and parliamentary decisions should require the support of two-thirds or more of their total membership. The Bill of Rights should protect racial and ethnic groups as well as individuals. Power should also be divided between central and provincial governments. The constitution itself should be rigid – extremely difficult to amend. De Klerk was hoping that he could keep the power of the majority in check. But Mandela knew he had numbers on his side and refused to make any concessions to minority groups.

In March 1992, De Klerk asked the White electorate in a referendum, “Do you endorse the continuation of the reform process … which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiations?” With a turnout of 87 percent of the electorate, 69 percent of the White electorate gave its endorsement. Despite some ambiguity, the ‘yes’ voters accepted that it meant the end of ‘apartheid’. De Klerk commented on the support he had received in the referendum, saying: “[it was] … a deed that echoed over the world” and a mighty message of reconciliation of Whites with their fellow South Africans. The world’s reaction was overwhelmingly favourable. The Afrikaners and their white fellow South Africans made their exit with some grace in the 1992 referendum – surrendering their position as sole rulers without being defeated. (See Hermann Giliomee, 2003, op.cit., pp.631-634)

In May 1992 CODESA held its second plenary session at the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg – preceded by private sessions between the ANC and NP representatives. Sticking points arose around the NP’s insistence upon a high percentage of votes in the special assembly which would be tasked to approve the constitution; entrenched regional powers; veto power for a community-based senate; and a prior agreement to convert any interim constitution negotiated by CODESA into a permanent constitution. But negotiations broke down. 112

The breakdown of CODESA was followed by four months of heightened conflict throughout the country. Fighting escalated in KwaZulu and Natal between ANC and Inkatha supporters. The ANC was running a campaign of ‘rolling mass action’ and the revival of the ‘armed struggle’ seemed to be on the cards. Mandela led a march of around 50,000 followers to government buildings in Pretoria. Ronnie Kasrils, ANC chief of intelligence, and guerrilla forces, led 70,000 marchers from King Williamstown to Bisho, the Ciskei capital. When they were routed by the police, Mandela called a halt to ‘mass action’.

By that time, South Africa verged on anarchy. As the bloodshed mounted, the economy slumped. Western governments pressured all parties to co-operate in finding a peaceful solution. Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer, the NP’s new principal negotiator, had been secretly meeting throughout the crisis. They persuaded De Klerk and Mandela to re-open talks. On 26 September 1992, they signed a ‘Record of Understanding’. It included the idea that the interim constitution should honour the existing contracts of civil servants, judges, police and military personnel by way of ‘sunset clauses’ and provide for a period of compulsory power sharing in the cabinet. By this time the ANC was clearly holding the upper hand in negotiations with the NP government. Nelson Mandela had been travelling all over the world and enjoyed unquestioned international support.

A new forum for constitutional negotiations was formed in April 1993, the Multi-Party Forum. It included all the major political organisations except the Conservative Party, the Volksfront (under Genl. Constand Viljoen) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (under Zulu chieftain Mangosuthu Buthelezi) who formed the Freedom Alliance with the object to halt the direction of change represented by the Multi-Party Forum. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) also stood aside, by propagating a separate, independent homeland for Afrikaners, and joined forces with the members of the Freedom Alliance.

Despite many distractions the Multi-Party Forum continued with their efforts to draft a new interim constitution relying on the assistance of a team of professional constitutional lawyers and advisors of the small Democratic Party. In December 1993 the South African parliament in Cape Town passed the necessary legislation to ratify the document, thus providing legal continuity between the old regime and the new. Parliament also created a multi-party Transitional Executive Council, which became the de facto government of South Africa until the election, and an Independent Electoral Commission to take responsibility for organising the election. The election date was set for 27 April 1994.

The interim constitution provided for the national territory of South Africa to be re-divided into nine regions: Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Orange Free State (later called Free State), Northwest, KwaZulu/Natal, Eastern Transvaal (later called Mpumalanga) and PWV (Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging – later called Gauteng). The central parliament was to comprise a house of assembly of 400 members elected by proportional representation (half on national and half on regional lists), while an upper house of 90 would be chosen by regional assemblies.

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The Interim Constitution, under which South Africa was to be governed for five years from the April 1994 elections, was finally endorsed on 18th November 1993 by the delegates to the multi-party negotiations. In December 1993, the newly created Transitional Executive Council (TEC) gave the African majority a legal role in central government for the first time in South Africa’s history. It was opposed by the Freedom Alliance consisting of Inkatha, the Conservative Party and the Afrikaner Volksfront as well as leaders of the two independent homelands, Lucas Mangope and Joshua Gqoza. Despite this opposition, it was agreed that South Africa would be ruled for a five-year interim period after its first one-person-one-vote election by a Government of National Unity (GNU) comprising five parties – the ANC, the NP, the PAC, the CP and the IFP – with Nelson Mandela as President.

During the period June 1993 to the end of April 1994, South Africa teetered on the brink of civil war. Ferocious fighting involving Inkatha (IFP) supporters and ANC supporters continued in KwaZulu-Natal and in the black townships east of Johannesburg. Thousands of people were killed. Rumours were spread that the conflict was fanned by “Third Force” activities involving military intelligence and security police factions. These allegations were subsequently repeated by the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry into Township Violence and by Eugene de Kock in statements made to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission headed by Bishop Desmond Tutu. It was claimed that quantities of clandestine weaponry were supplied to Inkatha commanders by “Third Force” elements that must have had access to Defence Force armament depots. It was also revealed that the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) elements were supplied with weapons and explosives from Defence Force depots. It is not clear how the ANC’s “Self-defence Units” acquired their weaponry.

Despite the sporadic outbursts of violence, the process of constitutional transformation proceeded according to schedule – largely due to a groundswell of support amongst mainstream elements of the South African population. The main transformative roles were played by Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk, whose contributions were subsequently recognised by way of a joint Nobel Peace Prize. On the ANC side, Mandela was actively supported by lawyers Chaskelson and Bizos, Cosatu leader Cyril Ramaphosa and a range of stalwart ANC leaders. On the National Party side, FW de Klerk was ably supported by Dr. Gerrit Viljoen and other Cabinet members such as Roelf Meyer and Leon Wessels. He also enjoyed the support of the influential Afrikaner Broederbond as well as the bulk of the White electorate.

The main opposition on the White side of the political spectrum came from the key members of the Freedom Alliance – the Afrikaner Volksfront led by two retired generals, Constand Viljoen and Tienie Groenewald, and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging led by Eugene Terreblanche. These leaders denounced De Klerk as a traitor for negotiating away any form of effective White power. On the Black side of the political spectrum the main opposition came from terrorist organisations such as the African People’s Liberation Association (APLA), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) who favoured the continuation of the armed struggle. It was also opposed by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) led by Chief Buthelezi. The IFP’s support base was focused on traditional Zulu elements who regarded the Xhosa-dominated ANC as an obstacle to Zulu self-determination. The joint members of the Freedom Alliance (the IFP, the AWB and the Volksfront) were all in favour of independent self- determination for their own ethnic groups and they all opposed the direction of change 114

represented by the Multi-Party Forum. They not only campaigned against the scheduled elections and the constitutional change - they also planned to shipwreck the entire constitutional transformation by way of an armed rebellion.

During the first months of 1994, weeks before the scheduled elections, the conflict potential in South Africa reached crisis proportions. The opponents of the planned new constitutional dispensation now realised that they faced a fait accompli and decided to dig in their heels. The IFP decided to boycott the April elections and to campaign for an independent Zulu state. Generals Viljoen and Groenewald secretly started preparations for an armed takeover of the South African government, detaining the NP and ANC leaders in Angola while forcing constitutional negotiations on their own terms. Training programmes were planned to mobilise thousands of Afrikaner and Zulu troops.

During March 1994, Lucas Mangope, the president of the Bophuthatswana Government, announced that his territory would not enter the planned new constitutional dispensation and sought the help of the Volksfront and the AWB to quell the breakdown of law and order in his territory. A convoy of AWB soft-side vehicles moved to Bophuthatswana where they were halted by a roadblock set up by the Bophuthatswana army and police. When some members of the convoy were shot dead in the roadblock, the whole operation came to a pathetic standstill. General Viljoen decided to end his association with this ill-conceived campaign of violent revolt and advised his supporters to participate in the elections.

Even as late as the end of March 1994, less than one month before the scheduled elections, Inkatha was still opposed to participation in the elections. On 28 March, 1994, a 20,000 strong contingent of Inkatha supporters marched towards Shell House in Johannesburg, the ANC headquarters. When security officers, acting on Mandela’s instructions, opened fire they killed 53 people. Inkatha demanded independence for KwaZulu. After some delay Buthelezi, in consultation with the Zulu King, agreed to let his Inkatha Freedom Party participate in the April elections.

The first elections in the New South Africa took place over 4 days, 26 to 29 April, 1994, and around 20 million people (86 percent of the electorate) sought to vote. At many polling stations there were not enough people to man them and electoral rolls were incomplete. The election was flawed on many counts with reports of stuffed ballot boxes, people voting more than once and underage youths allowed to vote. The European Union’s observer mission observed that the election ‘fell short of expectations’ while Commonwealth and OAU observers declared the election as substantially free and fair. The ANC won 62.65 percent of the 252 seats in the National Assembly, the National Party 20.39 percent of the votes and 82 seats, and the IFP 10.54 percent of the votes and 43 seats. Mandela was elected President, Mbeki as first Deputy President and De Klerk, under the sunset clauses, became Second Deputy President. The National Party obtained five cabinet positions and the IFP won three seats in the cabinet. The ANC became the majority party in seven of the nine provinces. The National Party won the Western Cape and the IFP won in KwaZulu-Natal.

On 10 May, 1994, Nelson Mandela took the presidential oath in the presence of the Secretary- General of the United Nations, 45 heads of state and delegations from many countries. The 115

dominant theme of his inaugural address was reconciliation. (See L. Thompson, op.cit., pp.250- 257). Despite the tumultuous period preceding the April 1994 elections, the transfer of power by the White community to the Black majority was, by any standards, an extraordinary achievement. Although internal inter-group violence and external pressures were potent influences, the mainstream White community effectively relinquished power voluntarily. The transition could have been infinitely more violent and destructive. In the very nick of time, South Africa was saved from an escalating maelstrom of violence.

Bibliography

Couzens, T. (2004) Battles of South Africa, David Philip Publishers, Claremont Davenport, T.R.H. (1977) South Africa – A Modern History, MacMillan, Johannesburg De Klerk, F.W. (1998) Die Laaste Trek – ‘n Nuwe Begin, Human & Rousseau, Kaapstad De Klerk, W.J. (1971) Afrikanerdenke, Pro Rege Pers, Potchefstroom Giliomee, H (2003) The Afrikaners – Biography of a People, Tafelberg Publishers, Cape Town Giliomee, H. & Mbenga, B. New History of South Africa, Tafelberg Publishers, (2007) Cape Town Giliomee, H. (2012) Die Laaste Afrikanerleiers, Tafelberg, Kaapstad Guest, R. (2004) The Shackled Continent, MacMillan, London Harrison, D. (1981) The White Tribe, MacMillan, London Johnson, R.W. (2004) South Africa – The First Man, The Last Nation, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg Mandela, N. (1994) Long Walk to Freedom, Little Brown & Co, London Meredith, M (2007) Diamonds, Gold and War – The Making of South Africa, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Jeppestown Millin, S.G. (1951) The People of South Africa, Constable & Co, London Pakenham, T. (1993) The Boer War, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg Pretorius, F. (ed) (2012) Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika, Tafelberg, Kaapstad Slabbert, F. Van Zyl (2006) The Other Side of History, Jonathan Ball, Cape Town Thompson, L. (2001) A History of South Africa, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Jeppestown Worden, N. (2012) The Making of Modern South Africa – Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, Fifth Ed. Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex

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7. Post-Colonial New South Africa (1994-2012)

When the new constitutional dispensation came into effect in 1994, the new government faced an immense task. Nelson Mandela enjoyed saintly reverence around the world, but lacked any experience in the practical management of a complex collective enterprise on a national scale: the New South Africa Incorporated (Pty) Ltd. Mandela rightly focussed his attention on building a more inclusive nation – the ‘rainbow nation’.

The country was racked by many generations of violent intergroup conflict. Decades of international sanctions in the form of trade boycotts and disinvestment campaigns were fatal to an open economy. The internal public management culture with its survivalist focus was based on exclusivist structures. The heterogeneous population structure was based on cleavages that universally give rise to strife: cleavages based on socio-economic class, culture (including ethnicity and language) and race, compounded in one country. Any public meeting of different group representatives had to be conducted in the second language of most of those present: broken English.

It was a matter of critical importance to reconcile the divergent interests, expectations and aspirations. The new country had to build a new nation out of its diverse components. The country had one of the greatest gaps in the world between rich and poor and although a new multi-racial middle class was forming, the socio-economic hierarchy was marked primarily by a division between races. A census that was held in 1996 – before changes had taken place since the transfer of political power – revealed the enormity of the challenges.

According to the People of South Africa Population Census, 1996: Primary Tables (Pretoria 1999), the vast majority of White South Africans had full employment and lived in modern (Western) houses or apartments equipped with electricity, piped water, telephones and flush toilets. By contrast, 42 percent of Blacks of working age were unemployed, only 45 percent lived in modern buildings and only 30 percent of Black households had electricity, 20 percent had piped water, 11 percent had telephones and 19 percent had flush or chemical toilets in their homes. Conditions were far worse among rural Blacks than among the 49 percent of the Black population who lived in urban or peri-urban areas. Many urban Blacks occupied shacks. The conditions of the Indian members were slightly worse than those of Whites whereas the conditions of the Coloured members of the population were in-between those of Indian and Black members of the population. According to the 1996 census, 46 percent of the Black population (i.e. around 14 million people) were under 20 years old – many born outside stable family relationships – badly educated, ill-equipped to find employment and exposed to a drifting life of lawlessness and crime. The annual murder rate per 100,000 people in 1990-91 was 98 compared to 15 in the Netherlands.

Martin Meredith described the post-apartheid South Africa as follows: “The assets that South Africa possessed to help it overcome (the apartheid) legacy was considerable. They included one of the world’s richest stores of minerals, with 44 percent of world diamond reserves, 82 percent of manganese reserves and 64 percent of platinum-group metal reserves. It was the world’s largest producer of gold, mining one-third of the world production. Its financial, banking and legal systems were well established and efficient; the 117

Johannesburg Stock Exchange was the tenth largest in the world. Its manufacturing base though over protected and uncompetitive by world standards, was capable of major expansion. The infrastructure of roads, railways, ports and airports was well developed. Telephone and electricity services were reliable. Universities and technical colleges turned out a ready supply of competent graduates. In statistical terms, South Africa, with a gross domestic product of $120 billion, ranked as one of the world’s twenty five largest economies. In Africa, it stood out as a giant.” (See Martin Meredith, The State of Africa – A History of the Continent Since Independence, Simon & Schuster, London, 2011, pp.654-655)

The ANC-led government’s initial attempts at social and economic redress were the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) formally adopted in 1994. Its main focus was to redress inequalities in the areas of healthcare, welfare, education and housing. Some projects achieved notable success such as the building of thousands of new houses, electrification schemes in townships, free medication to young children and the provision of clinics and water supplies in remote rural areas. However, the RDP achieved less than had been hoped. The tax base was too small to significantly increase the state’s financial resources. In 1997 the RDP was replaced by a new economic initiative called Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (GEAR) which stressed free market capitalism, the privatisation of state- owned enterprises and the lessening of fiscal and tariff restrictions. The aim was to attract foreign investment, to promote job creation and encourage economic growth.

Local companies and conglomerates, such as the mining houses and insurance companies, took advantage of more relaxed financial control to move capital out of the country. New and progressive labour legislation which ensured wages that were well above those in parts of Asia and Latin America, made South Africa less attractive to outside investors. As a result attempts to reduce unemployment were limited. Poverty levels increased in cities as rural inhabitants migrated in search of paid work, often without success. Official unemployment was reported around 25 percent, but this excluded thousands of persons dependent on casual employment or who worked in the informal sector. An estimated 40 percent of the adult population was without regular income. (See Nigel Worden, The Making of Modern South Africa, Wiley- Blackwell, West Sussex, 2012, pp.157-158)

During the early 2000s two issues dominated public debates in South Africa: the high incidence of HIV/AIDS infection and the high level of crime. By 2009 there were 5.2 million people in South Africa with HIV, the highest recorded number of any country and some 17 percent of the total population. Single parent families and orphaned children were straining social services and the large number of infected persons made overwhelming demands on the health system. Vice-President Thabo Mbeki politicised the issue by stating that AIDS was a Western disease and that alarmist reports reflected racist stereotypes about African sexuality. Eventually the government was mandated by the Constitutional Court in 2002 to expand retroviral treatment services. The high level of crime, particularly murder and property theft, became an alarming issue amongst White South Africans. It became a key factor in emigration pressures. The high incidence of attacks on White farmers was seen as examples of ‘racial revenge’. However, the large majority of crime victims were Black. Gang violence was rife in the Black townships, particularly in the ghettos on the Cape Flats area of Cape Town where drug-running gangs vied 118

with armed vigilante groups. It was believed that the police failed to take action, either because of under-resourcing or corruption and strains on the criminal justice system. It led some communities to take the law into their own hands. In predominantly White residential areas it led to the establishment of gated communities and the employment of thousands of private security guards.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in 1995 under chairmanship of Archbishop Desmond Tutu. It offered the possibility of amnesty for political crimes committed between 1960 and 1994, in return for full and public testimony by individuals and political parties. The subsequent public confessions, both from those who had fought for and against apartheid, revealed the extent of violence carried out during the preceding decades.

In 1996 F.W. de Klerk took the National Party out of the joint national government, renamed it the ‘New National Party’ to give it a different identity with cross-racial membership. He resigned shortly afterwards, causing many of its former supporters to switch their allegiance to the Democratic Party. In the 1999 elections the Democratic Party increased its proportion of the vote to 9.5 percent to become the official opposition in Parliament. It drew most of its support from Whites, Cape Coloureds and Natal Indians who felt alienated by the ANC’s affirmative action policies for Blacks. The Democratic Party renamed itself the Democratic Alliance (DA) in 2001.

After Mandela’s retirement in 1999, Thabo Mbeki, his successor, became the leader of the ANC. The Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, attracted wide support from the youth, the unions and the Communist Party supporters in the ANC Alliance. When Zuma was accused of financial corruption and of rape in 2005, Mbeki dismissed him, but it only served to increase tensions within the ANC, especially when Zuma was acquitted on both counts. (See Nigel Worden, op.cit. pp.163-165)

At the tumultuous ANC party conference at Polokwane in 2007, Mbeki was ousted as party leader and replaced by Zuma. Mbeki subsequently resigned and was replaced for a temporary period by his Deputy, Kgalema Motlanthe. After the ANC secured a further electoral victory in 2009, Zuma was installed as President.

A major bone of contention in the South African parliament in the 2000s was the ‘Arms Deal’ debacle. In 2000 a parliamentary committee reported irregularities in the securing of a $9.75 billion arms deal to supply the South African defence force with equipment from European manufacturers. It was suspected that considerable bribes had been paid involving inter alia a Durban businessman, Schabir Schaik, who had close connections with Zuma. A special unit, the ‘scorpions’, was set up to investigate corruption. Zuma led the opposition to the Scorpion’s activities which he described as ‘malicious misinformation’. The Scorpions were disbanded after Zuma’s takeover in 2009. Schaik was released from prison on the grounds of ‘ill health’.

The DA alliance, led by Helen Zille, branded Zuma as a man unfit to lead the country because of his association with patriarchy, outmoded traditionalism and corruption. Zuma responded by flaunting his traditionalist practices such as his polygamy and his extravagant lifestyle which gained him appeal in his home region of KwaZulu-Natal. His major political headache was 119

caused by populist orator Julius Malema appealing to the unemployed youth, but Zuma managed to prevail with the support of the BEE tycoons, the intelligence and security apparatus and the main ANC alliance partners.

Black Economic Empowerment

A massive transfer of assets to Black individuals, companies and trusts during the period 1990 to 2008 was orchestrated under the Black Economic Empowerment programme (BEE). Previously the Black business culture was largely underdeveloped as a result of many factors typical of most Black African societies: the tradition of communal land ownership, extended family relationships, absence of transferable contractual relationships and absence of enforceable documented legal obligations, exclusion (or at least marginalisation) from White- dominated business relationships.

During several generations of urbanisation and interaction with White society, robust business entrepreneurship developed on the fringes of the modernising areas of South Africa, particularly around cities and towns. These activities involved spazas, panel beaters, taxis, shebeens, woodwork, vegetable growing, livestock and dairy production, laundry/dry cleaning, hairdressing, dressmaking, shack building, herbalists, metal work, appliance repair, photography and street hawking. By 1995, around 23,000 urban Black businesses were clients of the Small Business Development Corporation.

Tabo Mbeki, who succeeded Nelson Mandela as President, initiated Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), ostensibly with the objective to build a Black bourgeoisie. BEE firms were to be privileged in public procurement: in tenders up to R500,000 the evaluation of tenders allowed 20 points for bids from HDIs (Historically Disadvantaged Individuals) and 80 points for price. Above R500,000 a 90:10 ratio would apply. On 22nd March, 2002, the Mercury Business Report announced that to date 66 percent of contracts awarded had gone to BEE companies. Companies sought hard to qualify as ‘black empowered’ in terms of the appointment of Black executives and board members, to transfer equity to black shareholders, to adopt BEE charters, to set numerical targets for Black employment and to commit to an annual social spending percentage on Black groups out of post-tax profits. The government announced its overall target of placing at least 35 percent of the economy into Black hands by 2014.

The downside of the BEE frenzy was ignored: once the principle was established that merit or price is irrelevant, there was a steep and slippery slope to the exercise of blatant racial choice, a dilution of standards and then the plunge into a morass of nepotism and corruption.

Donor-based Trusts - The first donor-based trust was the Kagiso Trust, set up in 1985 by Eric Molobi, a former Robben Island prisoner. The Trust was intended as a conduit for EU funds to apartheid victims, but it also received funds from the Communist bloc. The first R1.2 billion was largely used to fund ANC-connected causes. Accounting practices were based on what was then called ‘struggle accounting’. After 1990 the Kagiso Trust was transformed into a large corporation investing in companies, Molobi later became chairman of, inter alia, Telkom, Metropolitan Holdings and the R32 billion Imperial Group. Kagiso Trust was followed by Vusi Khanyile’s Thebe Investments with Tokyo Sexwale as director. 120

The Role of Corporate Giants - South Africa’s corporate giants led the way to prove their progressive credentials by selling off assets to empowerment partners. In some cases it might have paved the way for disinvestment from South Africa and for diversification abroad in a period of tight foreign exchange control.

South Africa’s biggest conglomerate, Anglo American Corporation, set the tone with a series of asset transfers. It sold off assets in order to create African Rainbow Minerals (run by Patrice Motsepe, later to become the wealthiest South African), Mvelaphanda Resources (run by Tokyo Sexwale), Shanduka (run by Cyril Ramaphosa), Ponahalo (run by Cheryl Carolus, former Ambassador to London, and Manne Dipico, former ANC premier of the Northern Cape), Eyesizwe Mining (run by former ANC-appointed senior civil servants) and Exxaro (run by Sipho Nkosi). Subsequently, Anglo American Corporation swallowed De Beers, listed in London and consolidated its investments abroad.

The mechanism used to transfer shareholding, was to sell assets at a discount, using large bank loans to finance the transactions. Repayments were then financed by dividend flows and the partial resell of shareholding – hopefully, at handsome profits. (See Martin Plant and Paul Holden, Who Rules South Africa, Biteback Publishing Ltd, London, 2012, pp.214-222)

Another major BEE project was Sanlam’s sell-off of shares in Metropolitan Life in 1993 to NAIL (New African Investments Ltd), a consortium led by Dr Nthato Motlana, Nelson Mandela’s doctor. NAIL enlisted the services of Jonty Sandler, a Jewish broker in Johannesburg, and bought the Johnnic conglomerate from the Anglo American Corporation. However, managing the Johnnic investment failed, as did other NAIL investments in The Sowetan and Radio Jacaranda until NAIL was taken over by Safika Holdings in a fire-sale bid – but not before the pioneers of NAIL could transfer millions to their private accounts.

A characteristic of many BEE deals was the role of a few white impresarios. By putting together consortia and providing the supportive rhetorical spin, the Whites involved made fortunes for themselves in agent fees and commissions.

The Makane Trust - Run by Tokyo Sexwale, this trust was created as a benefit fund for ex- Robben Island inmates. Together with Safika (run by Macozoma, who also ran Transnet) it made a bid for MTN (now M-Cell) shares, but the two bidders ended up in the Johannesburg High Court charging each other with fraud and theft. Ultimately, interventions were made by Jeff Radebe, Minister of Public Enterprises and Bulelani Ngcuka, the National Director of Public Prosecutions (both ex-political prisoners themselves) to settle out of court.

Telkom - Andile Ngcaba served as Director-General of the Communications Ministry for around ten years, but also became BEE partner of South Africa’s biggest home-grown hi-tech company, Dimension Data, and chairman of its local operation. This consortium then made a bid for the whole of 15.1 percent of Telkom’s shares worth R9 billion, which were held by the US-Malaysian company, Thintana Communications. The deal provoked outrage because Ngcaba was allegedly taking advantage of a situation which he himself had created. He served as head of DiData while 121

also serving on the board of Telkom. But the question of conflict of interest was ignored. Smuts Ngonyama, the ANC’s chief spokesman, was also involved as ‘facilitator’ of an arrangement between Ngcaba’s consortium (which involved Dali Tambo) and another BEE consortium led by Gloria Serobe, a Mbeki associate. Ngonyama, who was also a powerful NEC member maintained that he “… hadn’t joined the struggle in order to stay poor”. Ngonyama was believed to have made hundreds of millions out of the deal, while the Business Day editorialised that this was “… the least mass empowering and most individually enriching exercise in the distribution of wealth imaginable in a developing country with a majority of extremely poor people.” (Business Day, 10th November 2004)

IDC Involvement - The South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), originally led by Dr H.J. van Eck, has a proud history as trail-blazing development of major South African industries since the time of post-war reconstruction in 1948. Some of its main achievements include the Phosphate Development Corporation (PHOSCOR), the South African Marine Corporation (SAFMARINE), South African Synthetic Oil Limited (SASOL) and the South African Industrial Cellulose Corporation (SAICCOR). The equity holdings of the IDC in these privatised enterprises formed an important part of its asset base to finance further development projects. These assets came into the sights of the BEE juggernaut when, in 2002, Metallon Corporation (run by Mzi Khumalo) led a consortium to buy out Global Resorts for R1 billion. Then, in 2003, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) granted a loan to Metallon Corporation to acquire the IDC’s 10.7 million shares in Harmony Gold at a discount, which Metallon Corporation promptly sold at a profit of R1 billion. Accusations were made that Khumalo manipulated IDC officials and that he avoided exchange controls by transferring R700 million abroad, but nothing has been proved. Khumalo became one of the wealthiest persons in South Africa – even hiring the Onassis yacht at the 2004 Athens Olympics.

The Mining Industry - The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) of 2002 almost shipwrecked the South African mining industry – the cornerstone of the South African economy. Reviving the Freedom Charter of 1955, it put all the mineral rights in the hands of the state (ANC), including the expropriation of all existing mining rights. The state would grant 25 year mining licences, revocable by the Minister. All existing mining companies would have to re-apply to continue to mine on condition that they brought in a BEE partner of the Minister’s choice – no BEE partner, no licence. The Ministry was to become a vast patronage machine, handing out lucrative opportunities to BEE enterprises – despite the fact that 50 percent of the mining companies were owned by pension funds and 40 percent by foreign institutions. In 2002 Mambo-Ngcuka drafted a Mining BEE Charter aimed at 51 percent black ownership of the whole mining industry within ten years. This charter was leaked to the press and estimates were made that such a transfer of assets would cost R750 billion. Anglo American shares dropped 14 percent and investor confidence fell.

Of the R30 billion of BEE deals announced by 2003, two-thirds involved just two men: Patrice Motsepe and Tokyo Sexwale. Motsepe’s African Rainbow Minerals was, by 2004, South Africa’s largest Black-owned company (R7.7 billion, controlling nickel mines and substantial interests in gold, platinum, coal and iron ore). Another BEE group he led, bought 10 percent of Sanlam, the country’s biggest life insurer. He also owned the champion football team, Mamelodi Sundowns and headed NAFCOC. Sexwale’s Mvelaphanda Holdings owned 22 percent of Trans Hex diamond 122

mining, 15 percent of Gold Fields, 10 percent of Absa Bank, he chaired Northam Platinum and Wingate Capital and owned Big Bay real estate in Cape Town.

Platinum, being more valuable than gold, is an important resource in South Africa because close to 90 percent of the world’s supplies (and its associated metals such as palladium, rhodium and beryllium) are found in South Africa. Those who wanted to mine it, had no choice but to invest in South Africa – regardless of the legislative and political obstacles. Hence, Impala Platinum announced a BEE deal for 20 percent of its Winnaarshoek mine, half of which went to Minakau Mining, run by Bridgette Radebe, wife of the Cabinet Minister Jeff Radebe. She also acquired control of Alexkor, a diamond mine surrendered by its Canadian owner Platexco. Shortly after the Impala Plats deal with Bridgette, Anglo Platinum announced a similar deal with Bridgette’s brother, Patrice Motsepe, head of African Rainbow Minerals. Patrice and Bridgette are reported to be the children of a Tswana princess. Bridgette is also the sister-in-law of another BEE oligarch, Cyril Ramaphosa. Cyril Ramaphosa and Tokyo Sexwale, two leading oligarchs, both remained managers of the National Empowerment Fund (NEF). The Minister behind the Minerals Bill (MPRDA), Ms. Mlambo-Ngcuka, is married to Bulelani Ngcuka, the Director of Public Prosecutions, a key Mbeki confidant and also a major BEE beneficiary. Bridgette Radebe also acquired a stake in the fourth-largest gold producer, Durban Roodepoort Deep, and a controlling share in its Crown Gold Recoveries operation.

Small Business - During the transition period 1994-1996, various efforts were made by the newly appointed Director-General of the Department of Commerce and Industries, Dr. A. Ruiters, to grab control of the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC), a private- sector controlled development company in which the state held a 50 percent financial interest, but holding only a 20 percent control of its operations. After prolonged negotiations, the SBDC Board of Directors agreed to an arrangement to buy back 30 percent of the government’s shareholding for a total price of R600 million. This amount had to be paid over to the Department of Commerce and Industries, which, in turn, created a National Empowerment Fund (NEF) and a National Small Business Council with two operational arms under its control: Khula Enterprise Finance and Ntsika Enterprise Promotion – both institutions tasked to promote and assist small business development. The National Small Business Council was wound up in 1998 after chronic internal leadership struggles as well as allegations of financial mismanagement and a plunge into debt. Ntsika’s head resigned in 1996 amidst fraud and mismanagement allegations. The NEF had difficulties getting off the ground, but by 2004 its head and senior employees were suspended for ‘irregular payments’ and the NEF, supposedly the prime vehicle for launching new Black businesses, was left paralysed and its head jailed. By 2001, Khula found it impossible to retrieve misappropriated funds in several different cases and was subsequently disbanded. What remained of the Small Business Development Corporation was renamed Business Partners by its private sector shareholders and it remained an important financier of viable small and medium-sized businesses in all communities. Dr Ruiters subsequently became the Director-General of the Department of Trade and Industry, but resigned in February 2005, leaving behind a department allegedly riddled with maladministration.

Gambling and Lotteries - Sol Kerzner pioneered casino activities with his Sun International Company’s fun-palaces in conjunction with various former ‘homeland’ authorities: Sun City, Lost City, Wild Coast Sun and several others. In his BEE deal, Kerzner took the art of wheeling and 123

dealing to new heights with his new partner Lereko consortium representative, Valli Moosa, former Minister of Tourism and Popo Molefi, former ANC Premier of the North West province. Shares were sold at a 30 percent discount and warehoused until the two men left their offices. Moosa was also a director of Sanlam, Escom and SAA, while Molefe was chairman of two private companies and two para-statals, Armscor and Petro SA. The BEE-run national lottery, Uthingo, was transferred after its licence expired, to another BEE consortium, called Gidani, with Ramaphosa, Max Sisulu, Chris Nisson, Brigalia Bam and Bongani Khumalo in control.

BEE in Perspective

The director of the NEC, Mashudu Romano, gave perhaps the most apt comment on the BEE beneficiaries by saying that most of them “have never run a spaza shop”. The American ‘robber barons’ were the products of the rough and tumble of business competition, but the BEE beneficiaries are closer to the post-USSR Russian ‘oligarchs’ – off-shoots of a political spoils system. It is based on the enrichment of a small circle of ANC-connected elite, their wives and supporters, with their fingers in many pies, but without the technical know-how of running the companies they supposedly own.

They stand in stark contrast to the bulk of the South African Indian community. Motivated by strong entrepreneurial and educational traditions, South Africa’s Indian community had built up its own schools and family businesses. Despite racial discrimination during the ‘apartheid years’, the Indian community grew and prospered, producing a wealthy and well-educated merchant and professional class and many skilled artisans. By 2000 the top 10 percent of the Indian community had overtaken its White counterpart. It is one of the peculiarities of South Africa, that the groups achieving the highest levels of prosperity have always been East European Jews and Indian Muslims.

R.W. Johnson, who has carried out in-depth research on the predatory transfer of assets, had this to say:

“… In 1994 the country had far more skills and expertise available than most developing countries can dream of. The new regime needed to hang on tight to its skilled manpower, use it to help train and expand the skills pool, while exploiting the worldwide goodwill towards the new South Africa to acquire whatever fresh help it could. This would have represented no threat to the black elite, whose predominance is guaranteed in perpetuity simply by demography. (Johnson. R.W., 2009, South Africa’s Brave New World, London: Penguin Books, p.492)

It was indeed sad that the new political elite started to loot the assets of the country that should have been used to ignite the engines of economic growth and prosperity for all.

The Tyranny of Political Correctness

South African intellectual life has been severely constrained and impoverished by a tendency to gloss over societal problems and deficiencies. Political correctness has tended to make South Africa a society of pretence where it is generally expected not to talk about what is going wrong, what is not good enough and what is totally unacceptable. 124

R.W. Johnson describes the intellectual tyranny of political correctness as follows:

“Anyone who argued that merit was a vital criterion in choosing future doctors or competent managers was accused of being racist in principle. Indeed, all talk of meritocratic criteria was regarded as intrinsically racist. This left the government free to appoint to positions throughout society people who lacked the skills or qualifications necessary to do their jobs properly: young black women with no technical background to run the railways, ambassadors who had, at best, spent a few weeks learning the skills serious foreign officers spend years inculcating, judges who, even as lawyers, had been inexperienced, incompetent and drunk, and senior policemen who had been thugs or crooks. All these are real examples.”

“In order for this to pass muster, Society became a society of ubiquitous pretence, not only by government but by politically correct whites. … To notice that [certain appointees] could not possibly do their job properly was the height of bad manners. ANC municipal office-holders, who needed no encouragement to treat their towns as merely part of a spoils system to be ransacked, happily took the lesson and would gaily get rid of trained planners, accountants, engineers and their ilk in order to be able to hand their jobs to unqualified cronies or relatives.” (R.W. Johnson, op.cit., p.430)

The Balance Sheet of the New South Africa

One of the first things Nelson Mandela did after the transition negotiations were underway, was to ask the outside world to put an end to economic sanctions. By 1994 South Africa emerged from the turmoil of the previous decades with its economy badly injured by trade boycotts and disinvestment campaigns.

The steady decline in South Africa’s economic well-being since the 1960s is clear when the ten- year growth-rate averages are considered: 3.3 percent in the 1960s; 0.4 percent in the 1970s and -0.5 percent in the 1980s. The years 1990 to 1992 had yielded an average of around -2.5 percent. The real output available to the average citizen declined substantially and continuously – largely due to declining direct foreign investment after 1972 and the intensification of financial and trade sanctions after 1985. During this period a huge gap developed between population growth and economic growth.

A team of economists from the University of Pretoria wrote in 1994, “The liberalisation of the general social and political environment in South Africa should now be followed by a drastic liberalisation of the economy. However, the government still has an important role to play, albeit from a restricted budgetary situation. Should it allow the private sector to blossom and assist it with an efficient, outward-orientated, market-related macro policy and a domestic policy geared at creating competition across the board, there is no reason why real growth rates in excess of 7 percent cannot be attained within a few years.” (See G.L. de Wet, et.al., “Requirements for economic growth and development” in Vosloo (ed.), 1994, op.cit., pp.129-141)

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The New South Africa inherited many assets from the ‘old’ South Africa: the continent’s most powerful industrial base, its most extensive transport infrastructure in terms of paved roads and railways, an electricity grid producing more than half of the continent’s electricity, more telephone lines (and now mobile phone networks) than the rest of the continent combined, a network of world-class shopping malls and food self-sufficiency with surplus production for the export market, world-class teaching hospitals, internationally renowned universities, a significant defence force, a mature trade union movement and cadre of (mostly white) professional managers of world-class quality. (See Anna Starcke, “The S.A. balance-sheet: Growing assets – diminishing liabilities” in Bowes and Pennington, South Africa – The Good News, The Good News Pty Ltd, Cape Town, 2003, pp.16-20)

Balance Sheet Assets (2008)

- Moving from an era of debt moratoriums, sanctions, two exchange rates, travel restrictions, inward industrialisation, the SA economy became part of the global market again – although exchange control remained. - During the period 2000-2007 the South African economy reaped generous benefits from the rise in commodity prices. The Economist’s commodities index (taking 2000 = 100) rose to 155.9 for food and to a bonanza level of 321.2 for mining in 2007. This threefold rise in the value of South Africa’s mining exports, brought huge injections into the South African economy. The stock market more than tripled and growth took off to 3.7 percent in 2004, 4.3 percent in 2005 and 4.9 percent in 2006. Higher growth rates fed into housing and consumer spending and significant increases in wages and salaries. - South African companies have survived a very demanding era: sanctions, political instability, tough labour laws, the constraints of ‘black empowerment’ burdens. So far they have met these challenges with skill and resilience – carrying a heavy responsibility for the future prosperity of South Africa on their shoulders. - The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) continued to be amongst the world’s top 15 by size and is amongst the best performing of emerging markets. - South Africa re-entered the international bond markets and kept the Reserve Bank operationally independent and free of political interference and gave support to the Bank’s anti-inflationary policy stance. - Public-private partnerships have increased and the private sector has been encouraged to engage in the design, construction, financing, operation, maintenance and rehabilitation of government-owned facilities, power stations and roads. - In both public and private sectors, Blacks have advanced to management positions in substantial numbers: to 23 percent of senior management in the private sector, above 50 percent in the public sector and 75 percent in the Defence Force. - Certain public services have improved, such as access to clean water, increased electricity connections, provision of low-cost housing, redistribution of land, settling of land claims. - Tax collection has been made more efficient, mostly exceeding budgeted expectations, as a result of less income earners escaping the taxation network. - South Africa now has Africa’s only broad-based welfare benefit system, providing cash benefits to 12.5 million people compared to only 3 million in 1994. 126

- An estimated 2.6 million of South Africa’s 39 million Blacks now earn at least R6,000 per month with many earning a lot more. It is more than what nearly half of their compatriots earn in a year. It is a hopeful sign towards the gradual emergence of a new Black middle class.

Balance Sheet Liabilities (2008)

- A significant volume of sustainable direct foreign investment (FDI) is still absent, largely because South Africa is not seen as an attractive destination for investors as a result of regulatory constraints and a multitude of political interventions in the ownership and management of business enterprises. The remaining exchange controls send a message to the world that South Africa still needs ‘confidence protection’. You don’t enter a room if the entrance door cannot be opened from the inside. - The crucially important mining industry was subjected by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act (MPRA) of 2002 to invasive bureaucratic constraints and politically motivated interventions. The expropriation of mineral rights led to substantial disinvestment in the middle of a world-wide boom in the demand for mineral resources. The investment loss as a result of mines lacking legal title was calculated, in 2006, to be around R10 billion a year. Mining companies also claimed that the lack of secure property rights, obstacles to employ skilled expatriates, being forced to take on unwanted BEE partners, acted as major constraints on investment and expansion. BHP Billiton, the world’s biggest miner, built its new aluminium smelter in Mozambique while shelving its plans for a zinc smelter in South Africa. Other mining houses also divested their investment flows away from South Africa. The commodities boom brought over $200 billion of new investment worldwide in 2006, but South Africa remained below its 2002 levels, much behind Botswana, though still higher than Zimbabwe. - The railways and ports network (both part of Transnet) had proved to be woefully inadequate to deal with the expanded volumes. As a result South Africa could not take full advantage of the huge rise in the demand for mineral resources. - The electricity crisis which engulfed South Africa in 2008, was largely caused by a shortfall in spare capacity, which, in turn, was a consequence of inadequate expansion planning on the part of Escom management. When the power cuts started in 2008, the output of the mines declined and South Africa relinquished its position as the world’s largest producer of gold to China. - Unemployment is still unacceptably high at levels in excess of 25 percent. This is partly due to inadequate economic growth rates in relation to population increase, but it is also caused by a mismatch between job requirements and skills, between what the education system delivers and what the market requires. - Despite considerable progress in providing low-cost housing, all the major cities are surrounded by endless stretches of squatter camps (informal settlements) and slums housing millions of migrants from rural areas. - Land distribution and re-distribution policies have not been successful as a result of strong cultural bonds with communal land ownership in traditional areas and haphazard allocation and bad management of productive farmland bought from White farmers. 127

- Law enforcement constantly verges on a state of collapse: muggings in city streets, housebreaking, car theft, armed robbery, rape and, above all, murder. Even crime statistics are generally considered to be unreliable with the management of police forces highly suspect. - Health services, particularly for Black communities have substantially degenerated and are totally inadequate. The most obvious deficiency is associated with AIDS, both in terms of preventative measures and campaigns and also in terms of the treatment of patients. Much has been made of Mr. Mbeki’s lethal denial of the link between HIV and AIDS. But the problem is much wider because the nature of the disease has as yet not been taken seriously enough – despite the fact that South Africa has 5 million HIV-positive persons. - Since 1999 the ANC has become more intellectually repressive, less tolerant of criticism and more autocratic in its internal management – typical of one party domination. - Despite South Africa’s efforts to influence Robert Mugabe to change his repressive policies in Zimbabwe, it was sadly unsuccessful and did not contribute to the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis. - Nepotism has become a highly visible problem area. The principle concern revolves around a fatal conflation of party and state which undermines public accountability and responsibility. Most public institutions such as the SABC, the judiciary, government departments, para- statal institutions have been stuffed with ANC-linked cronies. All talk of meritocratic criteria is too often branded as ‘racist’. - Affirmative action was intended to redress past imbalances and injustices. Now a different kind of institutionalised race-based discrimination has been established, based on various legislative frameworks: the Employment Equity Act determines that ‘designated employers’ should have ‘demographic proportionality’ in employment (70 percent Black, 45 percent women, 5 percent disabled) and submit plans to attain such equity; the Equity Act reinforces the constitutional ban on discrimination and those who are accused of ‘unfairness’ have to prove their innocence; the Black Economic Empowerment Act imposes a host of obligations on companies. To be BEE compliant companies have to meet seven different criteria, which include having a designated proportion of Blacks in upper and middle management, paying for skills development, etc., thus creating a legal minefield benefitting a growing army of specialist lawyers, consultants and accountants – all part of a new industry of racial auditing. ‘Reverse discrimination’ will undoubtedly reinforce the growing exodus of ambitious, talented young Whites with internationally marketable skills. - Corruption has become a serious issue since revelations have been made of the infamous ‘arms deal’ bribery. Mr. Schaik was sent to prison for his role in soliciting ‘arms deal’ bribes. Efforts to prove Mr. Zuma’s involvement were thrown out of the courts on a legal technicality. Andrew Feinstein’s book After the Party (Jonathan Ball, 2007, pp.154-268) reveals a widely entangled web of personal wheeling and dealing and submerged channels for ANC fund raising. Much more transparency is needed to root out conflicts of interest in the business entanglements of political office-bearers. ANC dominance on all levels has made parliamentary control ineffective. It has converted South African public life into a ‘spoils system’.

Economic Constraints

Although economic growth rates increased to an average of 3 percent in the period 1994-2003 and to levels of 5 percent from 2004 to 2008, employment growth remained disappointingly 128

low. The strongest employment growth occurred in the informal sector which indicates the presence of constraints in the formal sector.

Economists Charlotte du Toit and Johann van Tonder identified a number of structural impediments: - mismatches between skills supplied and demanded; - insufficient access to effective education and skills development opportunities; - deterioration of motivation of individual job seekers caused by prolonged periods of unemployment; - insufficient opportunities for on-the-job training; - limited access to and cost of transport; - high dependency rates and demand for social security grants.

The calculations of these economists show that structural unemployment in the South African economy is almost equal to the official unemployment rate as calculated by Statistics South Africa – around 25 percent.

The economists found that the current programmes providing education, skills development, health services are not alleviating the backlogs in the delivery of essential services. They also found the levels of severe crime and corruption to be increasing. Institutional constraints like the asymmetry of information between employers’ vacancies and workforce mobility tend to aggravate the unemployment problem. Factor productivity constraints associated with technology deficiencies have reduced South Africa’s international competitiveness.

The most pertinent macroeconomic constraints lie in the dearth of investment in economic growth-creating activities. Investment is needed to provide the benefits of accelerator- multiplier effects on economic growth and job creation, as well as its forward and backward linkages to other sectors of the economy. Both government investment in infrastructure and private investment in business expansion are essential for job creating economic growth. Investment growth was also hampered by low local savings and the lack of foreign capital inflows in the form of FDI.

The economists also found that the current account deficit (defined as the difference between gross domestic expenditure and gross national income) has grown to a fully fledged structural problem as a result of the growth in foreign transport service payments and foreign exchange controls. In an open economy, the cost of import and export transportation services are substantial in view of the lack of local freight transport ownership. In 1970 South Africa had 50 vessels on its ship register, compared to only one in 2005. As a result South Africa had to pay increasing amounts to foreign owners of vessels to transport its imports and exports. Foreign exchange controls tended to distort exchange rates by keeping the rand at stronger levels and consequently rendering the exporting manufacturing industry less competitive. In addition, South Africa’s net foreign liabilities have increased substantially as a result of steep increases in dividend and interest payments to foreign investors.

The economists conclude that given the supply-side constraints in the South African economy, huge imbalances have developed which have limited the economy’s capacity to create new jobs 129

and reduce the structural unemployment problem. These imbalances are reflected in the deficits in the current account balances. The deficits have been financed by short-term foreign portfolio inflows, but at the same time exposed the South African economy to international financial crises.

(See C. du Toit and J. Van Tonder, “South Africa’s Economic Performance since 1994: can we do better” in Parsons, R. (ed.) – Zumanomics – Challenges for a New Government, Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd, 2009)

Undermining the Mining Industry

South Africa’s mining industry has been the bastion of the economy for more than a century. But regulatory uncertainty has started to undermine the expansion of the mining industry. Since 2004 investment in the country’s mining industry has continued to decline. Congested railways and ports are partly to blame, especially for coal and iron ore. But gold, once the pillar of South Africa’s mining wealth has also been in decline. As costs have risen, production has dwindled. The biggest problem is red tape and regulatory uncertainty.

In 2004 mineral rights were transferred from private to state hands. Firms had to convert their existing licences into new ones. To do so they had to establish labour and social programmes and detail plans to transfer 26 percent of their ownership into non-White hands by 2014 under the BEE initiative. Legal representatives of the mines claim that the rules that regulate the industry are too vague and do not include measurable objective targets for social and labour reforms. The vagueness and uncertainty gives wide discretionary powers to the Department of Minerals and Energy. One major result is a sharp decline in spending on exploration.

The Declining Role of White South Africa

Since 1994 the South African government has pursued constructive market-friendly policies such as deficit reduction, trade liberalisation, domestic deregulation, counter-inflationary measures and reductions in public sector employment. Even in the eyes of its most ardent critics, the track record of the ANC government to date in the field of economic policy has exceeded expectations. It is often said that “… it could have been much worse.”

But there is an ominous downside: nepotism and corruption. As is the case with any form of decadence, the scope of nepotism and corruption is a matter of degree: Zimbabwe is worse than Nigeria, the Congo is worse than Kenya and Italy is worse than Spain or France. In South Africa, the affirmative imperative is a constitutionally entrenched race-based prerogative. It has fuelled the growth of a racial favouritism that overrides all standards of excellence or merit. Accordingly no position or task needs to be assigned to the best qualified person. Appointments, promotions, contracts, awards, purchases, leadership positions, remuneration – or whatever – do not need to be decided on merit. On the contrary, a mentality of entitlement for an ascribed group of ‘previously disadvantaged’ has been created. Under these auspices any misdeed or abuse is possible. Within the scope of this mindset all the checks and balances of a civilised society are cancelled. Any actions within this framework are by definition constitutionally 130

protected, above reproach and beyond criticism. It is a template for the gradual rejection of all standards of excellence.

In February 2009 the world’s downturn also arrived in South Africa. Tito Mboweni, the Governor of the Reserve Bank, warned that the country would go through a ‘rough patch’ for the next three to four years. After a respectable 3 percent growth a year for the period 1994-2004, the resources boom pushed economic growth to even higher levels at 5 percent a year until 2007. But in the final quarter of 2008 the economy started shrinking. Manufacturing, mining and retail trade plunged into recession. New car sales, the property market and the export of commodities went into decline.

Between 2003 and 2007 an estimated 500,000 new jobs were being created every year. But for 2009 job losses were expected to push unemployment levels higher than the 4 million persons officially deemed unemployed. Although absolute levels of poverty have declined, the income of the top 10 percent of the population, both White and Black, is nearly 100 times that of the bottom 10 percent.

For 2009/10 a budget deficit of around 4 percent was predicted. But the banking system appeared to be strong enough to deal with the financial consequences of the drastic downturn. Fortunately a major spending programme on infrastructure had been started in 2008 in preparation for the hosting of the 2010 Football World Cup. This investment in productive assets stood the country in good stead during the financial crisis years.

South Africa’s Future

What about the future? Anthony Trollip, a well-known commentator who visited South Africa in the heydays of British colonialism, wrote the following words on his return to England in 1877: “South Africa is a country of black men – and not of white men. It has been so; it is so; and it will be so”. A quick glance at South Africa’s demographic picture confirms Trollip’s observation: more than 80 percent of South Africa’s population is Black, and counting. Since 1994 the Black population has gained overwhelming political control although the English-speaking Whites still predominate in the economic life of the country. The Afrikaner Whites today number about 2.5 million and have been completely marginalised over the recent two decades.

The Black population’s geographical distribution still follows the historical settlement patterns: the Nguni nations (Xhosa, Zulu and Swazi) are concentrated along the eastern seaboard and the Sothos (Pedi, Tswana and South Sothos) along the inland spine. Only Johannesburg is a veritable ‘melting pot’ where all the population groups rub shoulders. The Indians are still largely concentrated around Durban city and the Coloureds around Cape Town. During the first decade of Black rule, the Xhosa predominated. After the 2009 elections, it is the turn of the Zulus to occupy the command positions. Although provincial boundaries have been rearranged, Southern Africa still basically resembles the patterns visualised by Cecil John Rhodes: Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana as ‘homeland reserves’ for respectively Sotho, Swazi and Tswana peoples with Zimbabwean ‘Rhodesia’ dominated by a Shona chieftain at the expense of the Ndebele and the Whites who have been driven out and marginalised.

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South Africa has advanced on many fronts. Its economy outperforms any other on the African continent, more people go to school and university, it is self-sufficient in food production, it attracts millions of migrants from across its porous borders, it acts as role model and trendsetter for the continent on the international arena and it has become a favourite tourist destination.

During its convoluted history contributions were made by all parts of the unique kaleidoscope of South African peoples. The English contributed their language, political culture and economic inputs. The Afrikaners contributed the cultural traditions of continental Western Europe, their knowledge capital and managed to hold on to political power until the demise of Soviet imperialism when the USSR imploded at the end of the Cold War. The White communities, both English and Afrikaans speakers, are now part of dwindling and ageing population segments – ensconced in security-fenced cluster-housing estates or gated neighbourhoods. The members of the younger generation with internationally marketable skills and talents are emigrating in growing numbers. Those that remain in South Africa face all the problems of an endangered species: marginalisation and extrusion.

The Black communities contributed their manpower, their diverse cultural lifestyles and their formidable demographic preponderance. The future was now left largely in their hands.

The Conflation of Leader, Party and State

L’etat c’est moi (I am the state) are the words famously associated with Louis XIV when he tried to explain the absolute powers he held in his hands. As a counterpoint, the democratic response is expressed in the words of Lord Acton: “All power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. In the democratic tradition there is an ingrained suspicious aversion against any concentration of unchecked power.

Given South Africa’s racial and tribal mix, it is of critical importance to protect the independence of key public institutions such as Parliament, the judiciary, human rights monitors, academic institutions and free media. The President or the ANC should not be allowed to stuff as many institutions as possible with personal or party loyalists to entrench their hold on power.

After an eight-year tussle with the courts for alleged corruption, the National Prosecution Authority (NPA) withdrew all charges of corruption, racketeering, tax evasion, money laundering and fraud against Mr. Zuma. The merits of the case were not in question. The case was simply dropped because continuation was “neither possible nor desirable”.

In its cover story on South Africa, The Economist, October 20, 2012, states: “Nearly two decades after apartheid ended, South Africa is becoming a de facto one-party state”. It says that Mr Zuma, as President, has drifted and dithered, offering neither vision nor firm government; that he failed to tackle the scourge of corruption; that the ANC under his aegis has sought to undermine the independence of the courts, the police, the prosecuting authority and the press; that the ANC has conflated the interests of party and state dishing out contracts for public works as rewards for loyalty; that the ANC in government has reduced economic competitiveness and bolstered a fabulously rich black elite. 132

The Economist provides a litany of specific failings to illustrate that South Africa is in a worse state than at any point since 1994: number of police killings, wildcat strikes, a decline in sovereign rating, worsening foreign investment, a widening wealth gap measured by the Gini coefficient, falling education standards on all levels, real unemployment levels (particularly youth unemployment) approaching 50 percent, skills shortages, loss of confidence resulting in equity market outflows, a large slump in mining production, chronic failure of government services, unaccountability in government spending, declining GDP growth, decline in effective political opposition to sustain political accountability, the withering away of judicial independence and freedom of the press. The Economist concludes that South Africa is sliding downhill while much of the rest of the continent is clawing its way up. The question may well be posed whether South Africa will find a better future within the fold of the BRICS model?

Bibliography

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Raidt, E.H. (1991) Afrikaans en sy Europese Verlede, Nasionale Opvoedkundige Uitgewery, Kaapstad Theal, G.M. (1917) South Africa, G.P. Putnam’s & Sons, New York Thompson, L. (2001) A History of South Africa, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Jeppestown Van Rooyen, J. (2000) The New Great Trek – The Story of South Africa’s White Exodus, Unisa Press, Pretoria Vosloo, W.B., ed. (1994) Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth, HSRC Publishers, Pretoria Worden, N. (1012) The Making of Modern South Africa, John Wiley & Sons, West Sussex. The Economist The Third World Survey, September 23rd, 1989, pp.1-57 Rediscovering the Middle of Africa, December 1990, p.75 The Hopeless Continent, May 13th, 2000. How to Make Africa Smile, A Survey of Sub-Saharan Africa by Robert Guest, January 17th, 2004, pp.1-15 Africa’s Great Black Hope, A Survey of South Africa by John Grimond, June 2004, pp.1-16 Special Report on Thabo Mbeki, January 22nd, 2005, pp.26-28 Chasing the Rainbow, A Survey of South Africa by Richard Cockett, April 8th, 2006, pp.3-12 Africa’s Next Big Man, briefing South Africa’s elections, April 18th, 2009, pp.25-28 Over the Rainbow, briefing South Africa’s Sad Decline, October 20th, 2012, pp.21-23

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8. Post-Colonial Former British BLS Protectorates

When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910 between the four colonies (Transvaal, Orange Free State, Natal and the Cape), the other neighbouring black colonial territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland were strongly opposed to any suggestion that they should also join in the Union movement. Bechuanaland had come under British administration in 1895 to satisfy Rhodes’s preference for a route to the north lying outside the frontiers of the Transvaal. He wanted to safeguard his communications between Cape Town and the north of the subcontinent. At this time the Union Jack had been flying over Basutoland for twenty-seven years. Swaziland, which fell into the Transvaal Republic’s sphere of influence in 1875, had recovered its standing as a British ‘protectorate’ after the Anglo-Boer War.

At the unification conference in 1909, Genl. Botha raised the question of incorporating the three colonial territories, but was unsuccessful in relaxing opposition to incorporation, both on the side of Britain and on the side of the colonial territories.

During the following decades the idea of incorporation into South Africa was repeatedly raised, particularly by J.C. Smuts who believed that Rhodes’s inclusive unification plans made a lot of sense.

Dr. Verwoerd, in contrast to other National Party leaders, was not in favour of incorporation. His concept of ‘separate development’ of the various ethnic groups of Southern Africa was based on the premise that each major ethnic group should be encouraged to develop to its full potential within its own territory – the theory of ‘grand apartheid’. During an interview with the author of this manuscript in September 1965, he declared that he would prefer to drop the name ‘apartheid’ for his policies in favour of ‘separate development’. He also maintained that his policy of ‘separate development’, leading to ‘independent homelands’ for all the major ethnic groups who prefer to choose so, is but a continuation to its logical conclusion of the grand policy strategy initiated by the British in 1910 when they refused to incorporate Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland into the Union of South Africa. He argued that his policy of ‘separate homeland development in order to create separate, independent nationhoods’ for the major South African population groups already existed in embryonic form.

Although Britain had done relatively little to prepare its ‘protectorates’ for independence, Bechuanaland was the first to take independence under the presidency of Seretse Khama in September 1966. It was renamed Botswana. Basutoland was the next in line when it became Lesotho under its monarch King Moshoeshoe II in October 1966. Real governmental power was entrusted to Chief Leboa Jonathan. Swaziland, which kept its old name, was given similar status in September 1968.

Post-Colonial Botswana

Botswana is a land-locked country with a total land area of 582,096km2. That means it is larger in land area than France’s 547,020km2. Its comparatively fertile eastern grasslands along the Limpopo River are separated from the Okavango Swamps in the west by a north-south running 135

plateau. About 80 percent of the total surface area is covered with scrubland with forests confined to the banks of the Chobe River in the extreme north. Wholly barren desert conditions prevail in the south-western Kgalagadi and Kalahari desert regions.

The population is estimated at around 2 million of which only around 20 percent live in urban areas. About 80 percent of the population are Tswana, 11 percent Kalanga, 3 percent Basarwa and the remaining 6 percent are Kgalagadi and White. The main urban centres are Gaborone (capital), Francistown, Selebi-Phikwe, Serowe, Mahalapye and Lobatse. The official languages are English and Setswana.

The executive president is elected by universal suffrage for a renewable five-year term and he appoints a vice-president from among members of the National Assembly, of which 57 members are elected by universal suffrage, four are nominated by the majority party. Legislature elections are held every five years. The president presides over the cabinet appointed by him. An advisory 15-member House of Chiefs considers draft legislation relating to alterations to the constitution, to chieftaincy matters and may make representations to the president on matters affecting ethnic groups or their organisations.

The administration of the country comprises nine districts. The justice system is based on a combination of Roman-Dutch and customary local law. The Court of Appeal deals with criminal and civil appeals from the High Court and the death penalty is still in force.

The national currency is the pula and the national budget (2010 est.) is around US$5 billion. The GDP (2010 est.) is around US$12 billion with a per capita income of around US$7,500 p.a. The economy is heavily reliant on its diamond production, but it also produces coal, copper, nickel and gold. Only 0.7 percent of the land is considered arable and a further 46 percent is used for grazing. Rainfall is erratic. Traditionally, the economy has relied heavily on cattle raising. Around 17 percent of the land is given to wildlife preservation with controlled areas set aside for game viewing, safaris and recreational as well as subsistence hunting. Around 80 percent of exports consist of diamonds, of which Botswana is the second largest producer in the world.

Education is compulsory for all children between 6 and 15 years of age and around 2.5 percent of GDP is spent on education. Literacy rates are around 82 percent for females and 76 percent for males.

Around 30 percent of the population is affected by HIV/AIDS. Some projections have shown that 15-year old boys have an 80 percent chance of dying from HIV/AIDS.

Botswana has taken a lead in the establishment of the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) with the express aim of reducing South African states’ dependence on the South African economy. Gaborone is the home of SADCC’s permanent secretariat. SADCC also made several efforts to assist in the settlement of internal political disputes in Zimbabwe, particularly in view of the large number of Zimbabwean refugees who are constantly seeking refuge in Botswana. Many refugees are trekking through Botswana on their way to South Africa.

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In many ways, Botswana is often held up as a good example of a successful post-colonial African state. It tops the polls of the best-run, post-colonial African state. Average income has tripled in real terms in two decades, putting Botswana on a par with Mexico. It has consistently held unfettered multi-party elections.

What are the ‘secrets’ of its success? It has been lucky in its mineral wealth, deftly developed by De Beers, the South African diamond giant. Its population is fairly homogeneous whereas most African countries are struggling to find a modus vivendi between a diverse concoction of tribes within crudely drawn boundaries by colonial powers. A single party has ruled since independence but is has done so under responsible leadership. Over the years it has proved to be an example of what can be achieved with a rich natural resource base combined with good governance.

Post-Colonial Lesotho

By virtue of its history and land-locked geography, Lesotho developed a strong sense of national identity. The shadow of Moshesh, the great leader who brought its people together out of remnants of refugees from Zulu King Shaka’s persecution, still acts as a binding force. It is isolated from South Africa by the high peaks and deep valleys of the Drakensberg mountain range. The soil is poor and subject to erosion but the building of dams and hydro-electric installations with investments from South Africa has made the development of stock raising and crop growing possible. To the west of the country there is a 30-60km wide belt of fertile land along the Caledon River supporting the bulk of the local population.

Lesotho covers an area of 30,350km2 of which two-thirds is mountainous. The total population is around 2.5 million of whom 99.7 percent are Sotho, divided into several ethnic groups. Around 80 percent of the population are Catholic Christians.

The bulk of the population is poor and most adults are migrant labourers in South Africa: many in the mines but large numbers work on South African farms and in factories. The GDP is estimated (2010) at around US$2 billion with a per capita income of around US$700. Unemployment is estimated at around 45 percent.

The 1960 constitution provides for a monarchy and an elected prime minister, but after continued conflict between the monarch Moshoeshoe II and the prime minister Jonathan, the Lesotho Paramilitary Force conducted a coup d’état led by Maj-Gen. Justin Lekhanya in 1986. Thereafter Lekhanya restored the monarchy with reduced powers in 1990, when Prince Mohato Bereng Seisa was sworn in as King Letsie III. Moshoeshoe II went into exile in Britain. Lekhanya was forced out of office in April 1991 and Col. Elias Ramaema was sworn in as the head of the ruling military council.

In the 1993 general election, the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) led by Ntsa Mokhehle won all 65 National Assembly seats. The same year the BCP government was dismissed by King Letsie III with support from the security forces. He dissolved parliament and set aside the constitution. A 16-member transitional council of ministers was created, pending the restoration of King Moshoeshoe II. Then, in 1994 under pressure from the newly elected South African government 137

under Nelson Mandela, Ntsu Mokhehle was reinstated as PM by King Letsie III. Later the same year King Moshoeshoe was reinstated by a bill passed by the National Assembly.

Troubles persisted within the security forces and PM Ntsu Mokhehle fled to South Africa in 1997. In 1998 the South African and Botswana governments sent soldiers into Lesotho to put down a mutiny against King Letsie III who again took the throne after King Moshoeshoe was killed in a car accident. Fresh elections were held in 2000 and again in 2003.

A large project financed by the World Bank, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project aimed at the sale of water and hydro-electric power to South Africa, brought about a significant injection of job opportunities and income into Lesotho. But unfortunately the economy suffered serious setbacks as a result of the decline of job opportunities for migrant workers in South Africa and competitive pressure from China for the fledgling textile industry of Lesotho.

The Lesotho population also suffered heavily as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic which affected 30 percent of its population. In 2008 there were an estimated 100,000 AID orphans in Lesotho. The outlook for this poor country in the foreseeable future is indeed discouraging.

Post-Colonial Swaziland

Land-locked Swaziland covers a total area of 17,363km2, slightly smaller than Israel. Its population is estimated at around 1.2 million of which 97 percent are Siswati, a branch of the Nguni people, closely related to Zulu. Official government business is conducted in English.

The Kingdom of Swaziland is the only absolute monarchy in Africa. Executive power is vested in the paramount chief (king) and a cabinet appointed by him. The bicameral legislative body, the Libandla, has limited powers. The House of Assembly has 65 seats of which 55 are elected by popular vote for five years. The Senate has 30 seats, 10 appointed by the House of Assembly and 20 appointed by the monarch. The system of law combines the Roman-Dutch system (as in South Africa) in statutory courts and a traditional Swazi structure with 16 Swazi courts of first instance, two Courts of Appeal and a High Court of Appeal. The Chief Justice is constitutionally independent of the executive arm of government, though administered as part of the ministry of justice. The death penalty is in force.

The GDP stands at around US$3 billion, per capita around US$2,500. The main crops are sugar cane, citrus fruits, maize, cotton and rice. The climate is temperate and the annual rainfall at Mbabane, its capital, is 1400mm or 56 inches per annum. The country’s standard of living is about 50 percent higher than in Lesotho. Britain assumed sovereignty of Swaziland in 1894 and granted limited self government in 1963. Full independence was achieved on 6 September 1968.

In 1973 and also in 1977, King Sobhuza II dismissed parliament only to re-instate it a few years later. When King Sobhuza died in 1982, he was succeeded by his teenage son Prince Makhosetive who was crowned as Mswati III on 25 April 1986. A power struggle between traditionalists and modernists has dominated Swazi political life for many years. Mswati III has dissolved and re-instated parliament several times and continued to defy pressure for multi- party democracy. The bloated civil service absorbs around 60 percent of the national revenue 138

and seems to remain the source of the King’s power. The King acquired world-wide fame for having 14 wives and 23 children. His opulent lifestyle has triggered domestic protest, particularly his purchase of luxury cars and use of private jets. State houses have been built for his many wives.

The AfricanEconomicOutlook.org’s 2012 Economic Outlook for Swaziland provides a comprehensive overview of the country’s many problems: - high levels of poverty (63 percent of population); - food insecurity (29 percent of population); - unemployment (29 percent of population); - the highest rate of HIV in the world; - inadequate social protection schemes; - inadequate access of women to productive assets; - one of the lowest growth rates in Africa for the past decade (0.6 percent); - an underdeveloped private sector; - declining competitiveness (126 out of 139); - weak governance, especially in public financial management; - rapidly rising public debt (around 25 percent of GDP); - rising inflation levels (9 percent); - excessive public wage bills (18 percent of GDP); and - a budget deficit of 14 percent of GDP.

The report paints a discouraging future for a country that has been endowed with a favourable subtropical climate and a rich natural resource base. Reversing land degradation which stems from unsustainable land use and weak management is a key challenge for raising agricultural productivity. Adverse economic conditions are leading to social unrest organised by labour unions, teachers and other groups demanding political reforms. Discontented groups are not only seeking improved public finance management and transparency, but also greater democracy. Job creation is an urgent priority with over 50 percent unemployment in the 15-24 age group. The private sector remains underdeveloped, FDI inflows are limited and the number of SMEs low. The private sector has thus not been able to lift the economy out of the financial crisis that hit the country in 2008. Constraining regulations, lack of access to credit, skill shortages and mismatch and weak infrastructure hamper both foreign investment and the emergence of more productive and high-tec domestic entrepreneurship.

Bibliography

Arnold, G. (2005) Africa – A Modern History, Atlantic Books, London Meredith, M. (2012) The State of Africa, Simon & Schuster, London Nugent, P. (2012) Africa Since Independence, 2nd Ed, Palgrave MacMillan New York SBS World Guide (2008) Hardie Grant Books, Prahran, Victoria

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9. Post-Colonial Former British Central Africa

As a result of efforts by J.C. Smuts to incorporate Rhodesia into the Union of South Africa, a referendum was held in 1922. They were asked which option they would prefer – inclusion in South Africa or self-government within the British Empire. A total of 22,000 voters opted for the latter solution by a majority of over 3,800. It became a Crown Colony with a system of representative government. In theory Blacks and Whites received the vote, but only a few hundred succeeded to be registered as voters.

In 1952, at the instigation of the British government, Southern Rhodesia joined with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to form the Central African Federation with a parliament composed of thirty-six Whites and nine Blacks – the latter elected on the basis of three per territory. But within ten years, the Federation crumbled. The Blacks had little enthusiasm for the Federation. With Black states emerging all around them in the 1960s, they started demanding independence which they were granted in 1964. Northern Rhodesia became Zambia under President Kenneth Kaunda and Nyasaland became Malawi under President Hastings Banda. Southern Rhodesia remained one of the last two Crown Colonies left in Africa. It entered into a tense dialogue with Britain’s Labour government. London held onto a slogan of NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority Rule) which it considered an essential condition for an agreement. Salisbury was determined not to accept this formula. It retaliated with its own slogan, UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence), which it proclaimed on 11 November 1965. The Labour government of Harold Wilson, supported by the United Nations, reverted to the imposition of economic sanctions. The Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, refused to compromise with Wilson and in 1969 the effective independence of Rhodesia was confirmed by a referendum.

Post-Colonial Zambia

This land-locked country has an area of 752,610km2, slightly smaller than Namibia. It has a population of around 12 million of which 99 percent are Africans and 1 percent Europeans and others. Around 70 percent of the population are Christians and the remainder Muslim. English is the official language and an additional 7 major and 70 other indigenous languages are spoken. Most of its territory comprises an elevated plateau. Its rivers drain southwards towards the Zambezi. Its north-eastern tip flanks the south-western part of Lake Tanganyika. It borders Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the DRC and Angola. Its capital is Lusaka with Ndola and Kitwe two additional cities with populations close to 500,000.

The GDP is estimated at around US$11 billion with per capita income around US$900. Around 7 percent of the land is arable. Agricultural production includes wheat, rice, maize, sorghum, fruit, vegetables, sugar cane, tobacco and cotton. Close to 50 percent of the country is forested and fisheries in Lake Tanganyika provide a significant source of food for surrounding areas. The Zambian economy is dominated by the mining of copper and other minerals.

There are 2,157km of railways and 90,000km of roads. HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis are the main health threats. Education is compulsory for ages 7 to 13. Of the males, 86 percent are literate, compared to 75 percent of females. 140

Rhodes’s British South Africa Company signed treaties with local chieftains which allowed the company to administer the country until 1924. During this period lead and zinc mining was started at Broken Hill (Kitwe) in 1906 and railway connections were soon established to Katanga in the Belgian Congo. The discovery of copper along the border with Katanga fuelled rapid economic development during the 1920s to 1940s.

After breaking away from the Central African Federation it became an independent state in 1964 changing its name from Northern Rhodesia to the Republic of Zambia, with Kenneth Kaunda as its first president.

Kaunda established a one-party state under the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and embarked on a policy of industrial and commercial nationalisation. In 1973 the government took control of the country’s two largest copper-mining groups and merged them to form the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines. Being so dependent on a single export made Zambia vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market price for copper.

After attaining its own independence, Zambia played a major role supporting guerrilla movements in neighbouring Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. By the 1990s Kaunda’s UNIP was facing growing demands for internal democratisation. After a coup by junior army officers, multi-party elections were held in 1991. Kaunda was ousted after holding power for 27 years. His successor was Frederick Chiluba, a trade union leader, leading the Movement for Multi- Party Democracy (MMD). Chiluba promised privatisation and reforms to the economic system including the opening of a stock exchange. Subsequently the Chiluba government was accused of using privatisation to enrich cabinet ministers and their friends, of corruption and abuse of power. Chiluba’s government passed a law, the Powers and Privileges Act which prohibited non- members of parliament from criticising proclamations by members of parliament.

Kenneth Kaunda was re-elected as leader of UNIP. As a result of his popular support the Chiluba government tried to bar Kaunda from the presidential race. As a result major foreign donors, including the USA, suspended aid programmes to Zambia. Chiluba controversially won the 1996 elections amid accusations of election fraud. The police fired upon UNIP political gatherings. Kaunda and other opponents to the Chiluba government were imprisoned and his son was gunned down outside his home in Lusaka by security forces. UNIP seemed to be too ridden by internal squabbles to mount an effective opposition to Chiluba. The MMD eventually ruled against a third term for Chiluba and replaced him with Levy Mwanawasa as President.

In 2003 Chiluba was arrested on 66 charges of corruption along with his intelligence chief, Xavier Chungu, and ex-treasury secretary, David Diangano. In 2004 the charges were dismissed as principal state witnesses changed their stories.

In 2005 the US, France and Japan agreed to cancel US$1 billion worth of debts owed by Zambia. The IMF also agreed to cancel the debts of 19 poor countries, including Zambia.

In 2008 the London High Court found former President Chiluba guilty in absentia of stealing US$46 million, laundered through two British law firms. The judiciary in Zambia proceeded 141

with their action against the ex-President for corruption, but the trial was postponed to allow him to go to Johannesburg for medical treatment.

The Chinese became active participants in Zambia since they completed the Tan-Zam railway line connecting Zambia with Tanzania’s main port at Dar-es-Salaam. Subsequently they became the major investors in and operators of Zambia’s mines as well as the major retail trading in the country. Government owned Chinese companies have also taken the initiative to build schools and a major sport stadium.

China has capitalised on the void left by departing colonisers and is now the continent’s biggest trading partner. Their presence is particularly felt in Zambia where their investment in agriculture and mines exceeded US$1 billion in 2010.

The Chinese claim that they create many new jobs and invest in infrastructure as proof that they are giving back. But local people claim that the Chinese act with impunity and treat local workers badly with poor pay and harsh working conditions.

During the 2011 Zambian elections the Chinese issue came to a head when the incumbent president, Rupiah Banda, leader of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, was challenged by Michael Sata, who leads the Patriotic Front. Mr. Sata started his career as a sweeper at British Rail stations in London. In his election campaign he came out strongly against the numerous Chinese who found their way into the country. Mr. Banda, in contrast, has made life as easy as possible for the Chinese: cutting a windfall tax on mine earnings and allowing the Bank of China to set up in Lusaka, where Yuan could be deposited and withdrawn directly – the first in Africa. Mr. Banda’s election campaign was part funded by Chinese interests.

To everyone’s surprise Mr. Michael Sata won the election which he based on a pro-poor, anti- corruption campaign. He promised to “restore the dignity” of Zambians. Mr. Sata immediately dismissed a string of army officers, civil officials, dropped taxes and raised health and education budgets.

In his speeches he claims that he identifies with his people who still have to get by on less than two dollars a day, who are still walking long distances and working long hours.

Mr. Sata told his Zambian people that it is necessary to rebuild ties with the West and with Britain in particular: “better the devil you know than the one you don’t”.

Post-Colonial Malawi

Narrow, land-locked Malawi covers an area of 118,484km2. Traversing the country north-south, the Great Rift Valley contains both Lake Nyasa and the Shire River valley, draining south- eastward from the lake. The western central plateau is largely infertile, while the southern areas carry the bulk of the population of 14 million. The population is made up of several tribes: 60 percent Marawi, 18 percent Lomwe, 13 percent Yao, 7 percent Ngoni, as well as Asian and European minorities. Blantyre in the south is the largest city with Lilongwe as capital. Around 142

70 percent of the population is Christian, 20 percent Muslim and the remainder Animist. The two official languages are English and Chichewa, while other languages are important regionally.

Malawi is a republic within the Commonwealth. It has a 193 seat multi-party elected National Assembly and a president, elected for a five-year term. The justice system is based on English common law and customary law. The Supreme Court has a role in the review of legislation and there is a network of traditional courts. The death penalty is in force.

The GDP is estimated at US$3,5 billion with a per capita income of around US$300. Since 20 percent of the land is arable, the economy depends on agriculture: wheat, maize, sorghum, fruit, nuts, vegetables, sugar cane, coffee, tea, tobacco and cotton. There is limited industrial activity related to tobacco, tea, sugar and sawmill products. Its main trading partners are South Africa, Germany and Egypt. There are 800km of railways (including a link with Mozambique) and 15,500km of roads. The inland waterways consist of Lake Nyasa and the Shire River. Education is compulsory for ages 6 to 13 and literacy levels are 74 percent for males and 54 percent for females.

The British established colonial authority over the region in 1891. It joined the Central African Federation in 1953 and took independence in 1964 under Dr. Hastings Banda as president and leader of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). In 1966 Malawi became a one-party state with Banda as life president – a position he held until aged in his nineties. Malawi had a reputation for dealing ruthlessly with opposition forces. During the 1980s and 1990s Malawi was struggling with severe drought conditions and more than 800,000 refugees from the civil conflicts in Mozambique.

After several years of rising internal opposition against the Banda regime, it gradually led to violent conflict in which many people were killed. In 1993 Banda convened a National Consultative Council (NCC) of representatives from each political party – but excluded trade unions and churches. Unrest persisted until Banda’s MCP was defeated in the first multi-party elections of 17 May 1994, ending 30 years of one-party rule. The principal opposition parties were the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Alliance for Democracy (Aford) who participated in the formation of a coalition government with the UDF’s Bakili Muluzi, a Muslim, as President.

In the course of 2002, Malawi started to experience an influx of refugees from Zimbabwe as a result of the violence and economic disintegration caused by Mugabe. Malawi relied on World Bank and IMF support to deal with the growing domestic poverty levels, widespread famine and the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

During the 2004 election campaigns, Pres. Muluzi’s government was accused of corruption, nepotism and human rights abuses. Muluzi also tried to amend the constitution to allow him a further term as president. But the UDF elected a new leader, Mutharika, who became Malawi’s new president. He promptly moved into the lavish 300 room Lilongwe palace, built by former dictator Banda and used as parliament house, expelling the members of parliament from their offices and venues.

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During the following years, president Mutharika launched an anti-corruption campaign but failed to gain parliamentary and judicial support. As many as eight of the cabinet members, including the Minister for Education, were exposed for not having secondary school certificates as claimed in their official biographies!

The Malawi economy continued to decline with nearly half of the countryside facing starvation. The cities became grossly over crowded with impoverished refugees. In desperation, Malawi cut its longstanding ties with Taiwan in the hope of attracting financial support and investment from mainland China.

Post-Colonial Zimbabwe

Land-locked Zimbabwe covers a total area of 390,580km2 – slightly larger than Germany. The population is estimated at around 12.5 million of which 98 percent are African, 1 percent mixed and less than 1 percent White. The Black population is divided into 82 percent Shona and 14 percent Ndebele.

Topographically the country slopes from highveld in the north-west to south-east riverine lowveld regions. The Zambezi in the north-west and the Limpopo in the south-east are the principal rivers draining eastwards into the Indian Ocean. The climate is sub-tropical modified by altitude. Rainfall varies from 400-600mm in the lowveld, to 1200-1500mm in the mountainous north-east. Its capital, Harare, has an average rainfall of 830mm per annum whereas Bulawayo receives 600mm and Victoria Falls 700mm.

Zimbabwe has experienced serious economic decline over the past 30 years. Although around 9 percent of the land is arable, only about 0.3 percent is under permanent cultivation. In view of its temperate climate and good rainfall, the country is suited to a wide range of agricultural crops: maize, wheat, sorghum, fruit, soybeans, sugar cane, coffee, tobacco and cotton. It is also suitable for cattle raising. The country is well endowed with mineral resources such as coal, gold, copper, nickel and other metallic and non-metallic ores. The country has over 3,000km of railways and 100,000km of roads. The Mazoe and Zambezi rivers are used for transporting chrome ore from Harare to Mozambique.

After years as a self-governing British colony, the Central African Federation was formed in 1953, composing Northern and Southern Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) under premiership of Sir Godfrey Huggins (1953-56) and Sir Roy Welensky (1956-63). Nationalist movements in all three areas opposed the Federation and it broke up in 1963 as both Malawi and Zambia gained independence in 1964. Within Southern Rhodesia, opposition to Black majority rule, on the part of the White settler community led by Rhodesian Front’s Winston Field, gradually gained strength and sidelined PM Garfield Todd. When the Federation broke up in 1963, Southern Rhodesia formally submitted an application for independence to the British government. When it was rejected, Ian Smith, who became PM in 1964, declared independence unilaterally on 11 November 1965.

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The first African nationalist movement in Rhodesia, the African National Congress formed in 1934, was revived in 1957 under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo. It was first renamed the National Democratic Party and then the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). The party was banned in 1962 and when the movement split in 1963, a new party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed with Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole as its leader. Both ZANU and ZAPU were banned and many of its leaders detained by the Ian Smith government. The African liberation movement then went underground and a guerrilla war started in 1964, taking the form of a full-scale war in 1972.

The British government invoked selective international sanctions against Rhodesia but was not prepared to use force. PM Harold Wilson met Ian Smith in 1966 and in 1968 in unsuccessful bids to find a settlement. In 1971, Conservative Party foreign minister Sir Alec Douglas-Hume finally reached an agreement with Ian Smith. Country-wide opposition to the proposals was organised by the African National Council under Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

By 1973, ZANU, operating from bases in Mozambique, infiltrated north-eastern Rhodesia. At the same time ZAPU, operating from bases in Zambia, established a guerrilla presence in western Rhodesia. During the 1970s several negotiations were conducted, including a detente period in 1974-75 which resulted in the release of some detainees, including Robert Mugabe, ZANU’s secretary-general, Nkomo and Rev. Sithole. Mugabe then replaced Sithole as leader of ZANU. He then organised a loose alliance between ZANU and ZAPU, known as the Patriotic Front (PF). It is estimated that the guerrilla war cost at least 27,000 lives before talks eventually culminated in the British organised Lancaster House Conference (Sept-Dec. 1979), at which an agreement was reached for a transition to independence based on majority rule.

Zimbabwe became an independent republic within the Commonwealth on 18 April 1980, with a non-executive president (Canaan Banana) and Mugabe as the new country’s Prime Minister at the head of a coalition government. This coalition broke up in February 1982 when Nkomo and two of his ZAPU colleagues were dismissed from the cabinet after discovery of arms caches on farms owned by ZAPU. A wave of unrest in Matabeleland ensued and thousands of people were killed as the Mugabe government cracked down on Ndebele dissidents. This massacre was known in Mugabe circles as “Gukurahundi”, meaning “... the early rain that washes away the chaff”. Hopefully a proper inquest some day in future will reveal the full extent of the atrocities by Mugabe’s North-Korean trained soldiers.

In elections held in 1985, ZANU won 64 of the 85 Black seats in the House of Assembly and ZAPU only 15. The 20 White seats were abolished in September 1987 and replaced by ZANU nominees (which included 11 Whites). After constitutional amendments in 1987, Mugabe was elected as Zimbabwe’s first executive president. In the same month Mugabe and Nkomo signed a unity agreement which provided for a merger of ZANU and ZAPU. Zimbabwe seemed to be on its way to becoming a one-party Marxist state. In October 1989 the constitution was amended to give Mugabe full powers to establish a one-party state. The House of Assembly was enlarged to 120 elective seats of which Mugabe’s ZANU won 116 seats.

In 1992 the Land Allocation Bill was enacted, ostensibly meant to redistribute land to landless peasants. Much of the land subsequently went to cabinet ministers and high-ranking officials. A 145

challenge before the High Court, brought by White farmers, was dismissed in 1994. In the 1995 election ZANU-PF won 118 of the 120 seats in the National Assembly. There was a low turnout and accusations of vote rigging.

In February 1995 Standard Chartered Bank, Zimbabwe, reported that government debt had trebled in five years to over US$47 billion. Interest charges were the largest budget item. In 1996, public sector workers mounted countrywide strikes over lack of pay.

In 1997, Mugabe’s government published a list of 4.8 million hectares of white-owned properties (44 percent of commercial farms) to be compulsorily purchased under a controversial scheme that would only reimburse owners for infrastructural improvements and not the land itself. Since independence, the British government had provided £30 million for the purchase of white-owned farms. Mugabe argued that the former colonial ruler should continue to compensate white farmers for their land. The sporadic seizure of white farms continued and the white population continued to emigrate. Their numbers declined from more than 200,000 twenty years ago to less than 10,000 today and they are continuing to drift away.

In 1998, Morgan Tsvangirai of the Mineworkers’ Union, and Gibson Sibanda, president of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, led a countrywide strike. They set up the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In the growing chaotic conditions, Mugabe resorted to playing the race card, urging landless peasants and veterans of the liberation struggle to attack opposition demonstrations and to occupy white-owned farms. A number of white farmers and numerous opposition supporters were murdered.

In June 2000 Mugabe told the Congress of ZANU-PF party supporters that his aim was to take back all white-owned farms – as an irritating legacy of colonial history. He announced that the next stage of this “Africanisation” programme would be foreign-owned mines and other businesses.

In the June 2000 elections, ZANU-PF won 62 seats and the MDC 57 seats. The MDC challenged the results in 37 constituencies on the grounds of election rigging and intimidation of opposition officials and supporters. The High Court nullified the result of the 2000 election in two constituencies, but Mugabe continued to ignore count rulings that went against the government. To add insult to injury, the MDC opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai and secretary-general Welshman Ncube were arrested and charged with treason. In March 2002, Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth. Both the USA and the EU imposed sanctions, but they had little impact on the ruling ZANU-PF elite.

During this period the Zimbabwe economy continued to weaken, in part due to the disruption of agricultural production caused by the invasion of white-owned commercial farms by ‘war veterans’ linked to the ruling ZANU-PF. GDP fell by an estimated 35 percent over the years 1998 to 2003. Inflation stood at 228 percent.

As the economy spiralled downward, Mugabe clung to power through the use of force, intimidation and show trials before an increasingly politicised judiciary. ZANU-PF militia, known as Green Bombers, carried out assassinations and open intimidation. It was claimed that 146

Mugabe avoided ‘early retirement’ in fear of Milosevic-style indictment for human rights abuses, as well as repercussions for his extended family and allies. Mugabe continued to grab the best land for his family, party officials and military officers. State orchestrated political violence and police intimidation of the MDC, the Congress of Trade Unions and all opposition organisations continued to escalate. All independent newspapers remained closed.

Zimbabwe’s manufacturing, before its decay, was largely linked to farming output. After the expulsion of the white farmers, agricultural production went into a tailspin, leading to chronic food shortages. A country that used to act as a food basket for the region, became itself a basket case. The effects of the economic crisis became visible everywhere: people queuing to buy food, railway locomotives and buses chronically out of order, hospitals creaking under the strain of the increasing number of patients suffering from malnutrition, power failures became routine, refuse collection became sporadic, townships that were once claimed as models for Africa became stinking health hazards, water reticulation became sporadic, sewerage treatment plants became clogged, medical services declined because of a shortage of drugs, commuters turned into hitchhikers, lagging wage levels were unable to match inflation. Tens of thousands of ordinary Zimbabweans started to pour over the country’s borders to neighbouring countries, particularly Botswana and South Africa.

By 2007 the inflation rate was estimated to have reached 4000 percent. A new Zim dollar was issued equal to $1000 of the old currency. The increasingly paranoid Mugabe government relied on the highly politicised police and military to beat down any form of opposition, accusing churches, trade unions and others of plotting regime change. In March 2007 the police attacked Morgan Tsvangirai and several MDC supporters, putting them in hospital.

At the time The Economist, the British-owned news magazine, published a special briefing on Robert Mugabe (The Economist, March 31, 2007, pp.25-27). It described Mugabe as “a past master at holding on who has led Zimbabwe from an impressively successful country to the most dramatic peacetime collapse. The Economist described how the much feared Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) spreads dread in the cities, especially the poor townships, after dark. His political opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai, has been assaulted by Mugabe’s underlings and almost hammered to death. Mugabe provoked intense condemnation at home and abroad – but to no avail. If the leader of the opposition cannot be guarded, people ask, how can his ordinary supporters be protected if they protest? Trade union meetings are regularly broken up by the police for being “held without permission”.

The Economist further described how this troublesome Zimbabwean is, paradoxically, both despised and admired: “... Charismatic, well-educated and genuinely clever, he is not merely a thuggish clown like Uganda’s Idi Amin ... Mugabe is also a shrewd performer, switching from Shona to English to send different messages to different audiences. He exploits foreign condemnation of his rule so effectively that Britain’s government ... rarely comments on Zimbabwe ... The man is constantly able to reinvent himself. He is part African populist, prepared to snatch land from commercial farmers ... yet part Anglophile gentleman ... Mr. Mugabe is in part the product of Western, especially British, values ... he has an almost fawning respect for British tradition ... Until targeted sanctions prevented him doing so, his favourite pastime was to travel to London ... He once boasted that, in addition to his seven academic 147

degrees, he had a ‘degree in violence’... One particular concern of Zimbabwe’s leader is that he may face prosecution for overseeing the massacre of thousands of villagers by North-Korean trained soldiers in Matabeleland, in the south-west of the country, in the early 1980s ... Loss of immunity is one of the main costs, to him, of losing power.”

Efforts by neighbouring heads of state to bring about a negotiated settlement came to nothing. Mr. Mugabe, for all his flaws, continued to rely on his anti-colonial credits across the region, particularly on South Africa. Mr. Mbeki, as South African President with a lot of leverage on Zimbabwe’s well-being, tried in vain to broker talks between the opposing factions to find common ground on power sharing. Mbeki was left looking foolish and powerless. Apart from electricity and fuel supplies, South Africa continued to provide Mugabe with the most effective international cover for his misrule. After Zuma took over from Mbeki, Mugabe’s oppression continued unabated. Julius Malema, the wayward ANC Youth League leader, repeatedly referred to Mugabe’s exemplary strategic example for other African leaders. Could it be that South African political leaders saw in Zimbabwe a menacing reflection of what can happen when an ‘independence party’ is challenged by a new generation of leaders?

Presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008 gave the MDC’s candidate Tsvangirai majority support but Mugabe refused to accept the loss. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, plainly under duress, refused to release the ballot results. The ZEC later hesitatingly declared the presidential election “hung” and that the ZANU-PF party had lost its majority. A run-off election was called for the presidency later in the year. The police then started to raid MDC offices and several MDC officials were killed and beaten up. Morgan Tsvangirai was repeatedly arrested and detained in the lead-up to the run-off election. Mugabe also warned that he would not relinquish power if he lost. Days before the run-off election Tsvangirai pulled out, fearing further reprisals for his supporters. Uncontested, Mugabe won the election with 85 percent of the vote.

Mugabe entered into a power-sharing pact with Tsvangirai and set up a ‘unity government’, but only for 18-24 months until “our party was ready and raring to take on the enemy who sought our ruin”, he told the ZANU-PF congress to wild applause and ululations. He probably knew that his party would be wiped out in any reasonably free and fair elections. The Washington-based Freedom House carried out a survey in 2009 which showed ZANU-PF would get only 12 percent of the vote in a presidential election, compared with 55 percent for the MDC. Those surveyed thought that the unity government was helping to improve life for Zimbabweans by the reduction in political violence and the return of food and other goods to the once empty shops following the replacement of the worthless local currency by the American dollar. The power- sharing pact gave no date for the end of the unity government but set out a timetable for drawing up a new constitution which, after being put to a referendum, was supposed to be presented to parliament by October 2010. However, due to delaying tactics by ZANU-PF, this timetable soon fell behind schedule.

Mr Mugabe hated the power-sharing pact foisted on him by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). He continued to control the most important branches of the unity government: the intelligence service, the police and the media. When Tsvangirai threatened to withdraw from the sham setup, Jacob Zuma, president of South Africa, was appointed as 148

mediator to settle the issue before 6 December 2009. In South Africa there were signs of xenophobic violence against the estimated 3 million Zimbabwean refugees in South Africa.

In early 2010, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF unilaterally announced regulations to put into effect an “Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act”, which it had passed two years previously, but not enforced. This Act required all firms worth more than US$500,000 to be majority-owned by “indigenous Zimbabweans” and to show plans within six weeks for compliance within five years. White Zimbabweans are not considered “indigenous”. So any white Zimbabwean, let alone a foreign firm, would be liable to be prevented from wholly owning any enterprise or farm unless it is worth less than US$500,000. Among the firms that would be affected were Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Nestlé and Impala Platinum Holdings.

Just before the deadline for companies to submit their plans, the MDC partners of the unity government announced that the cabinet had pronounced the regulations “null and void”. The ZANU-PF spokesperson denied this and said there would merely be further “consultation” before the law was put into effect. Mr. Mugabe commented that the law “recognises our sovereign right of ownership” and that the law, ultimately, will prevail.

As a consequence to these wranglings within the “unity government”, all foreign company owners have postponed any decisions to invest. Predictions were made that the ‘indigination’ measures are part of ZANU-PF’s populist election platform.

In June 2010, Tendai Biti, Zimbabwe’s finance minister, announced that a discovery of the “biggest find of alluvial diamonds in the history of mankind” had been made in the 60,000- hectare Marange diamond field in Zimbabwe’s east. Civil rights groups claimed that the proceeds from the Marange diamond field were sold illegally and the proceeds used to pay ZANU-PF militias in order to continue attacking MDC supporters, human rights campaigners and white farmers. (See The Economist, June 26, 2010, p.48)

The potential revenue from this bonanza, estimated at US$1 billion-2 billion a year could put Zimbabwe out of its immediate economic misery. Zimbabwe’s entire GDP at the time stood at around US$7.5 billion. But there were problems related to the marketing of the diamonds under the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KP), the diamond trade’s international watchdog.

The Kimberley Process (KP) was set up in 2003 by governments, the diamond industry and NGOs to stop trade in rough diamonds that had helped pay for rebel groups and governments to wage civil wars in countries such as Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Angola. Its 49 members, representing 75 countries, including Zimbabwe, have agreed to comply with strict standards and undertook not to buy diamonds that had not been certified as ‘conflict free’, i.e. ‘blood diamonds’.

Following the announcement of the find by a London registered company, African Consolidated Resources (ACR), tens of thousands of locals and foreigners flocked to the area to try their luck as diggers and panners. Mugabe’s ZANU-PF quickly moved in to claim the field as its own, cancelling ACR’s prospecting rights and sending the army to oust the panners and diggers and 149

seal off the area. Reportedly at least 200 people were killed, many of them by bullets fired from army helicopters.

In the face of growing reports of human rights violations, the KP imposed a ban on all further sales of Marange diamonds. But production by two South African outfits in joint ventures with the Zimbabwean government continued. By June 2010, 4.6m carats, worth US1.7 billion – money the cash-strapped government sorely needed – had been stockpiled. After a favourable report by Abbey Chikane, a South African appointed by the KP to monitor things, he recommended that Zimbabwean sales of Marange diamonds be resumed – despite other reports of continuing human rights abuse and the sale of uncertified diamonds on the black market with proceeds going into the pockets of a group of ZANU-PF bigwigs and army officers. In June 2011, a KP meeting announced that two Zimbabwean-South African joint ventures, Mbada Diamonds and Marange Resources could resume diamond sales. Western members of KP disputed the validity of the announcement and requested traders not to touch Marange diamonds. Subsequently, however, a flood of diamonds kept pouring out of Zimbabwe, to be snapped up in Bahrain, China, India and Lebanon. The Kimberley Process was now in danger of collapse, but Mugabe and his party was being kept afloat. (See The Economist, July 2, 2011, p.40)

The Economist (August 13, 2011, p.15) reported that China was emerging as an important trading and investment partner for Zimbabwe. An important arm of Chinese foreign expansion under its “going out” strategy is the China International Fund, based in Queensway, Hong Kong. This syndicate is represented in Africa by Sam Pa, an alumnus of the Soviet academy in Baku. The syndicate bases its strategies on links forged during the cold war period. It is reported that Mr. Pa is a frequent visitor in Harare where he has been in regular contact with Mr. Happyton Bonyongwe, head of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the country’s notorious secret police which helps to keep Mugabe in power. Mr. Pa has also set up a company called Sino-Zimbabwe Development Limited, which acquired rights to extract oil and gas and to mine gold, platinum and chromium in Zimbabwe. In return, the company publicly promised to build railways, airports and public housing. Mr. Mugabe’s CIO subsequently appeared to be flush with money while the unity government is struggling to raise income to finance normal government services.

Zimbabwe is an example of letting a bad government stay in power, keeping their snouts in the trough.

Bibliography

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10. Post-Colonial Former Portuguese Africa

By the late 19th century, Mozambique and Angola were administered partly by Lisbon and partly by private companies. As was the case in Brazil, Portuguese landowners had acquired, by grants or conquests, large estates or ‘prazos’ along river valleys or elsewhere from the 17th century onwards. But until the slave trade was effectively ended in 1878, after it was abolished in 1858, slavery tended to inhibit the emergence of a corruption free, efficient and civic-minded administrative culture. A proper economic infrastructure in the form of codified and transparent commercial law, reliable banking services, investment security, surveyed land, competitive retail outlets, etc. was required to spur economic development. The colonies did not offer a significant market for manufactured goods.

The low-key style of colonial administration was continued during the first three decades of the 20th century. When the ‘Estado Novo’ of Dr Antonio Salazar was established in 1930, the passive policies of the earlier colonial era ended. The colonies were more directly subjugated to the immediate interests of Portugal.

The acceleration of anti-colonialist sentiments across the world in the aftermath of World War II also encouraged young nationalist leaders like Eduardo Mondlase, Mandelino dos Santos from Mozambique and Agostinho Neto and Mario Pinto de Andrade from Angola to start playing a catalytic role in the independence struggles of their respective countries in the 1950s and 1960s. This struggle was co-ordinated through the Conference of Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) after 1961. Gradually various other strands of liberation movements emerged. The Portuguese Communist Party established branches in Angola and Mozambique.

The various liberation movements in Angola merged in 1961 to form the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The various regional splinter groups in Mozambique were persuaded by Julius Nyerere of Tanzania to form the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in 1962. The boycott, the strike and the demonstration became crucial weapons in the nationalist armoury. The determination of the Portuguese to cling on spurred the liberation movements to take up armed struggle. Nationalist guerrilla armies gradually established political and military control over large parts of both Angola and Mozambique.

Whereas the neighbouring countries provided important footholds to the guerrilla war, the major powers in the Cold War conflict also lined up in the alliance pattern. The United States and the European members of NATO provided support for the Portuguese whereas the Soviet Union and China supported the guerrilla fighters. The Nordic countries also chose to provide funding to the guerrilla fighters.

In time serious power struggles erupted between rival factions within the liberation movement – partly as a result of conflicts of power structures and partly as a result of divergent views on the structure of the new society to be built at the end of the liberation struggle.

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The liberation struggle gradually had the effect of grinding the Portuguese down to the point where the financial and human costs became unbearable. Military expenditure was consuming over 17 percent of the Portuguese budget by 1973 – more than could be sustained by a relatively poor state. It effectively rendered the Portuguese position untenable. The regime in Lisbon was overthrown in April 1974 by the same officers who had been fighting the colonial wars. The Armed Forces Movement (MFA) led by middle-ranking career officers seized power and set up a new regime under the Junta of National Salvation (JNS). In the colonies the liberation movements stepped up their military campaigns and negotiations were started for a peaceful withdrawal from the colonies. In June 1975 the independence of Mozambique was declared and that of Angola in November 1975. But the internal struggle between the various political factions continued for several more years.

Post-Colonial Angola

Three nationalist movements were involved in the struggle for independence: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) led by Agostinho Neto, the National Front of Angolan Liberation (FNLA), essentially a tribalist movement operating in the north under Holden Roberto, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) operating in the eastern areas under Dr. Jonas Savimbi.

After the military coup in Portugal in 1974, a tripartite ‘government of transition’ was formed by the three nationalist movements, but armed conflict soon broke out between the MPLA and the others. This conflict intensified with superpower involvement with the Soviet Union and its allies (including a major presence of Cuban troops) supporting the MPLA, while South Africa, with Western support, backed UNITA. In 1975 South African troops entered and occupied parts of southern Angola taking military action against Namibian guerrilla camps. A further South African incursion was halted facing Cuban and MPLA troops 300km south of Luanda.

On 11 November 1975, the MPLA proclaimed the People’s Republic of Angola, with Neto as president, while the other two movements also claimed to have established governments of the new state. However, on 24 November, Nigeria recognised the MPLA government and prompted other states to follow suit. As 350,000 Portuguese settlers left Angola (thousands went to South Africa), South Africa announced on 25 March 1976 that its troops would be withdrawn from southern Angola.

A socialist regime was established in the new republic and in December 1977 the MPLA was restructured as a Marxist-Leninist party, with the state converted as an instrument of the party. President Neto died in Moscow on 10 September 1979 and was succeeded by another MPLA veteran, Jose Eduardo dos Santos. Elections for the 289 deputies in the National Peoples Assembly were held in 1980 and 1986, but control remained firmly in the hands of the 90-member central committee and 15-member political bureau of the MPLA.

During the period 1978 to 1985, South African troops periodically pursued Namibian guerrilla groups into Angola to destroy their bases from where they operated against South African troops based in Namibia. South Africa also continued to provide logistical backing to UNITA in 152

support of its claim to be included in the central government of Angola. Since 1976, UNITA had also received military and financial support from the USA.

As part of the peace process designed to bring independence to Namibia, South African forces were finally withdrawn from Angola on 30 August 1988. Under an agreement mediated by the USSR and the USA, signed in New York on 22 December 1988, Cuba and Angola agreed on a total withdrawal of the estimated 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola while South Africa agreed to withdraw from Namibia to allow free elections to be held prior to independence.

The warring factions in Angola agreed to a ceasefire on 22 June 1989. At the Helsinki summit in September 1990, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev agreed to help monitor the ceasefire and political settlement in Angola. Both sides agreed to stop supplying weapons once the ceasefire was in effect.

In March 1991 the Angolan ruling party dropped its commitment to Marxism, setting the stage for peace negotiations. By the end of May, the last Cuban troops had completed their withdrawal. In the same month President Dos Santos and UNITA leader Savimbi signed the Bicesse Accord, officially ending the civil war believed to have claimed 300,000 lives. Under the accord the two sides agreed to build a unified military force, to strive for political pluralism and a market economy and to work together until free and internationally supervised elections were held.

In the 1992 elections, Dos Santos won 49.57 percent of the presidential votes – short of a majority needed but well ahead of Savimbi. Savimbi refused to accept the electoral defeat and UNITA forces went on the attack again and soon controlled two-thirds of the country – including the diamond-mining areas and the Capanda hydro-electric dam site on the Kwaza River.

The MPLA then launched a military counter offensive taking advantage of its air superiority, using Russian pilots and aircraft. Huambo, Angola’s second largest city and Savimbi’s headquarters was heavily bombarded, killing an estimated 12,000 locals. There was similar destruction at Cuito, besieged by UNITA. Savimbi’s UNITA was backed by the Ovumbundu tribe against the other tribes backing the MPLA. Allegations were made of massive civilian massacres on both sides.

When the UN Security Council turned against Savimbi’s UNITA and supported the MPLA in 1993, the American CIA, which long supported UNITA, turned against it and began supplying intelligence to the MPLA. Russia, Britain, France and Israel provided military support to the MPLA. A mandatory oil and arms embargo was imposed by the Security Council on UNITA.

MPLA forces gradually gained the upper hand and captured the diamond town of Cafunfo, thus cutting off a major source of UNITA’s funds. In December 1994 the Lusaka Agreement was reached, providing for power sharing arrangements and the return of UNITA property. On the eve of the ceasefire, MPLA forces launched a major offensive, capturing the strategic mainland oil centre of Soyo and UNITA’s stronghold of Huambo. Savimbi refused to sign a peace accord but, instead, the truce agreement was signed by General Eugenio Manuvakola, secretary-general of UNITA. 153

The continued hostilities had put an enormous strain on Angola’s budget and foreign reserves. The exchange rate collapsed but as several oil fields came on stream in 1994-97, Angola’s financial position soon improved with high expectations of its vast untapped mineral resources.

In 1995 the UN Security Council established UNAVEM III allocating more than 7,000 personnel to oversee the truce in Angola. Continued tension between UNITA and the MPLA delayed implementation. In mid-1997 the mandate expired and was replaced by a UN Observers Mission in Angola (UNOMA). But UNITA refused to close its overseas offices and disarm its combatants. The Security Council agreed in 1997 to apply a range of sanctions against UNITA, but it continued to enjoy conservative US Republican support.

UNITA rebels continued to use Cabinda and parts of the DRC as sanctuaries. It also received support from the Chiluba government in Zambia. Savimbi continued to destabilise Angola with his military campaigns. But gradually Angola’s MPLA forces encircled the UNITA rebels.

In April 2000 the IMF signed an agreement with Angola which introduced broad economic reforms, including investment in infrastructure, liberalising trade and speeding up the privatisation of state assets. The UNHCR initiated schemes to assist and feed the millions of people displaced by the civil war. Landmines had been laid around the perimeters of many towns and in scattered locations.

In May 2000, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi offered a peace summit with President Dos Santos to end the 25-year civil war but the offer was rejected. In June 2000 some 20,000 people attended a peace rally and ecumenical service in Luanda. The MPLA gave its support and this gained propaganda value depicting Savimbi as the cause of all the trouble.

When Savimbi was finally killed in a MPLA ambush on 22 February 2002, the scene was set for a peace accord between the MPLA government and the UNITA movement. In June 2003, Isaias Samakuva was elected leader of UNITA and Dos Santos re-elected as MPLA leader later the same year. But multi-party elections were further postponed. President Dos Santos came under increasing pressure concerning corruption surrounding missing billions of dollars in oil revenue.

In terms of its vast natural endowments, Angola is a country with considerable potential. Situated along the west coast of Africa, Angola covers an area of 1,246,700km2, slightly larger than the whole of South Africa. Cabinda, the northern most district, is divided from the rest of the country by the estuary of the River Congo and DRC territory. The ‘planato central’ occupies nearly two-thirds of the country’s area (south and south-east). The land slopes gradually towards the Congo and Zambezi river basins. The south-western coastal desert strip extends as far north as the port city of Benguela. Semi-desert conditions continue north to Luanda, the capital. The central plateau and other inland areas have a predominantly tropical climate with a wet season lasting from October to May. The south-west coast is extremely arid with low temperatures and rainfall under the influence of the south-north flowing Benguela current. The arid south-west contrasts sharply with 600mm rainfall in the far north and 1,750mm in the extreme north-east. Luanda has an average annual rainfall of 320mm. 154

The population is estimated at around 12.5 million with an ethnic composition of 37 percent Ovimbundu, 25 percent Kimbundu, 13 percent Bakongo, 2 percent mestico, 1 percent European and 22 percent other (including 40,000 Mbuti pygmies in the north and 8,000 nomadic Angolan San in the south-west). The post-independence exodus has left around 30,000 Europeans (mainly Portuguese) in Angola.

Under the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accord, a multi-party system was introduced with a National Assembly of 230 members and a presidential system. There are 18 provinces each with a provincial governor. The system of law, originally based on Portuguese and customary law, has been modified in line with ‘socialist’ principles. The highest courts are the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal in Luanda.

The kwanza, its new currency, was introduced in 2008. The GDP is estimated at $US61 billion and a per capita income of around $US3,800. Crude oil and natural gas are the mainstays of the economy, with diamonds and gemstones also of considerable importance. Only 2.7 percent of the land is arable where the main crops are wheat, maize, fruit, vegetables, nuts, sugar cane, coffee, tobacco and cotton. Around 47 percent of the country is forested, with tropical rainforest in the north, from where mahogany and other hard woods are exported. Fisheries along the coast are also an important source of food and exports.

Despite an estimated $US100 million per day in oil revenue flowing to the country, the living standards of most Angolans remained painfully low. In 2005 Finance Minister Jose Pedro de Morais was linked to a $US2 billion oil corruption scandal involving China. Despite opposition party protests against government corruption, multi-party elections were continuously postponed. Factions in the Cabinda enclave continued to press for independence from Angola. In addition the longstanding border dispute between Angola and the DRC continued to drag on and destabilised investments in the area.

The discovery of on-shore oil deposits in Cabinda in 2006 led to increased investments and fuelled oil revenue which pushed Angola’s economic growth rate to a phenomenal 23 percent. But the country continued to be plagued by corruption and a lack of political accountability and transparency.

Post-Colonial Mozambique

The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was formed in 1962 with Eduardo Mondlane as its leader. The bitter armed struggle against the Portuguese which began in 1964 continued until a ceasefire was reached in 1974 after the army coup in Portugal. Mozambique became an independent republic in 1975 with Samora Machel, the leader of FRELIMO, as president.

At the outset Mozambique’s economy was severely damaged by the exodus of some 250,000 Portuguese settlers. As a result of FRELIMO policy to allow the establishment of guerrilla bases for the use of insurgency into Rhodesia and South Africa, Mozambique soon faced serious 155

destabilisation from the two white-controlled countries. The Rhodesians helped to found and foster the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR). The South Africans acted as backers of another black rebel faction (RENAMO) following Zimbabwean independence in 1980. RENAMO waged a terror campaign against the local population and also disrupted road, rail and oil pipeline links from Mozambican ports.

Many thousands of locals were killed in the conflict and many more died as a result of malnutrition associated with the war. Under the Nkomati Accord, signed on 16 March 1984, South Africa agreed to stop supporting RENAMO and the Mozambique government committed itself to ending facilities previously provided to South African nationalist guerrillas.

FRELIMO’s third party congress in February 1977 provided for its reconstitution as a Marxist- Leninist vanguard party with restricted membership. However, during the 1980s Mozambique started to seek closer links with the West. This process was further enhanced by the gradual decline of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

When President Machel died in a plane crash in October 1986, he was succeeded by his foreign minister Joaquim Chissano. FRELIMO then became a broader-based party of national unity. In the late 1990s the government dropped its commitment to Marxism. It adopted a new constitution and started to meet some of RENAMO’s demands. Moves towards multi-party democracy were implemented and opposition parties allowed. Hostilities nevertheless continued between the various factions of the population and RENAMO continued to gain strength in the northern provinces. When a general election was held in 1994, FRELIMO won 129 seats against RENAMO’s 112. But RENAMO’s enjoyed majority support in the most populous and prosperous northern and central districts.

Although, for many years, Mozambique was ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world, its natural endowments elevate the country to one of the most promising in Africa. Situated on the south-east coast of Africa, Mozambique covers a total area of 799,400km2 – larger than Portugal and Spain combined. The Zambezi River bisects the country. The terrain is predominantly semi-arid savannah bushveld with a coastal belt characterised by mangrove swamps and sandy beaches. The Zambezi delta is fertile and the north-west highlands are covered with tropical vegetation. The climate is tropical with high humidity. Rainfall decreases north-south, ranging from 1,450mm in the north-west to 600-750mm in the south-east.

The total population is estimated at around 21 million, mainly Shangaan, Chokwe, Manyika, Sena and Makua with less than one percent made up of Europeans, Indians and Euro-Africans. Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques) is the capital and Beira, Quelemane and Nacala are port cities to the north. Portuguese is still the official language, but other Bantu languages are used in local regions in the 10 provinces.

The president is elected by universal suffrage for a maximum of two five-year terms. The Assembly consists of 250 deputies elected by universal adult suffrage for five-year terms. The judicial system is based on Portuguese civil codes and indigenous customs. The death penalty was abolished in 1990.

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The GDP is estimated at $US8.1 billion giving a per capital income of around $US400. Close to 6 percent of the land is arable and the main cash crops are cotton, maize, sorghum, cashew nuts, sugar cane, tea, sisal and rice. Around 25 percent of the country is forested. There are vibrant coastal fisheries providing mainly for the local populace. The main export destinations are South Africa, the Netherlands and Zimbabwe. Tourism is a fast growing industry and a growing proportion of South Africa’s overseas trade is now channelled through the port facilities at Maputo.

In 1997 the Mozambique government, for the first time, agreed to allow private ownership of the land – including outside parties. Subsequently many South African white farmers moved into Mozambique to participate in the new land reform process. The Mozambique government also signed an agreement with South African interests for the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Mozambique to Johannesburg. It was estimated that this project would generate an income of over $US20 billion over a period of 20 years.

In order to jump-start its economy, in 1997 the Paris Club of creditor nations agreed to forgive $US600 million Mozambican debt incurred between 1975 and 1984, rescheduling the balance over 20 years. At the time, debt servicing absorbed around 35 percent of the national budget. Then, in July 1999, the Paris Club cancelled another $US2.2 billion of Mozambique’s debt, equivalent to 50 percent of its GDP.

During the first decade of the new millennium, Mozambique was rapidly transformed by massive foreign investments in natural resources from one of the poorest countries in Africa to one of the fastest growing economies. In January 2005, Britain offered to pay 10 percent of Mozambique’s outstanding debt to the IMF/World Bank and to cancel the entire £80 million still owed to Britain.

In 2006 negotiated payment of $US950 million to acquire 85 percent control of the Cahora Bassa dam in the Zambezi River, a major source of hydro-electric power, from its former colonial ruler. The dam is a major source of revenue, earning $US150 million per annum from sale of electricity to South Africa. The largest electricity consumer is BHP-Billiton’s Mozal aluminium smelter that consumes three times more power than the rest of the country combined.

With the emerging economies such as those of China and India demanding more coal and gas, the basin around Tete is expected to play a big part in developing Mozambique’s fledgling economy. Thanks to massive foreign investment in what may be the world’s biggest unexploited coal and gas fields, the Tete area on the banks of the Zambezi River is shaping up as an amazing growth point. By 2010, the bustling boom town was already boasting three banks, three car-hire companies, half a dozen decent hotels, an international school and a new airport with twice-a- day flights to Maputo.

After the 17 year civil war that destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure, logistics remain poor. But in February 2010 the long defunct railway between Tete and the port of Beira was re- opened after its complete renovation. A few kilometres upstream from Tete, a new bridge is being built across the Zambezi. The Zambezi provides a plentiful supply of cooling water for 157

mining operations and for hydro-electric power generation. The large Cahora Bassa scheme at Songo, a state-owned power station that was initiated by a joint effort of South Africa and Portugal and which lies 200km north-west from Tete, exports most of its power to South Africa.

China, Mozambique’s second biggest investor after South Africa, is contemplating building a second power station some 70km downstream from Cahora Bassa. Two of the largest mining houses in the region, Australia’s Riversdale (Rio Tinto) and Brazil’s Vale are planning to build their own plants near Tete.

Mozambique’s government is now democratically elected and stable and its economic policies are considered sound. It has become a ‘donor darling’. In 2010 international aid had reached some $US1.6 billion – more than half the total state budget. Foreign investment has been pouring in on an unprecedented scale.

But The Economist of July 10, 2010, reported that Mozambique still had a long way to go. It still remained one of the world’s worst performers – 129th out of 133 countries in the World Economic Forum’s global competitive index. It also ranked in the bottom dozen in terms of GDP per head, at less than US$1,000 in purchasing power parity terms. Despite a significant fall in the poverty rate from 69 percent in 1997 to 54 percent in 2003, the absolute number of people living below the poverty line remained at around 12 million out of a population of around 21 million.

The sad reality is also that Mozambique remains one of the world’s worst victims of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In 2005 UNICEF estimated that around 350,000 children were orphaned by the disease.

Freedom House, the watchdog for good governance, reported in 2010 that Mozambique had been dropped from the list of ‘electoral democracies’ because of alleged irregularities in its October 2009 elections. They found that state patronage and corruption were growing. So too was organised crime and drug trafficking. As a result a group of Western donor countries threatened a ‘donor strike’ unless Mozambique cleaned up its act. The G19 proposed 35 reforms as a condition of continued aid support. Without substantial foreign aid, Mozambique would not be a star performer. A bright future awaits this country if it succeeds in putting its house in order.

Bibliography

Arnold, G. (2005) Africa – A Modern History, Atlantic Books, London Ferreira, E de S. (1974) Portuguese Colonisation in Africa – The End of an Era The Unesco Press Meredith, M. (2012) The State of Africa, Simon & Schuster, London Nugent, P. (2012) Africa Since Independence, 2nd Ed, Palgrave MacMillan New York SBS World Guide (2008) Hardie Grant Books, Prahran, Victoria

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11. Post-Colonial Former German South West Africa

For thousands of years the land along the coast of the Namib Desert was inhabited by San and Khoikhoi tribes. They were followed by Damara tribes, Ovambo tribes and later also by Herero and Nama tribes. The first contact between Germans and the indigenous peoples occurred in 1842 when two German missionaries established a small missionary station at Windhoek on invitation of the Khoikhoi chieftain, Jonker Afrikaner. German merchants followed. Adolf Lüderitz negotiated occupation of a stretch of coastline where he laid out the town of Lüderitz. Gradually this area was extended by further negotiation with local tribesmen. By 1884 this area was declared a German possession and placed under the ‘protection of the German Empire’ as a ‘schutzgebiet’ (protectorate).

When Bismarck succeeded in setting up a unified Germany in 1871, he initially hesitated to participate in the scramble for colonies that characterised European countries at the time. He expressly stated: “I am not a man for colonies”, but in 1884 he agreed to the acquisition of colonies by the German Empire in order to protect trade, to safeguard access to raw materials and export markets and to open up opportunities for capital investment. He soon retracted his colonial endeavours and even, in 1889, tried to give German South West Africa away to the British, claiming that he would rather saddle someone else with such an expensive burden.

The Scramble for Africa Impact

During the later stages of the ‘scramble for Africa’ era of colonialism, enterprising German individuals started to drive German participation in the race to gain a foothold in certain territories in West Africa, East Africa, New Guinea and the Samoan Islands. German traders and merchants began to establish themselves in the African Cameroon delta and the mainland coast across from Zanzibar. In East Africa a German adventurer, Karl Peters, became notorious for laying claim to large tracts of land, supported by private, armed contingents recruited mainly in the Sudan and led by mercenary officers.

Bismarck’s transition to official acceptance of the colonial idea came about towards the end of his regime. He gave preference to land management by a ‘chartered company’, rather than setting up an expensive colonial government administration. He reluctantly acquiesced to requests to put down the armed hostilities – often driven by local rulers trying to protect their slavery activities.

Bismarck’s successor in 1890, Leo von Caprivi, maintained the colonial burden he inherited, but opposed new ventures. Other successors, however, especially Bernhard von Bülow as Chancellor, approved substantial treasury assistance to employ administrators, surveyors, commercial agents and tax collectors. Kaiser Wilhelm II, however, proved to be a stronger supporter of colonial activity and expressed his regret that Germany entered the colonial race after most of the desirable places had already been occupied. The balance sheet for the German colonies as a whole proved to be a fiscal net loss. Berlin nevertheless committed the German nation to the financial support, maintenance, development and defence of its colonial possessions. Before 1884 Bismarck was not keen on making formal claims on the territory – especially after the port of Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands had been annexed by Britain as 159

part of the Cape Colony in 1878. As part of the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty in 1890, a corridor of land taken from the northern border of Bechuanaland, extending as far as the Zambezi River, was ceded to the German colony by the British.

During the first twenty years under German control, the territory was plagued by sporadic revolts by the indigenous population groups, particularly by the Herero rebellion in 1904 which resulted in intensive military intervention and much bloodshed. The colonial administrative apparatus was overhauled under Bernhard Dernburg, a former banker who was appointed as the new secretary of the colonial office. His task was now presented as being an ‘agent of modernisation’. Dernburg managed to mobilise private sector investment in the colonies. Germans were encouraged to settle in the territory permanently but few accepted. The bulk of the 1,080,000 emigrants leaving Germany in the period 1887 and 1906 headed for the United States. Only 5 percent of the 22,000 soldiers mobilised to subdue the Herero revolt accepted the financial aid offered to settle in German South-West Africa. By 1913 only around 12,000 Germans had settled in the territory.

When World War I started in 1914, the British government decided to carry the struggle to Africa and the Pacific, initiating colonial campaigns to conquer Germany’s colonies. Genl. J.C. Smuts and the Prime Minister of South Africa, Genl. Louis Botha, led a successful military campaign against the relatively small German military force in South West Africa. After the war, the territory was mandated to South Africa as a C-Mandate by the League of Nations in 1920 with the duty of preparing it for eventual self-determination. The mandate required the administering power to ‘promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants’.

In 1946 South Africa requested approval from the newly established United Nations to incorporate South West Africa. The UN rejected South Africa’s request and in 1950 the International Court of Justice ruled that the territory should remain under an international mandate. Then in 1966 the UN General Assembly revoked the South African mandate and from 1968 referred to the territory as ‘Namibia’. South Africa, having contested the conversion from League of Nations mandate to UN trusteeship status in 1946, rejected the UN’s right to terminate its administration and continued to extend its laws to Namibia. In effect, it became an additional province of South Africa. It apportioned the territory along traditional ethnically demarcated ‘homelands’ including 43 percent of the total area reserved as ‘white’ farmland.

The South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) was founded in 1958 under the leadership of Sam Nujoma and in 1966 it launched an armed struggle for independence. In 1973 the UN recognised SWAPO as the ‘authentic representative of the Namibian people’ and appointed a Commission for Namibia. South Africa pursued its own plans for an ‘internal settlement’, setting up a political structure under the 1975 Turnhalle Conference proposals.

During the 1970s and 1980s various negotiations involving SWAPO, South Africa and internal Namibian leaders were held, including the unsuccessful Geneva conference in 1981, with a Western ‘contact group’ seeking to broker a solution. UN Security Council resolution No.435 which was originally passed in 1978, and in terms of which provision was made for UN- supervised elections prior to independence, was eventually in motion in December 1988 as part 160

of a tripartite agreement signed by Angola, Cuba (which was to withdraw troops armed by the USSR from Angola) and South Africa. Implementation of the agreement officially began on 1 April 1989 after it was delayed by SWAPO guerrilla forces crossing into Namibia from Angola. After a ceasefire, elections were held under supervision of a UN Transition Assistance group. SWAPO obtained 41 seats in a 72-member Constitutional Assembly, not the two-thirds majority that would have allowed SWAPO to dictate the contents of a new constitution. The new constitution was formally adopted on 9 February 1990 and took effect on 21 March 1990. Nujoma became the first president and his government consisted primarily, but not exclusively, of SWAPO members. South African troops were repatriated after the election.

Post-Colonial Namibia

Located on the south-west coast of Africa and bisected by the Tropic of Capricorn, Namibia covers a total area of 824,290 square kilometres – almost the size of Germany and France added together. From north to south, the arid and infertile Namib Desert forms a rocky coastal belt averaging 100 km in width – which was for generations known as the Skeleton Coast. Inland, the central plateau slopes to the east and the south to meet the arid scrubland of the Kalahari Desert. Rainfall is very sparse, ranging from 25mm per annum on the Namib coast to at most 360mm per annum at Windhoek. In the north it is bordered by the Kunene, the Okavango and along the Caprivi Strip by the Zambezi Rivers. In the south it borders on South Africa across the Orange River – and along the province of the Northern Cape in the Kalahari. Botswana lies along its north-eastern border. The northern half of the country where most of its Black population live is largely dependent on subsistence agriculture. The south is the area of White settlement – on farms and a few mining towns. Only 1 percent of the land is arable.

The economy of Namibia is largely dependent on meat packing, fish processing, dairy products, mining (diamonds, lead, tin, zinc, silver, tungsten, uranium and copper) and tourism. The current total population is estimated at around 2 million of which about one-third live in urban areas, 88 percent are Black (50 percent Ovambo, 7 percent Herero, 7 percent Damara, 5 percent Nama and 3 percent Bushmen), 6 percent are White (mainly German and South African Dutch descendants) and around 6 percent are of mixed-race origin. Afrikaans (South African Dutch) is the common language of the bulk of the population including around 60 percent of the Whites. German is spoken by around 32 percent of the Whites and English by around 7 percent. Amongst the Black population the main languages are Oshivambo, Herero and Nama. The main urban centres are Windhoek (capital), Grootfontein, Ondangwa, port cities of Swakopmund, Walvis Bay and Luderitz, Keetmanshoop and Mariental.

The infrastructure available includes 2,382km of railways, 42,237km roads (5,406 surfaced), a good urban and fair rural telecommunications service, 40 FM radio stations, 8 TV stations, 130,000 telephone lines, around 300,000 mobile phones and around 100,000 internet users.

Education is compulsory for ages 6-15. Around 8 percent of GDP is spent on education and the literacy rate is estimated at around 84 percent for both males and females. Although there is a widespread system of healthcare delivery, nutritional standards are considered to be poor. In 2004 there were 30 doctors and 306 nurses per 100,000 persons and 6.4 percent of GDP spent on health. 161

In 1993 an important restoration took place when the South African government transferred Walvis Bay, the largest port facility on the Namibian coast, as well as various offshore islands, back to Namibia. In the same year, the Bank of Namibia introduced its own currency, the Namibian dollar.

In the first post-independence elections in December 1994, SWAPO (which largely rests on Ovambo support) obtained a sweeping victory by taking 53 of the 72 National Assembly seats. Sam Nujoma was elected for a third term as president, despite the constitution limiting the presidency to two terms. However, at the next election in 2004, he was replaced by the election of President Pohamba.

In the economic sphere, Namibia continued to grow its mining and tourist industries. Namibia and Angola signed an agreement to build a hydro-electric dam on the Kunene River, financed by oil rich Angola. Namibia signed an agreement with De Beers to market its diamonds, which account for 40 percent of its export revenue, until 2013. After offering US$8 million debt forgiveness to Namibia, a Chinese-Namibian agreement was reached on a US$800 million investment in copper mining.

Bibliography

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Part III

Evaluation

12. The Plight of Sub-Saharan Africa 13. South Africa’s Exceptionalism 14. Prospects 163

12. The Plight of Sub-Saharan Africa

Southern Africa is an integral part of Sub-Saharan Africa and, with the exception of South Africa, shares its problems and prospects. It excludes the Mediterranean countries at the northern tip of the African continent: Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia which can be considered as more closely associated with the Islamic World than with ‘Black Africa’.

Sub-Saharan Africa comprises 48 countries with a total population of around 800 million. The Southern African component of ‘Black Africa’ comprises around 140 million people of which around 4.5 million are ‘Whites’ (European descent) of which more than 95 percent live in South Africa. South Africa’s exceptional position is illustrated by the fact that with only around 6 percent of Africa’s population, it accounts for no less than 45 percent of the GDP of the whole continent.

Its exceptionalism will be discussed in the next chapter. It is first necessary to look into the scope and possible explanations of the plight of ‘Black Africa’.

Black Africa’s Woes

Almost all the bottom places in the world league tables are, sadly enough, filled by Sub-Saharan African countries. Of the 160 countries on the United Nations annual development index, 32 of the lowest 40 are in Africa. It is claimed that at least 45 percent of Africans live in poverty and they need growth rates of at least 7 percent or more to cut that figure in half in 15 years. With the exception of South Africa, growth rates in the region have been less than 3 percent over the last half century – calculated from very low bases.

Poverty, ignorance, disease, brutality, despotism and corruption can be found in many parts of the world – but in Sub-Saharan Africa these problems exist in combination and have taken endemic proportions. Many explanations are advanced by scholars: social and cultural constraints, lack of opportunities, bad governance, predatory leadership, tribal or inter-group conflict, etc. Africans prefer to put the blame on their colonial past: the legacy of the slave trade, exploitative trade relations, capitalism, White racial discrimination, etc.

Exploitative Colonialism

Africa’s nation-states are artificial creations of the colonial era. Colonial boundaries, which were to define the borders of the new states, had been set quite arbitrarily by the European powers. European negotiators of the nineteenth century lacked detailed knowledge of African physical and cultural geography and tended to draw boundaries in terms of parallels and meridians, straight lines, arcs of circles or by reference to topographical features like rivers and valleys. These boundaries were artificial and arbitrarily cutting across ethnic, tribal and linguistic areas. Tribal groups, which even today, are a major force to be reckoned with in almost every black African country, were divided among two or more countries (e.g. the Fulani, the Bakongo, the Luo, the Tswana, etc.) The peoples living within any given colony hardly had any sense of community and common identity – let alone considered themselves a nation. (Kotecha, K.D. and Adams, R.W., African Politics: The Corruption of Power,1981, p.55) 164

Colonial powers tended to look upon their colonies as suppliers of raw materials for their own advanced industrial sector and as markets for the finished goods. In the process the colonies benefited by receiving foreign capital investment in extractive industry such as mining, oil drilling and plantations to produce raw materials. This in turn, resulted in infrastructure development such as communication systems, roads, railways and port facilities. But the industry introduced by colonialism remained dependent on the colonial power for its markets, its investment capital and its technology. What was drawn from the colony was raw material and labour and the relatively cheap availability of these made colonialism worthwhile to colonial interests. Colonialism certainly acted as a strong modernising force. But it came to the colonies as a force from without, not necessarily from within. In large measure the modernisation did not develop from within the colonies through the operation of forces native to those societies. In the process of modernisation the pre-colonial history and traditions were largely eliminated.

The European colonists found willing accomplices among Africa’s European-orientated elites. These modernising African elites tended to support the notion that anything traditional was by definition primitive. They tried to transplant European models to Africa and neglected to build indigenous models. Rather than to build on tradition, the new Africans often sought to purge what was authentic in their own cultures.

The African colonial experience is significantly different from the East Asian colonial experience. A common feature of Western colonisation in the societies of East Asia was that it never managed to supplant historical tradition – be it the emphasis on education, the hierarchical social structure or the religious tradition of Confucianism, Buddhism and, in Indonesia and Malaysia, Islam. Some East Asian countries also emerged as Africa did from colonial tutelage. Some had no natural resources and were as divided along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines as many African countries are today. Yet, with the exception of those who chose the authoritarian communist path – such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar – the South East Asians have prospered. They have diversified away from reliance on single commodity exports, they adopted ‘outward’ development policies and privatised land holdings. Africa, on the other hand, pursued ‘inward’ economic policies, based on trade restrictions and overvalued currencies. East Asia has become a model of economic success, while Africa has seen increasing poverty, hunger and economies propped up by foreign aid. After independence many African countries became ravaged by socialism, the ideology then in vogue throughout Europe. African varieties were developed such as Kaunda’s ‘humanism’ in Zambia and Nyerere’s ‘njamaa’ in Tanzania. The result was government ownership of most enterprises, a distrust of private sector initiative and of foreign investment.

Bad Government

Africa’s political liberation struggle against colonial rule was driven by nationalism – a drive for collective self-determination against alien rule. Almost no price was too high to achieve collective freedom. But collective self-government is not synonymous with democratic individual self-fulfilment or with good government.

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The problems started in large measure as a result of the gap between national aspirations and the practical problems involved in putting together a working government that is responsible, accountable and efficient. Constitutional democracy needs to be underpinned by a civic political culture. The mere fact of independence and self-governance did not propel governments to make sound decisions. Nor did it assure effective people’s participation at all levels and the rule of law to protect individual citizens from the government’s abuse of power and arbitrary and capricious bureaucratic controls.

The new regimes proved to be dysfunctional and unstable. During the period 1960-2003 a total of 107 African leaders were toppled by coups, war or invasion. Military juntas ruled in several countries like Benin, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire and Burkina-Faso. Other countries are characterised by one-party states and life-time presidents. These include Malawi, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Cameroon, Congo and, until recently, also Mozambique and Zambia. Up to 1990, only five – Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal and Zambia – allowed free elections. Governments lack public accountability and in many cases those in power have appropriated the machinery of government to serve their own interests.

The tragic case of Zimbabwe illustrates the immeasurable harm and destruction that can be caused by bad leadership. Mugabe has cowed the judiciary, smashed the independent media, stolen three elections, dispossessed Zimbabwe’s most productive citizens and printed money until inflation collapsed the Zimbabwe currency. To disguise his contempt for the law, Mugabe brought in new legislation to authorise his land grab. He pretended to hold free elections but had many opponents killed and had citizens intimidated into voting for his party. Other African leaders have done little to stop Mugabe from wrecking his country and oppressing his people. Many of his peers seem to think that Mugabe is a hero who knows how to sort whites out. (See The Economist, January 17th, 2004, pp.5-6.)

The institutionalisation of political power is not well developed in Africa. There is little evidence of significant representation of popular majorities in government decision making. Leaders tend to build personal coalitions to seize and hold power. Clienteles, and the coalitions of which they form a part, are held together by payoffs. Common ways of increasing the supply of payoffs include expanding the public sector at the expense of the rest of the economy. Given the importance of staying in office, opposition parties are thwarted, parliaments deprived of the means to oversee the executive, “Bills of Rights” are abolished and the judiciary is politicised or supplanted. (Kotecha, K.C. and Adams, R.W., 1981, op.cit., pp.74-76)

The World Bank in its 1989 study on Sub-Saharan Africa’s performance since independence reported that weak public sector management has resulted in loss-making public enterprises, poor investment choices, costly and unreliable infrastructure, price distortions (especially overvalued exchange rates, administered prices, and subsidised credit), and hence inefficient resource allocations. Even more fundamental in many countries, is the deteriorating quality of government, bureaucratic obstruction, pervasive rent seeking, weak judicial systems and arbitrary decision-making. As a result of pervasive one-party kleptocracy, drainage by corruption often equals or exceeds the legitimate revenue.

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In addition to the mismanaged public sector, should be added the dead weight of “crony capitalism” and “ethnic nepotism” where sectional political and business interests collude to protect their markets from competition from home and abroad. Entrepreneurial opportunities to other people are thereby denied and income inequalities aggravated. All of the abovementioned conditions not only added heavily to the cost of doing business, but also continued to discourage investment. (See The Economist, January 17th, 2004, pp.11-13)

The good news is that since 1990 more African states have introduced multiparty politics than in the previous 25 years combined. In recent years a growing number of Africa’s states have held free elections or adopted significant democratic reforms. Many Africans are talking about a second liberation struggle. If the first liberation effort was for political independence, the second struggle is for democracy, for wider human rights and for individual self-fulfilment.

Self-Serving Bureaucracy, Corruption and Nepotism

The source of much of Africa’s economic woes is the domination of its economies by corrupt and nepotistic overgrown state sectors. The state sectors are characterised by overlapping bureaucracies, stifling red tape, waste, inefficient state enterprises overstaffed with party functionaries and other camp followers. In some countries the state came to own and manage 80 percent of the formal economy. Senior executives were appointed for political reasons, not for competence. Government jobs were distributed as patronage. The enterprises, incompetently run, lost money. Tribalism, provincialism and nepotism grew rank and led to unemployment – along with resentment and low morale.

By far the largest chunk of government expenditures in Africa – in some countries up to 70 percent – is absorbed by wages and salaries in the public sector, instead of providing for the public goods required for dynamic private sector development. The World Bank’s 1989 Report found that in several countries productivity is extremely low, discipline is largely lacking, and overall there is little accountability.

To tackle this situation, civil service reform has been placed high on the agenda for many African governments in recent years. The first step has been to conduct a staff census to eliminate from the payroll departed staff, overage employees and unwarranted promotions and allowances and to determine precisely the numbers and deployment of civil servants. In Gambia more than 20 percent of the civil service was identified as superfluous. The Central African Republic terminated automatic recruitment of graduates and introduced competitive entrance exams; a census allowed savings of 7 to 8 percent of the wage bill. Ghana carried out a systematic job inspection programme that removed some 24,000 civil servants from the payroll over two years.

Corruption manifests itself by way of various malpractices: bribes, kickbacks, embezzlement, exploitation of privileged information, lavish spending of public funds, personal enrichment through public office, abuse of discretionary powers, preferential treatment of kinsmen or other favoured persons, deprivation or harassment of out-groups. Periodic cleaning exercises 167

obviously are of some value, but they cannot substitute for institutional checks on leaders exercising public authority in democratic systems.

Time Magazine described the emergence of a “parallel” economy in the “official” sector during the 1990s, in the following terms: “Salaries in Africa become living wages only by unofficial dealing – by baksheesh, bribing, finagling, operating off the books, bartering, finding a thousand intricate routes of collateral circulation around the occlusions of law and bureaucracy. A telephone company repairman in Lagos earns $60 a month. Therefore, the only way one can get a phone repaired is to offer him ‘a little something’ on the side. No extra money, no repairs – which may be one reason why most phones in Lagos do not work … Ripping off the government has become a popular sport: it is thought of as stealing from thieves … So Africa improvises its own unofficial social contract, one deal at a time. Africans are brilliant at adapting to the impossible conditions created by their governments.” (Time Magazine, September 7th, 1992, pp.36-37)

But the development of a market economy has not only been constrained or inhibited by the state per se – a number of socio-cultural factors also played a role. There are several examples where a corner of the market – or even the whole market – has been captured or monopolised by an ethnic group. Nigeria underwent the trauma of a costly civil war because the Igbo had been perceived as monopolising certain areas of the economy. In 1972 Idi Amin tried to break Asian commercial monopolies in Uganda by expelling Asians completely from the country. But Idi Amin then replaced Asian nepotism with Nubi nepotism in the economy. There are numerous examples where ethnic groups such as the Igbo in Nigeria, the Buganda in Uganda and the Kikuyu in Kenya, have distorted the market nepotistically – provoking counter-ethnic resentment. The restoration of ethnic balance by way of some form of “affirmative action” is sometimes – as in the case of Nigeria – done in a haphazard way and often in conflict with other democratic values. (Mazrui, 1992, pp.10-11)

Statism, bureaucratic obstruction, corruption and ethnic nepotism have been active as significant constraints on the development of true marketisations in Africa. These factors tended to clog up procedures and substantially paralysed the production and distribution of the goods and services required to improve the quality of life in many African countries.

Misconceived Development Strategies

In the World Bank’s report on Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, issues of governance were broached with unprecedented frankness. The World Bank’s team of authors concluded that Africa’s poor growth performance was to a large extent influenced by misconceived development strategies. The authors of this report summarised their findings as follows: “The post-independence development efforts failed because the strategy was misconceived. Governments made a dash for ‘modernisation’, copying, but not adapting, Western models. The result was poorly designed public investments in industry; too little attention to peasant agriculture; too much intervention in areas in which the state lacked managerial, technical and 168

entrepreneurial skills; and too little effort to foster grassroots development.” (World Bank, 1989, p.3)

A common misconception among governments of many African countries has been that only through economic independence and industrialisation can they improve their relative economic condition. They echoed the ideas of prominent economists of the day. Industrialisation was believed to be the engine of economic growth and the key to transforming traditional economies – partly because the prospects for commodity exports were thought to be poor and partly because of a strong desire to reduce dependence on manufactured imports. Agriculture was relegated to a secondary role. To implement their strategies, African leaders believed that government had to play the dominant role. That view reflected their mistrust of foreign business, the perceived shortages of domestic private capital and entrepreneurship and an underlying mistrust of market mechanisms. As a result governments drew up comprehensive five-year plans; invested in large state-run core industries and enacted pervasive regulations to control prices, restrict trade, and allocate credit and foreign exchange. (World Bank, 1989, p.16)

But misconceived strategies led to misdirected policies and measures. These relate to various forms of government intervention in the economy: nationalisation, forceful ‘Africanisation’ of key positions in public and private enterprises, prohibition against engaging in retail trade by certain categories of the population, requiring the sale of operating businesses to Africans, displacing non-Africans from distributive trade and small scale manufacturing, imposing indigenous ownership on private enterprises, expropriating land, confiscation of property, deportation of selected individuals or groups, etc.

Managing this regulatory apparatus embroiled governments in ever expanding intervention across their economies. That meant that governments had to get bigger. New interventions were introduced to deal with difficulties caused by earlier interventions. Government became such a suffocating force that the private sector went almost completely underground to escape it, or else virtually expired.

Ben Turok’s study of the collapse of the Zambian economy provided a comprehensive account of the consequences of massive state intervention. In 1968 the government bought out 51 percent in the copper giants Anglo American and Roan Selection Trust. In 1970 the granting of trading licences to expatriates was restricted and businesses such as brick-making and transportation were reserved for Zambians. The effect of these moves was to put the Zambian economy into a devastating tailspin. Far from bringing about socialism, they led to the rise of ‘state capitalism’ and a fast-growing self-serving state bureaucracy. Turok accuses this state bureaucracy of plotting an “indecisive and erratic course” and striving to create a firmer base for itself by increasing the sheer size of the state apparatus. He paints a picture of a bureaucracy, frustrated by the decline of the industries it has annexed, biting more and more pieces off the already dying private sector. The result of several decades of this kind of state capitalism is a generally weak economy with a state-employed elite class which has lost the capacity for innovation and the capacity to organise the economy. (Ben Turok, 1989, pp.5, 36-59, 109)

In contrast to the dismal picture in some countries, those with stronger economic growth performance followed policies of providing greater credit to the private sector, limiting the size 169

of government and public sector industries and relying on market forces for allocating resources.

Absence of an Indigenous Modern Sector

In most of Sub-Sahara’s 48 states, there is no modern private sector to speak of. A handful of multinationals dominate private business often in joint ventures with governments, which in the past have insisted on calling the shots. Resources are by and large monopolised by the state with private sector relegated a peripheral role. Coca Cola is Black Africa’s largest private employer.

Prof Tony Hawkins of the University of Zimbabwe’s Business School, found that African governments went about fostering indigenous enterprise the wrong way. They provided a blanket protection through import tariffs, subsidised capital, guaranteed markets and preferential access to government contracts. Invariably such potential enterprises became state-owned monopolies which not only bred incompetence and inefficiency by allowing politicians to use them as a vehicle for political patronage, but also became closed to the outside world. This ‘national champion’ strategy failed, partly because the enterprises were sheltered from competition and were denied the productivity gain which flows from access to new technology. In addition, they were often treated as part of a hidden agenda, tasked with creating jobs, generating exports or subsidising a sector of the economy.

In recent times some countries such as Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe started campaigns to sell off some of its large portfolio of parastatals. Few foreign investors have shown interest and locals do not seem to have the money. Those who do also face difficulties as these countries have not developed the financial instruments to enable such participation in the privatisation programme.

In Tanzania, for instance, its 13 financial institutions which include the central bank, three commercial banks, three development financial institutions and six non-bank financial institutions are all government owned. In the past they could not operate along business lines because of interference from the government and the ruling party. The government decided who the banks could lend to and at what interest rates. Most of their lending was to parastatals and agricultural co-operative unions. Interest rates were highly subsidised and the credit- worthiness of borrowers was not taken into account, with the result that the banks made huge losses. Most citizens have preferred to do their business outside the formal banking sector. As a result of negative interest rates which have prevailed in the past, it has been difficult to convince people to save – especially in view of the poor and inefficient services the banks have been offering.

The introduction of private banks is a slow process. Foreign banks which were nationalised are still reluctant to come back. Besides, the lack of capital and money markets or any related instruments, limits the flexibility and profitability and the type of services existing financial institutions can offer. The development of an efficient banking system and of capital and money markets is essential in privatisation programmes.

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Although much of the modern sector has been in malaise throughout Africa, the informal sector, in contrast, has shown remarkable dynamism. This sector refers to indigenous, mainly unregistered enterprises in both urban and rural areas as well as locally based intermediary non-government grassroots organisations. This sector is home to small firms involved in a broad range of activities in agriculture, industry, trade, transportation, finance and social services. In the informal sector enterprises find a business environment that is competitive, free from unjustified regulatory constraints and well-adapted to local resources and demand. These enterprises are also supported by a system of grassroots institutions such as on-the-job apprenticeships and small associations that can represent group interests and improve access to credit and other resources.

Official Neglect and Discouragement of Indigenous Entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship has a long history in Sub-Saharan Africa. As far back as the tenth century, before Africa was ‘discovered’, there were free markets at Timbuktu, Salaga, Kano and other terminals of the Trans-Saharan trade routes. Archaeological evidence indicates the presence of ‘Great Zimbabwe’ where mining activities were linked to Arab export markets on Africa’s south- eastern coast.

The neglect of traditional indigenous entrepreneurship started during the colonial period and was continued after independence when policy-makers focused mainly on promoting large- scale industrial enterprises. These were deemed hallmarks of development and were generously supported by public policy. Large firms enjoyed preferential access to credit, foreign exchange concessions and protection from competition through subsidies, tariffs, quotas and exclusive licenses. The state’s role as entrepreneur was justified by the argument that the indigenous private sector had neither the capital nor the expertise to drive rapid development and industrialisation. Africa was seen as a continent without indigenous entrepreneurial skills, its ‘progressive’ modern sector at odds with a ‘backward’ informal sector that could provide subsistence but nothing more. In viewing the activities in the informal sector as marginal to development, however, policy-makers have greatly underestimated the depth and potential of African entrepreneurship. Equally, they ignored the extent to which their own policies have driven entrepreneurs into the informal sector.

Even in instances where African governments tried to promote small- and medium-scale enterprises (SME’s), the policy and institutional background has been unfavourable. In Africa as a whole, the average cost of registration of a business is nearly twice the annual income per head. The rules that make it so expensive are usually pointless. Compliance with the rules only serves the financial interests of rent-seekers and special interests. Most of the SME’s that have grown in response to market demand have done so despite official obstacles.

In Ghana and Tanzania, two of the most extreme cases, massive resources were directed to public enterprises, while local entrepreneurs who attempted to circumvent price controls saw their property confiscated. Uganda’s entire Asian community was expelled in 1972. These policies crippled economic growth by deterring long-term investment by both foreign and local entrepreneurs.

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Today Africa’s traditional market traditions are reflected in towns and cities across the continent. Traders and artisans continue to organise activities according to long established customs and rules administered through grassroots institutions. The village market has changed little and remains free and open to all. Prices are determined by the forces of supply and demand. In traditional Africa, three of the four economic factors of production – labour, capital and entrepreneurship – are privately owned. The exception is land, but even with communally owned land, peasants exercise usufructural rights and what is produced on this land is privately owned. Moreover, peasants go about their business as they themselves see fit – not according to some bureaucratic or dictatorial decree.

In 1992, Time Magazine described a state of affairs which still applies in many places. “The second economy is endlessly inventive. It embraces everything from street vendors selling cigarettes and candy in a Dar es Salaam market to the large and intricate border smuggling of Zambian gemstones. At least 10 million of 26 million Kenyans make a living from small-scale cash-crop farming, carpentry, masonry, metalworking, tailoring, shoemaking, retailing, smuggling, illicit brewing and running private taxis and buses. Second-hand clothes are imported from Europe and America and sold by the roadside. Packing cases are fashioned into furniture. Oil drums are made into roofing sheets, frying pans, barbecues, stoves, knives and lamps. Cars that cannot be repaired are salvaged piecemeal and turned into carts to be pulled by bullocks and donkeys. Much of this unofficial labour is carried out in the open air and is therefore called jua kali (hot sun). As multinational companies are driven away by government policies and demands for kickbacks, as government-run enterprises fail and lay off workers, the jua kali economy is booming.” (Time International, September 7th, 1992, pp.36-37)

But as a result of past strategies and policies, outside of the informal sector, small- and medium- scale enterprises are few and far between. This paucity of businesses that can link imported and local technologies –the ‘missing middle’ – is a major impediment to Africa’s development. Despite recent reforms, entrepreneurial initiative is hampered by regulation and limited consumer demand for local products and services. Small-scale entrepreneurs find it hard to raise capital, to mobilise skills or to gain access to efficient infrastructure services. It is of critical importance that a middle ground of entrepreneurs between the largest and the smallest firms should be encouraged. SME’s create jobs at a lower cost and use local resources more intensively. These enterprises also contribute to equity by producing goods and services that are widely affordable. They foster entrepreneurship through learning-by-doing. By thus reconciling broad-based consumer demand, available resources and indigenous and imported technology, SME’s perform a vital role in development.

Although the informal sector offers entrepreneurs a competitive environment and grassroots support, it cannot provide all the physical and social infrastructure services that investment and growth require. Governments can build on the demonstrated strengths of the informal sector and try to correct its weaknesses. But more is needed by way of a more comprehensive SME development strategy that can help entrepreneurs overcome the barriers by improving the institutions and infrastructure that support enterprise.

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Socio-Cultural Constraints

In as much as ‘culture’ refers to a complex of characteristics and phenomena (which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, laws, custom, capabilities, habits and other ways of doing things) acquired by man as a member of society, it is simply a matter of observation that cultural factors do have some impact on economic behaviour. Socio-cultural determinants cannot be discounted or ignored simply because they cannot easily be quantified and validated by rigorous empirical, research methods.

Despite the scepticism in some parts of development literature, many observers have come to believe that socio-cultural factors must be taken into account to explain the success or failure of economic development strategies, policies and programmes. Theoretical assumptions are made which may not stand up to empirical actualities on the ground. It is argued that there are many misunderstandings about how market forces, privatisation and the profit motive actually operate (or fail to operate) in the African cultural context. Proper regard must be had to traditional African cultural traits such as attitudes towards authority, attitudes towards time, leisure and labour, attitudes towards decision-making, traditional incentives and behaviour patterns, land-use patterns, ethnic and group loyalty, family obligations, inter-personal relations, the role of women, the accumulation of wealth, individual performance, contractual bonds, etc. (See Mazrui, 1992, pp.9-21)

Western values are not always congruent with traditional incentives and behaviour patterns prevalent in most African countries. Self-reliance and self-interest tend to take a back seat to ethnicity and group loyalty. The main concern seems to be to keep social balance and equity within the groups, rather than individual economic achievements. The frontiers separating collective preferences from individual ones are often very vague. Typically a higher value is placed on inter-personal relations and the timely execution of certain social, religious or mystic activities than on individual achievements. The ritual surrounding economic transactions, are often more important than the business principles governing these transactions. Economic success in itself does not lead to upward social mobility. If achieved outside of the group, it may even lead to social ostracism. State resources can be considered fair game for ethnic groups and extended family to build their own bases of support and legitimacy, through patronage or even graft.

African society is generally very paternalistic and hierarchical. Little prone to individualism, it tends to be egalitarian within the same age group, but hierarchical in inter-group relations, with marked subordination of the younger members. These patterns run counter to Western values of individual freedom and individual responsibility. Africans tend to seek unanimity and are generally prepared to engage in seemingly interminable discussions. The tendency to value group solidarity and socialising has generally led Africans to attach high value to leisure and the attendant ability to engage in rituals, ceremonies and social activities. These activities serve as a means of reinforcing social bonds – even if its ‘marginal returns’ are more social than economic.

Ali Mazrui maintained that African economic behaviour is often more inspired by the pursuit of prestige than by the quest for profit. Precisely because African cultures are more collectivist, members of society are more sensitive to the approval and disapproval of the collectivity. 173

Mazrui also claimed that the prestige motive serves as a device of income distribution because those who are financially successful often desire renown for generosity. Hence obligations towards wider and wider circles of kinsfolk are fulfilled. Those who succeed share their rewards with many others. According to Mazrui, the prestige motive in African economic behaviour also shows a negative side in that it encourages “ostentatious consumption and self-indulgent exhibitionism”. While profit motive, as identified as the maximisation of returns, in classical economic theory was supposed to lean towards production, the prestige motive in contemporary African economic behaviour leans towards greater conspicuous consumption. According to the Mazrui thesis the prestige motive operates both privately and at the state level, eating away into resources of the country. In this way structural adjustment is severely constrained by cultural forces. Hence the problem in most of Africa is not simply how to liberate and activate the profit motive, but also how to control and restrain the prestige motive in such a way that it serves the goals of production and not merely the appetite of consumption. It is a question of making creativity more prestigious than acquisition and production more prestigious than possession. (Mazrui, 1992, p.12)

The essence of Mazrui’s argument is that the fate of both political and economic liberalisation hinges on cultural variables which have too often been underestimated. We may need to grasp the cultural dimension before we can fully gauge the scale and durability of change and development in Africa. (Mazrui, 1992, p.3)

Economic Challenges

Sub-Saharan Africa’s economies are characterised by low investment, low productivity, weak agricultural growth, a declining industrial output, poor export performance, climbing debt, single crop dependency, a disintegrating infrastructure and a small tax base. In short, their economies suffer from a combination of factors making the vicious circle of low growth and national poverty self-reinforcing.

The African economic crisis has taken a heavy toll in human terms: poverty, unemployment, starvation, illiteracy, disease, infant mortality, overcrowded cities and social breakdown. It is further exacerbated by a dysfunctional institutional environment which is characterised by bad and corrupt government, inefficient and poorly managed public bureaucracies, inefficient resource allocation, disintegrating educational institutions and the collapse of the banking and judicial systems. Political instability, coup d’états and ethnic strife exacted a heavy toll.

This picture of Africa does not look attractive to the investor or trading partner. Aid dependence and dearth of investment afflict Africa much more severely than other developing regions. The danger is that much of the external world’s interest in Africa threatens to become merely humanitarian. Other interested investors may see it as a vacuum to be exploited.

The African experience continues to raise some searching questions. Can the factors behind Africa’s economic malaise be eradicated? Will the next generation be more numerous, poorer, less educated and more desperate? How could the process of formulating and implementing 174

reforms be improved? Is there a long-term vision in terms of which the inner dynamics, the resources of vitality and resilience as well as the natural resources of Africa can be energised? Why is South Africa an exception to the general trend, or is it doomed to go down the same road?

Bibliography

Klitgaard, R. (1988) Controlling Corruption, University of California Press Kotecha, K.C. & Adams, K.C. African Politics: The Corruption of Power, University Press (1981) of America, Washington DC Marsden, K. (1990) “Africa’s Entrepreneurs”, IFC Discussion Paper, International Finance Corporation, Washington DC Mazrui, A.A. (1992) “The Liberal Revival, Privatisation and the Market: Africa’s Cultural Contradictions”, Arusha Conference Paper, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, pp.1-42 Turok, B. (1989) Mixed Economy in Focus: Zambia, Institute for African Alternatives, London World Bank (1989) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crises to Sustainable Growth, Washington DC The Economist The Third World Survey, September 23rd, 1989, pp.1-57 Rediscovering the Middle of Africa, December 1990, p.75 The Hopeless Continent, May 13th, 2000 How to Make Africa Smile, January 17th, 2004

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13. South Africa’s Exceptionalism

Foreign visitors, who might have been exposed to other parts of Africa, are often surprised at what they see on arrival in South Africa. Visitors are surprised by the modern airport facilities, the six-lane highways in and around the major cities, the many high-rise buildings, the large traffic volumes including a multitude of big trucks and expensive German cars, huge township development projects, five-star hotels, abundant modern shopping malls, more white faces than expected, well-maintained farmlands and high-quality livestock herds by the roadside, modern deepwater port facilities at five port cities, a wide variety of eateries and an abundance of food, a large stock of luxurious brick-built homes, extensive hospital and health services – but also around the cities large stretches of squalid squatter townships and, on street corners in the outlying suburbs of cities, large collections of people just sitting around looking for employment. To explain the context requires a more comprehensive analysis.

Positive Building Blocks

Sound Basic Infrastructure

Since its early colonial era, South Africa was well served by its major port cities: Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban. During the 1960s two additional deep-sea harbours were constructed: one at Richards Bay to export coal and one at Saldanha Bay to export iron ore. Both export harbours are connected with good railway lines running hundreds of kilometres to the inland mining areas. Apart from these, South Africa has well-developed transport corridors between the port cities and the mining, industrial and commercial centres in the inland area – some of which developed more than a century ago. South Africa has more than 40 percent of all the paved roads and railroads on the continent of Africa. South Africa produces more than 50 percent of the total electricity output on the continent at six major coal- fired power stations and eight hydro-electric power pump schemes, and one nuclear-powered power station. Several giant new facilities are under construction to service the expanding distribution networks. South Africa is also well served by around fifteen large water-storage dams and a wide network of irrigation canals and tunnels.

Sound Business and Financial Infrastructure

For more than a century South Africa has been served by a network of financial institutions and business support systems. The major banks, Standard, First National, Nedbank and ABSA have been in operation for generations, each with a countrywide network of branches. In addition, there are several merchant banks focusing on business expansions and mergers. All the major accountancy networks are represented across the country as well as a plethora of attorneys, solicitors, conveyancers, tax consultants, management consultants, marketing agents and insurance agents. The mining, manufacturing and retail sectors are well-organised to lobby their interests. The trade union movement has a history of more than a century and is today predominantly represented by COSATU, one of the partners of the ANC government.

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Several major insurance companies – SANLAM, Old Mutual, Liberty Life and African Life – have been in operation for over 80 years and have played a major role in offering pension schemes, a wide array of insurance policies and in mobilising the savings of millions of persons in their capacity as predominant institutional investors. South Africa has also been well served by development corporations, both public and privately sponsored, to stimulate and channel development support such as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC, now called Business Partners).

Last, but not least, a pillar of the business and financial infrastructure is the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) – the 11th largest in the world. Organised stock exchanges enable investors to acquire or sell shares in public companies. They can diversify risks by owning shares in several firms that are engaged in different businesses without having to become directly involved in management. Because shares can be easily bought and sold, change in ownership does not cause disruptions in operations as it does in either sole proprietorships or partnerships. The continuity of a public company makes long-range planning easier and also increases the ability of the incorporated firm to borrow money for expansion. The market capitalisation of the JSE is the largest in Africa and larger than Russia’s stock market. A strong capital market, strong financial systems and financial stability is crucial for sustained economic growth.

A Developed Education Network

Some of South Africa’s universities have been in action close to a century, e.g. Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Potchefstroom, Grahamstown, Fort Hare (counting Nelson Mandela as one of its famous students), Natal and University of South Africa (UNISA), a correspondence university with more than 100,000 students from across Africa and elsewhere in the world. Even Robert Mugabe, during his years in prison, was a student of UNISA. Most of South Africa’s Prime Ministers, Cabinet Ministers, politicians, senior civil servants and particularly also business leaders and managers are graduates of South African universities. In addition, every major city is also served by technical and teacher training colleges offering vocational training in all relevant fields.

The education sector consists of some 8 million primary, 4.5 million secondary, and one million tertiary learners. 30,000 schools and 400,000 educators. Education is compulsory for the 7-15 age category and 20 percent of the national budget (5.5 percent of GDP) is spent on public education. Literacy levels are estimated at 82 percent: 81 percent female and 83 percent male. At most primary schools, 50 percent of learners are female. At university level, the majority of students are female.

Much still needs to be done to improve the quality of public education. For most of the past decade, less than 50 percent of candidates passed the final school-leaving examination. Private (independent) education is able to offer world-class schools that increasingly attract international pupils. Within the public sector there are also many ex-White suburban schools that are now racially integrated, where 100 percent pass rates are achieved. Of those who gained matric passes good enough to get them into university in 2003, only 5 percent were Black, compared to 7 percent Coloured, 41 percent Indian and 36 percent White. Unfortunately there are also dysfunctional township schools, which only achieve 0 to 20 percent pass rates 177

and where a culture of teaching and learning is absent. The hardest part is to improve the quality of teachers.

During the anti-apartheid ‘struggle’ years, much criticism was directed against the Bantu Education Act of 1953 which introduced mother-tongue education for the various African communities. It was claimed that it was designed to consign Black people to a destiny of manual labour and mental oppression. But the principle of mother-tongue education was consistently supported by Afrikaans-speakers for many decades. Afrikaners have always maintained that mother-tongue education is the simple de facto reality in mother-tongue societies like England, France, Germany and Italy. The mainstream language, mother-tongue language and the official language is one and the same thing. In a multi-lingual country like South Africa, with its 11 official languages, English – or perhaps ‘broken English’ – has become the lingua franca.

A growing number of Afrikaner and African parents have selected English as the preferred medium of instruction for their children in recent years. The consequence has been a marked intensification of learning problems. A study by Webb and Kembo-Sure, a research team, reported in African Voices, 2000, p.7, “… The decision of school authorities and parents to use English as the language of learning in schools (especially primary schools) has definitely contributed to the under-development of the South African people.” The same point was also made by Mamphela Ramphele, widow of Steve Biko and former Chancellor of the University of Cape Town, in a press interview on March 8th, 2009: “There is overwhelming evidence that learning through the first language or mother tongue helps to anchor learning in the child’s immediate environment: family, community and everyday interactions. Children, who are taught in the first few years in their mother tongue, while other languages are introduced as subjects, tend to become more proficient in all languages. It provides the anchor for better and deeper learning by linking it to everyday life and one’s own identity.”

Access to World-Class Science and Technology

In contrast to other parts of Africa, South Africa had the benefit of easy access to the predominant sources of modern science and technology – the major Western countries such as the USA, Western Europe and the United Kingdom. A very large proportion of White academics in a multitude of disciplines had the opportunity to pursue post-graduate studies at the trend- setting universities abroad: the Ivy League schools of America, the top universities in the UK, the leading universities in Germany, France, the Netherlands and in Scandinavia. This interaction was facilitated by the language proficiency of not only large numbers of White scholars but also by a substantial number of Black, Coloured and Indian students.

The transfer of scientific knowledge and state of the art technology was evident in all the natural sciences, physics, engineering mechanics, IT-technology, architecture, electro- magnetics, nuclear physics, economics, business management, public management and administration, finance and banking, medicine, education, agriculture, psychology, sociology and even theology. This interaction created a vast amount of cross-fertilisation that enabled South African universities, technical colleges and research institutions to keep abreast of new trends and best practices. There is virtually no field of knowledge, or area of technological advancement, that has not been accessible to South African scholarship over many generations. 178

The presence of this relatively large ‘first world’ component of highly educated and skilled persons has enabled South Africa to calibrate its industrial manufacturing strategy to international realities – a shift away from raw materials and cheap, labour-intensive, heavy industry to what is increasingly known as the ‘knowledge economy’. Ideas, information and technology are believed to have acquired greater importance than muscle and commodities. Extracting the wealth of minerals in South Africa required a high level of mine engineering technology and geological science.

International Trade

After more than two decades of co-ordinated world-wide campaigns to isolate South Africa by imposing trade and investment boycotts, 1994 once again opened the world for South Africa. South Africa was able to share in the flourishing international growth rates. In the period 1994 to 2001, manufacturing’s share of total exports rose from 35 percent to more than 50 percent. The share of primary products in merchandise trade declined from 64 percent in 1970 to 37 percent in 2000. Its emphasis on high technology caused the low technology sectors to decline while the high technology sectors have seen a steady increase.

In the same period, exports, as a percentage of manufactured output, increased from 14 percent to 28 percent with motor vehicles, basic iron and steel products and basic chemicals leading the way. Vehicle exports rose from 15,764 in 1995 to 130,000 in 2002, and are still rising. Exports of vehicles as a percentage of domestic production have risen from 4 percent to 26 percent, earning more than R50 billion. From BMW, Mercedes Benz, Volkswagen to Toyota, South African right-hand drive vehicles are sold in many parts of the world. South Africa is also well- placed to penetrate the huge potential of the emerging African market.

Accommodating Governmental Structures

Heterogeneous societies always carry the burden of inter-group rivalry – often based on coinciding and reinforcing cleavages as in the case of South Africa. These cleavages provide a fertile seedbed for polarised, cumulative conflict with regard to the allocation of values such as natural resources, privileges, priorities, pre-eminence and the control of command positions. For several generations the South African political scene was characterised by White domination coupled by various efforts to implement a separatist policy by creating separate self-governing territorial units where feasible. The underlying assumption was that socio- cultural incompatibilities and political tensions could not be resolved within a single polity. Given this irreconcilability of interests, separation of the groups into their own socio-economic political units with a territorial foundation was viewed by White power centres as the solution. In the colonial era, separate protectorates, that later became independent states, were created as in the cases of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana.

Despite the operation of these centrifugal forces, the historical pattern of group interaction has also created common areas where members of all groups were permanently resided. A dismantling of the inter-racial South African economy proved to be unworkable without the total impoverishment of all concerned. Neither economic resources nor political capability was 179

available to accomplish the ‘separation of the inseparable’. The South African reality encompassed both socio-cultural diversity and economic inter-dependence. Normally, separation by way of partitioning can at best only be achieved if it is geographically and economically feasible and based on mutual agreement. However, successful examples of this solution, though not impossible, are hard to find.

The opposite option was to choose a Westminster-type non-racial ‘common society’, based on universal suffrage, which in South Africa would inevitably lead to unqualified Black domination. The Westminster system, although suitable for a fairly homogeneous society, was itself modified by the English to accommodate the Irish Catholics (partitioning off Ireland and again sub- partitioning Northern Ireland) and granting a degree of self-rule to Scotland (devolution). The problem with simple majority rule in deeply divided societies is that it has a basic tendency to revert to majority domination.

Some of the problems raised by an unmodified Westminster-type majoritarian approach can be summarised as follows: (i) Executive dominance with the acquiescence or support of a permanent parliamentary majority. (ii) An intensification of inter-group conflict as a result of the winner-takes-all principle and its concomitant inference that the losers may lose all. (iii) A concentration of political competition and conflict at the centre of the political system as a result of a lack of decentralisation to meet local problems and to respond to diverse needs and aspirations. (iv) A lack of restraint on parliamentary sovereignty and executive power in the absence of effective constitutional restraints. (v) The absence of power-sharing devices to reconcile conflicting group aspirations and to protect minority interests.

An accommodation response to the challenges of diversity and intergroup strife is to accept the plurality of the country as given and to design a political structure to fit and express this pluralism in a constructive way. Insofar as a democratic system rests on consent rather than compulsion, each coherent group must perceive that its basic needs can be fulfilled within the system. Examples of such needs are physical safety, preservation of language and culture, local self-government and effective participation in the decision-making of the overall political system.

Techniques of accommodation normally include decentralisation (devolution), federalism (regionalism), power-sharing (e.g. coalition, proportionality in policy-making bodies, mutual veto or even segmental autonomy in tribal areas, recognition of communal common law), and sub-cultural autonomy (enclaves of ethnic self-rule). These techniques can be applied to replace unrestrained majority rule with co-operative consensual rule; to replace executive dictatorship with power-sharing based on a mutual veto in order to harmonise inter-group relations; to replace winner-takes-all majority decision-making with the principle of proportionality or parity to scale down the disproportional exaggerated power of majorities in setting priorities and allocating resources; by delegating as much decision-making as possible to sub-units (e.g. 180

federal regions or provinces) where regional or national minorities are protected from being swamped politically, socially and culturally.

South Africa went through three phases of transition after a ground-breaking De Klerk speech in the South African Parliament on 2nd February, 1990, opened the door for the release of Nelson Mandela. The first phase, 1990-1994, was the negotiation phase. The second phase, 1994-1999, was the interim phase. The third phase, starting in 1999, was the phase during which the consolidation and expansion of Black Power took shape. Each phase involved all three levels of government: national, provincial and local.

Approximately 650 local municipalities had to convert themselves into negotiating forums and negotiate an interim phase of local government. This was done under the auspices of the Local Government Transition Act. On the national level an Interim Constitution was negotiated which provided for the election of a Government of National Unity. It was elected in the first non-racial democratic elections in April, 1994. At the same time, a Constituent Assembly was appointed which negotiated the Constitution that was finalised in 1996. The 1999 election was the first under the final constitution.

During the transition years, much use was made of the ‘co-optation’ technique to rope in leaders from minority communities in sensitive command positions. After the ANC triumph in the 1994 elections, Mr. F.W. de Klerk, the former President, was appointed as a joint Vice-President together with Thabo Mbeki under Nelson Mandela as President. For the next two years, two investment bankers, Derek Keys and Chris Liebenberg, were consecutively roped in as Minister of Finance to assist Deputy Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, to find his feet. Dr. Chris Stals stayed on as Governor of the Reserve Bank for two years to assist with the training of his successor, Tito Mboweni. Piet Liebenberg served as Receiver of Revenue for a period to facilitate the eventual take-over by Pravin Gordhan. After 1997, Thabo Mbeki roped in Marthinus van Schalkwyk, former National Party Minister, as his Minister of Tourism and Environmental Affairs. When Jacob Zuma became President in 2009, to appease general uneasiness, he appointed several non-ANC members to his Cabinet: Pieter Mulder, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, Sue van der Merwe, Andries Nel, Derek Hanekom, Gert Oosthuizen. In order to accommodate a wide variety of sub-cultures, minorities and interest groups, Zuma enlarged his full Cabinet to 34 Ministers and Deputy-Ministers.

The country was on a knife edge during the transition years, 1994-1996. There were isolated bombings, massacres, assassinations and limited armed confrontations. But on the whole, it was a relatively peaceful transition. South Africa proved to have the leadership and the character to walk through this period of turbulence and keep the transition process on track. F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela were subsequently joint recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize. Mandela deserves much praise for recognising the need for reconciliation; De Klerk for being prepared to sponsor the concessions made by his constituency.

Van Zyl Slabbert, a former Leader of the Opposition in the South African Parliament, summed up the process in the following words: 181

“Eventually all the major parties that could cause irreparable damage, came to the table and chose peace rather than violence. Their leaders have to be commended without exception: Mandela, De Klerk, Viljoen and Buthelezi.” (See Van Zyl Slabbert (2002), “Government and Opposition”, in Bowes and Pennington, South Africa – The Good News, pp.49-55)

So far the new constitutional dispensation has facilitated the achievement of a significant degree of democratic political stability; it has implemented an effective system of tax collection; it has achieved a peaceful, constitutional succession of political and executive leadership; it has tolerated the mobilisation of special interests; it has implemented a system of regional government to fit the ethno-graphic population composition (e.g. Zulus in KwaZulu Natal, Xhosas in the Eastern Cape, Tswanas in the North West; Sothos in the Free State and Coloureds and Whites in the Western Cape); and, it has maintained a reasonable economic growth rate of between 2 and 5 percent over the course of 14 years.

Problem Areas

Despite many ‘good news’ items, the New South Africa also produced a number of obdurate problem areas that needed to be addressed. Nelson Mandela deserves much credit for fostering a spirit of reconciliation and optimism – for leading by example. Since his retirement a range of serious problems emerged.

Law and Order

Crime statistics became a political hot potato with even the Commissioner of Police finding himself under suspicion. The most popular explanation for the high crime rate offered by ignorant journalists was that it was somehow attributable to the ‘apartheid’ system that existed between 1950 and 1990! But such simplistic explanations are not helpful to deal with a huge problem that particularly affects urban Black communities. They deflect attention from the real issues. Several studies have revealed that 72 percent of the victims of violent crime knew the offender. It also revealed that 60 percent of respondents in the survey had been victim of at least one crime between 1993 and 1998. In the period 1996 to 2000 the number of crimes, especially rape, carjacking, serious assault, housebreaking and common robbery, had been steadily increasing – particularly violent crime.

During the 35 apartheid years a total of 2,700 people were killed confronting government forces (The Economist, “Survey of South Africa”, February 24th, 2001, p.7). During the 3 years to March 2000, police officers killed 1,550 persons. Only for a period of two years, 2001 and 2002, police statistics recorded 21,000 murders each year – more than 50 persons per day. Between 1994 and 1997 a total of 554 farmers were killed on their farms, averaging almost 200 murders per 100,000 farming population. In 1999 the number of farm killings rose to 809. When caught, criminals are handled by a slow, over-burdened justice system. Only 18 percent of murder cases led to a conviction. Part of the problem is the poor quality of the policy force. Some are said to be corrupt, many untrained and more under-equipped. The Economist, (op.cit. p.7) reports that one-quarter are functionally illiterate and 10,000 do not have driving licences.

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In view of the high cost of crime to the business community, they have spent more than R11 billion on private security services since 1999. The police budget for 1999 was R15.5 billion. The private sector launched an organisation called Business Against Crime (BAC) to work jointly with government agencies to fight crime. Actions initiated included for example: - The streamlining of courts to handle cases faster and more efficiently. - Addressing of corruption by vehicle registration offices. - The elimination of the disappearance of dockets at many courts. - The elimination of the illegal re-registration of vehicles (used to recirculate hijacked cars). - Video surveillance in city centres, like Johannesburg, to reduce street crime. - Support to victims of sexual offences. - Reduction of commercial and organised crime. - Improvement of safety in areas frequented by tourists. - A schools crime prevention programme was launched. - Attention was turned to syndicated crime in the drug trade, corruption, illegal firearms and vehicle theft (which exceeded 120,000 in Gauteng alone). - Improvement of security in outsourcing and handling of cash in transit to commercial banks.

By 2006 a United Nations report claimed that South Africa still had the highest rate of gun- related crime in the world (except Colombia). They also reported an increase in well-organised armed robberies. To protect their own safety and their property, private individuals and businesses hire private security guards which appeared to outnumber police in a November 2006 count by at least two to one.

South Africa spends a lot on police, courts and prisons. In 2004 it spent 3 percent of GDP – or $130 per person – on criminal justice, compared with 1 percent and $66 in Europe.

An Over-Embellished Bill of Rights

The constitutional structure that was jointly designed by the outgoing National Party and the upcoming ANC, and implemented in 1994, has served the country reasonably well in the subsequent years in terms of reconciliation and reconstruction. The new constitution was formally adopted by an elected Constitutional Assembly in 1996 and formally came into force in February 1997.

Acknowledging injustices of the past, the new constitution makes a commitment to improve the quality of life of all citizens and to free the potential of each person by building a non-racial and non-sexist society in which fundamental human rights are respected. The founding values of the legal order thus established were stated as: human dignity, the achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms and respect for certain fundamental principles of democracy – the rule of law, universal adult suffrage, a common voters role, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government aimed at ensuring accountability, responsiveness and openness. These founding values of the Constitution were articulated in a Bill of Rights. These rights, however, are not absolute. They may be limited in terms of a law of general application, and only to the extent that the limitation is “… reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.” (See Section 36 of the Constitution) 183

The critical issue remained testing the scope and nature of the abovementioned provisions under the Constitution. Chaskelson’s response was not encouraging. He stated that it “… calls for a proportionality analysis, involving the balancing of different interests in the context of the relevant legislative and social setting.” (See Chief Justice Chaskelson, “The Constitution and the Constitutional Court” in Brett Bowes and Stewart Pennington, South Africa, the Good News, Rivonia: South Africa, the Good News Pty Ltd, 2003, pp.77-83)

The equal protection clause guarantees that “… everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law” (Section 9(1) of the Constitution). Discrimination is presumed to be unfair unless the contrary is established. However, ironically, “positive discrimination” in favour of black persons is exempted. The extent of this exemption could ultimately nullify all the constructive intentions of the constitution-makers.

The Constitution provides for a Constitutional Court to function as a court of appeal and its decisions are binding on all courts and all organs of the state. In addition, the Constitution is premised on a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The powers of each branch are defined in the Constitution.

A potential problem with the over-the-top scope of the ‘rights’ granted in the Constitution lies in its enforceability. In original form in Western democracies, a ‘Bill of Rights’ served as a charter guaranteeing fundamental liberties to the individual and setting firm limits on how far the state may encroach on the lives of its citizens. These conventional rights, as in the 1791 amendments to the USA constitution, refer to freedom of speech, religion, association and self-incrimination. But the new SA Constitution also includes socially inspired ‘rights’ such as “access to adequate housing”, “reproductive health care”, “adult basic education” and even green rights to “have the environment protected”. The Bill of Rights thus converts the constitution into an instrument of social-engineering for ‘righting wrongs’, e.g. all forms of social inequality and material disadvantage, and for promoting the rights of those who believe they have a special claim against society. It imposes positive duties on the state to achieve the realisation of certain socio- economic rights, e.g. rights to housing, health care, food, water and social security, land reform and access to land. These claims on society, elevated to constitutional imperatives and entrenched in a Bill of Rights constitute a legal base for aggrieved persons or interest groups to sue everybody. It would allow people to prosecute politics by litigation. Self-righteous reformers do not see the role of courts as simply to enforce the law, but to remake society in their own image. Obviously the courts have no power to order the government how to spend its budget! The broad range of issues covered in the Bill of Rights could open the door to an avalanche of frivolous litigation by opportunists.

Misguided grandiose designs are bound to end in disasters. No government can deliver equality as an outcome. The state can try to improve equality of opportunity, but to delude the man in the street that it can ensure equality of outcome as a legal ‘entitlement’ is surely dishonest.

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Nepotism and Corruption

As a result of the conflation of party and state, both embedded in a culture of reverse discrimination and compensative entitlement, nepotism and corruption have become unrestrained. ANC wheeling and dealing are by definition seen as actions of the previously disadvantaged, and accordingly above reproach and beyond criticism. Parliamentary control over the executive branch through its committees (e.g. Public Accounts) is neutralised and exacerbated by a shortage of opposition members adequately knowledgeable to penetrate and decipher the intricacies of public accounts. The traditional checks and balances between the different branches of government (legislative, executive and judicial) which are essential components of an accountable and responsible democratic system are slowly being eroded. Parliament has become a rubber stamp, the public broadcaster a government mouthpiece. Cost effectiveness and efficiency are sacrificed. Since it does not count in an open-ended timeframe of redress and compensation. Many ANC-connected members have promoted and enriched themselves in the name of ‘transformation’ and ‘affirmative action’. R.W. Johnson lists, in unrelenting detail, a web of ties between ANC leaders and their families and the new rich and powerful: crony capitalism for comrades and camp-followers.

Reverse Discrimination

While ‘affirmative action’ was intended to redress past imbalances and injustices, with the passage of time it established a different kind of institutionalised race-based discrimination which is underpinned by an elaborate legislative framework: - The Employment Equity Act which determines that “designated employers” should have “demographic proportionality” (70 percent Black, 45 percent women, 5 percent disabled) and submit plans to attain such equity; - The Equity Act that reinforces the constitutional ban on discrimination and those who are accused of “unfairness” have to prove their innocence; and - The Black Economic Empowerment Act which imposes a host of obligations on companies.

The Mbeki government which openly spoke of the need to build a black bourgeoisie took various legislative steps to push Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). BEE firms were privileged in public procurement. The overall target was to place at least 35 percent of the economy into Black hands by 2014. But the downside is clear: once the principle is established that merit or price is irrelevant, the exercise of blatant racial choice and a dilution of standards becomes standard practice.

In time, the BEE campaign spilled over into many additional areas of South African social and economic life: university admissions, management of business corporations and farm ownership. In February 2015, President Jacob Zuma announced the creation of an “Office of the Valuer-General” to determine land valuations in forced sales to enhance the distribution of farm land. He also announced a ban on foreign ownership of farm land, a restriction on the size and number of farms that citizens may own and also consideration of proposals to compel farms to hand over a 50 percent share in their farms to employees. (See The Economist, February 28, 2015, pp.40-41)

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These policies were announced despite the fact that the South African commercial farming sector is a significant export earner and employer. According to the government’s own account, 90 percent of the land redistributed since 1994 went out of production and was mainly used as rural settlement areas.

The momentum of the BEE campaign has not only inhibited new direct foreign investment, it encouraged disinvestment. The affirmative action programme has also spawned a populist campaign to nationalise mines, industries, banks and farmland. It created the spectre of unemployed youths who do not understand basic economic essentials such as the need for fixed investment, the laws of supply and demand, the role of profit to generate taxable income or the role of positive cash flow in running a viable business.

In May 2015, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released its African Economic Outlook Report for 2015 in which it estimated Africa’s average annual economic growth rate to reach 5 percent in 2016. However, Southern Africa, once the continent’s economic leader, is now considered a drag on overall growth. South Africa is projected to grow at only 2 percent as it is dogged by large-scale labour disputes and energy shortages frequently leaving its key mining sector without electricity. South Africa has declined from being the world’s largest producer of gold, platinum and other precious metals to No.7 on the list of mining commodity producers. The full-scale effect of this waning mining industry will be felt in many areas of the South African economy: job creation, tax revenue collection, new foreign direct investments and the decay of former mining towns scattered around the Witwatersrand. Without significant foreign direct investment, South Africa’s economic future will be severely diminished.

AIDS

Although South Africa’s health care is superior to what is available elsewhere in Africa, its response to the AIDS pandemic has failed. For a decade, the country’s political leadership has been in denial. This resulted in more HIV-positive people than anywhere else in the world.

AIDS came later to South Africa than to many countries further north. The first case was reported in 1987 and the epidemic did not really begin until 1993. Little is known for certain how many people are infected and how many people have already died. UNAIDS estimated the HIV-positive people at 4.2 million in 2001. Deaths were expected to rise to around 400,000 in 2005 and 600,000 in 2010. Average life expectancy was set to fall from 60 years to 40 by 2010. It was claimed that in 2006, AIDS killed as many as 900 people a day.

For a long time Mr. Mbeki questioned medical opinion on the causes and treatment of AIDS – particularly on the use of anti-retroviral drugs. This led to little public education and opinion leadership on the issue. Mr. Mbeki’s agenda was to find African solutions rather than the expensive anti-retroviral drugs.

It is clear that there is more merit in preventative measures than merely extending the lives of terminally ill AIDS patients in terms of funding priorities. But such an approach requires very intensive educational programmes aimed at teenagers and sexually active young adults. It also 186

requires a stronger focus on properly researched treatment of early stage HIV-positive persons. However, the expensive anti-retroviral treatment is essential to extend the lives of people who have already contracted the AIDS disease. But much more needs to be done to make the general public aware of the causes and consequences of AIDS.

The Zimbabwe Tragedy

In the period April to September 1994, Hutus in Rwanda carried out a systematic genocide of Tutsis, killing 800,000 to one million persons. The international community stood by, failing to intervene or to do anything to prevent this horrible massacre.

When Robert Mugabe’s supporters turned on white farmers in the mid-1990s, the UK faintly offered to fund the cost of a farm redistribution programme. Over a period of 10 years, Mugabe has virtually destroyed civilised life in Zimbabwe: he cowed the judiciary, silenced the media, rigged three elections, killed and imprisoned his opponents, dispossessed Zimbabwe’s most productive citizens and printed so much money that inflation destroyed his currency and brought his country to a standstill. He converted Zimbabwe to the level of a failed state. Yet, the free world stood by comfortably leaving the problem in South Africa’s hands.

Mr. Mbeki strived, over almost a decade, to set South Africa up as a symbol of African potential, with its own institutions (NEPAD) and its own mechanisms for solving problems (silent diplomacy). His ambition was that African countries should help each other uphold standards of good governance, human rights, democracy and economic progress.

But despite his repression of his own people, Mugabe remained a revered icon of the liberation struggle, as the man who can throw scornful insults at Western leaders in measured English. But after Mr. Mbeki had exhausted his arsenal of ‘quiet diplomacy’ measures, recalcitrant Mugabe remained in power and continued to ransack his country. South Africa also failed to help the people of Zimbabwe – except, perhaps, by way of allowing an estimated 2 to 3 million refugees to cross the borders into South Africa. Under Zuma, the Zimbabwe imbroglio continued unabated.

Political Correctness

Spin and propaganda are facts of life in the modern communication world. It involves avoiding or softening the unfavourable parts and stressing or focusing exclusively on the good news. The negative outcome is that the truth is either distorted or totally concealed. But you cannot build a future on ignorance.

The consequences of political correctness are that it dilutes civic consciousness and impoverishes the intellectual life of a society. If what is said is not meant, or what is meant is not said, then what needs to be heard remains silent. A society in the grips of political correctness becomes a society of ubiquitous pretence. Key positions and institutions cannot be used as instruments of social transformation if they raise the spectre of the dilution of quality. The sacrifice of standards could render everyone worse off as the quality of services is diminished. It is imperative that interventions to bring about ‘affirmative action’ should in fact bring about 187

social justice – and not something else like the favouritism of an undeserving clique. Expertise, good qualifications and experience do matter. If not, all the desirable public goods that are needed to improve the quality of the lives of citizens will fade out of reach.

Concluding Remarks

It cannot be said that South Africa has completed its transition from a polarised society to a smooth functioning liberal democracy. The temptation to suspend democracy in favour of some authoritarian alternative, as has often happened elsewhere in Africa, remains a danger. The practice of ‘reverse discrimination’, or what is euphemistically called ‘affirmative action’, remains an open question. If all problems faced by black societies are explained and treated in terms of a racialist paradigm, the incentive to find constructive self-reliant solutions will remain stunted.

Bibliography

Bowes, B. & Pennington, S. South Africa – The Good News, The Good News (Pty) Ltd, (2003) Hyde Park Johnson, R.W. (2009) South Africa’s Brave New World, Penguin Group, London Meredith, M. (2012) The State of Africa, Simon & Schuster, London Vosloo, W.B. (2010) Political-Economic Trends Around the World, Biblaridion-Crink, Cape Town

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14. Prospects

No one knows what the future holds. At best one can extrapolate from current trends, taking into account the dominant forces in operation. But looking into the future remains a speculative exercise. It could be useful to look at the assessments and prognostications of a few recognised external observers, as well as internal participant observers.

Study, Toil, Save and Invest

Robert Guest, former Africa editor of The Economist, wrote a book in 2004 entitled The Shackled Continent – Africa’s Past, Present and Future (MacMillan, London) in which he focussed understandably much more on the past and the present than on the future. Who can really predict the future? But Guest nevertheless takes a very specific stand on Africa’s future: “South Africa is Africa’s best hope. It has by far the continent’s largest and most sophisticated economy. If South Africa prospers, it could pull the rest of the continent in its wake, as Japan did in Asia. If it were to stagnate, or revert to tyranny, it would be as if someone had poured sugar into the continent’s petrol tank. So what are South Africa’s prospects?” (Robert Quest, op.cit. p.220)

Guest provides a long list of positives: - South Africa has become a freer, more tolerant place; - abortion and gay sex are now legal; - the government has built 1.4 million new brick houses; - the government supplied free piped water to 26 million of South Africa’s population; - the state has brought electricity to many who have relied previously on paraffin to light their homes and cook their food; - the government has given pensions to the poor, particularly old women, who have become the most reliable breadwinners for large extended families; - with sanctions ended, South Africa has become an easier place to do business; - Africans flock to South Africa for the same reasons that Mexicans head for California, the country accounts for 45 percent of the Sub-Saharan GDP; - the collapse of the Soviet Union prompted the ANC to abandon socialism; - fiscal discipline has been exemplary; - South Africa has a strong democratic culture, a free press, an independent judiciary, a feisty trade-union movement and a large middle class.

Guest also lists a number of negatives: - the government spends more than it receives in tax revenues; - many Black South Africans actually grew poorer under Black rule, mainly by losing their jobs; - joblessness exploded; - the ANC has tried to grant First World legal privileges to a workforce with largely Third World skills; - the new labour laws make it harder to fire workers, but also harder for the jobless to find work; 189

- South Africa has become a dangerous place to live as a result of its high murder and violent crime rate; - many police officers are barely literate, have trouble processing paperwork and have to deal with grid-locked courts; - for every fifty carjackers, only one hijacker is jailed; - chaos in local government helps crooked officials pilfer without fear of punishment, even when crooked bureaucrats are exposed, not much happens to them; - the drive for Black economic empowerment has produced perverse role models for Black entrepreneurs since they acquired their wealth by parlaying political influence into a share of someone else’s business; - what is missing is a wider understanding that wealth is something you have to create by making things and providing services that other people want to buy.

Guest ends his survey on a more optimistic note that out of Africa, hopefully, something new will grow: “Most African countries are not yet on the right path, but several are at least hacking through the undergrowth looking for that path. Where exactly it will lead is up to Africans; only they can choose what kind of society they want to live in ... I do not think I have met any Africans, whether peasants, bishops or bankers, who do not want their countries to enjoy a standard of living like the West’s. And this will take time ... To join the modern world, Africans will have to study, toil, save and invest.” (Guest, op.cit. pp.255-256)

Liberation’s New Set of Problems

R.W. Johnson is a Rhodes Scholar who bears the distinction of being the only Oxford don to resign his fellowship in order to return to South Africa. A former member of both the British Labour Party and the ANC, he pursued a combined career as a political scientist, historian and journalist. He produced several publications, but for the purposes of this manuscript our focus is turned on two: South Africa – The First Man, the Last Nation, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Cape Town, 2004, and Beloved Country Since the end of Apartheid, Allen Lane, London, 2009.

Johnson concedes that history is not written in a personal vacuum. His own space is that of a South African born Englishman who dislikes the Boers because they did not gladly embrace the English culture and who is now utterly disillusioned about the direction ANC-led South Africa is taking. Johnson says in South Africa (2004): “We have to face the sad truth that South Africa, with the end of apartheid, exchanged one set of authoritarian, hegemonic nationalists for another and that the many hopes of liberation have faded as the similarities between these two hegemonies have multiplied.” (Johnson, 2004, p.xiv)

Johnson argues that Afrikaner nationalism led them to such disgrace that what was in 1900 the world’s favourite victim group had ninety years later become its most hated ruling group. The nation was humiliated and even the Afrikaans language and culture have been undermined as a result. The ANC, in contrast, promised to build a common “rainbow” nation – a promise met with enormous enthusiasm and gratitude by all layers of society. But around a decade later, this promise of a common nationhood has not materialised. Like Afrikaner nationalism, the ANC has 190

built a following on a sense of historic suffering and grievance – a sense of victimhood. As a result African nationalism is bent on the same self-destructive trajectory as Afrikaner nationalism.

Johnson (2004) ends his assessment of South Africa’s travails with the following conclusion: “The tragedy of South Africa is that it has always been ruled – and still is – by elites which seek their own group self interest rather than that of the country as a whole. Only when it at last acquires a ruling elite which thinks and feels for the whole of the beloved country will the sad cycle change. This is what guarantees Nelson Mandela a special place in South African hearts. He alone for a brief and precious moment seemed to promise at least the possibility of a common South Africanism.” (Johnson, 2004, op.cit. p.232)

As his own challenge, Johnson saw it as his task “to be frank about history ... and to tell the truth about it so that we can, one day, go beyond it.” (Op.cit. p.xiv)

Johnson kept his resolve to be frank about history in his next publication South Africa’s Brave New World – the Beloved Country since the end of Apartheid. He displayed in this book his mastery of writing, both with a broad sweep and the complexities of history. He continues to provide robustly liberal critiques of both past and present governments of South Africa. He tells the story of how the “oppressive history of apartheid” was lifted after the fall of the Berlin Wall. He argues that the apartheid era did not produce an adequately educated Black middle class to run the new state. But just as damaging was the nature of the new leaders, many of whom had lived in exile or in prison for much of their adult lives steeped in decrepit Eastern Bloc political ideas in a world that had since moved on. This disastrous combination had a terrible impact – poisoning everything, from big business to education to energy utilities ... bringing South Africa to the brink of “failed state” status. Johnson argues that, as a first step, it is essential to “get the history right”. Southern Africa never had enough Whites to form a countrywide oppressor class. In 1800 there were only 26,000 Whites and in 1875 only 342,000 White persons. It meant that White rule, outside the Cape, lasted barely a century – and all Whites were not oppressors. Johnson claims that the African nationalist version of history has little to do with actual history and serves the lower political purposes of providing a founding myth, of keeping Blacks polarised against Whites, and keeping Whites on the defensive. But true history cannot be eradicated. South Africa is organically built on what went before – by far the most developed industry and infrastructure in Africa. Colonialism was in many ways a progressive, modernising force. Colonial rule contained its own emancipatory possibilities within itself. This was true ... “even under apartheid”. Record numbers of Black schools and township houses were built. In the end it was apartheid governments that conceded full trade union rights, the abolition of the pass laws and of the Immorality Act. Indeed it was a White minority government which abolished apartheid outright and helped usher in the era of universal-suffrage democracy. Change in South Africa, as elsewhere, has been organic.

To do away with anything that is Eurocentric is quite impossible. Black South Africans have eagerly embraced the elements of modernity: constitutions, political parties, human rights, gender equality, newspapers, television, modern medicine, football, motor cars, aeroplanes, electricity, railways, factories, telephones, universities, libraries, trade unions, etc. All cultures 191

are not equal or equally valuable. Inequalities have happened often before in human history. There is no racial element in recognising this. No amount of posturing can change that: “Getting the history right is difficult but vital, for the alternative, a sort of imaginary history, is politically toxic.” (Ibid. p.577)

Johnson argues that the ANC grew up in a “victim culture”, a “blaming culture”. The result is that no one is prepared to take responsibility for failures – it is always the fault of apartheid or the fault of the Whites. This self-defeating and dangerous frame of mind compromises the future – the past crippling the future.

Inventing an alternative history is like renaming a town where there was no preceding African town in that place. Addiction to imaginary history owes much to the non-literate nature of traditional African society and the corresponding reliance on purely malleable oral sources.

Johnson argues that if we put imaginary history aside and look at the undeniable facts of social progress in the colonial period, common sense suggests that all South Africans were beneficiaries of colonialism – even if unequally so as other Africans migrated happily into apartheid South Africa. Johnson claims that “... most Africans accepted the equation that the larger the white population an African country had, the richer and more developed it was likely to be and that South Africa was thus uniquely lucky in having the largest white population of all.” (Op.cit. p.579)

The eradication of South Africa’s colonial past is not simply a rhetorical issue, says Johnson, it is potentially a matter of life and death. Even an attempt to do so would have terrible consequences – as illustrated in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, Amin’s Uganda, Barre’s Somalia, Mobutu’s Zaire/Congo. If you accept the colonial legacy and build on it, you can go beyond it. If you attempt to destroy or reverse it, you end with a failed state.

In the South African case, colonialism is equated with apartheid. When the UN condemned apartheid as a “crime against humanity” in 1973, the motion was sponsored by the Soviet Union and Sekou Toure’s Guinea. No Western country ever ratified the resulting “International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid”. This was ironic since the Soviet Union was the author of the worst human rights atrocities of the 20th century while Sekou Toure’s Guinea was one of the bloodiest dictatorships in Africa. Yet these UN documents remained the ANC’s scriptural bases for the “victims-and-beneficiaries” view of history.

Johnson quotes two sets of figures to dispute the “crime against humanity” thesis. The first deals with demography stating that between 1904 and 1988 the White population of South Africa increased 4.43 times, Asians 7.61 times, Coloureds 7.03 times and “Africans” 7.48 times. The second deals with GDP. In constant 2000 prices the figure was R12,736 in 1948 when the apartheid government took over. This figure had doubled by 1981 to R23,972 (in constant terms). Though unequally divided, Black wages increased far more quickly than those of Whites from the 1960s on. The per capita income had almost doubled in real terms under White rule up to 1981. Thereafter the country suffered as a result of ANC organised international boycotts and disinvestment campaigns. Johnson argues that attempts to divide that nation into beneficiaries 192

and victims of history is counter productive: it encourages the majority to cling to a sense of victimhood and entitlements, while simultaneously berating as guilty beneficiaries the group on which the country still heavily depends.

Johnson argues that South Africa’s post-1994 governments live in a dream world exhibiting a strong sense of unreality. They still live in a world of slogans, ideology and resolutions – but with little sense of how things actually work. They need to become more realistic and effective governments. Mandela’s government was the most successful, inclusive and did much to engender a sense of common citizenship and national pride. The two Mbeki governments were worse in every respect, with every sign of further deterioration across the board under Zuma. The Zuma government is increasingly racked by corruption and incompetence: Parliament robbed of power and significance, state institutions abused for partisan ends, patronage, spoils and clientelism overwhelming constitutional government, etc. After the high hopes that South Africa would be different, it is not. Mandela allowed the country to dream of exceptionalism, but ultimately Mbeki and Zuma brought it down with a thump to a wearily familiar African reality.

Johnson lists the many things that have deteriorated: - the public health system has almost been destroyed; - the government has allowed the transport infrastructure and power-generation system to run down; - it has undermined one institution after another – the police, the army, the civil service, municipal and provincial administrations; - policy interventions greatly lessened the country’s food security; - government policies have caused a major investment slump in mining and have erected considerable barriers to inward investment; - the whole public sector is now seen as part of a gigantic spoils system; - admissions and appointments policies are bound to lower standards more and more over time; - affirmative action policies have encouraged emigration by talented Whites and Indians while building failure into the system as many posts are now filled by political cronies unable to do their jobs; - in contrast with Afrikaner nationalism and Anglo nationalism that went before it to build up the state and para-statal sectors, African nationalism has very rapidly run these sectors down, while at the same time attempting to extend the state’s functions and interventions in society – resulting in a grotesque over-reach and public sector chaos – leading progressively to system failure.

Johnson says the Nats thought they were in power for ever, but they have now disappeared. The ANC believe the same – that they will be in power “until Jesus comes”. But they too will, in the end, be disappointed. He expects the ANC to remain in power for a whole generation. As experience elsewhere in Africa shows, leaders usually attempted to remain in power too long and usually disappeared with the collapse of their parties.

Would South Africa follow Zimbabwe’s downward spiral? Johnson believes South Africa’s far stronger culture of democracy should shield the country from the Mugabe model. South Africa is far more integrated into the international world than Zimbabwe ever was and in many ways 193

dependent on its interaction with the Western World – despite its latter-day membership of the BRICS association.

According to Johnson, Mbeki paid too much attention to his foreign policy agenda and too little to local issues. Hence he was easily replaced by the “100% Zulu boy”. Zuma has always been the more earthy “village fundamentalist” who liked the “big man” style – far removed from Mbeki’s Marxist rhetoric. Zuma has totally changed the culture of the ANC, which Johnson describes as follows: “The party of Mandela has gone, vanished. Today’s ANC is a federation of warlords, sub-lords, or patrons and clients. And you’ll find that the head of every state or police department has profitable arrangements with those he is supposed to be controlling. Those controlling prisons will themselves be running corrupt rackets, the head of the drugs squad will have arrangements with the drug dealers, and so on. There has been a huge criminalisation of the state.” (Op.cit. p.645)

Johnson does not offer any advice to the current rulers or the people of the “beloved country” at large. He ends his tome with the conclusion that “... liberation was endlessly celebrated as if it meant that all the problems were over ... instead liberation meant simply that new problems began.”

The Massive Crisis of Delivery

A further assessment comes from an active participant observer, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert or “Van” as we used to call him at Stellenbosch University. In The Other Side of History – an anecdotal reflection on political transition in South Africa (Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg, 2006), Dr. Slabbert described his own experience as an Afrikaner African from being an academic sociologist to leader of the opposition party to “backroom factotum and facilitator to apprentice businessman”. The final chapter deals with ‘taking stock’ of South Africa.

Van Zyl Slabbert maintained that he preferred to talk his country up: “In South Africa, despite the enormous challenges we face, we have predominantly consensual stability, i.e. the majority of citizens, interest groups and organisations, whatever their differences, buy into the existing order and the manner in which change should come about. The government does not rely on coercion to force conformity, and there are no serious threats from society itself violently to overthrow the status quo”. (Op.cit. pp.142-143)

He believed that the consensual stability is built on three foundation stones: firstly, the classic liberal democratic constitution adopted in 1996; secondly, the supporting mechanisms eg. the Constitutional Court and civil liberties protected in the Constitution; and thirdly, the active and vibrant civil society to fill the space between state and individual which is needed to pursue collective goals.

Slabbert believed that it would be a mistake to equate the well being of society with the performance of government. Societies can make steady progress in spite of bad governance. All 194

that one can hope for from a democratic government is that it develops the ability to recognise its mistakes soon enough: - Confusing democratic representivity with competence; - Rewarding loyalty above competence; - Confusing authority with intelligence; - Dealing with corruption selectively; - Sacrificing domestic policy for foreign policy resulting in indifference about domestic problems and crises.

Van Zyl Slabbert noted that over more than a decade, South Africa’s quality of life had declined, life expectancy had dropped, income inequality had increased, levels of educational achievement had declined and that the poorest of the poor had become more and poorer. He admitted that he had no simple remedy to offer, apart from urging more foreign and domestic investment, a broader skills base and combating corruption on all fronts at all levels. But he asked, “When do we move from defining the problem to attacking it?” In South Africa these problems have transformed into “a massive crisis of delivery”. A crisis of delivery holds the potential to become a crisis for democracy: vigilantism, plundering of services, escalating crime and looting.

Van Zyl Slabbert devoted his final chapter to “Mythmaking in the New South Africa”. Starting with the myths of the “Population Registration Act” in the “Old South Africa” which resulted in endless classification problems, he moved to the “Black Economic Empowerment Act” of the “New South Africa”. The BEE Act considers ‘Black’ as a generic term to cover Coloureds, Indians and Africans. But nowhere is any legal definition given to these terms. Some companies even want the Chinese to be defined as Black so that they can qualify for ‘Empowerment’ deals. So, in the ‘New South Africa’ the myth race endures – with far-reaching consequences for (‘non- racial’?) policy making and implementation in trying to meet the challenges of reconstruction and development. He maintained that: “... the point about political myths is they need some kind of programmatic infrastructure to keep them going, whether it is Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, a military dictatorship in Chile, democracy in the USA, or communism in the USSR. Eventually myths disappear when the weight of historical pressure and evidence make them irrelevant. Race happens to be one of the most tenacious, enduring myths to survive.” (Slabbert, op.cit. p.162)

He referred to Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of “paradigm shifts” in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, i.e. when new research and evidence becomes so compelling that it challenges the assumptions of a dominant paradigm, and the paradigm shifts or becomes redundant. Just as the programmatic infrastructure that underpinned apartheid has been the subject of endless scrutiny, the programmatic infrastructure that underpins the myths of the ‘New South Africa’ should be scrutinised with a sharp eye. Attempts to circumvent the constitutional constraints on the use and abuse of power should be carefully monitored. The centralisation of decision making, euphemistically called “democratic centralism”, where the leadership of the ruling party controls all institutions on all levels of government is a serious threat to constitutional, liberal democracy. The national democratic revolution that is propagated by the ANC with the promise of “large scale, fundamental economic and social redistribution” is coming into conflict 195

with a macroeconomic policy of market-driven growth. The former promises growth through redistribution; the latter redistribution through growth.

Slabbert maintained that the “... myths of the new South Africa are maintained by the concurrent pursuit of four major programmatic goals: a liberal democracy, democratic centralism, a national democratic revolution and GEAR [Growth, Employment and Redistribution]. It is like standing on an elevator and trying to walk upstairs and downstairs at the same time. You stay on the same spot, and the world just keeps rolling away from you.” (Op.cit. p.165)

Van Zyl Slabbert claimed that the ANC government is potentially confronted with four paradigm shifts at the same time. He stated that in an emerging democracy, even one paradigm shift is sufficient to induce some form of authoritarian regression (eg. Pinochet in Chile). But Van Zyl Slabbert did not see this as possible in the “foreseeable future” – given the countervailing sources of influence and power in South Africa. But he believed that out of the confusion “... something extraordinarily creative may yet emerge” and that “... most of us are condemned to live on the other side of invented history”. (Op.cit. p.165)

As Bleak as Ever

Martin Meredith is another guide to Africa’s political trajectory since independence. In his The State of Africa – A History of the Continent Since Independence, Simon & Schuster, London, 2011, he provides a straightforward dispassionate account of what happened in each of the larger African countries.

In the final chapter “Out of Africa”, Meredith relates the events in Africa since Mandela spoke at the OAU summit of 1994 of need for a “new birth”, an African renaissance. This idea was followed up by Thabo Mbeki’s drive to launch the New Partnership for African Development (Nepad). It involved a pledge by fifteen African governments to promote democratic, popular participation, good governance and sound economic management. They agreed to set up an African peer review mechanism to monitor their performance and punish defaulters. In exchange they asked the industrialised states in the West to dismantle trade barriers, to increase their development aid and to encourage greater Western private-sector investment – lifting annual growth to 7 percent and reducing poverty by half by 2015. Their slogan was “Better Africa, Better World”.

Linked to the drive for renewal was a plan to overhaul the Organisation for African Unity, hitherto little more than a club for dictators, into a driving force for the “African renaissance”. The outcome was that in 2001 the OAU was replaced by the African Union, an organisation adorned with a plethora of new institutions, including a Pan-African parliament, a Pan-African Court of Justice, an African central bank and a Peace and Security Council. In July 2002, the leaders of 53 African states gathered in Durban for the inaugural conference of the African Union. There was a carnival mood, grand speeches, sumptuous banquets and a succession of pageants. Mbeki said that this was the “time to end the marginalisation of Africa” and for Africa to “... take its rightful place in global affairs” to be “... a continent of democracy, of good governance ... and where the rule of law is upheld”. Unfortunately, Mbeki’s attempts to endow 196

the occasion with a sense of gravitas was soon overshadowed by the antics of Gaddafi who arrived in Durban with an entourage of 600 officials and a cavalcade of sixty armoured cars. He stole the limelight standing up in King’s Park sports stadium in front of a crowd of 30,000 spectators, shouting platitudes. UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, sounded a note of caution: “Let us be careful not to mistake hope for achievement”.

Meredith states that after 50 years of independence, Africa’s prospects are as bleak as ever and falling behind all other regions of the world. Its average per capita national income is one-third lower than the world’s next poorest region, South Asia. Between 1981 and 2002 the people living in poverty nearly doubled. A UN Report in 2007 predicted that, by 2015, Sub-Saharan Africa will account for almost one-third of world poverty, up from one-fifth in 1990.

Although Africa possesses enormous mineral wealth its entire economic output is less than 2 percent of world GDP. African food production since 1960 has fallen by 10 percent and the number of undernourished Africans had risen by 100 million to 250 million since 1960. School enrolment as well as life expectancy is falling. Sub-Saharan Africa still accounts for 67 percent of all people living with the HIV/AIDS virus worldwide. On a list drawn up by the United Nations Development Programme, all 25 countries that rank lowest in terms of human development are African. Africa lacks both the skills and infrastructure to attract the multi-national corporations that drive globalisation. Africa’s rapid population growth – an average of 2.5 percent a year – compounds its difficulties: pressures on public services, urban squalor, unemployment and poverty. (See Meredith, op.cit. p.692)

The magnitude of the crisis in Africa is too large for African states to resolve by themselves. Most states are effectively bankrupt, weighed down by debt. By the late 1990s more than half of African states already relied on Western aid to fund as much as 50 percent of government budgets. Africa has received more foreign aid than any other region of the world. Lobby groups campaigned to “Make Poverty History” and Western leaders supported a new initiative in 2000 called the “Millennium Development Goals” that focussed upon social development targets. Debt relief schemes were put in place for highly indebted countries and Western governments undertook to raise their spending on aid to 0.7 percent of national income. Several other initiatives and crusades followed – most focussing on Western action, particularly aid packages and debt relief. By 2010 most Western governments lagged behind the commitments they made and the rhetoric they used. Aid budgets only reached around 0.34 percent of national income as economic recession took hold in the West. Most Western governments spend more money to subsidise their own farmers than the total gross domestic product of the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa – around $400 billion a year.

But however much foreign aid is pumped into Africa, the sum of its misfortunes has grown into crisis proportions. At the core of the crisis is the failure of African leaders to provide effective government. South Africa and Botswana stand out as exceptions with reasonably well managed democratic systems with checks and balances entrenched in a modern constitution. Meredith describes the rest as follows:

“For the most part, Africa has suffered grievously at the hands of its Big Men and its ruling elites. Their preoccupation, above all, has been to hold power for the purpose of self-enrichment. The 197

patrimonial systems they have used to sustain themselves in power have drained away a huge proportion of state resources. They have commandeered further riches by acting as ‘gatekeepers’ for foreign companies. Much of the wealth they have acquired has been squandered on luxury living or stashed away in foreign bank accounts and foreign investments. The World Bank has estimated that 40 percent of Africa’s private wealth is held offshore. Their scramble for wealth has spawned a culture of corruption permeating every level of society. A report prepared for the African Union in 2002, estimated that corruption cost Africa $148 billion annually – more than a quarter of the continent’s entire gross domestic product. Research results published in 2010 estimated that at least $850 billion has been siphoned off from Africa since 1970.” (Meredith, op.cit. p.698)

Many African leaders such as Gabon’s Omar Bongo, Guinea’s Obiang Nguema, Angola’s Dos Santos, Libya’s Gaddafi, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Tunisia’s Zine al-Abidine ben Ali have managed to accumulate huge personal fortunes simply by clinging to power for as long as they could, using their positions to build business empires. Even when regimes changed hands, new governments lost little time in adopting the habits of their predecessors.

Meredith concludes his sad account of Africa’s history since independence with the following words: “The same blight afflicts most of Africa ... After decades of mismanagement and corruption, most African states have become hollowed out. They are no longer instruments capable of serving the public good. Indeed, far from being able to provide aid and protection to their citizens, African governments and the vampire-like politicians who run them are regarded by the populations they rule as yet another burden they have to bear in the struggle for survival.” (Meredith, op.cit. p.704)

Endemic Mismanagement and Corruption

Another team of observers, Martin Plaut (African editor of the BBC World Service) and Paul Holden (a reporter on Africa for more than twenty-five years) published Who Rules South Africa (Biteback Publishing Ltd, London) in 2012. They claim that around 2012 the most powerful political (but not necessarily economic) players in South Africa are the BEE moguls and senior security advisers who have coalesced around the presidency of Jacob Zuma. South Africa’s new ‘Randlords’, the Black Economic Empowerment elite, have backed Zuma in public debates and funded his needs. The supportive and pliant intelligence and security sector helped Zuma escape charges of corruption and racketeering in connection with the Arms Deal and gave him unrivalled access to a key currency of political power: intelligence and information on his rivals. This explains Zuma’s campaign to pass the Protection of State Information Bill – also known as the ‘Secrecy Bill’. Plaut and Holden argue that BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) is linked to corporate and corruption abuses. It is described as a post-apartheid compromise known as the ‘1996 Class Project’ which involved White business interests ending the ANC’s anti-capitalist critique by making millionaires of its senior leadership. BEE served two primary functions: it provided a vehicle for elite enrichment and the brisk engineering of a Black middle class ... and has created a powerful political lobby inside and around the ANC against radical change. The result is that White business interests remain powerful – behind the scenes.

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The results are not encouraging. Corruption has become endemic, from the lowest levels to the very top of government. This underlies constant attempts to neuter key areas of democratic accountability: particularly Parliament and the court system. South Africa is thereby endangered of being ruled by a ‘predatory state’ that feeds on its people rather than serving them. So far the main opposition to these trends – elite enrichment, corruption and government dysfunction – has come from outside the ANC: the media, civil society, the unions and parts of the judiciary. Since 1994, civil society has acted as a significant brake on the ANC’s hegemony. Part of civil society’s success can be attributed to media exposure and seeking redress in the courts. To counter these restraints Zuma and his cohorts have been looking at ‘reviewing’ the powers of the Constitutional Court – even at changing the Constitution. Such changes will shape South Africa’s political future in a most profound manner.

Despite these onerous trends, Plaut and Holden remain optimistic about the future, for “... unlike much of the rest of Africa, the country has a powerful, well-developed civil society. It has newspapers that were founded more than 150 years ago. It has a union movement whose roots can be traced back further than the ANC itself, and a legal system that has largely proved itself to be a dignified corrective to non-delivery and the less salubrious authoritarian streaks of those in power. It has the finest universities in Africa, producing graduates who are equal to any in the world. And after centuries of colonialism and decades of apartheid, South African citizens have developed a seemingly inexhaustible but vital resource: the will to fight for their rights, to question authority and to shape their own destinies”. (Plaut and Holden, op.cit. p.355)

South Africa remains a complex and contradictory society. There is much that is positive including many Black businessmen and women who have built successful enterprises from scratch and owe nothing to the largesse of the state. The success of the 2010 World Cup showed South Africa in its best light, exceeding expectations and serving as a beacon of success on a continent where such examples are sorely lacking.

With so much in flux, some existing “fault lines” could develop in ways that would fundamentally change the future prospects. Plaut and Holden list a number of such “fault lines”” - the ANC Alliance which includes the unions and the communists may split up; - the supremacy of the Constitution may be challenged and the judiciary’s independence may be clipped or swamped with bad appointments; - the Democratic Alliance, as a multi-racial party, may make significant inroads into the dominance of the ANC; - a new generation, born since 1990, may be less willing to overlook the ANC’s infractions and baulk at the prospects of seeing their lives worse off than those of their parents; - the ANC may be faced with electoral defeat as they loose their sheen.

It is an open question whether the South African political power structure as it exists today can cope with a similar orderly, peaceful transfer of power as it did after 1994. What will the BEE moguls and the security apparatus do to pressure a future President in order to save their fortunes and status? Will the ANC accept the will of the people? Or will the President be more inclined to re-open the dusty manuals of the party’s Soviet tutors or enlist the clandestine support of its Chinese Communist ally in Beijing? As Plaut and Holden put it: “Anyone can be a democrat in victory; the true test of democratic credentials comes with defeat”. 199

A Black Man’s Prediction

Moeletsi Mbeki, brother of past President Thabo Mbeki, has distinguished himself as a business entrepreneur and political commentator. He is the author of Architects of Poverty: Why Africa’s Capitalism Needs Changing (Pan Macmillan, 2009) and several ad hoc essays, distributed by the Centre for Development and Enterprise.

Moeletsi Mbeki predicts that South Africa’s windfall benefits deriving from its exports of minerals to China will come to an end when China has completed its industrialisation phase by 2020. This export bonanza enabled the South African government to finance its social welfare programmes. The ANC government tends to ignore the fact that its tax base is very narrow and the more White taxpayers leave the country, the more the tax base shrinks.

Moeletsi maintains that the ANC government is creating a culture of handouts instead of creating real jobs so that people can gain an idea of the value of money. If you keep getting things for free you lose the sense of its value.

The ANC leaders are like a group of children playing with a hand grenade. They do not understand the flawed, complex society they inherited in 1994. Their tinkerings with it have turned society into an explosive cocktail.

In the 16 years of ANC rule, all the symptoms of a government out of its depth have grown worse. Life expectancy has declined from 65 years to 53 years since the ANC came to power. In 2007 South Africa became a net importer of food for the first time in its history. The elimination of farm subsidies has led to a loss of 600,000 farm workers’ jobs. At the same time the ANC has stopped controlling the borders with the result of a flood of poor people into South Africa. Most of the crime in our cities results from the desperate position of these unemployed migrants.

When the ANC took control in 1994 they should have identified South Africa’s strengths and weaknesses in order to build upon the strengths. Instead people who were in prison 20 years ago or who were non-entities have enriched themselves to become billionaires through BEE.

A wise government would have persuaded skilled Whites and Indians to train Blacks and Coloured persons to raise their skill levels. Instead the ANC leaders identified what they wanted and used South Africa’s strengths to satisfy the short-term demands of their supporters. People were put in positions they could not cope with.

BEE promoted a number of extremely negative socio-economic trends in South Africa. First it promotes a class of politicians dependent on big business and promoting big business’s interests. Second, BEE promotes an anti-entrepreneurial culture among the Black middle class by legitimising an environment of entitlement. Third, affirmative action, a subset of BEE, promotes incompetence and corruption in the public sector by using ruling party allegiance and connections as the criteria for entry and promotion in the public service – instead of tough 200

public service entry examinations. Nepotism is rife – jobs for family and friends who are nowhere near qualified – and then hire consultants to actually get the work done at additional cost.

The purpose of BEE, first proposed by Sankor, the industrial division of SANLAM, was to create a buffer group among the Black political class that would become an ally of big business in South Africa. This group would use its power to protect the assets of big business. It was designed by the big conglomerates. The conglomerates took their marginal assets and transferred them to politically influential Black persons in order to protect their own interests.

BEE is advancing a culture of entitlement – not a culture of entrepreneurship where you build up your business from the ground. BEE is based on the idea that you can create a business by redistributing already existing assets held by conglomerates. The ANC government is using the BEE model to redistribute jobs to the party faithful. This is a recipe for incompetence and corruption. Instead of reshuffling pre-existing wealth South Africa needs new business enterprises creating new jobs.

Before 1994 the ANC promised the masses that they would get housing, electricity, water and health services, etc. They were not told that these services would have to be paid for. Now masses of people refuse to pay for electricity, water, property rates, etc. they expect government to pay for these services. Moeletsi Mbeki believes that around 2020 South Africa will experience its “Tunisia Day” when the money from the minerals’ export bonanza is likely to run out. It would be naive to think that China would come to our rescue. The Chinese would expect something in return: land and entrance for its people.

Growing Chinese Involvement

While Western interest in Africa has flagged, China has stepped into the breach with growing ambition. During the Cold War, China maintained a relatively low-key approach to Africa, concentrating on aid projects in select countries like Tanzania and Zambia. In the 1990s a new long-term strategy began to take shape as part of its plan to ‘go global’ – zou chuqu. China started to encourage state corporations and private enterprises to find new export markets and expand their operations overseas. Joint ventures were established in the oil and mining sectors, in power generation, in manufacturing and telecommunications. In exchange for deals over oil and mineral supplies, China undertook to build roads, railways, refineries, schools, hospitals and football stadiums. Thousands of Chinese businessmen followed in the slipstream of major projects, establishing factories, buying property, investing in farms, retail outlets and restaurants. Chinese products and traders became a common feature in many African cities and rural towns. By 2000, some 42,000 Chinese engineers and skilled labourers were working in Africa, and the two-way trade had reached $10 billion. (See Meredith, op.cit. p.696) By 2014, China’s burgeoning presence in Africa had risen to more than a million traders and settlers. (See H.W. French, China’s Second Continent, A.A. Knopf, N.Y., 2014)

According to Meredith, the centrepiece of China’s long march into Africa, the Forum on China- Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was launched in 2000 at a ceremony in Beijing attended by 201

representatives from 44 African countries. China pledged an array of new programmes on debt relief, investment and training. In 2006 it held a second FOCAC summit introducing plans for a new ‘strategic partnership’. President Hu Jintao promised to double aid to Africa, provide more concessional finance for trade and infrastructure, allow duty-free entry for many African exports and build more schools and hospitals.

By 2010 trade between Africa and China had risen tenfold over the decade to nearly $115 billion and Chinese direct investment had jumped to more than $9 billion with an estimated one million Chinese (entrepreneurs, technical experts, medical staff, prospectors, farmers) having moved to Africa. China had emerged as the most powerful outside player in Africa.

Western observers have pointed out that China undermines the West’s efforts to promote democracy and good governance as being essential ingredients to progress, by setting up lucrative deals with dictators, despots and unsavoury regimes with no strings attached, helping them to stay in power and ignoring human rights abuses. Examples are Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. But many African leaders seem to welcome China’s pragmatic, business-first approach to Africa in contrast to Western meddling and lectures about corruption, transparency and human rights.

The Economist of 13 August, 2011, surveys the activities of the China International Fund, a trading and investment syndicate based in Hong Kong’s Queensway. It appears that the opaque syndicate is an important vehicle of China’s ‘going out’ strategy to gain access to foreign resources. Strategic resources are swapped for aid, commercial financing and payments in kind for public infrastructure. But it is also reported that with the intermediation of the syndicate, billions of dollars meant for schools, roads and hospitals have ended up in private accounts.

Angola – along with Saudi-Arabia – is China’s largest oil supplier. Angola’s oil is handled by Sonangol, a state oil firm which in turn is authorised to cut deals with China’s trade representatives based in Hong Kong, the Queensway Syndicate called China Sonangol. The syndicate is built on links forged during the Cold War by a Chinese trader known as Sam Pa (born Xu Jinghua). China Sonangol is part of the China International Fund, the vehicle for the Chinese government’s ‘going out’ strategy.

Mr. Pa and Angola’s President Dos Santos are both alumni of a Soviet academy in Baku. President Dos Santos authorised Manual Vicente, the chief executive of Angola’s Sonangol, to enter into a deal with the China International Fund to set up the joint venture China Sonangol. All of China’s imports from Angola in 2010, worth more than $20 billion, was handled by China Sonangol.

The Economist reports that China Sonangol has now expanded to other African countries such as Guinea, with the world’s largest reserves of bauxite and its largest untapped reserves of high- grade iron ore. Mr. Pa is also in regular contact with Mr. Happyton Bonyongwe, head of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the country’s notorious secret police which helps to keep Robert Mugabe in power. Mr. Pa, who has one of several of the syndicate’s airbuses at his disposal, frequently shows up in Harare where he bought several properties, including the 20-storey Livingstone House. He also set up a new company called Sino-Zimbabwe 202

Development Limited, which received rights to extract oil and gas and to mine gold, platinum and chromium in Zimbabwe. In return, the company publicly promised to build railways, airports and public housing.

By 2009 the Queensway syndicate spanned the globe from Tanzania and the Côte d’Ivoire to Russia and North Korea and on to Indonesia, Malaysia and Latin America. It had bought the J.P. Morgan Chase building at 23 Wall Street, in New York.

The Economist argues that although it must be conceded that China needs the raw materials that the Queensway syndicate can source wherever it is available, there are some concerns about the syndicate’s modus operandi.

The first is personal gain because the terms under which China Sonangol buys oil from Angola have never been made public. Does it buy the oil at low 2005 prices ($55 a barrel) or at market prices, which are likely to be double? In addition, is the question of evaluating the quid pro quo for Angola. Who can ensure that Angola gets a fair deal if China pays in kind in the form of unpriced infrastructure? The deals are contaminated by conflicts of interest. According to the IMF and the World Bank, billions of dollars have disappeared from Sonangol’s accounts.

The second complaint about the Queensway syndicate is that African countries have no recourse if the obligations towards them are not met. What happens if the infrastructure is not delivered or only haphazardly met?

The third complaint is that its cash props up certain selected political leaders and thereby fuels violent conflicts as happened in Guinea as well as in Angola and in Zimbabwe. Mr. Mugabe’s CIO seems to be flush with cash while the coalition government is struggling to raise income to finance normal government services. During 2010 the CIO doubled the salaries of its agents, acquired hundreds of new off-road vehicles and trained thousands of militia men who are now in a position to intimidate voters.

Blaming Apartheid

The Black media commentators and ANC spokesmen were faced with a quandary when one of their own raised a sensitive issue. At a public servants’ summit in April 2013, Trevor Manuel, a senior ANC cabinet member, set off an explosive reaction when he said: “Nineteen years into democracy, our government has run out of excuses. We cannot continue to blame apartheid for our failings as a state. We cannot plead ignorance or inexperience. The time for change, for a ruthless focus on implementation, has come”.

Redi Tlhabi, a columnist in The Sunday Times in her “Review” of April 14, 2013, referred to Zuma’s rebuttal of Manuel saying that he was wrong to suggest that we cannot blame apartheid for what is happening in our country now. She said Zuma rightly said it was impossible for change to be completed in just 20 years. “Apartheid can indeed be blamed for the inferior education bequeathed to the black child, for inferior houses, spatial development that placed black people far from the centre of economic activity and the breakdown of families through 203

forced removals and cheap migrant labour. There is no way that wounds from this dark period could be completely healed in 20 years.”

But then she asks “how does the president account for public funds wasted in the years since the ANC came to power? Every year the auditor-general continues to unearth billions in unauthorised, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure. Is that Verwoerd’s fault too? ... Is it apartheid that made the Free State government spend 40 million rand on a website when this service could have been provided for free or, at most, a few thousand rand? Is it apartheid that failed to deliver text books to children whose lives will be bleak without an education? The shoddy RDP houses that have collapsed and thus require more money to rehabilitate were built by apartheid too? The sad irony of this is that the matchbox houses the apartheid government built are solid and still standing.”

Reflecting her ambivalence about the causes and consequences of apartheid, Redi Tlhabi asks in desperation “... when are we going to say that apartheid was atrocious, but we will prove to those racists who looked down on us that we can, and we will, turn things around? Instead, some in the government – including the president – have an emotional attachment to apartheid and need it to blackmail voters and justify mediocrity. This plays safely in the hands of the “forget apartheid brigade” who think this oppression was a walk in the park. Both sides must own up to the past and acknowledge its ill effects – but for goodness sake, work with what you have to build the country”.

In the editorial leader of the same issue of The Sunday Times, the same ambivalence reappeared: blaming apartheid while lamenting about the continued hardships suffered by the people. The editor writes that “President Jacob Zuma is absolutely correct – there are many of apartheid’s legacies that still haunt us, that stubbornly cling to a democratic South Africa ... There are generations of black South Africans who will spend the rest of their lives chained to menial jobs because Bantu education ensured that they became the handmaidens to white South Africans during apartheid ...”

Then as an aside, the editor states that “ ... it was a crass, opportunistic move by Zuma to use the 20th commemoration of Chris Hani’s death to counter Planning Minister Trevor Manuel’s recent remarks that we could not continue blaming apartheid after 19 years of democracy. Manuel’s assertions were as correct as Zuma’s. We certainly will not overcome the legacy of apartheid if civil servants do not make a concerted effort to deliver to millions of South Africans who need the most basic services ... it is self-serving to hark back to apartheid as the primary obstacle to transformation ... South Africa will not move forward if it has one foot stuck in the past ... It is only when we – particularly our president – show the unfettered determination to accept responsibility for our present and future that we will be able to address apartheid’s legacies with determination and purpose.”

In the same issue of The Sunday Times it was reported that the ANC had announced the formation of an integrity committee to investigate claims of corruption against party members. ANC stalwart Frene Ginwala had been appointed to lead the committee.

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The Fool’s Gold of Reverse Discrimination

In the April 27th-May 3rd, 2013, issue of The Economist, a briefing on “affirmative action” covers three case studies: race-based discriminatory practices in the USA, South Africa and Malaysia. The South African survey is captioned “Fool’s Gold”. It reports that when apartheid ended in 1994, the ANC promised to make black South Africans richer. To this end, it has promoted the transfer of stakes in white-owned businesses to a new class of black co-owners. Change at the top, it was claimed, would foster change further down by removing blockages to hiring and promotion of blacks.

The first BEE (Black Economic Empowerment ) transaction involved Metropolitan Life, an insurer controlled by Afrikaans (White South African Dutch descendants) interests, selling a 10 percent stake to Methold, a holding company owned by well-connected blacks such as Nelson Mandela’s former personal physician. By 1998, BEE transfers really took off with 111 transactions worth a total of 21 billion rand (worth about US$3.8 billion). Stakes were typically sold at a discount and financed by loans, often from the companies themselves in the expectation that it was wise to woo influential black shareholders.

Initially, the transfers were voluntary, but in time the ANC passed legislation to speed up the process. One of the accelerators was the awarding of licences in mining, telecoms and other regulated sectors. Unless sufficiently “black empowered”, business firms could not win or retain an operating licence. In addition, state-backed lenders are expected to favour black-owned businesses and state-owned enterprises in transport and energy are expected to favour black- owned suppliers. Various laws were passed to add to the pressure. The Employment Equity Act of 1998 obliges larger sized firms to make their workforces racially “representative” and to report every second year on their progress in making their staff 75 percent black, 10 percent coloured and 3 percent Indian – on every level from shop floor to boardroom. Failure to show “reasonable” efforts to comply carries fines up to 900,000 rand. Businesses with annual turnover above 35 million rand are also expected to obey a 2003 act which called for “broad- based BEE”. It sets targets for black ownership as well as the promotion and training of black workers. It also expects firms to buy from black-owned suppliers or to help them to set up.

The white business elite at the top of the hierarchy has been joined by a select small coterie of super-rich blacks. A black middle class made up of hundreds of thousands of government employees as well as employees of banks and other private companies has emerged. Educated blacks can command around 20 percent higher wages than similarly qualified whites. The lot of poorer blacks has not improved significantly. The unemployment rate of blacks is reported to be 28.5 percent compared with 5.6 percent for whites. The real unemployment rate is estimated at 41.6 percent for blacks and 7.5 percent for whites.

The Rothschild Company, which advises businesses on BEE, claims that the BEE policy is essential because it has raised the level of black participation. But The Economist argues that “... gains must be weighed against the policy’s unintended consequences”, pointing to the few new businesses created by blacks in view of the ease of making money by acquiring stakes in existing firms. It points out that in BEE deals, political connections often matter more than business skills. A costly bureaucracy has grown up to enforce racial targets. Some businesses re-employ 205

white professionals as freelance consultants to plug skills shortages without falling foul of the law.

Lucy Holborn from the SA Institute of Race Relations has called for BEE to be scrapped. She argues that the binding constraint on greater black participation is education. The proportion of professionals who are black is 36 percent, which is fairly close to the share of degrees held by blacks, which is around 40 percent. Holborn claims that it is no good setting quotas if there are no skilled workers to fill them. Few business folk or politicians have expressed support for scrapping BEE. No one wants to offend the ANC, which is not about to lose power. Far from scrapping BEE rules, the government has indicated its desire to seek stiffer penalties for firms that do not comply with BEE rules.

In its accompanying leader article entitled “Time to scrap affirmative action”, The Economist of April 27th, 2013, writes that “Many of these policies were put in place with the best of intentions: to atone for past injustices and ameliorate their legacy ... At the same time, the downside of affirmative action has become all too apparent ... Although the groups covered by affirmative action tend to be poorer than their neighbours, the individuals who benefit are not ... When jobs are dished out for reasons other than competence, the state grows less competent ... Affirmative action replaced old injustices with new ones: it divides society rather than unites it ...” (See The Economist, April 27th-May 3rd, 2013, p.10 and pp.17-20)

The Financial Mail’s Special Report entitled “20 Years of Democracy”

In its May 2, 2014 edition, the Financial Mail offers a special report on South Africa’s first 20 years of democratic rule. The contributions of several participants are briefly summarised.

Former SA Reserve Bank governor, Tito Mboweni’s report on “Economic Policy” states that the New South Africa started with an empty purse after prolonged disinvestment and boycott campaigns against the apartheid government. The budget deficit was 7.9 percent and the public debt to GDP ratio was round 50 percent. The most debated issue at the time was whether South Africa faced a debt trap or not. Mboweni argued that the figures clearly indicated that South Africa was on the brink of a debt trap, had no credible investment rating, had a balance of payments crisis and had to approach the IMF for a contingency concessionary fund of $750 million to support the balance of payments. The new government decided to test global markets for a sovereign bond issue of $700 million which was successfully raised in New York. By 2003, South Africa managed to obtain a budget surplus. Improvements in South Africa’s fiscal status opened the way to attain capital market resilience. The market capitalisation of the JSE quadrupled from $230 billion in 1994 to around $900 billion in 2014, with foreigners purchasing an average annual net of R15 billion SA bonds since 1997. Mboweni argued that the challenge now is not to destroy the gains made by embarking on unsustainable social plans and imprudent macroeconomic diversions such as large fiscal deficits, high inflation and unsustainable currency manipulations.

Joel Netshitenzhe, a member of the National Planning Commission and also of the ANC’s national executive committee, claimed that much progress had been made in consolidating democracy, in lifting millions out of abject poverty and neglect and bridging the chasm of race. 206

He claimed that in the first ten years of democracy, interracial inequality narrowed, but after 2003 the gap widened because the rich were better able to take advantage of growth opportunities. At the same time inequality widened within black communities. Netshitenzhe made a strong plea for a higher trajectory of growth and development – with higher rates of private sector investment, equitable income distribution, an improved investment climate, adequate infrastructure, state efficiency and integrity in the conduct of leaders.

Mark Cutifani, the Chief Executive of Anglo-American, pointed out that mining still represented the major economic heartbeat of South Africa. The current contribution of mining to the economy according to the Chamber of Mines stood at 17 percent of GDP, earning more than 50 percent of foreign exchange, accounting for 19 percent of private investment (12 percent of total investment) and for 24.4 percent (R1.9 trillion) of the JSE’s market capitalisation, paying R21.4 billion in direct corporate tax – 14.1 percent of total direct corporate taxes and being the leader in reshaping the economic demographics of the country. However, Cutifani drew attention to the alarming trend that the mining sector is losing its central role in building a sustainable economic platform in South Africa. Since 2007 the JSE all-share index rose by around 60 percent while the mining index remained flat (in nominal terms) which represented a real value destruction of more than 30 percent. This problematic state of affairs undermines the position of an industry that is responsible for 19 percent of the country’s economic activity.

Jonathan Jansen, rector of the University of the Free State, expressed serious misgivings about what he termed the “... steady institutionalisation of mediocrity in our public schools”. He expressed approval for improvements in pre-school education in the non-governmental sector and the stability in upper-tier university education, but said attempts to create respectable vocational and technical education and training programmes had failed. More than half of students who start school in Grade 1 do not finish the school cycle of 12 years. Schools are constantly disrupted by teacher unions which have pushed South African schools to the bottom of competitive tables of literacy and numeracy. Jansen paints a picture of an education system collapsing under the weight of low expectations.

Ken Owen, a former editor of Business Day, notes that most whites have opted out of serious politics. With the bitterness of a dispossessed elite they “especially like to regale each other with stories of corruption ... (of) once prosperous farms lying derelict, dysfunctional towns and lumbering bureaucracy ... (and that) they seldom acknowledge they have themselves grown rich under the ANC”. Owen states that the main threat to stability in South Africa comes from the gross inequality, not poverty. He argues that when markets fail, liberals intervene as Franklin Roosevelt did. He does not see the DA as a serious threat to the ANC because it smells too much of bankers and foreign mining companies. The more serious threat to the ANC lies with trade unions and Julius Malema’s populists. Owen believes the “predatory capitalism” of “big business” and the “one percent” will not long survive. “The choice is liberalism or socialism”.

Siswe Nxasana, CEO of First Rand Bank, writes that the SA economy is underperforming and not attracting the levels of inward investment that other emerging markets enjoy. This deficiency is reflected and exacerbated by several deficits: lack of job creation, lack of investment activity, a skills gap and a lack of black entrepreneurs. BEE has been a cornerstone of the government’s strategy to crate a broader distribution of wealth more closely linked to the current and future 207

demographics of the country. Although the strategy has been broadly positive, one of the unintended consequences of “ownership transference” of private sector assets is that a much needed class of black entrepreneurs has lagged behind. The levels of mistrust between government and business, if allowed to continue, will not help SA to overcome the challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment.

John Kane-Berman, consultant to the SA Institute of Race Relations, describes how socio- economic segregation began to erode prior to 1994 as desegregation spread to universities, schools and group areas. On the issue of race discrimination he maintains that what is generally played down in most reviews of 20 years of post-apartheid rule is the extent to which government is stepping up implementation of all its own new racially discriminatory laws and practices. The ANC argues that discrimination is justified in terms of the Employment Equity Act of 1998. This statute, it is also argued, is in line with the equality clause of the constitution. But it reveals a major contradiction. On the one hand the equality clause (section 9) outlaws racial discrimination. On the other hand, it licenses such discrimination when the purpose is to advance persons or categories of persons previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. He quotes Cyril Ramaphosa who said, “Race will remain an issue until all echelons of our society are demographically representative”.

Hoosen Coovadia, a commissioner in the National Planning Commission, provided a survey of health services. He mentioned the progress made to deal effectively with HIV/AIDS, but focused strongly on the large race differentials still prevalent as a result of social determinants of health – especially housing and sanitation for the poor and inequity between the sexes. He maintains that neither the public nor the private sector is ethically justifiable, efficient, effective and sustainable. He doubts the suitability of the market mechanism to provide for health, education and security in terms of “fair” outcomes. He writes that “... the SA health system is anything but ‘fair’ or just: those with a 10 percent need for health-care receive 40 percent of the benefits. Private and public sectors each account for about 43 percent of the total health expenditures, but the population coverage is 68 percent for public and 16 percent for private health care ... The private sector has more of some key personnel (doctors 69 percent, dentists 85 percent, pharmacists 84 percent) though at lower levels the larger public sector has more health personnel.” Hoosen Coovadia pleads for “universal coverage” (UC) which means “access to key promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health interventions for all at an affordable level”. Unfortunately, the professor does not provide a funding strategy to deliver universal coverage to South Africa.

Nick Vink, agricultural economist, University of Stellenbosch, explained that the South African agricultural sector had been losing subsidies and had been deregulated since the early 1980s. By 1994 all forms of support services were either restructured or removed. In 1997 the last traces of the old Control Board system were swept away and farmers had to compete globally. In 2003 a minimum wage was introduced into agriculture, but combined with the Extension of Security of Tenure Act legislation, farmers feared they would lose property rights to farm dwellers. As a result many farm dwellers were evicted. Following these changes, farmers stopped investing enough in agriculture to maintain a steady growth. They invested outside of agriculture and even turned to farming in other parts of the world. Commercial agriculture was practiced by fewer farmers with farming operations larger in size. As the demand for food 208

continued to rise in the face of slower domestic output growth, imports have increased rapidly. As a result South Africa’s food security was brought under threat.

Nazmeera Moola, an economist at Investec Asset Management, wrote about economic growth patterns. Between 1994 and 2003 South Africa’s GDP rose by 3 percent and since 2003 it rose by 3.5 percent. Initially growth was driven primarily by consumption by established consumers. The creation of a black middle class in the late 1990s and stable macro policies resulted in both a housing boom and a more widespread consumer boom in the 2002-2006 period. During the first five-year period of the new century, investment in infrastructure declined from 11 percent of GDP to only 4 percent of GDP. In 2009 it increased to 8 percent of GDP in preparation for the 2010 Soccer World Cup. This investment supported growth through the downturn brought about by the World Financial Crisis. The infrastructure spending stimulated the economy by essential job creation programmes. Unfortunately much extra spending went into public sector salaries which rose at a rate of 14 percent per annum. Government debt increased significantly with limited long-term benefits. The removal of exchange control benefited companies such as Naspers and SAB Miller. But the mining sector was less successful as a result of regulatory uncertainty and stunted investment. While major commodity exporters such as Australia and Brazil experienced a significant increase in mining export volumes between 2002 and 2012, South Africa’s shrank. The main flaw in South Africa’s growth history since 1994 has been the lack of significant job creating growth beyond the meagre levels of 3-3.5 percent.

A 20 Years Appraisal by The Economist

In 2013, Nelson Mandela passed away almost 20 years after he stated in his inaugural address in May 1994, “... We have, at last, achieved our political emancipation. We have triumphed in the effort to implant hope in the breasts of millions of our people. We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity ... a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world.”

The Economist asks what has been achieved after 20 years? It finds that there certainly is a good story to tell. South Africa has succeeded in building a constitutional structure that has entrenched the rule of law and has become a more stable and peaceable country. Rates of violent crime are still comparatively high, but they have nevertheless fallen. Prudent management of public finances since the early years of majority rule has created the fiscal capacity to weather global financial crises, the ability to harvest tax and to make prudent monetary policy decisions. South Africans have on average grown richer and their living standards are generally higher than in 1994. More than half of all blacks have bank accounts compared to less than the 20 percent of 20 years ago. Around 40 percent of senior managers are black compared with just 4 percent in 1994. Races mix easily in shopping malls in the wealthier parts of the major cities. Poverty is still widespread, but is falling. More households have access to basic amenities such as electricity, drinkable water and flush toilets. The number in receipt of welfare grants has risen from 2.6 million to almost 16 million. The urban population has risen from 52 percent to 62 percent. More than 2.5 million homes have been built by the state since 1994. However, life expectancy for HIV/AIDS sufferers has fallen as a result of disastrous policies on HIV/AIDS under Thabo Mbeki. (See The Economist, May 3rd, 2014, pp.41-42) 209

The Economist also acknowledges a downside. The gains from a growing economy have been skewed since mainly whites, Indians and some Coloureds as well as educated blacks have done well. The rest have largely been left behind. The jobless rate after 20 years is higher than in 1994. The economy has grown too slowly to keep pace with a burgeoning population which now stands at around 52 million. The GDP grew at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent in the two decades after 1994. Africa’s growth rate averaged 4.8 percent according to the IMF. The Economist highlights three of the biggest problems: South Africa’s rigid labour laws, its unskilled labour force and a business climate that is increasingly unfriendly to much needed foreign investment. Small businesses also struggle to comply with the racial quotas set by affirmative action laws. The result is a dismal rate of small business creation. Education standards also declined to the extent that the Swiss-based Economic Forum ranked South Africa 146th out of 148 countries. Only four out of every ten pupils who start school pass matric (year 12) and only 5 percent pass maths with a mark above 50 percent. Just 12 percent achieve high enough marks to get into university. (The Economist, op.cit. pp.42-43)

In its leader article The Economist states that the ANC has been heading the wrong way under the Zuma leadership. Two distinct scourges are singled out: lack of jobs and the spread of corruption. Unemployment is estimated at a third of the working-age population as a result of the stagnant economy. Corruption is said to grow apace with the ANC turning South Africa into a de facto one-party state where only its friends get plum jobs and contracts. The main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, which has successfully run the Western Cape province since 2009, is considered to be sadly unable to get much more than a fifth of the national vote with its support limited to whites, mixed-race citizens and Indians. The Economist predicts that unless the ANC reinvents itself or splits, South Africa will increasingly flounder under its rule. (See The Economist, May 3rd, 2014, p.14)

Concluding Remarks

Why are some countries more successful than others? Economic historian David Landes, in his remarkable historical survey called The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (Little Brown, London, 1998) examined the various factors that could possibly explain the divergent outcomes in different parts of the world. Landes found that certain material as well as non-material factors stood out as important determinants. The more successful societies were those that knew how to operate, manage and build instruments of production and to create, adapt and master new techniques on the technological frontier. Successful countries also succeeded in imparting this know-how to the next generation; to choose people for jobs based on competence and relative merit; promoted and demoted on the basis of performance; afforded opportunity to individual or collective enterprise; encouraged initiative and competition; allowed people to enjoy and employ the fruits of their labour and enterprise.

David Landes also found that to be relevant these standards imply certain corollaries such as gender equality, no discrimination on the basis of irrelevant criteria (such as race, sex or religion) and a preference for scientific (means-ends) rationality over magic and superstition (irrationality). Landes remarked that the tenacity of superstition in an age of science and rationalism is surprisingly common: it even beats fatalism. 210

David Landes compiled a list of measures which “the ideal growth-and-development” government would adopt: “1. Secure rights of private property, the better to encourage saving and investment. 2. Secure rights of personal liberty – secure them against both the abuses of tyranny and private disorder (crime and corruption). 3. Enforce rights of contract, explicit and implicit. 4. Provide stable government, not necessarily democratic, but itself governed by publicly known rules (a government of laws, rather than of men). If democratic, that is, based on periodic elections, the majority wins but does not violate the rights of the losers; while the losers accept their loss and look forward to another turn at the polls. 5. Provide responsive government, one that will hear complaint and make redress. 6. Provide honest government, such that economic actors are not moved to seek advantage and privilege inside or outside the marketplace. In economic jargon, there should be no rents to favour and position. 7. Provide moderate, efficient, ungreedy government. The effect should be to hold taxes down, reduce the government’s claim on the social surplus, and avoid privilege.” (See Landes, op.cit., pp.217-218)

Landes admits that no society on earth has ever matched this ideal paradigm. Many prosperous societies, both from the East and the West, are marred by all manner of corruption, failures of government and private rent-seeking. But the Landes paradigm nevertheless highlights the virtues that have promoted material and cultural progress. But, as we know, virtue is always a matter of degree.

How does the track record of Africa and particularly the countries of Southern Africa stack up against the benchmarks suggested by the David Landes paradigm? This survey indicated that the areas of Southern Africa most penetrated by European influence are the most advanced economically, culturally and politically in Africa. South Africa, Botswana and Namibia are more advanced on all relevant development indexes. Their fortunes still depend heavily on the skills, expertise and capital of the descendants of its European settlers. These parts of Southern Africa stand out from the rest in terms of sound basic infrastructure, sound business and financial structures, developed education networks, access to world-class science and technology, international trade and accommodating governmental structures.

South Africa has more than 40 percent of all paved roads and railroads on the continent of Africa and produces more than 50 percent of the total electricity output on the continent. The deep-sea harbours at Cape Town, Saldanha Bay, Port Elizabeth, East London, Richards Bay and Durban handle the largest volumes of sea-borne goods in Africa. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is the eleventh largest in the world. The major banks, Standard, Barclays, Nedbank, ABSA and First National have been in operation for generations, each with a countrywide network of branches. Old Mutual, SANLAM and Liberty Life have been in operation for close to a century and have played a major role in offering pension schemes, insurance policies and mobilising the savings of millions of persons in their capacity as prominent institutional investors. But can South Africa retain its growth momentum?

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South Africa’s demography indicates the continuation of some form of Black dominated rule. But would it be under control of the ANC? The ANC is currently essentially united by race not by its leadership and policy focus. However, the ‘enemy’ (the Whites) is a dwindling entity. Today it constitutes less than 8 percent of the total population and is subject to a rapidly ageing process. Many young Whites have emigrated and many more are likely to leave as a result of the discriminatory effects of ‘affirmative action’ policies. But the discrepancies in income and living standards between White and Black are likely to remain a cause of tension along the racial axis of differentiation. It remains a visible differentiator and a potential cause of antagonism.

Whether the ANC would remain the dominant vehicle of Black power is, however, a different issue. The Black population is not united by a single history that stretches over many generations, or a single language, or even a single culture. The demographic distribution of the South African Black population shows large concentrations of ethnic pockets in particular regions: Zulus in Natal, Xhosas in the Eastern Cape, Sotho’s in the North-West and Coloureds in the Western Cape. The Whites are concentrated in the major metropolitan areas around Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, Kimberley, George and Cape Town. Hence the pattern of potential conflict is no longer simply based on race as a differentiator, but on other cultural and socio-economic cleavages such as language or economic wellbeing as potential foci of solidarity. These factors are likely to increase as determinants of political alliances or allegiances and election outcomes in future.

The single most acute source of tension lies in the fact that close to 40 percent of the working age population is unemployed or under-employed – particularly millions of young persons in their late teens or early twenties who are badly educated or unskilled and who have grown up outside the solidarity of family relationships in the cities. There is no evidence of any possibility of a significant improvement in the job-creating economic growth prospects of South Africa in the near future. There are no signs that education and training standards are improving, no signs of major new investment in productive assets (apart from growing Chinese penetration) and no prospects of increased productivity in the public sector. Too many resources are squandered by incompetent and corrupt management practices and ill-conceived priorities. Hence South Africa faces an uphill struggle to correct the course of its ailing economy which is relied upon as the engine room of much of Southern Africa.

In the current situation the overwhelming focus on “transformation” has resulted in the widespread misappropriation of available human resources. Inept and untrained persons have been placed in positions of power and authority on all levels of public life. The overriding objective of “transformation” has become a shield for inefficiency, nepotism and corruption. Vague ideological ends can never be used to justify highly questionable and harmful means.

Much of the real energy of Africa, and its future, lie outside government structures in the creative potential of its people with their rich diversity of culture, experience and tradition. Although good governments can facilitate progress, only people can make things happen: people with entrepreneurial talents, skills and access to appropriate resources. To spur economic development a country also needs, apart from a physical infrastructure in the form of port facilities, railroads, electricity and water supply, viable socio-economic infrastructure in the form of relevant education and training services, codified and transparent commercial law, 212

reliable banking services, investment security, non-disruptive labour relations, surveyed land coupled with enforceable property ownership, competitive retail outlets, a well-trained expanding working-age population and a stable governmental environment based on the rule of law.

Is South Africa likely to advance along the path of a modernising representative democracy with an investment-driven economy or is it more likely to slide into a dismal Zimbabwe style of degeneration? If the ANC manages to redirect itself onto a path of public-sector reform and investment-driven, job-creating economic growth, the future would hold much promise. However, if Julius Malema’s recipe is followed, the future would be even worse than a Zimbabwe scenario – not only for South Africa, but for the whole of Southern Africa.

In the European world the modernisation process was given a strong impetus by three ground- breaking trends in the opening of the European mind: the Reformation (16th century), the Scientific Revolution (17th century) and the Enlightenment (18th century). Over more than three centuries, the European settlers and their descendants carried this legacy into Southern Africa – sometimes haphazardly but oft-times extensively and systematically.

The process of modernisation has been closely associated with the introduction of technology, scientific patterns of thought and civilised standards of societal life. Modernisation meant a transformation to improved living conditions, less disease and ignorance and the engagement of a growing proportion of society in an inclusive process of problem-solving and where a growing proportion of society can share in opportunities to achieve a higher standard of living.

On the broader issue of the impact of European footprints in Southern Africa it is necessary to reflect on the fact that cultural interaction is a cumulative, continuous process. The descendants of European settlers in Southern Africa continue to exert their influence in all fields of human endeavour: cultural, political, economic, intellectual, legal, technological, social, etc. Moreover, all the manifestations of Western civilisation carried into Southern Africa by European settlers continue to influence everyday life in the region in numerous ways. In today’s interconnected world it is difficult to identify any aspect of human activity – good or bad – anywhere, that has not been pervasively influenced by aspects or offshoots of European civilisation.