CANADIAN NEO-CONSERVATIVE DISCOURSE: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSE

DONNA L. LILLIAN

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilrnent of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Programme in English York University Toronto,

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by DONNA L. LILLIAN

a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of York University in partial fuifiIlment of the requirernents for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Q 2001 Permission has been granted to the UBRARY OF YORK UNIVERSITY to tend or sel! copies of this thesis. to the NATf ONAL UBRARY OF CANADA to microfilmthis thesis and to lend or seIl copies of the Mm, and to UNIVERSITY MîCROflLMS to publish an abstrad of this thesis. The auGhor reserves other publication rights. and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it rnay be printed or otherwise reproduced without the auttior's written permission. The ideology reflected and reproduced in the popular writings of William D. Gairdner is that of neo-, which seeks to protect the interests of the dominant elites in Western countries inciuding Great Britain, the , and Canada. Those dominant elites are predominantly white, male, and heterosexual, and they maintain their dominance in part through discourse. Because public discourse -- education, politics, and media -- is controlled by these elites, their discourse is privileged and becornes naturalized within the societies in which they are dominant, and as consequence, the ideology behind the discourse seldom cornes under cnticism. This dissertation employs critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis to analyze three aspects of Gairdner's neo-conservative discourse, namely sexism, hornophobia, and racism. Gairdner's sexism and his homophobia are related, both ideologically and linguistically. Feminists are equated with lesbians, and both are denigrated along with gay men. However, while al1 three groups are denigrated through unnattering and inflammatory lexical choices, and metaphon of cancer

and disease, gay men are represented differently from ferninists and lesbians in temof transitivity (sentence-level linguistic choices). Neo-conservatism racism is manifested in two ways in Gairdner's discourse, first through an Anjlo-centred, anti-French ethnicism,

and second through an anti-immigrant bias, directed against people whose origins do not trace back to Europe, particularly to Western Europe. In Canadian politics, neo-conservatisrn is most closely associated with the provincial governments of and Ontario, led by Ralph Klein and Mike Harris, respectively, and with the federal Party (formerly the ). William Gairdner has been identifieci as one of the mentors of the Refom Party, and it is in part because his books have idiuenced the policy platfonns of the Reform and Alliance parties that his discourse merits critical discourse analysis in this dissertation. 1 would first iike to acknowledge the work and cornmitment of my supervisory cornmittee, Dr. Susan EhrIich, Dr. Sheila Embleton, and Dr. Ruth King. Without their help and guidance, this dissertation would never have been possible.

In addition to my cornmittee, 1 would like to acknowledge the help and support of Dr. Terry Pratt and Dr. Thomas Spira, of the University of Prince Edward Island. Dr. Spira, in particular, offered immeasurable support and help, and commented helpfully on an early draft of the dissertation. Denise Marie Trembath and Ruth Rosen compensated for my own inadequate skiils by conducting intemet searches for materials relevant to my work. My father, David W. Atkinson, instilled in me an appreciation for the value of education and cntical thinking, and has aiways taken an interest in my scholarly pursuits. My mother and stepfather, Ruth and Allan Paterson, have provided constant moral support and many delicious rneals when rny work left me no time for the finer points of domesticity, such as cooking suppers. My farnily and friends have been greatly neglected over the course of years in which 1 have kenpursuing my doctoral studies, but their loyafty and patience has not gone unnoticed or unappreciated. 1 hesitate to begin narning them all, lest 1 inadvertently forget sorneone, but I know that they know who they are. Finaily, Maggie May Lillian, my loyal canine cornpanion, deserves a special recognition for endunng far too many hours of boredom as 1 tap-tapped away on the cornputer instead of taking her on outdoor adventures or holiday excursions. To al1 who have helped and supported me in my pursuit of this goal, 1 offer my sincerest thanks and appreciation. Table of Contents

Abstract Acknowledgements

Chapter 1: Introduction Background: William D. Gairdner Persuasion and Propaganda Discourse Defined Ideology Defined Discoune Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis Theoreticai and Methodological Orientation of this Dissertation Chapter 2: Sexist Discourse Introduction Metaphor Dichotomous Thinking: Self versus Other Lexical Choices Transitivity Modaiity Sample Analysis Conclusion Chapter 3: Homophobic Discourse Introduction Lexical Choices Metaphor: Disease/Pathology Transitivity Sample Analysis Conclusion Chapter 4: Racist Discourse Introduction Anti-French Racism: French as 'Other' Sample Analysis: Racisrn I Anti-Immigrant Racism: Immigrant as 'ûther' Sample Anal ysis: Racism II Conclusion Chapter 5: Conclusion summary New RightMeo-Conservative Ideology The Rise of the New Right in Canada The Reform Party of Canada Wiliarn D. Gairdner and the Reform Party of Canada Conclusion Notes Bibliography Chapter 1: Introduction

Background: W~lliamD. Gairdner

William D. Gairdner, a conternporary Canadian writer of political and social comrnentary, holds a Master's degree in Structural Linguistics (1%7), a Master's degree in

EnglishICreative Writing (1%9), and a doctorate in Enplish Literature ( L970), al1 from

Stanford University.1 In addition to his one scholarly book, The Critical Wager ( 1982), he has written four 'popular' books, The Trouble With CaMda (1990, revised 1994), The

War Agaimt the Farnily ( L992). Constitutional Crackup ( 1994), and On Higher Ground

( 19%), has edited one, After Liberalisrn ( 1998)' and has CO-editedanother, Cd's Founding Debnres (1999). Gairdner's political, economic, and social views, as the title of his 1992 book suggests, fa11 within the 'family values' spectrum of the New Right In the Introduction to The Trouble With Canada,Gairdner, refemng to the terrns 'conservative', 'liberal', and 'socialist', asserts that, "[olne of the airns of this book, therefore, is to provide a key to the real meaning of these terms" (1990: 4, italics added). Indeed, in that book, as in bis other writings, Gairdner does define not just those terms, but the world and everything in it, to suit his particular ideology. Gairdner gains part of his appeal through his use of a 'tell-it-like-it-is' style of wnting. He is, of course, telling it as he thinks it is and virtually everything he writes cm be challenged; nevertheless, his readers may be drawn to his books in part because of the non-academic style in which he writes. [I]t is not an academic study or research document -- there are too rnany of those available already on every subject in this book. For the most part, no attention is paid to them, or they preach to the converted, or they are countered by further research, equally ignored. So I'm not trying to add to the academic uproar by wnting a book in which the risk of offending is reduced to zero. That can result in a du11 book and endless equivocation. Rather, this is a book meant to change minds. (Gairdner 1990: 1) Although this description comes frorn his first popular book, Trouble, it aptly describes the style he employs in his subsequent books as well. This disparagement of academic prose is in marked contrat with the delight Gairdner expresses in the subtlety and complexity of academic discourse in neCritical Wager. My hope is that, for al1 those who love ideas for their own sake and who find the tension and excitement of the structures they pnerate attractive to contemplate, this book will be of some value. If the only result of reading it is to foster a renewed interest in the attractiveness, complexity, and viability of criticism as an end in itself, as an intriguing intellectual pursuit, and most of al1 as a means, as Merleau- Ponty suggested, to 'kelearn to see the world," then i: will have been justified. (Gairdner 1982: 195) Gairdner's anti-intellectualism, as expressed in his popular books, is typical of the New Right movement in Canada. The anti-intellectualism of so many of the New Right's membership and supporters has been amply demonstrated elsewhere, but bears repeating, since the implications for politics are so significant. When evea someone like Diane Ablonczy, a Reform MP with a university degree and professional training, says she relies more on the impressions of her constituents than on the scientific findings of experts or data from Statistics Canada, the policy-making process is in serious difficulty. If credentials and expertise are rejected by the New Ripht as the basis for decision making and replaced with "common sense," rational arguments will be powedess to oppose their agenda. (Jeffrey 1999: 399) William Gairdner is a man capable of subtle and reasoned discourse, as his academic book, The Critical Wager, demonstrates. T hat analysis of various philosophical traditions that underlie different schmls of literary criticism reveals that his academic training was not in vain, and he does indeed understand subtiety and intellectual argumentation. In the Preface he describes his goal in wnting the book: To the sarne degree that the greatest feature of human consciousness is Our ability to reflect upon our own activities, so the greatest feature of people cornrnunicating is that sirnilar ability to discourse upon our own discourse at any chosen distance. 1 want to show just how, in so discoursinp, we make what 1 cal1 "the critical wapr," by speaking one particular way, and not another, and therefore how, in so speaking, we trap ourselves inside an entire structure of thought, the implications of which rnust be borne as a consequence in our findings. (Gairdner 1982:3) Gairdner's choice not to employ in his popular books the principles of reasoned academic discourse that he has so clearly demonstrated in The Crirical Wager is, therefore, a cooscious choice, not one resulting from an inability on his part to argue or to write with academic integrity. In his social commentaries, particularly The Tro~ibleWith Canada and me War Againsi the Family,Gairdner chooses to util ize emotionall y-charged language which is apt to incite strong reactions, be they reactions of assent or of dissent. In The Trouble With Cd,Gairdner expresses his feelings and refi ections on a vast array of social, political, and economic concems, touching on his views about farnily along with many other topics. The following list of chapter titles from the book illustrates the range of issues he deals with: A Question of Styles: What Should Be Our Method of Government; The Popular Illusions: Eight Unnecessary Obstacles; Democratic Capitalism: Breakiop the Chains of Economic Stagnation; The Bonus System: The Tools of Freedom and Wealth Creation; The Handicap System: The Socialist Reaction to Democratic Capitalism; The Political Parties: Where They Stand and What They Stand For; Canada at a Glance: Canadian Opinions and Performance; The Great Welfare Rip-Offi Soaking Everyone, to Pay Everyone; Foreign Aid: Buming Canadian Money; Radical Feminism: The Destruction of Traditionai Society; Medical Mediocrity: Canada's Sick Health-Care System; The Criminal-Justice System:

Public Safety or Public Danger?; Pulpit : The Church Against Democratic Capitalism; Goverurnent Jocks: The State and the Comption of Sport; The Silent Destruction of English Canada: Multiculturaiisrn, Bilingualism, and ImM,ption: Political Sleight of Hand: The Charter and the ; and A Cal1 to Action: We Can

Regain Popular . It is in this volume that he explains in the greatest detail his anti-French, anti-immigrant views, positions which are discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. In The War Agaimt the Family, Gairdner revisits the argument he begins in Trouble and magnifies that part of it which appiies specifically to farnily values and family structures, as he conceives of them. It is no accident that Gairdner chooses war as the overarching metaphor in this book. Although wars are highly complex, both in their

causes and in their conduct, they are generally presented both to the soldien fighting them and to the civilians called upon to support them as if they were simple matters of 'we're

right, they're wrong'. They are presented as two-sided and only two-sided, with a clear

division between good and evil. Of course, each side believes that their side represents the ripht side, but while they may disagree over who is nght and who is wrong, both promote a view that al1 who fight alongside them are their friends and dlwho oppose them are their enemies. If Gairdner wants an excuse to present a sirnplistic view of society, then the meîaphor of war offers him just such an excuse to abandon subtlety and reason. Using this metaphor he can draw the reader into a similarly simplistic mind set, ascnbing everything he supports to the 'good' side, and everything he dislikes or disagrees with to the 'bad' side. And if the saying is true that 'al17sfair in love and war', then by utiliung the frame of

'war', Gairdner may feel that he is therefore free to employ whatever tactics he sees fit, regardless of whether or not they are 'fair' in normal contexts. The following excerpt from the Preface of Wnr captures, in Gairdner's own words, the central theme of the book. But The War Againsr the Family shows how the political, economic and socialhord troubles that play themselves out in the nation at large inevitably ûickle down to alter our most pnvate lives and dreams; horv any democracy based on freedorn and privacy will strangle itself if it drifts toward, or is manoeuvred into, a belief in collectivism of any kind. As we shall see, that's simply because in our Western civilization there is an inherent and deadly conflict between statism and the whole idea of the private farnily. (Gairdner 1992: ix-x) This passage makes it clear that in order to undentand Gairdner's views on issues such as farnily and gender roles, one must dso understand the broader political framework, neo- conservatism, in which he operates.

ConnitutionuICrackup(1994) is a short book ( 122 pages) which presents

Gairdner's views on Canada's constitutional stniggles, with particular reference to 's role in Canada. Gairdner bnefly introduces three different kinâs of law. The first he identifies as charter law or code law, which he says "is upheld as the highest legal ideal and is aiways wntten to take precedence over al1 other Iower forms of law in the nation" (Gairdner 199428). This form of law he identifies with the "homfying tyramy" of the French Revolution, Nazi Germany, and the former Soviet Union (Gairdner 1W.29). Gairdner places Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms and provincial Bills of Rights alongside these other charters and blames them for what he sees as the demise of individual freedorn in Canada, and possibly of Canada itself.

1 will argue that such egalitarian charters are the greatest menace not only to individual freedoms,but to the organic health of society itself, and that in the case of Canada, the imposition of such a charter set the stage for revolt in Quebec, and thereby for the possible dissolution of the nation. (Gairdner 1994: 40)

The other two forms of law, those of which Gairdner approves, are statute law or "law from the people" (Gairdner 1994: 30) and cornmon law or "real life law" (Gairdner 1994:

3 l),and these are the forms that Gairdner associates with English tradition. He argues that it is 'national' preferences for different fonns of law which underlies the tension between Quebec and Canada. We need to understand as a nation that just as Quebec prefers its own "distinct" centralism. for reasons arising from the history of French thought, English Canada, for reasons ansing from the history of English thought, will aiways reject anything but political equality among provinces. (Gairdner 1994: 58) Most of the ideas presented in CorntifutionalCrackup are also contained in the revised (1994) edition of Trouble. On Higher Ground (1996) contains little that is original- It is a repackaging of the ideas already contained within War and Trouble, formatted in very short chapters, almost al1 of which are reprints of pieces Gairdner had original1y wntten for the Eclmonton Jorrrnal. Likewise. Gairdner's contribution to his edited collection, After

(1998), adds nothinp new to what he had already said at great length in Trouble and War. Because his first (and longest) two books, Trouble and War, contain the most detailed presentation of Gairdner's views, this dissertation draws rnost heavily on those two volumes. William Gairdner may attempt to portray himself as just an ordinary Canadian, but there cm be litde doubt that he speaks from a position of relative power, king a wealthy white male, holder of a doctorate from Stanford University, former Commonwealth, Pan- American and Olympic decathlete, former president and owner of The Fitness Institute of

Canada, Chair from 1994 - 21XX) of The Gairdner Foundation, and president and owner of Gairspar Investments, Ltd., Toronto. Gairdner has social and linguistic power, and he wields it in his writing in order to induce other people to adopt his political and social policies. This rnakes his books appropriate for critical discourse analysis, particularly because he sornewhat problematically positions hirnself as opposing academic approaches to knowledge, even though it is his training within acadernia that in large measure gives hirn the credibility to have his books published. Indeed, his academic credentials are used as marketing tools for his books.

Gairdner deliberately aims his books at a non-academic readership, therefore at a readership which is untrained in deciphering the author's subtle but effective rhetoncal and discursive techniques. The discourse of Gairdner rnust, therefore, be brought under scrutiny, and people must be educated to recognize the ways in which they are potentially

being manipulated through that discoune. It is in the spirit of exposing some of the linguistic and rhetorical strategies used by Gairdner in his bid to convert to his political perspective that the following analysis is presented. William Gairdner knows and understands that discourse is not neutral, and he acknowledges the validity of exarnining others' discourse in order to discem their 'distortions', as the following quotation illustrates. Once again: no commentary can be innocent; al1 commentary about Iiterature or the world it speaks of necessarily involves a structure of moral, literary, and philosophical choices; and even the most "neutral" or "objective" remark indicates an entire, usually hidden, structure of attitudes toward redity (itself a conditional terrn), which is always also an interpretation. In short, al1 criticism, ail literature, al1 writing itself, is a distortion of a reflection, and this being the case, we are at least obligated to show the shape of Our &or, the worst strategy king the pretence that our rnirrored view is undistorted. It is to a description of these distortions that this book is devoted. (Gairdner 1982: 4) This dissertation examines Gairdner's writings in order to reveal the discursive distortions contained therein.

Persuasion and Pro~aganda- There can be no doubt that in al1 of Gairdner's popular books, the author's aim is to convince the readers to adopt his point of view, and further, to take action based upon that point of view. In that respect, Gairdner's writing may be seen as a fom of persuasive literature. However, while utilizing many of the recognizable techniques of persuasion,

Gairdner goes beyond the bounds that normally delineate persuasive prose and strays into the realm of propaganda. If a reader or hearer is to be persuaded by a given message, then one of the preconditions is that the recipient must trust the source of the message, for if the source is distnisted, then the message is aiso likely to be suspect. One way of promoting trust is to induce the recipient to identify with the source. What is even more effective is when the victim gets the impression that both partners have had the same outlook on reality from the very bepinning, in which case the persuader is regarded and accepted as one of the victim's near and dear. Here the central aim of the persuader, i-e. to get the recipient to ident0 himself [sic] with the views proffered, is achieved by one of the time-honoured tricks of rhetoric, i-e. the feigned identification of the persuader with his [sic) victim. (Somig 1989: %)2 In the case of Gairdner, the target audience consists of so-called ordinary Canadians, as opposed to academics, politicians, or other atypical groups. Thus, in order to get the readers to identify with hirn, Gairdner tries to present himself as just an ordinary and average family man. "1 have wntten this book as a parent, and a father, both for my own five children and, 1 trust, for the reader's children" (1992: xiii). Gairdner never overtly lies about his background, and his Ph.D. is used as a marketing tool on his book covers, but he does appear to be concealing his academic background when he opens the Preface of War with the following statement, "My first book, The Trouble with Canada, was one man's view of this wonderful country" (1992: ix). Trouble was not, in fact, his first book, although it was his first popular book. His first book was 7ïze Critical Wager (1982), a scholarly, academic book on the history of philosophy as applied to literary criticism. Since that book is, adrnittedly, irrelevant to his popular writings, except as evidence that contiary to what one sees in those books, he actually does know how to wnte in a scholarly and responsible manner. it is not surprishg that he would not promote it or even refer to it in his popular books. However, what the above quotation suggests is that he is virtually denying its existence. Perhaps he hopes that his readers will not discover that he once pursued an academic career himself. Perhaps too, he would shrink from having his readers discover that he who rails against any form of public subsidy, including educational and academic support, actually had assistance from public sources of funding in the making of that book.

This book has been published with the help of a mantfrom the Canadian Federation for the Hurnanities, usinp funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and with the assistance of block gants from The Canada Council and the Ontario Arts Council. (from the back of the title page, along with the publication data, of Gairdner 1982) It is Gairdner's choice to project himself as an ordinary farnily man, rather than as a man of privilege and education writing condescendingly to the masses. He could have done othenvise. However, psychological studies have suggested that the audience is more likel y to be accepting of the message if they identify with the messenger (in this case, the writer, Gairdner). "When a communication cornes from an unknown or arnbiguous source, acceptance will be increased if, at the beginning, the cornmunicator explicitly claims that his [sic] own position is in accord with that held by the audience" (Hovland efal 1953: 27). Based on this, appearing 'folksy' is the best course of action from Gairdner's point of view. Gairdner's attempt to establish solidarity and identification with the readers is enhanced by his use of personal pronouns, especially his use of the inclusive first-person plural to refer to himself and his readers. Karl Sornig explains the effect of this pronoun choice.

Moreover, the pronoun of the I st person plural ("Let's be reasonable. . .") is frequently used as a pronoun of (feigned) solidarity: it is a kind of WE with socialking force, which 1 shall cal1 the "nurses' plural" (KrCULke~~~chwestempIt~~aC). Foms of address like this, which include the speaker and the person addressed (cf. Brown/Levinson 1978) are very likely to create that atmosphere and feeling of shared situational assessment, mutual understanding, and common destiny mentioned above. It is this atmosphere of mutuai trustworthiness and suspended warhess which is the basis and background of chumminess. To my mind, the creation of this feeling and the atmosphere of being buddies, of belonging and being accepted, is the centrai and most effective instrument of persuasion. (Sornig 1989: 1û3-104) The following three quotations illustrate typical ways in which Gairdner uses this

device io force a division between the 'we' side and the 'they' side, and to draw the readers into solidarity with him on the 'we' side. But if we wish to create a good society, we must insist on the prirnacy of individualism in its fullest sense and not allow this important concept to become diluted by proponents of collectivism. (Gairdner 1992 22) Let us examine the intellectual process precedent to the modem practice of wholesale abortion on demand. (Gairdner 1992: 423)

We watch our belief system and values suffer blow after blow. and a great and growing hunger for pnnciples and arguments to deiend what we hold dear begins to gnaw. But because of the gened radicalization of society, most of us lack the means to respond and defend against these blows. In short, the progressivist, modem liberal consensus, largely engineered by the knowledge class and promoted by media elites, weakens us and successfully expunges primordial values. Divided we fali. (Gairdner 1992 Sû)

The two supposedly wamng factions, 'us' and 'thern', are associated with lexical choices that make it impossible for anyone to doubt which he sees as good and which he sees as evil. In the 'good' camp, there is extensive use of first person pronouns, especially first penon plurals. Gairdner makes explicit who he considers to be with him, and who he considers to be against him. Since everyone who disagrees with Gairdner and his approach is described in very uncornplimentary tems, the reader may unconsciously slide into prefening inclusion within Gairdner's 'we', to being scorned along with his 'they'. Gairdner's use of the first-person plural may seem innocuous -- just an innocent stylistic device to make the book more readable - but there is more to it than that. Using 'we', thereby constantly implicating the reader in the statements he makes, arnounts to coercing the readers to move along his thought-paths wiîh km, whether they would otherwise choose to do so or not.

A wideIy used rhetorical device in officia1 rhetonc is to coalesce speaker, audience and theme so that the immediate impression is one of unity and common purpose. More subtly, the repeated use of the plural first-person pronoun we (presumably interpreted inciusively) links the individual with the state and, through insistent repetition, may weaken in some sense the individual's hold on independent thought. (Moss 19235: 46) Seeking to critique his position becomes more difficult for the reader who has been positioned, metaphorically through pronoun usage, directly alongside Gairdner. Thus, in order to critique his position, one must first retrace one's own footsteps back far enough to escape from the net of his inclusive 'we', or else one must, from the outset, position oneself as one of 'them', the 'bad guys'. Most insidious, however, is the fact that Gairdner's net is cast so wide that almost every reader is likely to find something, however minor, somewhere in his writings that they can agree with. So the 'we' is then partially valid, but only partiaily, and the challenge for the readers is to separate dlthat they disagree with from the Iittte bits they rnight actually have in cornmon with Gairdner. Of course, unless a reader is consciously working to combat Gairdner's seduction, the chances are that

they will simply be swept along by the imposed membership in his inclusive 'we'. Persuasive use of language does not so much appeal to reason but to the recipient's expectations and emotions. As its purpose is not so much to inform as to make people believe, and in the end to act upon their beliefs, he/she w ho sounds like one of us is the one we most easily trust. If two or more people share the same comotative bias in their semiotic and communicative behaviour they most likely are -- simply by this fact -- forced to find their mutual partner a rnost agreeable penon indeed, and thus have no difficulty in identifying thernselves with herhim. (Somig 1989: 109) It is to emotion and expectation that Gairdner does pnmarify appeal, not to reasoa. A carefuI exarnination of his work reveals that he asserts many of his premises without offering substantiating evidence for them, or 'proves' them by arnassinp questionable evidence, gamered fmm unreliable or academicaily unsound sources, then draws faulty conclusions through the stringing together of faulty prernises. He dismisses credible academic sources and relies instead on questionable, biased sources with whom he hap2ens to agree. A reader may be swept along, confused and befuddled, as he quotes sources. bandies about statistics, and even invents largely meaningless graphs, but chances are that

the reader's lack of resistance is generated in part by the emotional appeal of being included in the 'rnotherhood and apple-pie' imapry that Gairdner associates with his neoconservative agenda. "[Ilt is not the verifiable tmth of a message which is relevant and

iikely to impress an audience and make it act upon a certain impulse; it is the way things are said (or done), irrespective of the amount of genuine idormation camed by an utterance"

It is Gairdner's one-sidedness and his position that there cannot be more than one

legitimate interpretation of reality which, in part. signals that he has crossed over the line

between legitimate persuasive discourse and propaganda. Scholars have V~~OUSways of defining and descnbing propaganda as distinct from persuasion. but there is general agreement ihat whatever their simiiarities, these two modes of discourse are distinguishable from one another. Ropaganda is the communication of a point of view with the ultirnate goal of having the recipient of the appeal corne to "voluntarily" accept this position as if it were his or her own. Not al1 persuasion is propaganda. The classical rhetoric theones of the early Greeks and Romans - which were avidl y studied by those responsible for crafting the govemments of Western Europe and America -- prized discourse that could illuminate the issue at hand. Such persuasion could take the form of an argument, a debate, a discussion. or just a well-argued speech presenting the case for or against a given proposition. The end result was an education for both the audience and the speakers. (Pratkanis and Aronson 1991: 9) Jowett and O' Donnell's book Propagnnda andPersumion discusses at length the similarities and differences between the two modes of discourse named in the book's title. A persuasive message has a point of view or a desired behavior for the recipient to adopt in a voluntary fashion [. . -1. The process of persuasion is an interactive one in which the recipient sees the fulfilrnent of a need or desire if the persuasive purpose is adopted. Because both persuader and persuadee stand to have their needs fuNlled, 'persuasion' is a more neutrd term than 'propaganda.' (Jowett & O' DomeIl 1986: 24) In contrast to persuasion, which involves meeting a need or desire of the persuadee, propaganda is geared primad y toward meeting the needs or the political agenda of the propagandist, even though it rnay be presented such that it appears as if the addressee stands to benefit at least as much as the persuader. The propagandist is very likely to appear as a persuader with a stated purpose that sppears to promote interactive dependency. In reality, however, the propagandist wants to promote his or her own interests or those of an organization, sometimes at the expense of the recipients, sometimes not. The point is that the propagandist does not regard the well-being of the audience as a pnmary concem. The propagandist is likely to be detached from the recipients. (Jowett & O'Donnell 1986: 34) At the outset, botb propaganda and persuasion may be classilied as informative. "Informative messages have an impact upon receivers by allowing them to acquire

information, understand the environment, and Iem" (Jowett & O'Donnell 1986: 2 1). However, propaganda employs informative discourse in a different way than does persuasion. Pmpaganda utilizes informative communication [. . .]. The difference is that the purpose exceeds the notion of mutual understanding. The purpose of propaganda is to promote a partisan or cornpetitive cause in the best interest of the propagandist, but not necessarily in the best interest of the recipient. The recipient, however, may believe that the communication is merely informative. (Jowett & O'Donnell 1986: 23) It is undoubtedly in Gairdner's interest to have Canada operate according to the econornic and social principles he advocates. As a business person. he would benefit from policies that promote business interests over the interests of individual citizens. As a white Anglo, he would continue to benefit from being part of the dominant group, the group whose reality is assumed in al1 policies and laws that are made. As a male, he would benefit from a situation in which women did not compete with him in the public arena. and in which they played a role primarily of supporting, through unpaid labour, his efforts, the efforts of his male colleagues, and the efforts of their children. Unfortunately, there are many people who would suffer in Gairdner's 'paradise': persons with disabilities, persons from disadvantapd backgrounds, persons who are not white and not English-speaking, women, gays and lesbians, single parents, in short, anyone whose social position does not afford them the advantages that Gairdner's affords him. Many middie- and upper-class men would certainly prosper under Gairdner's system, but the social and economic positions of other people, those that constitute the majority of Canadians, would be seriously threatened. Gairdner may fool himself into thinking that he is merely expressing a point of view, but given that his point of view is discriminatory against non-white, non-Anglos, women, and homosexuals, and given that he is using his discourse to iuflame the passions of heterosexual, white hg10 Canadians in order to bnnp about policies that could pemanently barn members of the groups Gairdner fears and dislikes, it is simply not credible to argue that Gairdner's discourse constitutes anything Less than sexist, homophobic, racist propaganda. In wnting against the makers of immigration policy,

Gairdner says, "[nlever mind what its inventon say is their reason for the policy -- which is often a smoke-screen -- what does the policy really do?" (1990: 400). Perhaps Gairdner should use his own statement as a mirror in which to peer into his own eyes and see that whatever agenda he may say he is pursuing, the effects of his writings are the denigration of vast segments of the Canadian population -- anyone who does not look, and think, and act like Gairdner himself. Discourse Defined The tem 'discourse', which is used frequently throughout this dissertation, has a range of meanings dependinp on the theoreticai and discipfinary context in which it is used, and to some extent, depending on the individual author using it. There are sigaificant differences between, on the one hand, the various linguistic uses of the tenn 'discourse' and, on the other hand, the various uses of the terni within what might be broadly labelled 'cultural studies'. Each of these two major sets of definitions of the terrn 'discourse' will be discussed in tum, beginning with the linguistic set.

Deborah Schiffrin devotes a chapter of her book, Approaches tu Discourse ( 1994),

to an exploration of different ways in which discourse is defined within two major linguistic paradigms, offering as a third aitemative her own definition of discourse. The two paradi,ms she identifles are the fomalist (or structuralist) paradigrn, charactenzed by a focus on language as an autonomous and self-contained system, and the functionalist paradigm, charactenzed by an emphasis on language as a social phenornenon. Schiffrin cites Stubbs as representing the classic fomalist definition of discourse, "language above

the sentence or above the clause" (Stubbs 1983: 1). This definition implies that discourse is in some sense just a higher level on a continuum of phonemes. morphemes, words, clauses, sentences, discourse, and that it can therefore be expected to consist of units and anangements of units analogous to the sorts of units and arrangements hypothesized for structures lower on the hierarchy. Unfortunately, while such an approach may be borne out in part if one limits one's data to orderly standard prose, it is not particularly well suited to the study of spoken language, which often coosists of utterances that do not constitute 'well-fomed' clauses, sentences, or even phrases. Schiffrin presents the functionalist paradigm as charactexizing discourse as

'language use' (Schiffrïn 1994: 3 1). citing Fasold's definition as representative of this approach: "the study of discourse is the study of any aspect of tanguage use" (Fasold

1990: 65). Schiffrin is critical of functionalist approaches to discourse because she sees

them as not clearly delineating the boundaries between language and context (1994: 34). The definition of discourse that Schiffrin herself proposes is c'discourse is utterances" (1994: 39). Her rationale for favouring this definition suggests that she sees it as a compromise of sorts between the fomalist and functionalist definitions; however, her definition of discourse as 'utterances' is problernatic in that it excludes written texts from the field of discourse. Teun van Dijk has a broad view of discourse and of discourse analysis, as evident

both in the four-volume Handbook of Discourse Anabis ( 1985) which he edited, and in

the journal Discourse & Society, which he also edits, both of which contain discourse analyses of both spoken and written texts from a vanety of rnethodological and theoretical

perspectives. Indeed, in a recent editonal in Discourse & Society (van Dijk 1999: 291 ), van Dijk opens with the statement that "[d]iscourse analysis as a discipline deals with the study of text and talk in context". A somewhat more abstract description of discourse is offered by Norman Fairclough: "language is a part of society; linguistic phenomena az social phenomena of a special sort, and social phenornena me (in part) linguistic phenornena" (Fairclough 1989: 23). This description highlights the social, rather than the linguistic or structural properties of discourse. Although the definitions offered thus far differ from one another in drawinp the exact boundanes of 'discourse', they can al1 be seen as characterizhg a broadly linguistic approach to discourse, in which specific micro-linguistic features of a text are examined and are interpreted within the context (textuai andor social) of the utterance or the 'token', be that a word, a phrase, a clause, or a larger unit of text. Distinct from this linguistic concept of 'discourse' is a complementary use of 'discourse' within cultural studies.

Margaret Gibbon describes these two different uses of 'discourse' in this way: discourse: in linguistics, refers to an extended written or spoken text which has a structure which helps to define it. In cultural theory, discourse refers to sets of beliefs and statements with some form of patteming or hornogeneity, which can be identified or 'unpacked' by close, cnticd reading. (Gibbon 1999: 172) In its linpistic sense, the noun 'discourse* does not normally occur in a plural fom, and so it is parallel to phonology (*phonologies), morpholopy (*morphologies), syotax (*syntaxes) in describing a 'level' of linguistic structure or theory- In its cultural theory sense, however, 'discourse* easily and regularly occurs in the plural, so that one might talk about 'dominant discourses' or 'discourses of law and punishment', or any nurnber of other 'discourses'.

James Paul Gee, in An In~oducrionto Discourse Analysis: Theon and Merhod

(1999). distinguishes the two major senses of 'discourse' by refemng to the linguistic sense as 'discourse' and the cultural theory sense as 'Discourse', with a capital D. Of

'Discourses', Gee writes the following:

"Discowses" w ith a capi ta1 "D,"that is, different ways in which we humans integrate language with non-langage "stuff," such as different ways of thinking, acting, interacting, valuing, feeling, believing and using symbols, tools, and objects in the right places and at the right times so as to enact and recognize different identities and activities: give the material world certain meanings, distribute social goods in a certain way, make certain sorts of meaningful connections in Our experience, and privilege certain symbol systerns and ways of knowing over others [. . -1. (Gee 1999: 13) 'Discourse* in both its linguistic and culturai senses acquires different shades of rneaning according to the theoretical, methodological, and political orientations of the person using the tmn, and Gee attempts to summarize the various expressions used by different writers to refer to what he refers to as capital-D 'Discourse'. It would be simplistic to suggest that this set of terms constitute a set of exact synonyms, in part because the ways they are used Vary according to the disciplinary paradigms in which they occur and in part because they are 'loaded' with different political content depending on the political orientation of the individual writer. Nevertheles, Gee's list, quoted below is useful as an indication of the range of terms which identify the 'cultural studies', as against the linguistic, understandings of 'discourse'. The term "Discourse" (with a big "D)is meant to cover important aspects of what others have called: discourses (Foucault 1966, 1%9, 1973, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1985); communities of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991); cultural comrnunities (Clark 19%); discoune communities (Berkenkotter and Huckin 199% Miller 1984); distnbuted knowledge or distnbuted systems (Hutchins 1995; Lave 1988); thought collectives (Fleck 1979): practices (Barton and Hamii ton 1998; Bourdieu 1977,1985, 1990a, b; Heidegger 1%2) cultures (Geertz 1973, 1983); activity systems (Engestrom 1987,1990; Leont'ev 1981; Wertsch 1998); actor- actant networks (Callon and Latour 1992; Latour 1987); and (one interpretation 00 "forms of life" (Wittgenstein 1958). (Gee lm-38) In this dissertation, when the term 'discourse' is used to refer to Gairdner's writings or to those of any other individual wnter, it is normally the linguistic sense of the word that is being activated and the reader should undersiand it to refer to a linpuistic

analysis of what Gairdner says, how he says it, and what it means or may mean. Wheo the term 'discourse' is used in a cultural theory sense, it is apt to occur in a phrase such as 'a discourse of liberalism' (see p. 151 this dissertation), where it refers to the ways, linguistic and non-linguistic, in which the specified philosophy or ideology is manifesteci. Since 'discoune', particularly in the cultural theory sense, is understood in terms of differeot or competing ideologies, the terni 'ideology' will be explored in the following section. Ideology Defined The notion of 'ideoiogy' figures prorninently in the field of critical discourse analysis, so it is appropriate to define it before further discussing the nature and development of CDA itself. The term 'ideology' appears frequently in the literature of cntical discourse analysis, but it is often used without an accompanying definition. When it is defined, it is not always defined in the same way by al1 discourse analysts. This variability in the use of the term is not surpnsing, considering that it has been subject to variability throughout its history, and not just within modem discourse aoalysis. ( See Raymond Williams (1983) for a history of the terrn.) Kathryn Woolard (1998) identifies four major 'strands' of understandings of 'ideology' in contemporary usage. "The first common strand is an understanding of ideology as ideational or conceptual, refemng to mental phenornena; ideology has to do with consciousness, subjective representations, beliefs, ideas" (Woolard 1998: 5). Although this strand of 'ideology' is not associated as often with cfitical dimensions of analysis as are some of the others, Woolard acknowledges that some critical analyses of ideology do share at least some of this emphasis on ideation (Woolard 1998: 5). Woolard notes that this first strand has not kenthe most influential view of ideology over the past several decades. The most widely agreed-upon strand of ideology, according to Woolard, is the second one, which conceptualizes ideology as "derived from, moted in, reflective of, or responsive to the experience or interests of a particulas sociai position" woolard 1498: 6). It is the emphasis on the social and expenential ongins of ideology that differentiates this strand from the first. The third strand appears to follow from the second, but incorporates an analysis of power. In this third strand, "[iJdeology is seen as ideas, discourse, or signifyinp practices in the service of the stmggle to acquire or maintain power" (Woolard 199&7). Roponents of this strand of ideology differ on the question of whether ideology only serves dominant interests or can be used also as a tool of resistance against the dominant order (Woolard 1998: 7). The fourth strand understands ideology to involve "distortion, iliusion, error, mystification, or rationalization", and is othenvise seen as king closely related to the third strand (Woolard 1998~7).In Woolard's analysis, the first two strands fonn a sub-set in contrast to the sub-set of the third and fourth strands, or, in her own words, "betweea neutral and negative values of the terrn" (Woolard 19%3:7). Discoune analyse define 'ideology' in vanous ways. For example, in one of the earliest books in the field of critical discourse analysis, Gunther Kress and Bob Hodge define ideology as "a systematic body of ideas. organized frorn a particular point of view. Ideology is thus a subsurning category which includes sciences and metaphysics, as well as political ideologies of various kinds, without implying anything about their status and reliability as guides to reality" (Kress and Hodge 1979: 6). This definition apparently seeks to be both broadly inclusive and politicalty and academically 'neutral', in that Kress and Hodge avoid uses of the term which are confined to any one political or academic tradition, and they likewise avoid any of the pejorative senses sometimes associated with it. Unfortunately, in spite of the advantages of this definition as inclusive and 'neutral', it is almost too broad to be helpful in delineating the boundaries of what the word might legitimately be said to mean. Roger Fow Ier, in his 199 1 book, Longuage in the News: Discourse and Ideulogv in the Press, does not define the terrn 'ideology*, but rather assumes that his readers understand his use of the term. ln the first paragraph of the introductory chapter he writes, "1 take the view that the 'content' of newspapers is not facts about the world, but in a very general sense 'ideas*. 1 will use other terms as appropriate: 'beliefs', 'values*, 'theones', 'propositions', 'ideology"' (Fowler 1991: 1). These terms, including 'ideology', are assumed to carry meaning for the reader without being defined. Elsewhere, however, Fowler does offer a bnef definition of ideology as "a shared system of beliefs about reali ty" (Fowler 1985: 66). A more elaborate definition of the term is presented in Fowler's essay, "On critical lioguistics", in Caldas-CoultharC and Coulthard 19%. Here he writes, [clritical Iinguists have always been very careful to avoid the definition of ideology as 'false consciousness' [. . .] making it clear that they mean something more neutrai: a society's implicit theory of what types of objects exist in their world (categonzation); of the way that wortd works (causation); and of the values to be assigned to objects and processes (gened propositions or paradigms). These implicit beliefs constitute 'common sense', which provides a normative base to discourse. (Fowler 1996: 10 - 11) Norman Fairclough explains 'ideology' in the Introduction to Language and Power: My approach will put particular emphasis upon 'common-sense' assumptions which are implicit in the conventions according to which people interact & lin guis tic al^^, and of which people are generany not consciousl y aware. [. . .] Such assumptions are ideologies. Ideologies are closely linked to power [. . .]. (Fairclough 1989: 2). Fairclough's definition shares with Fowler's the notion that ideologies rnay be unconsciously held and may exist as d cornmon-sense' rather than as a set of doctrines or values that have been explicitly articulated by the people who hold them. Paul Simpson's view of ideology is expressed in slightly different words, but nevertheless appears to be consistent with Fowler's and Fairclough's view of ideology as reflecting what is taken as 'cornmon-sense'. Simpson writes that [flrom a cntical linguistic perspective. the tem nomally descri bes the ways in which what we Say and think interacts with society. An ideology tberefore derives from the taken-for-granted assumptions, beliefs and value-systems which are shared collectively by social groups. (Simpson 1993: 5)

The relationship between 'common sense' and 'ideology' is made even more explici t by Michael Billig, who ties these notions to the pattems of power and domination that may exist in a given society. Billig writes, [a]s critical theorists from Marx onwards have stressed, common sense is a forrn of ideofogy. This means that common sense not only has a wider history, but that it also possesses present functions, which relate to pattems of domination and power. In using cornmon-sense notions, people will find themselves repeating the assumptioos of their times. Moreover. according to theorists of ideology, they will be repeating assumptions which confimi existing arrangements of power. In this way, the continuing histoiy of domination flows through the patterns of cornmonsense thinking. (Billig 1991: 1) In "Discourse semantics and ideology", Teun van Dijk "presents fragments of a new, multidisciplinary theory of ideology and its relations with discourse, formulated in the broader framework of a critical discourse analysis" (van Dijk 1995a: 243). The theoretical framework he develops in that paper is summarized in the following quotation from it: Ideologies are basic frameworks of social c~~gnition,shared by members of social groups, constituted by relevant selections of sociocultural values, and organized by an ideological schema that represents the self-definition of a group. Besides their social function of sustaining the interests of groups. ideologies have the cognitive function of organizing the social representations (attitudes, knowledge) of the pup,and thus indirectly monitor the grouprelated social practices, and hence also the text and talk of its mernbers. (van Dijk 1995a: 248) Van Dijk expands his programme of study of the nature of ideology and ideologies in his 1998 book, Ideology. For van Dijk, rneaningful pprgress in the development of cntical discourse analysis requires this sort of detailed exploration of ideology, from a socio- cognitive perspective. In ternis of Wwlard's fourfold classification of 'ideology*, the dominant paradigm within critical discourse analysis would fall within her third category, explicitly acknowiedging power as a dimension of ideology, although Kress and Hodge's,

Simpson's. and Fowler's definitions of ideology cited above are less explicit in their attention to power than are those of Fairclough, Billig, and van Dijk. Discourse Analvsis and Critical Discourse Analvsis

In the inaugural issue of Discourse & Sociezy, the leading penodical in the field of critical discourse analysis, Teun van Dijk, the journal's editor, provides an overview of what CDA is and how it arose (van Dijk 1990: 5-16). inciuding within it a condensed version of his Introduction to the four-volume edited collection, Handbook of Discourse

Analysis (van Dijk 1985). Reviewing the history of what he calls the new cross-discipline of discourse analysis, van Dijk acknowledges classical rhetoric as one historical antecedent of modem discourse analysis. "Its crucial concern [. . .] was persuasive effectiveness. In this sense, classical rhetoric both anticipates conternporary stylistics and structural analyses of discourse and contains intuitive cognitive and social psychological notions about memory organization and attitude change in communicative contexts" (van Dij k 1985: 1). At the same time, he notes that the intellectual progress from rhetoric to modem discourse analysis was not direct, given that the study of classical rhetonc gradually fell into disfavour after the eighteenth century . In the twentieth century, van Dijk cites Vladimir Propp's Morphology of the Folkrak (1928, first English translation 1958) as contributiag significantly to the emergence of a structuralist paradigm of discourse analysis. However, without dismissing this and other earl y stnicturalist work on texts, van Dijk locates the direct origins of modem discourse analysis in the I%O's, particularly noting the influence of the new discipline of semiotics (van Dijk L985:2). At the same tirne that serniotics was becorning increasingly important in Europe, the ethnography of speaking (cf. Hymes 1964) was growing out of anthropological linguistics in North America, and sociolinguistics was emerging as a distinct focus of linguistics which examined language use in context. However, it was not until the 1970's that discourse analysis came into its own. As van Dijk describes it,

[wlhereas the 1!36ûs had brought various scattered attempts to apply semiotic or linguistic rnethods to the study of texts and communicative events, the early 19705 saw the publication of the first monographs and collections wholly and explicitly deaiing with systematic discourse analysis as an independent orientation of research within and across several disciplines. (van Dijk 1985: 4) Much of the detail of the development of discourse analysis as a field of study is tangentid to the present dissertation, so it will suffice to condense van Dijk's account, listing disciplines and schools of thought that he acknowledges as cootnbuting to the 'new cross-discipline' of discoune analysis. In the order in which van Dijk mentions thern, these disciplines and approaches are: anthropology, specifically the ethnography of speaking; linguistics and grammars; sociolinguistics; phenomenological or qualitative microsociology ;cognitive psychology; social psychology ;communication, includinp speech communication, interpersonal communication, and mass communication. In addition to these contributing disciplines, van Dijk acknowledges the disciplines of law, history, and pulitics as increasingly recognizing the importance of the analysis of texts as data within their fields of enquiry (van Dijk 1990: 5-6). While hailing the emergence of discourse analysis as a valid and valuable cross- discipline, van Dijk simultaneously criticizes it in its plethora of realizations for placing too much emphasis on micro-level analysis and too little on a macro-level analysis of the relationships between discourse and broader political and social structures. The following descnption captures what van Dijk considers to be senous limitations of most discourse anal ysis: The study of text, talk or interaction is typically associated with apolitical, micro- level studies of culture, the polity or society. Fundamental notions of the social sciences, such as those of power and dominance, group relations, ideologies, cultural reproduction, institutional decision making, among many others, were and are hard to find in most studies of discourse. The problems of discourse analysis are typically scholarly problems of theory formation or discourse description, rather than social or political problems. As a consequence, for research into the many foms of social inequality, for instance those based on gender, class or ethnicity, the social or political scientist seldom tums to analyses of text and talk. (van Dijk 1990: 7) The approach to discourse advocated by van Dijk and promoted in the journal Discourse &

Sociev is, thetefore, one that dues focus on the social, political, and cultural dimensions of discourse (van Dijk 1990: 8). This approach is commonly identified as critical discourse analy sis. Critical discourse analysis is a diverse, multi-disciplinary approach to the study of texts, not a ngidly or narrowly-defined theory or discipline. Cntical discourse analysis (CDA) is obviously not a homogeneous method, nor a xhool or a paradigm, but at most a shared perspective on doing linguistic, semiotic or discourse analysis. Where some critical scholars are cautious and subtle in their critique, others may be more outspoken and radical. And where some scholars in this perspective, at least in practice. remain within the theoretical and methodological mainstream of modem linguistics and discourse analysis, others extend their domain of exploration to serniotics, history, cognitive science and the sociai sciences. (van Dijk 1993a: 13 1) While it borrows many of the insights and tools of other branches of forma1 linguistics and discourse analysis, CDA differs from them in being cntical, that is, in explicitly engaging in an analysis of the structures of power and dominance at work in the context of particular texts (van Dijk 1994). Expressed another way, "[tlhe concem of critical linguistics is to relate language to its users, and to seek some principled way of bnnging out the ideologies inherent in their cornrnunications" (Steiner 19%: 2 18). While the label 'cntical discourse anôlysis' subsumes a variety of different meth& and approaches to the study of text and talk, one of the major fields which faIls under the umbrella of CDA is critical linguistics. Erich Steiner credits Roger Fowler (Fowler etal 1979) and Gunther Kress (Kress and Hodge 1979) with being the originators of critical linguistics, defining it as "the application of linguistic methods in the investigation of ideology (i.e. system of beliefs and meanings) underlying a text and reinforced by it" (Steiner 1985: 215). Fowler himself elabrates on the definition of the field: Critical linguistics seeks, by studying the minute details of linguistic structure in the light of the social and histoncal situation of the text, to display to consciousness the patterns of belief and value which are encoded in the language -- and which are below the threshold of notice for anyone who accepts the discourse as 'natural'. (Fowler 1991: 67) Among the linguistic devices that Fowler includes in his linguistic checklist are lexical processes. transitivity, syntax (including deletion, sequencing and complexity), and modality (Fowler 1935 68 - 73 and Fowler 1991). Other items on his checklist, such as tum-taking and phonology, are not relevant to the present dissertation, which deals only with written texts. Paul Simpson highlights some of the common ground shared by stylistics and

cntical linguistics, aoting that "[c]ri ticai linguistics. like stylistics, seeks to interpret texts on the basis of linguistic analysis", and that critical linguistics "expands the horizons of stylistics by focussing on texts other than those regarded as literary" (Simpson 1993: 5). The motivation for stylistics might often be aesthetic appreciation, but the motivation for critical linguistics, as Simpson sees it, is clearly political and directed at changing, not merely at observing reality. First of all, dominant ideolopies operate as a mechanism for maintaining asyrnmetrical power relations in society. As language can be used by powerful pupsto re-inforce this dominant ideology, then language needs to be targeted as a specific site of struggle. Analysis for the sake of analysis is not sufficient; instead, the analyst makes a committed effort to engase with the discoune with a view to changing it. In other words, by highlighting tnsidious discursive practices in language, those practices themselves can be challenged. (Simpson 1993: 6)

Simpson thus goes one step beyond Fowler, who proposes to expose linguistic devices of persuasion and manipulation, and seeks to use cntical linguistics as a tool for bringing about changes in relationships of power and domination. Norman Fairclough, working within a paradigm that he refers to as 'Critical

Language Study' (CU),has education and 'social emancipation' as his primary goals (Fairclough 1989 233ff). In analyzing texts, Fairclough examines lexical processes, transitivity, syntactic complexity and arrangement, and modality in rnuch the sarne way as these are examined and analyzed within cntical linguistics. Such linguistic analyses fa11 within his category of 'text description'. However, for Fairclough, a complete analysis must also include intertextuai analysis, which "draws attention to the dependence of texts upon society and history in the form of the resources made availabie within the order of discourse (genres, discourses, etc)" (Fairclough lm: 195). Fairclough has high regard for the linguistic analysis of Fowler, Kress and Hodge and others working within cntical linguistics (Fairclough 1989 246) but he is nevertheless always careful to distinguish his Critical Language Study approach from their critical linguistics. The edited volume, Texts and Pracfices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis

(Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 1996) bnngs together a collection of papers by different authors, using different approaches, al1 of whicb the editors consider to represent critical discourse analysis. Rather than offering a defini tion of critical discourse analysis, the editors comment on the purposes for which researchers engage in such analyses. Discourse is a major instrument of power and control and Critical Discourse Analysts, uuiike Chomsky, feel that it is indeed part of their professional role to investigate, reveal and clarify how power and discriminatory value are inscribed in and mediated through the linguistic system: Critical Discourse Analysis is essentially political in intent with its practitioners acting upon the world in order to transform it and thereby help create a world where people are not discriminated against because of sex, colour, creed, age or social class. (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 1996: xi) The book is divided into two major sections, roughly 'theory' and 'praciice', although as pointed out in a review of this book (Lillian 1998: 1IO), there is not always a very clear dividing line between theory and practice in the papers in this collection, or indeed in the

discipline itself. The 'theory' section contains contributions by five scholars identified by

the editors as "the leading names in the field" (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 19%: xi), these five king Roger Fowler, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen, Norman Fairclough, and Teun A. van Dÿk. The 'pracîice' section contains papers by nine other scholars, including one paper by each of the editors, representing a variety of approaches within CDA. To surnmarize, critical discourse anaiysis includes a variety of methodological, theoretical and disciplinary approaches to the study of texts and talk, but researchers who include themselves within CDA tend to share a common social and political orientation which includes identifying and resisting structures of oppression and discrimination, especially those that manifest themselves in language. Van Dijk recognizes both the differences and the commonalities among the practitioners of CDA: Though in different ternis. and frorn different points of view, most of us deal with power, dominance, hepmony, inequality, and the discursive processes of their enactment, conceal ment, legi tirnation and reproduction. And many of us are interested in the subtle means by which text and talk manage the mind and manufacture consent, on the one hand, and articulate and sustain resistance and challenge, on the other. (van Dijk 1993a: 13 1- 132) Theoretical and Methodolo~icaIOrientation of this Dissertation The ideology reflected and reproduced in the popular wntings of William Gairdner is that of neo-conservatism, an ideology w hich w il1 be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Neo-conservatism seeks to protect the interests of the dominant elites in Western countries including, but not limited to, Great Britain, the United States of Amerka, and Canada. Those dominant elites are predominantly white, male, and heterosexual, and they seek to maintain and expand their power, in part through discourse. Because public discourse -- education, politics, and media -- is controlled by these same elites, their discourse is privileged and becornes naturalized within the societies in which they are dominant. What the elites Say and how they say it acquires the status of 'cornmon sense' and is rarely challenged, because it is below the Ievel of conscious awareness for most people. This elite discourse is perceived as 'natural', not as deviant, so the ideology behind the discourse seldom cornes under criticism. Three aspects of dominant neo-conservative discourse are sexism, homophobia, and racism, and it is these three aspects of New Right ideology which will corne under scnitiny in the discourse of William Gairdner. Chapter 2 of this dissertation demonstrates that William Gairdner's discourse is sexist and anti-ferninist, and Chapter 3 demonstrates that it is homophobic. Gairdner's sexism and his homophobia are related, both ideologically and linguistically. Feminists are equated with lesbians, and both are denigrated along with gay men. However, while al1 îhree groups (feminists, lesbians, and gay men) are denigrated throuph unflattering and inflammatory lexical choices, and metaphors of cancer and disease, gay men are represented differently from feminists in the system of transitivity. Specifically, gay men frequently appear as agents of highly transitive clauses, many of which utilize verbs of violence, while feminists rarely appear as agents in highly transitive clauses, but frequently appear as subjects of predicates denoting forms of talk or verbalization. The result is that gay men are portrayed as threatening society by what they do, while lesbians and feminists are portrayed as threatening society by what they say. An ideolopy such as neo-conservatism cannot manifest dominance through gender relations without simultaneously manifesting it through racial and ethnic discrimination. Thus, Chapter 4 examines two aspects of neo-conservative racism that are reproduced in Gairdner's wnting, the first being an Anglo-centred, anti-French ethnicism, and the second being an anti-immigrant bias, directed against people whose ongins do not trace back to Europe. Sexisrn, homophobia, and racism are thus three manifestations of the same drive for dominance by white male eiites. Chapter 5 of this dissertation outlines the rise of neo-conservatism in Great Bri tain, the U.S.A., and Canada. In Canadian poiitics, neo-conservatism is most closely associated wi th the provincial Progressive Conservative governments of Alberta and Ontario, led by Ralph Klein and Mike Harris, respectively, and with the federal Canadian Alliance Party (formerly the Refonn Party of Canada). William Gairdner has been identified as one of the menton of the Reform Party, and it is in part because his books have influenced the policy platfoms of these parties that his discourse merits critical discourse analysis in this dissertation. If critical discourse analysis is both multi-disciplinary and crossdisciplinary, then this dissertation reflects that breadth and inclusivity in its theoretical and methodological approach and in the orientation of its author. The dissertation bridges both English and linguistics as disciplines, being written to fulfil the requirements of a linguistics orientation within a predominantly literary department. It deviates from most English studies, however, in focussing on non-fiction texts rather than on texts that fail within the traditional designation of 'literature', those king fiction, drama, poetry, and some genres of essay and biography. It also differs from most published critical discourse analyses, which may focus on any nurnber of text types including newspaper articles, news broadcasts, interviews, political speeches, advertising, courtrmm transcripts, among others, but which rarely focus on texts of the specific genre of the books under examination in this dissertation. This author's training in linguistics makes it natural that from the multiplicity of approaches within critical discourse analysis, this dissertation would utilize critical linguistics as its prirnary theoretical and methodological orientation. Yet the choice to employ critical linguistics is also a deliberate choice because this approach requires that no conclusions be drawn in the absence of data. The requirement that a researcher constantly focus on the linguistic structures of the text under discussion prevents her/hirn from digessing into unsubstantiated speculation. At the same time, however, if the goal is to reveal the hidden sources of power and manipulation within the texts, then a slavish adherence to one theory or methodology may not always be the most productive. In introduciog his own work. Ideology and Opinions (1991), Michael Billig comments on the potential limitations of too stnctly adhering to any one methodology. The reliance upon a single rnethodology would inevitably du11 the critical edge. The analyst, instead of possessing a tool-bag of specialized instruments, would have but a single lawn-mower, chugging backwards and forwards, always leaving the gr= at a unifonn height. (Billig 1991: 22) In that same spirit of utilizing a range of appropriate tools, while employing piimarily a critical linguistics model, this dissertation will, as appropriate, incorporate insights or methods from other branches of critical discourse analysis. To conclude, then, the subject under analysis in this dissertation is a set of texts by William D. Gairdner, representative of the far nght in Canadian politics from the late 1980's through to the present. The dissertation consists of a cntical discourse analysis of those iexts, incorporating a feminist perspective, which takes as fundamental the equality of al1 people, whatever their sex, race, sexual orientation, religion, language. nationality, (dis)ability, or socio-economic class. While the analysis strives to be academically rigorous and intellectually valid, in keeping with the cri tical agenda of critical discourse analysis, it does not purport to be value-neutral. This study has been undertaken not in order to foreground the discourse of William Gairdner that others rnight admire it, but rather, to expose it as being discriminatory and dangerous. In the words of Teun van Dijk [i)f powerful speakers or groups enact or otherwise 'exhibit' their power in discourse, we need to know exactly how this is done. And if they thus are able to persuade or otherwise influence their audiences, we also want to know which discursive structures and strategies are involved in that process. (van Dijk WBb: 259) It is in the spirit of exposing Gairdner's discursive strategies that this dissertation is undertaken. Chapter 2: Sexist Discourse

Introduction The current chapter argues that Gairdner's discourse is sexist. Sexism and anti- feminism, two sides of the same coin, have been identified elsewhere as being a feature of right-wing policy and discourse. In "Antifeminism and the British and Arnerican New

Rights", Miriam David and Ruth Levitas point out that, "[tlhe two main strands within New Right thought, free market economics and social authoritarianism, operate with very different (and mutually contmdictory) views of human nature, but both support policy initiatives which are antifeminist in effect, if not intention" (David and Levitas 1983: 141). David and Levitas name George Gilder and R. Viguene in the U.S.A. and Ferdinand Mount and Roger Scruton in Great Britain as representing the social-authontarian wing of the New Right. George Gilder is heavily cited in Gairdner's own wntings and two of

Gilder's books, MenandMarriage (1986) and Wedhand Poverty (1981) are iisted in the Selected Bibliography of Trouble. (Men and Mmiage is also listed in the Selected Bibliography of Wr.) Given that Gairdner draws extensive1y on Gilder's ideas, the observations David and Levitas make about the British and American New Rights are readily applicable to Gairdner, as the New Right's Canadian counterpart. According to David and Levitas, "[tlhe support and protection of the family is thus a central part of the conservative pmject and any changes in laws which tend to reduce rather than reinforce the obligations of life within this patriarchal family [. . .] ars highly undesirable" (David and Levitas 1988: 142). They go on to observe that in New Right thought, "[tlhe importance of the family as a basic unit of society gives the state the nght and duty to encourage certain forms of it and thus discourage others" (David and Levitas 1988: 142-3). Although Gairdner's books were wntten after David and Levitas wrote this, they could easily be describing the position he outlines in his writings. Colette Guillaumin also identifies hierarchical patriarchal relationships ascentral to the agenda of the right. Guillaumin writes, [rlight-wing discourse, and speech, which present 'facts as they stand', claim, therefore, that these facts are correct, that they must be maintained andor improved. according to their own logic and in conformity to their nature. Relations of domination, exploitation, inequality are held as socially necessary and, furthemore, they are sometimes dressed up in terms of 'complernentarity.' (Guillaumin 1988: 22) She goes on to identify relations between the sexes as an area in which dominance is fundamental in right-wing thought. [Tlhe Right gives a great deal of importance to this social relation which is present as a naturd relation. The reader will have understood that we are refemng to the relation between the sexes which is seen as the foundation and crux of any society. Both the classical, conservative right, through the family, and the cynical rïght, through the channel of reproduction, treat this relation between the sexes as a fundamental and incontrovertible datum. (Guillaumin 1988: 23) Sexism, the ideology and practice of relegating women to a lower rung on the social hierarchy than men simply by virtue of their femaleness, is an integral component of New Right thinking and one way that sexism is produced and reproduced is in language. Since the early 1970'~~sexisrn in language, particularly in English, has been a subject of research and debate. One major area of concern for feminists has been the identification and elimination (to the extent that this is possible) of linguistic sexism as it is manifested in particular lexical choices, including false generics such as 'he' and 'man7. The research on such sexist linguistic forms as fdse generics, unequal word pairs, sexist job titles, and sexist ternis of address and reference is distilled and surnrnarized in Ruth King etd (1991), Talking Gender: A Guide to Nonsexisr Cornmication. While the aim of this book is not to provide a cornprehensive summary of the research in each area it deals with, it nevertheiess provides a cogent encapsulation of the major arguments concerning the sexism of various fomsand the non-sexist alternatives available. As important as are feminists' efforts to identify and eliminate the sorts of linpuistic sexism discussed in King emi (1991)' the issues of sexism and language are bbroder than lexical choices and pronoun usage. In addition to working on rehabilitating existing foms

in English (and other languages), feminists have introduced new lexical items such as 'feminism', 'sexism', 'sexual harassment', and 'date rape', to name experiences of women which had previously gone unnamed. Naming these experiences not only empowers women individually and penonally by explicitly acknowledging problematic aspects of their lives, but it also provides a means of drawing public attention to the issues so named as a step toward seeking positive social change for women. Susan Ehrlich and Ruth King have investigated what happens to such feminist words and feminist meanings when they enter the sexist mainstream (Ehrlich and King 1992, 1994, 1998). As Ehrlich explains, [blecause linguistic meanings are, to a large extent, deterrnined by the dominant culture's social values and attitudes -- that is, they are socially constructed and constituted - terms initially introduced to be non-sexist, non-racist, or even feminist may (like a woman's response of "no" to a man's sexual advances) lose their intended meanings in the "mouths" and "ears" of a sexist, racist speech community and culture. (Ehrlich 1995: 51)

Ehrlich and King identify three major processes of redefinition that feminist meanings undergo: redefinition as omission or obscuring, redefinition as expansion, and redefinition

as obliteration (Ehrlich and King 1994). Among the lexical items that Gairdner subjects to such redefinition are 'family', 'date rape', and the word 'no', as used by a woman in the

context of refusing a man's sexual advances, each of which is discussed below in this chapter. Critical linguistics, as discussed in Chapter 1 above, is a hybrid of traditional literary stylistics, rhetoric, and social analysis. Feminist stylistics, as developed and

practiced by Sara Mills, can be seen in its hirn as a hybrid of critical linguistics and feminist theory. Mills introduces feminist stylistics this way: Both the 'feminist' and the 'stylistics' parts of this phrase are complex and may have different meanings for readers. [. . .] Feminist analysis aims to draw attention to and change the way that gender is represented, since it is clear that a great many of these representational practices are not in the interests of either wornen or men. Thus feminist stylistic analysis is concemed not only to describe sexism in a text, but also to analyse the way that point of view, apncy, metaphor, or transitivity are unexpectedly closely related to matters of gender [. . .]. (Mills 1995: 1)

Mills cites Deirdre Burton (1982) as a source on which she draws in developing her own feminist stylistics. Burton outlines a programme for utilizing the tools of stylistics to politicize the study of literary texts for explicitly feminist ends and she is unapologetic in priontizing feminism as the means to reforming the status quo to produce a more just

Let me state my own political biases as clearly as possible in a simple, bland way. It is clear that we live in a classist, racist and sexist society, and that is, at the very least, a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs. 1 believe that, of these three major and massive injustices, sexism is the most deep-ruoted (psychologicall y), the most pervasive, the most difficult to perceive, the most resistant to chan. -- yet available as a locus for important and essential radical impetus to the reorganization of al1 the unequal and oppressive power-structures in Our society. (Burton 1982: 197) Burton's programme for reform through stylistic analysis is pnrnarily directed at literary texts, but Mills demonstrates that feminist stylistics can be used as a framework of analysis and criticism for texts of any type, both linguistic and graphic. Although none of the papers discussed in the present chapter of this dissertation consist of analyses of literary texts and none use an approach which they explicitly label 'feminist stylistics', they nevertheless have in common with feminist stylistics a concem to reveal patterns of sexism that are linguistically and discunively coded in texts. The studies by Susan EMich and Ruth King, cited above, examine the fate of specific feminist linguistic innovations such as 'sexual harassrnent' and 'date rape' once they enter the sexist mainstream, but feminist researchers have also investigated more broadly the discursive construction of sexual consent (or lack thereof), sexual assault, and violence against women and girls in the context of patnarchal society. In "Fomulating

Rape: The Discursive Construction of Victirns and Villains", Linda A. Wood and Heather Remie (1994) report on a study in which they interview eight women, aII of whom had been raped by a date or acquaintance, about their expenences of rape and their ways of

dealing with those experiences. The women had responded to an announcement in a university newspaper seeking volunteers for the study. In examining the data gathered through these interviews, Wood and Rennie focus on specific linguistic forms such as the use of the modal 'should' ,or the use of fat se deixis ('Dummy-it'), to name j ust two examples, and they analyze the specific linguistic choices of the interviewees as a way of gaining insight into the range of ways in which they characterize their own roles and the roles of the man who raped thern. For example, under the general sub-heading of "Negotiation of victidnon-victim identity" they write, [slhe views herself as having received an injustice, 'like somebody . . . smashing into my van in the parking lot' (Kim, 1000-1)- The use of verb rather than noun foms in accounts of rape is important for two reasons. It accomplishes a shift in emphasis from the person to the properties of action (and ptentidly to the agent of the that action, Le. the rapist). It also pIaces temporal boundanes on the experience. The distinction thus allows Kim to feel the injustice of being victimized; she is allowed sympathy and compassion. She can be a victirn ternporarily, without accepting a victirn identity or its negative consequences. (Wood and Rennie 1994: 138)

Because they take into account the complex ways in which the wornen they interviewed use language to daim and reject various identities for themselves and others, Wood and Rennie are able to rnove beyond a characterization of rape in terms of absolutes or dichotomies (1994: 144). In doing so, they demonstrate the value of analyzing 'texts' (in this case transcripts of interviews) in their totality, rather than just focussing on individual Lexical items. Discursive constructions of rape are also discussed in "Critical Linguistics and Feminist Methodology", Susan Ehrlich's contribution to Sandra Burt and Lorraine Code,

Changing Methodr: Ferninists Trmfoming Practice ( 1993, in S usan Ehrlich and Ruth

King (LM),"Consensual Sex or Sexual Harassment: Negotiating Meaning", and in

Ehrlich (2001 ), Represenring Rape: hguageand SexmZ Consent. Al1 three of these works utilize data from the transcript of a university disciplinary tribunal, in which a male student is charged with sexual harassment, the charge available under the university regulations which corresponded with the criminal charges of sexual assault filed under the Ontario Criminal Code in connection with the same events. The case involveci charges brought against a male student by two female students who alleged that the defendant persisted in unwanted sexual behaviour after king invited into the women's residence roorns. "Both of the women reported that they were quite clear and insistent that he stop, but their demands were ipnored" (Ehrlich 1995: 60). Not surprisingly, the questions posed by the defendant's representative to the two complainants at the hearing were designed to try to construct the events as consensual sex (Ehrlich 1995: 61). More significant was the way in which the questions posed by two members of the university disciplinary tribunal - pesons who were supposed to be 'neutrai' parties -- tended to follow the same themes as those of the defendant's representative in their cross-examination of the complainants. Specifically, the questions focussed on "(1) the so-called 'inaction' of the cornplainant and the witness and (2) the deconstruction of these individuals' fear of the defendant" (Ehrlich

1995: 63). Ehrlich concludes, [tlhis two-part discursive strategy funetions to construct and define the events in question as consensual sex, not as sexual harassment or sexual assault: first the women' s inaction is established; second, the justification for the inaction is eliminated or minimized; conclusion, if there is no justification for the inaction, then the inaction means that the sexud activity was consensual. In the case of the defendant's representative, this discursive strategy is quite enplicit and conscious; in the case of the tribunal rnembers it operates in a more subtle, less conscious manner, perhaps, but the same strategy is operative. (Ehrlich 1995: 68) Analyzing the same university tribunal transcnpts as Ehrlich (1495) and Ehrlich and King (1996),Ehrlich (1998) focusses on a different aspect of the discourse. Specifically, she demonstrates how a defendant accused of sexual harassment (sexual assault) can use a

'miscommunication' mode1 of conversation (cf. Tannen 1990) in order present himself as innocent by claiming that he simply rnisunderstood the cornplainants' refusais of his sexual advances. Ehrlich observes that,

[bJoth the defendant through his testimony and the tribunal memben ... through their questioning communicate that neither the man (the defendant) nor the women (the complainants) have been able to interpret each other's verbal and non-verbal communicative acts accurately, pnmarily because the complainants have been 'deficieut' in their attempts to signal non-consent. (Ehrlich 1998: 151) The myth that women are 'deficient' in communicating sexual refusals is taken up in Celia Kitzinger and Hannah Fritb (1999), "Just Say No? The Use of Conversation Analysis in Developing a Feminist Perspective on Sexual Refusal". Utilizing the pnnciples of conversation analysis, Kitzinger and Frith show that when women use indirect or mitigated refusais to sexual advances, they are, in fact, employing conversational foms which are the nom for refusals, and are thus engaging in culturally appropriate behaviour. They further show that the sort of bald refusal advocated by many assertive-training or rape-prevention programmes is ineffective and inappropriate because it violates cultural noms, and further that such bald refusals are unnecessary, because in non-sexual contexts, men understand and use culturally appropriate refusds unproblernatically. Together,

Ehrlich ( 1998) and Kitzinger and Fnth (1999) present evidence that sirnplistic notions of conversation and especially of conversational 'deficiency ' make i t far too easy for defendants and even for well-meaning feminists to imply that 'miscommunication' rather than male aggression against women is responsible for tape and sexual assault Together these studies go a long way towarci challenginp William Gairdner's insinuations that women's refusals are ambiguous and that a wornan, not the man who assaults her, is therefore responsible if the man persists in unwanted sexual behaviour (Gairdner lm: 558 - 563). Moving from the courtroom to the newsroom, sexist bias in media representations of sexual violence against women is described in Kate Clark (1992). "The Linguistics Of Blame: Representations of Women in the Sun's Reporting of Crimes of Sexual Violence". Clark's data consist of fifty-three reports of male violence against women taken from the

British tabloid, The Sun, between Novernber 1986 and January 1987. Utilizing naming analysis (which of a range of possible labels the wnter selects to identify the participants in an event) (1992 2 IO), and transitivity analysis (how responsi bility, absence, emphasis or prominence of a participant can be encoded in the clause structure of a text) (1992: 2121, two of the tooIs of critical linguistics, Clark illustrates that there is a consistent pattern of deflecting blame and responsibility for violence away from the male perpetrator (or alieged perpetrator) and laying it instead on the victim adorsome other female. "Girlfriend, mother, victims: at every stage it is the women who are blamed, while the actual attackers, the men [. . .] are released from the responsibility for their crimes. This is a chosen stance" (Clark 1992: 217). By examining the specific linguistic choices made by the writers from the range of options available, and by compiling the data from individual articles and drawinp cornpansons, Clark is able to demonstrate that the particular choices of individual wnters are not idiosyncratic, but rather they reflect and reproduce the 'ideology of blame' (Clark 1992: 217) which characterizes The Sun newspaper. While acknowledging that there can only be conjecture as to The Sun's motivation (1992: 220), Clark nevertheless identifies this ideology with patriarchy . "The naming of the victims clearl y reflects a patriarchal viewpoint because women are categonzed in terms of possible sexual encounters with men, ratfier than as autonornous individuals" (Clark lm:223). Janet M. Bing and Lucien X. Lombardo (1997) explore the reporting of sexual harassment in seven major U.S. newspapers and magazines, between 1989 and 1995.

Utilizing the notion of communicative 'frames' developed by, among others, Deborah

Tannen (1993), Bing and Lombardo identify four frames most commonly used in reports of sexual harassment, namely, the judicial frarne (which compares behaviours to predetermined legal policies or statutes), the victim frarne (which focusses on the victirn's

experiences of harassment, especially on the degree of hamor injury resulting from the harassing behaviour). the initiator frarne (which focusses on the behaviour of the alleged perpetrator, redefining the behaviour as sornething other than harassment), and the social science frame (which positions the wnter as an 'objective' observer who explores the issue of sexual harassment in a more general or abstract way, avoidiog taking the perspective of victim, initiator or judge). The authors note that "[w]hen reader and writer do not share the same frarne, a reader may misunderstand or reject a writer's evidence and opinions" (Bing and Lombardo 1997: 307). In a course on violence against women, one of the authors presented the four frames and subsequently found that hostility between those with different viewpoints was reduced, and the quality of student dialogue dramatically improved because students were able to identify and offer alternatives to the frames being evoked (Bing and Lombardo 1997: 308). Although the experiences of this one class are insufficient data on which to make generalizations, the authors conchde that, "[w]e hope that identifying and describing predominant frames and making explicit the expectations they create will help clarify public discourse not only on sexual barassrneut, but on other issues as well" (Bing and Lombardo 1997: 308). The theme of male aggression and violence against women is explored in "Dominance and Entitlement: The Rhetoric Men Use to Discuss Their Violence Towards

Women" by Peter J. Adams, Alison Towns and Nicola Gavey (1995). The authors analyze the transcripts of interviews conducted with fourteen men who had recently been violent to their partnen and who were voluntarily attending programmes aimed at stopping male violence against women, "to illustrate how attention to the rhetorical features of men's accounts can assist in unpicking the various strands which reinforce male entitlement to positions of dominance" (Adams etai 1995: 388). For the purpose of their analysis, they define rhetorical analysis as "a particular form of discourse analysis which draws on fine detail in the language in resourcing the expressive potential of a text" (Adams etal 1995: 391). They observe that the particular rhetorical devices of reference ambiguity, axiorn markers, metaphor, synecdoche, and metonymy together constmct a discourse of natural entitlement w hich, "[iln its simplest form [. .-1 advocates that men are entitled to dominate women because they are designed to be that way" (Adams etal 1995: 401). Referrinp to one of the interviews with a man they refer to as Gavin, the authors illustrate how they see various rhetorical devices working together to constmct a 'discourse of entitIement': But how was this impression of male authority supported within the text? Closer scrutiny revealed the use of a variety of rhetorical devices which enhanced titis impression. Ambiguous reference, particularly the ambiguous use of pronouns, helped disguise the assumptions of authority. Axiom markers served to anchor fundamental assumption and protect them from challenge. Metaphor subtly reinforced the correctness and reasonableness of discourses of male dominance. Synecdoche and metonymy added incrementally to the connotations and associations which resource these discourses. And, working together in a complementary and synergistic fashion, these devices functioned alongside discourses of male dominance to generate a sense of naturalness and correctness to Gavin's entitlement, as a man, to positions of power. (Adams et al 1995: 4-03} While discursive and linguistic representations of sexual harassrnent and violence against women underlie a simdficant and theoretically diverse body of work, as iliustrated by the papers discussed above in this section, other themes have also received attention from discourse analysts seekinp to reveal patterns of sexism and dominance in laquage. Two studies that represent the scholarship on images of women in popular female-targeted magazines are Reiko Hayashi (1997), "Hierarchical Interdependence Expressed Through Conversational Styles in Japanese Womeo's Magazines", and Ana Cristina Ostermann and

Deborah Keller-Cohen (1998),"'Good Girls Go to Heaven; Bad Girls ...' Learn to Be Gwd: Quizzes in American and Braziiian Teenage Girls' Magazines". Hayashi shows how particular linguistic structures are used in Japanese magazines aimed at young women to position the female readers simultanwusly as subordinate in the social hierarchy to the magazine writers and editors and as in a relationship of solidarity with them. For example, "the writers use jargon which is made by meaningless sound combinations. such as 'purikon', an abbreviation of 'pretty, conservative style' in English, 'consaba' and 'teku', abbreviations of 'conservative' and 'techic' [. ..] and assume that the readers are frivolous, dumb, or should be encouraged to speak like a child" (Hayashi 1997: 363). Positioning the readers as childish or immature thus relegates them to a lower position in tems of a Japanese social hierarchy which is, in part, deterrnined by age. Simultaneously, the wnters employ what Hayashi identifies as a conversational style in order to construct an empathy network (Hayashi 1997: 365). For example, in conversational Japanese, the particle 'ne' functions in a rnanner sirnilar to an English tag-question to invite response from the listener, thus personalizinp a sense of rapport between the writer and the reader (Hayashi 1997: 366). According to Hayashi. the purpose of creating this 'hierarchical interdependence' is commercial: in the role of 'helpers', the writers and editors influence the readers to value the images promoted in the magazines and therefore to buy the products being sold. "The magazines as entrepreneurs confine the women in the culture of dependence by propagating sexism" (Hayashi 1997: 360). Ostermann and Keller-Cohen (1998) conduct a criticai discourse analysis of the structure and function of quiues in American and Brazilian magazines aimed at teenaged girls. The genre of the quiz in these magazines works to tum an inherently uni-directional communication (front writer to reader) into a form of interaction by inducing the reader to respond to a series of questions. The 'dialogue' continues after the reader answcrs the questions when the magazine provides a scoring table and classification of the reader based on her score. The girls who are classified as having 'inappropriate' behavior are labeled as problematic. They are given advice on how to change or correct that 'improper' behavior. Thejudgement. classification, and advice in the quiz work towards the nomalization of the reader, that is, towards the achievement of conduct that the magazine descnbes as appropriate to the 'good' girl. (Ostermam and Keller-Cohen 1998: 553) Since 'good' girls uphold the patriarchal noms of femininity and heterosexuality, the magazines are not only reinforcing and reproducinp these values of compulsory patriarchy, but they are also working to 'reform' girls who fa11 outside those noms. Patnarchal definitions of women's roles are also evident in the so-cailed Family Life advertisernents analyzed in Michelle M. Lazar (2000),"Gender, Discourse and Semiotics: The Politics of Parenthood Representations". Lazar focusses on fourteen advettisernents that form part of a campaip by the Singaporean govemment to encourage young adults to have families consisting of several children, analyzing both the linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of the texts. She classifies the advertisernents as displaying one of two ideologies, either a dominant one of conservative gender relations, or a competing one of egalitarian gender relations. Although Lazar's analysis depends on considering the visual (non-linguistic) features of the texts alongside, not independent of, the linguistic features, there are, nevertheless, certain linguistic features that were characteristic of the -L two types of advertisements. For example, one characteristic of the 'epalitarian' advertisernents was the use of the word 'parent(s)' to conflate the roles of mother and father into one shared role of parenting. "As a corollary of king referred to as joint

participants,we also find [. . .] that women and men are represented as sharing a common

experience. They are affected by parenthood in the same way, and appear to respond to i t identically" (Lazar 2000: 380). Not only are the parenting roles in the conservative

advertisements portrayed differently from those in the egalitanan advertisements, but within the conservative advertisements, the roles of father and mother are portrayed in distinctly different w ays. For example, in the conservative advertisements, men are portrayed as active participants in the family, but in clauses with mental processes. 'These convey men's response to the benefits they have received from having a family. The self-revelatory construals by means of the mental processes indicate the positive transformation farnily life

has had on these men" (Lazar 2000: 381). In contrast to the self-fulfilment that is portrayed as characterizing or resulting from fatherhood is the other-centredness that characterizes mothers in the conservative advertisements, as shown in part through a repeated linking of mothers with the act of giving. Other-centredness applies not only to wives' relationships with their husbands, but also to mothers' relationships with their children. In the 'Family Life' ads, one of the most powerful other-centred gestures mothers can express is to consider the interest of an only child by producing siblings for that child to grow up with. (Lazar 2000: 389) Lazar argues that in spite of the coexistence of two apparently competing ideologies in the govemment-sponsored advertising campaign, the 'brand' of egalitarianism is not genuinely subversive and does not acnially challenge the noms of multichild heterosexual farnily life. Hence, Lazar concludes that "the disempowerment of women is discoursally maintaineci by the state in its efforts to boost national fertility rates" (Lazar 2ûMk 397). The studies presented in this section encompass a wide range of genres: transeri pts of interviews, transcripts of a disciplinary tribunal, conversation, newspaper reports, women's magazines, magazine quines, and advertising. The range of genres that can be analyzed using feminist-informed methods of discoune analysis illustrates the versatility and robustness of such analyses and justifies the application of feminist-informed critical linguistics to the particular genre of political and social cornrnentary that constitute the writings of William D. Gairdner. Metaphor What William Gairdner descnbes as the 'naturai family' versus the 'social family', George Lakoff describes in terms of the metaphors of the Strict Father versus the Nurturant Parent (Lakoff 19%). The Strict Father rnebphor is associated with both conservative

Christianity and with conservative politics in the United States. The philosophy behind this metaphor is identified by Lakoff as the metaphor of Moral Order, which is summarized as the following:

God bas mord authonty over people. People have moral authority over nature (animals, plants, and nahiral abjects). Adulr have moral authonty over children. Men have moral authority over women. (Lakoff 1996: 81) According to Lakoff, conservative Chnstians extend Strict Father morality beyond religion, applying it to politics as well, "forging a metaphoncal link between (1) their religious

system of moral accounting ,(2) laissez-faire free-market economics, and (3) the Strict Father morality system of reward and punishment" (Lakoff 19%: 253). Lakoff's Nurturant Parent metaphor is associated with liberal poiitics in the U.S.A. and is parallel to what Gairdner calls the 'social family'. In this model, men do not automatically have authority over wornen and patriarchal families are not the only configuration deemed acceptable. Families consist of whatever their members say they consist of and can be led by heterosexual or homosexual parents, and by single or partnered parents. Whereas in the Strict Father model the 'law' is laid down by the Father and everyone obeys, the Nurturant Parent model rejects a 'law and order' model in favour of a model wherein people are taught to behave in sociaily responsible ways through nurturance and through rewards rather than through punishments. In terms of social policy, the Nurturant Parent model advocates providing first and foremost for people's needs, especially for the needs of those who are unabie to provide for themselves, and it is thus more consistent with a post-World War II liberal welfare democracy than with a conservative free-market unbridled capitalist model such as those advocated by ne* conservatives. Although Lakoff has studied the United States, not Canada, what he describes is directly parallel to the intertwined systerns of morality, economics, and faith that Gairdner advocates as the one true path for Canadians.

As with al1 of the themes Gairdner wntes on, in his views of the appropriate role of women in society he allows for virtually no middle ground. What Gairdner argues for is a very traditional, patriarchal, nuclear family, and what he identifies as the primary opposition to the role of women within such a family structure is 'radical feminism' (a term which is discussed below in this chapter). In order to understand Gairdner's views of women's des,one must first understand his conception of the family. Throughout his books, Gairdner's definition of family remaius the sarne. Although the basicpulitical unit of modem society is the individual, the basic social unit throughout human history has been the family: that immernonal unit of a married man and wornan and their dependent children living together in the same home. (Gairdner 1992: 3) Gairdner is not content, however, to present this as his definition of family. Rather he insists on it as the only possible definition, and the only version that can correspond with reality. "The prima1 and inescapable natural family triangle - mother, father, children -- is the most basic universal fact of our existence" (1992: 55). This structure Gairdner refers to over and over in his writings as 'the natural family'. According to Gairdner, 'the natural farnily', or 'the intact natural family', as he sometimes calls it. consists only of "a rnarried man and woman living together with their dependent children" ( 1992: 59). A mamed couple without children does not constitute a family (1992: 58). "A single divorced mom or dad with a child is a broken family" (1992: 59). 'Two gays or lesbians clairning cornmon law status or marriage can never be a natural family" (1992: 59). "An unmarried couple with a child may be very nice people, but they have failed to make what anthropologist Margaret Mead called 'a cornmitment of permanence' to the community" (1992: 59). If al1 these variations do not instantiate the so- called 'natural' family, then by implication, the reader is left to conclude that they are unnatural. In this way, Gairdner simply dismisses al1 these family configurations as deviant, leaving ody his patriarchal nuclear family structure as 'normal'. In tems of Ehrlich and King's discussion of redefinition, cited above, one can view Gairdner's attempt to restrict the scope of the word 'family' as a case of redefinition as narrowinp, since he attempts to narrow the range of referents of the terni 'family', so that al1 that remains is his own conception of family as a patnarchal, heterosexual, fertile union. In order to try to counter the obvious argument that people living in a wide variety of configurations both in our culture and in different cultures across time and place may al1 consider themselves to be part of families and may be considered by most people around them to be part of fdies,Gairdner attempts to claim a distinction between 'the natural farnily' and 'the social family'. 1 have concluded that the rranaal family does not change in any important way - in fact, that the root natural family, parents and their children, has been the same for millions of years. It is true that the social family - ail the extensions of the natural family, whether of bldrelatives or just fnends -- does change. It responds to and itself generates ail sorts of political, econornic, and social forces that complicate the moral and legal meaning of mamage and childbirth. (Gairdner 1992: 59) Gairdner's use of 'in fact' and 'it is true' represents a subtle but important manifestation of a modality of certainty. He is purporting to represent not just himself or his views, but sorne sort of absolute certainty. The scope of his claims is preposterous, as, for example, when he claims to know what fom human families have taken for millions of years, something no one can know as fact, given the lack of histori~aland anthropological data extending back into the remote past. While one cannot observe what happened millions of years ago, what one can observe is the variability and flexibility in wbat 'family' has been and has meant in different 'natural' and spontaneous contexts in recorded history. What we mean by a famiIy has always varied, not iust in different cultures or different periods-of histoj, but according to what%e want from it -- to the different needs fett in the various cootexts in which we use the idea. (Midgley & Hughes 19%: 60) Having clairned as tmth the distinction, however problematic, between the natural family and the social family, Gairdner then seizes that as the premise for his next assertion, that 'radicals' (Le. people who challenge his notion of 'natural' family as distinct from social family) deliberately confiate the two concepts for their own selfish and ideologicaily- driven ends. Regrettably ,&ter observing changes in the social family ,w hat the radicals do is wilfully confuse it with the natural family, then triumphantly announce that the natural family has changed forever, and wiil be no more. It is this confusion that then enables them to declare that because more change is likely, it ought to be engineered to meet their goals for society. (Gairdner 1992: 60) Without citing any specific sources and without presentinp data of any kind, Gairdner dismisses ail who may disagree with him as king 'confused'. Readers are given Gairdner's judgement on a position he identifies with no particular individual or group, without king given any data with which to make up theirown mind. One of the ironies of Gairdner's attempt to discredit those he terms 'radicals' is that the very charges he levels against them can be more accurately levelled apainst Gairdner himself. In the passage quoted above, Gairdner charges these so-called radicals with attempting to engineer society to meet their own goals, but what Gairdner himseif is doing

amounts to attempting to engineer society to meet his own goals. For example, he

advocates a tax system that favours his 'natural' farnily over al1 other household

arrangements, in part so that more people will be induced to get manied, stay mameci, and

have chifdren than might otherwise do so. Likewise, he advocates a return to the nineteenth-century notion of a 'family wage' for a rnarried man with children that is higher than the wage paid to women or to men who are not mamed with children but who are nevertheless doing the same job. By paying fathers more, he hopes to induce couples not to postpone having children. By paying women les. he hopes to induce women to give up

theirjobs and marry in order to improve their economic lot. By seeking to (re)institutionalize the 'family wage' gap (1992: 80),Gairdner is engaging in a blatant effort to engineer society to conform to the mode1 he advocates. In doing this, he is not

responding to the actual state of affairs, since that includes a variety of househotd and family structures and it necessitates a careful consideration of the needs and values of al1 people, not just social conservatives. Rather, he is attempting to bnng about his vision of a neo-conservative utopia using economic coercion, in a marner typical of proponents of New Right ideotogy. For Gairdner, it is not merely that the 'natural' family consists of a mother, a father, and their children. Rather, this family configuration also irnplies 'a natural hierarchy of authority', which he acknowledges is patriarchal(1992: 82) but which he advocates as the only alternative to 'sociaiism'. In this patriarchal family structure, the man wurks outside the home and provides the income for the household, and the woman foregoes paid

employment and stays in the home to raise and care for the children and do the domestic labour for the farnily. It is instructive to examine Gairdner's description of the average

family, as he conceives of it. But consider just a few moves in the day of the average family. Father drops the kids off at school on the way to work, works al1 day for his boss, swings by the bicycle shop to pick up a new wheel for his son, takes out the garbage, walks the dog, spends an hour with irascible junior's math homework and perhaps another hour trying to raise funds for the new hospital. His wife has taken clothes to the cleaners, cleaned the house. boupht necessities for the children, and spent an hour cornforting her gravely il1 mother. In addition, the parents provide each other wi th love, and sexual services. He provides security to dl(she dislikes staying alone at night), and she an endless round of matemal contributions. Meanwhile the whole family often works in the garden, or around the house. (Gairdner 1992: 90)

Following the example of Polanyi and Strassmann (19%), who deconstruct portiayals of families in economics textbooks to reveal the underlying assumptions inherent in those models, this 'average famity' of Gairdner's imagination can be deconstructed. This 'average' family lives in a house that has enough property with it to provide a garden. The garden is large enough that it periodically takes at least four people workinp together to maintain it (two parents plus at lemtwo children). The family owns at lest one automobile, which Father drives around in, and given the number of errands that Mother runs in a day, they likely have two vehicles. Father does not work shifts, since he is apparently always able to drive the children to school and is home in the evenings. Since he does not work a second job in the evenings, and since the woman does not work outside the home for pay, the man must make a substantiai income, and indeed, their lifestyle suggests that they live at a middle class level, perhaps even upper middle class. They have enough disposable income to utilize dry cteaners on a regular basis, wbich also makes it likely that Father is a white-collar worker whose suits need cleaning. Blue-collar worken more typically Wear cIothing that can be laundered at home. While not exhaustive, this account provides a great deal of insight into why Gairdner may advocate some of the policies he does. This so-called average family appears not to require, at this stage of its existence, a great deal of public support. However, if he considen that the average Canadian family lives this sort of middle or upper-rniddle class Me, or that only such configurations comprise valid families, then he is badly ill-infomed. House ownership -- called home ownership -- may be a convenient dernographic twl for identifying coresidence. But as a prirnary criterion for identifying a family, it valorizes wealth and stability and rnay pathologize poverty, homelessness, and physical separation to the point where such "unfortunate" characteristics of a family block recognition of the existence of that family. (Zack 19%: 49) In advocating his model of the house-dwelling patriarchal family with a division of Iabour between a man and a woman, Gairdner says, "My point sirnply is that the sum of these voluntary services is far more than the State could ever afford to provide to such a typicaf famify" (1992: 90, italics added). This is not, however, a typical or average Canadian family, although coming, as he does, from an economically and socially privileged background, Gairdner may not see this. Within Gairdner's model of the family, women have a prexribed role, that of beinp full-time homemakers and care-providers for the other members of the household. Al1 other roles for women are deerned to be unnatural or deviant. Much of the 'evidence' upon which Gairdner bases his claims about men and women and the social roles he thinks they should enact derives from sociobiology, as interpreted by Americao neo-conservative writer George Gilder, upon whose ideas Gairdner relies heavily. Gairdner, following

Gilder, postdates that women and men have inoate biological ciifferences that prescribe certain social roles. Because women carry and give birth to children, Gairdner attributes to them the role of 'nurturer', not just with respect to the children they bar, but with respect to al1 human beings. Women's 'naturaI', biologically detennined role is purported to be to tame men by king sufficiently numirant and loving. The following quotation from Gilder

illustrates the sort of argument that Gairdner copies in his own writings: Such sing!e males - and man-ied ones whose socialization fails - constitute our major social problem. They are the murderers. the rapists. the burglars, the suicides, the assailants, the psychopaths. What they are not is powerful oppressors, with hypertrophied masculinity. They are impotent figures [. ..]. Their problem is a society inadequately affirmative of masculinity: a society seduced by an obsessive rationalisrn and functionalism -- a cult of efficiency and a fetish of statistical equality - to eliminate many of the male affirmations that al1 human societies have created throughout history to compensate for male sexual insecurity and fernale sexual superionty. The women's movement seems deterrnined to create more and more such exiled "chauvinist" males, al1 the while citing their pathetic offenses as a rationale for ferninism. (Gilder 1974: 105 - 106) Following Gilder's lead, Gairdner portrays men as violent and unsettled predators who rove about wreaking havoc and endangering women. Single young men are a hazard to society and its procreative, or family health, for the followinp reasons. They vastly prefer uncommitted, hi t-and-run sex (called "cruising"). They are wildly more aggressive than fernales. They drink more, more often, and have far more - and more serious -- car accidents than women or married men. Although single men number only about 13 percent of the population over 14, they commit some 90 percent of the crimes [. . -1. Young bachelors are 22 times more likel y to be committed for mental disease, and 10 tirnes more likel y to go to hospital for al1 chronic diseases than are mamed men. Single men are convicted of rape five times more often than are mamed men, and have almost double the rnortaiity rate of mamed men and three times that of single women, from al1 causes. (Gairdner 1992: 3 18) The collocation of lexical items in this passage is instructive. The noun phrases 'single young men' and 'young bachelor' are collocated with: hazard, uncommitted, Kt-and-nin, wildly, aggressive, drink, car accidents, commit, crimes, committed, mental disease, hospital, chronic diseases, convicted, rape, mortality rate. Thus single young males are portrayeci as a threat both to themselves (disease. mortality) and to others (car accidents,

rape, hit-and-run sex). According to Gairdner, the only way to curb these dangerous tendencies is for a woman to marry and bme the man. By providing him with free and ready access to sex, she quenches his sexual appetite so that he need no longer go about rapinp women to satisfy his lust. By bearing his children, the woman provides him with a motivation to work hard and earn as high a wage as possible so that he might provide for the material needs of his family. Without this domesticating influence of a wife, a man wiLI not work as hard, will seek simply to gratify his desires wherever he might, and will pose a threat to the tranquility of society as a whole. Or so Gairdner purports. George Lakoff analyzes and discusses both the Strict Father and the Nurturant Parent metaphors, conciuding finally that the Strict Father metaphor and the system of morality that goes dong with it are out of touch with reality. OveraII, Strict Father rnorality is out of touch. It is out of touch with the realities of raising children. It is out of touch with the nature of the human mind, And it is out of touch with cornmon hurnanity. with the thing that should be most basic to any moral system. Strict Father morality is not just unhealthy for children. It is unhealthy for any society. It sets up good vs. evil, us vs. them dichotomies and recomrnends aggressive punitive action against "them." It divides society into groups that "deserve" reward and punishment, where the grounds on which "they" "deserve" to have pain inflicted on them are essentially subjective and ultimately untenable [. . .]. Strict Father moraiity thereby breeds a divisive culture of exclusion and blarne. It appeals to the worst of human instincts, leading people to stereotype, demonize, and punish the Other - just for being the Other. (Lakoff 1996: 383) One group of 'others' that Strict Father rnorality, and by extension Gairdner, opposes is feminists, and another is homosexuals. "Homosexuality and feminism, which are both seen as violating the natural order and therefore the moral order, become threats to the moral system itself' (Lakoff 19%: 98). The following section explores Gairdner's theme of feminists as 'other', and Chapter 3 of this dissertation explores homosexuals as 'other'.

Dichotomous Thinking:- Self versus Other There is a tendency in much polemic literature and speech to reduce complex arguments to simplistic dichotomies. This propensity for dichotomization can be seen even in everyday expressions such as 'there are two sides to every question'. Logically, there is no necessity that reality , or reality as humans perceive it, be treated in this way. They might just as well be presented and discussed as multifaceted. In this vein, S. 1. Hayakawa and Alan R. Hayakawa (1990) contrast what they refer to as a 'two-valued' orientation with a 'multi-valued' orientation, and they discuss how these different orientations are manifested in discourse. In the expression "We must Iisten to both sides of every question," there is an assumption, frequently unexamined, that every question has two sides -- and only two sides. We tend to think in opposites, to feel that what is not podmust be bad and that what is not bad must be good. [. . .] This penchant to divide the world into two opposing forces -- "nght" versus "wrong," "good" versus "evil" -- and to ignore or deny the existence of any middle ground, may be termed the two-valued orientaion. (Hayakawa and Hayakawa 1990: 113)

The terni 'two-valued orientation' originated with Alfred Korzybski (1933), who argued that while a two-valued Anstotelian system of logic is entirely appropnate for mathematics and logic, it is 'unsane' as a modus operandi for everyday living. This idea is further developed by Hayakawa and Hayakawa, who point out that the language of everyday life reflects scales of judgement, or as they terni it. a multi-valued orientation (Hayakawa and

Hayakawa 1990: 126). Speakers distinguish not just 'good' and 'bad', but also 'very goodlbad', 'not so goodbad', 'fair', and so on. The everyday multi-vaiued orientation tends, however, to give way to a two-valued orientation in the face of strong feelings, as Hayakawa and Hayakawa point out. In spite of al1 that has kensaid to recornrnend multi-valued and infinite-valued orientation, it must not be overlooked that in the expression of feelings, the two- valued orientation is almost unavoidable. There is a profound emotional tmth in the two-valued orientation that accounts for its adoption in strong expressions of feeling, especially those that cal1 for sympathy, pity, or help in stniggle. [. ..] The more spirited the expression, the more sharply will things be dichotomized into the "good" and the "bad." (Hayakawa and Hayakawa 1990: 128) Without discounting the potential power or influence of a two-valued approach, Hayakawa and Hayakawa nevertheless consider two-valued orientations 'primitive' and clearly inferior to other approaches: The two-valued orientation, in short, can be compared to a paddle, which perfoms the functions, in primitive rnethods of navigation, both of starter and steering apparatus. In civilized life, the two-valued orientation may be the starter, since it arouses interest with its affective power, but the multi-valued or infinite-valued orientation is the steering apparatus that directs us to our destination. (Hayakawa and Hayakawa 1990: 128) In critical discourse analysis, the tendency for people to embrace dichotomous modes of speaking and writing has not gone unnoticed, although it has generally not been discussed in Hayakawa and Hayakawa's language of 'twcwalued orientation'. The most fundamental dichotomy noted in CDA analyses is that of 'self versus 'other'. Stephen Harold Riggins notes that while the tem 'other' in sociology has relatively recently ken introduced through the interdisciplinarity of scholars working in post-rnodernisrn and cultural studies, it has origins in philosophy dating back as far as Plato (Riggins 1997: 3). As it is used in critical discourse studies, the temi 'other' typically refers to some extemal other or others. Riggins (1997: 4) notes that "[slelf and extemal Other may be understood as unique individuals (I and You) or as collectivities that are thought to share similar characteristics (We and They)". Indeed, an analysis of the use of personal pronouns by a speakerfwriter is often one of the clearest ways of identifying the 'self and the 'other' defined by the discourse. Who constitutes the 'self' and who the 'othef will Vary not just across different texts, but potentially within a given text. Riggins points out that in many texts analyzed using the framework of critical discourse analysis, the 'other', whether or not it is named that way, is a racial or ethnic group to which the speaker/wnter does not belong, but the 'other' could also be women for men, the nch for the poor, conservatives for Marxists, etc. Riggins does not specifically mention them among potential 'others', but homosexuals can be the 'other' for hetemsexuals, as this dissertation discusses further in Chapter 3 below. Identifying someone or some group as 'other' is not inherently discriminatoty against the one(s) so identified, but in practice, when powerful speakersiwriters categorize someone(s) in that way, whether or not they utilize the specific terni 'other', they utilize a strategy which van

Dijk describes as positive self-presentation, negative otber-presentation (van Dijk 1997a: 36). This dissertation reveals the discursive means by which William Gairdner creates a 'self' for himself and his (ideal) readers which is male, white, financially stable, able- bodied, heterosexual, anglophone, and Christian and endows this 'self' with positive attributes, while simultaneously creating both one 'super-other' ('socialists') and a series of specific 'others' including feminists, women, homosexuals, people of colour, the French, immigrants, and poor people, all of whorn are portrayed negatively. In the present chapter, the 'self' as male, 'other' as femaie dichotomy will be examined.

The picture Gairdner paints of men is as stereotyped and distorted as that which he paints of women. In keeping with his general propensity to dichotomîze, Gairdner maximally polarizes his descriptions of wornen and men, and in doing so distorts the reality that for women and for men, there is no one personality or character type or biologically determined social role. What is instructive, however, is that within the paradigin Gairdner presents, men pose a threat to society, but it is women who must diffuse that threat by marrying them and becoming stay-at-home wives and mothers. Thus, if women seek personal andor financial fulfilment through employment and they opt not to become unpaid domestic labourers in the service of husbands and children, they are held responsible for the breakdowu of society and for male violence. The men are apparently not expected to take full responsibility for managing their own urges and desires. Women who choose desother than that of full-time stay-at-home wife and mother, and especially those who actively seek to create conditions in which women who choose other roles are not discrirninated against, are the women dubbed the 'radical feminists' by Gairdner, and they are purported to be the instmments of the breakdowu of so-called traditional values in our society. In Trouble, Gairdner devotes a chapter to such issues, entitling it "Radical Feminism: The Destruction of Traditional Society," but in Wm, Gairdner devotes two distinct chapters to this ("The Feminist Mistake: Women Against the

Farnily," and "Women at War: On the Military, Daycare, and Home Fronts"), but extends his attack on 'radical feminists' into almost every one of the nineteen chapters in the book. As these chapter titles alone suggest. Gairdner portrays feminists as maximally harmful and as anti-family. As Zack points out, this is not a strategy unique to Gairdner. By trading on the general sense of "the family," conventional philosophers have been able to write about the family as thouph al1 readers (and perhaps everyone else, as well) shared the same meaning of "the family," experienced the same kind of family life, and strove for the same famiIy vaIues. They have written about "the farnily" as though an unstated specific form of it were a universal, natural phenornenon. As a result, radical philosophers who have critiqued social structures that give rise to, support, and are in turn supported by the specific form of the famil y to w hich particular conventional philosophers intend their use of "the famil y" to refer, have kenaccused of wanting to "destroy the family." (Zack 19%: 43) Gairdner's position on the roles of women and men demeans women by reducing them only to reproductive and numiring des. While such desare valid and important ones, they do not satisfy the needs of many women to contribute in other ways to society, and they waste many of the skills and abilities of women who could and shouid use those skills both for their own good and for the good of society. This reduction of women to reproduction and nurturing is far more sinister even than his unflattering portraya1 of men as feckiess and dangerous unless married to a subservient woman. At least the men are acknowledged to have a role outside the home and family as well as within it Wornen are confined to just their family roles, and extensions of that in the volunteer realm, such as teaching Suuday çchool or leading women's auxiliaries or home and school organizations. activities which are largely an extension of their domestic roles. In such roles, they can have very little, if any, power to participate in decision-making at the societal level, and they can have no independent economic power. Gairdner's views of women in general are demeaning and sexist, but his views of feminist women go even beyond that and become hostile and nasty. In Chapter 1 1 of Wur,

'The Feminist Mistake: Women Against the Family," Gairdner starts off by establishinp a (false) dichotomy between those he considers true feminists and those he dubs radical feminists. Gairdner supports a position he identifies as being a 19th century traditionai, or Judeo-Christian fom of feminism, "promoting fernininity, motherhood, and family" (1992: 297). This he also identifies as 'farnilism' (1992 297). Versions of this philosophy continue to exist and proponents employ various labels for it, including domestic feminism, or matemal ferninism, but in its narrowest fonns it is not part of mainstream ferninism today because the latter embraces a wider spectrum of philosophies and approaches and does not embrace as prescriptive any one form of interpersonal or family arrangements.

Feminist scholar Rosemarie Putnam Tong, in her book, Feminist %ught: A More

Comprehensive Imoduction ( 1998), identifies the fol lowing major categories of feminism: liberal ferninism, radical feminisrn, Marxist ferninism, socialist ferninism, psychoanalytic feminism, gender ferninism, existential ferninism, postmodem ferninism, rnulticultural and global feminism, and ecofeminism. Within these major divisions Tong discusses a number of sub-divisions. For example, radical feminism is described as falling into two brod groupings, radical-libertarian feminism and radical-cultural feminism. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss all the variations within feminism, but because Gairdner repeatedly uses the term 'radical femiuist' in his writings, it would be useful to see how Tong defines the concept. According to Tong, [rladical feminists [. . -1 claim the patriarchal system is characterized by power, dominance, hierarchy, and cornpetition. It cannot be refomed but only ripped out root and branch. It is not just patriarchy's lepal and political structures that must be overturned on the way to women's liberation. Its social and cultural institutions (especially the farnily, the church. and the academy) must also be uprooted. (Tong 1998: 2)

Thus, when Gairdner notes that what he calls radical feminisrn attempts to change society from its very roots upwards, he is not entirely incorrect. However, he both over-extends and misrepresents the complex goals of radical feminism and he conflates al1 forrns of feminism, and even dl foms of radical feminism, into one simplistic mode1 which he then demonizes as being anti-family. Citing Bunch (1986), Tong notes that radical-cultural feminists believe that "in order to be liberated, women must escape the confines of heterosexuality and create an exclusively fernale sexuality thmugh celibacy, autoeroticism, or lesbianisrn" (Tong 199û:4). Thus, Gairdner is right insofar as there are some radical ferninists who advocate that women abandon heterosexual sex, but he is inaccurate in attributing lesbianisrn or an anti-heterosexuality to al1 feminists or even to al1 radical feminists. Radical feminists may indeed critique the very foundations of the patriarchal farnily, but it does not follow from that they are necessarily 'antifarnily' in any broad or comprehensive way, and it certainly does not follow that al1 ferninists of al1 points of view reject child-rearing and family as options for women. Rather than recognizing that most conternporary feminists and most ferninisms accept that for some women a choice of staying at home to do domestic and &Id-rearing labour may be viable, Gairdner prefen to present modem feminism as being in complete opposition to everything that so-called familism stands for. Gairdner's position is, of course, in no way original. "A claim that emerges repeatedly in popular political discussion, and even in some scholarly settings, is that feminism is fun&mentally 'antifamily "' (Moody-Adams 19%: 76). In just 82 lines of text, between pages 2% and 298 of War, Gairdner utilizes al1 of the following lexical choices to refer to feminists and feminism: the local Gender Committee, intellectual cancer, strident, petty, whining feminist arguments, modem radical ferninists, extremist, totalitarian, virulent, cultish, man-hating, family-hating program, radical feminism, collectivism, radical feminists, women's interest groups, outright antifamily postures, srnall unelected minorities, radical ferninist views, pervasive and illogical, inherent contradictions, a cultlike belief system, radicalisrn, lesbianism, antifamily ideology, so-called feminists, today's activists, modem feminists, the new barbarians. This list is by no means exhaustive of the unflattering descriptions applied to feminists, but the fact that these items al1 occur within just over two pages of text illustrates the vehemence and hostility with which Gairdner approaches the topic of feminism. Comiog as this does at the beginning of a long discussion of feminism, it colours the entire discussion by implanthg in the reader a first impression of feminists that is hiphly charged and negative. In contrast to 'familism', which Gairdner presents as a serious and const~ctive movement, feminism is presented as a rnovement to be ridiculed, despised, and feared. Familism is accorded the moral high ground of protecting chitdren, while feminism is portrayed as endangering the health and well-king of children. The inescapable conclusion to which we are led by the facts is that this former feminism insisted that society be stmctured to protect children inside the family. The feminism we have today is, in contrast, attempting to structure society to protect women outside the family (the children can fend for themselves in daycare centres or as latchkey children in empty houes). The result is that the children have no advocate, (Gairdner 1992: 2W-8) Gairdner views femioisrn as a serious danger, as evidenced by his use of the metaphor of feminisrn as a cancer and as barbarism, yet instead of presenting and treating feminism as a set of senous ideas and dealing with it in an acadernically credible manner, Gairdner resorts to ridiculing and tnvializinp ferninists and feminism as his primary response to their ideas and practices. Lexical Choices One of the ways in which Gairdner ridicules ferninists is by portraying them in rather unflattering animal ternis. He wants them to "get their snoots out of the govemrnent trough" (1992: 301). 'Snoot' is a variation on 'snout', and this combined with the reference to the trough connotes a hog or a sow. A few pages further on is a reference to

"the bleating objections of feminists the world over" (1992: 307). Sheep and goats are the animals most often said to bleat, although the term can also be used of calves. None of those animal associations can be construed as positive ones for feminists or for any women. Gairdner exploits the stereotype that women are emotional and irrational to further demean and discredit feminists. They are said to 'aggressively advance' their cause, and their position has 'a frantic and bitter tone' (1992: 300). Academic feminists are referred to as 'angry, narrow-rninded feminists' ( 1992: 3 12). Women advocating affirmative action are 'insecure', 'angry', and 'conspiracy-oliented' (1992: 309). People dealinp with violence against women are referred to as 'near-hysterical' (1992: 327)' and advocates of universally accessible daycare are 'rabid feminists' (1992: 334). Furthemore, feminists are repeatedly characterized as full of hate: 'man-hating. politically motivated feminists' (1992: 344, 'virulent, cultish, man-hating, and family- hating program' (1992: 2%). and 'family-hating, man-hating. tradition-hating' (1992: 118). Individual feminists are also attacked with labels meant to discredit them and their work by making the expression of their views appear as nothing but an outpouring of negative, uncontrolled emotion. For example, Andrea Dworkin is descnbed as 'bitterly hostile', and Ruth Bleier is called 'another fanatical feminist academic' (1992: 3 11). Betty Friedan's book, The Ferninine Mystique, is charactenzed as being an 'inflammatory antifamily hate tract' (1992: 308). Given the amount of hatred and hostility that oozes out of Gairdner's own books, this latter accusation is, indeed, ironic, and as Michele Moody-

Adams points out, if feminists are angry, so too are their critics.

To be sure, the social and political effects of many contemporary feminist views often include the very anger and resentment dended by some recent critics. But this fact would not distinguish feminist-inspired political discourse from the rhetoric of contemporary commentators who summarily demonize ferninists as "ferninazis." This rhetoric plays into socially constructed fears that feminists are so authontarian and socially dangerous that they cannot be "real" women. (Moody-Adams 19%: 79) An example of the way in which Gairdner trivializes the concerns of women is his treatment of the issue of acquaintance rape. As part of his argument promoting conservative sexual morals, which is to say condoning sexual intercourse only in the context of (heterosexual) marriage, Gairdner attempts to dismiss the reality of date rape altogether, or in hrlich and King's tems, to redefine it by obliteration (Ehrlich and King 1994: 68 - 69). To accomplish this, Gairdner first establishes a category which he calls 'true rape' (Gairdner 1992: 533) and later 'real rape' (Gairdner 1992: 559). In Gairdner's own discourse these tems appear without quotation marks or italics (two devices which he regularly uses to forepround terms or concepts he finds problematic), which implies that he sees himself as using unproblematic terms in unproblematic ways. Indeed, he does not even define what he means by 'true rape' or 'real rape', apart from describing the former as

"a vicious offence for which not very long ago men were properly hanged" (1992: 558) and the latter as a "horror" (1992: 559). The context, however, makes it clear that he is talking about rape by a stranger, in contrast with "ordinary sexual relations between men and women" which "are now trivialized by such expressions as 'date rape"' (Gairdner

1992: 558). Significantly, in contrast with ?rue rape' and 'real rape', the term 'date rape'

does appear in quotation marks in Gairdner's writing, a signal that he questions the validic). of the term and the experience it names. Gairdner blames women for what feminists identify as date or acquaintance rape, and this blame is further illustrated by his discussion of the feminist-inspired phrase 'no

means no'. He describes this phrase as both 'garbled' (1992 558) and 'silly' (1992: 559). and then argues that the contextually-determined connotations of 'no' outweigh its

denotation as a term of refusal. For example, if a woman gives a c1ear "no" with obvious stemness of voice and demeanour as she pushes the man toward the door, she confirms the dictionary meaning of the word; but if she says "no" with a slip of a smile or taunting tilt of the head, or as she coyly lifts her dwr key from her pocket, it has another meaning entirely. Same word. Different meaning. (Gairdner 1992: 560) Linguists would not deny the importance of context in interpreting the meaning of utterances, but feminists would object to the use of such an argument as a justification for a man forcing sex on an unwilling wornan. Gairdner further redefines 'no' as being a device used by a woman to heighten sexual arousal- both her own and her partner's.

She rnay Say "no"' after tomd foreplay, pulling her date forward physically even as she denies him -- and herself -- verbally. In fact, much of the excitement of sexual Iove can arise from such sexually contradictory messages, ones in which the denier herself may find simultaneous self-denial and yielding -- and control of the male - auto-erotic. (Gairdner 1992: 560) Gairdner's formula for avoiding what he sees as the ambiguity of 'no' is apparent1y that women should dress modestly. not be alone with men, not flirt unless they intend to have sexual intercourse, and many young so that men are provided with an outlet for their sexual desires. Needless to Say, this pu& the onus almost entirely on women to 'avoid' being raped, rather than putting the onus on men not to rape women. If a woman even hints at 'rnaybe', or does anything (consciously or unconsciously) that might arouse a man, then Gairdner would hold her responsible for provoking whatever her partner might do, on

the grounds that "a stiff member hath no conscience" (Gairdner 1992: 561).

Gairdner's depiction of feminists as confused, emotional, and even trivial might suggest that they pose so Little threat as ta not deserve his attention, yet the amount of space

he devotes in his books to attempting to dixredit feminists and feminist principles suggests

otherwise, as do some of the epithets he hurls at them. If he saw them as posing no danger, then surely he would not resort to statements such as, "radical feminists are properly labelled intellectual terrorists" (1992: 321). Feminism does, in reality, pose a threat to Gairdner's program of re-extending patriarchy and reinstating forms of wage discrimination and social discrimination against women, and he hows it. Instead of confronting feminisrn in an academically honest manner, how ever, Gairdner relies heavil y on attackinp the character of ferninists and trying to discredit them through ridicule and stereotyping. Through his lexical choices, Gairdner portrays feminists as ernotional and inational, but through his use of transitivity, he seeks to disempower them and make them appear to say a lot, while hing little, as dernonstrated below. He tries to make the readers see feminists as not worth listening to, perhaps because he fears that if people do Iisten to feminists, they witl understand that it is Gairdner, not the feminists, who are trying to deceive the public for the sake of advancing their own ideological agenda.

Transitivity3

The following discussion of transitivity draws heavily on the insights of Fowler

(1985), Simpson (1993), and Sykes (1985), al1 of whom employ Halliday's notion of transitivity as something much broader than the traditional notion that a verb can be either transitive (having a direct object complement) or intransitive (having no direct object complement).4 Rather, within critical discourse analysis, transitivity is a relative concept which is applied to a clause rather than just to a verb. Thus, rather than a clause simply beinp ei ther transitive or intransitive, it cm be judged as being highly transitive, somewhat transitive, relatively low in transitivity, with infinite gradations in between. Clauses that are deemed to be very highly transitive have three main characteristics: an animate subject, who deliberately performs an action, which affects a patient. The transitivity of the clause diminishes as one alters, obscures, or removes any of these three criteria. For example, the following sentence could be judged as king highly transitive:

( 1) James Smith stabbed the police officer four times. It contains an animate subject, James Smith, who deliberately performed an action, stabbing (one stab might have ken an accident, but four stabs is almost certainly deliberate), which affects the patient, the police officer.

Example (1) can be rendered less highly transitive by a number of different processes. For example, one could make the sentence passive, as in (2),shifting the agent from subject position into a prepositional phrase, or even deleting it as in (3). Both (2) and (3) give greater pmminence to the patient, thus necessanly reducing the prominence of the agent (or deleting it entirely).

(2) The police officer was stabbed four times by James Smith. (3) The police officer was stabbed four times. Transitivity could dso be lowered by describing the same incident using a different, les explicit verb, as in (4). The vagueness of the verb leaves open the possibility that the police officer was not seriously injured, as well as the possibility that the injury was inflictecl accidentally.

(4) James Smith injured the police officer. Yet another way to lower the transitivity of the sentence would be to obscure the patient, possibly calling into question whether there really was anyone affected. (5) James Smith stabbed someone.

(6) James Smith waved around a knife while resisting police. Simpson (1993) formalizes the transitivity scale by characterizing it in ternis of four types of processes, listed frorn highest to lowest levels of transitivity: material processes,

verbalization processes, mental processes, and relational processes. According to Simpson, material processes are processes of doing,characterized as consisting of ACTOR

PR~CESS(GOAL). Sentence (1) above wodd faIl into this category, as shown in (7):

(7) ACïOR PROCESS GOAL James Smith stabbed the police officer four times.

Verbalization processes. or processes of sqing, consist of SAYER PROCESS

VERBIAGE (TARGïT), or SAYER PROCESS TARGET VERBIAGE. Processes of saying are observable, they involve no ACTOR and are thus less highly transitive than are material processes. Sentences (8),(9), ( 19) (from Simpson 1993: 90) illustrate this type of process:

(8) SAYER PROCESS VERBIAGE He said that.

(9) SAYER PROCESS VERBIAGE TARGET They amounced the decision to me. (10) SAYER PROCESS TARGET VERBIAGE John told MW his life story. Mental processes are processes of senring. These are intedized processes, involving perception, reaction. or cognition. As such, they are less transitive than either of the first two types of process which are at least observable. Mental processes require a

SENSER PROCESS PHENOMENON (or CIRCUMSTANCE), as seen in the following examples (frorn Simpson 1993: 9 1): (11) SENSER PROCESS PHENOMENON John saw Mary.

(12) SENSER PROCESS PHENOMENON She likes Bach.

(13) SENSER PROCESS PHENOMENON She considered the question. (14) SENSER PROCESS CIRCUMSTANCES 1 thought hard. Simpson's final category involves relational processes, processes of being , w hi ch

are categorized as intensive ( 15), possessive (16), and circurnstantiaI( 13, and which

consist of CARRIER PROCESS ATTRIBUTE (Simpson 1993: 92):

(15) CARRER PROCESS AITFUBUTE Mary isJseems wise. (16) Gill hadow ns a guitar. (17) Bill is at home. By applying Simpson's taxonomy of processes to the chapter from War that focusses most directly on feminism (Chapter 1l), one can describe how Gairdner attempts

to discredit feminists through transitivity. The following quotations consist of the

sentences in those chapters in which 'ferniaists' function as the grammatical or logical subject of a predicate in an active clause. Since matenal contained in quotations within Gairdner's text is not the author's own prose, it has been excluded from this analysis.

Clauses containing abstract nouns such as 'ferninism' as the subject have also been excluded, since the first of the three critena cited above for high transitivity involves having an animate subject. The relevant material in the following exarnples is that which has been underlined, but an attempt has been made to include enough of the coatext to facilitate interpretation. "For in order to achieve their objectives, modem radical feminists are increasingly relving on political, economic, and legal stratagems that in any other age would rightly, and without delay, have been labelled extremist. even totalitarian." ( 1992: 296) 'That is why it is fair to Say modern ferninists are the new barbanans." (1992:298) "We shall see that there is a crucial difference in nature between the moral order they were trying to protect and the one modem ferninists value today." (1992: 299)

"Feminists have worked hard to further their agenda . . ." ( 1992: 301 )

"That's why 1 said radical feminists -the new barbarians of modem society." (1992: 302)

"One of the favourite tncks of feminist debaters is to argue as if the force of culture and the power of law are the sarne." (1992: 302) "As an ideological necessity to support their case, feminists now argue that women are ' vicfims' of social expectations . . ." (1992: 304) "Feminists cannot afford to admit into their belief system one smidpon [sic] of evidence that men and women are naturally different, else their entire argument faits." (1992: 306) "Whenever the logical inconsistencies in their program are pointed out, feminists respond by shifting to new ground. It takes a while, but once thev realize the trap of their own logic -- that the theory of socialization means al1 humans must be caught in an eternal imrnobility of action - thev quickly shift mound and begin to argue against themselves by insisting that women as a gender have a special way of seeing the worki . . ." ( 1992: 307)

"But mainstream unrepentant radical feminists continue to wiggle inside t heir own logical confusion" (1992: 3m) "At the extreme, feminists even arme that God is both male and female . . ." (1992: 3 10)

"Beginning in the l%ûs 1. . .] the radical ferninists be~anto argue . . ." (1992: 3 10)

"Angry, narrow-minded feminists have ken extremely influential, despite the blatantly ideological, political nature of their program and their shoddv science -- not to mention their perverse values." (1992: 3 12) "That is precisely what the feminists are now doing. Thev will have to work very hard.. ." (1992: 316) "Nevertheless, ferninists stnigde to substitute political explanations for real, bioiogically based social differences wherever possible. Othenvise, thev have no argument (unless, of course, thev are armiing for the superiority of females)." (1992: 3 17) "So the feminists have it tragically backwards. Instead of reinforcing the need to make men equal by drawing them more deeply into the family, feminists are trving to make themselves equal to men and to their inherently antifamily biology." (1992: 320) "On a recent television panel, 1 argued that feminists are tryino, to substitute a political order (defined by them) for a free-market order, by assipnin~wage-values to women's jobs instead of letting the market decide." (lm:320) Material processes are potentially the most highly transitive of the four types of processes, but the 34 pages of Chapter 11 contain surprisingly few examples that might be said to represent material processes associated with feminists. The ten examples that do occur represent lower levels of transitivity than rnight typically be associated with material processes, since they refer to metaphorical, rather than literal, physicat actions. In (21), for example, both 'worked' and 'further' represent mental or verbal processes pertaining to an agenda which Gairdner attributes to them. Likewise, 'work' in (3 1) is more likely to entai1 verbal activities, since it is used in the context of working to pass certain sorts of legislation. This same activity of passing legislation is what is alluded to with the verb 'doing' (3 1). Thus, although 'doing' and 'work' are likely to trigger in the reader an association with physical action, the transitivity levels are lowered by the contextual information that legislative and verbal work. not physical work are actually what is referred to. The metaphor of shifting ground occurs twice within example (26),'respond by shifting to new ground', and 'quickly shift ground'. While a clause involving shifting of physical objects rnight be fairly high in transitivity, the transitivity is lowered because the 'shifting' refers, in this case, to verbal strategies and argumentation, rather than to physical activities. Sirnilarly, when the verb 'wiggle' is used in (23, it may conjure up images of physical movement, but in the context of the sentence, it refers to mental processes akin to thinking. In (32), feminists 'struggle to substitute', and in (34) they are 'trying to substitute'.

Once again, a verb which can denote physical actions, in this case substitution, is used metaphorically. What is purportedly king substituted are explanations and ideologes, not physical objects. Finally, in (33). feminists are 'trying to make thernselves equal', but it is

not a physical 'making' that is described, but a symbolic or ideological transformation. Verbalization processes are second highest in transitivity after material processes, and in addition to the rnatenal processes which are metaphors for verbal activities, there are nine examples of verbalization processes in the data. Of those aine, six consist of the verb

'argue' (examples (23). (24).(261, (28),(29), and (32)), which adds to the impression Gairdner tries to create of feminists aggressivel y prornoting their cause. Such aggressive verbal behaviour is echoed in example (26). in which ferniuists are said to be 'insisting'.

Example (25) contains the verb 'admit', but in the negative construction 'cannot afford to admit', which implies that they ought to admit but won't. The final example of verbalization processes is 'arsigning', from example (34) (italicized in the original).

Assigning or placing something in one category rather than another, is inherently a verbal process. Taken together, these nine examples portray feminists as engaping in agpressive, argumentative verbal behaviour. Mental processes, deemed to be the second-lowest category in ternis of transitivity, occur only four times in the corpus. In (18), feminists are 'relying on' [stratagems], in order to 'achieve' their objectives. While 'achieve' might also pertain to material processes, if one were to achieve a physical goal or outcome (winning a race, for example), it is cleariy used in a more abstract way in the context of example (18) and pertains to objectives of principle. rather than to physical achievements. The third mental process

occurs in (20),in which Gairdner comments on what he believes that feminists 'value'. The fourth of the mental processes attributed to feminists is 'realize' (26),but this is even in the context of a hypothetical 'once they realize', so its already low transitivity is made Iower by the fact that it is hypothetical rather than a report or claim that feminists do 'realize' the trap that Gairdner envisions them falling into. The least highly transitive are the relational processes, of which there are three occurrences of BE and two of HAVE in this corpus. Gairdner States twice that 'feminists are the new barbarians' (examples (19) and (22)),hardly a flattering characterization. The third occurrence of BE is no more complirnentary: 'angry, narow-minded feminists have been extremely influential' (30). These three examples demonstrate that while contained within clauses low in transitivity, these assertions are nevertheless strong in their criticism of ferninists. Exarnple (33) contains a metaphorical use of 'have', in which feminists are said to have 'it' backward. The 'it' in question refers to the goal of working toward a society in which women are treated as equai to men. Frnally, example (32) contains another metaphorical use of 'have', this one refemng to having no argument. Thus,

Gairdner uses even relational processes to contribute to an impression of feminists as engaging in large numbers of verbal processes. Taken together, examples (18) - (34) illustrate a pattern. Gairdner almost never places feminists as agents of highly transitive matenal clauses, and the matenal processes that are attributed to them are lowered in transitivity because the verbs are being used metaphoncally rather than literally. In patticular, most of the verbs which appear to illustrate matenal processes are, in facf used to convey meanings pertaining to verbalization processes. Taken together with the overt verbalization processes and one mental and one relationai process that also convey verbal activity, these verbs paint a

picture of feminists doing a great deal of talking and arguing, a portrait which coincides closely with the widespread stereotype of wornen as people who hlk a lot. The examination of Gairdner's lexical choices and use of metaphors reveal that Gairdner sees feminists as a threat, and the analysis of Gairdner's use of transitivity suggests that he sees the threat as centring on what feminists say, even more than on what they do. Modalitv

In cntical linguistics, a productive area of analysis involves an examination of the types of modality used by a speakedwriter. Roger Fowler explains that "[tlhe term 'modality' subsumes a range of devices that indicate speakers' attitudes to the propositions they utter, and to some degree to their addressees" (Fowler 1985: 72). Although Fowler is writing about spoken discourse in this quotation, the concept of modality applies equaily well in analyses of written texts. The 'devices' that Fowler refers to include overt modal auxiliaries such as 'may', 'might', 'can', 'could', 'will', 'shall', 'should', and 'mut', along with 'ought', which is different from the others in that it takes an idnitival complement rather than a simple verb, but which nevertheles functions in a rnanner similar to the others. In addition, modality is conveyed through certain sententia1 adverbs such as 'probably', 'certainly', 'regrettably', thmugh adjectives such as 'necessary', 'unforninate', 'certain', and throua certain verbs and norninalizations such as 'permit', 'predict', 'prove', 'obligation', 'likelihood', 'desirability', and 'authority' (Fowler 1985: 73). Fowler's list of examples is suggestive, rather than exhaustive, but the categories he identifies constitute a useful guide. Linguists have proposed various ways of classifying modals, according to their functions. For exampfe, Jesperson makes a broad division of modalities into two categories: those that contain an element of will, and those that contain no element of will

(Palmer 1986: 9- 10). Von Wright ,on the other hand, postulates four modes: alethic , consisting of necessary, possible, contingent, impossible; epistemic, consisting of venfied, undecided, falsified; deontic, consisting of obligatory, pemitted, indifferent, forbidden; and existenhl, consisting of universal, existing, empty (Palmer 19%: 10- 1 1). Fowler proposes the following five categories of modality: validizy, indicating greater or lesser confidence in the tmth of the proposition: predcfability. indicating future events are more or less likely to happen; desirabiliiy, indicating practical, moral, or aesthetic judgements; obligarion, indicating in the speakedwnter's judgement, another person is obligated to perform some action; permission, indicating speakerlwriter allows addresseeheader to perform some action (Fowler 1985: 72). Fowler's first two categories, validity and predictability, correspond roughly to von Wright's epistemic category and to Jesperson's category of containing no element of will. The rernaining three of Fowler's categories, namely desirability, obligation, and permission. correspond roughly to von Wright's deontic category and to Jesperson's category of containing an element of will. In this dissertation, Fowler's terminology will be utilized in discussions of modality.

In the two books under analysis in this dissertation, me Trouble With Canada and The War Againrt the Farnily, the modality of the ovenvhelming majority of clauses falls into the categories of validity or predictability. Particuiarly when they convey a modality of validity, many clauses contain no overt modals at all, and when they convey predictability, they generally contain the modal auxiliary 'will', which is the usud way of sigaalling futurity in English. For the genre of non-fiction that Gairdner is writing, these epistemic modalities function as the 'default' modalities, since he devotes much of his effort to making assertions about what is, what has been, and what will be, according to his own interpretation of reality, so it is not surpnsing that they constitute the majority of clauses. Examples (35)- (37) below illustrate the modality of validity, while (38) - (40) illustrate the modality of predictability. In example (40). the modality of predictability is strengthened by the modal adverb 'inevitably'. Examples (35) through (40) are al1 taken from Gairdner 1992. "At the same tirne Dewey's infiuence was making itself so strongly felt in North American educational circles, so too was the influence of experimental psychology." ( 1992: 2 17)

"Before it adopted its Charter. and thus subordinated its free parliament to the authority of the courts (that is, to unelected judges), Canada was one of the few couutries left based on the notion of inherent, as opposed to conferred rights." (1992: 15) "When the State is minimal, people exercise their inhmenf, protected freedoms to create a myriad of different and hence urzeqzcal social groups such as the farnily, which they then strive to pmtect with legal and tax pnvileges." (1992: 14)

"Surely any such declaration will entrench our moral and fiscal problems even further." (1992: 48) "Future historians of Canada will say that we gobbled ourselves right up by means of this illusion." ( 1992: 48) "Such belief systems inevitably become an extension of the believer's consciousness, a kind of personal Strategic Defence Initiative that shoots down any invading ideas or beliefs before they upset intemal equilibrium." (1992 99) The epistemic modalities of validity and predictability are, as noted above, ubiquitous in Gairdner's prose. Nevertheless, it will be instructive to note the content of the pmpositions which he couches in these epistemic modalities, many of which are highly questionable and open to dispute. in a preliminary analysis of Gairdner's Reface to The Trouble Wirh Canada (Lillian 1996), I argue that his use of rnoddities of desirability, obligation and permission are among the devices that cause his writing to resemble an evangelical preaching style. In the present dissertation, reference is made to modality primarily in the context of sample analyses of passages, rather than as separate chapter

sections, since modality can be best illustrated and understood within a larger textual context. Sarnple Andvsis This section presents an analysis of a passage from Gairdner's writings, demonstrating how the various linguistic devices employed by Gairdner work together to

create a stronp sexist and anti-feminist message. The passage forms the opening of the first of two consecutive chapters in which Gairdner systematically attacks feminists and feminism and anything that he associates wi th them. Within the passage, [ ] signals that the original text contained a footnote which has been omitted here.

Excerpt €rom The War Agoinst the Famil'. Chapter 11: The Feminist Mistake: Women Against the Farnily. (pp. 295 - 296) 1 would hate to be a woman. My wife says that she would hate to be a man. 1 think this has something to do with why we have a good mamage. 1 have asked my lawyer whether the local Gender Cornmittee will charge me with "sexism" for writing this. Ah me. . .

Every age seems to have its peculiar intellectual cancers, and this chapter is

meant to serve as a kind of anticarcinopeo. Like so many, 1 find myself

increasingly surrounded by strident, petty, whining feminist arguments that have by

now nibbled their way ioto every orgm of our society. If that were the limit of i t, most of us would simply get on with Our lives and ignore these people. But matters are far worse than the public seems aware. For in order to achieve their objectives, modem radical feminists are increasingly relying on political, economic and legal stmtapms that in any other age would rightly, and without delay, have been labelled extremist, evea totaiitarian.

When studied carefully, it becomes transparently obvious that their arguments, taken as a whole, amount to a virulent, cultish, man-hating and farnily- hating program that threatens the fundamental health of our society, which is what it is intended to do. So we must be far more wary, because radical feminism, as we shall see, is a form of collectivism that appeals to what is lowest in al1 men and women, and therefore is guaranteed an endless supply of believen. The witty and trenchant critic Kenneth Minogue wrote that "the first nile in reading feminist literature is never to identify feminism with women." [ ] For women as a whole in

North America have never supported the aims of radical feminism. In a 1988 U.S. poll, a mere 18 percent of American young women descrïbed themselves as feminists, and in Canada's last election, according to Gallup (December 3, 1988) only 18 percent of women voted for Canada's socialist , the agenda of which is indistinguishable from that of radical ferninists.[ 1 Far, far more women from both nations support traditional male, female, and farnily roles, yet our craven three-level govemments spend about $60 million annually (about $1 billion over the pst decade and a halo supporting women's interest groups, many of them with outright antifamily postures.[ 1 This support will surely amaze future historians, attempting to explain exacdy how in a demmracy such small unelected minonties can control the rnajority, and thus how the Canadian people Iost their dernocratic soul . Radical feminist views are by now so pervasive and illogical, however, and the media so craven and uncritical in promoting them, that what follows must necessarily take the form of a piecemeal unravelling of their basic arguments and

inherent contradictions, the better to see the pattern. Very few ordinary women who cal1 themselves feminists perceive that what they rnay support (or support in part) is likely a segment of an interlocking structure of ideas -- a cultlike belief system -- the explicit intent of which is to destroy everything they hold dear. And let us be clear. Many younger women who Say they accept feminism, while rejecting its radicalisrn, lesbianism, and antifamily ideology, are serving as an unconscious vanguard for the very movement most eager to demolish their fondest dreams.

Their position is equivalent to saying that they accept Marxism but reject i ts ban on

private property rights, free enterprise, and democratic elections; or they accept a wornan's right to abortion but not the killing of human life.

A tone of ridicule and rnockery is established in the very first lines of this passage. which forms the opening of Chapter 11 of The War Agaimt the Family: 1 would hate to be a woman. My wife says she would hate to be a man. 1 think this has something to do with why we have a eood mamage. 1 have asked my lawyer whether the local Gender Committee wrll charge me with "sexism" for writing this. Ah me . . . (Gairdner 1992: 295-6) Although there is no such thing as a 'Gender Committee', this phrase is meant to conjure up in the reader's mind any and al1 feminist groups that rnight exist either in reality or in the imagination of the author or the reader. Associating such groups with something as silly as whether or not Gairdner and his wife may or may not prefer bzing a man or a woman respectively, something no actual feminist group would care a whit about, Gairdner rnakes the groups themselves seem silly. Furthermore, suggesting, even ironically, that such women's groups would go about bringing charges against people on account of their persona1 preferences rnakes them appear as malicious busybodies with nothing better to do than to poke their noses into other people's penonal affairs. Placing 'sexisrn' in quotation marks is equivalent to calling it 'scxalled sexism'. Both place it within a modality of doubt. The result is to cal1 inro question the very existence and validity of such a concept. In this passage, in five short sentences, Gairdner trivializes by association dlfeminist groups and their activities, and implies that sexism does not exist. If sexism does not exist or is not what feminists Say it is, then the mandate of feminists to combat sexism is erased. They are lefi, in effect, tilting at the wind, looking absurd and ridiculous, which is exactly how Gairdner wants them to appear.

As if that ridicule were not sufficient, it is folIowed up immediately with another

attack. If the first 5 lines are meant to ridicule feminism, then the second major parapraph (Iines 6 - 14) is meant to generate a fear and loathing of feminism on the part of the readers. Gairdner likens feminisrn to cancer, a deadly fom of disease for which there is, as yet, no complete cure. The cancer is further portrayed as 'nibbling into every organ of our society', so it is likened to a spreading and deadly disease, out of control. Although identifying ferninism with cancer does imply that it is something serious, extending that metaphor to identify his own chapter as an 'anticarcinogen' is apt to draw a chuckle, or at lest an inward smile of appreciation from the reader for his witticism. Thus, even in proclaiming it a danger, Gairdner detracts fmm the senousoess of feminism with his Me barb. One of the most worn-out clichés about feminists is that they are 'strident'. If a commentator wishes to criticize a feminist but does not wish to engage in the effort that would be involved in actually thinking about and seriously conunenting on her views, then slhe is apt to resort to simply trying to dismiss her as being 'strident'. Collocating, on line 8, 'strident' with 'petty' and 'whining', Gairdner portrays ferninists as childish and immature. Robin Lakoff describes the effect of such terrns in this way:

A favorite tactic is the metaphorical use of words that describe a physically unpleasant manner of articulation to suggest that the content of the utterance is as repugnant as the sound, words Iike shnll, sh-ideni, whine. When someone's speech is publicly described that way, hearers or readers feel a subliminal need to put space between thernselves and the awful noise. (Lakoff 2000: 69) Suggesting that feminist arguments (and by implication, feminists themselves) have 'nibbled' their way into every organ of society (line 9) extends the cancer metaphor while simultaneously extendinp the imagery of ferninists as childish and impotent. The verb

'nibbling' can also connote the eating behaviour of certain small animals such as mice, rats, or rabbits, al1 relatively non-threatening animals. Nibbling is, in effect, a diminutive sort of eating or chewing. Thus, feminist arguments apparently lack the force to bite into, or to devour the organs of society, two other 'eating' words with stronger connotations of power or efficacy . The self/other or udthern dichotomy is first made explicit in this passage on lines 9 and 10: "If that were the limit of it, most of us would simply get on with our lives and ignore these people." If one searches for the antecedent of 'these people' in this passage, then one finds no grammatically obvious choice. The preceding sentence refers to 'strident, petty, whining feminist arguments', but the head of the noun phrase is 'arguments', an inanimate, abstract noun, whereas 'these people' implies a sentient and probably human antecedent. Rior to 'arguments', 'cancers' is a grammatically possible antecedent, but again, it is inanimate and so is not semantically compatible with 'people'.

The third possible antecedent is the mythical 'Gender Cornmittee', headed by a singular noun, but implying a collection of individuals or 'people'. Thus. given no alternatives, the reader is forced to select the 'Gender Committee', three sentences removed, as the antecedent for 'these people', but it is collocated with 'cancers' and 'arguments' in the two intervening sentences, so 'these people' ends up carrying the weight of al1 the negative associations and ridicule thus far mentioned in the passage. In opposition to 'these people' Gairdner sets 'us' and 'our lives', which must refer to a set of people that includes the author himself, dong with anyone who wishes not to include themselves in the 'other' category alongside cancers, strident, petty, whining feminist arguments, and purported busy-body Gender Cornmittees. Since feminists themselves do not establish or belong to 'Gender Cornmittees', nor do they consider themselves to be a cancer, nor do they consider themselves to be strident, petty and whining, then even ferninists themselves would want to disassociate themselves from 'these people' who are so characterized. This places feminist or feminist-posi tive readers in a bind, however, since only two alternatives are presented in the discourse: either you are one of 'these people' or you are one of 'us'. If readers identify themselves with 'these people', then for the balance of the chapter they are under attack and forced to defend a position defined not by themselves, but by Gairdner, yet if they reject the association with 'these people' then they must identify with Gairdner's 'us', which stands against most of what feminists believe in and work for. Thus, actual feminists do not have a place in the discourse of Gairdner; only his caricatures and distortions of feminists and feminisrn are present. In the tenth sentence of the passage (lines 11-14),feminists are finally named, but the noun 'feminists' is rnodified by the adjectives 'modem radical', thus still limiting its scope and dismissing most of the vast range of feminists and feminisms that exist. Since the noun phrase 'modem radical ferninists' in this sentence is made to bear the accumulated semantic burden of 'Gender Cornmittee', 'cancers', 'arguments', and 'these people', what

it cornes to mean in Gairdner's usage is not even what the tem 'radical feminists' would mean in feminist circles or to tbose people who consider thernselves to be radical feminists. The ferninists named in this sentence are portrayed as dangerous and threatening, yet they

are simultaneously disempowered by Gairdner's other linguistic choices. The noun 'feminists' is cotlocated with the adjectives 'extremist' and 'totalitarian'. In a democratic

society such as Canada, which pndes itself on being moderate and distinctly not extremist, Gairdner's choice of adjectives is highly loaded and is apt to generate a strong emotional reaction of outrage in the reader. and this outrage against extremism and totalitarianism will be extended against the ferninists who are purportedly associated with it. A closer examination of the sentence reveals that the feminists referred to in the sentence are the subject of the intransitive and semantically weak predicate 'reiying on'. The feminists do not generate or originate ideas; rather they 'rely on' unspecified political, economic and tegal stratagems that apparently exist independently of ferninism. It is these stratagems which are purportedly extremist and totalitanan. Since the stratagems are not identified, the reader is free to fil1 in whatever extremist or totalitarian system they cal1 to rnind, whether that is fascism, cornmunism. or any other system of which they disapprove. Ironically, although feminists are collocated with these unnamed dangerous stratagems, they are impotent insofar as they are not themselves responsible for anything more than relying on those stratagems. Evidently, in Gairdner's universe, even dangerous 'radical feminists' ultimately only rely on someone or something else, just as Gairdner's ideal woman relies on her husband and does not act independently in the world. Both sorts of women are denied their own power and independence in Gairdner's universe. Sentence 1 1 (lines 15 - 18) is a cornplex, multi-clause sentence conveyiog little actual information but a great deal of emotion and hostility. The sentence opens with a dangling participial clause, 'when studied carefully', for which Gairdner provides no logical subject for the reduced passive 'studied*. Theoretically, 'it', the subject of the main clause must function as the logical subject of 'studied', but since 'it' is a dummy-pronoun

in this case, it is a place-holder with no actual semantic content. Thus, Gairdner does not

specify what it is that he has studied, leaving open the possibility that he has actually not studied anything. Even if he had studied some unspecified material, the reader is

powerless to obtain it or to evaluate for her/himself, since it is nowhere identified. Since Gairdner dso does not specify who studied the unidentified sources and to whom 'it' becomes transparently obvious, the reader is left to supply an agent/experiencer. If Gairdner had intended the reader to believe that it was Gairdner as an individual who was implicated here, then he might have specified 'transparently obvious to me' or in some other way narrowed the possible agentslexperiencers to just himself. Not having done sol Gairdner implies chat anyone who studied 'X' would find 'it' transparently obvious. Thus he universalizes what really is his own interpretation. The redundancy of the adjective phrase 'transparently obvious' suggests an over-emphasis, which, combined with the emotionalism of adjectives such as 'virulent', 'cultish', 'man-hating', and 'family-hating' causes the sentence to convey anger rather than the sort of reasoned critique one might expect if one is commenting on something one has 'studied'. The phrase 'their arguments' must refer back to the feminist arguments of the previous paragraph, arguments which still have not been presented to the reader. However, to the previous description of these arguments as 'strident, petty, whining feminist arguments (line 8) is added the descnption 'virulent, cultish, man-hating and family-hating' (lines 16 - 17). The Concise Oxford Dicriotuuy ( 1982) offers as defini tions of virulent: poismous; malignant or violent; (fig.) rnalignant, bitter. Thus, 'virulent' continues the imagery of disease. malignancy, cancer, and provides a direct sernantic lid to Gairdner's previous description of feminist arguments. Adding 'cultish' to the list of adjectives not only suggests a misguided and dangerous religious fervour, but also helps to justify the claim that these arguments amount to a programme. since cults are commonly believed to have as part of their agenda a specific, concrete plan to proselytize and convert as many people as possible to their faith. Furthemore, cuits tend to be groups who are outside the mainstream and it is the mainstream faiths and sects that tend to characterize groups they disapprove of as cults. If such a cult gained a majonty following within a society, then it would cease to be cakd a cult and would instead be called a faith or a religion. Thus, naming sornething a cult is a way of disparaging it and stigmatizing it as outside of the mainstream, and as therefore marginal and potentially dangerous. With the adjectives 'man-hating' and 'family-hating' Gairdner begins to reveal what he purports to be the content of the arguments and the programme that he attributes to the 'cult' of radical feminists. Gairdner does not actually present evidence here to support his description of feminist arguments as man-hating and farnily-hating, and since no arguments or evidence are presented, the assertion cannot easity be refuted or disputed. Even if one were to attempt to challenge Gairdner by citing specific feminist arguments, Gairdner could retreat to a position arguing that he does not claim that individual feminist arguments are man-hating and family-hating, but that 'taken as a whole' they 'amount to' such a programme. This careful choice of words would allow Gairdner to stitch together any nurnber of discomected and decontextualized arguments from any number of disparate feminist or quasi-feminist perspectives to create a sort of Frankenstein-like feminist programme. As an intelligent man and a scholar, Gairdner must know that feminism is neither man-hating nor family-hating, even if some isolated individual feminists may appear that way, so he side-steps possible charges of dishonesty or misrepresentation by hedging with vague expressions such as 'taken as a whole' and 'amount to'. This hypothetical femiaist programme that Gairdner writes of supposedly 'threatens the fundamental health of our society ' (line 17). This clause continues the disease/cancer metaphor, through reference to 'health', and it reinforces the uslthern dichotomy by inviting the reader to identify as part of 'our' society, the society w hich is supposedl y threatened by 'them', the feminists. The sentence ends with the relative clause, 'which is what it is intended to do', containing an agentless passive construction 'is intended'. Since no agent is provided, the reader must attempt to reconstruct from the context who might intend to threaten society. The choices are that 'we' threaten Our own society, obviously not the interpretation that Gairdner intends, or that 'they', the feminists, intend to threaten 'our society ' . Sentence 12 (lines 18 - 20) continues to induce the reader to identify with the 'we' that includes Gairdner and to disassociate herhimself from anything or anyone associated with feminism. The purported element of danger in feminism is heightened by the warning that 'we must be far more wary'. It would not be sufficient to be wary, but 'we' must be more wary, as if the danger were increasing and with it the need for wariness. Intensifying

'more' as 'far more' suggests that the danger is vast and poses an immediate and senous threat. In sentence 12, Gairdner presents the least embellished noun phrase denoting feminists that he has used thus far in the passage. They are identified here simply as 'radical feminists', and this is to become the way he typically refers to feminists henceforth in the chapter and in the book. However. since the passage began by loading the term 'feminist' with al1 of the negative adjectives (stndenl petty, whining, virulent, cultish, man-hating, family-hating) and the metaphors of cancer and disease, it will carry these negative associations fonvard whenever it is used by Gairdner, and potentially even when used outside of Gairdner's own discourse. whenever the reader may encounter the term in any other context. Even if a reader consciously rejects Gairdner's characterization of ferninists, s/he may nevertheless be influenced by the negative associations that have been added into the semantic content by Gairdner. When Gairdner identifies radical ferninism as a forrn of collectivism, he is utilizing a code word that he has carefully invested in earlier chapters of the book with connotations of political, economic, social, and moral evil. Collectivism, for Gairdner, represents the antithesis of free-market capitalism and of individual freedom and responsibility. In case the reader rnissed the intent to discredit ferninism by associating it with collectivism, Gairdner emphasizes his disdain by associating feminisrn with baseness, appealinp to the lowest in al1 men and wornen, not to anything honourable or laudable. These dishonourable impulses are linked back to cults through the noun 'believers' in the phrase 'an endless supply of believers' (line 20). In contrast to the anonyrnity of the ferninists Gairdner purports to be discussing, in sentence 13 (lines 20-22) the critic of feminism Gairdner cites is not only named, 'Kenneth Minogue', but is introduced by the adjectives 'witty and trenchant', and is directly quoted and footnoted so that the reader can actually find and read the source for herlhimself. The credibility of this critic, in Gairdner's eyes, is thus proclaimed and emphasized, especially in contrast to the credibility of ferninists thernselves. Not only are the feminists slandered as a group, but they are not narned and they are not quoted and footnoted so that a reader could actually find and read what they Say first-hand. The fint adjective used to describe Minogue, 'witty', suggests both intelligence and good humour. Oxford defines witty as, "capable of or fond of saying things that are brilliantly or sparklingly amusing", and

trenchant as "sharp, keen; penetrating, incisive. decisive, vigorous" (Concite Oxford Dictionary 1982). Thus, because of the way Minogue is described, his barb that "the first mle of reading feminist literature is oever to identify feminism with women" (lines 21 - 22) is accorded a level of credibility that far outweighs its actual content, which is little more

Yet in spite of the fact that the quote from Minogue (197'7) is merely unsubstantiated opinion, Gairdner takes that opinion as the premise for the assertion that he makes in the next sentence of the passage (lines 22 - 23): "For women as a whole in North America have never supported the aims of radical feminism." The modality of validity conveyed by the bald present perfect form 'have supported' is reinforced with the adverb 'never', italicized in the ori gioal. The certitude conveyed in this sentence leaves little room for the reader to challenge the assertion or even to doubt it, in spite of the lack of evidence presented to support it. Gairdner's use of 'radical feminism' is also problematic in this sentence because he is using it to descnbe the straw position he has set up and discredited through a series of negative metaphors and insulting adjectives, without actuall y defining it.

However, since he has c-opted the term 'radical feminism', which is used with a different meaning by feminists themselves, the readers are apt to conflate Gairdner's made-up

'radical feminism' with the views and positions of actual radical feminists. It is probably true that most North Amencan women would not support the aims of the people (real or imagined) that Gairdner cd3 radical feminists, but that does not necessarily mean they might not support the aims of actual radical feminists if they were allowed by Gairdner to

between the U.S. poll's report on percentages of women who identify as feminists and the unrelated poll on voting patterns of Canadian women. It is unlikely that the average reader would take the time to aitique the assumptions or the validity of Gairdner's report of these two polls, with the result that they would accept as 'factual' any conclusions that Gairdner draws from the polls or from statements that he links to the polis. Following immediateiy after the sentence reporting the statistics. Gairdner does

make a claim that seems to rely on the assumption that the statistics he has presented are in fact valid and meaningful. Gairdner claims that "[flar, far more women from both these

nations support traditional male, female, and farnily roles" (lines 27 - 28). Even if one were to accept the highly dubious statistics discussed above, it would not necessarily follow that if 18% of wornen supported the aims of feminism or identified with the so- called radical feminism Gairdner refers to, then the remaining 82% percent suppon the traditional desGairdner claims that they support. Logicaliy, there are any number of other possible philosophies and role-definitions that they could advocate. However, Gairdner once again relies on the tendency for people to revert to dichotomous thinking when no third alternative is explicitly presented. It is easiest for people to assume that the only two alternatives are to cal1 oneseif a ferninist or else to reject ferninism completely in favour of traditional patriarchal roles for men and women, and Gairdner leads the reader to exactly that assumption. In the subotdinate clause of sentence 16 (lines 28 - 3 l), Gairdner makes a number of assertions. Most prominently he says that 'ouf, in this case to be interpreted as meaning 'Canadian', three levels of governrnent (municipal. provincial, and federal) spend about $60 million annually supporting 'women's interest groups'. He gives no sources to indicate how he amved at this figure and the fooinote at the end of the sentence also fails to reveal a source for the figure. There is as much chance that the figure is an estimate concocted by Gairdner or someone with whom he agrees as there is that it is authentic, but this reality is likely to be clouded by the daulingly high number, made even more impressive-sounding by the parenthetical 'cdculation' that this would amount to a billion dollars over fifteen years. Since figures can be interpreted differently by different people and some people might interpret $60 million as a scandalously low figure of support for wornen's groups relative to the total budgets of ail levels of govemment, Gairdner makes sure that the reader gets the point that he considers this spending to be much too high by inserting several negative terms into the clause. First, the governments are described as being 'craven'. The Concise Oxford (1982) defines 'craven' as "cowardly, abject", an odd rneaning to incorporate into this particular sentence. Why would it be cowardly for govemments to give money to 'womeo's interest groups'? The answer to why Gairdner selects this particular term seems to have two elements. Tint, he wants to generally discredit governments in Canada, so in that spirit almost any insulting terrn would do. Second, and perhaps more important, by insinuating that it is cowardly of govemments to give money to women's groups, he implies the converse. that it would be courageous of govemments to withhold such money. This would only make sense if 'women's interest groups' posed some sort of threat or danger, and it is consistent with Gairdner's portrayal of feminists that they pose a danger (recall the adjectives 'virulent' and 'cultish' and the metaphor of cancer). To reinforce the notion that women's groups are a threat, Gairdner alleges in this clause that many of them have 'outright anti-family postures' (line 3 1). Consistent with his treatment of (alleged) ferninist groups elsewhere in his discourse, Gairdner dws not identify any specific group but rather makes a broad ciaim intended to apply to anything he or the reader might wish for it to apply to. He also fails to identify any specific policies or aims that he considers to be anti-farnily. Within the final sentence of the paragraph Gairdner makes a prediction into which he embeds two extremely significant but unsubstantiated assertions. Utilizing the modality of prediction, Gairdner daims that the govemment's support of women's groups will amaze future historians. This prediction is strengthened through the use of the modal adverb 'surely' to convey certitude. The first of Gairdner's embedded assertions is that

"such small unelected minorhies [. . .] control the majority" (lines 32 - 33). The reader's fint task is to find an antecedent for the 'unelected rninorities', since 'such' presupposes

previous mention of said minorities. Looking to the previous sentence, the groups mentioned are the governments, but since they are elected they can't be the antecedent, and

'women's in terest groups ', who must therefore logically be the unelected groups alluded

to. Clairning that such groups represent a minority of women (and by implication of Canadians in general, since it is meant to be a given that most men do not support

ferninism) is consistent with the 18% statistics Gairdner has already used. More interesting, perhaps, is that he sneaks in a claim that women's groups (by which he means feminists) control the majority. If Gairdner attempted to present such a daim in a main clause, then he might be obliged to at least try to offer evidence to support it, but he slips it instead into a subordinate W-clause, where its truth-value is presupposed. A further

claim, which is sneaked into an even more deeply embedded WH-clause (embedded within the embedded clause refemng to rninorities controlling majonties), is that Canadians have lost eheir dernomatic soul. Taken together, the two sentences beginning on line 27 and ending on line 34 argue that Cauadians have Lost their democratic soul because govemments have given public money to feminist or women's groups. Since the purpose of giving money to support various groups is often to enable them to participate in the democratic process, a process that is prohi bitively expensive to al1 except weal thy Canadians and weal thy corporations, it can be counter-argued that giving money to women's groups is in fact an expression of the democratic sou1 of Canadians, rather than an indication of its toss. The last paragraph of this passage opens with another of Gairdner's cornplex sentences conveying several assumptions and assertions, al1 packed together into a dense and multi-layered sentence. The reader is first told that "Radical feminist views are by now so pervasive and illogical [. . -1" (line 35). The adjectives 'pervasive' and 'illogical' are conjoined so that they appear as if they might be somehow relevant to one another, but they are actually making two entirely distinct claims about the nature of radical feminism as Gairdner sees it. It is difficult to justify Gairdner's claim that radical feminist views are pervasive, and indeed, Gairdner does not offer any evidence or argumentation that might justify such a claim. Given Gairdner's use of 'radical feminist' throughout his wntings, this would have to mean that so-called cultlike anti-male and anti-farnily views were pervasive. The ovenvhelming propensity in Canada for people to pair up and have children and the fact that traditional notions of femininity and masculinity still prevail belies this ciaim. If, on the other hand, one takes 'radical feminist' to refer to views held by people who identify themselves as radical feminists, then this claim is even more problematic, since portrayals of feminism outside of academia (and even at times within academia) show little appreciation or understanding of what these views actuaily are. The claim that 'radical feminist views' are iILogica1 is Iittle more than a siander, with no evidence to demonstrate or substantiate the claim. Within the chapter of which this passage forrns the introduction,

Gairdner does attempt to portray feminists as illogical. but his attempts are illegitimate since they consist of him quoting short decontextualized pieces from purported feminists, or even just reporthg on what some unnamed feminists purportedly said, and then shooting down these straw positions. Since feminists are not accorded the right to speak for themselves and are not quoted in a fair and reasonable way, then it is not surprising that their views, distorted by Gairdner, would appear to be illogical. A second clause in the same sentence asserts that the media are craven and uncritical in promoting radical feminist views. It is no accident that Gairdner uses the same adjective, 'craven', to describe the media as he used to describe governments. Gairdner sees the

media and govemments as being locked in a conspiracy to deceive the public and to tum Canada into a socialist, 'collectivist' state. The accusation that the media are uncitical is no doubt meant as a particularly cutting criticism, since the journalistic ethic in democratic societies requires and presupposes that the media be critical, not just of govemments, but

of any and al1 stake-holders. The fact that no media are exempt from influence on the part

of those who pay their salaries and expenses does not alter the ideal of a cntical, non- partisan media, at least taken collectively. The work of Ehrlich and King (1992, 1994, 1998) shows that rather than promoting feminist meanings and ferninist values, the media actually re-interpret and redefine key feminist ternis and concepts with the result that they

disempower feminist rneanings and make them conform more closely to the dominant patriarchal value structure in Canada. In a manner typical of his style, Gairdner uses the problematic assertions that radical ferninist views are pervasive and illogical and that the media are craven and

uncritical as premises for his next statement, that "what follows must necessarily take the form of a piecemeal unravelling of their basic arguments and inherent contradictions. the better to see the pattern" (lines 36 - 38). The modality of necessity is made explicit both in the modal 'must' and in the adverb 'necessarily'. If what he says follows 'necessarily' then it sounds as if he is contrasting a purported logical necessity inherent in what he writes

with the purported illogic of feminist views. Claims of logical necessity aside, Gairdner

appears to be acknowledging that what he is about to present in Chapter 11 is illogical, piecemeal, and contradictory, but rather than accepting responsibility for the lack of logcal

form and structure and placing it on himself, as author, he is deflecting responsibility and attempting to blame those he is critiquing for bis own contradictory and disjointed argumentation. Sentence 19 (lines 38 - 41) opens with the somewhat puzzling noun phrase, "very few ordinary women who cal1 themselves feminists". According to Gairdner's clairns, only about 18% of women support feminism or identify themselves as feminists to begin with, so if 'very few' of that 18%hold the misperception that he clairns they hold, then it

puuling why he would even focus on them at this point in his discourse. What threat could such a small number of women actually pose, one wonders, The answer seems to be that identifying this unspecified group of wornen provides Gairdner an excuse to reassert his accusation that feminism is a dangerous and cultlike movement. Ironically, Gairdner's claim that feminists' belief systems are out 'to destroy everything they hold dear' (line 41) could also be levetled against himself. Gairdner explicitly aims to dismantle the social safety net that generations of Canadians have voted to build and maintain and which most Canadians apparently hold dear, since they object when any govemment tries to dismantle it. Gairdner also seeks to destroy the nghts of equal pay and of non-discrimination against women, homosexuals, visible minorities and people with disabilities. Given what Gairdner himself proposes, it is indeed cocky of him to accuse feminists of seeking to destroy what they hold dear.

The short sentence "And let us be clear" (lines 41 - 42) functions primarily to establish a rnodality of certainty as a context of interpretation for what follows. Gairdner implies that what he will say next is going to be clear, and by implication accurate. In this sentence, his use of 'us' seems to depart from his earlier uses of the first person plural in this passage. Here Gairdner appears not to be including any portion of the readers, or indeed anyone but himself. He has no CO-authoron this book and nothing in the context identifies any group or set of individuals he might be including with himself in the pronoun. It is the 'royal' or 'transcendent we' in which Gairdner, one individual, atternpts to afford his views a credibility they might not otherwise have, by implying that he represents more than just himself. Perhaps even Gairdner recognizes that he is doing little more than expressing angry and hostile persona1 opinions, so he atternpts to bolster his credibility by appealing to this 'divine we'. By sentence 22 (lines 42 - 44) the reader is accustomed to Gairdner's practice of attributing views and opinions to unspecified groups of women who are never concretely identified and never allowed to speak for themselves, for exarnple, through quotations from them. Furthermore, in the phrase which begins 'rnany younger women who say' the reader once again encounters a quantitative clairn that is impossible to verify or even to interpret cIearly. What constitutes 'many'? The women are 'younger' than whorn? How young is younger? Which of these women did Gairdner talk to, or if he didn't talk to them himself, then who did talk to them to know whether or not they Say that they accept feminism? The reader is forced to interpret 'rnany younger women' as refemng to the same set of people as the 'very few ordinary women who cal1 themselves feminists', which in tum seems to derto some subset of the 18% of women Gairdner talks about. Besides accepting feminism, this unidentified group of women are purported to reject 'its radicalism, lesbianism, and antifamily ideology' (line 43). As in Gairdner's preceding sentence, claims about an unidentified groups of women are used as a smoke- screen to allow Gairdner to slip in unsubstantiated and unargued claims about the content and nature of feminism. In this case, Gairdner slips in the claims that feminist ideology is radical, lesbian, and antifamily. The association of feminism with radicalism is not new in this passage, nor is the refrain that it is antifamily, but the attempt to equate ferninism and lesbianism is new within the passage. Gairdner witl reiterate this daim elsewhere and often, but here he manages to slip this premise into the introduction, embedded in a participial clause and sandwiched in between two other claims about feminism which he has never substantiated but which has drilled into the mind of the reader through constant repetition. If the reader has begun to believe that feminism is radical and antifamily then inserting lesbianism as if it were 'naturally' part of the package rnight easily go unnoticed and unchallenged. Claiming that the young women of his discourse serve as an unconscious vanguard utilizes both the military metaphor that predorninates in The War Agaim? the Family , and the cult metaphor, since he implies that they are unconscious and therefore under some form of mind-control. Both metaphors convey possible danger, and cornbining them heiphtens the sense of threat. Warriors are potentially threatening, but if they are not acting as independent moral agents, but ratber are controlled by some cultlike belief structure, then they are perceived as potentially king fanatically dangernus. Since Gairdner portrays them as a vanguard for a movement purportedly set to destroy the very dreams of these 'wamion' then they are seen as self-destructive on top of posing a threat to others. Furthermore, the 'cult' which purportedly controls them is made to seem even more insidious and immoral because they destroy their own followers in their efforts to pursue their agenda. In the final sentence of this passage (lines 45 - 47) Gairdner draws a three-way parallel between the 'radical feminism' he has been describing and both Manrism and abortion. For Gairdner, socialisrn and Marxism are equivalent, so within the set of terrns that Gairdner has previously established in the earlier chapters of the book, the sudden mention of Marxism in the closing sentence of the section is not sudden at all, but is meant to harken back to his earlier mention of the New Democratic Party of Canada (line 26) and to 'co1lectivism' (line 19). Feminism is thus linked to socialism and Marxism and to a rejection of 'private property rights, free enterprise and dernocratic elections' (line 46). Feminism is simultaneousIy linked with a wornan's rigtit to abortion, not itself an unlikely association, since most feminists do support women's rights to reproductive freedom, including the right to have an abortion. However, 'abortion' is conjoined to the noun phrase 'the killing of human life', so the effect of making the plausible connection of feminism with abortion rights is to simultaneously associate feminism with murder, or 'the killing of human life'. The introductory section of chapter 11, analyzed here, contains no concrete, vefiable data beyond the questionable 18% statistics and the figure of $60 million in govemment spending, the accuracy of which is not easily verifiable. The use of these figures may create an aura of scholarliness and reliability, but in reality there is Little substance behind their use. Yet in spite of the Iack of data and the lack of narned and identified sources, Gairdner makes sweeping claims about feminists and feminism. In the space of four paragraphs, Gairdner uses the metaphors of war, cancer, and cults and a long series of adjectives including 'strident', 'petty', 'whining', 'extrernist', 'totalkarian', 'virulent', 'man-hating', 'farnily-hating', 'antifamily', 'pervasive', and 'illogical' to portray feminists and feminisrn in a negative light. He further links feminism with Marxism, socialism, and abortion, al1 of which he attacks in other chapters of the book. Even if what followed in the chapter consisted of sound and responsible scholarship discussing or cntiquing feminism, which it doesn't, the introductory section has so poisoned the reader against ferninism, be that actual feminism orjust the irnaginary ferninism Gairdner sets up as a straw position, that it would be difficult for any but the most alert and pro-feminist reader to read and evaluate any of his clairns and arguments with anything approaching objectivity. Gairdner has established a prejudice against feminists and ferninism and so for the remainder of the chapter and of the book, al1 he needs to do is to heap on more questionable statistics and dubious data in order to draw the reader along to the conc1usion he wishes them to make, which is that feminism is evil and must be squelched. Conclusion

Gairdner does not advocate physical violence against women, feminist or othenvise, but he does seek to permanently disable the feminist movement and to re- enslave women within the narrow sphere of the idealized traditional farnily home. Gairdner's venomous attacks on feminist women and the social justice causes they advocate and his calls to disempower them by removing their funding, to discriminate in the wage and tax system against single adults, especially single women, and to codme them almost entirely to the domestic and volunteer spheres arnount to sexist propaganda. Feminists are only selectively quoted by Gairdner in support of his position; they are never allowed to speak for themselves and no effort is made to present more than one side -- Gairdner's -- on any issue pertaining to them.

If a woman were to attempt to respond to Gairdner by identifying herself as a femioist and challenging him on specific issues he mises. such as daycare, abortion, affirmative action, violence against women, then she would be starting from a disempowered position at the outset. Since Gairdner has claimed the ground by defaming and denigrating feminists so thoroughly, any respondent identifying as a feminist would be forced to carry the baggage that Gairdner has imposed on her. If, on the other hand, she were to challenge Gairdner on matters of principle and policy without identifying herself as a feminist, then he could daim this as a victory because he would still have succeeded in appropriating the term 'feminist' and rendering it unusable even by feminists cballenging him. The disempowerment of feminists by Gairdner can be likened to what Rita Kirk WhilIock describes as a general effect of hate speech: Both defensive and avoidance strategies are ineffectual in responding to the out- group treatment of the hater. The use of response strategies implies that the opposition will respond to a reasoned defense, or at least find an unreceptive climate for future attacks. By contrast, the stratagem of hate is designed to conquer, not to negotiate. The result is that rather than diffusing a crisis, victim responses often escalate the problern. They fuet the fires of hate by proving that the message had the hannful effects intended. (Whiltock 1995: 43) The question of whether or not Gairdner's writings constitute hate speech perse is beyond the scope of the present dissertation, but it is one worth considering in future research. Whether Gairdner's discourse does or does not fit the linguistic and/or the legal definitions of 'hate speech', it certainly constitutes sexist discourse, as this chapter has demonstrated. Chapter 3: Homophobic Discourse

Introduction Chapter 2 of this dissertation argues that William Gairdner's discourse is sexist. This chapter argues that his discourse is also homophobic. With the exception of Constih~tionalCrack-up,al1 of Gairdner's popular books contain at least some discussion of homosexuality, and a11 of them contain variations on the same themes. Fewer academic studies have been published on homophobic language than on either racist language or sexist language. Barbara Smith notes that "[h]omophobia is usually the last oppression to be mentiooed, the last to be taken senously, the last to go.

But it is extremely serious, sometimes ta the point of being fatal" (Smith 1993: 99). The relative paucity of linguistic analyses of homophobic discourse rnay, at least in part, reflect this tendency for homophobia to be prioritized below racism and sexism as forms of

oppression to be challenged both within and without academia. Ironically, according to Smith, while the anti-oppression forces of the left may sometimes fail to recognize the full impact of homophobia, "for the forces on the right, hating lesbians and gay men, people of

color, Jews, and women go hand in hand. They make connections between oppressions in the most negative ways with hodying results" (Smith 1993: 100). Gayle Rubin, writing in the sarne volume as Barbara Smith, likewise links right-

wing politics with narrow definitions of 'appropnate' sex: "Right-wing ideology linking non-familial sex with communism and political weakness is nothing new. During the

McCarthy period, Alfred Kinsey and his Institute for Sex Research were attacked for weakening the moral fibre of Americans and rendering them more vulnerable to comrnunist influence" (Rubin 1993: 7-8). Rubin 's term 'non-familial sex' would incl ude same-sex relationships. According to her analysis, dominant North Amencan views divide sex into a hierarchy consisting of "the charmed circle", seen as GO^, Normal, Blessed Sexuality, consisting of sex that is heterosexual, mamed, monogarnous, procreative, non- commercial, in pairs, in a relationship, same generation, in private, no pornography, bodies only, and vanilia, versus "the outer lirnits", seen as Bad, Abnormal, Unnatural,

Damned Sexuality, and consisting of sex that is homosexual, unmarried, promiscuous, non-procreative, commercial, alone or in groups, casual, cross-generational, in public, pornography, with manufactured objects, andor sadomasochistic (Rubin 1993: 13).

William Gairdner's characterization of sex into acceptable and unacceptable varieties conforms closely to this mode1 proposed by Rubin, althouph nowhere does he actually refer to Rubin or to her ideas.

In 'The Gay Agenda: Marketing Hate Speech to Mainstream MediaT',Marguerite J. Moritz identifies sorne of the extreme anti-homosexual rhetonc of the religious right in the U.S.A. as hate speech (Moritz 1995: 58). Some of the most extreme forms of this propaganda include disfor the death penalty for homosexwals, whom they purport violate Biblical laws and pnnciples. According to Moritz, these extreme forms of rhetoric gain little support for the anti-gay lobby outside of fundamentalist circles, so the radical nght has moderated its rhetonc somewhat to appeal to mainstream audiences, often reframing their arguments as a 'special rights' issue (Moritz 1995: 58). Marian Meyers echoes the observation about the use of a category of 'special interest group' to rnarginalize gays and lesbians and to distance them from the so-called mainstream of America (Meyers 1994: 340). Although Gairdner's own anti-gay rhetoric at times becomes quite extreme, his use of the 'special rights' argument (see below) against gays and lesbians also links him to the right-wing forces Moritz refers to as the radical right. The fact that Gairdner's anti-gay rhetonc is not isolated, but rather forrns part of a wide continuum of such discourse makes it al1 the more potent. Many Canadians, especially those who adhere to far-right political andor relipious positions, are accustomed to reading American perspectives on issues, and thus find that Gairdner's writings resonate with ideas and even styles of langage with which they are already farniliar and with which they already feel comfortable. Gairdner sows his seeds of hatred in ground that has been already tilled by the years of homophobic propaganda that various right-wing elements have been circulating throughout North America. Elizabeth Moksh, writing about Great Britain, also observes that there is a certain cumulative effect to public discourses about lesbians and gays.

In the case of discourse about lesbians and gays, there is a clear cumulative effect that leads to an atmosphere in which homosexuality is deemed "umatural" and threatening to the dominant culture and in which hornophobic acts are held to be justified and in the interests of the "gened public". (Morrish 1997: 335) Momsh notes two recumng themes in public discussion of homosexuality, namely family life and disease (Momsh 1997:338). She observes that, "... most often in contemporary discourse, the term fmily has becorne a codeword for the exclusion of homosexuality"

(Morrish 1997: 339). Both themes, family life and disease, will be shown below to be central also to Gairdner's discourse on homosexuality. Lexical Choices

"Verbal substitution pherwmew " Gairdner is well aware of the potential power of linguistic choices. He criticizes his opposition for supposedly redefining reality by substituting a negative word for a positive one. He names this the 'verbal substitution phenornenon' and explains it in some detail:

One of the best ways to control a political or moral agenda, or simply a debate over cocktails, is to put the opposition on the defensive by being the first to define their behaviour negativel y. This is achieved most effectively by forcibly substi tuting a negative word for an ordinary one; the word infokrmfor the word dlrnpprove, for example. Soon, if repeated often enough, the negative word becomes a cover term for any of the ordinary words previously used. Rendered speechless by this negative contamination of their vocabulary, ordinary people react by backing down. They are then effectively silenced, terrorized, and neutralized by the group with the agenda. (Gairdner 1992: 45) This 'verbal substitution phenornenon' that he claims is used by his left-wing opponents is exactly the technique that Gairdner himself uses and advocates with respect to tems such as 'gay' versus 'homosexual', and 'sexual orientation' versus 'sexual choice'. Furthemore, he practices this same substitution throughout his writing by applying a negative label and then continually using it to the exclusion of more neutral or positive terms. For example, feminists are almost never referred to simply as feminists, but instead are 'radical feminists' or 'antifarnily radicals', and modem iiberals are 'collectivists'. Gairdner says, in italics, of people whose definition of 'farnily' is broader than his, "They attack it by redefining it" (1992:133). This is richly ironic, given that it is Gairdner, not his opponents, who goes to such lengths to redefine the family to exclude many of the usual meanings of the tem, in order to promote his own sexist, heterosexist political and social agenda. This section will explore four particular terms which Gairdner subjects to his own sorts of 'verbal substitution phenomena', twisting and redefining them to suit his own purposes, namely the terms 'special interest group', 'sexual orientation', 'gay', and 'homophobic'.

As Marguerite Moritz explains, the radical right has a clear purpose in framing the issue of gay and lesbian rights as one of 'special rights'.

Just as it [the Radical Right] succeeded in renaming and thus reframing i ts antiabortion stand into a "pro-Iife" position, just as it tumed antiferninism into "pro- family," so has it successfully tumed the issue of civil rights for gays and lesbians into one of "special rights" (Moritz 1995:76). Marian Meyers elaborates on the right's use of the related term 'special interest group',

pointing out that it is used by political conservatives to marginalize any group or class of people who rnight have an agenda different from theirs. Thus, women, minorities, the disabled, organized labor, the poor, gay men and lesbians - all, presumably, but white, middle- and upper-class, fully-abled, heterosexual males - constitute a special interest group whose agenda is suspect. Despite the fact that most of the US population is a special interest group by this definition, the term cames with it the assumption that those so designated would sacrifice the larger social good in pursuit of their own narrow interests. (Meyers 1994: 340) Meyen is arguing in the context of a discussion about then-U.S. President Clinton's effort to repeal the ban on homosexuals in the U.S. military, but her observations can be readily

extended to the Canadian context. In Canada, as in the U.S., the far right defines as 'special interest groups' any groups who are not advocating on behalf of the rights of middle- and upper-ciass healthy, white males. Gairdner is a salient example of just such a right-wing cornmentator. The following quotation from The Trouble Wilh Canada captures succinctly Gairdner's attitude toward homosexuals as a smcalled special interest group and foreshadows themes that will be expanded on, pnmarily in Chapter 13, "Radical

Homosexuals vs. the Family," and Chapter 14, "The Gay Plague and the Politics of AIDS" of The War Againîr the Family: Astonishingly, it [the State] may even promote the idea of family in words, while providing funds to special-interest groups that promote perverse anti-family sexual "orientations" (for example, Ontario's Bill 54, which bas the unfortunate effect of giving homosexuality the status of normal behaviour) [. . .]. (Gairdner 1990: 81) first, by lumping homosexuals and homosexual groups into the categocy of 'special-interest groups', Gairdner attempts to diminish their significance. Throughout his

witings, any group that stands up for itself publicly and lobbies for recognition of its members' rights or for the promotion of their goals is a 'special-interest group', any group, that is, except those representing the white, Judeo-Christian, Anglocentnc, patriarchal, capitalist values of which Gairdner approves. Thus, for example, although the organization R.E.A.L. Women of is mentioned in both Trouble and War,it is never identified as king a special-interest group, in spite of the fact that the extreme rel igious anti-feminist policies it advocates represent on1y a minon ty view wi thin Canada.

Instead, it is identified as "a pro-family group known as REAL Women of Canada*' ( 1992: 143), and as "the 'right-wing' group REAL Women" (1990: 105). His use of quotation marks around 'right-wing' signals that it is not his way of identifying the group, but someone else's. To Gairdner, it is not 'right-wing', it is mainstream, and since he agrees with it, it is not a 'special interest' group. "Sexual orientation'' Gairdner likewise signals his rejection of the concept of sexual orientation by placing 'orientation' in quotation marks. In War, he attempts to justify this position. Perhaps one of the most insidious victones of the homosexual movement cm be seen in the broad acceptance of the term "sexual onentation," now used widely in our schools and in sociological and govemment documents. tt was coined to replace the phrase "sexual preference," which suggested that homosexuals were choosing their behaviour and therefore were responsible for it - an implication most of them stnve to avoid. They needed to find a word which suggested that just as the magnetic forces of earth pull the mmpass needle to North, something calleù "sexual orientation" directs homosexuals to indulge in the behaviours they enjoy as if they were a natural fact of life. [. . .] The public would do well to reject this word [. . .] and to blk about "sexuai choice" instead of "orientation." And everywhere they see the former phrase, they should insist on the use of the latter, both privately and publicly . (Gairdner 1992: 378-9) The "OW!SPOKEN" Styleguide (ad.) concurs with Gairdner that the term 'sexual orientation' is the tenn most often used in anti-discrimination IegisIation to refer to an individual's primary gender orientation (OWISPOKEN n.d.: 14)' but not surprisingly it does not identify the tem as problematic. In fact, whereas the OI/TISPOKENguidelines generally identify as controversial terms such as 'queer', 'fag', or 'dyke' which are not viewed or used by al1 gays and Lesbians with equal degrees of cornfort, the terni 'sexual orientation' is presented as unproblematic and uncontroversial (see also Jacobs 1998). Thus, Gairdner appears to be attempting to generate a storm where none exists and to attach

controveny to a tem which is not othenvise a site of contestation in discussion of gay and

lesbian rights. If Gairdner's readers were to follow Gairdner's admonition to insist on the use of 'sexual choice' in place of 'sexual orientation' then one could easily see that they would never actually get around to listening to what advocates of gay and lesbian rights have to Say. Contesting otherwise uncontested terms is thus a strategy that Gairdner employs in order to deflect attention away from the serious issues of discrimination faced by gays and lesbians and ont0 the largely moot issue of whether king gay or lesbian is an inherent or a denved state. To put the issue in context, if Canadians have the right to practice their faith free of penecution, then ir matters little whether they were bom into that faith or whether they chose it later in life- They still have full rights to freedom of religion.

Likewise, whether a person is bom homosexual or becornes homosexual through some as- yet unidentified process, they are entitled to the full rights and protections that al1 other people are entitled to.

"C;ayV' 'Sexual orientation' is not the only texm Gairdner rejects. He also rejects the term 'gay' as used by and about homosexual persons. The OUT!SPOKEN Styleguide offers the following explmation of the term 'gay': The term that homosexual men and some women have used to describe themselves, and the cwrently preferred term to describe men whose primary romantic and physical attraction is to members of their own gender. On pnnciple, societal groups should be referred to by the media in the way that mernbers of each group prefer. Most gay people prefer "gay" to the clinicai word "homosexua1." The term "gay" may be used to refer to both men and wornen, but "lesbian" is the preferred term for women. (OUT!SPOKEN n.d.: 12) Arnold M. Zwicky notes that neither 'homosexual' nor 'gay' is universally preferred as a

term of self-identification, and that for at least some people the two terms may not be equivalent, although the perceived difference between them varies somewhat unpredictably from speaker to speaker. Of 'homosexual' and 'gay', Zwicky writes, "[slome would

insist on one, some on the other, and many see a distinction (behavior vs. identity, identity

vs. sensibility, whatever) between the two" (Zwicky lm 22). Jacobs (1998: 194) surnmarizes the history of the word 'gay' as used by

homosexual men, citing Cory (1951: 106-7) as arguiog for the use of 'gay', on the grounds that it is easy to Say, free from the stigmas usually attached to words about homosexuals, and useful as a code-word by which homosexua1 men could identify each other without revealing themselves to heterosexuals. By the IWO'S, 'gay' was becoming increasingly popular as a term for homosexual men and it began to appear in the mainstream press. Accordiag to Ashky (1979: 226), the word 'gay' was not uniforml y accepted, and was considered by some homosexuals to be silly or fnvolous. Nevertheless,

'gay' "regu1ariy appeared in the mainstream through the 1980s, due mostly to the media attention focussing on gay issues in the context of the tragic introduction of AIDS to North

America, which at first surfaced predominantly in the male homosexual comrnunity"

(Jaco bs 199û: 195). Speculating about people's motivation for using terms such as 'gay' and 'sexuai orientation', Gairdner asserts that "by altering the word-labels that describe their world, homosexuals hope to make their behaviour invisible, or at least so 'nod' it won't be noticed. This is part of their campaign to rnorally desensitize the public" (Gairdner 1992: 376). This explanation imputes sinister, or at Ieast objectionable, motivations to gays and lesbians who use these terms, an idea on which Gairdner elaborates in the following excerpt:

Public acceptance of the word "gay" has been a Great victory for homosexuals, for the word "homosexual" had always been a negative term to denote those wlto preferred to copulate with their own sex. But what homosexuals wanted was a word that elevated their behaviour to an admirable status, and they achieved this by taking a perfectly good English word - now off-limits to normal people -- and appropriating it for their specific use. (Gairdner 1992: 377) In both of the two preceding quotations, Gairdner appropriates the voice of 'hornosexuals' and purports to know and undentand their motives and their goals. Furthemore. in both of these quotations, he isolates homosexuals from the mainstream, in the first case by contrasting them with 'the public', which they purportedly wish to desensitize, and in the second case by contrasting them with 'normal people', who purportedly have been robbed of a 'perkctly good English word'. The choice of someone, particularly someone outside the gay and lesbian community, to use 'gay' instead of 'homosexual' to refer to gay men does, as Gairdner recognizes, have a significance, although not necessanly the significance he assigns it when he claims that [t]o them, the word "gay" suggests carefree, happy-plucky individuals who have a culture and a way of being al1 their own, which may in some secret way be superior to the hum-dmm, sometimes ungay world of the rest of humanity. The word suggests a speciai in-group with access to happiness the rest of us lack. (Gairdner 1992 377)

The word does not, in fact, necessady connote cheerfulness or good humour on the part of gays, except in the mind of Gairdner and those like him who will impute any rneaning in order to discredit a concept they dislike, but it does suggest a more positive, or at least accepting, attitude towards members of the group than does 'homosexual' in many contexts, which is undoubtedly why Gairdner admonishes his readers not to use it. Those who wish to defend the natural family and the core values of our society should strenuously resist the use of this word, and publicly replace it with the word "homosexual," which is more honest. After all, most of these people are the furthest thing from "gay." (Gairdner 1992: 377) In one of his charactenstic flights into hyperbole, Gairdner says of the belated

acceptance of the word gay without quotation marks by the New York Times in 1487 that "it was inching further into moral chaos, and was also the culminating point in a long and continuing homosexual campaign to alter the way the public thinks, by controlling the way it is allowed to speak and to read" (Gairdner 1992: 376-7). Using the word 'gay', first among thernselves and only later in a wider public context, did not and does ndconstitute a threat by gays and lesbians to anyone's freedom or rights, nor, as Gairdner implies, is it dishonest, whatever Gairdner may choose to claim. It is Gairdner's admonitions to readers to insist that people use the terms 'sexual choice' and 'homosexual' that constitutes an intrusion, not the fact that the terms 'sexual orientation' and 'gay' are used by gay- and lesbian-positive individuals. The contestation of the word 'gay' both within and outside the homosexual community is not unlike the evolution of terms to refer to descendants of African slaves in North America, particularly in the U.S.A. John Baugh (1991) discusses some of the controversy surrounding the origin and use of the tem 'African American'. Although the media and many Americans, particularfy those who have little direct contact with Afncan American vemacular culture, first became aware of 'African Arnerican' as a preferred term of self-identification through a 1988 speech by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Baugh reports that the tenn was already being discussed and debated by some African Amencans prior to that speech. For exarnple, Baugh quotes a young African Amencan man arguing in favour of using 'African American' in a group interview in East Austin, Texas in 1987 (Baugh

1991: 135). Just as 'gay' was at first primarily in-group usage by homosexual men before it became widely recognized and used outside the homosexual comrnunity (Jacobs 1998), so was 'Afica American' first used and discussed within the black community before it came to the attention of most Americans (Baugh 1991), and just as 'gay' was not at first uniforml y positively received (Ashley 1979: 226),neither was 'African American' (Baugh 1991: 135). By the early 1990's, accordinp to Jacobs (1998). the term 'gay' was not a source of debate within the homosexual community, but rather, at lest in Toronto, the term 'queer' had become a focus of controversy. Wilfiam Gairdner does not discuss the term

'queer', probably because the term was not yet widely heard or seen in the mainstream media at the time he was writing Trouble and Wm,but the fact that he expends such effort over 'gay' demonstrates that naming and the right to self-identification is a site of considerable ideologiêal struggle, and is contested by representatives of the dominant heterosexist pattiarchy such as Gairdner.

Gairdner's discourse is blatantly homophobic, and that reality is not altered by his rejection of the term 'homophobic'. In much the same way that he rejects the terms 'gay' and 'sexual orientation,' he also rejects 'homophobic' . Once they have defined themselves anew by rejecting society's generic uhomosexual" label and established the "dignity" of king "gay," the next choice was to position normal people as fnghtened, bigoted, and irrational. This was achieved by inventing the nonsensical but extremely effective word "homophobic" and using it like a grenade to throw at anyone who dared to utter the slightest oegative opinion. (Gairdner 1992: 377)

Gairdner attempts to argue away the reality of homophobia by rejecting the terni itself. By suggesting that homosexuals invented the terni, he is implying that they invented the concept that the terni represents. In his statement "[m]ost people, of course, are not afraid of homosexuals at aH. They're disgusted by hem" (1992: 377), Gairdner reveais that his rejection of the term 'homophobic' is based on the assumption that it rneans something like 'fear of hornosexuals'. However, the root 'phobe', from which 'phobic' is formed, is defined by Oxford (1982) as "not fond of, (person) disliking or fearing". Thus, even a dictionary allows for a broader meaning than Gairdner does. Furthermore, in common usage, describing someone as homophobic is asserting that they hate, despise, andor fear

homosexuals and homosexuality. OWSPOKEN defines homophobia as, "[flear of or aversion to homosexuals or homosexuali ty, including one's own homosexual feelings, and the hatred, disgust, and prejudice that fear brings" (OUï?SPOKEN n.d.: 13). Gairdner cannot, by fiat, make the word stop meaning what it does mean, and he cannot erase the reality of homophobia with glib remarks such as the following: "After dl, the truth is that it is not we who are homophobic, but rather homosexuals who are 'heterophobic,'

'moralphobic', and 'familyphobic"' (Gairdner 1992: 37û). In his discussion of homosexuality, Gairdner challenges the use of the terms 'gay', 'sexual orientation,' and 'homophobic'. In fact, he attempts to 'disallow' such ternis and urges his readers to refuse to use them and to try to force others to abandon them as well. Those who want to fight back and preserve the mord dignity of Our society will have to begin by refusing publicly such words as "gay" and "homophobic," for to accept and use them means to accept the assumptions they denote. (Gairdner 1992: 378) Gairdner recognizes that language is a site of ideological struggle, although he appears not to acknowledge that he is engaging in just the sort of linguistic manipulation he accuses his opponents of using. By trying to force his meanings onto particular lexical items, to the exclusion of al1 other meanings, he is manipulating not just the language, but through the language the thoughts and ernotions of the readers, attempting to generate in them the same sorts of hornophobic attitudes that he holds.

A prevalent metaphor in Gairdner's writings on homosexuality is that of disease

110 and pathology . Gairdner's position is that homosexuality is chosen, not innate, so he attempts to portray it as an unnatural and unhealthy state or condition. As if fearing that his

homophobia would lose whateverjustification he considers it to have, and in the absence of conclusive scientific evidence about the cause(s) of same-sex orientation, Gairdner even attempts, indirectly, to convince gays and lesbians that it is in their best interests not to seek to discover a physical cause for homosexuality.

[I]t is dangerous for them to argue that they are born homosexual, because what they do has always been universally despised. If homosexuality is found to have a physical cause, then society will likely set about to root it out. The offending gene, or whatever, will get excised at birth. So they had better not argue that way if they want to preserve their habits. (Gairdner 1992: 366) Here, Gairdner presents homosexuality as if it were a genetic disorder which could ultimately be eliminated and furthemore, he frames this possibility in a manner that is clearly meant as a threat to homosexuals. Homosexuals are first wamed that it is dangerous to them to argue for genetic causes of homosexuality. The source of the danger is left unspecified, but the danger is linked causally through the subordinator 'because' to the assertion that 'what they do has always been universally despised'. Although couched in an agentless passive structure, this clause has, as an implied agent 'everybody', since the claim is made that hornosexual actions (and therefore by extension homosexuals themselves) are 'universally' despised. The danger is further extended through tirne by the adverb 'always', which suggests that there is no escape anywhere at any tirne from the danger of being a homosexual. The final dement of threat in this passage cornes in the last sentence, which begins 'SO they had better not argue that way'. The expression "X had better not. .." typically frames a threat. A parent might tell a child, "You had better not do that again or 1 will [spank you, etc]"; a bully might Say to his or her victim, "You had better not do that again or I'rn gonna [beat you up. etc]". When Gairdner chooses this frame it cames with it al1 of the connotations of threat it has in any other context. The modality Gairdner employs heightens the effect of the threat and the message of danger. Gairdner uses epistemic rnodalities of validity (e-g. it is, has always been) and predictability (society will likely, the gene. . .will get exccised) to imply that what he says is a certainty. Although the adverb 'likely' in the phrase 'society will likely' admits some possibility of doubt, this small element of potential uncertainty is heavily outweighed by the other modal elements in the passage. In particular, the adverbs 'universally' and 'always' suggest an incontrovertible degree of certainty and inevitability. Since Gairdner's entire argument against homosexuality hinges on the presupposition that it constitutes a behavioral choice, he has a stake in preventing anyone from discovering a physiological or

boenetic cause for homosexuality. If homosexuality were found to be genetically determined, then arguing. as he does, for systernatic discrimination against gays and lesbians would be viewed in similar terms to arguing for discrimination against people with Down's Syndrome or any other genetically caused condition. Thus, in order to protect his position, he irnplies a threat to try to prevent people from even attempting to discover whether or not there is a genetic cause for homosexuality.

In case the reader is unconvinced by his first threat against seeking to discover a genetic or physiological cause for homosexuality, Gairdner attempts a further argument to the effect that one should not argue that homosexuality is natural, since some things that are natural are 'bad for us or bad for society' (1992: 367). The argument presented by Gairdner is the following: Many cancers are oatd. So are heart disease, tuberculosis, and sexually transmitted diseases. Society is not required to encourage or protect things just because they are "natural." On the contrary, it tends to sort out the natural gd from the natural bad and then organize for self-protection, whether against physical, social, or moral threats. (Gairdner 1992: 367) Gairdner is evidently trying to hedge his bets here. On the one hand, he argues that people should reject homosexuality because it is unnatural, but on the other hand, just in case it can be shown to be natural after all, he argues that even if natural, it is bad. Collocating 'homosexuality' with diseases such as cancer. heart disease, tuberculosis, and sexually transrnitted diseases rnakes it unnecessary for Gairdner to make an overt claim that homosexuality is a disease. He has planted the association between those categories in the reader's mind and in doing so has heightened the negative impression he is atîempting to convey of homosexual persons. Furthemore, by collocating homosexuality with diseases. and with potentially fatal diseases in particular, Gairdner maintains the mood of danger that he establishes in the preceding excerpt. However, the danger posed by the diseases that

Gairdner names is oot limited to the homosexuals whom Gairdner is targeting, but rather, is extended to anyone who might unwittingly corne in contact with them. Heart disease and cancer may affect only the individual suffering from them, but tuberculosis and sexuaily transrnitted diseases are potentially a threat to 'innocent' people who may have contact with the infected individual.

Although in this passage, Gairdner does not make any direct reference to feminisrn, his use of the cancer metaphor links this discussion with his attack on feminisrn. discussed above in Chapter 2. Feminism and homosexuality are both associated with cancer. Lesbianism is equated with feminism. Thus, through the image of cancer, Gairdner links his attack on hornosexuals with his attack on ferninists and invites the reader also to draw paraliels between these disparate groups. For Gairdner, forging links between the vanous groups, individuals, ideologies and lifestyles that he opposes makes it easier to dismiss them en masse and to propose a simplistic single 'solution' to everything he identifies as a problem. In a chapter entitled "The Gay Plague and the Politics of AIDS" (Wu,Ch. 14), Gairdner seiectively interprets data about AIDS and other (potentially) sexuaily transrnitted diseases, presenting them separately and collectively as 'the gay plague'. The word

'plague' occurs four times in the text of this chapter, but it occurs an additional nine times if one counts the chapter title reprinted in the header of each odd-numbered page. Thus, the word, and therefore the concept of 'plague', is never far from the consciousness of the reader. In addition to the word 'plague', the chapter is sanirated with terms denoting diseases and illnesses, among them cancer, amebiasis, giardiasis, salmonellosis, shigellosis, hepatitis, tuberculosis, syphilis, AIDS, HIV, gonorrhea, and others. Terms denoting illness and disease are repeatedly collocated throughout the chapter with the terms 'gay' and 'homosexual', including such phrases as 'the hornosexual disease epidemic'

The most explicit statements in the chapter are those that blame gay men for AIDS. For example, having cited a Rofessor Robert Root-Bernstein of Michigan State University, who calls AIDS a 'life-style disease' (Root-Bernstein 1990:74), Gairdner continues: Homosexuals know this. That's why AIDS is king used politically by their lobby groups to distort information, fool the public, hide the truth, spare themselves stigma, and promote their own sexual agenda. It's a dreadful mess. 1 don't think anyone reaily knows what's going on, and I'm certainly not going to pretend I do. However, this brief segment on AIDS belongs in this book because, as 1 have argued, homosexuality is an antifamily phenornenon, and AIDS in North America is still ovenvhelmingl y a homosexual disease. Encouraging more of one will bring more of the other. (Gairdner 1992: 401)

Gairdner's alleged modesty, claiming that he does not purport to know what is going ou, rings rather hollow in light of his use of modalities of certainty, and the aimost total lack of modalities of doubt, throughout the chapter. If Gairdner were portraying homosexuals as carriers and sufferers of disease amonp themselves, that would be bad enough, but he goes much further in attempting to portray gays as knowingly and caliously posing a direct health risk to heterosexuals, and especially to children, al1 in the i nterests of promoting their dleged poli tical agenda. In fact, we are spreading extremely dangerous disinformation to the public and especially to school children, because they are being told that homosexuality is normal and are not vigorously counselied against such behaviours. But because AIDS is so overwhelmingly associated in North Amenca with what homosexuals do, this message is close to a counsel of death. (Gairdner 1992: 404) Gairdner accuses homosexuals of trying to prevent the public from having vital information about AIDS and its relationship to male homosexuality. There is cause for worry, because the politics of AIDS, which seems to be largely controiled by homosexuals wherever there are "AIDS cornmittees," government overseers, or media watchdogs, is preventing a full public examination of the relevant facts. (Gairdner 1992: 405) Gairdner contends that AIDS is prirnariiy a gay disease spread through anal intercourse, but he also argues strenuously that it can be spread through non-sexual, casual contact between people. Although AIDS is mostly confhed to male homosexuai, male bisexual, and dnig behaviour, where it is cornmunicated with a wildfire certainty, it may also possibly be communicated, although with much gfeater difficulty, through casual contact among people outside such groups. (Gairdner 1992: 406-7) Rather than drawing the conclusion that since the virus can be spread through means other than gay sex, it is therefore not a 'gay plague', Gairdner uses the possibility of it spreading in other ways to further condernn homosexuals, since 'they' might infect 'us' in addition to themselves. He also exploits this notion to reinforce the connection he forges throughout his writings between gays and children. In this case, he also manages to mndemn daycare centres, one of his primary targets in the war to force women to stay out of the paid workforce and in their homes, caring for children. If the AIDS virus, with up to a three-year "negative window" of undetectability and a lû-year period for full-blown AIDS, is commonly communicable, even if with great difficulty, a creeping plague could indeed be under way. If so, a special hazard for children everywhere are schools and daycare centres, where young children kiss each other, sneeze, cough, eat each other's food, suck on toys, bite each other, sometimes bleed on each other, and generally get saliva and lots of microscopie fecal material on everything. (Gairdner 1992: 4û7)

After declaring gay sex as the major source of AIDS, Gairdner then makes the foltowing accusation: It is criminal. Because it means that lots of innocent people, including children, are going to die, simply because the homosexual lobby is politically powerful enough to ensure that normal public heaith protection is not introduced. It remains powerful because the public, the media, and the educational establishment are morally cowardly and fnghtened to condemn homosexual behaviour. Many will pay the ultimate price. (Gairdner 1992: 41 1) Gairdner's entire discussion of AIDS is meant to constmct a metaphor of disease and danger so pervasive that it becomes impossible for the reader to ignore it. The images of filth, violence and illness are so vivid that they remain in the reader's rnind long after the book has ken read, even in the case of a reader such as the author of this dissertation who hows that Gairdner is spreading misinformation and hateful propaganda. Thus, even if one consciously rejects Gairdner's distortions, it is almost impossible to purge the imagery he has implanted in the reader's mind, and in that sense Gairdner scores a victory in writing his chapter linking AIDS with homosexuality. His opponents not only have to present data and information to counter his misinformation, but they must also somehow seek to erase the grotesque imagery which he presents and which no amount of reasoned argumentation can erase from the memory of the reader. Gairdner, not content to collocate homosexuals with physical diseases and pathologies, also attempts to link homosexuality with the spread of social pathologies, particularly in daycare centres. In keeping with his overall preference for the notion of personal responsibility and a general rejection of the notion of social conditioning, Gairdner ultimately rejects socialization as the cause of hornosexuality, but not without first exploiting the theory in order to further his attack on daycare centres. But homosexuals don't like these theones either, because the implication is that pathology is present -- that they are sick -- and therefore society is correct to shun their ways and seek a cure. They have visions of State supervisors seeking them out as irirants and placing them in re-education clinics. In this respect, one of the most chilling suspects as a spawning ground for increasing homosexuality must surely be long-term daycare. That's because developmental psychologists have discovered that the 1û- to 24-month period of life is crucial in the formation of sex- role identity. (Gairdner 1992 36û) Gairdner approvingly quotes psychologkt Elizabeth Moberly (1983). who theorizes that homosexuality is a search for parenting that was absent or inadequate during a person's

infancy. Since Gairdner sees it as primarily a mother's responsibility to provide the crucial nurtunng to children, he exploits Moberly 's view as another opportunity to blame feminists for what he perceives to be the destruction of human society. "If Moberly is correct, then from the egalitariadfeminist drive for tax-funded universal daycare we can expect to see a horrendous u~ntendedconsequence: tax-funded centres for sexual pathology" (Gairdner

1992: 368). What Gairdner means here by 'sexual pathology ' is homosexuality. He is echoing the disease-and-death associations he made previously by linking homosexuality with such illnesses as cancer and tuberculosis. He is also drawing a conclusion about a purported causal link between daycare centres and homosexuality, between feminists and hornosexuality, and between egalitarianism and homosexuality, none of which causal links have ever been demonstrated by him or by anyone else. If he cannot friphten the reader by implying that hornosexuals will infect children with physical diseases, then he will frighten them by suggesting that daycare workers will socially condition children to become homosexuals. As a final attack against homosexuals, and on the excuse of doing a public service, Gairdner presents nine pages of graphic description of activities which gay men purportedly engage in, many of thern violent. As a writer and the parent of five childrea, 1 now have an unpleasant duty. We are al1 being grievously rnisled by an extrernely accommodating media, and a dangerously dent medical and educational profession, into believing that homosexual behaviour is just a harmless variation on normal sexuality. But this is far from the truth. People need to know exactly what it is that most homosexuals do, and what moral, social, and medical dangers arise from their behaviour. (Gairdner 1992: 387) The message of danger is explicit, with both the adverb 'dangerously' and the noun 'dangers' being used in this passage. The fact that the noun 'dangers' is plural multiplies

the threat. Before launching into his nine pages of description, Gairdner first very carefully draws imaginary lines to place both himself and his reader on the 'safe' side of the division that he is creating. Gairdner places himself alongside the readers, and in opposition to the media and to educational and medical professionals, through the phrase 'we are al1 being grievously misled'. In contrast to the presumed professional credentials and professional integity of the specified professionals, Gairdner offers as his credentials merely the fact that he is a writer and a parent, but the very simplicity of his self-portrayal is meant to generate trust and empathy in the reader. The narned professions are accused of deception (through portraying as harmless what Gairdner daims is not harmless) and untruth. The noun 'people' is juxtaposed with the noun 'homosexuals', effectively defining homosexuals as non-persons, in contrast to the readers and Gairdner, who are the 'people7 who need the information that media, educational and rnedical professionals are denying them. Furthemore, the category 'normal sexuality' is denied to homosexual sexuality but is attributed to the 'people'. Anticipating that some people might point out that heterosexuals as well as homosexuals may carry out the activities he is about to list, Gairdner attempts to inoculate himself against accusation of unfaimess by interjecting a small disclaimer to the effect that some heterosexuals may aiso engage in activities such as those he catalogues in the chapter. The disclaimer, however, is little more than a meaningless gesture, as evidenced by the way in which he effectively excuses particular activities if done by heterosexuals and

condemns them if done by gays. Some argue that heterosexual people do lots of the things detailed below, too. And some do. But very few. And whereas a normal couple may engage in some unnatural behaviour as a matter of a ternporary detour or experiment, or in a fit of passion, or while intoxicated or usingdrugs, radical homosexuals choose such behaviours as a matter of routine and ideological preference. In doing so, they position themselves as alien and opposed to the hurnan enterprise. (Gairdner 1492: 387) The eadier attempt to isolate the readers from the group he is about to condemn is reinforced in this excerpt. The category 'normal couple' is juxtaposed with the category 'radical homosexuals'. Furthemore, acknowledgïng that so-called 'normal couples' may do the same things that he is condemning 'radical homosexuals' for doing, he creates a senes of excuses for the former group, including a fit of passion, intoxication, or drug use. This allows him to maintain a definition of these behaviours as abnomat, by attributing them to abnormal or exceptional circumstances when camed out by hetemsexuals, without alienating any of his heterosexual readers who may engage in those behaviours themselves. In contrast, the sarne activities are portrayed as routine and even idealogically preferred when carried out by homosexuals. The 'othering' of gay men (since the activities are described as specifically pertaining to gay men, not to lesbians) reaches a pinnacle in the last line of the excerpt when gays are labelled 'alien' and placed in opposition to 'the human enterprise'. Gairdner, however, even dodges responsibility for calling gay men alien by attributhg agency to the gay men themselves as 'positioning themselves as alien'. Thus, whereas Gairdner is, in reality, taking it upon himself to viciously attack gay men, through his writing, discursively he is positioning himself as a responsible, dutiful parent compelled to reveal the perverse behaviours of a dangerous set of diens out to ham normal human people li ke hirnself and like his idealized reader. Although the text of Gairdner's description of alleged homosexual behaviours could be described at length and in detail on several different levels, to do so in the context of this discussion would almost be to glorify what Gairdner has written by paying it undue attention, with little benefit either academically or morally. The following discussion of Gairdner's use of transitivity is more than adequate to reveal the nature of his attribution of violence and disease to gay male sexual activity. Transitivitv The images of homosexuals presented by Gairdner, chosen to maximize the image of homosexuality as violent and unhealthy, can perhaps best be understood in the context of a discussion of Gairdner's use of transitivity, in a manner parallel to the discussion of transitivity and feminism in Chapter 2 above.6 In contrast to feminists, who are given little agency but much responsibility for causing homosexuality, gays are often placed as agents of transitive clauses and especially as agents of violent acts. Taken togetber, this paints a picture of gay men as actively canying out material processes, especially those resulting in real or perceived hmor injury, The excerpts in this section are al1 taken from Gairdner 1992, Chapter 13: "Radical Homosexuals vs. the Family".

"[Canadian homosexuals*]increasinply strident platform" (1992: 357)

"The issue is that homosexuals have broken the implicit pact of a conservative society, which has always been to tolerate unnatud private behaviour, but never to approve of it; nor allow it any public weight; and certainly never to force acceptance of it upon the citizens at large." (1992: 357) "homosexuals are in tentionall y attacking this pact9*(1992 357) "radical homosexuals want to destroy the natural family [. . .] they clamour [. . .]" (1992: 361) 'Thus, proponents of the activist group Queer Nation go public, feverishly chanting: 'We're Queer! We're Roud! We're Fabulous! ' and threatening, like Toronto mernber Greg Pavelich, that 'we're not going to be good little boys and girls any more."' (1992: 369) "Young male homosexuals (14-21) commit suicide at two to three times the rate of heterosexuals [Pedcanics,June 1991 1" ( 1992 375) "a long and continuing homosexual carnpaign to alter the way the public thinks, by controlling the way it is allowed to speak and to read." (1992: 377)

"But what homosexuals wanted was a word that elevated their behaviour to an admirable status, and they achieved this by taking a perfectly good English word - now off-limits to normal people -- and appropriating it for their specific use." (1992: 377; talking about the word "gay")

"Once they have defined themselves anew by rejecting society's genenc bhornosexual' label and established the 'dignity ' of being 'gay,' the next choice was to position normal people as frightened, bigoted, and irrational. This was achieved by inventing the nonsensical but extremely effective word 'homophobic' and usinp it like a grenade to throw at anyone who dared to utter the slightest negative opinion." (1992: 377) "But the major thmt of the homosexual movement in Our society -- and in this respect it is a rnovement of the liberal left -- is to destroy al1 moral hierarchy so that homosexuals cm escape cnticism." ( 1992: 378)

"They needed to find a word which suggested that just as the magnetic forces of the earth pull the compas needle to North, sornething called 'sexual orientation' directs homosexuals to indulge in the behaviours they enjoy as if they were a natural fact of life. Homosexuals have thus imported the notion of 'moral equivalence' into the 'orientation' dialogue, and even attempted to justify it scientifically" (1992: 379)

"But as they are out in the open promoting their 'life-style' as good for your kicis and mine, they've declared war against the farnily" (1992: 38T) ''And whereas a normal couple may engage in some unnahird behaviour as a rnatter of a temporary detour or experiment, or in a fit of passion, or while intoxicated or using drups: radical homosexuals chwse such barren behaviours as a matter of routine and ideological preference." (1992 387) "they perpetrate between one-third and one-half of al1 child molestations (Los Angeles Times survey, August 26,1985). and [. . .] homosexual teachers commit between 25 and &O percent of al1 pupil molestations." (1992: 388) "likely to molest [. . .] homosexually assaulted [. . .] actively approached by adult homosexuals [. . .] perpetrators [. . .] killed [. . .] committed [. . .] raped, killed, then raped them dead, and ate parts of 15boys and young men*' (1992: 388-9) "Fully one-third admit to sado-masochisrn [. . .1 homosexuals frequently use whips and leather straps to tie up and beat, or 'punish,' their partners [. . .] they enjoy violent pomography [. . .] use [. . -1 are publicly beaten and 'sold' [. . -1 hurt, scratched, bniised andor bloodied [. . .] 'Gays hurt each other. They also hurt themselves. "' ( 1992: 389) "they seldom stop to disinfect and thus ingest fecal material [. . .] lickinp [. . .] inserting [. . .] admit to eating [. . -1 rubbing themselves with feces [. . .] ingest [. . .] unnating on their partners 1. . -1 defecating on them [. . .] drank urine [. . .] urinated on [. . .] ate feces [. . .] received spem" (1992: 394-395) There are 47 predicates in (41) - (57) that represent the category of material processes, 8 of which represent metaphorical rather than literal actions: 'have broken the implicit pact' (42); 'are intentionally attacking this pact' (43); 'to destroy the natural farnily'

(44); 'taking a perfectly good English word' (48); 'like a grenade to throw at' (49); 'to destroy al1 moral hierarchy ', 'can escape criticism' (50);'have imported the notion' (51). The remaining material processes represent literal rather than figurative activities:

' homosexuals commit suicide' (46); 'indulge in the behaviours' (51); 'perpetrate child molestations', 'homosexual teachers commit pupil molestations' (54); 'likely to molest' 'assaulted', 'killed', 'committed', 'raped, killed, then raped them dead', 'ate' (55); 'use whips', 'tie up', 'beat', 'punish', 'use', 'are publicly beaten and "sold"', 'hurt',

'scratched', 'bniised' ,' bloodied' ,' hurt each other' , 'hurt themselves' (56);'seldom stop to disinfect', 'ingest', 'licking', 'inserting', 'eating', 'rubbing', 'ingest', 'urinating on', 'defecating on', 'drank' , 'uiinated on', 'ate' , 'received spem' (57). With the possible exception of the processes 'escape' and 'import', al1 these material processes, whether they are used literally or figuratively, convey violent or at the very least unhealthy (e.g. 'ingest fecal material') acts. This chapter paints a picture of homosexual men as violent and dangernus, a picture which is no&altered by the disclaimer Gairdner makes near the beginning of chapter 13. So this chapter is not about homosexual individuals who are minding their own business. Nor is it intended to hurt the feelings of otherwise proper homosexual citizens, many of whom are themselves extremely distraught by homosexual behaviour and the radical agenda. (Gairdner 1992: 357) The import of this dixlaimer is lost completely since throughout the chapter, Gairdner attributes actions simply to 'homosexuds', effectively painting al 1 homosexuals with the same bmsh.

Of the verbal processes attributed to homosexuals, several connote violence and aggression, as the following exarnples demonstrate: 'chanting'. 'threatening' (45); '"homophobic" . . . using it' (49); 'to justify it' (51); 'promoting', 'declared war' (52); 'admit to' (56). The mental processes attnbuted to homosexuals are closely linked to the verbalization processes and tend to coocem homosexuals' purported efforts to justify themselves and their actions and to convince other people to accept their views and actions.

Thus we get: 'homosexuals want [to destroy]' (44); 'to alter the way the public thinks', 'controlling' (47); 'wanted . . . a word', 'appropnating it' (48); 'defined', 'rejecting', 'to position', 'inventing' (49); 'needed to find a word', 'enjoy', 'attempted [to justify]' (51); 'choose' (53); 'enjoy' (56). The only relational process assigned to homosexuals is 'they are out in the open' (52), but even that is linked to the verbalization processes 'promoting their "life-style"' and 'declared war' (52). To surnmarize, in excerpts (41) - (57), homosexuals are associated 47 times with material processes. many of which represent acts of violence (see esp. 54 - 57),7 times with verbalization processes, 14 times with mental processes, and only once with relational processes. Even without further analysis, the contrast between the types of processes altributed to gays and the types attributed to feminists (10 material, 9 verbalization, 4 mental, and 5 relational -- see Chapter 2 above) is both striking and suggestive. Whereas feminists are most often assigned predicates that literally or metaphorically pertain to verbalization, gays are most frequently assigned roles in matenal processes which are hi@ in transitivity and which often connote violence or aggression. The effect of this is that while feminism is portrayed as an abstract threat concerning the expression of ideas, homosexuality is portrayed as an actual, physical threat. Gairdner may be attempting to generate disdain toward ferninists, but he is evidently out to generate fear and loathinp of homosexuals, particularly gay men. Damning gays (since he large ignores lesbians in this discussion) as perverse, and attempting to generate feelings of revulsion among readers by his unfair and prejudicial association of gays with paedophilia, bestiality, and violence, Gairdner works to generate panic and fear among readers by portraying gays as dangerous not just to themselves, but to the health and well-king of the public at large. Sample Analvsis The passage chosen for analysis in this section by no means represents the most extreme example of Gairdner's homophobic discourse. In fact, it represents some of Gairdner's least 'outrageous' anti-gay writing. The choice not to present here a sample analysis of Gairdner's most extreme discourse is deliberate. It is relatively easy for even non-academic readers to identify how statements such as "1 should state rny view that as citizens of a free country, homosexuals ought to have the same legal protections as any other citizen, as long as they keep their proclivities to themselves, but never the same privileges" (1992: 356) are offensive to and discriminatory against homosexuals, but sornetirnes it is the more rational-sounding and seemingly 'neutral' discourse which is the more insidious, precisely because readers will not be as likely to realize that through reasonable-sounding prose they are being led toward a hornophobic position. The passage is taken from the rniddle of a #page chapter entitled "Radical Homosexuals vs. the Farnily" and constitutes one complete sub-section of the chapter. Prior to the section quoted and analyzed here, Gairdner discusses homosexuality under the following main section headings: How Equal "Rights" Undermine Social Values; Getting

the Same Rights; Born, Made, or Homosexual by Choice? Under the last of these, there are four sub-sections: Born Homsen

Excerpt from The War Against the Family, Ch. 13: Radical Homosexuals vs. the Family, (pp. 369-70). The A uthor's Mode1

1 My view is that any human population could be made homosexual

2 under certain extreme conditions. For example, a group of young 3 children with no pnor sexual knowledge, raised on a desert island 4 by a homosexual, would likely end up fancying homosexual behavi-

5 our themselves. In other words, it is quite possible to train a young 6 population to like homosexual behaviour. What prevents this from 7 happening on a large scale are the social sanctions against it.

8 Societies intentionally suppress homosexual behaviour so that such 9 extreme situations cannot arise.

10 Secondly, there may be very small numbers of people with a

11 predisposition, however caused, to choose homosexual behaviour. 12 Notice that 1 used al1 the modets here. Some may be predisposed, in the way an alcoholic may be predisposed to dnnk if dnnk is available. But nothing except personal desire makes the bottle (or the penis) jump into the mouth. After all, al1 societies have people

with predispositions to al1 sorts of weird appetites and behaviours, whether homosexuality, suicide, drunkenness, killing, stealing, overeating, or bad temper. This has always been so, and it is not going to go away. We are only going to exhaust ourselves trying to figure out why, and we likely will always wind up in a conflict of expertise in which biased experts with warrïnp political agendas dispute each other's findings for eternity. It's a dead end.

In a passage of 230 words, there are three personal pronouns which can have human referents (Le. 'it' is excluded from consideration in this case), the first occumng as the first word of the passage. The passage opens with the phrase 'my view' (italics added). The personal possessive pronoun 'my' is in marked contrast to the impersonal fom of the sub-heading '?Xe Author T Model', and the use of this pronoun suggests that he is about to present a view that is different in some way from the three theories he has presented in the preceding sub-sections of the chapter. It also sigaals that the author is stepping away from traditional impersonal academic style and is foregrounding himself as author over the ideas he is presenting, since the noun phrase 'my view' fomsthe subject of the main clause, with the view itself being relegated to a subordinate clause. The proposition of the subordinate clause, which constitutes the substance of Gairdner's view is that, "any human population could be made homosexual under certain extreme conditions" (lines 1 - 2). On its own, this clause conveys a modality of validity, reflecting a high degree of certainty and confidence on the part of the writer. 'Any population' defines the broadest possible range of humanity, potentially including not just 'other' people, but also the reader and even the wri ter himself. Gairdner thus presents homosexuality as something which the readers cannot afford to ignore, since, according to him, they themselves could be vulnerable to king made homosexual 'under certain extreme conditions'. In one sense, by adding the qualifying phrase 'under certain extreme conditions', Gairdner mitigates the modality slightl y, but Iater in the chapter and in the following chapters, Gairdner argues that daycare centres constitute the sorts of 'extreme conditions' that generate

homosexuality, ço in practice, the qualifier does not significantly reduce the modal strength of the assertion Gairdner is making. On its own, Gairdner's proposition makes a very strong daim, one for which he lacks supporting empirical evidence. Thus, he utilizes the syntax, placing his proposition in a subordinate clause, together with the personalized

pronoun (my) in the main clause to alter the modality of the opening sentence of the passage such that he is not making an empirical claim, but rather is expressing his proposition in the form of an opinion. In the second sentence of the passage (lines 2 - 3,Gairdner gives an example to illustrate the daim he makes in the first sentence. The opening, 'for exarnple', implies that he has selected one possible example from among a number of possible ones, although no other examples are given in this section of the book. Gairdner then preseats as his example a scenario which is so unlikely as to be absurd: a group of young children raised on a desert island by a homosexual. Nevertheless, as absurd as this scenario is, it will serve subsequently as part of the foundation of ideas and impressions upon which Gairdner will rely in trying to argue that homosexuals working in daycare centres are likely to 'cause' inordinate numbers of children to become homosexuals themselves. In the sample passage above, Gairdner suggests a cause-and-effect relationship between the sexuaI orientation of a care-giver and the sexual orientation of the children who are king cared for. Perhaps Gairdner is aware of the research which finds that children raised by gay or lesbian parents are no more likely to be homosexuals than are children raised by heterosexual parents, for he modalizes his proposition considerably. He writes that this hypothetical set of children "would likely end up fancying homosexuai behaviour themselves" (lines 4 - 5). The degree of certainty is mitigated by the modal adverb 'likely', which allows for the possibility of doubt. Gairdner also stops short of asserting that such children would become homosexuals, claiming instead t hat they would likel y 'fancy ' homosexual behaviour, a somewhat weaker claim. However, even rnodalized as it is to include no direct cause-and-effect assertion, this sentence contains sorne insidious implications. As he establishes the scenario, the desert island contains one adult (presumed to be male since Gairdner uses 'homosexual' for males, but 'lesbian' for fernales) and two or more children. The children are presumably quite young since they have no prior sexual knowledge. In agricultural cultures, children are likely to be aware of the mating habits of anirnals from the time they are very young. In cultures such as that of present-day Canada and most other industrialized Western countries, children are bombarded with sexual imagery and sexual information (and misinformation) through the masmedia almost from the day they are bom. Thus, Gairdner may have some trouble in making a plausible claim to even being able to find such a group of naive children and if be found them, they would be very young indeed. For the sake of argument, one might accept that such children exist, and that somehow they become stranded on a desert island with just one adult, who happens to be a homosexual man. If the caregiver is the only adult, then he would have no available adult sexual partner with whom the children might observe him engaging in sexual acts. That being the

case. then how could he model for tbem these 'homosexual behaviours' they purportediy grow to fancy? The answer is cleail Gairdner is implyinp that the adult will engage in sexud acts with the children. Tnus, even without saying it expiicitly, Gairdner is planting in the reader's mind an irnpIication that homosexuals are paedophiles, and that in the scenario, the homosexual care-@ver would deliberately expose the children to homosexuai acts. This implication is made more explicit in the third sentence of the passage (lines 5 - 6),"In other words, it is quite possible to train a young population to like homosexual behaviour". The verb 'to train' implies a conscious and deliberate teaching, together with practice in the behaviour. The implication behind the assertion that children may be trained to like homosexual behaviour is that homosexuality is an acquired preference, not something that wouId arise spontaneously. Sentences 4 and 5 (lines 6 - 9) tum the reader's attention away from the hypothetical example and back to the 'real world'. Both sentences utilize a modaiity of validity that is neither emphasized nor mitigated, which constitutes a sort of 'unmarked' expsitory style. In terms of the content of these sentences, Gairdner rnay be reassuring the readers that societies prevent 'this' (the child abuse implied by sentence 3), but he qualifies the assertion through the phmse 'on a large scale' (line 7) in such a way that he

suggests that such abuse occurs on a small saleand that homosexuals must therefore still

be considered a threat. This suggestion is then, presumably, meant to justify what is asserted in sentence 8, which is that societies intentionally suppress homosexual behaviour.

This amounts tojustifying the persecution of homosexuals on the bais of a preposterous hypothetical scenario involving people stranded on a desert island. In the space of nine short lines. Gairdner has therefore moved the reader from an empirically unjustifiable proposition, through a preposterous hypothetical situation, to an unsubsbntiated generalization about children being trained to become homosexuals, and theo to a justification for persecuting homosexuals on no grounds other than their homosexuality. Sentence 6 (lines 10 - 11) asserts that "[s]econdly . there may be very small numbers of people with a predisposition, however caused, to choose homosexual behaviour". In context, what Gairdner designates using 'secondly7 might be tter be designated using 'secondanly', not only because of its secondary position, but also because the content of its propositions, namely, that some homosexuals rnay be born, not 'trained' to be that way, is so heavily modalized and modified that any positive content it might convey is obliterated in the para,pph which forms its immediate context. The main verb is rnodified by the modal verb 'rnay', which serves to introduce an element of doubt conceming the rnith value of the proposition to follaw. If Gairdner actually believed that sorne people are bom homosexual, then he would presumably not introduce doubt through the modal 'rnay'. As sentences such as 4 and 5 above demonstrate, Gairdner has no disinclination to màke bald, unmodalized assertions, so the use of 'may' in this case cannot be taken as either accidental or without significance. It is as if Gairdner is only gmdgingly admittinp the possibility that his earlier view might not be completely valid. Gairdner continues in sentence 6 with the noun phrase 'very small numbers of people'. A more neutral way of writing this rnight have been to say 'some people', but Gairdner diminishes the possible significance of the identifieci group of people by specifyinp that they are a 'very small' group. A small group would seem to be fewer people than 'some' people, and a very small group would seem to be insignificant in number and therefore in importance. Gairdner thus conveys to the reader an impression that if such people exist at all, they are too insignificant for him (or by implication for the reader) to bother with. As sentence 6 continues, the impression becomes even stronger that however it may appear on the surface, Gairdner is not actually conceding any of the ground he staked out in asserting his views on the origin of homosexuality. The very srnall group of people whose existence he may concede are said to potentiaily have a 'predisposition' in the direction of homosexuality. (The implications of the term 'predisposition' will be elaborated on below, when sentences 8 through 10 are examined.) This concession of Gairdner's is only apparent, not mal, as the context makes clear. In sentence 6, 'predisposition' is modified by the tmncated passive clause, 'however caused'. It may be possible to read this truncated passive as an indication that Gairdner is maintaining an open mind about the causes of hornosexuality, but a more plausible reading is that 'however caused' is intended to negate altopther the notion that people may be inherently predisposed to hornosexuality (Le. that it rnay be imate and not, therefore, caused). By reasserting the notion of causation, Gairdner in effect retums to his original position that homosexuals are created, under the influence of other homosexuals. Finally, the notion that homosexuality may be imate in some individuals is once again denied by Gairdner through his insistence that the predisposition (if such exists) is not to be homosexual, but rather 'to choose homosexual behaviour'. Thus, Gairdner's apparent concession of a second possible explanation for homosexuality is actually no concession at dl, but is simply a thinly disguised restatement of his original views. Sentence 7 (line 12), "Notice that 1 use al1 the rnodels here", is remarkable in at least three ways. First, the sentence contains the second use of a first-person singular pronoun in this passage. Gairdner is still particularizing what he is asserting as being identifiably his views, not necessarily those of anyone else. Second, the sentence has the form of an imperative, addressing the reader directly, in contrast to al1 the other sentences in the passage (and most in the book) which are indicative rather than imperative in mood.

Third, w hat is asserted is that Gairdner 'used ail the models' . One is forced to wonder why Gairdner would stand back from his argument to inteject this injunction that the reader notice his use of the three models presented in previous sections of the book as possible explanations of the origins of homosexuality. The impression created by this sentence is that either someone, perhaps his editor or publisher, has advised Gairdner that he cannot ignore different theories about hornosexuality and go entirely his own way, or that if no one has done this yet, Gairdner anticipates that they wilI, so he is seeking to head off possible criticisms that he is asserting his own theories without taking other views or arguments into account. Ether way, this intejection of an irnperative suggests that Gairdner is conscious of the fact that his views run counter to the theories offered by others about the origins or causes of homosexuality. In order to understand more comptetely Gairdner's use of the noun 'predisposition' in sentence 6, one must look to sentences 8 through 10 (lines 12-18). In sentence 8, a 'predisposition' to homosexuality is equated with a predisposition for an alcoholic to drink if drink is available. By equating homosexuality with alcoholism, Gairdner pathologizes it and presents it as inherently harmful and unhealthy. Gairdner then portrays both alcoholism and homosexuality as simply rnatters of desire. "But nothing except personal desire makes the bottle (or the penis) jump into the mouth" (sentence 9, lines 14 - 15). The assertion 'nothing except' conveys a strong modaiity of certainty and leaves no room for evidence or argument to the contrary. such as evidence that alcoholism may be a disease with a physiological basis, or that sexual orientation may be something over which a person has no control and which is innate. Still not satisfied that he has sufficiently denigrated homosexuals, in sentence 10 Gairdner collocates 'predispositions', the noun he has used in connection with homosexuality, with 'al1 sorts of weird appetites and behaviours' (line 16). The assertion that homosexuality amounts to appetites and behaviours is consistent with what he has said before, but now homosexuality, and by extension homosexual people, are denigrated as 'weird'. At this point in the passage, Gairdner is dropping al1 pretence of presenting any sort of rational argument and is merely expressing his disgust with hornosexuality. The impression that Gairdner is engaging here in an undisguised attack on homosexuality is strengthened by the iist of items with which he collocates hornosexuality in exemplifying what he describes as weird: suicide, drunkenness, killing, stealing, overeating, and bad ternper (lines 17 - 18). What the items in this collocational set have in comrnon is that they al1 represent negative states or activities. Beyond that, there are subsets of items from the list that may be related, but the list as a whole does not form any particularly natural or transparent set. Killinp and stealing both constitute illepl acts. Suicide and killinp both pertain to death. Drunkennw

(not alcoholism, which despite Gairdner's suggestion to the contrary is about more than just appetite) and overeating both pertain to indulgence in the appetites of the plate andh the gullet. Bad temper cannot be linked in any apparent way with any of the other items in the list, nor can homosexuality. Nevertheless, there is a strong tendency for a readerfhearer to attempt to find some semantic link between items enumerated within a list. The negative judgement made about al1 the items in the list is the only obvious link. Still, linking homosexuality with such things as overeating and bad temper serves to trivialize it and hold it up to ridicule. In spite of the preposterous nature of the daims that Gairdner makes about homosexuality, he inserts sentence Il (lines 18 -19) to try to impose a measure of seriousness and validity to his assertions: "This has always been so and it is not going to go away". At this point in the passage Gairdner begins to move away from the particularization implied by his use of the first person singutar, toward a claim for univenality. Sentence 11 offers the claim that his assertions are universally true across dl times, and sentence 12 (lines 19 - 22) then moves from first person singular to first person

plural, as if to imply that what started out as Gairdner's view is king extended to encompass a larger group: "We are only going to exhaust ourselves trying to figure out

why, and we likely will always wind up in a conflict of expertise in which biased experts

with wamng political agendas dispute each other's findings for eternity". The context does not explicitty indicate whether the pronoun 'we' (used twice) is intended to include or to exclude the reader, but given that just seven lines earlier, the reader was addressed in an imperative clause, the default assumption is that the reader is meant to include himherself in the pronoun. Either way, whether or not the intention or the outcome is that the reader include hidhenelf, Gairdner does broaden the agency of his claims by moving from a singular to a plural pronoun. Sentence 12 asserts that seeking to uncover the causes of any of the items in his 'weird' list, including homosexuality, is futile and would only generate unending academic debate; however, in keeping with his generai disdain for academics,

Gairdner seizes the opportunity to paint thern in as negative a Iight as possible. The experts

are described as 'biased', sornething they might (if they are at al1 self-aware) acknowledge, but in charging them with bias, Gairdner appears to be irnplying that they are biased while he is not. Furthemore, academic research into homosexuality is tnviaiized as being based on 'warring political agendas'. Gairdner thus reintroduces one of the recurrent metaphors of his book, war. It is the 'experts' (Gairdner's term for academic researchers) who are warring here, an assertion which tends to deflect attention away from the fact that in this chapter and in the next, Gairdner is warring relentlessly against hornosexual persons. The final sentence of the passage under anal ysis States, "It' s a dead end" (line 22). The context would lead to an interpretation that the academic debate is a dead end, but that in tum leads to an interpretation that fmding out the ongins or causes of homosexuality is a dead end. An interpretation that is not mled out by the context is also that homosexuality is itself a dead end, and this interpretation is in fact consistent with Gairdner's use elsewhere of imagery of death in connection with homosexuality. The passage analyzed in this section constitutes only a very small sample of the many pages that Gairdner has written about homosexuality, but this analysis is sufficient to demonstrate the range of devices that Gairdner employs in his anti-homosexual rhetoric: lexical choices, metaphor, rnoûali ty, syntax, mood, modali ty, pronoun choice, colIocation and implication. Concl usion The scorn Gairdner expresses toward feminists in the expression of his sexist views, serious as it is, pales in companson to the vituperation he pours out in the propagation of his homophobic agenda. Marguerite Moritz discusses the situation in the U.S.A. in "The Gay Agenda: Marketing Hate Speech to Mainstream Media," but her observations are applicable to Gairdner's ad-gay propaganda, especially since so many of the sources he relies on are. in fact, American. Noting that the religious right has had little success in appealing to the gened public when it has used Biblical arguments to condemn homosexuals, Moritz notes a different approach taken by other elements on the right:

By contrast, the Radical Right has ken more effective with its antigay efforts when it has reframed the arguments as a "special rights" issue, obscured its relipious motivations and connections, toned down its language, and focuseci its attack on iadividuals and groups that most critically challenge conventional standards for public behaviour and cultural expression." (Moritz 1995: 58) This description echoes Gairdoer's own strategy in attacking homosexuals as a marginal but dangerous and perverted special interest group, In reality, homosexuals reflect the same range of diversity as heterosexuals do in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, and politics. They are also diverse in their sexual practices, as are heterosexuals. Yet Gairdner dismisses the majority of homosexuals and then presents a gruesome and often violent picture of 'homosexual behaviour' as if it represented the nom.

And 1 know that there are a lot of respectable, kind-hearted, talented homosexuals out there. But that's not the issue here. The issue is that homosexuals have broken the implicit pact of a conservative society, which has always been to tolerate unnatural private behaviour, but never to approve of it; nor allow it any public weight; and certainly never to force acceptance of it upon the citizens at large. [. . .] So this chapter is not about homosexual individuals who are minding their own business. Nor is it intended to hurt the feelings of otherwise pmper homosexual citizens, many of whom are themselves extremely distraught by homosexual behaviour and the radical agenda. (Gairdner 1992: 356 - 357) These condescending and insulting disclaimers in no way counter-balance the pages of negative and violent imagery which are presented to the readen as sirnply a description of 'homosexual behaviour'. The repeated pairing of homosexuality with paedophilia and with bestiality, the images of violence and disease, and the erroneous identification of AIDS as 'the gay plague' become indelibly imprinted in the mind of the reader even though they are distorted, exaggerated, and unrepresentative of gay practices and values. This treatrnent of homosexuals is consistent with one of the hate strategies identified by Whillock.

Another strategy the rhetor may use is to vilify the out-class in ways that make it difficult to elicit the support of others in mounting a response. The villains in a hate story must, therefore, be made to appear as evil, opposing the values of the audience. (Whillock 1995: 40) Some heterosexuals engage in paedophilia, bestiality and sado-masochisrn, as do some homosexuals. However, if the proverbial Martians were to land on earth to study human sexual practices. Gairdner would, no doubt, be outraged if they presented those practices as typical of human sexuality in their pan-galactic reports to other beings, with

merely a little disclaimer that certainly lots of humans don't actually molest children or animals or each other when they have sex, and oh, some of them may even be End-hearted and talented individuals. It is equally outrageou for Gairdner to portray homosexuality as if its diversity were reflected in the carefully-selected violent and unhealthy images that he presents of it. It is also possible that, being outside of the heterosexual procreative sexual framework, gays may mean and interpret each other's sexual behaviours in ways that are

beyond the ability of most heterosexuals to understand and appreciate. Moritz makes a

similar point about the way gay pride parades may be read differently by gays and lesbians themselves than by their heterosexual critics. Certainly gay pride parade images will be read differently by straight, white, conservadve audiences than they will be by gays and lesbians who are likely to view these events as queer performance, that is, an expression that may incorporate irony, camp, comedy,- coof;ontation of mainstream sexual mores, exohca, erotica, and more. By showing only those gays and lesbians who most critically challenge conventional standards for public behavior and cultural expression, the video implies that they represent the entire group. As many have pointed out, this is the equivalent of showing pictures of drunks during Mardi Gras to illustrate the lifestyle of white, heterosexual men. (Moritz 1995: 71)

Any sexual acts, including consensual penile-vaginal intercourse, can be made to appear disgusting if one chooses to portray them as such. Homosexuais are presented as one-dimensional beings entirely consumed by insatiable sexual desire, not as people. The reason that Gairdner presents them this way is clear: he wants to eradicate homosexuality altogether, so he works hsrd to discredit homosexuals. Gairdner has three main strategies for getting nd of homosexuality. His fint strategy is to get rid of feminism, since he thinks that feminism causes homosexuality. "It is no simple coincidence that homosexuality is thriving in a time of sexual egalitarianism and feminism. The two go together like the two sides of a coin" (Gairdner 1992: 3 18). Through a bizarre redefinition of 'polygyny', Gairdner equates polygyny with feminism: . . .ferninism, by default, has through its promotion of easy divorce and economic autonomy encouraged the creation of a system of legalized polygyny (what Martial, in Roman time, cailed "legalized adultery") -- one in which the strong men, over a lifetime, can have many younger partners. (Gairdner 1992: 3 19) He then continues, [i]n short, "polygyny produces homosexuality." [Gairdner's footnote 403 It does this both by li beralizing the choices of strong males (thus destroying the equal apportionment of mates, leaving too many men with a poor choice of fernales), and by setting the female ethos against the male ethos (thus encouraging a man-hating culture of sexual resentment -- and hordes of uncertain males who will turn to each other for sex, instead of to challenging fernates). (Gairdner 1992:3 19) Based on this (il)logic, if Gairdner can eradicate feminism and get al1 women to be submissive towards men, then the men won't be frightened of women and so they won't tum to each other. Furthemore, if sexual activity is restricted to a mamed couple ody (and it is up to women to enforce his ban on premantal and extramarital sex, since he thinks men are incapable of controlling themselves voluntarily), then in order to get sex, men will marry and have al1 their sexual needs met and they will not be tempted to look for whatever sex they can get, including sex with other men. In this way, much male homosexuality will be eliminated. As for lesbianism, Gairdner sees it as virtuaily synonymous with feminism, so eradication of feminism is, for Km,equivalent to eradication of lesbianism. Gairdner's second approach to eliminating homosexuals is to 'cure' them. In a compassionate society, we should do everything we cmto help such people recover normalcy (they will protest, absurdly, that homosexuality is "normal," too). In fact, there are many oreanizations, mostly religion-based, such as Exodus International, New Directions for Life (Toronto), and New Beginnings that specialize in this very chore of helping homosexuals recover. (Gairdner 1992: 373) Obviously, discussion of curing homosexuality presupposes that it is sorne sort of disease or addiction, analogous, perhaps to alcoholism or drug abuse. Recall his statement that "[s]ome may be predisposed, in the way an alcoholic rnay be predisposed to dnnk if dnnk is available" (1992: 370). That the evidence does not support this supposition does not deter Gairdner or the members of groups such as those he names. No doubt, after king subjected to their programmes or to intense psychiatric counselling, some people might stop practising homosexuality, but that cannot be used as evidence that they still may not be homosexual, nor can it be used, as Gairdner attempts to use it, as evidence that homosexuality is sirnply a matter of behavioral choices.

A third approach Gairdner would use in his campaign to eliminate homosexuality is to censor sex education programmes in schools so that they either teach against homosexuality and hold up married heterosexuality as the only acceptable sexual choice, or else simply avoid mentioning homosexuality entirely. Gai rdner's fourth method of eliminating homosexual ity is to make practising it illegal. In most nations sodomy, for example, is still illegal. However, the United States has dropped its law against sodorny in 24 states, and Canada dropped its antisodomy law in 1968. Anal intercourse is legal in Canada today, in private, but not in public, between any zwo (not more) consenting people over 18 (lowered from 22, in i985). There it is. Once such behaviour is legalized, other citizens cannot legally object to it, nor can they protest by withholding their services, nor cm they any longer tell their children it is iilegal. Had the people, instead of their political representatives, kenasked directly. this legalization could never have occurred. (Gairdner 1992: 374)

Along with advocating making certain sexual acts illegal, Gairdner proposes actively limiting the rights and freedoms of homosexuals. Although he 'ody' advocates repression of homosexuals, he writes approvingly of the oppression they are subjected to in China. This [claiming that homosexuals are curable] amounts to saying that al1 human societies have engaged in - and must continue to engage in -- a civilized repression of socially unsavoury behaviour as a matter of course, for the sake of self- protection and child protection. Some,like China and other socialist states, actually engage in oppression of such behaviour, which seems to do the job. (Gairdner 1992: 374) Gairdner seems to recognize, even as he tries to deny it, that some people may simply be homosexual: "there may be very small numbers of people with a predisposition, however caused, to choose homosexual behaviour" (1992: 370). By trivializing homosexuality through collocating it with bad temper, and by cnminalizing it by equating it with stealing and killing (see analysis of sample passage above), Gairdner attempts to justify his contention that homosexuals are not entitled to the full range of benefits available to other people in our society. He states unequivocally, "1 should state my view that as citizens of a free country. homosexuals ought to have the same legal protections as any other citizen, as long as they keep their proclivities to themselves, but never the same privileges" (Gairdner 1992: 356). Gai rdner advocates, in effect, designating homosexuals as second-class citizens and repressing them such that they must hide their tnie identities in public.

Clearly, in the case of homosexuality, it is far better for a normal society to be unfair to homosexuals in the name of its own social health, than to be unfair to the entire society in the name of faimess to homosexuals (or any other pressure group). (Gairdner 1992: 36 1) Such discourse can and must be identified as nothing less than homophobic propaganda. Chapter 4 Racist Discourse

Introduction Racial and ethnie discrimination in discourse has been a central concern of critical linguistics and critical discoune analysis since their inception. More recently, an entire issue of Discourse & Society (Vol. L 1(1), January 20)was devoted to papers dealing with aspects of raciçrn in discourse. This chapter will examine aspects of Gairdner's writings, arguing that they constitute discourse that is racist against the French in general and French Canadians in particular, and against non-European immigrants to Canada.

At the outset, it is necessary to define how the terms 'race', 'racist', and 'racism' are king used in this chapter, and indeed, how they are typically used within critical discourse analysis. In its narrow sense, 'race' may be taken to reier to a group of people from a distinct genetic stock, and may populady be used to delineate categones of humans such as 'blacks' , 'whites' ,'Chinese', etc., who display characteristic physical features which distinguish them from other 'races'. Frank Reeves, in Brirish Racial Discourse

(1993),explores the meaning of the tenn 'race', noting that it encompasses social as well as phy sical or genetic denotations. He w rites, [tlhe sociologist's approach has ken to study the definition of 'race' in popular usage in a given society. 'Race', then, is seen to be a social classification based primarily on perception of physical differences, although these physical differences need not be demonstrably geneticall y based. (Reeves 1993: 8) While this view of race explicitly acknowledges that race is a socially constnicted category rather than a biological one, it is nevertheless incomplete in that it does not adequateiy reflect the range of cultural, as well as physical, traits which trigger discriminatory behaviour in humans. Ruth Wodak, a prominent critical discourse amlyst, drawing in part on work by Guillaumin (1991)' lists the following examples of traits that functioo as 'race' in ternis of generating racist attitudes and behavioun or acting as rationalizations for such attitudes and behaviours: 1. physical traits (real or attributed ones such as skin, hair color, sex, and physiognomy), for example, the darker skin and hair color of some Rumanians or Jews; 2. spiritual-cultural features or sociohistoncally acquired traits; 3. religion (Musiims, Jews); 4. nationality (Arnericans, Israelis); 5. social traits; 6. socioeconomic features such as the economic system or prosperity (economic refugees, East Gerrnans oss sis"]); and 7. politics (Communists). (Wodak t 997: 70) This list encompasses far more than just genetic or physiological differences between groups of people. Teun van Dijk sirniiarly includes more in the notion of 'race' and 'racism' than a strict definition of these terms might predict-

It should be emphasized from the outset that our conception of racism also includes emcism, that is, a system of ethnic group dominance based on cultural critena of categorization, differentiation, and exclusion, such as those of language, religion, customs, or worldviews. Often racial and ethnic cntena are inextrïcabiy linked in these systems of group dominance, as is the case in anti-Semitism. Following oened academic and political usage we therefore will generally use the term rucism kherthan ethnicism in this book. (van Dijk 19mb: 5)

In a more recent (joint) article, van Dijk etd reiterate the custom of using 'racism' rather

than 'ethnicism' within CDA, specifying that the term 'racism', "also includes various forms of ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism, xenophobia and " (van Dijk etal 1997: 146). Thus, in this dissertation, consistent with the nom in CDA, the concept of 'ethnicism' wiH be subsumed under the term 'racism'. No discussion of research on racist discourse could do less than acknowledge the central deplayed by Teun A. van Dijk within the field. In his fiat book on this therne,

Prejudice in Discourse: An Anulysis of Ethnic Prejudice in Cognition and Conversation (van Dijk lm),the author presents and anaiyzes data gathered as part of a larger interdisciplinary study on prejudice carried out at the University of Amsterdam. The data

consist of interviews which were conducted in Dutch, but which were subsequently translated into English. Although translating data and drawinp conclusions based on

translations cm be problematic, the concept of prejudice, dong with the general sorts of discourse moves involved in communicating prejudice do bear translation, and subsequent studies by van Dijk and others on English and on other languages have demonstrated that while individual languages may show particular borammaticai or lexical features not shared by other languages, some of the broader strategies of communicatinp racism are found across a range of different languages. For exarnple, van Dijk identifies a strategy of 'concession' used by one interviewee, citing the clause "foreigners, they are also people" as an exarnple of this strategy (van Dÿk 1984: 12). Regardless of whether this clause is spoken in English or in Dutch, the strategy of 'concession' is apparent as the speaker attempts to mitigate prejudiced attitudes about foreigners with this assertion of the humaaity of the foreigners. In fact, one of the remarkable features of prejudiced talk, whether that be racist, ethnicist, sexist or homophobic talk, is that comparable bmad discourse strategies are used by speakers of different languages, a fact which enhances the credibility of the observations made in individual studies of particular languages. Van Dijk's writings on prejudiced talk, racist discoune, and on cnticai discourse analysis as an approach and a theory are prolific in both Dutch and English. In addition to his analyses of spoken discourse, which includes work on parliamentary discourse (van Dijk 1997a), van Dijk has done extensive work on racism in written discourse, particularly with respect to written news accounts (see, for example, van Dijk 1988a, 1988b, 198&, 1991, 1993b, 19%), and also with respect to school textbooks (van Dijk I99.a). Racism is not the exclusive property of the privileged classes of society, but for van Dijk and others engaged in critical discourse anaîysis, the primary concem is the racism that gets expressed by society's elites, not that which may be expressed by the downtrodden and oppressed

themselves. In the introduction to van Dijk (1995b), "Elite Discourse and the Reproduction of Racism", the editon note that "although elites cloak their language in tolerance, they linpuistically institutionalize the dominance of white groups over rnultiethnic components of society" (Whillock and Slayden 1995: 2). It is because the eli tes inchde the media, politicians, and educators, in particular, that their racism haa disproportionate effect on society as whole, given their numben. These elites control the public flow of information, not just in tems of content, but also in terms of affect, and so even their subtle racism can

have an impact on the attitudes of a majority of people in their society. In a series of books and articles published during the 1990's, van Dijk focusses explicitly on the nature of elite

racism and on its manifestations in discourse (for exarnple, van Dijk 1992, 1993b 1995b, 19%). These and other discussions of elite racism shed light on the nature of William Gairdner's discourse, in spite of the fact that none of them deal with the particular genre that Gairdner writes (Le. non-fiction popula.books).

Another European researcher who has also made significant contributions to the study of racisrn in discourse is Ruth Wodak. Wodak studies the nature of racist, including anti-semitic, discourse in Austria, focussing especially on media discourse and the discourse of politicians (see, for exarnple, Wodak 1991, 19%, 1947, and Wodak and

Matouschek 1993). Wodak's primary sources of data are German, but like van Dij k, she has published widely in Engiish and many of the discourse strategies that she observes in

Austrian Geman are consistent with those used in other languages, includinp English. Wodak challenges the notion that contemporary Austria is free of racial prejudice in general, and of anti-semitism in particular, by demonstratinp that even though Nazi-style overt racism is iargeiy absent, more covert foms of racism litter the public discourse of the media and of politicians. Racism and racist discourse have also been studied and theorized as they occur in Britain, particularly in the media and in the discourse of politicians. The Thatcher era in Great Britain has been characterized by Gill Seidel as having a "climate of creeping authoritarianism, sexism and racism" (Seidel 198&: 7; see also Seidel 1988b) and by Norman Fairclough as rejecting post-war Cooservatism and as setting out "to swing the political spectrum and the limits of acceptable political action decisively to the right"

(Fairclough 1989: 177). Thatcherisrn has provided rich fodder for researchers working in critical linguistics and critical discoune analysis. Utilizing British examples of ethnicist and racist discourse, Mary Sykes (1985) outlines several linguistic devices that can contribute to the creation of discrimination in discourse, including syntactic configurations (especially transitivity) and semantics (in particular, lexical choices). Sykes' definition of discrimination in discourse (quoted below in this paragraph) is particularly useful, although as she herself admits, it is not always a straightfonvard task to establish whether or not her three criteria are met in every given case of apparently discnminatory discourse. In order to demonstrate that an act of discrimination agsnst a racial or ethnic group has occurred, three things need to be shown: (1) that differential treatment of two or more parties has occurred; (2) that this is les favorable to one of the parties; and (3) that the grounds for the differential treatment were racial or ethnic ones (rather than some other characteristic of the party that is relevant to the social act in question). (Sykes 1985: 83)

Although in this quotation Sykes lirnits the grounds for discriminatory differential treatment to race and ethnicity, her three criteria can be extended to include other grounds of discrimination, such as age, (dis)abiIity, social class, sexual orientation, and sex (see King etal 1991: 2-3,for an example how this definition has been adapted to issues of sexism in language). Sykes (1988) uses critical linguistics to examine and evaluate official discourse produced by the Cornmunit- Relations Commission in Britain (part of the Commission for Racial Equaiity). She argues that "[tlhe [. . .] 'language of race relations' [. . .] provides an account of race in Britain that is possibly dangerous to the long-tem welfare of blacks, and involves a depiction of blacks that, though intended to evoke sympathy, degrades their status as full social actors in the social world" (Sykes 1988: 176 -17'7). Sykes calls this pmess 'the welfarization of race', a process in which the systemic discrimination which produces social inequality and disadvantage for blacks in Britain is transformed discursively into the 'problems' of individual black persons and is then addressed through welfare programmes rather than through addressing the underlying social structures which produce a racial underclass. Gill Seidel's research focusses on rninority groups in Bri tain (in which she includes women, who, while not numencal a minority, suffer some of the same sorts of marginalization as ethnic and racial minonties do) and on "the different nature and weight of majority and rninonty discourses" (Seidel 1988~:8). By 'minority' discoune, Seidel (following Guillaumin 1972) means the discourse produced by relatively powerless groups (Seidel 198Ek: 8),and by 'majority' discourse she means something comparable to what van Dijk describes as elite discourse - the discourse generated by the economic and political elites and propagated through the rnainstream media. Among the discourse strategies used by the elites, Seidel identifies semantic reversais, in which antiracists are depicted as totalhian and as responsible for generating racial tensions and conflicts and for weakening 'British' culture (Seidel 1988b: 136 - 139). By shifting blame to the antiracists and putthg them on the defensive, as it were, the New Right attempts to secure for itself the high moral ground. An important body of research on racist discourse in English has also emerged from Australia. Martha Augoustinos, Keith Tuffin, and Mark Rapley, for example, have sought to identify patterns of talk and rhetoric in discussions of race relations in Australia

(Augoustinos et al 1999). They recorded conversations among two proups of non- indigenous university students on issues pertaining to race relations in Australia, and found that the students' discourse displayed features of what has been characterized as 'modem racism'. Modem racism is conceived of as a resentment towards non-white people which is embedded within a broader neo-liberal/economic-rationalist discourse of 'rugged individualism', exemplified by a set of moral values such as the scxalled 'protestant work ethic', self-reliance, individual achievement and self-discipline. (Augoustinos et al 1999: 352) The participants in this study acknowledge the existence of racism, but distance themselves from accusations of racism through a number of moves, including downplaying the extent of racism by utilizing strategies of rnitigation, justification, excuses, reversal, and victirn- blaming (Augoustinos etal 1999: 364). These strategies are consistent with those that van Dijk (1992) identifies as characterizing 'new' or 'modern' racism. Peter Teo (20)also wntes about racism in the Australian context, but his study differs from that of Augoustinos etal in at lest two ways. First, Teo examines written newspaper accounts as opposed to conversation, and second, Teo looks not at racism against Aboriginal Austraiians, but at racism against Asian immigrants to Australia from countnes such as Vietnam, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. Nevertheless, like Augoustinos etd (1999) and van Dijk (lm),Teo employs the notion of a 'new' racism that is "much more subtle, covert and hence insidious" (Teo 2000: 8) than the 'old' racism which tends to involve verbal or physical abuse against the victimized group, as well as policies of segregation andor genocide. Through his examination of transitivity, thematic cohesion, and lexical cohesion, Teo shows that there are marked differences in the ways that the newspapen portray the police, on the one hand, and the largely Vietnamese gang known as the 5T,on the other hand. As a result of the discursive polarization of the police and the X,the Sï are made into 'others' as against the dominant white majority in Australia.

A number of studies have also been conducted on racist discourse in the U.SA One of the themes that has emerged in CDA writiogs about the U.S.A. is anti-immigrant discourse, a theme that echoes racist discourse in the countnes already examined in this literature summary, namely, the Netherlands, Austria, Great Britain, and Australia. Hugh Mehan (1997) examines the discourse strategies that characterize immigrants as 'enemies', particularly in the context of discussions about California Proposition 187. Proposition 181, which passed by a strong majority of California voters on November 8, 1994, among other things denied health, education, and other social services to undocumented immigrants and their children, and required service providers to report any suspected undocumented persons to the authorities. The targeted persons in this case were ovenvhelmingiy Hispanics from Mexico and Central America. Mehan focusses on the question of "what made the arguments of the proponents of Proposition 187 more persuasive than those of its opponents?" (Mehan 1997: 257) and concludes that "[iln ways rerniniscent of the discourse strategies deployed by the State dunng the Cotd War, in which

Soviets were depicted as the enemy to be feared and reviled, proponents of Roposition 181 successfuIly constmcted the Mexican immigrant as the enemy" (Mehan lm. 266). Roponeots of the proposition employed compelling anecdotes which appealed to personal self-interest, in contrast to the statistically-based research studies of their opponenb, who appealed to the common public good, rather than to individual self-interest. In a rather strong claim that appears to be based more on political cynicism than on hard linguistic evidence, Mehan asserts that "[djuring the Cold War, the State constmcted an extemal enemy, a military enemy. to discipline the citizenry. Now the State and aligned elites are directing our gaze inward, constructing an economic enemy, one who lives among us, but is not a part of us" (Mehan 1997: 267).

The discourse surrounding the debate on illegal immigration in the U.S.A., and in

Califomia in particular, is also the subject takeo up by Otto Santa Ana (1999),who examines the use of metaphors about immigrants in The Los Angeles Times over a two- year period, drawing heavily on the theory of metaphor developed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). The metaphors are catalogued and counted by theme, with the result that the dominant metaphor about immigrants in this Califomia newspaper is found to be

IMMIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS, with less frequent secondary metaphors being IMMIGRANTS

ARE DEBASED PEOPLE, WEEDS, COMMODITIES (Santa Ana 1999: 198). The IMMIGRANTS

ARE ANMALS metaphor in particular is discussed at length and is characterized as conveying racisrn. "The conceptuai correspondence IMMIGRANTS ARE AMMALS is racist.

It belitties immigrants as it separates non-citizens and citizens, since it assigns them a less- than-human standing" (Santa Ana 1999: 216). Only one class of positive metaphors was found, that being a set of Biblical metaphors, exemplified by the term 'scapegoat' (84%of the tokens in tbis class) and by reference to angels, in the context of an allusion to the notion that one should treat strangers well, lest one should find oneself 'entertaining angels unawares'. Santa Ana does not daim that The Los Angeles Times writers are overtly racist. In fact, a content analysis revealed that the majority of writers "could be described as balanced with regard to standard measures of journalistic 'objectivity' in the representation of undocumented immiapntsw(Santa Ana 19993207). However, the negative, racist force of the metaphor is independent of the intent of the writer using it, since the metaphor activates a concepfual framework independent of either the writer or the reader. "The miodful reader cao choose to reject the linkage. If, however, the metaphor does not draw attention to itself, then the reader is most often unaware that a conceptual linkage has been reproduced and is being reinforced" (Santa Ana 1999: 217). Thus, with

respect to the IMMIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS metaphor, Santa Ana concludes that "i ts

dominant use thus sustains the racist wodd-view" (Santa Ana 1% 217). A study by Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Tyrone A. Forman (20)extends the discussion of racist discourse in the U.S.A. beyond simply a consideration of discourse about immigrants, to a consideration of discourse by whites about rninorities in general. The sample for the study consisted of white college students from three different universities in different regions of the U.S.A. From the 541 white students who completed a written survey of social attitudes, a random sample of 41 students was selected for in-depth interviews, exploring the same themes covered in the written questionnaires, namely affirmative action, interracial marriage, and the significance of dischination. Among the questions being explored in this research was one investigating why interview- based research consistendy reports higher levels of prejudice among whites than does survey-based research (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000: 51). Among the findings of

Bonilla-Silva and Forman was that, although, based on the interview data, the respondents were more prejudiced than in the survey, they used a varîety of semantic moves to save face. Interview respondents consistently used phrases such as "1 don't know", "1 am oot sure", "1 am not prejudiced", or "1 agree and disagree", rather than explicitly expressing their racial views. In addition, they often incorporated discursive elements into theu answers that expresscd socialdistance (indirectness) or projection (displacement), usuaily followed by statements that betrayed these hesitations. (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; 76)

Employing these semantic moves allowed the students to express more prejudiced views, disguised in more mitigated forms than occurred in the written survey data. Students who

expressed themselves through what Bonilla-Silva and Forman describe as a 'discourse of liberalism' resolved the apparent dissonance between their professed liberalisrn and their prejudiced views by turning liberalism into an abstract matter (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000: 77). "By invoking abs~ractelements of liberalism, making pragrnatic claims (e-8 these are the facts), and transforming the notion of equality into 'mentocracy', our respondents could display moral fervor and indignation toward 'undeserving rninorities' who 'take their job' and their 'places in colleges'" (Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000:78). Thus, Bonilla-Silva and Forman's resufts are consistent with the results in other research cited, namely that a 'new' racism is less direct and explicit than 'old' racism, and it is accomplished in large measure through subtle semantic moves that mitigate racist statements and distance the speaker (or writer) from the racist implications of those statements. The studies reviewed in this section demonstrate consistencies across langages, across countries, and across genres in the ways in which the so-called 'new' or 'modern' racisrn is expressed and propagated. None of these studies, or indeed any others that the course of the research for this dissertation have uncovered, have studied the genre of non- fiction book-length text (such as the texts of Gairdner), nor have they presented data specifically from a Canadian context. Nevertheless, as the balance of this chapter will dernonstrate, the racist discourse of William Gairdner takes fonns that are consistent with the strategies identified by other researchers in the field. Racism has kenidentified as one of the consistent features of neo-conservative or New Right discourse, and the New Right discourse of William Gairdner is no exception in this regard. The prime targets of Gairdner's racism are the French in general and French Canadians in particular, as well as non-European immigrants to Canada. Gairdner's conception of a true Canadian is someone who is white and Anglophone, or at the very least, someone who has assimilated completely to Gairdner's conception of white Anglophone nomand culture. Anti-French Racism: French as 'Other' The point has been made above that within CDA, the terni 'racism' is typically used to refer to prejudices that rnight more precisely be described as 'ethnicisrn'. Anglo- Canadians and French Canadians do not constitute distinct or separate racial groups, nor did the English or the French in Europe ever constitute separate racial groups. The differences between these groups are differences of language and culture and so an Aaglo prejudice against the French is a type of ethnicism, rather than strictly speaking racism. Nevertheless, the marner in which Gairdner portrays the French as 'other' is of the sarne nature as racism, and so will be identified as racism within this dissertation. Perhaps because AngleCanadians and French Canadians are not self-evidently 'othen' to one another, Gairdner attempts to create an 'othemess', in part through his version of the history and philosophy of 'the English' and 'the French'. Aithough content analysis is not central to critical linguistics, it does have a legitimate place with cntical discourse analysis, so the emphasis on content in what follows is not tanpntial to the present study. In War (p. 7-8), Gairdner associates a 'topdown' style of govemment with French thinkers such as Claude Henri Saint-Simon and JeamJacques Rousseau, and in Trouble, he explicitiy names it the 'French' style of govenunent (Gairdner 1990: 10). In contrast, the style of government which, accordinp to Gairdner, supports the family is credited with moral agency and is dubbed both the 'bottom-up' style and the 'English' style of government (Gairdner 1992: 15)- This 'English' style is rooted in comrnon law and in the concept of 'natural rights'. Its development is linked to Chnstianity, 'especially its

Protestant variety' ( 1992: 15). It is difficult to imagine any disceming reader not recognizing that Gairdner's deliberate contrasting of the moral, English, Protestant system with an immoral, compt

French system is bound to incite strong passions, especially in Canada. Elsewhere Gairdner explicitly argues that Canada is an English nation, not a bilingual nation. and that the French are not one of two founding peoples of Canada ( see Gairdner 1994), but in both War and Trouble, even the repeated contrasting of French with English is sufficient to generate a clear Anglo-Canadian bis. If Gairdner were merely interested in contrasting the philosophical positions of people such as Rousseau and Locke, he could have done so without the continual repetition of 'French' versus 'English'.

Gairdner idealizes the English commoa-law tradition that existeci pnor to the Norman Conquest, clairning it as the true origin of freedom and democracy. His simplistic histoncal account of the period leading up to the Conquest runs as follows: Those of us fortunate enough to live in Anglo Saxon-based nations need reminding that this fomof law got its start in northem Europe around A.D. 450 when, as legend has it, the Britons invited from the continent the amies of the Angle warrion Hengist and Horsa. Bnton soon became Angleland, or England. The Angle form of govemment was remarkable. The Angles considered themselves a commonwealth of freemen who selected leaders and passed al1 laws based on the consent of the people. Power flowed up, not down, and al1 leaders were strictly lirnited in power as servants of the people. Theirs was a very effective form of people's law, or parliament. (Gairdner 1994: 30) Gairdner offers his interpretation of history without citing references to which readers might turn for further information, and few readers of Gairdner's brief interpretation of 1600 years of history would be in a position to challenge either his facts or his interpretation of the facts. Thus, Gairdner's version of history effectively becomes ao unchallenged premise upon which he builds his argument, a premise he draws on over and over as he attempts to make his case that this English system was doing perfectly well before the French came along and tried to min it. There were many subsequent political setback for the English, caused by such as William the Conqueror, who in 1M6 imposed a French forrn of code, or rulers' law, on the people. But the people eventually rejected this. Beginning with the Magna Carta of 1215, they rnanaged to institute a tnie pariiarnentary system that has endured and evolved in Enpland since the thirteenth century. (Gairdner 1994: 30) That Gairdner's account of history is absurdly over-simplified does not diminish its power. Rather, by settiog out this easily-digested myth of the perfection of the 'English' systern of governrnent, Gairdner probably scores points with readers looking for easy answers to complex problems. Furthemore, in case anyone misses the message that

'English' is good and 'French' is bad, Gairdner reinforces it through his lexical choices. Thus, in the passage quoted above, William 'imposed' a French fonn of code, or rulers' law on the people. 'Impose', used here as a transitive verb, has strong negative connotations, suggesting that what was given (imposed) was unwanted - in this case, it is 'the people' who are being imposed upon, by having a 'rulers' code', a 'French' code thrust upon thern. Had Gairdner wished to convey a more neutral value-judgement, he might, for exarnple, have written that W~lliarn'brought' a different code of law to the people of England, 'brought' having none of the negative connotations of 'imposed'. Gairdner's choice of the verb 'impose' in this passage calls to mind the oft-heard refrain of many Angle Canadians that English-speaking children should not be 'forced' to leam French, or that French is being 'shoved down our throats' because the study of French as a second language is compulsory in the school system.7 It cannot be accidental that Gairdner utilizes this semantic frame at this point. He is tapping into a pre-existing hostility that many Anglophone Canadians feel toward French, and in effect he is conveying the message to them, "See, the French have been forcing themselves on us for 100years!" To reinforce his message, Gairdner collocates the 'French form of code*with 'rulers' law'. The 'French' system is bad not only because it is French, and not only because it was imposed, but because it is a 'rulers' law' rather than a common law. As a people who value democracy and reject totalitarianism, Canadians typically bristle at the implication that the rulers' law would be laid down by a king or dictator, not by the 'true parliamentary system' of the people. Finally, in contrast to the 'irnposed' system, the 'English' system is said to have 'evolved'. Evolution is taken to be a natural process, and this lexical choice is consistent with Gairdner's overall program of porirayinp everything he advocates as 'natural' and everything he rejects as umatural, contrived, or imposed. In case anyone had yet failed to grasp his point that the 'French' are bad, Gairdner associates them with three historical contexts that are generally viewed negatively by most Canadians. The charters of the French Revolution, Nazi Gemany, and the former Soviet Union were glorious-sounding documents ringing with phrases about human freedom and rights. But they legitirnized some of the most horrifying tyranny in the history of the world against the citizens of those states, millions of whom were oificially classified as the 'interna1 enemy.' (Gairdner 1994: 29) The French Revolution is, admittedly, French, and it entailed a govemment utilizing brutality against its own citizens, something most Canadians would consider reprehensible.

Likewise, the Nazi regime was oppressive and vile, and at Ieast some aspects of the Soviet system were brutal and oppressive. However, picking one period of French history and holding it up alongside other oppressive regimes presents more of a caricature than a history of 'the French', especially since England's own penods of internai religious and political persecution and their colonial aggression are left unmentioned. Once again, through gros simplifications and distortions of history, Gairdner has linked 'French' with undesirable terms and concepts such as 'Nazi' and 'homfying tyranny'. Ignoring the reality that England still has a class system, most crudely delineated as 'the aristocracy' versus 'the cornmoners' (visible, for example, in the existence of the two houses of Parliament, namely the House of Lords and the House of Commons) Gairdner characterizes the 'French' style negatively for producing an unofficial two-class society. The French style, however, seerns inevitably to evolve into an unofficial two-class society, the goveming elite and the govemed, in which legislatures once adamantly democratic begin to see themselves not as carrying out the people's wishes but as sbaping those wishes, and with increasing vigour marketing them back to the people dong with the extensive apparatus required for the execution, and then entrenching the whole business in the code as rights. (Gairdner 1994: 49)

Gairdner hates govemment, so he links povernment in this passage to the already negatively characterized 'French' style. Just as the Normans 'imposed' their system in 1066, 'French style' governments today impose their will on the people, even within a legislative framework. This 'French' style governing elite utilizes 'the extensive apparatus required for. . . execution'. In the French Revoiution, the apparatus for execution was the guillotine, and it is hard to ignore the semantic parallel Gairdner is drawing here between the metaphysical and the literal apparatus the 'French' use for 'execution'. In applying his English-French, good-bad dichotorny to Canada, Gairdner continues to employ his global notion of 'French'. For Gairdner, 1759 marks the beginning of an ongoing stmggle for Canada between two forces, the French and the English. Despite Canada's brave efforts ever since Codederation in 1867 to blend these two styles, they are inherently incompatible, even mutuaily destructive. This is Canada's predicament. Ever since the battle of the Plains of Abraham, in 1759, there has been a national struggle for supremacy between these conflicting visions (as there have kenwith varying degrees of emphasis in all , ancient and modem). (Gairdner 1994: 56) Here, Gairdner achowledges that similar conflicts between competing visions long predate the French and the English, OCCU~~~'in al1 democracies, ancient and modem'. Thus, if such conflicts existed before either the 'English' or the 'French,' then his persistent

labelling of the competing sides as 'English' and 'French' can only be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to cloak political differences in ethnic labels in order to promote anti- French racism. Glossing over the French settiement of Quebec and Acadia, dong with the Native settlement before that, Gairdner makes Canada out to be an English nation containing a problematic French 'cultural presence'. In The Trouble With Canada,1 suggested that Canada. long a country based on English common-law traditions, yet with a large French cultural presence, is still struggling with the conflict between the English and French styles of govemment. For the English, or 'bottom-up,' style, is based on the notion that the most important political fact of life is individual freedom and responsibility and that there is a bundle of natural rights we ail possess by virtue of being boni humans. These cannot be given to a person, or taken away, by a charter, because they are inherent and pre-exist any such documents and indeed the whote idea of the State itself. (Gai rdner 1994: 47) In this description of Canada's English tradition. Gairdoer utilizes the lexical choices that he associates with everything positive and desirable and good. The English system is based on 'traditions', and what are traditions except practices that people develop over time, amongst thernselves, which they must like or else, in this 'bottom-up' system, they would change. Luckily for the English, they stumbled upon a system that conveniently encompasses 'individual freedom and responsibility' and 'natural rights'. Since these natural rights are 'inherent' and 'pre-exist' the idea of the State, then effectively, Gairdner appears to be claiming that the English system is 'divinely' ordained. The alternative to this English system, the only alternative in Gairdner's polarized univene, is associated with coercion, power, and al1 things negative and, of course, French. In contrast, the French, or European, style of government is collectivist, centralizing, 'togdown,' and rooted in the belief that people are not personally but only socially redeemable. The way to redemption is to create a virnious society and keep anarchy at bay, not through individual moral agency but through the creation of a code, or charter, or constitution - a control document - irnposed from above by a political elite. This process ensures that society is rnanaged according to a pre- set idea of the social good, and also ensures a stronp central govemment to supply the power. This is a quasi-utopian vision of society bent on social perfection, by force if necessary. (Gairdner 1994: -9)

In this passage, terms that rnight in other contexts carry neutral or even positive connotations are assigned a negative value by virtue of their collocation with other terms that cary negative connotations. A 'code' of ethics, a 'charter* of rights, or a 'constitution' might be highly revered in certain contexts, but here they are denigrated by being collectively paraphrased as 'a control document', one 'irnposed* on the people by a 'political elite*. The negativizing of 'code, or charter, or constitution* is further enhanced by the descriptive list that precedes it in the paragraph: 'collectivist', 'centralizing', and 'top-down' are al1 used repeatedly by Gairdner in his writings to signify highly undesirabte characteristics. In the current climate of opinion in Canada, politicians are mistmsted, and labelling them as an 'elite* provides a further excuse to abhor them in a society that considers itself democratic and classless, especially since these politicians are said to

'manage' society. Few people like to think that their lives are king managed by politicians. Furthemore, whereas the 'English* system is said to 'pre-exist', the 'French' system is 'pre-set*. No doubt, these references, dong with the notions of 'strong central govemment', 'power*, 'quasi-utopian vision', and 'force' are meant to conjure up in the reader's mind scenes from Huxley's Brave New World or Onvell's 1984. 8 In case the reader had faiIed to apply Gairdner's clainu about the evils of the 'French' system to modem Canada, Gairdner brings the point home by clairning that the federal Liberal party, under Pierre Elliot Tmdeau, effected a 'French* takeover of a previously 'Euglish' form of society . We have seen how after Canada had flourished for puerations under English-style nile, modem liberals (1 mean those interested in imposed positive law, egalitarians) came to power in 1%8, and assisted by like thinken from many other parties, began to change everything. While English Canada slept, they swifily transformed the country into a more French-style nation. (Gairdner 1494: 5657) By using the metaphor of English Canada sleeping, Gairdner avoids making an overt criticism of them. The vision of the 'French' sneaking in and taking advantage of the vuluerable English while they slept makes the French seem devious and dangerous. Still. there may be an implied criticism of English Canada for sleeping when perhaps he thinks they ought to have been more vigilant. Finally, lest anyone doubt the 'evils' of the French. Gairdner assigns them the label 'totalitarian*, unfairly citing one Quebec law which is controversial not just among English Canadians, but arnong French Canadians themselves. ''The idea of forcing businesses in Quebec to psttheir signs in French, and outlawing

English is, well, toblitanan" (Gairdner 1994: 72). His rhetorical use of 'well' is meant to imply that he hesitates to make such a strong daim or to use such stronp language, but the fact is that he does choose to use 'totalitarian* nonetheiess and this loaded word-choice must be taken to be deliberate. Had he simply wished to draw attention to the Quebec language law in a more neutral way, he might, for exarnple, have described it as 'problematic', or even as 'unfair', without conjuring up the miliiaristic and violent irnagery that 'totalitarian' is apt to evoke. The Liberal Party underTrudeau is not, however, Gairdner's only political target.

Throughout his writings, Gairdner disparages dl three of the traditional Canadian political parties, the Liberals, the Progressive Consewatives, and the New Democratic Party, sometimes implying that an alternative is needed, without narning that alternative. However, Gairdner final1y does name an alternative, the (now-defunc t) Reform Party of

Canada9, setting it up clearly as the tnie 'English' dternative to the 'French* 'lie'. The predictable result was that by 1993 Canada had two large minority parties in Parliament, each determineci to end the big lie -- one, the Bloc QuCbécois. wishing to separate from Confederation altogether; the other, The Reform Party of Canada, wishing to refederdize the nation on equal terms for al1 provinces: to return to the original meaning of federalism, or else negotiate the separation of Quebec. Here were two elected political symbols of the clash between the French and English styles. (Gairdner 1994 98) Reform is portrayed as retuming to an earlier (and therefore better) federalism, based on 'equal terms*for al1 provinces1o. 'Equality ' is one of the neo-conservative code- words which peppers al1 of Gairdner's wiitings, and Reform is here associated with it. In the only other direct reference to the Reform Party in Crack-up, that party is named as opposing the Bloc Québécois. The various constitutional crises that arose after 1982 - îhe failed Meech Lake Accord, the defeated Charlottetown Accord of 1992, and the public opposition between the separatist Bloc Québécois and the Reform Party (which says no more pandering to Quebec or any other province) in the 1993 federal election -- were active symptoms of this underlying conflict. (Gairdner 1994: 58) In stipulating that Reform says 'no more pandering', Gairdner implies that there has been and continues to be 'pandering' to Quebec (Le. to the French). To pander, in its intransitive form (as used by Gairdner above) means "minister (to base passions or evil designs, or persoos having these)" (Concise Oxford 1982). Thus. Quebec is associated with base passions and evil designs, as by implication are the parties, especially the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives which have formed federal govermnents in

Canada, that, unlike Reform, have not opposed Quebec in this way. Only Reform is portrayed as standing up to 'evil'. The phrase 'or any other province' is a red herring in this context, for while Refonn does oppose anything it sees as 'special status' for any province, the context of the remark contains no other claims by any other provinces. However, by slipping in reference to 'any other province', Gairdner may be attempting to inoculate himself and the Reform Party against accusations of king specifically anti- Quebec or anti-French. As shown below, however, this effort is in vain. In spite of Gairdner's efforts to portray himself as not being prejudiced against the French, as illustrated by the following quotation, the balance of the evidence contradicts any such notion: "most English Canadians, [. . .] still see the leaming of French as a fine cultural achievement (1 enjoy being fluent in French myself) [. . -1" (Gairdner 1990: 3%). This expression of enjoyment in kuowing French may differ in structure, but not in intent from assertions of the fom, "I'm not a racist, but. .." If Gairdner had wanted to present a philosophical argument anaiyzing and contrasting two political systems, he could have done so without repeatedly and relentlessly identifying the favoured one as English and the disfavoured one as French. However, he chooses not only to identify them in this way, but to further exacerbate the hostility by consistently linking exaggeratedly negative ternis and concepts with 'French', including 'evil', 'Nazi', and 'totalitanan', and linking unrealistically positive ternis such as 'natural', 'equal ', 'inherent' and 'freedom' with 'English'. Gairdner may indeed happily speak their language on occasion, but he expkitly places any values or ideas that he associates (rightly or wrongiy) with the French below those that he associates with the English. Sample Analvsis: Racism - 1 Excerpt from The Trouble With Cuncula, Chapter 15: The Silent Destruction of English Canada: Mnlticnitaralism, Bilinguaiism, And Immigration, (p. 398) 1 For what Trudeau wanted most, distrusting as he did the English mode in gen- 2 eral, and democratic capitaiisrn in particular, was a strong socialist

3 nation governed by the same institutions coast to coast.

4 In order to make this possible, he had $0suppress the desire of Quebeckers tu become a separate nation. For othemise his dream would

fail. His solution to the problem was to force the rest of Canada to accept official bilingualisrn, thus neutralizing any French cornplaint that they were second-class. He would simply confer upon the rninoriv the same status as thr of fkmajoriîy. Because no party can win wi thout Quebec's support, this policy amounted to both appeasemnt and con-

trol of the French fact in Canada. It was simple. And it was also a recipe for a very successful State-irnposed program to discriminate against English Canadians, nationwide. While English Canada slept, Trudeau did something insidiously clever that was -- and stiIl is -- invisible to parents trundling their children off to French-immersion classes (English-immersion classes for francophones are illegal in Quebec): he dethe rnimriîy and the majariv equal in law. [7 lines ornitted: a quotation by Canadian constitutional expert, Eugene Forsey] In short, the experience of the French and the English in Canada is an illustration of my argument on mu1 ticul turalisrn, above: once you give official stahis to cultural differences, you are then forced to give

hem "rightç," which euch different group will then use to dismember the cornmon social fabric through Iobbying to protect ifsown herests. How ,

otherwise, could a minority French population in a vast land like Canada have succeeded in dominating the Linguistic, cultural, and con- stitutiond framework of our nation? They have been very, very clever,

and we, very careless. (Part of the answer is that we have shelled out, between 1985-88, about $730 million to promote officiai bilingualism.) The passage quoted above encapsulates, better than almost any other single passage does, Gairdner's Anglocentnc. anti-French prejudices. While a Iine-by-line analysis of this passage could be presented here, instead this section will simply highlight several of the recumng features of modality, transitivity, and lexical choice that are also discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, and will discuss Gairdner's characteristic use of italics, as illustrated in this passage, a feature which has not been dealt with at length elsewhere in this dissertation. The modality in this passage is consistent with the modality of validity which constitutes the default modality throughout Gairdner's writing. He asserts his views, including his interpretations of the thoughts and motives of other people, with the force of certainty, not rnitigating his assertions with markers oidoubt or with markers that explititly draw attention to the status of much of what he asserts as interpretation or opinion. For exarnple, Gairdner writes, "[flor what Trudeau wanted rnost" (line l), as though he had had some direct way to tap into Trudeau's psyche in order to know what he wanted. For the most part, the modality of certainty is conveyed throuph the lack of modal verbs and modal adjectives and adverbs. Since this style is typical of an academic prose style, it lends to his writing an aura of conforming to the conventions of sound acadernic writing, rather than to those of persuasive literature, polemics, or pmpaganda. Pierre Trudeau, whom Gairdner uses as the embodiment of al1 things French, is portrayed as the agent of a number of predicates high in transitivity. The following examples al1 occur with one 14line paragraph and together they portray Trudeau as someoue prone to unilateral, sometimes aggressive acts against dlsides in Canada: "to suppress the desire of Quebeckers" (lines 4-3, "to force the rest of Canada" (line 6), "confer upon the minority" (line 8),"to discriminate against Engiish Canadians nationwide" (line 12- 13), "he made the minority and the majonty equal in law" (line f 7)-While

'confer' and 'made' in these examples do not have the same hostile connotations as

'suppress', 'force' and 'discriminate against', they nevertheless convey a seose of Trudeau acting with authority, an authority which Gairdner disparages by associating Trudeau with 'a strong socialist govemrnent' in contrat with 'democratic capitalism' (lines 2-3). Gairdner demonizes socidism and idealizes democratic capitalism throughout his wriiings, such that 'socialist' becomes a code-word for 'evil' and 'capitalism' for 'good', whenever he uses thern. Other verbs high in transitivity are used to disparage groups which Gairdner implies are connected with Trudeau or are his allies or followers. Since optional French-immersion classes in Canadian schools came about as a direct result of the officia1 bilingualism policy initiated by the Trudeau govemrnent, bilingualism becomes a target of Gairdner. Parents who enrol their children in French-immersion classes are described unflatteringly as "tmndling their children off to French-immersion classes" (lines 1916). According to The CadianOxfordDictio~(199û), the transitive meaning of 'trundle* is "push (a heeled vehicle) along", and while Gairdner undoubtedly intends that readers picture parents pushing children into bilinguaiism, there is little doubt that he also borrows from the intransitive meaning of the verb, which is given as "go or move, esp. heavily, noisily, or at a steady pace". Thus. clumsy, stupid-lwking parents are pushing their children into French-immersion, according to the picture Gairdner paints. In lines 19 - 21, Gairdner switches temporarily from third-person reference to second person address, using the pronoun 'you' in a context in which the impersonal 'one* mi@ be appropriate. Thus, since Gairdner could have wntten, 'once one gives official status to cultural differences, one is then forced to give them rights', it is reasonable to assume that the switch to a second person 'yod had a purpose. Since Gairdner wants his readers to feel that Trudeau and anyone who supports the policies Trudeau supported is dangerous to them, he personalizes the passage, drawing the readers in by addressing thern with 'you'. The passive 'you are then forced to give' does not specify an agent who is

forcing 'you', so the reader must look to the context to supply an agent. EIsewhere, as argued above, Trudeau is poarayed as an aggressor, and is even the agent of the verb 'to force' (Line 6). Thus, when 'force' is used again, but with no agent, the likely agent that the reader will supply is Trudeau, and 'you are then iorced to give' may be understood as meaning 'Trudeau forces you to give'. Seen this way, it is advantapous for Gairdner to personalize the clause in order to rnake readers feel more directly irnplicated in Trudeau's actions. As the Rime Minister whose government instituted policies of multiculturalism,

Trudeau is implicated by the phrase 'each different group' (line 21), and although the nature and composition of 'each different group' is not specified, the context supplies 'multiculturalisrn' (line 19), implying that groups of varying ethnicities are the intended referent in the phrase. Gairdner asserts that each of these groups will use the status granted it through multicultural policy "to dismember the common social fabnc through lobbying to protect its own interestsn (lines 21-22). 'Dismember' is not merely a highly transitive verb, it is also a verb connoting callous violence and disrespect towards its victim. The pseudo- victim named is 'the common social fabric', by which Gairdner means AngbCanadian culture, especially AngleCanadian Christian culture. By extension, then, the victims of the violence are understood to be Anglo-Canadians, and the perpetraton are people of non- Anglo ethnicity. To complete his picture of the victimization of English Canadians, Gairdner makes 'the French population' the agent of 'dominating', suggesting that they are linguisticdly, culturally, and constitutionally dominant in Canada. Since the proposition is frarned as a question, Gairdner can claim that it is not an assertion at dl, but in the context, this rhetorical question has the force of an assertion. Like the parents whom he disparages through the use of the verb 'trundling', the taxpayers of Canada are disparaged through Gairdner's use of 'shelied out' in the context of the clause, "we have shelled out [. . -1 $730 million to promote official bilingualism" (lines 2627). 'Shell out' is most often associated with the practice of childreo going door to door on Hallowe'en, dernandinp that the occupants 'shell out' candy to them, originally to prevent the children from perpetrating pranks against them. Shelling out is thus linked to children, and also to the buying or cunying of favour to side-step a threat. In effect, then, Gairdner is suggesting that the govemment (acting as the agent of the taxpayers) is afraid of

French Canadians and is therefore giviog away money to them or for them, in order to keep them from harming the rest of the people of Canada. In the passage under analysis, Gairdner uses italics to set several clauses and individual words apart from the rest of the text . As a device used sparingly, italics can be an effective tool for ernphasizing a word or a phrase by rnaking it stand out from the text. Used heavily and used for whole clauses, italics begins to do more than to simply add emphasis. In a review of The War Againsr the Fumily, Scott Piatkowki, referring in general to Gairdner's writings, observes, crudely but aptly, that "Gairdner's key points are put into italics (just in case their endless repetition is not a sufficiently heavy weapon with which to bludgaon the reader)" (Ratkowski 199345). The effect of reading so much emphatic italics is akin to being screarned at orthographically. In the passage under analysis, al1 of the italicized segments contain ideas and principles of which Gairdner is critical, but instead of arguing them coherently, he places them in italics, as if that rnakes of them a less easily assailable target. To illustrate the effect of the italics, the followiog two examples from the passage will be analyzed: "He would simply confer upon the rninority the same staîus as thuî of the majority" (Iines û-9); and "he made the minority and the mjority equd in faw" (line 17). The two examples deal with the same theme and express the same basic idea. In both quotations, 'he' refers to Pierre Trudeau and the policy with which Gairdner takes exception is offlicid bilingualism. In context, it is impossible to interpret either of these quotations as anything other thari criticisms, but outside the context of Gairdner's wntinp, both of them could very easily be read as conveying approval. For example, someone might be arguing that a way to end unfair treatment of an (unspecified) minority group would be to give them equality under the law. In such a context, and without itaiics, these two quotations couId 'sound' very different: "He would simply confer upon the minority the same status as that of the majority"; "he made the minonty and the majority equal in law". It is likely, given the democratic ideals of Canadian society, that a majority of Gairdner's readers would consider it only proper that the law not discriminate against people on account of their minority status, and that they might therefore select a positive interpretation of the two quotations in question. However, by putting these passages in italics, Gairdner signals to the reader that there is something exceptional about the concept of equality of the minority and the majonty and that they ought, therefore, to view these as subject to a special interpretation, specifically, to Gairdoer's negative evaluation. Here, the emphatic use of italics does not merely draw more attention to what Gairdner is saying, but rather draws attention in order to convey a negative evaluation of the proposition that the minority and the majority should be made equal under the law. While italics are a cornmon and legitimate means by which writers may emphasize key words or phrases in a text, heavy use of italics, such as is found in Gairdner's writing, conveys not a sense of emphasis, but rather, a sense of fanaticism, not unlike that of a charismatic preacher shouting at a c~n~pgation,hoping to win over converts, not by reasoned persuasion, but rather by ernotional and psychological engineering. Once Gairdner has added the full weight of his negative evaluation to ideas such as equality for French and English in Canada, then anyone who wishes to contradict him must not only challenge his ideas, but must confront and overcome the negative presuppositions about those ideas which Gairdner has introduced into the context. In short, once Gairdner has tainted the idea with his scorn, that scom remains a defining feature of the context and therefore of the topic, in perpetuity. Al1 of the various linguistic devices mentioned (modality ,transitivity, texical choices, and italics) contribute to Gairdner' s success in positioning the topic of officia1 bilingualisrn as a 'problem'. Anti-Immigrant Racisrn: Immigrant as 'Other' That Gairdner9sAnglocentric views extend beyond his anti-French sentiments to encompass a wider racism against non-Aoglos can be seen in his writings on immigration and multicuIturalism. Just as he attempts to fnghten English Canadians into adopting an anti-French position by associating the French with tyranny and totalitarianism, so he attempts to fnghten these same people by portraying non-Anglo immigrants as a threat. Al1 these prejudices are grouped together, in fact, in Chapter 15 of Trouble, ''The Silent Destruction of English Canada: Multiculturalism, Bilingualism, And Immigration9' (Gairdner 1990, revised 1994). In discussinp immigration and multiculhiralism in Canada, Gairdner begins with the precept that 'the elite of ourcollectivist govemment' and 'the people' are at odds with one another (Gairdner 404-5). Since Gairdner identifies the government with the 'French style', repardless of their linguistic or ethnic affiliations, and 'the people' with English Canadians, immigration policy is presented as one more case of the purported victimization of English Canadians by the French. Gairdner takes this accusation to even greater extremes, however, by asserting with respect to immigration that a "foreign threat exists intemally" (Gairdner 1940: 405).

Gairdner does not oppose al1 immigration, just immigration from so-called non- tradi tional sources: Traditional immigration is defined as from the U.K., Europe, the U.S.A., New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa (we can disregard the minimal non-white immigration from the U.S.A. and South Africa); non-traditional is from everywhere else. (Gairdner 1990: 410) In Gairdner's mind, 'traditional' immigrants are the source of Canada's so-called 'core' culture. Immigrants to Canada should be instructed in the core heritage and culture of this nation, which is Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman, and Anglo-European. And they should be expected to assimilate to that culture. This does not mean losing their own, which they are free to promote and protect, using their own resources, if they so desire. But it does mean their own culture is secondary. (Gairdner 1990: 419) In order to gamer support among readers for the racist immigration policies he proposes, Gairdner employs infiammatory lexical choices designed to demonize all non-

Anglo-European immigrants and poteotial immigrants to Canada. The racially, ethnically, and linguistically diverse people coliectively labelled 'non-traditional immigrants' by Gairdner are also labelled a 'foreign threat' (see above) and 'an invading culture' (1990: 408). They are described as being 'completely dien' (1990: 413), with the Chinese being used to illustrate this particular cfaim, and most cultures are deemed by Gairdner to be

'incompatiMe, even hostile to each other' ( 1990: 413), with "devotees of Islam [who] have a doctrinaire disdain for dernocratic politics" (1990: 413) king used as bis example of this claim. Continuing with the theme that English Canada is under attack from immigrants and must respond or be annihilated, Gairdner asserts, in the italics that he uses regularly for emphasis, that "surely any miion har rhe right to defend itselfagainsr dernographie capture, ur, îfyou prefer, against passive racial or cultural ~akeover"( 1990: 4 13). In case al1 the violent and hostile imagery above is not enough to convince the reader to oppose 'non-traditional' immigration, Gairdner adds to his case the suggestion that since family-class immigrantsi 1 are not screened in the way other immigrants are, they may be unworthy of king admitted to Canada, and that furthemore, they come in a 'large influx' (1940: 416). For al1 we know they could be ignorant, illiterate, unqualified people. We don't know because we don't ask. But we do know that non-traditional immigrants tend to have much larger families than those from traditional couutries. Sojust imagine the multiplication of unscreened immigrants this implies. (Gairdner 1990: 414-5) As well as being portrayed as a cultural threat to English Canadians, immigrants are portrayed as posing an economic ihreat, because "the govenunent keeps bringing in immigrants who compete wi th citizens forjobs*', and even an immigrant who enters with a job in hand will become "a free-floating cornpetitor for other jobs and theiefore a threat to the unemployed already here" ( 1990: 417). People seeking refuge status in Canada likewise come under attack. The fint reference to refugees in Chapter 15 of Trouble is "the tide of queue-jumping 'economic' refugees" (1990: 416). Since a tide is an inanimate and uncontrollable force of nature, this image dehumanizes and depersonalizes the refugees, likening them to some sort of naturd disaster. They are further denigrated by the accusation that they fail to observe proper procedure and to wait their tum. Use of quotations around 'economic' implies that they are not genuine refugees, or that 'economic refugees' are not legitimate refugees in any cucumstance. Van Dijk has noted a similar attitude about refugees in Europe. Such a negative portraya1 is intended to warrant a tough reaction against further immigration: 'It is easier, if not naturai or imperative, to withhold hospitality to people who break the law.' The way this is done is by invoking what might be called the Fake Refugee Schema, an attitude consisting of largely negative opinions about what is usually called the economic refugee, a buzzword in Outch and European political and media language for fake, while not really political, refugeer This schema features evaluative propositions about illegal entry, fake passports, lying, making several refugeelwelfare applications in different countries or cities, and the activities of traffickers, seen as the merchants of human rnisery. (van Dijk 1mb:79) Gairdner's next reference to refugees, a few lines below that quoted above, cornes in a quotation attnbuted to Joe Bissett, an executive director for immi,ption in the federal Employment and Immigration Department., who ciaims that '70% of refugees coming to

Canada are bogus" (1990: 416).1* Elsewhere in the paragraph are references to refugees corning 'illegally' to Canada, to refugees as 'dishonest', and to 'social dislocation' caused by higher non-traditional immigration. The next paragraph refers to 'phony refugee immigrants' as a 'drain' on Canadian resources, elaborating on this theme somewhat, including a reference to 'the sick immigrants'. The reader is informed that 'these people are lying to us' (refemng to economic refugees), and that they are "spongers and lazybones who corne here for the instant benefits of the welfare State" (1990: 417). In his section on refugees, there are no positive ternis used to describe refugees or their actions at all. No mention is made of the possibility ihat refugees could have legitimate reasons for coming to Canada Al1 that Gairdner's readers are exposed to are negative associations with the term 'refugees'. leaving hem with a strong impression of refugees as iIlegitimate and dishonest. AIthough Gairdner does not Say that al1 claims for refugee status corne from Trinidad, that is the only country specifically named with respect to econornic refugees. Since no other source country was named, the reader may be left with the impression that the Caribbean is the source of most econornic refugees coming to Canada. Whether or not that is the source of such refugees is alrnost imrnaterial once the seed of prejudice is planted in the reader's mind. Gairdner has implied that the Caribbean as a source of 'non-traditional' immigration poses a threat because such people are supposedly just looking for a free ride in Canada, The govenunent is blamed for the 'farcical' (1990: 417) immigration system, but Gairdner does not simply believe that the government May accidentally have instituted probiematic policies. Rather, for Gairdner the immigration policies are al1 a part of the 'French' collectivist conspiracy against English Canada. For example, Gairdner posits that people have a 'natural fear' of losing their connection with 'the familiar culture they love' in the wake of so-called non-traditional immigration, and t hat, "in order to neutralize this natural fear, the government hit upon the idea of 'universality' - the idea that people al1 over the world are basically the same" (lm406). Even without the subsequent pages in which he elaborates his attack on what he labels ' universality ', Gairdner has already launched a substantial attack on the principles at stake. The government is said to have 'hit upon' a policy, which suggests that it was not well thought out and carefully considered, but rather, was probably generated during a brain-stonning session. This contnved notion is contrasted with supposedly 'natural' fear. That such fear actuaIly exists, or that it is natural if indeed it does exist, is not argued for, but is presented as a given. By placing 'uaivenality' in quotation marks, Gairdner calls the very concept into doubt. It is equivalent to labelling it 'so-called universalism', thereby dismissing it as not a concept to be treated seriously.

Indeed, Gairdner goes on to trivialize what he calls 'universalism' in a variety of ways. The pnncipled belief that al1 human beiags have equal value regardless of their race, that the cultures of al1 societies are equally valid, and that al1 languages are inherently adequate for their speakers is a serious tenet of modem anthropology, sociology, and linguistics, oot a passing impulse hit upon by a conspiratorial govemment. In adopting immigration policies that are designed to avoid favouring 'traditional' over 'non-traditional' immigrants, legislators are responding to the insights of sound scholarship and are attempting to eliminate policies that prejudp potential immigrants based on their racial, ethnic, religious, or national background. Yet Gairdner trivializes and dismisses this worid-view as 'sentiment', as 'a badly flawed result of Pollyanna thinking', and as 'one- world dreams' (1990: 4067). Raisin:: yet again the spectre of govermnent as Big Brother, Gairdner presents the principle that al1 humans are of equal value as 'another form of planning, of control disguised as humanitarianism' (1990: 406), and claims that the govemment adopted such a world-view 'to buy ethnic votes' (1990: 407). In Gairdner's world view. the question of immigration is inseparable from that of policies of multiculturalism for the people already in Canada. On this theme, Gairdner is explicit about his conspiracy theory. "It is in the interests of the collectivist State to deceive us - to make us think it is merely teaching us to enjoy other cultures" (19%: 390). By once again holding up his own values as natural and wholesorne, and the values he opposes as unnatural, coercive, and harmful, Gairdner gives no opportunity for the reader to consider as valid any view but his own. Note the string of negative or densive tems used with reference to multiculturalism in the following paragaph: 'one-worid socialism', 'forced equalization', 'neutrdization', 'idealistic', 'artü7cial', 'bureaucratic', 'quotas', 'dividing', 'secular', 'guise', 'rend asunder', 'self-contradictory', 'self-defeating', 'socially divisive', 'destructive'. These and other negative terms are contrasted with terms such as 'natural cultures', 'moral values'. 'natural differences', 'religious beliefs', and 'the best interests of ail the Canadian people'.

The purpose of [. . .] one-world socialism was and remains the eventual achievement of a world-wide equality of social outcornes; a forced equalization of wealth, regardless of merit; and the neutralization of al1 value-preferences between different peoples and cultures. The goal of this policy is to replace al1 nahlra! cultures with the idealistic, ar?zjïcial, bureaucratic culture of the State itself; to replace moral values with political ones; natural differences with quotas; religious beliefs with secular ones. [. . .] By dividing them (in the guise of uniting them under an abstract ideal), giving thern money, and thus acquiring their vote, it could de. Readers may want to ask themselves how it is that a mere hmdful of individuals like Mr. Kent13 can so change the face of this nation. Alas, he may yet live to see his policies rend Canada asunder, for each of them is self-contradictory (and therefore ultimately self-defeating), socially divisive, and destructive of the best interests of al1 the people of Canada. (Gairdner 1490: 390) In page after page, Gairdner derides the straw position he sets up as his opposition. Never are opposing views presented in anythiog other than a densive way, as maximally threatening to Canadians. Even more insidious, however, are the ways in which Gairdner attempts io manipulate readers into believing that they already think w hat Gairdner thinks, and that Gairdner is not actually convincing or persuading them, but is merely doing them a favour by saying out loud what they purportedly don? dare to Say. By now, the entire subject [immigration] has become so politicized, the average Canadian so frighteoed of expressing an opinion, and the media so ready to pounce, that al1 reasonable dialogue has been shut down completely. Public opinion on immigration has been officially squelched. (Gairdner 1990: 405) The following section provides a sample anaiysis which illustrates how Gairdner cornmunicates his racist, anti-immigrant views. Sample Analvsis: Racism - II This excerpt bridges two sub-sections in The Trouble Wilh Canada, Chapter 15: The Silent Destruction of English Canada: Multicnlturalism, Bilingualism, and Immigration, (pp. 406-8) WHAT ARE PEOPLE AFRAID OF? 1 First of all, most of us are very rnoved by the experiences of id- 2 grants who come to this country, work hard, and advance themselves

3 and their families. Especially when we see a large percentage of Our own population wailing about unemployrnent, or on the pogey, and then leam that many of them refuse to take hard physical jobs that immigrants gladly take, or for which we import foreign labour. The question has nothing to do with admiring deserving immigrants. It has everything to do with the people's fear of losing their comection with the farniliar culture they love. "UNIVERSALITY" In order to neutrdize this naturd fear, the government hit upon the idea of "universality" -- the idea that people al1 over the world are basically the same, and therefore as Tmdeau said, "it doesn't matter where the irnrniC,gantscorne from." The governing elite would iike us to agree with this sentiment, and at first it sounds good. But it is just that, a sentiment In the section on multiculturalism above, 1 tned to explain why it is a badly flawed result of Pollyanna thinking.

As you will see, the "universaiityWapproach was really another fom of planning, of cootrol disguised as humanitananism. It was the gov- ernment's way of changinp our society to match its one-world drearns, to buy ethnic votes, and fend off any objection from the citi- zenry at the same time.

But we can test this idea for ounelves with a little thought experi- ment. Let LU suppse the government is right, andpeople are all the same. Let us dsoagree that the three areas that generate the most fear are language, appearance, and religion. For these have to do with how we communicate with others, how we see ourselves reflected in our chiIdren, families, and in daily Me, and with our most fervent relationship with the Divine. Let us question ourselves honestly to see if the universality theory holds up. 1. bbWouldit make any difference to you if 80 percent of those around you spoke an unfamiliar foreign laquage?' Although I very much enjoy foreign languages, 1 would have to answer "yes." For 1 would at

fiat be interested, then quite uncornfortable. Then possibly a bit des- perate in this situation. 2. "Would it make any difference to you if 80 percent of those around you were suddedy a different colour andor had different racial fea- tures from you and your family?" 1 would have to answer "no," not if it was a limited expenence, such as 1 had once living in Japan for six months, quite rernoved from any Westerners. For 1 always knew 1 could leave and corne home. But if 1 had to stay in such a foreign com- munity for Me, I would feel quite forlorn. My answer would be "yes." 3. "Would it make any difference to you if 80 percent of those around you suddenly worshipped a God other than youn?" Again, this would be a fascinating situation at first, then downnght newewracking. The disappearance of many churches of my faith, its music, festivals, reli- gious celebrations, and holidays, as well as the scripturd literature and ethical system derived from it, would in the long nin be the most upsetting. My answer would be "yes."

If you answered "no" to these three questions, you are either a died [sic]- in-the-wool universalist, or you haven't had the expenences I've out- lined. If you answered "yes," you cannot be a univedist. You will

probably argue for some kind of control over immigration. When put to the test in this way, the "universality" theory is so obvi- ously badly fïawed we can onIy conclude that either it has been con- cocted to popularize, and assist a lazy government out of messy racial situations, or more cynically, it is simpiy an extension of the egalitar- ian, one-worlder's philosophy that requires the eradication of differ- ences - a policy introduced to make their theory more plausible.

The sub-heading which opens this passage poses a question: "What are people afraid of?" It begs the question of whether, in fact, people are afraid at al1 and presupposes that they are. It also begs the question of who the people are who are purportedly afraid, although the subsequent paragraph rnakes it clear that the people referred to are a sub-set of native-boni Canadians. Finally, the appearance of this question as a section sub-heading within the chapter implies that Gairdner is about to provide an answer to that question. Since the theme of the chapter is how (according to Gairdner) bilingualism and rnulticulturalism are destroying English Canada. the reader will be anticipating a response to the question that will concem cultural or racial dilferences between groups. There is, furthemore, a subtle implication within the form of the question that Gairdner believes that 'people's' fears are justified. If he were about to argue that (Ang1w)Canadians have nothing to fear, then he might formulate the question in a way that trivializes or mocks their fears. For example, he rnight write, "What are people afraid of anyway?", using 'anyway* to suggest that the question of fear is tangentid, not central to the issue at hand. Instead, Gairdner seeks to make fear a central component of his case against open immigration policies. The first seven lines of the "What are people afraid of-" subsection have several functions, the first of which is to set up a selfiother, Canadian~lirnmi~pntsdichotomy.

This dichotomy is visible in the pronouns Gairdner uses. In the first sentence, a contrast is made between "most of us" and "immigrants [. . .I themsetves" (lines 1-2, italics added). While 'most of us' is vague enough that it couid, potentially, include everyone in Canada, the scope of 'us' is narrowed to just people born in Canada once the contrast is made between 'us' and immigrants. Gairdner is not an immigrant himself and he separates himself from immigrants by refemng to immigrants in the third person. Furthermore, within the broader context of the whole chapter, Gairdner is purporting that it is precisely Anglo-Canadians whose culture is threatened, so the most plausible interpretation is that 'us' refers to native-boni AnglcKanadians, while the 'othen' are immigrants. This dichotomy is maintained and developed in the second sentence (lines 3 - 6) in which

Gairdaer asserts that "we see a large perceotage of Our own population [. . .]", contrasting the insider group once more with the immigrants. Furthermore, within the same sentence, a subdivision is established within the 'us' group, as Gairdner seeks to distance himself from unemployed people. Unernployed people are portrayed as 'wailing', a verb often used of excessive md possibly unjustified crying, especiaily that of babies and very young children. The unemployed are also descnbed as beinp 'on the pogey'. 'Pogey' is an informal Canadian word which refers to unemployment insurance benefits or welfare benefits (Canadian Oxfrd Dictionmy l998), and Gairdner's use of the colloquial tenn 'pogey' marks his disapproval both of the benefits themselves and of people who collect such benefits. Finally, unemployed people are disparaged as 'refusing' to take hard physical jobs, the implication being that such people are lazy. By then asserting that immigrants 'gladly take' such jobs, Gairdner is effectively setting unemployed Canadians apart both fmm other Canadians and from immigrants, and is implying that unemployed

Canadians are even lower on the social hierarchy than the immigrants or 'foreign labour' who purportedly accept jobs that unemployed Canadians refuse. By 'foreign labour' it is assumed that Gairdner is alluding to migrant worken, especially migrant agnculturai workers, who are granted work visas on a seasonal basis and who then retum to their home country for the balance of the year. These workers are dehumanized and

commodified in Gairdner's discourse by king referred to abstractly as 'labour', a commodity which 'we' import, presumably in much the same way as we import coffee or bananas. The 'othering' of the migrant workers is reinforced by the adjective 'foreign'. Not only does Gairdner set immigrants up as 'othea', but he further denigrates them through condescension. Immigrants, in this paragraph, are stereotyped as noble, hard-working, 'deserving' folks whose heroic stories move 'us'. This picture of the Noble Immigrant is particularly stnking because it contrats sharply with the picture Gairdner paints elsewhere of immigrants as dishonest and dangerous. Rhetoricall y. Gairdner' s apparent admiration of immigrants in this passage functions as a denial of prejudice against them. He might as well have said, "1 have nothing against immigrants but. . ." or "Some immigrants are wonderful people but. . ." This strategy of apparent denial is a common one in elite racist discourse; as Teun van Dijk observes, "semantic moves of apparent denial or concession may be used in a combined strategy of positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the Other ('1 have nothing against foreigners, but . . .')"(van Dijk 1993b:

35). Si,&cantly, because Gairdner positions himself within a 'we' group in this paragraph, his own denial of racism and purported admiration of 'deserving immigrants' is extended to everyone in the 'we' group. This allows Gairdner to position the readers alongside himself, in contrast with the 'others', and provides the readers with the same inoculation against charges of racism as he affords himself through his apparent concession of immigrants' admirable and moving hard work. The sub-section ends in lines 7-9 with a return to the theme of fear. Gairdner presupposes, rather than argues for, the notion that 'people' are afraid. This is apparent by the placement of the complex noun phrase 'the people's fear of losing their connection with the familiar culture they love', buried within a prepositional phrase which is, in tum, part of an infmitival clause. The concept of fear is alço nominalized: not 'the people fear X', but 'the people's fear', so that Gairdner cmavoid a bald and potentially inflammatory assertion such as 'people are afraid of immigrants'. Instead, the fear is portrayed abstractly and almost positively, as something concemed with 'people' and their love for their own culture. Looking ahead to line 10, this fear is even lauded as being 'natural', which for

Gairdner is a code-word for 'good'. Thus 'people', understood as the native-bom, not- unemployed Canadians who are the 'we' group established earlier in the passage, are tacitly encouraged to claim this fear as an almost noble reflex of patriotism. "Universality", the second sub-heading in the passage, is almost always placed in quotation marks by Gairdner (the exception being iine 29), to emphasize his disapproval of the concept as he defines it and attributes it to his opponents. The quotation marks not only signal his disapproval, but also signai to the reader that he is not rejecting the terni in its entirety, just with respect to the particular loaded meaniog which he assigns it in his discussions of multicultural policy in Canada. In Iine 10, Gairdner refers to 'the govemment', and then in iine 12 he refers to 'Trudeau'. Pierre Elliot Trudeau was for 14 of the 16 years between 1986 and 1984, and it was his governent which instituted policies of official bilingualism and multiculturalism in Canada. During his time in office, irnmi,gation policy in Canada moved away from a policy favouring British and Western European immigrants, to one which more explicitly included immigrants from other countries and other regions of the world. It is this more open immigration policy that Gairdner objects to and which he dubs 'universality' . His 'definition' of 'universality' in lines 11 - 13 is a subtle and deliberate twisting of the intent of an open immigration policy. Welcoming people from a variety of regions, religions, races, and languages, and acknowledging that al1 people and al1 cultures are equally good is not the same as what Gairdner purports when he descnbes the policy as "the idea that people al1 over the world are basically the same" (lines 11 - 12). In fact, a policy of multiculturalism celebrates variety and difference among cultures, it does not deny it, so Gairdner is attempting a semantic reversal to tum the notion of multiculturalisrn, in which cultural diversity is celebrated and honoured, into the notion of 'universality', in which cultural distinctiveness is denied. In lines 12 - 13, Gairdner quotes Trudeau without providing any information about the context of the sentence that he quotes, and without providing any reference which would allow the reader to seek out the full text of Trudeau's remark. This irresponsible use of quotation is typical of how Gairdner deals with people whose views he opposes. Quotations are frequently attnbuted to people or to groups whom he is denigrating or criticizing, but the reader is provided with no context and no source, and in some cases not even with the narne of the individual or group king purportedly quoted. In coutrast, when Gairdner quotes people who support his views and whose ideas he admires, the source is almost always provided. Throughout his w ritings, Gairdner disparages 'govemment' ,and this passage reflects the range of linguistic devices he uses to comrnunicate his disdain. In line 10, the phrase 'the govemment' is a neutrai designation, but it is made the subject of the predicate 'hit upon the idea of "universality"'. The verb 'hit upon' connotes haphazardness and lack of careful thought or reflection on the part of the govemment, so Gairdner is accusinp the govemment of instituting an ill-considered policy, with the implication that people who think it through would come to a different conclusion. Line 13 uses the phrase 'the goveming elite'. Gairdner hopes to alienate the readers from the govemment (from any govemment, not just the former povemment of Pierre Trudeau) by labelling those who sit in govenunent as elites, who. presumably are out of touch with 'us' (line 14), the ordinary citizens who are not part of the poveming elite. There is, of course, a nch irony in Gairdner including himself in the 'us' of ordinary citizens, given that he hirnself is indisputabiy a member of the economic elite of Canada. The government is portrayed as incornpetent through the use of 'sentiment' (lines 14 - 15) as a paraphrase to refer to its multicultural policy. If Gairdner can get the readers to disrniss the policy as sentimental and ill-conceived. then it is only a srnall step from there to convincing the readers to reject it altogether. The attack on govemment, and in particular on govemrnents which support multiculturalism. continues on line 16, where the policy previously said to have been 'hit upon' by the govenunent is further attacked as king 'a badly flawed result of Pollyanna thinking'. 'Pollyanna' is an allusion to a novel by E. Porter published in 1913, featuring an uofailingly optirnistic character, whose name has since come to connote "a cheerful optirnist; an excessively cheerful person" (Cmiadian OxfordDictioluuy lm).Combined with the earlier verb 'hit upon' and the noun 'sentiment', 'Pollyanna' and 'badly flawed' reinforce Gairdner's attempt to tnvialize the principle of multiculturalism to such a degree that readers would feel almost embarrassed to embrace it, lest they be associated with such muddle-headedness themselves. This trivialization is reinforced subsequently in the passage when multiculturalism is labelled the govement's 'one-world dreams' (line 19-20) and 'one-worlder's philosophy' (line 57).

Sipniftcantly, Gairdner's attack on goveniments which support multiculturalism is not limited to strategies of trivialization. In addition to and intemiingled with his attempts to ridicule govermnent are attempts to portray govemment as evil, deceptive, and dangerous. Multiculturalism, labelled 'univenality', is descnbed as "really another form of planning, of control disguised as humanitarianism" (lines 17-18). For Gairdner, an advocate of direct, populist democracy, in which governments follow rather than lead the majonty of voters, the spectre of government planning is meant to be viewed as intrusive, invasive and inappropriate, a sentiment which is reinforced when he paraphrases 'planning' as 'control'. presumably to scare raders into believinp that the governent seeks to control them and to change 'our society' (line 19). The seemingly innocuous phrase 'our society' contrasts the 'we' group with the 'other'. This time it is the government which welcomes non-Anglo immigrants, rather than the immigrants themselves, who are the 'others', but by this point, Gairdner has effectively set up govemment as a front which allows him to attack the immigrants indirectly. Within the free-speech ethos in Canada, it is acceptable, even laudable, to speak out freel y to criticize govemments and politicians, while it is less acceptable to directly attack minonty groups, including immigrants. Thus, by substituting govemment and its multiculhvalism policy for the immigrants themselves, Gairdner can deflect accusations that he is attacking immigrants and advocating a racist immigration policy by pointing out that he is merely critiquing a government policy. His earlier praise of 'deserving immigrants' could then be cited as 'evidence' that he is not prejudiced against them. The attack on multicuituralism continues as Gairdner paints govenunent as behaving deceitfully and dishonestly toward the citizens of Canada with respect to this policy. Multiculturalism (the 'universality' approach) was apparently disguised as humanitanankm (lines 17-18) to fool the citizens into accepting it. The accusation of

deception alone would constitute a harsh cnticism, but the claim that the policy was disguised as humanitarianism is particularly cutting. It is difficult for any person with a

conscience to reject humanitarian principles, and even people who may seldom act on such principles are likely to embrace them at least as an ideal. Thus, if the govemment made culturally destructive (in Gairdner's view) rnulticulturalism policies appear to be

humanitarian, then the deception would be seen as hitting people at the deepest levels of their principles, and would therefore be even more reprehensible than almost any other dishonesty that Gairdner rnight attribute to the govemment. In fact, another accusation is made, that the govemment used multiculturalism 'to buy ethnic votes' (line 20). Vote- buying is not only immoral, it is illegal, although the context does not suggest that Gairdner is accusing the govemment of cnminal behaviour here. It is not just any votes, however, that the government is said to have bought; it is 'ethnic votes'. An 'ethnic vote' is presumably a vote cast by someone who is 'ethnic', Le. a non-Anglo voter. Without stating it directly, Gairdner implies that Anglo voters do not support multiculturalism, and/or that they are smart enough not to allow their votes to be 'bought' by a deceptive government. In contrast, Gairdner seems to be suggesting that the 'ethnic' voters are apparently too stupid to perceive that their votes are king bought, or too self-interested to consider anyihing beyond their own self-interest. Voters of non-Anglo (Le. 'ethnic') origin are depersonalized as being simply the votes they cast, with the result that they are denied the agency that 'voter' (one who votes) would give them. This grammatical and semantic transformation of non-Anglo voters into pawns of the government does not prevent Gairdner from reinforcing their status of 'other', as he contrasts the ethnic votes with the objections of 'the citizenry' (Lines 20-21). tmmigrants and other non-Anglo residents of Canada may or may not be citizens, but by contrasting 'ethnic' with 'the citizenry', Gairdner apparently denies the 'ethnic' voters the status of full citizen,

regardless of what their legal standing in Canada rnight be. The core of Gairdner's argument against mukiculturaIism in this section consists of 'a little thought expeirnent' (lines 2223)in which he invites the readers to participate. Ostensibly, the purpose of the expenment is to get readers to 'discover' that they actually oppose multiculturalism and open immigration policies, no matter what they may previously have rhought that they believed. In actuality, this 'experiment' is a strategy used

by Gairdner to confuse the readers into believing that non-Anglo immigration should be strictly curbed. The term 'experiment' lends a quasi-scieotific validity to what is neither scientific nor valid. The 'experiment' starts with Gairdner introducing an invdid premise: Let us suppose the governmem is right, and people are ail the same (lines 23-24, italics in the original). Although in other contexts Gairdner's use of italics is noteworthy, in this particular instance, it is unrernarkable, since the italics are used in a conventional way, simply to highlight the hypothetical presupposition of the 'expenmeat'. The first problem with Gairdner's premise is his use of the noun phrase 'the government'. Throughout the passage under analysis, Gairdner has referred generdly to 'the govement', as well as specifically to Trudeau, a former leader of the federal government. Eisewhere in his wntings, Gairdner makes it clear that in his rnind, ail federal govemments starting with

Trudeau's (in 1968) and going up to the time this book was wnnen ( 1990) are interchangeable and equdly reprehensible, so in one way, his inexplicit reference to 'the govemment' in the premise of his 'experiment' is unremarkable. However, since bis premise attributes to 'the government' a specific view, it is inappropriate for him not to identify precisely which govemment he means. By leaving it open, Gairdner lets readers supply any govemment, federal or otherwise, of any political party as their referent. Since chances are most readers will have been discontenteci with at least some govemment at some time, this allows Gairdner to activate anti-govemment sentiments in a wider vanety of people than if he had specified any particular govemrnent. The proposition 'the government is right' is embedded within a clause that is subordinated to the verb 'suppose'. While most people are probably not so trusting or naive as to believe that govemments never make mistakes, they would probably still like to think that at least sorne of the time, about at least some issues, the government is right. By placing the proposition 'the govemment is nght' within the range of fantasy or supposition, Gairdner invites the reader to imagine that if it takes supposition to propose that the govenurient is right, then the reality must be that it is not, in fact, right. There are actually two sepatate propositions tbat the reader is invited to suppose, the first king that the government is right and the second being that 'people are al1 the same'. As separate propositions, they rnipht be either accepted or rejected independeotly of one another. The comma between them favours the interpretation that they are separate propositions, yet the juxtaposition of the two propositions in the same relatively short sentence and conjoioed by

'and' invites the reader to conflate the two propositions into one, in which 'the people are al1 the same' is subordinated (semantically, if not syntacticaily) to 'the govemment is rïght'. Of course the discussion of whether the second proposition is part of the fint or is separate from it fails to address the even more si@cant problem that it is simply

preposterous. No one, not Trudeau, nor any govemment or leader after him has ever , offered the view that 'people are al1 the sarne'. Multiculturalism asserts that people have equal value as human beings regardless of their language, religion or culture, and that al1 cultures are equally valid, but it celebrates the multiplicity and diversity of people and of cultures. It does not assert that people are al1 the same. This proposition is a red hemng, and the outcome of any 'expenment' based on Gairdner's faulty premise cannot possibly be valid.

Gairdner's use of his 'linle thought experiment' iunctions as a ploy to abandon al1 pretence of objectivity and to personalize the issue of multiculturalisrn, in order to better appeal to the individual readen' feelings. In the paragraph introducing the 'experirnent' (lines 22-29), first-person plural pronouns (we, us, Our, ourselves) are used a total of ten times, as Gairdner seeks to create a sense that he and the readers are al1 part of the same group, al1 having the same basic values and attitudes. In the portion of the discourse which constitutes the 'experiment' itself, the questions are al1 posed in the second person (you), and are alanswered in the first person singular. The readers are directly addresseci in the 'you' of the questions and are ostensibly invited to answer, but imrnediately following each question is Gairdner's own highly personalized answer to the question, replete with personai anecdotes and expressions of emotion, meant to draw the reader in to accepting

Gairdner's 'yes' answer as their own. The emphasis on the 'we' group leading into the questions predisposes the reader to identify with Gairdner as a fellow member of the group, a group which the context clearly signals is composed of white, Christian, Anglophone Canadians. The three questions al1 f01low a formulait pattern: "Would it rnake any diierence to you if 80 percent of those around you [. . .]" (lines 30-3 1,3536,4243). Since humans are social, interactive beings, it is difficult to imagine anything, however innocuous, that 80 percent of the people around one might do that would not in some way affect one or 'make a difference' to one. However, making a difference could be positive, negative, or value- neutral, so almost everyone would have to answer 'yes' that it would make a difference, to at least one of the questions posed. It is deliberate that Gairdner sets the questions up in such a way that they elicit 'yes' responses, since the interpretation he offers at the end of the 'experiment' is designed to draw al1 readers, if possible. into a position where he can force on them the faulty conclusion that they must oppose rnulticulturalisrn and open immigration policies. Gairdner offers no explanation or justification for using the figure '80 percent' in these questions. One might wonder why he did not choose 75 percent or 90 percent or any other figure. Thus, 80 percent seems to be an arbitrary figure meant simply to represent 'a large majonty' of people around one. The number '80 percent' may lend an aura of scientific precision to the 'experiment', but only if the reader fails to stop and look for a rationale for the fi,aure. While the frame of each question is the same, the content of each question and the nature of Gairdner's answerç warrants examination. Question 1 asks, "Would it make any difference to you if 80 percent of those around you spoke an unfamiliar foreign language?" (lines 3û-3 1). It is presumably self-evident that if people do not speak the same language as oneself, then it would make a difference to the ease with which one might communicate with them, and so on this basis, most readen might tend to answer 'yes' to this question.

Of' course, the question is actually quite vague. It does not, for example, specify that this

80 percent of people speak only 'an unfamiliar foreign language'. If they ais0 spoke the reader's own language, then presumably communication could still proceed with relative ease. The question is also not specific about context, although the chapter (and indeed the whole book) from which this passage was taken is about Canada, and presupposes that Canada is an English-speaking nation, so there is a strong tendeocy to assume that Gairdner is implying by his question that one is in Canada, surrounded by people speaking a 'foreign' (i.e. non-English) language. In this context, 'foreign' cames decidedly negative connotations, predisposing the reader to answer yes, that it would matter. Gairdner's answer to question 1 takes the form of the denial of prejudice noted

above (I'm not racist but . . .), when he says "Although 1 very much enjoy foreign languages, 1 [. . .]" (lines 31-32). By asserting uot just that he likes, but that he very much enjoys foreign languages, Gairdner attempts to rnitigate his apparent rejection of them in this context Witb reference to his own feelings, Gairdner leads the reader from 'interested' to 'uncomfortable' and finally to 'desperate' (lines 33-34). If Gairdner confesses to these feelings, as one who purports to enjoy languages in the abstract, then surely this acts as a justification for any reader to join in his feelings of desperation. One

might eveo feel sorry for a person who feels desperate, in a way that one rnight not feel sorry for someone who is hostile or angry, so Gairdner has deliberately led the reader to a negative emotion that is notas easily criticized as emotions of hostility or anpr would be. Question 2 asks, "Would it rnake any difference to you if 80 percent of those around you were suddenly a different colour andor had different racial features from you and your family?' (lines 35 - 37). Although the question is written in an ostensibly neutral manner, in the context of his book, Gairdner is, in effect, asking white readers whether it would matter to them if people of colour moved into their neighbourhood. From a discourse/linguistic point of view, the most significant feature of this question, and also of question 3 ("Would it [. . .1 those arouod you suddenly worshipped a God other than yours?") ,is the inclusion of the adverb 'suddenly'. What would have to happen in the real wodd such that 'suddenly' 80 percent of' the people around one changed colour, race, or religion? Contextually one must reject the interpretation that some sort of science-fiction catastrophe occurs in which large numbers of individuals are transfomed sirnultaneously, in favour of an interpretation that would suggest that a lot of people resembling oneself move away or disappear and a lot of people unlike oneself in colour, race, or religion move into the area. That a transformation affecting 80 percent of the population could happen 'suddenly' is highly implausible, yet both questions 2 and 3 depend upon having the readers accept just such an interpretation. For if the reader observed a gradual transformation of his or her neighbourhood, then presumably sfhe could adapt and become accustomed to and maybe even grow to like the new neighbours, or shecould move elsewhere. So the suddenness of the transformation becomes a key to leading readers to answer in the affirmative, that the situation would make a difference to them. Gairdner's answer to question 2 (lines 37 - 41) contains a twist. He starts by answering 'no', a surprise answer, given that everything up to that point in the text would

lead the reader to expect him to answer 'yes', but he inevitably leads the reader to a 'yes'

by the end of his answer. His reference to spending six months in Japau is a ploy to make

him appear to be cosmopolitan and favourably disposed to non-Western cultures, but his tolerance for unfamiliar cultures is soon shown to be hollow as he once again appeals to the reader's emotions, describing the prospect of living permanently in an unfamiliar culture as

making him feel 'quite forloru' (liae 41). Once again, just as linguistic intolerance is portrayed sympathetically as making one feel desperate, so is racial and cultural intolerance portrayed sympathetically as making one feel forlom. The fom of question 3 has been discussed above, both in terms of the comrnon frarne it shares with the other two questions and in ternis of tbe peculiar use of 'suddenly' within the question. Gairdner's answer begins with the appeal to emotion that follows the pattern established in the first two questions. He fint attempts to portray himself (and by extension the readers) as open-mindedly finding other religions 'fascinating', but he rapidly moves to a description of the hypothetical situation of being surrounded by people of a different faith as being 'downright nervewracking' (line 44). It is difficult to imagine what could be so downright nervewracking about king among people of a faith different from one's own, provided, of course, that no faith was being penecuted by any of the others. Also peculiar about Gairdner's 'answer' is that he leaps, without any contextual justification or explanation, to the conclusion that living among people, many of whom did not share one's faith, would lead somehow to the obliteration of one's own religion. If one did accept, for the sake of argument, the shaky premise that suddenly 80 percent of the people around one would worship a different God from one's own, then it is conceivable, as Gairdner suggests, that this could lead to the closure or disappearance of many churches of one's own faith. (Notice Gairdner's unstated assumption that his readers are, like him, Christian.) However, the suggestion that his faith, the Christian faith, would be obliterated entirely is simply absurd hyperbole designed to incite feelings of anxiety arnong the readers. Gairdner's confession that this would be 'upsetting' has the ring of understatement in light of the nearly apocalyptic picture he painted of the sudden disappearance of his faith. As in the case of the other two questions, Gairdner's answer to the questions focusses on unpleasant emotions, designed to make the reader join Gairdner in rejecting the (hypothetical) situation which might generate such emotions. Lines 49 - 52 comprise Gairdner's interpretation of the results of his 'experiment'.

He maintains the direct-address second person pronoun that was used in the 'expenment' questions, to maintain the personal, individual tone he has established. It is in his interest to set up a dichotomy such that readers might faIl into just one of two categories, and indeecl, this is precisely what he does by offenng the interpretation that one consistently answers either 'yes' or 'no'. People who answer 'no' are quickly dismissed by being swept into one of two categories. The characterization that one rnight be 'a dyed-in-the- wool universalist' is unambiguously unfianering. The modifier 'dyed-in-the-wool' implies that an individual has a preforrned, predeterrnined view that is so deeply ingrained as to be irnpervious to any modification or alteration. In other words, it is akin to saying 'closed- minded'. 'Universalist' in Gairdner's writings is always a derogatory term, the term he uses to disparage views and policies that support multiculturalism and open immigration. The second characterization of people who rnight answer 'no' to Gairdner's three questions is that they 'haven't had the experiences' he has outlined. This is tantamount to calling them naive. Thus, a reader who found herself or himself answering 'no' to any of the questions is promptly silenced by being informed that they are either closed-minded and idealistic, or simply naive and inexpenenced. One can almost imagine a reader going back and revising their 'no' answers at this point to avoid being relegated to a group that

Gairdner so obviousl y disparages. Those people who answer 'yes' to the questions are informed that they cannot be universalists. Given that Gairdner uses 'universalist' as a negative code-word for multiculturalism, readers are invited to conclude that they cannot support multiculturalism or open immigration policies, and in the next sentence are led to believe that they should therefore support 'some End of control over immigration' (line 52). In reality, the immigration policies of al1 federal govemments have strict numerical quotas on immigration, so there is and always has been control over immigration. What Gairdner is actually arguing for here, therefore, is not simply a numencal quota, but a restriction to severely limit immigrants who are not white, Western European, and preferably English- speaking. In order to sel1 his race-based immigration policy to readers and to encourage to continue to identify with him in the 'we' in-group that he is atîempting to establish among Anglo-Canadian readers, he has disguised it as something much more neutrai and almost 'cornmon-sense' . Striking about lines 49 - 52 is the modality of validity that Gairdner employs as he purports to see with absolute certainty into the minds of readers, 'inforrning* them of what they believe or of what ptinciples they can or cannot hold. Rhetorically, he has left no room for the reader to support in part or to weakly support multicuIturalism. Rather, he has forced the reader into one of two groups. By this point, 40pages into the book, the reader has repeatedly seen how Gairdner belittles, ridicules, and sneers at his opponents. Thus, he bas, in effect, conditioned them to recoil from people and from ideas which he disparages. Only a courageous, deeply committed, or unusually perceptive reader will pause to reflect that he is manipulating them into siding with him, even if they do not fully understand or agree with al1 his views. He wants them to join his 'club', and once they join, he wants to dictate to them what they can and cannot advocate or support. Lines 53 - 58 consist of one long sentence which is fittle more than a summary statement of what Gairdner had said before he introduced his 'experiment '. It also marks a return to the first-person plural pronoun 'we', after the interlude of the 'experirnent' in which both the readers and Gairdner were individudized by the use of the second-person and first-penon singular pronouns. Gairdner has tricked the readers into thinking that the y have individuall y thought through the complex issues surmunding immigration and multiculturalisrn and have ail corne to the sarne conclusion he came to, so he once again invites them, through his pronoun choice, to rejoin the group -- his group. Conclusion Gairdner's discoum is nothing hotinflammatory. By repeatedly characterizhg governments, the French, non-European immigrants, and refugees as a thfeat, Gairdner seeks to generate fear among the readers. He even produces a graph, entitled "People Who Say They Are 'of British Extraction' as a Percentage of Canadian Population", and another. "Population of British and French Extraction (or Any Combination of the Two) as a Percentage of the Canadian Population", which purport to show that by the middle of the twenty-first century, lesthan 10% of Canadians will claim British extraction, and only a few more than 51% will daim British andfor French extraction (Gairdner 1990: 41 1-412).

He uses figures from Statistics Canada and then makes projections into the future, but does not explain how he calculates the projected figures. While purporting to offer a disclaimer, Gairdner simultaneously attempts to dodge criticism by casting aspersions on the science of demography, implying that a demographer producing different results might be biased. At any rate, this whole field is rife with pseudo-scholarship and wild predictions, but 1 don? think a career demographer would corne up with results very different from mine - depending on his [sic] biases. (Gairdner 1940: 41 1)

However, Gairdner tums even this disclaimer into a cause to stir up fear in his Anglo readers.

So don? take this too seriously, but also remember: it merely reflects present trends, which may alter, and . . .it could be worse. Although, 1 have softened the trend somewhat to avoid the charge of alarmism, it still looks alamiing to me! (Gairdner 1990: 411) Two pages later, Gairdner identifies the Chinese as a particular threat to Canadians. Imagine that only people completely alien to our culture, tanguage, religion, and customs (the Chinese, say) are apply ing to enter Canada. Theoreticall y, in a sidficient number of years they could dominate every profession in Canada (and quite capably, 1 might add). In 250 years Canada could be a Chinese-run nation. Ii that's what we want, then let's get on with it. But if it's not, then let's say so and take steps to ensure it doesn't happen. (Gairdner 1940: 413) While it is beyond the scope of the present dissertation to argue whether or not

Gairdner's writings constitute hate speech in the legal sense of the tem, it would be an oversight if attention were not drawn here to the resernblance between Gairdner's discourse on race and ethnicity and the critena Rita Kirk Whillock (1995) identifies as charactenzinp hate speech from a linguistic, if not a le@, perspective. Inflammatory prose is the first of Whillock's characteristics of hate speech, and Gairdner's prose is indisputably that. Her second charactenstic, 'denilrate the designated outclass', is, uofortunately, arnply represented in Gairdner, as shown above in his lexical choices which associate the 'French' with oppression from above, a stifting of freedom, socialism, totalitarianism, taxation, immorality, barbarisrn, crass materialism. and the destruction of the family, among other things; and immigrants and refugees with 'demographic capture', racial or cultural take- over, a foreign threat, ignorant, illiterate, or unqualified people, sickness, laziness, and greed. Arguably, Gairdner also seeks to inflict permanent and irreparable harm to the opposition, Whillock's third feature of the hate stratagem. Nowhere does Gairdner call for physical violence against the fiench or against any immigrant or refugee individual or group, nor does he call for their impnsonment. He does, however, call for the deportation of people claiming refugee status as economic refugees. ''Vlhese people are lying to us. If they are lying, we should send them al1 back home" (1990: 417). He also calls for at least a two-year hak to immigration (1- 419), and he cails for a quota system if immigration is to be continued (1990: 413). This call for tight controls over imrnigmtion, and even for quotas, is quite remarkable for Gairdner, as he himself admits, and shows how intensely threatened he must feel by non-white, non-Anglo people. Now, I don't like quotas for anything, but in the face of outsiders detennining the faîe of our nation by numerically ovenvhelming a "neutrd" selection system, I'd use them. 1 might even argue that we should use them to redress the present trend. Otherwise, we may become subordinated to people and cultures unlike our own through reliance on a system designed to eliminate cultural bias! (Gairdner lm. 413) Quotas or controls of any kind are normally an abomination to Gairdner. As an economic libertarian, Gairdner is adamant about free markets, free exchange of goods and services unhindered by govemment tegulation, and freedom of individuals to choose where to live and work. In light of his advocacy of immigration restrictions and quotas, however, it is evident that the scope of freedom that Gairdner is prepared to live with is severely restncted. This freedom apparently only applies within the limitation of white, English- dominated, first-world countries. People of colour, especially if they are from third-world countries, are not to be welcorned into Gairdner's paradise of freedom. They, unlike white English-speaking people, are to be subject to restrictions on where they can live and work and do business. There is no principled reason for Gairdner's inconsistency on this matter. The only reason that can be deduced from this is that Gairdner is advocating racist policies, based on his Anglocentnc nativism. That the policies that Gairdner advocates would wreak permanent and irreparable harm on the affected people is also evident. Refugees denied access to or deported from Canada could be sent back to conditions of political and econornic danger, in which they would be unable to live healthy and productive lives, or in which they might even be killed. When Canada joined other nations in tuming away Jew ish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution in Europe, they effectively issued them a death sentence, and for tens of thousands of other refugees, Gairdner's policies might have a similar homfic effect today. Refusing other non-white, non-Anglo immigrants could likewise have a permanent hduleffect, since this could result in the permanent separation of individuals from theheir families, especially since one of the categories of immigration that Gairdner most vehemently opposes is that of family reunification. Given the passion with which Gairdner defends the importance of family for both individuals and for society, it is wholly inconsistent that he explicitly rejects family reunification as a bais for immigration to Canada. Gairdner intends as a 'horror story' the case of one Sikh immigrant who, in the

17 years following his arrival, estimates that 60 - 70 family members followed him here, through a series of successful farnily-sponsored immigration applications (Gairdner 1990:

415). That Gairdner chooses a south Asian man to illustrate his point is not a coincidence. Doubtless, many immigrants from Great Britain have sponsored just as many relatives, but since Gairdner is cornfortable with other white, Anglo, Chnstians, he does not choose to highlight those particular cases. By highlighting one case, Gairdner is attempting to suggest to the reader that this one case is symptomatic of a much larger problem. Importantly, the use of synecdoche -- linking smaller events to larger ones and then arguing that the part stands for a larger whole -- invites the audience to believe that the exampIes the rhetor offers are not atypical. Isolated events, then, take on greater significance because they are understood in light of a larger scherne or plan. [. . .] Typically, the use of synecdoche by hatemongers implies that there is some great conspiracy at work. (Whillock 1995: 3û-39) The conspiracy that Gairdner sees is one of so-called statists, whose agenda he believes to be the destruction of traditional English culture, in favour of a Marxist social organization. Since French people, unlike new immigrants, are already an integral part of Canada, Gairdner does not advocate attempting to remove them. His racism against them is nevertheless obvious in the way that he seeks to make them un-French by removing from

French the status of an official language of Canada. He advocates having no official language at all, recognizing thai English would then defac~obecorne the unoff~cial language of goveniment, education, and public administration in most of Canada, but he is prepared to go against his own ultimate preference in order to give preferential status to English if there is any offkial language at al1 in Canada. Canada does not need any "official" languages. It is a free country, and the people ought to be able to speak or use whatever language they wish. We need a free languae market, not govenunent language police to terrorize people and fine them for postmg signs on their own property in their own lanauage. In such a market, English will naturally dominate. But if we must have az'official" language, then let it be only one. (Gairdner 1990: 419) It has been argued elsewhere by linguists studying language retention and language death that a people's Loss of its language represents a serious loss to its identity and its social and cultural well-being. Thus, advocating that French be discontinued as an official language in Canada, while explicitly recognizing that this will result in having English predorninate, is effectively calling for the graduai death of the French language in Canada. Although Gairdner does not explicitly address the question of French's official language status at the provincial ievel in Quebec and New Brunswick, it would seem inconsistent for

him to support provincial officia1 language policy ,while vehernentl y opposing i t federally , so one must assume that he is calling for the elimination of French as an official language in all junsdictions in Canada. Given the dominance of English, politically, economically, and

culturally, in North Amerka, removing official language status from French would begin a process in which cash-strapped school boards might reduce or etiminate French programmes. Govenuneut agencies might case to translate documents into French and to offer services in French, a process which would force francophones to use English instead of French. French might survive longer in regions where it was spoken by a majonty of the people, but udess they remained within those enclaves, they would have to become fluent in English in order to live and work in Canada. The death of French might not be inevitable in such a scenano, but its survival in the long term would almost certainly be jeopardized. Since there are few cases of nearly-dead languages being revived to a point of being healthy (Modem Hebrew in Israel being a notable exception), the elimination of French as an official language would, arguably, have the outcome of inflicting permanent and irreparable harm to the French in Canada. That Gairdner's goal is ultimately to conquer his opposition, Whillock's fourth characteristic of the hate stratagem. is easily argued. It has been amply dernonstrated above what Gairdner believes, namely, that what he identifies as the 'English' system is supenor to al1 other political, economic and social systems. He wants Canada to be a white- dominated, English-dominaied country in which any non-whites or non-Anglos are numerically and sociologically dominated by a white Anglo majority. What is that excepta wish to conquer al1 his opposition? Gairdner would deny that he is racist and that his discourse on immigration, race, and ethnicity constitutes racist hate speech. He purports to be tolerant and to appreciate other cultures.

1 must be clear from the outset that a dislike for pvemment-imposed .* "multicultural" policies has nothing to do with disliking other cultures. In fact, it may result from a deep love of culture. Most of us enjoy travelling to experience the differences between cultures -- their histories, religions, values, arts, and languages. We al1 have roots in common, but very few of us have comrnon roots. (Gairdner 1990: 390) Nevertheless, as van Dijk, writing in the book Hate Speech, argues, the lack of awareness of one's own racist biases does not make one's discourse any less an example of hate speech. The elites have the unshakable self-image of being specifically tolerant, unlike ordinary people. At the same time, they need arguments, reasons, and legitimation to keep (too many) non-Europeans from entering the country, the city. the school, the university, the scholarly journal, the Company, or politics. To do that they have recourse to a number of standard arguments about equality and equal nghts (primarily of their own white group), about quality (never mentioned when the minorihl of white men are favored by positive discrimination), social order, and so on. In surn, given that it is articulate, seemingly well-argued, apparently moderate and humane, and given its power of control and access to the means of ideological production, elite discourse about ethnic affairs effectively establishes, maintains, and legtimates the ethnic consensus, and consequently the dominance of the white group in the increasingly multiethnic societies of Western Europe and Northern America. (van Dijk 1995b: 25) Just as Chapter 2 of this dissertation argues that Gairdner's discourse is sexist, and Chapter 3 argues that it is homophobic, the present chapter argues that it is racist. Gairdner's exploitation of linguistic devices such as lexical choices, modality, metaphor, and transitivity, among others, are used in different combinations and in different balances in the various topin that he wntes on, but al1 conspire together to produce a discourse that is unhealthy and offensive in the extreme. Chapter 5: Conclusion

Summarv Chapters 2 through 4 of this dissertation argue that William Gairdner's discourse, as it appears in his popuiar books, is sexist, homophobic, and racist. Gairdner advocates restrictive roles for women, primarily in the pnvate, domestic sphere or in volunteer, care- taking contexts outside the home. He argues that women who choose to work in paid employment are anti-farnily and are disruptive to a healthy socid order. Ferninist women are a particufar target of Gairdner's rhetoric, and he conflates feminism with lesbianism, blaming 'ferninists' for male violence and aggression and for male homosexudity, on the grounds that they scare away men and cause hem to turn to one another for sex and intimacy . Gairdner argues that homosexuals should not enjoy the same privileges as heterosexuals, because, in his view, homosexuals violate the 'natural' order and contribute to the breakdown of the family and by extension of the sort of sùciety which is constructed with the patriarchal, heterosexual farnily at its core. Gairdner's ideaiized Canadian society is also Anglo-saxon in culture, English in language, and Judeo-Christian in faith and values. In order to make redity confom to this 'ideal', Gairdner would rescind al1 policies and laws which support officiaf bilingualism and would make French language and culture subordinate to English, right across Canada. Furthemore, Gairdner would have the government restnct immigration to severely limit the number of non-white, non-European immigrants to Canada. The attitudes of sexism, homophobia, and racism that Gairdner presents are neither subde nor difficult for a reader to detect. Nevertheless, what makes them compelling is the way that those ideas are presented. Using the methods of critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis, this dissertation has shown that Gairdner manipulates lexical choices,

metaphor, modaiity and transitivity, and he structures his discourse around false

dichotomies, characterizhg feminists, lesbians and gays, French and non-Anglos as 'others', in contrast to himself and people who resemble him. Gairdner sets himself, his language and culture, his values, and his politics up as nomal, while demonizing the 'othen' as being anti-fadly, anti-democratic, and dangerous to the well-king of Canadian society. In doing so, Gairdner, an able-Wied, well-off, white, Anglo, Christian male, seeks to reinforce the power relations which have accorded him the positions of privilege which he enjoys in order that they may be mainiained indefiaitely. Gairdner may be the quintessential Canadian example of this sort of New Right hegernony, but he is not alone in promoting these politics, as the following discussion illustrates. New Rieht/Neo-Conservative Ideolooy In order to contextualize Gairdner's discourse, one must undentand the political philosophy undedying the terni 'the New Right'. In fact, there is not any one uncontrovenial definition of the terni, and it is used somewhat differently in the U.S.A. and in Great Britain. Given the different govemmental structures of these two countries, it is not surprising that the New Right manifests itself dflerently in each, but there is still a cornmon core of meaning to the term which makes it possible to use it even for the somewhat different political movements of Thatchensm and Reaganism, both of which are identifiable manifestations of New Right ideology, and both of which influenced

Gairdner's thinking at the time he was writing The Trouble With Canada and The Wm Againsi the Family. Under Reagan, the Amencan govenunent did take a strong verbal position on democratic processes, civil rights, and welfare. The position taken was clearly consonant with the new right ideology. SimilarIy in Britain, under Thatcher's govenunent, a new right rhetonc accompanied cutbacks in public spending on welfare and education. (Marchak 1988: 2 13) To complicate matters, there is sometimes confusion between the terms 'New Right', 'neo- conservatism' and even sometimes 'ne~liberalism*.Trevor Harrison characterizes the situation in this way: n]he challenge to liberal democracy came from a coalition of right-wing elements, fearful of the emerging econornic crisis, sickened by what they viewed as a civic culture dominated by moral laxity and excessive individuaiism, and resentful of the gains previously made by the New Left. The narne given to this right-wing response was 'the New Right,' and its ideology was termed 'neo-conservatism.' What is neo-conservatism? The literature is fairly consistent in defining it as an amalgarn of classical liberal economic and political theory with traditional conservative social and moral doctrine. Specifically, neo-conservatism is said to prornote capitalist socio-economic structures and beliefs (the free-market system, individuaiism, a minimal state, and pnvate ownenhip of property) while espousing a belief in natural inequalities and natural authorities (the Christian church, the family ,and the state). (Hamson 1995 20-21) Patricia Marchak characterizes the New Right movement as being centred in the United States. "The new right is an international movement, with its centml location in the United States but with institutes and publications in al1 the industrialized, capitalkt countries" (Marchak 1988: 187). She points out that part of the confusion over the meaning of the term arises from the way that we are accustomed to using terms such as 'right', 'left', and 'centre'. The popdar way of thinking about political ideologies is to classify them as "nght," "centre," and "left." The positions correspond roughly to positions on the equality- elitism continuum, with "left" closer to egalitarian beliefs and "ri@t" closer to elitist beliefs. But if we use these ternis, we have a problem in classifying what has corne to be known as "the new nght" because part of its message is neo-conservative, and part, li bertarian. (Marchak 1988: 187) Marchak describes the libertarian position in this way : The individualist position is taken to the extreme in anarchist and Iibertarian ideologies; dl other values becorne subordinate. Anarchists wodd do away with al1 govenunent and social restrictions on personal liberty; Libertarians (though with some differences between various groups) generally accept the necessity of govemrnent, but would restrict its functions to the defence of persons and pmperty. Anything which prevents individuals from fully exercising their initiative, entrepreneurid skills, and talents is harshly judged: thus democracy and the welfare state are deemed to be impediments to individuai growth. Inequality is viewed as inevibble because people are genetically unequal, and as necessary because the most talented provide the leadership which pennits others to survive. Libertarians believe that "pure" capitalism is an ideal social and economic system because it includes a genuinely free market for absolutely al1 goods and services. In a libertarian society everything would be commodities for sale, including education, al1 mass media presentations, postal services, dnnking water, and the use of highways. This position is part of the "new right" ideology. (Marchak 1988: 89) This libertanan position forms the basis of William Gairdner's economics, but in spite of sharing certain econornic views, Gairdner vehemently rejects other aspects of libertarian thought. It is easy to syrnpathize with much fibertarian thought simply because it holds the individual to be more important thm the State; but [Thomas] Szasz, and most other libertarians, go too far. They also hold the individual and his [sic] freedom to be more important than culture, society, tradition, custom, transcendant [sic] values, duty, and many other supra-individuai realities that lie beîween the individual and the State. In this sense, these theorists have provided a forceful philosophical tool now frequently used to destroy al1 the social and legal pxivileges of traditional society. Ironicaliy, libertarian philosophy, initially and properly a weapon used to protect the individual against the State, has too often become a charter-supported philosophical weapon used by radicals against the farnily and society. (GGrdner 1992: 127) Intersecting with the egalitarian-elitist continuum in Marchak's conception of the political landsape is the individualist-collectivistcontinuum (Marchak 1988: 9). The two philosophies most consistently identified as comprising the New Right both fa11 dong the elitist end of the spectrurn, but classical liberalism/libextarianism is close to the individualist pole, while neo-conservatism is closer to collectivism than to individualisrn. Elitism is easily recognizable in New Right discourse, but the contradiction between individualism and collectivism is harder to detect. It may seem counter-intuitive that neo-conservatism is placed closer to collectivism than is liberalism, but Marchak explains that [tlhe chief difference between conservatism and liberalism is in their respective views of society: consematives viewing it as an organic whole within which individuals have assigned places; liberals as a collection of individuals each striving for personal goals. Thus bue conservatives shouid be concemed with the collective moral fabric as well as the permanence of a dominant class. Logically, liberals would be less concerned with social and moral issues except where society infringes on individual rights. (Marchak 19823: 13) Desmond King expresses the mixing of classical liberalism and conservatism in this

As a political force New Right advocates represent not only a restatement of fiberal values but dso certain social and moral conservative positions. These include those advanced by social authontarians concemed to re-establish state power, moralists wishing to restore religious and pre- 1%0s values, and conservatives who fear the reduction of inequafity and extension of citizenship rights. [. . .] Conservatism is secondary to liberalism in New Right ideology because it anses prirnarily in response to the consequences of liberal economic policies. Outside this context, conservative beliefs and objectives have a narrow appeal. (King 1987: 16-17) In this passage, King claims that economic libertanankm is the root of New Right philosophy, and that neeconservative sociaVmoral values arise from it. In contrast, Marchak claims that the neo-conservative values are fundamental, and that the libertarian economics arise as a means of bringing about the desired social order (Marchak 1988: 198). Nothing precludes both King and Marchak king ri@, since sorne people arrive at a New Right ideology from an overriding social or religious preoccupation, and others from a predominantly economic orientation. Either way, [a]n important connection exists between the economic underpinning of the New Right [. ..] and specific policy positions regarding the welfare state and a host of 'family'- type-- issues: each reflects individualist (that is, healthy, adult male) assumptions; each seeks a reduced role for the &te both in ec6nomic and welfare activities, and a restoration of the family as the main economic and social unit in society. (King 1987: 17)

Rather than being assofiated directly with any one political party or one social group, the New Right actuaiiy comprises a &fm ailiance of sorts amonp at least diree different sectors of society. the international corporations, assorted smaller forms of capital which favour a libertarian, ultra-free enterprise version of the New Right, and fundamentalist religion (Marchak 1988I 187). Economically, the New Right advocates a classical liberal, or 'laissez-faire' form of capitalism. In its purest forms, it thus rejects al1

forms of social welfare administered by the state. This extreme form of economic independence is linked with hi& morality, as economic success and independence are viewed as signs of good moral character, and a lack of economic success is viewed as a sign of moral degeneration and laziness. Although New Right proponents encompass a varied religious spectnirn, the philosophy of equating economic success with moral virtue is clearly linked to the so-cailed Rotestant work ethic, and this moral preoccupation cannot be separated from economics in New Right philosophy. The New Right somewhat contradictoriiy holds that al1 people should be treated as equals, and that inequaiity is the natural state of humans. Their argument is that society and the law should treat ail people ar ifthey were equal, giving no social assistance or welfare to anyone. (Some would accept welfare for the most needy. but one suspects that in order to qualify an individual would have to be worse than destitute.) If people are al1 left qually without government assistance, be that financial or legal assistance, then the New Right argues that the natural ciifferences and inequaiities between people will emerge. In this view, then, the 'natural' leaders wili become leaders, those with greater ski11 and ability and determination will becorne property owners and entrepreneurs, and those with less potential will sink to the bottom of the social scale. The attack on welfare and citizenship rights is not, however, lirnited to a strictly monetary concem. Certainly, the New Right wants to end wehein order to cut taxes, but there is also a moral component to their objection to welfare. In some sense, the New Right thinks that the welfare state is responsible for undennining the traditional patnarchal family by taking over different family functions. The health, weifare, and education of individuals, it believes, should be the purview of the family. The New Right's critique of the wekestate in this way becomes closely linked to its understanding of the crisis of the family. (Eisenstein 1982: 77) Particulariy within North America, the 'family values' constituency makes up a significant core of the New Right. Not al1 who support the so-called family values agenda of the New Right are themselves evanplical, or even necessarily Christian, as Gillian Peele points out. The specifically Jewish intellectual milieu from which many of the neo- conservatives came had the effect of making its members especidy sensitive to the importance of religion, while also, of course, ensuring that they would have some grounding in the teachings of the Old Testament. This religious background has had an important impact on the style of thought of modem neo-conservatism, which insists on the importance to a society of a shared code of mords even where orthodox religious observance may be abandoned. Egually ,one can trace to the specificaily Jewish background of many leading neo-consewatives the concern with preserving the institution of the family and the emphasis on ethnicity. (Peele 1984: 25) In both its Jewish and Christian origins, however, it is on the cluster of social family values issues that the religious right has its strongest impact. Central to the family values agenda is an anti-feminist carnpaign to make staying at home raising children the only viable choice for women. As Eisenstein explains, "[bly reasserting the power of the family against the state, the New Right more accurately intends to reestablish the power of the father" (Eisenstein 1982: 85). Ironically, the state would have to bnng to bear a certain coercive power in order to force adherence to these narrowly defined family values, and this is one of the points at which a completely libertarian or classical liberal view clashes with the conservative imperative to impose uniforni socieîal noms and values. Attacking feminism, and reimposing traditional fernaie deswithin the family, is at the core of New Right conservatism. This desire to restore traditional values both in the United States and in Bntain is a powerful element of New Right rhetonc and relates to economic arguments about reducing the scope of the state. [. . .] However, to pursue many of these conservative objections an activist or strong state is necessary, thus violating the liberai desire for minimal govemment [. . -1. (King 1987: 21) Despite some differences in emphasis and ongin, the different strands of the New Right have in common that they occupy what Marchak labels the elitist pole of the egalitanan- elitist continuum. Specifically, this amounts to privileging white, heterosexual, English- speakinp males above dl other individuals and groups. Because black women have always worked outside the home in disproportionate numbers to white women, whether in slave society or in the free labor market, the mode1 of the traditional patrïarchal family has never accurately described their farnily life [. . .]. In this fundamentai sense the sexual politics of the New Right is irnplicitly antifeminist and racist: it desires to establish the rnodel of the traditionai white patrïarchai family by dismantling the weifare state and by removing wage- earning married women from the labor force and retuming them to the home. (Eisenstein 1982: 78) The Rise of the New Rioht in Canada Although the New Right in Great Bntain and in the U.S.A. peaked in its influence during the 1980's under Margaret Thatcher (Prime Minister from 1979 - 1990) and Ronald Reagan (President from 1980 - 1988). the religious right, in paaicular, still exerts a strong influence in Amencan politics in the 1990's and beyond. (The Republican Presidential victory of George W.Bush in 2000 is evidence of the continuing influence of the far nght in U.S. politics.) The movement was slower to gain a foothold in Canada and did not begin to manifest itself as a force to be reckoned with until the 1990's. Brooke Jeffrey attributes the sIower development of the New Right in Canada to several factors. She argues that Canada's political culture tends to be further to the left than that of the United States, as illustrated by programmes such our public heaith system, making Canadians slower to embrace New Right conservatism. She further argues that Canadians tend to exhibit a greater respect for authority and deference to elites than have Amencans, in part because of the Loyalist origins of many Canadians and in part because "immigrants to Canada were rnost likely to be traditional Anglicans or Catholics, rather than the Calvinists and other fundamentalists who settled in the United States" (Jeffrey 1999: 45). In addition to these factors, Jeffrey also points out that, [wlith a much smaller population and far less capital for private-sector investment, state intervention in the economy and the provision of government-spoosored social programs through the welfare state came to be not only strongly supported, but expected. Many Canadians considered it a right of citizenship. Risk-taking and entrepreneunhip, by contrast, never figured prominently in the Canadian identity. (Jeffrey 1999: 46)

The fact that Canadians have tended to perceive neo-conservatism (the New Right) as being a predominantly American phenornenon bas also made them less inclined to adopt it. Jeffrey notes that "[slince most Canadians define their national identity as one that is emphatically not Amencan. they have been very unwilling to irnport Amencan political baggage" (Jeffrey 1994: 47). Nevertheless, while slower to become a force in Canada than elsewhere, the New Right did eventually gain a foothold as discontent from the Mulroney era of the 1980's mounted, particularly in Alberta. Although Canadian neo-conservatism in generai places less emphasis than its Arnerican counterpart on the 'family values' aspects of the ideotogy, Jeffrey notes that the moral aspect of American neo-conservatism has more appeai in Alberta than elsewhere in part because, like the United States. it was settied by a number of groups with fundamentalist religious ties (Jeffrey 1999: 51). A further factor in Alberta's susceptibility to American New Right values may be the sirnilarity between its economic base of oil and cattle and that of Texas, making it nahiral for them to look to the U.S. for direction. To date, although neo-conservative goveniments bave kenelected in Canada's two wealthiest provinces, Alberta and Ontario. as yet its federai manifestation, the Canadian

Alliance Party (formerly the Reform Party of Canada)l? has not fonned a govemment.

(See below in this chapter for a history of Reforrn pnor to its transformation into the Alliance Party.) In Alberta, the provincial Progressive Conservative party came to power under leader Peter Lougheed in 1971, ending the longstanding Alberta Social Credit dynasty. Between 1971 and 1985 when he stepped down as Premier and party leader, Lougheed and his government expanded the role of govemment in the province, improving programmes related to health care, welfare, and education. Taking advantage of the strong economy, they also expanded the provincial infrastructure and they provided incentives to industry, in part in an effort to diversify the province's economy so that it would be less susceptible to the period swings in the oil industry (Jeffrey 1999: 60). By the time Don Getty succeeded Lougheed as party leader and Premier in 1985, however, an economic slowdown was underway and boom times were over. Under Getty, the Progressive

Conservatives won the 19â9 Alberta election, but Getty's leadership only lasted until the fa11 of 1992. Lougheed and Getty exemplified the 'progressive' or centnst values of the Progressive Conservative party, but in Alberta, under Ralph Klein, the party would take a definite tum to right. In December 1992, Ralph Klein won the leadership of the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party and assurned the premiership of Alberta. This marked the introduction of the neeconservative agenda in Alberta. Alrnost immediately, Klein's govemment began making cuts to the public sector and freezing the pay of those whose jobs had not been cut. He further put a freeze on govemment contracts, and he cancelled the pension plan for the mernbers of the Legislative Assembly. Pursuing his neeconservative agenda unwaveringly, Klein went on to win the lm, 1997, and 2001 provincial elections and at the time of this writing is stU Premier of Alberta. In Ontario, the neo-conservative agenda has been pursued by Mike Harris and his supporters. Harris, fmtelected to the provincial legislahue in 19û1, won the provincial Progressive Conservative leadership race in 1990, when the party was in opposition. Shortly afterwd, Harris' party placed third in the provincial election, behind the winning New Democratic Party led by Bob Rae, and the incurnbent Liberal party led by David Peterson. Using the time in opposition to his advantage, Hams and his advisors developed the plan for what would corne to be known as the "Cornmon Sense Revolution", which they reveaied in 1994. The main platforms of this plan were tax cuts and a balanced budget, a classic ne-conservative economic agenda. Jeffrey notes that there was a signif~cantArnerican influence on the development of Hams' agenda as a result of his advisors' consultations with Arnerican Republicans such as Christine Todd Whitman, Governor of New Jersey, John Engler, Govemor of Michigan, George Pataki, Governor of New York, and Newt Gingrich, Republican House Leader in Washington, D.C. In Jeffrey's own words,

[slome of the rhetoric in the CSR [Cornmon Sense Revolution] cornes directly from Gingrich's Contruct with Arnerica. Several of Engier's policies ended up in the 1995 platfom, and the state of Michigan was mentioned by name in the CSR as an example of a mode1jurisdiction, in whch privatization and deregulation had had a very beneficial effect on the economy. (Jeffrey 1999: 167)

Alberta was aiso mentioned in the CSR and Klein's economic strategy was discussed, aithough care was taken to differentiate Harris' Ontario strategy from Kîein's Alberta strategy (Jeffrey 1999: 167-8). It was no coincidence that Alberta, the ody province run by a neo-conservative party, was also the only other province mentioned in the CSR. In June 1995, Mike Hams and his far-right Progressive Conservative Party won the provincial election and immediately began instituting the measures outlined in the CSR. Not surpnsingly, his advisors continued to consult with other neo-conservative parties, and Ernie Eves, then Minister of was sent to Britain to study Margaret Thatcher's pnvatization scheme (Jeffrey lm: 183). Harris' governrnent was re-elected in 1999 and continues to govern Ontario at the time of tbis writing. The Reform Party of Canada During the 1980's, while Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan promoted their New Right agendas in Britain and the United States, and while Ralph Kiein and Mike Harris awaited their chance to form neo-conservative govements in Alberta and Ontario, an assortment of neo-conservatives based in Alberta and British Columbia dreamed of

pursing their own agenda in Canadian federal politics. , son of Ernest C. Manning,Alberta's Social Credit Remier from 1943 to 1%9, sought to establish a political

alternative to the existing federal parties. By 1986, Preston Manning was part of a group calling itself the Reform Association of Canada, which held its first major event in May of 1987 in Vancouver. Estimates of the number of participants range from 300 to 600 (Jeffrey 1999: 293) and by the end of the weekend convention 76% of the delegates had voted in favour of Manning's cal1 for a new party (Jeffrey 1999: 295). In November 1987, at the foundinp convention of this new party, The Reform Party of Canada, Preston

Manning was acclaimed as its first leader, a position which he held until2000, when the Refonn Party of Canada merged into the new Conservative Refonn Alliance Party of Canada, more commonly known simply as the Alliance Party. (See also fwtnote 14, this dissertation, regarding the transformation of Reform into the Alliance Party.) One factor which disthguished the Reform Party from both the Klein and Harris neo-conservative parties was that it embraced not only the fiscal conservatism of those provincial parties, but also a very strong social and moral conservatism. According to Jeffrey, writing in 1999, before the Alliance Party replacd Reform, "the federal Refonn Party's decision to highlight its commitment to moral conservatism has been a signifiant factor in its inability to expand from its Western base in Alberta and the Bible Belt of British Columbia" (Jeffrey 1999: 50). Reform's uncomprornising position with respect to Quebec, that it should be granted no special constitutional status in recognition of its distinct cultural and social nature, has been a further factor in its failure to elect significant numbers of members in central and eastern Canada. The Refonn Party considers itself to be "a populist and democratic party" that "draws its agenda from consultations with Canadians" (Manning 1992: 103). Populist parties are like oil wells, tapping reserves of pent-up energy. Every peration or so the y release the anger of Canadians in a geyser of frustration dtrected maidy at the country's political and economic elites, the people who daim to know best. is always hungry, often negative, and aever friendly to the status quo, but it is ultimately useful because it forces politicians to get back in touch with the people. (Sharpe & Braid 1992: 61)

The Reform Party may have ben born out of a widespread dissatisfaction with mainstream politics in Canada, but it was clearly shaped and controlled by Preston Manning. The deep religious convictions of the Manning farnily, rooted in evangeiical Christianity, are central to Preston Manning's plitical beliefs. [. . .] He believes that every word of the Bible is true and knows that he has a calling to translate those words into political action. Every one of his views on capitalism to privatization, can be traced in a straight line back to his vision of the proper Christian society. He is convinced that Canada is hell-bent for damnation but can be saved by turning sharply toward the heavedy beacon of the Reform Party's New Canada. (Siharpe & Braid 1992: 2-3) Although Manning never apologizes for or conceals his own religious convictions,

he downplays their influence on the Reform Party. "[A]lthough it has chosen me, a practising Christian, as its first leader, no doubt the party will one day be led by someone with different convictions" (Manning 1992: 103). Nevertheless, in his 1992 book, The New Ca~da,which is a cross between an autobiography and a political rnanifesto, Manning devotes an entire chapter, Chapter 4: "The Spiritual Dimension," to a description of his faith and how it interacts with his politics. While the tone of the chapter is not heavy-handed, its fom is a cross between a testimony and a sermon, and he is unarnbiguous about his faith. EvidentIy, his expenence in Christian broadcasting, on his father's "Canadian Bible Hou? radio show, has camed over even in the style of his political speeches (Sharpe & Braid 1992: 19-20). The Reform Party claimed to be 'populist', but it appears that its membenhip base did not constitute a balanced, representative cross-section of Canadians. The people attracted to the Reform Party are pretty much the sarne no matter where Manning finds them. As countless journalists have noted. his audiences are rnainly white, male, middle class, and pushing the far side of middle age. Non-white faces are rare enough to be an event. At three meetings in Ontario, attended by a total of at least 9,000 people, there were fewer than 10. Not much has changed since eariy 1990, when a party poll leaked to the Edmonton Journal showed that 72 per cent of the party members were men, 48 per cent were over 6û years old. and 38 per cent were retired. The party says i t does not hepfigures on ethnicity ,but it doesn't have to. The answer is in the sheet of white faces stanng raptly at Preston Manning. (Sharpe & Braid 1992: 3 1-32) In common with their New Right fellow-believers elsewhere, Reform placed a strong emphasis on individualism.

Individual nghts would be paramount whiIe group or collective rights would have no standing. Most Reformers finnly believe that the individual is paramount in society and that al1 gmup ri@tts tend to infringe on individual rights. Preston Manning's own belief in indwiduaIism, in turn, springs from bis deep religious convictions. If any one idea expresses the Reform Party's core ideology, it is this pure individualism with its strong echo of the western frontier. (Sharpe & Braid 1992. 172)

'Group rights' as seen by Reform would include such things as the rights of women to be treated as equal with men and to be paid equally. If women's rïghts are dismissed as 'group rights', then that leaves just men with rights. Since rights for other 'groups', such as sexual minonties, ethnic minorities, linguistic minorities, and people with disabilities,

must also be discounted, the term 'individual rights' is left applying just to able-bodied, English-speaking, srraight, white males. It is thus oot surprising that this was precisely Reform's main constituency. Refonds attitude toward feminism is exemplified by Deborah Grey, the first Reform MP to be elected, and arguably the leading woman within the party. The mode1 Reform Party woman, Grey does not iike feminism, affirmative action, or anything at al1 that smacks of special treatment for her gender. That is why she opposes laws to enforce equal pay for work of equal value. Women are different but equal, she says. They should not try to be like men or to pull men down in order to feel that they are gaining ground. (Sharpe & Braid 1992: 137) In addition to being anti-feminist, Reform was hostile to Quebec's self- identification as unique within Canada.

The very heart of the Reform Party, its fervent individualism, is the bom enemy of modem Quebec collectivism. These two political forces, the rawest expression of the deep split in the Canadian political psyche, cmnever be reconciled in such pure forrns within one country. The Reform Party, despite its optimistic noises about striking a deal with Quebec, is the strongest expression of individualism Canada has seen in rnany years, (Sharpe & Braid 1992: 151) Trevor Harrison describes the Reform Party as 'nativist' in a distinctively Canadian

While nativism elsewhere involved prejudicial attitudes and actions directed towaràs minorities perceived as threatening the national temtory or nation state, nuîivisrn in EngZish-speaking Canada hQs tended instead to fasten its loyaZq to the wider Anglo- culture rather than to the temtorial nation of Canada. (Hamson 1995: 166) A few pages later he adds that "This identification [of Reformers with 'Angle' culture] is nowhere more strongly enunciated than in William D. Gairdner's Trouble with Canada" (Harrison 1995: 171). William D. Gairdner and the Reform Partv of Canada

WilIiam Gainlner was an influence particulariy in the early days of the New Right or neo-consewative movement in Canada, and his role in the Reform Party was considerable during its fornative years. Trevor Harrison places Gairdner among the most infiuential core members of Reform. The party's chief ideological mentors - Brimelow, Gairdner, Manning, and Bfield -- also express an extreme faith in unbridled capitalism, individdism, and the workings of the marketplace, a stance found in the party's strong support of free trade in 1988. (Harrison 1995: 209)

Gairdner was a key-note speaker at the 1991 Reform Party's Assembly in Saskatoon. That Reform ideology carries within it this element of classical liberal thought is aptly displayed by party mentor William Gairdner. [. . .] Such a notion of society and social obligations clearly would be anathema to many traditional conservatives, although it is worth noting that Gairdner received repeated, thunderous ovations from Reform delegates who heard his speech at the Saskatoon convention. (Hamson 1995: 21 1) Controversy arose, however, over Gairdner's enthusiastically-receivedaddress to the Assembly, and it is instructive to compare Manning's account of the speech with the accounts given by two of his critics. As Hamson describes the event, "delegates to the 1991 Saskatoon convention gave William Gairdner enormous applause, even more than Manning later received, for his vitriolic speech deaouncing feminists, bilingualism, and multiculturalism, among other things" (Harrison 1995: 1734). Murray Dobbin's account is leneg$.hy, but it portrays bot.Gairdner's views and the delegates' response to those views in a way that makes it clear that Gairdner's effect on the party mernbers carmot be ignored or dismissed.

The media paid very little attention to one of the speakers at the assembly. Had they listened to William Gairdner they would have indirectly heard the political sentiments of the 1,îO Reformers gathered in Saskatoon at the peak of their party's success. They had just pleased their leader by endorsing his carefully crafted, moderate-sounding package of policy resolutions. Requested not to express any extreme views themselves, they were, nevertheless, permitted to cheer those expressed by someone else. Bill Gairdner, author of the best-selhg book, The Trouble with Canada,warmed up the audience at 8: 15 Saturday xnorning. The cheen and whistles he evoked tell a separate story of the Reform Party's 1991 Assembly. Gairdner thanked Preston Manning for personally inviting him to speak. Then he gave the Reformers what they wanted to hear. As Manning has done repeatedly, he attacked al1 ''politicians." [. . .] Gairdner went on to attack the whole concept of human rights and the funding of advocacy groups that "compete for government funding to get these rights." The attack on the "rights illusion" brought applause, but his atîack on feminists bmught a roar of approval: "Furthemore [. . .] we fund [. . .] radical feminist groups al1 over the country [. . .] [extended applause] that publicly support social revolution [. . .] of the most utopian kind and they vow to abolish the traditional family." Again, going after women and women's rights, Gairdner suggested to more loud applause, that Canada "throw the Charter [of Kghts and FreedornsJ out and retum to our common law hentage. [. . .] Any Charter should only refer to citizens without distinction as to sex, colour or religion. [. ..] Women get special treatment but men do not. [loud 'boos']. Such favountism by ranking cannot lead to a happy nation [more loud applause]. [. . .] Whether the cheers for William Gairdner more accurately reflect the delegates' views than the policies they passed is open to debate. In any case, Preston Manning was now prepared to take his party officialiy into the rest of Canada -- excluding Quebec. (Dobbin 1992: 1756) Comparing these accounts with Manning's own account, below, it appears as if Manning is attempting to distance himsetf (publicly at least) from the more inflamrnatory aspects of Gairdner's speech. The morning of Apnl6, the third day of the assembly, began with an address by Bill Gairdner.[ . . .] From a completely different background and perspective, he had arrïved at conclusions on the need for constitutional and fiscal reforms that were very similar to those of the Reform Party. What many Reformers concluded from his remarks was that there was a national constituency for fundamental change in Canada. (Manning 1992: 277)

Note in particular that Manning credits Gairdner's views as merely king 'very similar' to those of the Reform Party. In contrast, Dobbin reports that l?ze Trouble with Canada, upon which Gairdner's speech was based, "has become, in the words of Southam News's

Mike Tnckey, 'the de facto manifesto for Preston Manning's Reform Party"' (Dobbin lm:134). What Manning chooses to report about Gairdner's speech is merely that from it many Reformers concluded that there was a national constituency for the party. This seems an incredible supposition in light of the other accounts of the event, but it rnay reflect a deliberate attempt by Manning to distance himself from the negative public reaction to

Gairdner's views outside of the Reform movement. Dobbin reports that Manning was taken aback by the negative reactions he got in Toronto in June 1991 on account of Gairdner's views, but that according to Nom Ovenden, of the EdmontonJou~, Manning "tumed down several invitations to dissociate himself from the author" by reporters and open-line callers who denounced Gairdner's views during Manning's visit to Toronto in June, 1991 (Dobbin 1992: 133 - 135). Had Manning decided that Gairdner's views were too radical even for Reform, he

could have made use of these opportunities to denounce Gairdner and his views. Rather, it seerns more likely that even though Gairdner's views were more extrerne than the official Reform Party policies, they may have coincided with Manning's own views. Manning

was politician enough to know that trying to sel1 the public on an idea they were not yet ready to accept could be counter-productive, but as the following quotation suggests, he had his own agenda which he would attempt to seH to Canadians when he thought the timing was right. The proponents of New Canada cmsafely argue that the constitution of New Canada should entrench a cornmitment to freedom, federdisrn, and democracy, but any attempt to go much beyond that - to entrench the concepts of a Swedish-style welfare state (as Audrey McLaughlin suggests) or an American-style market economy (as some of us might prefer) cannot, in my judgement, be sold to the Canadian people at this point. (Manning 1992: 2834)

Further evidence that Gairdner' s views may be closer to the hart of Reform sentiment than official policy refl ected is the fact that his 1991 Saskatoon address was only the first among many such speeches to Reform audiences. Dobbin reports that "Gairdner is one of the party's most frequent guest speakers at rallies" (1992: 118). that he is "the man most often used as a key-note speaker by Preston Manning" (1992: lm)),and that specifically, he "has been featured at many of the party's rallies in Ontario" (1992: 134). The warm response Refom delegates gave Gairdner's anti-feminist rernarks at the 1991 convention have been noted above, but at least as significant are the influences of his racisf anti-immigrant biases. Dobbin suggests that while the Reform Party officially had a moderate stand on immigration, it did not discourage the sort of racist attitudes that Gairdner propagated. While the party harshly rejected eepiicitly racist resolutions from its members, it invites Bill Gairdner to speak to its assemblies and rallies. Gairdner's views on immigration - eagerl y taken up by Reformers who buy his book and applaud his speeches - are much more expiicitly racist than those contained in the rejected resolutions, leaving the party open to the suspicion that it wishes to attract the anti- immigration vote but be officiaily comrnitted to a moderate policy. (Dobbin 1992: 202) In fact, Dobbin even identifies Gairdner as "anti-Asian immigration author, Bill Gairdner" (Dobbin 1W2: 24û). Dobbin further associates Gairdner with racism by noting his support

of [then-] apartheid South Africa (Dobbin 1992: 124). Harrison also associates Gairdner with support of the apartheid regime in South Afnca.

This support for white South Afica, a country whose political system was based on racial group affiliation, by many within the Reform party, a party that otherwise espouses the principle of individual rights over group rights, cannot be explained adequately unless one accepts the notion that many Reforrners strongly identify with 'Anglo' culture. This identification is nowhere more strongiy enunciated than in 'William D. Gairdner's Trouble with Canada . [. . .] Gairdner contends that the superionty of Anglo-saxon culture lies in its historical discovery/creation of the values of individualisrn, free enterprise, and liberal democracy. (Harrison 1995 171-2)

Evidence of Gairdner's racist tendencies can be seen not only in his writings, but aIso in some of the associations and organizations to which he belongs. In her analysis of the New Right in Canada, Brooke Jeffrey (1999) identifies Preston Manning's national Reform movement, Ralph Klein's Alberta govement, and Mike Harris' Ontario government as reflectinp and representing the core of the movement She then goes on to discuss several 'marginal special-interest groups' of the far right, arnong them the National Citizens' Coalition, founded by 'an anpry millionaire', Colin M. Brown. In its activities the group followed Brown's eariy example, focusinp on single issues, uing national ads and encouraging letter-writing carnpaigns to Ottawa One of the WC's early efforts was a scumlous anti-immigration carnpaign that focused on the Vietnamese refugees arriving in the late 197%. Brown himself led the charge, attempting to distinguish between this "invasion" of Asian boat people and the somehow more felicitous arriva1 of Hungarians fleeing communisrn in 1957. His explanation left little doubt as to his racist views. "1 think the Hungarians have made marvellous citizens," Brown declared, "but the bloodlines run the sarne way. We al1 corne from Europe so they fit in. You wouldn't know if the people next door to you are Hungaxian or not. They don't dl go and gather in a ghetto." (Jeffrey 1999: 408) Although formal ties between Reform and the NCC were never established, the two gmups were, in practice, tightly inter-comected, but according to Dobbin. "[w]ith virtually identical objectives and many personal ties overlapping the two organizations, formal ties

would be redundant" (Dobbin 1992: 118). Furthemore, Sharpe and Braid quote David SornerviUe, chair of the National Citizens' Coalition, as stating that "The Reform Party has cribbed probably two-ttUrds of Our policy book" (Sharpe & Braid 1992: 65).

William Gairdner is recognized as one of the links between the two organizations. Sharpe and Braid observe that "Gairdner, a former chairman of the National Citizens' Coalition, which Manning's father helped to found, has been a popular figure at Reform

Party rallies" (Sharpe & Braid 1992: 125). Dobbin also makes a similar observation when he writes that, [alnother NCC member prorninently associated with the Reform Party, and a key- note speaker at the [ 199 11 assembly ,is Bill Gairdner, author of The Trouble with Ckmzkz, a book prornoting many of Reform's policies and prominently reviewed in the NCC's newsletter, Consensus. Gairdner is one of the party's most frequent guest speakers at rallies [. . .]. (Dobbin 1992: 118) Gairdner's association with the National Citizens' Coalition is reasonably well known, and he speaks approvingly of the Coalition in his books. Murray Dobbin describes the NCC as secretive (Dobbin 1991: 116), but it is a far more public and more prominent group than another with which Gairdner's name has kenassociated, namely, The Northern Foundation. Comparing it to the Fraser Institute, a right-wing think-tank highl y praised by Gairdner and highly criticized by herself and others, Jeffrey writes, [a] second and far more obscure radical-right think-tank is one very few Canadians have ever heard of, the Northern Foundation. [. ..] By comparison, the views of the Northern Foundation sponsors make even the Fraser Institute appear to be a reasonable mainstream organization. (Jeffrey 1499: 430) Jeffrey lists Gairdner as one of the founding members of the Foundation, dong with Peter Brimelow, Link Byfield, , and representatives of R.E.A.L. Women and of the Association for the Preservation of English (Jeffrey 1999: 430). Al1 of the individuals named, as well as the group R.E.A.L. Women, had strong ties with the Reform Party as well as with the Northern Foundation. The Northern Foundation is arguably a racist organization that advocates

Anglocentric and white supremacist policies. "The Northern Foundation was established in

1489, otigiaally as a pro-South Africa group. [. . .] Since its establishment, however, the foundation has developed into a broad coalition of right-wing groups and individuals across the country" (Dobbin 1992: 121). As the following quotation illustrates, Dobbin notes that the Northern Foundation's magazine has provided free advertising space to an assortment of extrernist groups, as well as to the Reform Party, and in addition to its racist and anti-feminist tendencies, the magazine also features homophobic wnting.

In most issues of its quarterly magazine, called Norîhern Voice (it was called The Continuhg Crisis), the foundation donates a full page as a "free service" to conservative groups by advertisinp their policies and addresses. In the Fall, 1990 edition, it gave free space to the Reform Party, the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, the Christian Heritage Party, the Codederation of Regions party, and the Mackenzie Institute for the Study of Terronsm, Revolution and Ropaganda. Other issues have featured REAL Wornen, the Freedorn Party of Ontario, The National Action Cornmittee on the Status of White Heterosexual Single Christian Men, the Alliance for the Reservatioo of English in Canada (APEC), and the Byfields' British Columbia Report. The foundation's magazine cames a half-page ad in every issue for The Phoenix, a pro-white South Afnca magazine, and regularly solicits support from members on special causes, from property rights to English language rights. A ttacks on homosexuals and homosexual rights are frequent, including a cal1 in the Wmter, 1990 edition for "No Special Privileges for Homosexuals," which canied a special fuiancial appeal for the fight against "tax dollars going to homosexual activists." (Dobbin 1992: 122) Harrison's description of the Northern Foundation is consistent with Dobbin's and Harrison goes so far as to list individuais as well as organizations that are members of the organization or who are associated with it by appearing as guest speakers at their conferences. Harrison writes, [i]n short, the Northern Foundation portrays itself as a kind of 'radical vanguard' for the dissemination of social and econornic conservative ideas. [. . .] The Northem Foundation was the creation of a number of generally extreme nght-wing conservatives, including Anne Hartmann (a director of REAL women), Geoffrey Wateneys (a longstanding member of Am), George Potter (also a member of APEC), author Peter Brimelow, Link Byfield (son of Ted Bfleld and hirnself publishedpresident of Alberta Rem), and Stephen Harper. The roster of conservative adherents speaking at foundation conferences in 1989, 1990, and 1992 is equally instructive. Among speakers were Dr Walter Block (the Fraser Institute), Ed Vanwoudenberg (leader of the Christian Heritage party), Lubor Zink (an extreme right-wing columnist with the Sun chah), Dr John Whitehall (of the Canadian Christian Anti-Communist Crusade), Ron Lietch (president of APEC), Gwen Landolt (founder of REAL Women), Ken Campbell (founder of Renaissance Canada), Paul Fromm (former member of the Western Guard, a neo-fascist group, and later founder of CFAR), and author William Gairdner. The foundation's quartedy tract, The Norrhern Voice, regularly provides advertising space for these same individuals, their ideas, and their organizations. [footnote: Northem Foundation, Leiter; also The Norîhern Voice, 3-3( 1991 ), and The Northern Voice, 4, 1 (1992)] (Harrison 1995: 121-122) While Hamison does not believe that the overlap in personnel is insignificant, he also does not believe that the Northem Foundation was a 'front' for Reform. Evidently, the Foundation is, in fact, more radical than Reform, actually banishing Stephen Harper. a former Reform iosider, for not king right-wing enough. In a 1991 interview with Hamson, Harper reportedly referred to the Northem Foundation as "quasi-Fascist" (Harrison 1995: 121- 122). Taking not just Gairdner's views, but aiso his associations into account, Jeffrey lumps him in with the Reform Party lunatic fringe that caused Manning so much trouble. [Olbsessed with his concern about the involvement of Western separatists, [Preston Manning] had ignored the threat from the right's lunatic f~geand let any number of disaffected right-wing extremists attend, including many pro-Me, anti-French, anti-immigration and victim's nghts proponents. At the Winnipeg founding meeting only a few months later, delegates included Fred Debrecen, founder of the anti-French group One Nation, One Language. At the assembly in Saskatoon, inflamrnatory fringe author William Gairdner, a Reform favourite, was a keynote speaker. (Jeffrey 1999: 309) The precise relatiooship between William Gairdner and Preston M&g is difficult to establish, but Sharpe and Braid suggest that Manning distanced himself from Gairdner because of public reaction against the latter's racist views. Nevertheless, regardless of whatever personai associations Manning and Gairdner may have or may have had in the pst, Manning did facilitate the propagation of Gairdner's views by providing him opportunities to speak at Reform Party gatherings. Even though the Reform party no longer exists as a distinct entity, the former Reformers still hold a great deal of influence within the new Alliance party, and so, one might surmise, might Gairdner. through his writings, if not in person. Conclusion This dissertation argues that Gairdner's popular writings contain racist, sexist, and homophobic propaganda. Booksellers and wnters in Canada also recognize Gairdner's work as problematic, based on Gairdner's own account of the banning of The War Against the FamiZy from some books tores in Canada. The War Agaimt the Family was instantl y banned by many bookstores across the nation. The banning story hit the front page of the Globe andMail for a day, îhen died quickly when everyone realized that it's outrageous, indefensible, and discriminatory to ban a book by a liberal, but okay if it's a book by a conservative. Some national joumalists such as Ottawa's Peter Stockland and Vancouver's Trevor Lautens defended the book vigorously and deplored the baaniog. But others? The Writer's Union of Canada thought the banning was fine. The Canadian Booksellers Association gave its annual prize (a free trip to Europe) for the best essay on "freedom of speech" to a bookseller who defended the banning of my book! (Gairdner 1990 (revised 1994): viii) It is a problem when any writer utilizes sexist, homophobic, andor racist discourse and propagates discriminatory ideas, but in the case of William Gairdner, the problem is made worse by the fact that he has had considerable influence, both as an invited speaker at assembties and as an author, over the members and leaders of what has become a major political party in Canada. Even as the Official Opposition in Parliament, the Reform Party, and its new incarnation, the Alliance Party, has considerable ability if not to make policy, certainly to influence policy through manipulating public opinion, and so, indirectly, does Gairdner. Although it is not the job of a linguist qua linguist to debate social and political policy, it is the role of a critical discourse andyst to reveal not ody a writer's discriminatory ideas, but also the linguistic means by which that wnter conveys those ideas, in order to alert the public to the ways in which they can be manipulated through that discourse. This dissertation demonstrates, through the analysis of one man's popular writings. that the same sorts of sexist, homophobic, racist discourses that have kenidentified in other countries are also readily available in Canada. It further illustrates the links between Canada's New Right rnovement and sirnilar movements in Britain and the U.S.A. Relatively little work in critical discourse anaiysis has been conducted in the Canadian context, and this dissertation addresses that gap within the field and invites further exploration of Canadian texts. While obviously written primarily to fulfil an academic requirement, this dissertation was also written in the spirit of educating ordinary Canadians, not just academics, about the discursive manipulation of William Gairdner, in order that they and we can amourselves against being taken in by one-sided and discriminatory discourse, regardless of its source. Since this dissertation has examined a

Canadian source of New Right discourse, the last word on the subject will go to well- known Canadian feminist, f udy Rebick, who observes that "for dlthe strength of the Right, they are appealing to the worst in people: selfishness, individualism and resentment" (Rebick and Roach 1996: 32). -Notes

1. Biopphical data here and on page 6 taken from Gai rdner's Cmiculum Vitae, posted on his intemet home page, www.WilliamGairdner.com. 2 . Uniess othenvise indicated, the use of italics in quotations within this dissertation should be assumed to dectthe author's original usage. For any quotation in which I have added the italics myself, such will be specified.

3 . This section on transitivity incorporates material that was previously published in Lillian 1997. Copyright rests with the author. 4 . See also Kress 1976, chapter 11. 5. The acronym R.E.A.L. stands for 'Realist, Equal, Active, for Life'. R.E.A.L. Women of Canada was incorporated in 1983, claiminp a membership of 10,000. A year later, they claimed to have doubled their membership. Karen Dubinsky writes

of them (Lamentfor a "PatrratrrarchyLosr "?: Anti-feminism. mi-abortion, and R.EAL. Women in Canada Ottawa: CEUAWflCREF, 19û5): They oppose no-fault divorce, universal free child care, enforced affirmative action, equai pay for work of equal value, and prostitution. They argue that the wage gap between men and women is not evidence of sex discrimination, but simply a reflection of the different career paths chosen by the sexes C'Wage Gap Between Men and Women Not Sexual Discrimination", REALlTY Updare, Nov. 19843. They suppoa dl policies which uphold the Judeo Christian view of traditional rnarriage and the family. [. . .] They organized precisely to undermine the legitimacy of groups like the National Action Cornmittee on the Status of Women (NAC) which they refer to as "a hanciful of radical feminists promoting their own persond extremist views purportedly on behalf of the women of Canada" ["Feminists NAC - Who are They?', Real@, Vol. 2, No. 2, Fa11 1984) [. . .] By asserting themselves as the majority; as the "reai" women of Canada, this group is obviously attempting to broaden the appeal of 'pro-life' ideology.

6 . This section on transitivity contains matenal that was previously published in Lillian 199'7. Numbering of examples bas been changed in this dissertation, however, from the numbering in the original paper. 7 . From 1989-1992,I taught French as a Second Language for the Victoria County Board of Education in central Ontario. During that time, 1 was often told by

parents, students, fellow teachers, and members of the public at large that they ielt that people didn't want French "shoved down their throats". On one occasion, the

principal of the elementary school at which 1 taught told me that as far as he was concerned, the children should not be forced to leam French, but that as principal he was obligated to have French taught in the school. The resentment against French is deep-seated among many of the people of the area, as reflected in a comment made to me in class by a Grade 5 boy, who announced in a loud voice that "1 know how to solve Canada's problems! We should just get Our sbotguns and go down to Quebec and shoot them dl!" There is no doubt in my rnind that this

boy was parroting things he had heard aduits saying. Although some of the anti- French comments I heard in Victoria County were more violent than those I have heard elsewhere, I have heard English-speaking Canadians expressing sirnilar

objections to French king "forced" on them in various parts of Canada, both nuai and urban. 8 . Both of these novels appear frequently in the English curriculum in high schools, and both have been made into motion pichires. Even readen of Gairdner who may not have seen the movie versions or read the original novels are Iikely to be at least familiar with them from the frequent references made to them in the media and even

in conversation. References to either or both of these novels typicaily conjure visions of totaiitarian states in which individual citizens are subject to complete control by a central govemment.

9. in 20,The Reform Party of Canada officially ceased to exist, being reinvented as the Conservative-Reionn Alliance Party of Canada. This new party is most often referred to either as the Alliance Party or as the Canadian Alliance. The Reform Party held that Quebec undesentedly receives special treatment that

other Canadian provinces do not receive, and that Quebec gets more than its fair share of federal monies.

Family-class immi,mts are people who are granted landed immigrant status on the grounds that at least one member of their family already has landed immigrant status in Canada or has Canadian citizenship. These family-class immigrants are thus not required to meet the sarne criteria as most other immigrants for entry into Canada. Since family-class immigration promotes family reunification, it is ironic that Gairdner, who daims to be pro-family, so strongly criticizes this aspect of immigration policy . The source of this quotation attributed to Joe Bissett is unclear. The paragraph in which this quotation occurs runs as follows: At last, the Mulroney governrnent has done something to stem the tide of queue- jumping "economic" refuges. Needless to say, Canada's refugee screening process has been, and I'm sure still is, a scandal. As Joe Bissett, executive director for immigration in the federal Ernployment and Immigration Department, says, "70% of refugees coming to Cana& are bogus." Geraid Yetming, High Comrnissioner for Trinidad, says that "what we are having with [our] nationals coming to Canada is a claim for refugy status, not on the basis of political persecution but for economic reasons (ToronîoStar, Jan. 5, 1989). Most Canadians feel that priority should not be given to immigrants or refugees landing here illegally [. . -1. (Gairdner 1940: 416) The sentence in which the Bissett quotation occurs contains no reference to the source of the quotation. The following sentence, in which a quotation is attributed to Gerald Yetming, cites the Toronto Star as the source. This makes it ambiguous whether or not the reader is meant to assume that the Bissett quotation also cornes fmm the Toronto Star. Even if i t does corne from that source, i t is then at least a second-hand quotation and there is no guarantee that the Star itself quoted Bissett faithfullv or in context. Tom Kent was an advisor to Liberal Rime Minister Lester B. Pearson during the

1960's. Gairdner describes Kent as 'socialist-minded* and as 'a dangernus radicai'. Kent is credited with shaping the policies of Pearson and of his succesor, Pierre Trudeau, particularly with respect to medicare, official bilingualism, and multi-culturalism. Kent is the author of A Public Purpose (1988), a memoir of his role and his experiences in public life. After the 1997 federal election, the Refoxm Party became the Official Opposition

Party in Parliament, but held only one seat east of (the one seat king in Ontario). In an effort to gamer more support in central and eastem Canada, party leader Preston Manning proposed, at the May 19% Refonn convention in London, Ontario, a United Alternative movement which would seek to unite the Reform Party with the federal Progressive Conservative Party, Ied by Joe Clark. Clark did not support this "Unite the Right9*proposal at any point, but many mernbers and supporters of his party were drawn to it. A meeting to discuss the United

Alternative proposal was held in February 1999, in Ottawa, attracting over 1200 delegates, and a motion was passed to form a new federai political party (Jeffrey 1999: 383). In January 2000. in Ottawa, The United Alternative convention passed a number of policy resolutions, including one recogniting Canada's two official languages -- French and Englisb - and official bilingualism, a stand that Refoxm would not likely have taken on its own. Since Reform still existed as a distinct party, separate from the UA party, during the same weekend, Refonn held separate meetings at which Preston Manning's leadership was reaffixmed and the decision was taken to conduct a mail-in ballot on adoption of the UA constitution and policy framework (Hoy 2ûûû: 126). At a convention March 27,2ûûû in Calgary, the results of the ballot were announced and Reform fonnally ceased to exist. The new party adopted a new name, the Canadian Conservative Reform Alliance Party, but it is usuall y referred to simpl y as the Canadian Alliance or the Alliance party. On July

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