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Home , Afrikaner Party, Alec Erwin, Anton Lembede, Baleka Mbete, Bantu Holomisa, Biko (book)

Opposition in ’s New

28–30 June 2000 Kariega Game Reserve Table of Contents

Introduction 5 Prof. Roger Southall, Professor of Political Studies, Rhodes University

Opening Remarks 7 Dr Michael Lange, Resident Representative, Konrad Adenauer Foundation,

Opposition in South Africa: Issues and Problems 11 Prof. Roger Southall, Professor of Political Studies, Rhodes University

The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences 27 Prof. Robert Schrire, Professor of Political Studies, University of

Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa 37 Prof. Hermann Giliomee, Formerly Professor in Political Studies, Mr James Myburgh, Parliamentary Researcher, Democratic Party Prof. Lawrence Schlemmer, formerly Director of the Centre for Policy Studies, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of the Witwatersrand

Political Alliances and in Post- South Africa 51 Prof. Adam Habib, Associate Professor of Political Studies, University of Westville Rupert Taylor, Associate Professor of Political Studies, Wits University

Democracy, Power and Patronage: Debate and Opposition within the ANC and the 65 since 1994 Dr Dale McKinley, Freelance Journalist, Independent Writer and Researcher

The Alliance Under Stress: Governing in a Globalising World 81 Prof. Eddie Webster, Professor of Sociology, Wits University

‘White’ Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in South Africa 95 Dr Eddie Maloka, Director, Africa Institute of South Africa

3 Table of Contents

Opposition in the New South African Parliament 103 Ms. Lia Nijzink, Senior Researcher, Institute for a Democratic South Africa

The Potential Constituency of the DA: What Dowries do the DP and the NNP Bring 113 to the Marriage? Prof. Hennie Kotzé, Professor of , University of Stellenbosch

A Question of Interest: Women as Opposition 127 Dr Louise Vincent, Senior Lecturer, Political Studies, Rhodes University

Cynicism at the Grassroots? Political Opposition in Kwazakele , Port Elizabeth 139 Ms Janet Cherry, Lecturer, Sociology, University of Port Elizabeth

The and Opposition Parties in South Africa 151 Dr David Pottie, Senior Researcher, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa

The Politics of Adaptation and Equivocation: Race, Class and Opposition in 20th 169 Century South Africa Prof. Paul Maylam, Professor of History, Rhodes University

Race, Democracy and Opposition in South African Politics: As Other a Way as Possible 179 Prof. Gerhard Maré, Professor of Sociology, University of Natal-Durban

Reflections on the Politics of Minorities, Race and Opposition in 191 Contemporary South Africa Mr Ivor Sarakinsky, Lecturer, Political Studies, Rhodes University

Conclusion: Emergent Perspectives on Opposition in South Africa 199 Prof. Roger Southall, Professor of Political Studies, Rhodes University

Programme 205

Participants’ List 209

Seminar Reports 211

Occasional Paper Series 213

4 Introduction

The papers in this collection are all drawn from contributions made to a conference on ‘Opposition in South Africa’s New Democracy’ which was hosted by the Department of Political Studies, Rhodes University and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, at Kariega Park in the Eastern Cape, 28–30 June 2000.

The conference was conceived in the wake of South Africa’s second democratic general , which was held in June 1999. Following its triumph in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) was again returned to power, this time with almost two-thirds of the vote, and hence because of South Africa’s adoption of the system of proportional representation, nearly two-thirds of the members of parliament (MPs). Meanwhile, in contrast to the 266 seats won by the ANC, the remaining 134 seats were shared amongst some twelve opposition parties. This result appeared to reinforce analy- sis which suggested that the ANC was becoming a ‘dominant’ – that is, one that was unlikely to lose any electoral contest for national power in the foreseeable future.

This in turn aroused fears in some quarters that the ANC might become increasingly unaccountable, and perhaps increasingly arrogant in its use of the state machinery. Consequently, the post election period saw the development of a debate in the media about what role opposition parties – apparently excluded from power long term (although the continued to serve as a junior partner in government with the ANC) – should and could play, especially given their state of fragmen- tation.

A larger number of difficult questions began to be posed: should the opposition parties seek to com- bine, and if so, along what lines and around what principles? Should they seek to oppose ‘robustly’ or ‘constructively’? Was there a danger that unity amongst particular opposition parties might bring about a further racialisation of South African politics? But in addition, a further set of questions were also asked: as the majority of the existing opposition parties did not offer fundamentally different economic strategies from the government (which since 1994 had abandoned its social-democratically inclined Reconstruction and Development Programme [RDP] in favour of a neo-liberal and conservative eco- nomic path known as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution [GEAR] policy), was it not more likely that real opposition to the government would emerge from within the Tripartite Alliance – com- prising the ANC, the South Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu)?

Indeed, it was increasingly often suggested that the ideological divide would soon see the SACP and Cosatu peeling away from the ANC to form a social-democratic opposition to the left, opening up the possibility of politics moving away from divisions that revolved principally around ‘race’, to ones which centred around ‘class’.

The objective of the conference was to consider such questions as these in depth, as well as debating

5 Introduction exactly what opposition was for. Emphasis was laid on the fact that it was in no way intended to be a ‘congress of the opposition’; that is, a meeting to promote any particular agenda of opposition (such as encouraging a uniting of parties). Instead, it was designed to bring together leading social scientists and MPs drawn from both the ANC and opposition parties to discuss the legitimacy of, prospects for, and the role of, opposition given the present context of South African politics.

In the event, the conference proved even more topical than had been anticipated, as only a day or two before, the two largest opposition parties – the Democratic Party and the New National Party – announced their merger into the Democratic Alliance, a development which some interpret as presag- ing a shift towards a two-.

Prof. Roger Southall Department of Political Studies Rhodes University

6 Opening Remarks

Michael Lange

INTRODUCTION The international activities of KAF are root- On behalf of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation ed in the Christian concept of human nature. (KAF), I would like to extend a very warm By advocating Christian values, the foundation welcome to you all. is helping to establish Christian Democratic This is the first time KAF is cooperating with principles not only in Germany, but worldwide. the Rhodes University Department of Political KAF has been cooperating with partners Science and I would like to take this opportuni- throughout the world for almost 40 years. ty to thank Professor Southall and his team for Currently, some 80 representatives working all the work they have put into this event. abroad, oversee some 200 projects and pro- From our side, we can only this confer- grammes in more than 100 countries. It there- ence on ‘Opposition in South Africa’s New fore comes as no surprise that international Democracy’ will contribute in a meaningful cooperation accounts for approximately half the way to our common efforts to assist democratic foundation’s total budget. In this manner, KAF transformation in the new South Africa. makes its own contribution to policies serving KAF has had and maintains close contact peace and justice in international relations. with a variety of political forces and parties in Our general aim as a political foundation South Africa. We are delighted that this confer- working in South Africa, is to strengthen ence is being held at a time when all political democracy and the rule of law while educating scientists and observers of note, are preoccu- informed and responsible citizens, as well as pied not only with the role an opposition may political leaders, to play a more active part in play in our neighbouring country, Zimbabwe, the political and social lives of their communi- but also with the possible effects of the realign- ties. ment of opposition forces currently under way More specifically, we want to inculcate in South Africa. democratic patterns of behaviour, including the ability to compromise, settle conflicts peaceful- 1. A BRIEF BACKGROUND ly and help implement sustainable solutions to Allow me to give a brief overview of KAF and political problems. why it is involved in South Africa. We also believe it is vital for democracy, that KAF is one of five political foundations in the parliamentary multiparty system should Germany today and is closely affiliated to the function well. We therefore try to assist parlia- Christian Democratic Union Party – a centrist ments, composed of freely elected members political party in Germany, founded after the representing the interests of the population and Second World War. It proudly bears the name fulfilling adequately their function of control- of one of the founding members of the ling government, to work without restriction Christian Democratic Union Party, Konrad and outside interference. Adenauer, who subsequently became the first At the same time we strive for the creation of Chancellor of post-war Germany. freedom of action for a plurality of political

7 Lange parties – especially opposition parties – because of power in which the appointment of the gov- we believe that political parties and particularly ernment is regulated peacefully, the call to opposition parties are indispensable in all political competition in election campaigns democratic societies. sometimes leads to an escalation of underlying For this reason, KAF seeks to establish con- tensions. This results in clashes between mili- tact and cooperation with centrist political par- tant supporters. Some provinces in South ties wherever possible, now that the single- Africa – namely KwaZulu-Natal – as well as party systems in Africa, as much as anywhere our neighbour to the north, have seen more than else, have been found incapable of living up to enough of this. the challenge of development. What has been crucial for our expanding KAF currently has wide-ranging programmes activities in Africa in general and in sub- in the different provinces of South Africa. Most Saharan Africa in particular, is the fact that centrist political forces of relevance benefit democracy orientated institutions and structures from these activities. have been developing considerably in recent The foundation does not, however, only years. cooperate with political parties and their But there has been an emerging consensus respective think-tanks, but also with reputable among my colleagues that a simplistic imposi- education and research institutions, as you will tion of Western-style multiparty systems on note from this event. African societies is not as automatically benefi- cial as was imagined. This primarily has some- 2. DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA thing to do with the unresolved question as to A rapid change has taken place in Africa since whether Westminster-style democracy is neces- the end of the , a decade ago. Almost sarily the only form of democracy suitable to the entire continent has, in an amazingly short the African concept of democracy, or opposi- time, made remarkable progress towards politi- tion for that matter. cal participation and economic emancipation. In a recent newspaper article, a former Most African countries have held ‘more or cabinet member in the first Government of less’ competitive parliamentary – and National Unity (GNU) expressed his reserva- approximately half of these have been declared tions regarding a ‘white-dominated’ debate free and fair by international monitoring teams. about the possible role of a strong opposition, In many cases, opposition parties were while highlighting the unease these circles feel formed legally and could go public for the first with the concept of a GNU, where the Inkatha time. They called, above all, for the abolition of Freedom Party (IFP) – a party clearly distin- one-party rule and the modernisation of elec- guishable from the African National Congress toral systems. (ANC) – was nevertheless invited once again to Parliamentary and presidential elections serve with the ANC in a GNU; something diffi- which give voters the opportunity to choose cult to explain from a Western point of view. between parties, persons and programmes are For him, this was another indication that it today seen worldwide as an indicator of democ- seems to be impossible, or at least questionable, racy. A proper democratic electoral process to discuss opposition politics outside the con- cannot be implemented without allowing a mul- text of the African concept of democracy. tiparty contest. It is still remarkable to me that even auto- 3. OPPOSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA crats, who have great reservations about Since the last parliamentary elections we have multiparty systems and see them as a Western nevertheless witnessed a ‘new political fluidity’ invention that is worthless in the African con- within opposition ranks seeking common text – do not want to do without the election ground and evaluating the possibility of instrument altogether, since it seems the only stronger future cooperation. means today to legitimise their claim to power Although many people have been sceptical in an international context. about an election alliance of different, though At the same time, the notion of democratisa- like-minded, political parties before the last tion being a peaceful process is not necessarily national elections, the fact that the governing correct. Although democracy is the only form parties as a result of that election command

8 Lange such an overwhelming majority in parliament native leader should represent the majority of has made political – or parliamentary – life for the South African population, does South South Africa’s opposition parties even more Africa possess such a well-identified, acknowl- difficult. edged black leader or leadership right now? I The need for a stronger opposition has since believe the answer is, No! then taken centre stage in the political dis- Neither Magoba from the PAC, nor Holomisa course, at least in white opposition circles. from the United Democratic Movement (UDM) The discussion concentrates on the situation produced the kind of leadership necessary to in parliament and does not take into account win over the the black constituency in the last opposition from beyond parliament, for exam- South African election, and they have not ple, from extra-parliamentary angles of civil gained grassroots support since then. society. IFP leader has some- I believe that South Africa’s civil society – what compromised his ‘opposition credentials’ and in particular institutions like a free press, by accepting a role in government for the sec- the independent judiciary, the , ond consecutive time. the special investigation units, etc. – has as Despite these reservations concerning the much a role to play as the watchdog of govern- viability of a serious opposition challenge of ment as does parliament. I hope we will shed the present government, there nevertheless more light on this feature of a system of seems room for more – if only administrative – ‘checks and balances’, with which a parliamen- cooperation between opposition forces. tary opposition is otherwise entrusted. Considering the fact that South Africa is fac- Looking at the content of what an opposition ing municipal elections in the near future, there could propagate as opposed to what the govern- is a need for opposition parties to discuss how ment is suggesting, some observers have come best to challenge the ANC alliances on this to the conclusion that there is little overall occasion, since the electoral system with regard political/ideological space for an opposition to to municipal elections obviously favours occupy when it comes to specific policy alliances, to the detriment of multiple opposi- approaches. Many see alternative policies pri- tion parties. marily on the left of what the current govern- This aspect might have been the single most ment is propagating and not on , where important reason for the cash strapped opposi- the current realignment is obviously taking tion parties to seriously look at cooperation at place. this point in time, which eventually – and to the This assessment of the political/ideological surprise of many observers – produced the landscape has been underlined by the recent recent merger between the Democratic Party, talks about an alliance between the Pan African the Federal Alliance and the New National Congress (PAC) and the Socialist Party of Party. Azania, the black consciousness breakaway The real challenge facing the new Demo- faction of the Azanian People’s Organisation. cratic Alliance will nevertheless be – as it has For many, the most viable ideological oppo- been for the UDM before – to attract black sup- sition to current government policies may still port, while at the same time not losing white come from within the ANC alliance itself, support. The UDM had to experience during where communist and trade unionist alliance the last election that South African society has partners challenge the government from a leftist not yet deracialised enough to allow for elec- perspective on a continuous basis. toral success. Whether the situation will be dif- If there seems little that a realigned opposi- ferent the next time around, has yet to be seen. tion could offer ideologically with regard to government policies, the question may be asked CONCLUSION whether there is an alternative political leader As much as South Africa today can be consid- who could encapsulate the aspirations of a ered a consolidated democracy in which the groundswell opposition movement, similar to development towards a constitutional, pluralis- the one we witnessed developing in Zimbabwe tic state ruled by law appears to be irreversible, recently. the recent events in Zimbabwe, and more so the Considering the necessity that such an alter- reaction towards them in certain political cir-

9 Lange cles in South Africa, should alert all of us who mitment by all segments of South Africa’s support a democratic system based on the rule diverse population to reconciliation and far of law, regular free and fair elections and reaching economic and social transformation; governance. KAF is willing to continue to participate in this By transforming white minority rule to black process. , only the foundations of a I hope this conference will contribute to the peaceful democratic society have been laid in discussion of the concept of democracy in an South Africa. Building and maintaining South African society and to evaluating the meaning Africa’s democratic dispensation on this of opposition in such a context. I wish you suc- foundation will depend on a continuing com- cessful deliberations.

10 Opposition in South Africa: Issues and Problems

Roger Southall

Contemporary debate in South Africa is not the desperate legacy of apartheid and the brevi- just about whether democracy will survive, but ty of its democratic experience, it is not sur- about the quality of that democracy if it does. prising that this optimistic viewpoint is gener- The role, functions, legitimacy and capacity of ally tempered by quite a number of considera- political opposition, in a situation where it is tions. Lodge himself qualifies his assessment highly fragmented, constitutes a key aspect of by observing that South Africa is challenged by this debate, most notably because of the status the prevalence of alarming social inequalities of the African National Congress (ANC) as a and by the continuing weakness of ‘the struc- dominant party since its assumption of power tural correlates of democratic endurance’, and in 1994. Following a discussion of the mean- it is only too well known that democracy in ings of ‘opposition’, this paper examines issues South Africa may yet be blighted by a horrific and problems for the idea and practice of crime rate, corruption, economic stagnation opposition posed by the challenges of democra- and regional mayhem as well as by a host of tic consolidation and by the ANC’s dominance. other socio-economic deficits. Yet increasingly It is proposed that if opposition parties are to the debate is not just about whether democracy be perpetual electoral losers, then progress in South Africa will survive, but about the must be made towards entrenching the notion quality of that democracy.2 of opposition as accountability. It is concluded The particular aspect of the debate with that the way forward for democracy and oppo- which this collection is concerned is that of the sition in South Africa lies in efforts to over- role, functions, legitimacy and capacity of come historic social cleavages in favour of an political opposition, about which there is issue-oriented politics in which racial and eth- presently considerable argumentation. The nic affinities play a backstage role. debate starts from the fact of the current over- whelming political dominance of the ruling INTRODUCTION African National Congress (ANC) and the frag- South Africa’s first universal election mentation of the opposition, which assisted by in 1994 was widely hailed as a ‘miracle’, mark- the party-list system of proportional representa- ing a transition from colonial-racial dictator- tion (PR) is split between some 12 different ship to a condition of non-racial democracy parties which are represented in the National elaborated around one of the most liberal- Assembly (see table). democratic constitutions in the world. More Divided along grounds of history, ideology, recently, this perspective has been sustained by aspiration, orientation, race and ethnicity, as the successful conduct of a second popular well as by more immediate competition for election in 1999, which – in the judgement of electoral advantage, the parties of opposition its foremost student – indicates that ‘South are generally conceived to be struggling around Africa has travelled quite far along the road to major questions of tactics and strategy. How democratic consolidation’.1 Nonetheless, given should they best ‘oppose’? Should they work

11 Southall

The national election results, 1994 and 1999

1994 1994 1999 1999 % of Vote Seats in % of Vote Seats in National Assembly National Assembly

African National Congress (ANC) 62.65 252 66.36 266 Democratic Party (DP) 1.73 7 9.55 38 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 10.54 43 8.59 34 (New) National Party (NNP) 20.39 82 6.87 28 United Democratic Movement (UDM) – – 3.42 14 African Christian Democratic Movement 0.45 2 1.43 6 Freedom Front (FF) 2.17 9 0.80 3 United Christian Democratic Movement – – 0.78 3 Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 1.25 5 0.71 3 Federal Alliance – – 0.54 2 Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging – – 0.29 1 Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) – – 0.17 1 Totals 100 400 100 400 singly, or in combination? If the latter, in infor- come about largely on the DP’s terms, not least mal alliance or formal coalition? And is their because the NNP had proved so inept in adapt- best option to engage in ‘constructive opposi- ing to the rigours and narrowed rewards of tion’ or should they be ‘robust’? And as the opposition after over 40 years in power since parties themselves struggle with these dilem- 1948.4 However, while much of the current mas, commentators regularly suggest that the debate is understandably absorbed by the opposition as a whole faces an existential crisis shapes of and prospects for opposition in South wherein some parties will die and others Africa, it is rather more importantly engaged decline, as only the fittest survive and prosper. with what can be termed the issue of necessity; Meanwhile, a common refrain emanating espe- that is, the extent to which opposition is an inte- cially from the Democratic Party (DP) – which gral component of democracy, and how its sur- following the election of 1999 was elevated to vival and health can contribute to democratic the status of being the ‘Official Opposition’ – is consolidation. that in its bid to establish its political hegemo- This point can be developed by reference to ny, the ANC has embarked upon a deliberate two quotations from the Mail & Guardian, one project of defining robust opposition as illegiti- of South Africa’s most influential and highly mate, and that it is engaged in marginalising respected weeklies. The first is from its and taming opposition in order to shore up its Editorial which preceded the most recent elec- monopoly of power. Not surprisingly, there- tion: fore, there are those who argue that the best ‘How will political science classes ... look hope for rendering the government accountable back on the of 1999? ... to the electorate is if opposition effectively The answer, we would hope, will be that becomes internalised, if constituencies within 1999 was the election which brought home the Tripartite Alliance – of the ANC, South to South Africa how integral a real opposi- African Communist Party (SACP) and tion is to the concept of democracy.’5 Congress of South African Trade Unions ‘Real opposition’, it went on to define as the (Cosatu) – keep alive the flame of criticism posing of effective challenge to government in from within.3 parliament, which it elaborated as requiring the An immediate answer to one of these dilem- threat that ‘the government of the day faces the mas was given by the DP and the New National prospect of losing power if it fails to perform’. Party (NNP) in June 2000 when they announc- This, in turn, was in essence only a restatement ed their formation of a Democratic Alliance of what its political commentator, Howard (DA). This represents a transitional step Barrell, had proclaimed some months earlier: towards a comprehensive merger which has ‘If the first duty of an opposition party is to

12 Southall

oppose, or at very least test, government legal opposition among organised political par- policy at every turn, its second is presum- ties had existed throughout the preceding ably to become the .’6 decade. As Barrell went on to observe, however, none Dahl’s book stands as the first major attempt of the opposition parties appeared to have any to understand the conditions under which politi- chance of replacing the ANC as government in cal opposition can expect to flourish, and what the forthcoming election, or even the one after patterns it is likely to assume – even though the that. No party, in other words, can yet aspire to politico-geographic scope of its coverage was serving as an ‘alternative government’, and limited to ‘established ’. Yet, sig- South African democracy is unlikely to be nificantly, he was also writing as a committed spared the rigours of the so-called ‘turn-over advocate who conceived of opposition as a nec- test’ for some years, perhaps decades, to come. essary ingredient of democracy, one who was It is this dilemma that has spawned the post- inclined to the view that ‘the existence of an apartheid debate around party dominance, as opposition party is very nearly the most distinc- most notably expressed in The Awkward tive characteristic of democracy itself.’ Embrace: One Party Domination and This important supposition had recently Democracy, edited by Hermann Giliomee and (1965) become embodied in the foundation of Charles Simkins.7 The importance of this the journal Government and Opposition by debate cannot be underestimated, for whereas Professor Ghita Ionescu of the University of the more optimistic assessments of the ANC’s Manchester, a development which one com- dominance propose this as likely to stabilise the mentator, Rodney Barker, was to describe as new order and to guarantee democracy, indicating the arrival of Opposition (with a cap- Giliomee and Simkins themselves take a dia- ital ‘O’) as not only ‘a valued element in demo- metrically opposite view which argues that cratic politics’ but also as an accepted subject party dominance is rather more likely to close for academic dissection and examination.11 down opposition and, in effect, transform Subsequently, however, the study of opposition democracy into elective dictatorship.8 Indeed, attracted rather limited attention and in a recent various contributions in this present collection overview, Jean Blondel complains that furthers that debate via the elaboration of con- although the word ‘opposition’ is used daily to servative and radical critiques of the ANC-in- account for a variety of developments, ‘its power which, as is argued in the Conclusion, many meanings have not been systematically have a surprising amount in common. It will related to the differences among the political therefore be necessary to return to this debate systems of the world’.12 Various volumes did below. However, any such discussion can attain appear after Dahl’s initial foray, yet they were a wider relevance only upon the basis of an only comparative in the sense that they dealt attempt to locate the study of opposition in with more than one country, and their scope South Africa comparatively. remained limited to a region or a particular type of political system. The problem, argues 1. THE STUDY OF OPPOSITION Blondel, is in large part the fact that opposition In the Preface of his landmark collection on is a ‘dependent’ concept; that is, its character is Political Oppositions in Western Democracies9 tied to that of its government: apparently the (1966), Robert Dahl noted that of ‘the three only way to discover the character of opposi- great milestones in the development of democ- tion is by first examining regime, rule, authori- ratic institutions’– the right to vote, the right to ty or state. Nonetheless, he goes on to assert the be represented, and the right of organised oppo- importance of making progress towards a theo- sition – it was the last which was ‘wholly mod- ry of the conditions under which opposition is ern’ to the extent that it was ‘a recent un- likely to emerge, grow and decline in all differ- planned invention that (had) been confined for ent types of polity.13 the most part to a handful of countries in The objectives of the present collection, Western Europe and the English-speaking restricted as it is to the study of a particular world’,10 with only about 30 of the then (1964) country, are far less ambitious than those existing member states of the espoused by Blondel, who was writing for a (UN) having political systems in which full comparative volume dealing with the ‘The

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Repositioning of Opposition’ in the context of power of the state when the latter is viewed as the post-Cold War wave of democratisation. an oppressive institution; third, it may refer to Most certainly, this set of essays will hope to resistance to the group, faction or dynasty in contribute to the wider enterprise of the study command of the state, and to a denial of its of opposition more generally. However, the legitimacy; fourth, it may be used to denote a more particular concern of the conference on loyal opposition which opposes the command- which this collection was based, and which ing group without either contesting its legitima- inspires the different contributors, is a particu- cy, or threatening or rejecting the basis of the lar set of challenges which confront democratic state or the constitution; fifth, opposition may politics in South Africa today. Emerging from refer to a system of checks and balances where- the long drawn-out nightmare of apartheid by the constitution guards against and corrects authoritarianism, South Africa’s new democra- its own excesses; and finally, the term may cy ostensibly celebrates and rejoices in dissent, describe the methods whereby the citizen or debate and diversity. Yet there are manifestly group modifies a government’s actions or pre- tendencies and traditions within the body vents its tyrannies, without condemning the lat- politic which run counter to those aspirations ter as inherently oppressive. While noting that and values. It is the increasing set of tensions it is necessary to recognise the close relation- between South Africa’s formal commitment to ship which often exists between the different democracy and its practice which have set the activities referred to, Barker went on to argue agenda for this set of studies around the issue that all these meanings, save one, have a long of ‘opposition’. That very term, however, ancestry. For instance, ‘Aquinas was ready to requires careful explication before progress invoke Aristotle in defence of the overthrow of towards those wider objectives, of any sort tyrants’, and beliefs in the balance of power whatsoever, can be made. and the desire to furnish the citizen with safe- guards against overweening public power have 2. DEFINING OPPOSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA a secure pedigree in judicial and legal theory. As Geraint Parry has observed, the attempt to In contrast, the idea of opposition as ‘legal and define what constitutes ‘opposition’ is a highly loyal opposition’ was remarkably new.15 contested matter.14 Some analysts argue that to Barker identified the fundamental require- be meaningful it should be restricted to the idea ment for the flourishing of opposition as some of ‘institutionalised opposition’ within a separation between the person or persons sym- context of established liberal democracy; others bolising sovereignty, and those exercising gov- propose that opposition suggests representation ernment. Where, as throughout most European and acceptance of difference; and yet others history, the integrity of the state and responsi- argue for extension of the term to incorporate a bility of government had been exercised by an much wider range of anti-government behav- absolute monarch, it was difficult to challenge iours that are normally found in the established, one without the other. In contrast, oppositional democratic world. None of these uses of oppo- politics had only developed in countries where sition is ‘right’’or ‘wrong’, and all are a distinction had been allowed to grow between employed in contemporary usage (as is illus- first order and second order conflicts, where trated by this collection). What is clearly there was a generalised acceptance of rules of important, therefore, is for any study of ‘oppo- fair play whereby those out of power expressed sition’ to define in what way that term is being their grievances or demands for reform in a used. manner that did not challenge the essence of the Barker tackled this issue some three decades existing state. Barker noted, furthermore, that ago when he noted that because the word even though legal opposition was recognised at ‘opposition’ has so many different meanings, the level of practical politics in European (espe- there was the unfortunate consequence that the cially British) politics throughout the 19th cen- different phenomena are often treated as if they tury, it was not valued or even greatly com- are the same. He therefore identified six uses of mented upon as a necessary or desirable feature the term as follows. First, opposition may mean of free, parliamentary states. Indeed, even total resistance to the form and basis of the though John Stuart Mill recognised that in any state; second, it may denote resistance to the there would be diverse approaches to

14 Southall political problems, he found no place for ‘loyal teristic of contemporary democratic govern- opposition’. Although he was convinced of the ment. necessity of critical debate, he saw that as sus- Barker’s analysis of the development of the tained not by opposition but by a free press, idea of opposition has much to say to our inter- which he saw as embodying a spirit of critical pretation of the phenomenon of opposition in enquiry. And while he perceived parliament as South Africa. For instance, the strategy of the performing as a restraint on government, he ANC, from its foundation in 1912, might be attributed this role to the whole body, and not interpreted: any one faction within it. Mill, in other words, • as resisting the power of the settler state as did not envisage opposition and dissent as an oppressive institution from the formation being embodied in parties divided by irrecon- of the settler state via the formation of the cilable divisions of principle, but as arising out in 1910 through to the of a multiplicity of opinion which shifted and capture of power by the National Party (NP) changed as issues themselves changed. in 1948 Barker went on to chronicle how a long line • before thereafter transiting to resistance to of commentators continued to value the free- the post-1948 apartheid government based doms to oppose and criticise over the consolid- upon a rejection of its legitimacy, notably ation of those freedoms into political parties, from 1960, after which time the ANC was which continued to be portrayed as factional. It banned and was forced into the adoption of was only after the Second World War that seri- armed struggle from exile ous attention was granted to the idea of opposi- • then, subsequently, after having moved into tion as essential to democracy, a transition government from 1994, it might be argued which implied an acceptance of relativism in that the ANC views opposition as most con- political thinking, a suspicion of grand causes structively embodied in constitutional checks and ultimate ideals, and a preference for the and balances functions of opposition over principles. • or as entailing pressure upon government Barker ascribed this remarkable change in the directed from outside parliament by civil status of opposition to changes in the political society, from both within and beyond the and intellectual environment. Party and opposi- Tripartite Alliance. tion had existed for well over a century before However, what the DP – and at times other par- they were given credit for sustaining democra- ties – are increasingly arguing is that the ANC cy, yet their favourable recognition only is reluctant to concede the idea of ‘loyal oppo- became possible after the idea of the state came sition’, especially insofar as such opposition under attack – from pluralists and international- emanates from parties that are ‘historically ists – after the First World War, and as para- white’. doxically, the state began to expand its func- As will be argued below, it is a welcome fact tions to assume positive responsibility for the for democracy in South Africa that the ANC, as general well-being of the population. As a the leading force of the liberation movement, result, political enquiry became increasingly never rejected the basis of the state, even directed to the examination of second order though it challenged its form as a racially con- rather than constitutional politics, as solutions structed entity. What the ANC always wanted were sought to problems which would previ- was not to overthrow the state, but for all per- ously have been considered economic or reli- sons of whatever race, colour or background to gious rather than political; and although plural- be able to participate in its affairs on an equal ist thinking often assumed an ultimate unity or basis. This has important implications for the need for constitutional balance, it also asserted legitimacy of the post-apartheid state, and the legitimacy of sectional principles which arguably places democracy in South Africa at a might not be compatible with the demands and major advantage compared to the situation in desires of particular groups or individuals. many other African countries, where the very Virtue therefore became lodged not in the ends existence of the post-colonial state has been, or – good government – to which democracy was is being, severely tested by a variety of cen- previously considered instrumental, but in the tripetal challenges centred around ethnic and very institutionalisation of dissent as a charac- regional polarities.16 Nonetheless, for all that

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Barker’s clarifications can be employed to illu- customarily occurs only in two-party systems. minate the study of opposition in South Africa In contrast, in pluralistic party systems, the historically, they can only take us so far in most frequent pattern is coalition governments, helping us to understand the present. in which all parties are likely to share, at differ- A first problem is that Barker’s formulations ent times, a fraction of governmental power – are time-bound and Anglo-centric. Even as he although in some such systems a centre party, was writing, in 1970, the notion of ‘loyal oppo- or group of parties, are rarely forced to leave sition’ did not sit comfortably with either government while ‘extreme’ parties tend to Western presidentialism – as in the United remain excluded.18 The relevant distinction, States (US), where there has never been such therefore, he argues, is between ‘responsible’ an office as ‘Leader of the Opposition’ – or and ‘irresponsible’ opposition: ‘An opposition European parliamentarism, where opposition which knows that it may be called upon to parties were those currently excluded from “respond”, i.e. which is oriented towards gov- shifting multi-party coalitions or, as in the Italy erning and has a reasonable chance to govern, of the day, were inclusive of Communist – not or to have access to governmental responsibili- yet ‘Euro-communist’ – and neo-fascist parties ty, is likely to behave responsibly, in a which served in parliament yet rejected the restrained and realistic fashion’. In contrast, a principles upon which the constitution was party which is not called upon to respond in based. In short, Barker’s own vision of opposi- this manner may well become irresponsible, tion was very much based upon the British taking a path that seeks to outbid the govern- model of opposition which was simultaneously ment by making wild promises. The mechanics intensely adversarial, yet founded upon an of responsible opposition therefore rests upon acceptance of the legitimacy of the state. In two conditions: ‘the constitutionalisation of contrast, the situation in contemporary South politics and, additionally, the kind of induce- Africa is much more fluid. For instance, the ments that are provided by the particular party present constitution – in echo of Westminster – system’.19 provides for recognition of the largest opposi- What may be drawn from this debate is the tion party in parliament as ‘Leader of the suggestion that, rather than looking – as most Opposition’. On the other hand, the electoral popular commentaries do – to the Westminster system, which is based on the party list system model of ‘loyal opposition’, the Western of PR, has produced a party system within European model of ‘overlapping and shifting’ which the opposition is highly fragmented; the (‘constitutional’) oppositions is more akin to physical lay-out of the National Assembly itself what actually obtains in South Africa at the has been restructured to get away from moment. Furthermore, if this point is accepted, Westminster-style confrontationalism; and the it may serve as something of a counter to the constitution formally eschews adversarialism in more gloomy prognoses which argue that South favour of the practice of ‘cooperative gover- African democracy is doomed by the continu- nance’, which at another level is expressed by ing fact of the fragmentation of opposition – an ‘opposition’ party – the Inkatha Freedom despite the formation of the DA – and the pre- Party (IFP) – serving in government. No won- sent lack of prospects for the emergence of an der that the idea of opposition in contemporary identifiable alternative government. Nonethe- South Africa is somewhat confused, even less, it must be accepted that even this takes us before any allowance is made yet more catholic only so far, for the following reasons. notions of opposition as inter-party dissent and First, the current debate around the idea of interest representation! South Africa as a dominant party system raises A degree of clarification is provided by our awkward problems about whether or not post- replacing the terminology of ‘loyal opposition’, apartheid politics is fully constitutionalised, and with its Westminster-style connotations, with hence raises further questions about what might that of ‘constitutional opposition’, which as be meant by ‘responsible opposition’. This has articulated by Giovanni Sartori envisions oppo- major implications for democratic ‘consolida- sition opposing a government, not the political tion’. system as such.17 Yet, pace Duverger, Sartori Second, the model of constitutional opposi- further notes that ‘real alternative government’ tion – especially if such opposition takes place

16 Southall in a context of ANC-party dominance and even tion parties be expected to act so ‘responsibly’? if it is interpreted as taking place most mean- At what moment should a democracy be ingfully within and not outside the Tripartite adjudged to be sufficiently consolidated to Alliance – is still far more obsessed with pro- allow for a transition from ‘cooperative’ to viding alternative government than what can be ‘adversarial’ opposition? What extent of argued is at the present juncture, a much more authoritarianism, corruption or other abuses pressing issue – that is, the need for rendering committed by government should be tolerated government accountable. These two aspects by an opposition fearing that democracy itself will now be looked at in turn. be undermined by robust challenge? And if such a democracy could not withstand such a 3. CONTEXTUALISING OPPOSITION IN SOUTH challenge, would it be worth saving? AFRICA: CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY AND These questions are undoubtedly rendered PARTY DOMINANCE more acute in the South African context by the Alfred Stepan has called for more attention to reality of the ANC’s hegemony, for as be given to ‘how, after a democratic transition, Giliomee and Simkins observe, there is a fun- the democratic opposition can help consolidate damental tension between dominant party rule and deepen democracy’.20 This is clearly an and democracy.21 Following Pempel,22 they enormously important focus for South Africa, define dominant parties as those which manage where the contemporary efforts to consolidate to establish electoral dominance for an uninter- democracy are faced by a long history of racial rupted and prolonged period; dominance in the inequality and cleavage, skewed in favour of a formation of governments, and dominance in white minority which has now lost its monop- determining the public agenda, notably with oly hold on political power yet remains over- regard to its successful pursuit of a ‘historic whelmingly in control of the economy. In such project’. However, whereas in some cases party conditions – where as Schrire suggests in his dominance can pave the way to competitive paper (included in this volume), politics is not democracy, in others it can lead to facade just about the struggle for wealth and power but democracy, or a barely concealed authoritarian- is also, under the hegemony of the ANC, a ism. In seeking to extend Pempel’s analysis – drive for the attainment of a ‘historic mission’ – which was largely restricted to industrialised political conflict can too easily descend into a societies – to semi-industrialised countries zero-sum game which could pull South Africa (notably with regard to the rule of the Insti- apart. What his analysis therefore suggests – as tutional Revolutionary Party [PRI] in Mexico, does that of Ivor Sarakinsky – is that precisely the United Malays National Organisation because South African democracy is peculiarly [UMNO] in Malaysia, and the Kuomanting fragile, strategies of ‘robust’ or ‘adversarial’ [KMT] in Taiwan), they seek to assess the opposition – as they have been pursued by the prospects for democracy in South Africa now DP – are potentially dangerous, more likely to that it is under the apparently firmly established inflame racial antagonisms, and less likely to dominance of the ANC.23 encourage acceptance of the legitimacy of In crude summary, what Giliomee and opposition. Responsible opposition, they seem Simkins propose is that dominant parties in to say, needs to be much more nuanced, more semi-industrialised countries are more likely to attuned to the fragility of South Africa, and abuse power than in the industrialised cases hence much more oriented to the promotion of studied by Pempel, the key difference being national reconciliation and co-existence that in less advanced and highly unequal soci- between the country’s potentially warring racial eties, a capitalist state has considerable difficul- and ethnic communities, although they would ty in establishing any real autonomy from the doubtless add that ‘responsible opposition’ capitalist interests on which it is dependent for ought to be rewarded by ‘responsible govern- investment decisions. Because they are com- ment’. The essence of democracy, whether pelled to maintain friendly relations with a fragile or more solid, is, clearly, that responsi- business sector which they once considered to bility should cut both ways. be the enemy, dominant parties in such coun- Nonetheless, the immediate dilemma posed tries are compelled to shed radical at by such analyses is: how long should opposi- an early stage. Yet to facilitate this compro-

17 Southall mise, these parties establish a mass base which mix non-racialism with Africanism, acceptance captures the popular sectors of society via, of the free market with regulation of the labour notably, the granting of concessions to organ- market, and state patronage of African contrac- ised labour – which is thereby effectively emas- tors with continued near monopolies for white- culated – thus shoring up the support of big controlled corporations. Finally, to contain the business. Meanwhile, in countries like strains imposed by managing the syncretic Malaysia and South Africa which have deep state, the ANC leadership has embarked upon a ethnic and/or racial divisions, the mass base of strategy of concentrating as much power as the dominant party simultaneously assumes an possible over the party and state machinery in ethnic or racial form, particularly when growth its own hands. Contesting rival interpretations and redistribution are modest. Consequently: which view ANC dominance as being under- ‘Given the superiority of ethnic to class mined, in the medium term, by a shift away appeals, an alternation in government is from race-based to interest-based by the much more unlikely in South Africa and electorate, or by hopes that democracy may be Malaysia than in Mexico and Taiwan.’24 sustained by ‘internal pluralism’ within the Giliomee and Simkins make three further ANC and by an ‘external pluralism’ – of oppo- observations with particular reference to South sition parties and civil society – without, Africa. First, the liberal macroeconomics of the Giliomee and Simkins similarly dismiss corpo- 1990s will put severe limitations upon govern- ratism – which they see as riven by too many ment intervention in the private sector or on contradictions – as either a sustainable strategy using state corporations to expand the share of for long-term growth or the maintenance of African equity holding. The ANC will therefore social harmony. have to live much longer with the white domi- All in all, Giliomee and Simkins’ prognosis nation of the corporate structure than, for is remarkably gloomy. The basic requisites for instance, UMNO has had to do with Chinese democracy in South Africa are not in place, domination of corporations in Malaysia. while prospects are further damned by the fact Second, the ANC has enjoyed considerably less and likely direction of ANC dominance. For success than the KMT, PRI or UMNO in estab- liberal democracy to come about, democratic lishing itself as a coalition that spans both eth- institutions would need to be greatly strength- nic groups and classes. It remains unable to ened to counter the might of the executive, con- attract the support of the economically domi- tain corruption, curb state patronage, maintain nant white group, with the result that it is aban- free and fair elections and include the opposi- doning its 1994 election appeal of non-racial- tion in formulating the identity of the nation. ism for an increasingly explicit call for African Even though none of these projects would be solidarity. easily met by any dominant elite, their pursuit As a result, given their superior political is the ‘only way to build a liberal democracy’. weight, the ANC is becoming an alliance of a The best hopes that democracy will ultimately black middle class and – unionised – labour be realised therefore lie with a mix of globalisa- aristocracy, whose interests increasingly take tion – which will put pressure upon corrupt or preference over the non-unionised and unem- inefficient state-business links – and hopefully ployed blacks. Third, in having to straddle the a refusal of the poor to allow the ANC to take seemingly impossible contradictions posed by their fate out of their own hands by launching a its need to reconcile the majority with diverse ‘silent’ economic revolution. Opposition forces minorities, dominant party rule in South Africa would seem to be largely sidelined as agents of has given rise to a ‘syncretic state’, which as in democracy. Malaysia operates multi-dimensionally, includ- James Myburgh and Lawrence Schlemmer ing mixing coercive with democratic proce- join up with Giliomee in extending this analysis dures, engaging in ethnic mobilisation while in their paper, contained in this volume. Suffice cultivating a national following, and pursuing a it to say that their joint prognostications are no combination of economic practices, ranging more cheerful this time around, with the added from liberal capitalism and state intervention proviso that, in their view, the ANC is pursuing into the economy, to rentier arrangements. a set of strategies which are deeply alienating to Syncretism has therefore allowed the ANC to South Africa’s racial minorities while in no

18 Southall way guaranteeing that the interests of the mass tion politics in Malaysia, whether the for- of blacks are best served by majoritarian hege- mal opposition parties or groups in civil mony. society. Opposition political parties have Whether or not this interpretation is accepted, great difficulty developing a coherent pro- the dominant party thesis as put forward by gramme alternative to the ruling regime, Giliomee and his co-authors poses major chal- because the state has a powerful ability to lenges to any assessment of the prospects for absorb diverse ideological orientations and opposition in South Africa. interests in society, leaving only narrow First and foremost, the dominance of the constituencies for the opposition to culti- ANC, as it is presented by Giliomee et al. sug- vate.’26 gests difficulties with Sartori’s idea of ‘consti- Jesudason goes on to note that changes in tutional opposition’. Precisely because the syn- Malaysia are more likely to come about from cretic, dominant party state blurs distinctions the loss of coherence of the ruling coalition between party and state – and legality and ille- than from more effective political opposition. gality – it is likely to also blur the distinction Yet if opposition parties were to accept this between what is and what is not constitutional. argument, it would have major implications for Or to put it another way, how ‘responsibly’ their strategy. Can they realistically hope to should an opposition party be expected to act if ‘shadow’ the government in every sphere – as it is subjected to a barrage of legally dubious the DA attempts to do at the moment? Or and coercive pressures? should they accept that they merely represent Second, whereas Giliomee and Simkins see ‘narrow constituencies’ and pursue their partic- corporatism as, in effect, working to compro- ular interests – as do, in effect, the smaller par- mise opposition by entrenching ANC domi- ties such as the African Christian Democratic nance, certain pro-labour analysts have pro- Party and the Federal Alliance? posed that the consolidation of democracy is Not everything that Giliomee and Simkins dependent upon the need for a ‘historic com- say has to be accepted for it to be admitted that promise’ between organised labour and capital, these are very real and testing dilemmas. On thereby containing potentially destabilising the one hand, they raise the issue of whether class conflicts, if South Africa is to embark party dominance can be combined with suffi- upon a sustainable growth strategy.25 Eddie cient internal democracy, and toleration of a Webster pursues this analysis in the present diversity of viewpoints ‘within the family’, to collection, although he worries that if the ANC counter potential democracy-suppressing ten- continues to pursue the neo-liberal economic dencies. And on the other, if opposition parties policies it has pushed in recent years, that the are cast in the role of perpetual losers, then how established trade union movement will become might broader external pressures be brought to increasingly marginalised. Even so, rather than bear upon the ruling party? It may be proposed suggesting – as do Habib and Taylor in their that, in part, this takes us back to something contribution – that Cosatu should therefore similar to Mill’s notion of shifting opposition, break the alliance with the ANC and constitute and of parliament as a whole, civil society and a labour- and class-based opposition, he argues a free press acting as a restraint upon govern- more equivocally that Cosatu might emerge as ment. a ‘left pressure group’ inside the alliance push- ing for redistributive policies. But he adds that 4. TOWARDS OPPOSITION AS ACCOUNTABILITY such a development would require from the Mill’s vision of a legislature is of a body whose ANC a degree of political tolerance that has function is: rarely been found in Africa. ‘to watch and control the government: to Third, if Giliomee and Simkins’ characterisa- throw the light of publicity on its acts: to tion of post-1994 South Africa as a syncretic compel a full exposition and justification of state is accepted, then it implies that the present all of them which any one considers ques- state of acute fragmentation among the parties tionable; to censure them if found con- of opposition is likely to endure. As Jesudason demnable, and, if the men who compose the has noted, syncretism: government abuse their trust, or fulfil it in a ‘(has) centrally framed the nature of opposi- manner which conflicts with the deliberate

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sense of the nation, to expel them from predecessor NP counterparts which were elect- office ... In addition to this, the Parliament ed on a racially restricted franchise and, latterly has an office, not inferior even to this in at least, working in very close, yet almost whol- importance; to be at once the nation’s ly opaque, collaboration with unaccountable Committee of Grievances, and its Congress security services. That is now not the issue. of Opinions; an arena in which not only the Much more important is the question whether general opinion of the nation, but that of the constitutional provisions designed to render every section of it ... can produce itself in government accountable under the new consti- full light and challenge discussion; where tution are working adequately. Unfortunately, every person in the country may count upon there are already more than sufficient indica- finding somebody who speaks his mind, as tions that they are not. well or better than he could speak it himself Any statement like that needs to be placed in – not to friends and partisans exclusively, context lest it be taken to be some wilful attack but in the face of opponents, to be tested by upon the new government. The first point to adverse controversy ...’27 make is quite simply that the struggle to render As indicated above, Mill’s notion of an inde- government actions accountable remains one of pendent legislature serving as a check upon the the foremost challenges even in contemporary executive has long been overtaken by the advanced democracies. It is probably true to development of parties, and the disciplines and say that virtually all governments prefer to act subordination to political leaderships that they behind a veil of secrecy if they can get away impose upon individual members of parlia- with it. Yet experience proves that secrecy is a ments. Nonetheless, his eloquent ideal contin- closer friend of dictatorship than it is of democ- ues to inform our visions of how representative racy. A second, more immediately alarming organs in society should reflect wider public point, is that after the hopes of a new opinion and serve to constrain any abuse of raised by the democratic openings in Southern power. Africa in the early 1990s, there are some After years of racial dictatorship, the call for extremely worrying indicators that the region popularly accountable government was one of might be about to embark upon a ‘reverse the major demands that shaped the South wave’, with democracy being under acute pres- African transition. As a result, South Africa sure in Zimbabwe, in considerable trouble in now proudly proclaims itself as a constitutional countries such as Namibia and Lesotho, and state and its government as bound by the rule of democratisation processes apparently stalled in law. Indeed, under the final constitution of Swaziland and war-torn Angola. Indeed, a 1996,28 democracy is presented as being pro- recent report has indicated that media freedoms moted not only by the popularly elected are under severe assault and that Southern National Assembly’s ultimate ability to dismiss Africa is becoming one of the most dangerous the Executive, but by government’s freedom to regions in the world for journalists to work in.29 act being constrained by a Bill of Rights, an In short, if – as is so often asserted – South independent judiciary and by a set of institu- Africa is to become a beacon of freedom for tions (the Public Protector, the Auditor- Africa, and even an active agent for democracy General, the Independent Broadcasting throughout the continent, then the question of Authority, the Independent Electoral Com- the accountability of its government has be kept mission, and other commissions for Human alive. Rights, Gender Equality and for the Promotion The immediate question that is posed by the and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, dominant party thesis is: how effective can Religious and Linguistic Communities) whose society in South Africa be in calling govern- particular status is meant to provide for the ment to account if there is no credible threat to functioning of key bodies independently from the government of being replaced at the polls? government and for the exercise of external Or, to put it another way, is government suffi- review of major areas of official performance. ciently constrained by the checks and balances There can be no serious debate about whether formally provided for under the 1996 constitu- or not South Africa now has a government tion? which is more accountable to society than its There is already a substantial body of opinion

20 Southall which would respond with a loud negative. By and popular constituencies they are uncomfort- far the most vigorously articulated critique has able. As a result, criticisms which may have a been that of the DP, which has protested that wider support tend to become the public prop- the government is undermining the constitution erty of only the opposition parties, and the con- by inter alia pursuing a policy of seeking to tent of those criticisms therefore becomes ‘capture the state’ by systematically deploying blurred by the hurly-burly of insult, exchange, loyal and uncritical members of the ANC to all exaggeration and half-truth which, in South key organs of state; ignoring findings or failing Africa as elsewhere, constitutes the negative to implement recommendations of the Auditor- aspect of party politics. General and various ad hoc judicial commis- There is clearly no easy way forward, espe- sions appointed to probe corruption; assaulting cially in a still racially polarised society where the freedom of opposition parties to ask ques- opposition can so easily become entangled with tions in parliament; seeking to de-legitimise racial stereotyping and antagonisms. However, opposition by demonising all criticism emanat- if we believe, with Mill, that, ‘In all human ing from non-Africans as racist; and so on.30 affairs conflicting influences are required to Meanwhile, even though not all critics sub- keep one another alive and efficient even for scribe to the DP’s entire panoply of complaints their own proper uses’,32 then: nor their world-view, many of their concerns First, students of South African politics need have been echoed in, for instance, arguments to evince a greater commitment to serious that the abolition of constituencies under the empirical research concerning the actual func- national-list electoral system has empowered tioning of the country’s new institutions. party bosses and increased the distance between Parties such as the DP may well come up with voters and those they elect to represent them; their own well-founded research, yet their moti- that the government is starving the ‘democracy vations and findings are always likely to be promoting’ commissions of funds to inhibit contested more upon the basis of their author- their capacity for investigation and criticism; ship than upon their substantive content. Yet and most notably, that the ANC government is although it is necessary to be wary of any sug- seeking to curb the media – with a recent gestion that academic research is value-free or enquiry by the Human Rights Commission into ‘more expert’ than that done by political par- racism in the media interpreted in many quar- ties, the best of it will state its value-basis open- ters as an ANC-aligned, Africanist assault upon ly and strive for ‘independence’ and rigour. In press freedom. this context it should be noted that any inter- Mamphele Ramphele has recently faulted party debate about how well – or otherwise – what she deems to be significant ‘silences’, or the constitutionally established checks and bal- the reluctance of intellectuals who identified ances are doing in rendering government with the liberation struggle to openly criticise accountable, needs to be informed by a substan- what they deem to be mistakes or abuses by the tial body of accessible and well grounded ANC now it is in power lest they be construed study. Unfortunately, Ramphele’s ‘silences’ as being ‘anti-liberation’.31 Such loyalty is seen seem to be accompanied by an alarming lack of as misplaced and, indeed, counter-productive to professional interest by South African political the realisation of the objectives for which the scientists in such nitty-gritty areas as: the func- liberation struggle was fought in the long term. tioning of parliament, the working of provincial What she did not say – but which follows – is legislatures, the performance and impact of the that when particular opposition parties, such as ‘democracy supporting’ commissions, the inter- the DP, offer robust criticisms of the ANC, face between the government and the civil ser- many intellectuals are reluctant to identify with vice, etc. Indeed, most such work seems to be them because first, they do not want to be seen undertaken by a handful of monitoring non- as opponents of the government, and second, governmental organisations such as Institute for they do not wish to identify openly with the Democracy in South Africa and the . parties concerned, perhaps especially if they – Second, following Dahl, the search for the the intellectuals – are white and they do not conditions under which accountability can wish to be accused of consorting with opposi- flourish in South Africa needs to be combined tion parties with whose historical backgrounds with a firm commitment to the legitimacy and

21 Southall vigour of constitutional opposition as a neces- Such a recognition should necessarily imply a sary ingredient in democracy. This need not vigorous defence of the rights and freedoms of commit any analyst to the support of any partic- an independent media and press as a constitu- ular party – even though individuals may tive element of a democratic society. But much choose to so align themselves – yet it should be more than this, a radical perspective would urge linked to a firm assertion of the positive func- the need for internal democratic processes with- tions of opposition or, if a different word is in the ANC/Tripartite Alliance to bond the rul- more acceptable, diversity of opinion. Or as ing party to its popular support base. Indeed, Shils put it some time ago, open opposition John Saul sees such linkages as vital to counter- provides inter alia for: acting some of the ‘autocratic ethos’ that the • the institutionalised expression of conflicting ANC developed in exile.35 interests Fifth, if civil society is accorded a key role in • the communication to government of inter- counter-balancing government, then the condi- ests which might otherwise be disregarded tions under which it may flourish will need to • the improvement of performance by govern- be addressed. The particular challenge, of ment by criticism of mistakes, omissions and course, is that civil society has been in decline injustices in South Africa since 1994 through a combina- • the enlightenment of the public, and the tion of factors: problems of reorientation from improvement of its qualifications for approv- ‘resistance’ to development, the drain of skilled ing or disapproving of the actions of its activists to government, loss of funding, decline rulers.33 in union memberships, etc. Consequently, how Third, while it is probably too late, in Robert to revive the vibrance and ‘weight’ of civil Mattes’ terminology, to go ‘Beyond society organisations constitutes as urgent a Government and Opposition’ by the constitu- task as elaborating how they should interact tional provision for a strict separation of pow- with both government and the political parties ers and the creation of an independent legisla- of opposition. ture wherein a fluid party system would allow Finally, it needs to be emphasised that the for cross party collaboration as well as scope demand for accountability should constitute as for independent activity by individual parlia- much a plank of ‘loyal support’ for implemen- mentarians,34 the need for the vigorous asser- tation of any government agenda as much as it tion of full opportunity for free debate in the should underpin the promotion of a coherent face of any encroachments of that ideal remains alternative programme by any party of opposi- paramount. This implies both positive and neg- tion. ative responsibilities: for instance, a demand for increased allocation of resources to the CONCLUSION committee system – a relative, if struggling, This discussion has been pitched at a minimal success of the new – on objective of securing consensus around – in the one hand; and an outright condemnation of generous paraphrase of Barrington Moore – the such moves as a recent rewriting of the rules assertion: ‘no opposition, no democracy’. It surrounding parliamentary question time which seeks to build upon the growing uneasiness are clearly designed to hamper the opposition, upon both the political left and the political on the other. At the same time, Mattes’ formula right – a disquiet which is reflected in the suggests some possibility of hitching present majority of papers in this collection – that, conceptions of ‘constructive opposition’ and whether it be for reasons to do with South ‘cooperative governance’ to a Mill-like consid- Africa’s complex legacy or certain tendencies eration of issues on their merits rather than sim- exhibited by the ANC government, newly won ply upon party lines. democracy could be endangered by an effective Fourth, it needs to be stressed that the task of capture of the state by the ruling party.36 criticism rests not only with opposition political Elaboration of this argument is complicated parties but also with dissident elements within by two factors. First of all, as noted by Stepan, the ruling party, and with the wide diversity of amidst the mass of literature considering the interests, organisations and associations which transitions to democracy around the world in are usually taken to constitute ‘civil society’. recent decades, there has been a remarkable

22 Southall failure to focus explicitly upon the state of and throughout the African continent, despite its conditions for political opposition in newly enormous racial and socio-economic disparities democratised countries.37 Instead, opposition as and other deficits. Indeed, as Spence has noted, a phenomenon and necessary aspect of democ- one of the striking aspects about South Africa’s ratisation has tended to be sidelined as an situation is the fact that the democratic arrange- aspect of regime change (oppositions becoming ments adopted in 1994 drew heavily upon government), of dominant party systems (oppo- experience since 1910, and in this sense the sitions as victims), of civil society (oppositions new constitution was not an alien imposition subordinated to assessment of wider state-soci- but autochthonous. Despite the brutalities and ety linkages) or of democratic consolidation racial exclusions of apartheid, ideas of constitu- (opposition subordinated to a focus upon estab- tional government had had time to take root.39 lishment of rights of association and democratic Hence the idea of opposition in South Africa is behaviours). In all probability the lack of inter- far from new. Furthermore, the ‘pacted transi- est is a product of the weakness of oppositions tion’ was brought about by a trade-off which in many newly democratised countries once a saw the ANC accept political power balanced transition has been achieved (not to mention the by the continuing domination of the economy fact that parties which constitute oppositions, by white corporate capital. While the subse- especially parties such as the NNP that have quent prospects for transformation (and conti- lost out in a regime change, often lack interna- nuity) are subject to diverse interpretations, this tional respectability). Nonetheless, whatever bargained settlement undoubtedly realised the reason, it makes the task of assessing the widespread agreement (going beyond elites) role of opposition in contemporary South based upon the formalities of the interim 1994, Africa that much more difficult. and later the 1996, constitution. This in turn Meanwhile, a second and related factor is that would seem to provide for a minimum consen- of minimalism: the suggestion that because sus between those of significantly different things are better than they were, because South ideological persuasions around the necessity of Africa has a certain threshold of democratisa- opposition, debate and diversity as a compo- tion, we should rest content and not expect too nent of democracy, even if there will be consid- much. Indeed, often tagged on to this sort of erable differences around the most suitable argument is the question (posed, ironically, vehicles and modes for expressing, institution- either from Africanist or racist quarters) of alising and mobilising such differences. whether Africa should be judged by the same Finally, there may well be one last area of democratic standards as are applied to agreement: that the way forward for democracy ‘advanced’ Western countries. This approach and opposition in South Africa lies in transition certainly has its merits, as demonstrated for to an issue-oriented and ideologically based instance by Wiseman’s important statement of politics in which racial and ethnic affinities the case for ‘Demo-optimism’ in Africa,38 yet it play a backstage role.40 Or to put it another can too easily slide into a passive relativism – a way, can South Africa overcome the legacy of political acceptance of the suggestion that a its historic social cleavages to allow the content lower standard of civil rights and democracy is and characteristics of its political opposition to acceptable for Africans. Even if it is argued that be shaped by issues and institutions rather than the low levels of economic development and by communal sentiments?41 Some interpreta- state integrity which obtain in most African tions of the present state of play suggest that states are unlikely to provide for the existence of this historically unlikely;42 others claim that it vibrant popular counterweights to government, is already in process and that South Africans that perspective remains highly problematic as are increasingly assessing their political an agenda for either policy or political solidarity. options, rationally and pragmatically.43 In any case, South Africa’s considerably Whatever our own particular assessments, more advanced development status is widely few will dispute that progress towards non- considered to provide a firmer foundation for racial democracy, the classic goal of the ANC, democratic consolidation than in most countries remains a decent enough goal to aim at.

23 Southall

ENDNOTES

1) Tom Lodge, Consolidating Democracy: 14) Geraint Parry, Opposition Questions, South Africa’s Second Popular Election, Government and Opposition, 32, 4, 1997, (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of South pp. 457-461. Africa and Witwatersrand University 15) Barker, Introduction. Press, 1999), p. 210. 16) Christopher Clapham, Opposition in 2) Bruce Baker, The Quality of African Tropical Africa, Government and Democracy: Why and How It Should be Opposition, 32, 4, 1997, pp. 541-556. Measured Journal of Contemporary 17) Giovanni Sartori, Opposition and Control: African Studies, 17, 2, pp 273-286; Roger Problems and Prospects, in Barker, Studies Southall, The State of Democracy in South in Opposition, pp. 31-37. Africa, Commonwealth and Comparative 18) Again, the Barker volume shows its age, Politics, 38, 3, 2000, pp. 147-170. with France and Italy cited as pluralistic 3) The South African Communist Party has party systems in which the respective had a long history of association with the communist parties were never involved in ANC since its foundation (as the government. Subsequent to Sartori’s Communist Party of South Africa) in paper, both parties did join governing 1919. At present, it operates in a sort of coalitions, without the system breaking marriage whereby its representatives are down. elected to parliament and other bodies as 19) Ibid p. 35. members of the ANC. The Tripartite 20) Alfred Stepan, Democratic Opposition and Alliance is a formalised, yet loose, Democratisation Theory, Government and arrangement whereby the ANC, SACP Opposition, 32, 4, 1997, p. 657. and Cosatu work in harmony, although as 21) Giliomee and Simkins, The Awkward the papers in this collection by Habib and Embrace, p.337. Taylor, McKinley and Webster indicate, 22) T.J. Pempel, (Ed) Uncommon this relationship is presently under consid- Democracies (Ithaca: Cornell University erable strain. Press, 1990). 4) On this, see the paper by Hennie Kotzé, 23) Giliomee and Simkins, The Awkward included. Embrace, pp. xv-xviii. 5) Mail & Guardian, 28 May–3 June 1999. 24) Op. cit. p. 341. 6) Howard Barrell, The Race for the Real 25) Eddie Webster and Glenn Adler, Towards Second Place. Mail & Guardian, a Class Compromise in South Africa’s 28 February–4 March 1999. Double Transition: Bargained Liberali- 7) Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins sation and the Consolidation of Demo- (Eds), The Awkward Embrace: One-Party cracy, Politics and Society, 27, 3, 1999, Domination and Democracy, (Cape Town: pp. 363-371. Tafelberg, 1999). 26) James Jesudason, The syncretic state and 8) Op. cit, Giliomee and Simkins, the structuring of oppositional politics in Conclusion, p. 347. Malaysia, in Garry Rodan (Ed), Political 9) Robert Dahl, (Ed), Political Oppositions Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, in Western Democracies, (New Haven: (London and New York: Routledge), pp. Yale University Press, 1966). 128-160 (quote from p. 130). 10) Dahl, Political Oppositions, p. xiii. 27) John Stuart Mill, Representative 11) Rodney Barker, Introduction, in Rodney Government, p. 239, in John Stuart Mill, Barker (ed) Studies in Opposition (London Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1971). Government (London: J.M.Dent & Sons, 12) Jean Blondel, Political Opposition in the 1971). Contemporary World, Government and 28) The democratic transition was overseen by Opposition, 32, 4, 1997, p.462. an interim constitution (gazetted in 1994) 13) Jean Blondel, Political Opposition in the which made provision for parliament to Contemporary World, p. 464. draw up a final constitution by 1996.

24 Southall

29) Sechaba ka’Nkosi, Hostility to press rises emergence of a one-party state with all in Southern Africa, Mail & Guardian, 28 that it implies for probity of government April–4 May, 2000 (citing the annual and the virtues of accountability and trans- report of the Committee for the Protection parency’ (p. 539). of Journalists for 1999). 37) Alfred Stepan, Democratic Opposition, p. 30) See, for instance, the DP’s document The 657. Politics of Intolerance: How the ANC 38) John Wiseman, The Continuing Case for Attempts to De-legitimise its Opponents. Demo-Optimism in Africa, Democratisa- 31) Mamphele Ramphele, When good people tion, 6, 2, 1999, pp. 128-155. are silent, Mail & Guardian, 10-16 39) Jack Spence, Opposition in South Africa, December, 1999. p. 524. 32) Mill, Representative Government, p.247. 40) Cf, Stepan, Democratic Opposition, p. 670: 33) Edward Shils, Opposition in the New ‘... recent experiences of democratisation States of Asia and Africa, in Barker, underline the importance of also studying Studies in Opposition, pp. 45-78. how opposition groups in civil society can 34) Robert Mattes, Beyond ‘Government and themselves create new agenda items, and Opposition’: An Independent South especially turn non-issues into issues’. African Legislature, Politikon, 20, 2, 41) Cf. Blondel, Political Opposition, pp. 481- 1993, pp. 64-91. 483. 35) John Saul, Liberation without Democracy? 42) This seems to be overall thrust of Rethinking the Experiences of the Giliomee and Simkins’ analysis, for Southern African Liberation Movements, instance, their judgement that the ANC in Jonathan Hyslop, (Ed), African will remain dominant and preside over a Democracy in the Era of Globalisation, regime that is decreasingly liberal, assisted (Johannesburg: Witwatersand University by continuing electoral support from Press, 1999), pp. 167-178. Xhosa, Sotho and urban Zulu ethnic blocs. 36) This view is also shared by observers who See their Conclusion, in The Awkward are far removed from the battlefield. See, Embrace, p. 353. for instance, Jack Spence, Opposition in 43) See, for instance, Steven Friedman, Who South Africa, Government and we are: voter participation, rationality and Opposition, 32, 4, 1997, pp.522-538, who the 1999 election, Politikon, 26, 2, 1999, warns of the long-term danger of ‘the pp. 213-224.

25 The Realities of Opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences

Robert Schrire

A genuine democracy can almost be defined in ruling and the opposition parties may have the terms of the existence of an effective opposition. capacity to destroy democracy itself. Thus both However, in contexts where democracy is frag- the balance of political forces and the respec- ile because of factors such as ethnic divisions tive party strategies will be critical in shaping or religious conflicts, strong oppositions and/or political developments. robust strategies may endanger democracy At the same time, it has long been recognised itself. In contemporary South Africa, political that the political system is only partly autono- loyalties are in large part determined by race mous and that it is located in a context which and ethnicity. Political parties do not share a may be more or less favourable to the estab- common view of the nature of politics. For his- lishment or consolidation of democracy.2 Any torical reasons, the ruling African National discussion of political opposition must there- Congress (ANC) has a historic mission to trans- fore be contextualised. form the racial nature of the political economy, In the ideal world of democratic theory – while the major opposition parties have a more based largely on the Western experience – we modest and instrumental view of the political use as our model a polity in which the political process. The context is therefore not favourable forces are reasonably balanced and dynamic: at to textbook liberal democracy. However, if a least a significant minority of the electorate is core value of opposition is to contribute uncommitted to any party and will tip the bal- towards government accountability, other fac- ance periodically and thus make a change in tors – the vertical restraints on power, and the government possible.3 Two threats to democra- influence of globalisation – may serve to cy are eliminated by this definition. The first is improve the prospects for democracy signifi- a society which is based upon ethnic communi- cantly. Thus despite an unfavourable context for ties whose loyalty is to their group, and where a functioning democracy – a dominant party, there is the probability of ethnic censuses in weak and fragmented opposition parties, and a which elections produce permanent winners historical legacy of racism and inequality – and permanent losers. The second is the exis- democracy may yet survive. It will not be the tence of a long-term imbalance which provides democracy which South Africa deserves, but it one party with a long-term numerical prepon- may be the democracy which it can sustain. derance. I would argue that in the South African con- INTRODUCTION text we need to explore several key questions if In many ways, a democracy can almost be we wish to develop insights into the conse- defined in terms of the existence of an effective quences of political parties and broader issues opposition.1 The complex relationships of democracy and accountability. Firstly, what between political parties will do much to deter- are the social forces which underpin party mine the quality, and indeed the stability, of the alignments and which shape mass political political order. In fragile democracies, both the behaviour? Secondly, what is the relationship

27 Schrire between the ruling party, the ANC, and the democracy is one of several possible systems of consolidation of democracy? Are its policies governance. However, the political system and actions towards other players, including the operates in a given socio-cultural context.5 The opposition, likely to make a viable democracy nature of the cleavages, political cultures and more or less likely? And thirdly, are the actions history of the society will be critical influences and strategies of the opposition parties likely to on the polity, irrespective of the constitution in impact positively or negatively on the prospects place. Other papers in this collection examine for democratic consolidation? These issues are the debate about the nature of the South African clearly too ambitious to be answered adequate- electorate. Some conclude that the influence of ly within the space constraints of this paper. race and ethnicity is on the decline and the Nonetheless, the comments which follow are importance of the is increas- designed to serve as an introduction. ing – for instance, Mattes and Piombo.6 Others argue that South Africa is a classical example 1. THE NATURE OF DEMOCRACY of a plural society in which political affiliation Before we can begin the substantive analysis, it is shaped almost exclusively by race/ethnic is important to first outline what is meant here membership – for instance, Maloka.7 The key by the concept of democracy.4 It is generally issues for the future are the trends in ethnic accepted that an effective democracy entails mobilisation and allegiance. more than simply periodic free and fair elec- For my purpose here, however, I would argue tions. All societies must devise mechanisms for that the present party political alignment clearly determining the following: reflects the influence of past racial/ethnic con- Who will control the state? How will that flicts: the ANC remains at its core the party of control be established? Who will benefit from African , in potential competition state actions? Who will pay the costs? Will the for African votes with parties such as the Pan- exercise of power be constrained? Africanist Congress (PAC), the Azanian In contemporary South Africa, the key issue People’s Organisation (Azapo) and the New is the degree to which these issues will be National Party (NNP). Although the last men- resolved not only in a technically democratic tioned has lost most of its white support since way – regular elections, accurate vote counting 1994, it remains a party based on conservative – but in the spirit of a democratic society which now allied with conservative requires that: coloured people. The Inkatha Freedom Party • opposition parties are free to compete for (IFP), after attempting to broaden its ethnic electoral support and established and accept- base prior to the 1994 election, is now once ed procedures, including periodic free and again a party supported largely by traditionalist fair elections, are in place Zulus. The Democratic Party (DP) remains a • groups within civil society, such as trade party based on white support although its tradi- unions and business organisations, are free to tional English support has been bolstered by interact with government to further their sec- conservative Afrikaners and who are tional interests attracted to its tough opposition stance. From • civil liberties are recognised and protected, the perspective of the ANC then, we would and the population has access to an indepen- anticipate a certain ambivalence in its attitude dent mass media to opposition parties. Firstly, given its own self • there is some form of separation of powers – image as a party which represents the ‘nation’, at least at a minimum between the executive it is suspicious of most opposition parties, and the judiciary which it regards as ethnically based. Secondly, • all parties – the ruling and the opposition – as the party charged with the historical chal- agree to play the political game by the rules. lenge of ‘transformation’, it views some oppo- This implies that the losing parties accept the sition strategies as illegitimate. These issues legitimacy of the winners who in turn accept will be discussed in greater detail below. the legitimacy of constitutional opposition. 3. CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICS 2. THE SOCIAL BASIS OF POLITICS Given the communal elements of South African It follows from the discussion above that society, we would anticipate that the nature of

28 Schrire politics itself would be a contested issue. The would be low-to-moderate because the stakes various ethnic communities have experienced are modest. In the third and fourth cases, we historically very different consequences from would anticipate a significantly higher level of politics. For some, government was a benefi- conflict because of the zero-sum nature of the cent force which furthered and protected their contest. Later in this paper we will examine interests; for others, the state was an instrument where South African political parties locate used to oppress them and to impact negatively themselves on the issue of the nature of politics on their life choices. and governance, and indicate some of the How can political life be conceptualised?8 I implications which follow. would argue that the following definitions of the nature of politics are themselves part of the 4. THE ANC AND THE OPPOSITION political contest: How do South African parties interpret the • Politics is about contests within a set of rules nature of politics? The ANC and its predeces- which give priority to the individual over the sors struggled for 80 years to win political lib- claims of society and the state. This is the eration from white rule.10 Given this history, it world of Margaret Thatcher who claimed that was almost inevitable that the party saw its role there was no such thing as society, only indi- as a ‘historical mission’: to transform South viduals. Or as another Tory put it, ‘Conserva- African society from one based on race to one tives do not believe that political struggle is in which race and class are unrelated. The the most important thing in life ... The man ascent to political power is viewed as only the who puts politics first is not fit to be called a beginning of this process which, if it is to be civilised being ...’9 Politics is important only successful, must include black empowerment at the margin because the role of the state and a dramatic decrease in the magnitude of itself is limited. black poverty. The ANC looks to the political • Politics is the mechanism for modifying the kingdom to achieve what, in their view, the allocations of economic values determined by market cannot do. In contrast, the major oppo- the market. The invisible hand cannot be per- sition parties, including the IFP, DP and NNP, mitted to operate in isolation from the state argue (at least in theory) for a more modest and community. The state must enter into a conception of power. All stress the limits of partnership with the market to ensure that political power, the advantages of a free market social values are protected. Politics is, at least and the benefits of greater territorial decentrali- in part, about social justice. sation. The fundamental conception of the • The state is the instrument for the achieve- political is thus contested in South Africa. ment of a ‘historic mission’. This could entail For the ANC and the parties of the left, the the unification of an ethnic/national commu- status quo is illegitimate because it reflects the nity, the righting of historical ‘wrongs’, or legacy of 80 years of white rule. The distribu- the construction of a society on the basis of tion of wealth, including land, incomes, human new principles and institutions. development and core values are all the result • Politics is about the struggle for wealth and of racially discriminatory legislation and poli- power: to the victor the spoils. The victor cies. From this perspective therefore, ‘normal may be an individual and his family/cronies, politics cannot take place in an abnormal soci- or it may include a clan or ethnic group. The ety’. Against this, most of the opposition par- key element is the cynical manipulation of ties accept that the status quo is based upon a the resources of the state for narrow self- history of injustice. However, they argue that interest. Politics becomes a zero-sum game. the state cannot be used effectively to undo the Politics in all contexts involves a struggle for wrongs of the past. They thus support a market- power between competing groups and interests oriented system which they believe will max- over the issue of control over the instruments of imise growth rates and thus in time reduce the power. In the modern world the state thus overall levels of poverty and inequality. becomes the site of struggle. However, the con- We thus have a clear conflict between the lib- sequences of this struggle will be shaped signif- eral view of politics as an instrumental process icantly by the role played by the state. In the designed to influence society only at the mar- first two cases above, the level of conflict gins and the view of the political as part of a

29 Schrire much larger historical mission represented by loss of power, would act, the ANC has nonethe- the ANC. This is compounded by the historical less acted as good democrats. At the national role played by the ANC in the liberation strug- level, the party has played the political game by gle. By definition, a liberation struggle has to the rules: it has accepted the decisions of the be carried out in secrecy and with considerable courts even when the outcomes were unfavour- ruthlessness. It represents, after all, a conspira- able; it has at least tolerated the parliamentary cy designed to overthrow the existing order. No opposition even if it has reduced the traditional revolutionary who did not believe in the power role filled by the ‘official opposition’. Even in of politics to transform human existence or who the , where after the 1999 elec- did not believe that the end justifies the means tion the ANC was excluded from the provincial could be even remotely effective. The ANC, government despite winning the largest vote of historically and into the present, has never per- any party, it has served as the opposition. ceived of itself as a mere political party. It is Even so, the ANC remains ambivalent about more than the instrument of the oppressed – it the concept of legitimate opposition. While it is the embodiment of the national will. recognises the philosophical justifications for Until the fall of , ANC strategists an opposition, it harbours several serious reser- envisaged a protracted armed struggle which vations about the nature of opposition in con- would eventually lead to the fall of white domi- temporary South Africa. First, given its unqual- nation. The ANC leadership was as stunned as ified commitment to ‘transformation’, it main- most observers by the collapse of the Soviet tains that opposition based upon a rejection of Union and the subsequent surrender of power fundamental socio-economic change is not by the National Party (NP). legitimate. It believes that all political parties, The ANC in power then, is torn between its including the opposition, should support the intellect and its emotions and interests. Its key nation-building enterprise. Secondly, it does leaders – as sophisticated observers of the West not accept the legitimacy of opposition parties and intellectual trends in general – are aware of that are based upon the representation of minor- the victory, at least for the present, of ity interests. Given its own self-image as a non- in both its economic and political forms.11 racial organisation, it rejects the democratic Indeed in theory at least many of its leaders are credentials of parties which have, by design or liberals. On the other hand, its historical role in otherwise, a limited multiracial support base. the liberation struggle and the massive To some extent then, the ANC wishes to inequities that characterise South African soci- determine, at least in theory, the nature of its ety, result in a party that is unwilling to accept own opposition. It has a clear view of what a liberal view of politics and the political. This opposition parties should stand for and how expresses itself in its ambivalence towards their support should be structured. If the ANC opposition parties in particular and the idea of could determine its own opposition, its political opposition in general. A clear statement by then rivals would be a mirror of its own self-image. President illustrates this A second critical determinant of the quality ambivalence when he stated that: of a democracy is the conduct of opposition ‘(the opposition parties) have chosen to parties. Several typologies of systems of oppo- propagate a reactionary, dangerous and sitions have been devised which range from opportunistic position which argues that extra-system opposition which seeks – via non- (because) a normal and stable democracy constitutional means – to overthrow the govern- has been achieved ... their legitimate ment, to models of ‘loyal opposition’ in which responsibility is to oppose us as the majori- the legitimacy of the system itself is not in ty party ... (the implication, therefore is that dispute.13 Perhaps surprisingly, given South they have) no responsibility both for our Africa’s recent political history, neither the par- past and present; and consequently that they liamentary nor extra-parliamentary organisa- have a democratic obligation merely to dis- tions dispute the legitimacy of the constitution- credit the ruling party so that they may gain al order. Indeed, even the radical Africanist power after the next elections.’12 parties such as Azapo and the PAC, at least Although we may certainly speculate about within parliament and the formal institutional how an ANC, genuinely threatened with the world, accept as legitimate the constitutional

30 Schrire framework. All political opposition is thus although its influence on government perfor- institutionalised. The key debates revolve mance has been limited. Certainly the dramatic around which interests should be represented growth in the DP’s support since 1994 must be by which party and how this opposition should directly attributed to what it characterised dur- be expressed. ing the 1999 election as its ‘fight back’ cam- All societies are divided to a greater or lesser paign and a public perception that the party is a extent according to economic, ethnic and value tough and fearless critic of the ANC. lines. In contemporary South Africa, all the major players – the ANC, DP, IFP and NNP – 4.2 Cooptive opposition are broadly centrist, at least in theory. The An alternative form of opposition, usually political debates revolve largely around techni- found only in coalitions where no single party cal issues such as the labour relations system, has a parliamentary majority, is the strategy privatisation and law and order. Perhaps sur- adopted by the IFP. While competing fiercely prisingly, the radical and Africanist parties in elections, and clinging to its identity as an have remained marginalised. autonomous political entity, the IFP has joined South African politics is not, therefore, struc- with the ANC in a at both tured around ideology (left-centre-right) or national and provincial levels which has class interests. While the DP is clearly right enabled it to be part of the government and par- leaning, the ANC is a broad church which con- ticipate at the highest levels in policy. Indeed, tains all economic interests within its ranks. Mangosuthu Buthelezi was even Historical ties thus largely determine political offered the deputy presidency by President loyalties. These ties generally coincide with Mbeki after the 1999 election. However, the ethnic membership. Opposition choices will party has lacked either the talent or the will, or thus have important political consequences both, to use its potential leverage effectively. It despite the relatively weak electoral support of has become in effect just another component of all the opposition parties. Each opposition strat- the ANC’s ‘broad church’, at least at the egy will have different consequences for the national level. While party leaders individually stability of the larger polity. have benefited from this strategy, it can be We may distinguish between three broad argued that the party itself has paid a high price opposition strategies: robust, cooptive and for its cooption. Rank and file members of the cooperative: party have been confused by a change in strate- gy which has seen the IFP moving from 4.1 Robust opposition demonising the ANC to entering a coalition Robust opposition represents as much a style of with it and, since 1994, the IFP has also lost politics as it reflects deep-seated policy and most of its non-Zulu support base. Cooperation ideological disagreements. Indeed , in the at the national level has, however, not ended United Kingdom, robust politics continues to the often violent struggle for support at the characterise the relationship between the gov- provincial level. erning party and its opposition despite a remarkable degree of basic consensus on the 4.3 Cooperative opposition key issues. The NNP attempted to develop in many ways In South Africa only the DP has built its the most subtle of strategies, that of cooperative strategy around robust opposition. This opposi- opposition. In essence, this entailed rejecting a tion has, in general, not been based on profound strategy which was based on an almost total philosophical conflicts with the ruling party. rejection of government actions and moderating The thrust of its opposition has been the failure its rhetoric when criticising the government. of the government to move more rapidly in The intention was not to antagonise the ANC areas such as labour market reforms and pri- by robust and frequently intemperate attacks, vatisation. Its most robust attacks have been but to encourage the government to moderate against members of the government itself – for policies which the NNP regards as unwise. incompetence, corruption, and the lack of a Tragically for the NNP, its supporters have sense of urgency. The strategy of the DP has either not understood this strategy or they have been effective in terms of electoral results rejected it. The party has encountered the worst

31 Schrire of both worlds: on the one hand, the ANC has quences. I would argue that had De Klerk taken largely ignored the party while, on the other, his party out of the post-1994 election of the traditional supporters have deserted to the DP Government of National Unity on the grounds in droves, attracted by the more robust style of of the total failure of the ANC to govern effec- criticisms of their traditional ‘enemy’. The cul- tively and adopted a policy of robust opposi- mination of this process was the NNP’s deci- tion, democracy itself would have been endan- sion in mid-2000 to effectively disband and gered. Whites and many coloured voters would merge with the DP in the Democratic Alliance have rallied to the NP, but from a broader per- (DA). spective, this would have reintroduced the race factor into politics explicitly. Foreign investors 4.4 Analysis of strategies of opposition would have taken fright and the country’s econ- In an ideal democracy, where the voters are omy would have been substantially weakened. informed and rational, and ascriptive factors The outcome would have been a stronger NP, a did not resonate, the strategies of opposition weaker economy, and an alienated ANC under parties would be relatively unimportant. The considerable pressure from its own supporters natural rhythm of politics would continue – a to ‘fight back’. In a similar vein, had the IFP period of party rule followed, sooner or later, adopted a robust strategy of opposition, levels by a change in government as a result of of violence and bloodshed, especially in changes in the support base of the parties. KwaZulu-Natal, would have been significantly South Africa, as illustrated above, is not a nor- higher. Given the historical animosities mal democracy for at least two reasons: its his- between the ANC and the IFP, and between tory made a political struggle inevitable and Buthelezi and the United Democratic Front dictated that a new African-oriented govern- (UDM) – which served as an internal surrogate ment would unavoidably see its task as under- for the ANC when it was still banned in the taking a ‘historical mission’. Secondly, whatev- 1980s – the demonisation of their opponents er the future may hold, electoral loyalties still would have been unavoidable. The participa- seem to be largely based upon ethnic and racial tion of the IFP in a national coalition with the factors. If a ruling party has the capacity to ANC has reduced, but not eliminated, levels of destroy a democracy through abusing the power conflict and violence. In contrast, it is likely it derives from control over the instruments of that neither of the other strategic options would the state, then opposition parties in fragile soci- have produced this outcome. eties may have similar power. Even short of The DP was able to benefit from its strategy explicit revolutionary intent, opposition parties of robust opposition for two reasons: first, the may create a dynamic which, whether intended decisions by its principal rivals, the NP and the or not, destroys democracy itself. For example, IFP, not to engage in robust politics after 1994 parties which (either as official strategy or as a created the space for the smaller DP to fill the result of the inability of the party to control the gap. Secondly, precisely because the DP does actions of its supporters) use violence and the not have an ethnic/historical constituency, it is threat of violence to increase their support, can in South African terms far less important than undermine the democratic order. Opposition its smaller opposition rivals. Had the DP been a promises of utopian outcomes may prevent the powerful party representing real interests, its ruling party from adopting key policies which strategy may have had disastrous national con- in time produce unmanageable problems. And sequences. The formation of the DA, intended the politics of ethnic mobilisation, with all its as an interim stage before the full merger of the destructive consequences, are too recent a DP and NNP takes place, therefore has uncer- memory in South Africa to require further elab- tain implications. Irrespective of its liberal and oration. What are the implications of these real- non-racial policies, its support base remains ities for opposition strategies? limited to whites, coloureds and Indians, creat- The core of robust opposition is to oppose ing the perception in some quarters of a racial vigorously the actions of the government. Is it ‘ganging-up’ against Africans. On the other however, a suitable model for South Africa? I hand, the end to the competitive process of would argue that this strategy, generalised to NNP and DP bidding for white and coloured other parties, would have catastrophic conse- votes, with its inevitable subliminal racist over-

32 Schrire tones, will now come to an end. It may now kind of effective opposition likely to emerge become possible for the formerly white opposi- would be either ethnic (for instance, a robust tion to move to the political centre and begin a white/Zulu alliance built around a rejuvenated genuine process of seeking to appeal to the IFP and NP), or the emergence of an effective African community. African/populist alliance. Both would represent What general conclusions follow? Under pre- a real threat to the nascent democratic order. sent circumstances, it is difficult to see how the Only the emergence of a powerful moderate opposition can become more effective and liberal alliance would not be a direct threat to expand its support base. I have argued that democracy, and as our analysis indicates, such South Africa’s fragile democracy would para- a development is highly improbable. doxically be weakened by a stronger opposi- However, the situation is not so grim as this tion. Ethnic conflicts would be an inevitable scenario would indicate. In the contemporary consequence and many would argue that the world of globalisation, other factors exist to ANC, after a titanic struggle for power, would limit state power and create at least some of the play every card in its hand to retain its support conditions conducive to elite accountability.15 base. The race card, and worse, would undoubt- The global factors which limit party policies in edly be brought into play.14 the economic field such as the critical need to Yet is the future of democracy in South encourage foreign investment and retain human Africa inexorably bleak? I would argue not, for capital are well known and do not need to be even if we accept that the ANC will remain in repeated here. In addition, within this context, power for a lengthy period, the prospects are the full range of horizontal and vertical not hopeless. After all, one of the major func- restraints on state power, such as the judiciary, tions of opposition is to ensure government and the various statutory bodies such as the accountability, and perhaps even an opposition public protector and the auditor general, with no immediate prospect of winning power become increasingly important.16 This is not to can play this role. claim that a dominant party would not have the political power to conquer these obstacles, for it 5. ACCOUNTABILITY clearly would, but the cost, from a global per- One of the key values of a democracy is the spective, would be simply too great to make degree to which the rulers are held accountable this a rational strategy. Furthermore, the rule of to the citizenry. Indeed one of the central argu- law is still taken seriously in South Africa. ments for the importance of an opposition is the When an ANC spokesperson recently publi- thesis that power demands the creation of coun- cally criticised the court’s decision to uphold tervailing power if it is not to be abused. An the conviction for theft of the former ANC opposition is a necessary but not sufficient con- Western Cape leader, Rev. Alan Boesak, the dition for democratic accountability. heads of the High Court and the Constitutional From this perspective then, the outlook for Court repudiated this attack. The ANC later South Africa is not promising. The ANC, while accepted that attacks on the integrity of the paying lip service to liberal democracy, places judiciary are unacceptable. In addition, South its highest value on fulfilling its ‘historic mis- Africa is a complex society with a wide range sion’. I do not doubt that it would play the of devices designed to contain state power: the racial card with ruthlessness if its power base provincial powers, the separation of power was threatened. Even if its senior leaders were between the executive and the judiciary, and genuine political liberals, its followers, depen- between the government and the central bank, dent upon the perks of power in a context of and so on. Again, although opposition parties desperate poverty, would not easily follow a may not pose a credible electoral threat to the liberal line, as the events in KwaZulu-Natal ANC, they remain powerful players: in two of indicate. the three key provinces, opposition parties are In many ways then, democracy would be in effective control over the administration; threatened if opposition parties became more one-third of the South African electorate sup- powerful. Firstly, the ANC would react in a ports opposition parties, including most of the way inimical to democracy to protect its ability wealthy and educated; and the parliamentary to fulfil its ‘historic mission’. Secondly, the opposition has the critical mass to have some

33 Schrire influence within the legislature and to link up cal mission’ transcending the politics of detail effectively with the mass media and powerful experienced in a status quo democracy, parties elements of civil society. A future united like the DP view South Africa as a normal soci- DP/NNP, as embodied in the DA, would cer- ety and expect politics to be robust. This in tainly strengthen opposition in parliament and itself creates seeds for conflict. More impor- the provinces, especially the Western Cape. tantly, however, is the fragility of the democrat- ic order. In a country of great poverty, a politi- CONCLUSION cal class has emerged that would lose every- South Africa is not a normal democracy. Given thing if dislodged from power. For the masses the recent past, the miracle is that democracy in who struggled for political rights, often at great any form operates. Without an effective opposi- cost, political views are intensely held and do tion, it is difficult to hold leaders accountable. not include the tolerance which comes from a However accountability, despite its critical legitimate political order. A viable democracy importance, is only one of several key values. is based upon the view that those who disagree In a democracy other values include stability, are rivals and not enemies. South African vot- tolerance and peaceful regulation of conflict. In ers and leaders still have a long way to go in many socio-economic contexts these values this respect. may be in conflict with each other, for instance, The ANC recognises that despite its political robust opposition, while contributing to democ- predominance, it is operating from the base of a ratic accountability, may increase conflicts and weak state that cannot perform even the core levels of intolerance. Thus in unfavourable con- function of law and order effectively. Hence its texts, accountability may to some extent have response, at least under Mandela, was to seek to be traded in favour of other values. In inclusivity. This weakness could equally pro- KwaZulu-Natal, for example, it is clear that the duce a strategy of exclusion of opposition. IFP-ANC coalition decreases accountability Stable democracies are usually based on a and reinforces an elite cartel that is frequently shared vision of the scope of the political in the corrupt and authoritarian. While it would be the context of at least a sense of a common destiny ideal if the viable alternative was an effective if not of shared nationhood. Genuine democrat- opposition and genuine accountability, the ic attitudes, such as tolerance of diversity and indisputable reality is that a less inclusive acceptance of alternative views and interests, administration would be accompanied by high tend to be most prevalent in wealthy and edu- levels of violence and civil unrest. The cated societies and among middle and upper undoubted costs of a less accountable govern- middle socio-economic groups. The poor, while ment are preferable to the actual alternatives frequently paying lip-service to democratic val- available in the real world. ues, are generally less committed to genuine An accountable government does not depend democracy. Opposition is frequently identified solely upon a large opposition party. A strong with the creation of obstacles to delivery and and independent civil society, including a free the protection of illegitimate special interests. press, strong economic association and power- The poor in general are also more susceptible to ful professional organisations can all contribute the lure of ethnic mobilisation although it is the to more accountable government. The existing intellectuals and not the underprivileged who structures of vertical accountability in a context actually formulate ethnic strategies. of globalisation may exercise some influence. The cruel reality in South Africa is that a The contemporary political opposition, while large majority of the population, especially posing no electoral threat to the ANC, may within the African community, is poor and nonetheless in synergy with civil society act to lacking in appropriate education. It is clear, limit the emergence of significant abuses of then, that the context for democracy is not power. favourable nor is the practise of democracy Thus despite the institutional framework of a ideal in South Africa. The ANC is too domi- sophisticated and liberal democratic order, nant electorally: the opposition parties too democracy remains a fragile plant. While the weak. South African society, with its massive ANC, for logical reasons derived from a history inequalities, racial and ethnic sensitivities and of racial exploitation sees its task as a ‘histori- authoritarian legacies, is hardly an ideal

34 Schrire environment for textbook liberal democracy. the democracy it deserves, it may well have the However, although South Africa may not have democracy that it can sustain.

ENDNOTES 1) The literature on democracy is voluminous. B.Guy Peters, Modern Politics, (London: For a useful summary of the key issues, see Macmillan, 2000). J. Arthur, Democracy: Theory and 10) Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Practice, (Andover, Hants: International Since 1945, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, Thomson Publishing Ltd. 1991). 1983); Martin Murray, The Revolution 2) Many of the key arguments are contained Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post- in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.) Apartheid South Africa, (London: Verso Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Press, 1994). Democracy, (Baltimore: The Johns 11) Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and Hopkins University Press, 1994). the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 3) The classic statement remains Anthony 1992). Downs, An Economic Theory of Demo- 12) Quoted in Jack Spence, The 1999 South cracy, (New York: Harper and Row, African General Elections, Government 1957). and Opposition, Vol 34, no 4, pp. 458-459. 4) See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation 13) Marco Rimanelli (ed.) Comparative and Opposition (New Haven: Yale Democratisation and Peaceful Change in University Press, 1971), and Thomas Dye Single-Party-Dominant Countries, (New and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of York: St. Martins Press, 1999). Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to 14) For a theoretical analysis, see Donald American Politics, (Monterey: Brooks/ Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Cole, 1986). (Berkeley: University of Press, 5) Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural 1985), and Alvin Rabuschka and Kenneth Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) Theory of Democratic Stability, (Colum- and Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man, bus: Charles E. Merrill, 1972). An applica- (New York: Doubleday, 1960). tion to South Africa is contained in Donald 6) Robert Mattes and Jessica Piombo, Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Opposition Parties and the Voters in Constitutional Engineering in a Divided South Africa’s 1999 Election, in this Society, (Berkeley: University of California collection. Press, 1991). 7) Eddy Maloka, ‘White’ Political Parties and 15) David Held, Democracy and the Global Democratic Consolidation in South Africa, Order, (Stanford: Stanford University in this collection pp. 95-101 Press), 1995 provides an interesting analy- 8) Most of the key issues are discussed in R. sis of the restraints imposed by globalisa- Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, tion. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974); C. Pierson, 16) See Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marxist Theory and Democratic Politics, Marc Plattner (eds.) The Self-Restraining (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), and J. State: Power and Accountability in New Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Democracies, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Columbia University Press, 1993). Publishers, 1999), for an analysis of inter- 9) Quinton Hogg, quoted in Alan Ball and nal restraints.

35 Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa

Hermann Giliomee, James Myburgh & Lawrence Schlemmer

South Africa has achieved a certain level of respect formal democracy. In today’s South formal democracy in that regular elections are Africa, elections are free and fair, the provi- held and the constitution is unaltered. sions of the constitution are unaltered, the deci- However, the persistence of South Africa’s sions of the courts are upheld and the principles racial voting patterns mean that minorities are of majority choice are applied to the hilt. In marginalised and that, in effect, the ruling recent years, however, the same international party is no longer accountable to the elec- opinion has expressed growing concern about torate. The ruling African National Congress what is called ‘illiberal’ or ‘virtual’ democra- (ANC) has embarked on a radical project of cies that appropriate the rituals of a liberal ‘transforming’ the state and society. This democracy without its substance.2 entails both the elimination of the distinction What that substance is has been more diffi- between party and state, and the attempt to cult to define. In this paper, six interrelated ele- enforce equality of outcomes or ‘demographic ments of a substantive democracy are pro- representivity’ on all institutions in both the posed: public and private sphere. The persistence of • The political system be so structured as to racial division also enables the ruling party to preserve the principle of uncertainty of elec- delegitimise the opposition as ‘racist’ or toral outcomes, implying that no set of politi- ‘defenders of white privilege’, a strategy which cal interests are categorically excluded from further entrenches racial division. bidding for power. ‘The effort to override the constitution and • The vital interests of all political segments destroy the power of the courts to uphold are respected and the majority does not ride the constitution, flows from the conviction roughshod over oppositions and minorities that in racial affairs there is only one cor- on key issues. rect policy.’1 • Minorities and oppositions are not denounc- ed for mobilising on issues vital to them. INTRODUCTION • Key issues are not placed above public debate. The ANC was the driving force among the lib- • There remains a clear and obvious distinction eration movements that opposed apartheid. Its between ruling party and the state. mission, and the condition for the widespread • Political minorities, although not in power, international support it enjoyed in those years, retain sufficient leverage and participation in was its goal of inclusive democracy. As the political decision-making to avoid becoming governing party today it prides itself in being alienated from the system. the standard bearer for democracy, and is anx- It will be argued that a liberal democracy is ious to continue to project this image among under serious threat in South Africa on all these Western opinion-leaders. Thus, it is at pains to scores.

37 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer

1. OPPOSITION AND THE NEED FOR next five years7 suggests that there is little UNCERTAINTY OF ELECTORAL OUTCOMES prospect of a change in government at the next James Madison wrote that a must not election either. It is certainly not being suggest- only guard against the tyranny of the rulers ed that African voters are motivated by crude over the ruled; it must also protect one part of racism, for the appearance of a ‘racial census’ society from the injustice of the other. follows from rather complex processes, which ‘If a majority will be united by a common are outlined in section 6 below. Nonetheless, interest, then the rights of the minority will the outcomes have all the effects of racial soli- be insecure.’ darity in political behaviour. Madison argued that it was only an ‘uncertainty Consequently, after just two elections it can of condition’ – essentially that a minority be said with a fair degree of confidence that the would be able to win over a section of the ruling party suffers none of that ‘uncertainty of majority and turn the tables at the next election condition’ which would lead it to respect the – that would induce a majority party to moder- rights of minorities. In consequence, for as long ate its behaviour in office and protect the inter- as race remains the salient political divide in ests of all.3 This also locks the opposition into South Africa, the white minority is excluded the system and ensures its loyalty. As Alexis de from any share of power. This has prompted Tocqueville noted of (US) several commentators to argue that if the democracy a century-and-a-half ago, all parties Democratic Party (DP) wanted to challenge the were willing to recognise the rights of the ANC, it would have to become a black-led and majority, ‘because they hope to turn those predominantly black opposition. But this miss- rights to their own advantage at some future es the point noted by Alexis de Tocqueville, time’.4 who wrote: Prior to the election of 1994 some white ‘there are certain communities in which the political leaders expected that once the libera- persons who constitute the minority can tion euphoria had spent itself, the outcome of never hope to draw over the majority to elections would become uncertain. Voters their side, because they must then give up would hold the ruling party accountable for any the very point which is at issue between lack of delivery, and class interests rather than them.’8 racial identity would determine voter choice. Despite the non-racial banner the ANC waved Subsequently, some commentators have drawn during the liberation struggle it was quick after comfort from the fact that the 1999 general the 1994 election to call for ‘black unity’, election was more peacefully and professional- emphasising that black South Africans retain a ly conducted than its predecessor and that ‘common interest.’ Furthermore, since 1997, majority voters displayed greater tolerance. the ANC has adopted various racial preference Some even claimed that South Africa has ‘trav- policies that severely prejudice the interests of elled quite far along the road to democratic the white minority and advance the interests of consolidation’.5 a black elite. It has underplayed the widening However, the elections of 1994 and 1999 income differentials within the black popula- were misleading indicators of the state of South tion, and emphasised the continued (relative) African democracy for there was simply no wealth of the white population. In 1998, for prospect that the ANC would lose. Indeed, the instance, President informed only question was by what degree it would South Africans that they were ‘two nations, the increase its share of the vote, and whether it one black and poor and the other white and would gain a two-thirds majority. The well off’.9 More recently, an ANC submission inevitability of the result may well have con- to the Human Rights Commission on Racism in tributed to the peaceful nature of the poll. the Media blamed white racism for continued Furthermore, the ‘racial census’ pattern of vot- black impoverishment. ‘Racist ideology has ing remained largely intact, with the ANC win- been used’ the report argues, ‘to justify and ning over 80% of the black vote.6 The fact that promote the further entrenchment of the unac- in a post election poll 76.8% of black ANC vot- ceptable reality’.10 ers said that they would still vote for the party This racial consolidation, with only the even if it failed to fulfil its promises over the coloured and Indian voters as a ‘swing factor’,

38 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer goes against Madison’s argument that society overthrown, there is no one left to fear, for ‘just should be divided up into ‘so many parts, inter- as before his victory the conqueror had nothing ests and classes’ that the rights of the minority to hope from them, so afterwards he need not would never be under threat from the ‘interest- fear them’. In France, on the other hand, it was ed combinations’ of the majority.11 Because the much easier to invade if you managed to win ANC is guaranteed over 50% of the vote, there over discontented barons. Yet having seized are none of the shifting interest-based coalitions control it is much harder to hold it, for the on the lines of European democracies. As a nobles can neither be satisfied nor destroyed consequence the opposition tends to be periph- and can ally against the victor’s rule.14 eral to the system. The liberal establishment in South Africa, Under these conditions, constraints on the and more particularly the churches, some busi- ANC are very weak. In an October 1996 poll, ness elites, the South African Institute of Race 48% of black voters agreed that they would Relations, some newspaper editors and the DP ‘support and stand by my political party and its (and its predecessors), resembles France. leaders even if I disagree with many of its poli- During the 1980s and early 1990s the ANC was cies’.12 By October 1997 this percentage had always able to win over useful allies among the increased to 59%. Among ANC supporters this English liberal ensemble in the fight against figure rose to 63%.13 While the ANC focuses apartheid. However, these same liberal institu- on voter concerns during the course of the elec- tions have proved to be some of the ANC’s tion campaign, the top leadership is able to most vehement critics now that the latter has govern as it sees fit once the party’s mandate gained power. The ANC has also had difficulty has been renewed. in extending direct control over ‘centres of Further supporting evidence on the limited power’ in the media and the economy which prospects of major opposition gains at the bal- have traditionally been dominated by the lot box is provided in section 6. English establishment. The NP, by contrast, resembles Turkey. The 2. OPPOSITIONS AND MINORITIES: PROTECTING main feature of the political system between VITAL INTERESTS: 1990-1999 1910 and 1994 was the all-pervasive role of the While the first five years of majority rule saw state. It controlled virtually all facets of society the inexorable rise of ANC dominance, they and, by 1990, no distinct white class retained also saw the withering away of the previously the capacity to organise separately to promote dominant National Party (NP) and the rise of its specific interests. This monolithic and hier- the DP to the position of Official Opposition. In archical front was very difficult to overcome, the 1999 election the DP won 9.56% of the but once the ANC had done so, it was very easy vote, and the (New) NP – that won over 20% in to consolidate power. 1994 – was relegated to third position behind As President – from late 1989 until 1994 – the (Zulu-based) Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). NP leader F.W. de Klerk hoped that his party How can the NP collapse be explained? would continue to play a strategic role in a Machievelli drew a distinction between two Government of National Unity (GNU) well kinds of government: that of the Turks, and that beyond a second free election. The assumption, of the French. Turkey was a highly centralised and it is not one that should be easily dis- and hierarchical state with all power and missed, was that a stable, semi-permanent GNU authority concentrated in the ruler. In France, would unleash the energies of all South on the other hand, the King was surrounded by Africa’s peoples better than any other system. powerful nobles who had their own preroga- But this hope rested on a misconception. It was tives and followings. Machievelli wrote that it assumed that the new state could not function was much harder to win control over the without the cooperation of sectors like the Turkish Empire, ‘but once it has been accom- white civil servants, the white security forces plished, it can be held with ease’. The reason and the business class, and that these classes was that in a state such as that of the Turks ‘one would insist on the NP remaining part of the cannot hope to forward the enterprise by the cabinet to protect their interests. This did not rebellion of those who are near to the ruler’. happen. These classes were poorly organised as Yet once the latter and his family have been potential power bases, and the ANC quickly

39 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer bought off civil servants with severance pack- formed to rule out any danger of armed rebel- ages and by guaranteeing pensions. It won busi- lion, it first squeezed the Council financially ness over to a position of neutrality and avoid- before disbanding it in 1999. The ANC had ance of conflict by firmly committing itself to managed to emasculate the white separatists at respecting property rights and to a liberal fiscal the cost of a mere R15 million! Then, in the and monetary policy.15 early months of 2000, it moved ahead on the The fortunes of the NP after 1994 were heav- establishment of the Commission to protect the ily invested in the negotiated transition. This rights of cultural, religious and linguistic com- hope was soon dashed. Through a psychologi- munities. However, the draft legislation is a cal war by proxy, waged through the establish- strange document, for it makes no provision for ment of a Truth and Reconciliation any rights that the proposed Commission is Commission (TRC), the ANC destroyed the supposed to protect. NP’s claim to moral legitimacy as the co- The key minority rights issue is the wide- founder of the new system. It was thereby able spread perception among speakers to consolidate power rapidly and bypass the that the ANC is intent on drastically scaling various checks and balances of the negotiated down on Afrikaans – along with the African transition easily. The more the ANC was able marginalised languages – as a language of gov- to extend its power, the more it seemed, to ernment and administration. Protests from white voters at least, that the NP had negotiated Afrikaans organisations prompted (then) a surrender rather than an honourable compro- Deputy President Mbeki to announce in March mise. 1999 the establishment of a ‘language mecha- There were two reasons why the IFP, based nism’ in the President’s Office, to investigate largely on traditional Zulu voters, was able to any changes in the policy of the public sector secure a continuing role where the NP failed. with a view to possible violations of language Firstly, IFP supporters exhibited extremely high rights before they are introduced. Fifteen levels of loyalty to the party and to its leader, months later, there was still no ‘language mech- Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Although the ANC anism’, despite a decision by the Pan South brought the IFP into government, they were African Language Board – a statutory body, unable to steal the party’s constituency. The that several public institutions, including the NP, on the other hand, proved unable or unwill- electricity parastatal, , and the ing to aggressively defend their supporters’ Department of Public Works – to introduce interests within government or mobilise them English-only policies that were unconstitution- outside of it. al.16 The main right wing opposition, organised by Meanwhile, the Department of Justice is General , all but collapsed pressing ahead with an attempt to turn English between the elections of 1994 and 1999. The into the sole language of record in the courts. In ANC secured the cooperation of Viljoen and May 2000, Judges Buys and Majiedt of the his followers through introducing two clauses Supreme Court declared a sen- in the constitution. Article 185 envisages the tence of a lower court unconstitutional. The establishment of a Commission for the legal assistant provided by the Department Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious could only understand English while the and Linguistic Communities, while article 235 accused could only understand Afrikaans. The underwrites the right of self-determination of Supreme Court judgement pointed out that any community sharing a common cultural and Afrikaans was the first language of 72% of the language heritage. The clauses differ sharply province, against less than two per cent for from the Bill of Rights that recognises only whom English was the first language.17 individual rights. The ineffectuality of protests of Afrikaans The ANC was probably never serious about speakers and the white minority in general have either of these two clauses. It set up a surprised many observers. There are several Council, comprised of Viljoen’s followers, to reasons for the muted protests. As in the case of investigate the feasibility of an Afrikaner ethnic the Chinese of Malaysia, talented members of state. However, once the ANC felt confident the white minority make ready use of the that the security forces were sufficiently trans- escape hatch of emigration. Second, the ANC

40 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer does not need to win the vote of the white placed to influence the agenda of transforma- minority and can treat it with indifference or tion in favour of the privileged classes’. This contempt. Third, those (younger) members of enabled those ‘fundamentally opposed to the white minority who have decided to remain change to mobilise against it’ and meant that in South Africa have an uncertain future in the ‘capacity of the democratic movement was view of new affirmative action legislation. in many respects circumscribed’.21 The argu- Finding or retaining a job has become a priori- ment was that the ‘mainly white opposition par- ty. Further, with few exceptions, the press has ties’ were propagating a ‘reactionary, danger- not criticised the ANC’s project of transforma- ous and opportunistic position’ which would tion and most Afrikaans newspapers have failed see them exploiting their role as a loyal opposi- to support minority rights, advising Afrikaners tion to discredit and displace the ANC in power to rely only on individual rights. In South at the next election.22 Africa the dictum about the pen being mightier The ideas propagated by the ANC at than the sword has been transformed into the Mafikeng would subsequently come to domi- pension is mightier than the sword. nate South African political discourse. As one All this suggests that the vital occupational commentator wrote at the time: ‘The key to and cultural interests of the non-African understanding the mood and ideas that domi- minorities are under severe threat. In this sense, nated Mafikeng 1997 lies in “the goal of trans- the new democracy is working mainly for the formation”, a formula which was used in racially defined majority. almost every speech.’ He noted that ‘transfor- mation’ was not only a ‘term without content’ 3. TRANSFORMATION AND MINORITIES: but also ‘an indefinable moral end, reminiscent ATTACKS ON THE LEGITIMACY OF OPPOSITION of communism, and one which serves a similar The watershed for South Africa’s democracy purpose. It justifies the retention of an organisa- was the ANC’s 50th National Conference in tional form espoused most notably by V.I. Mafikeng, December 1997. Since there was Lenin – vanguardism. Essentially, present liber- very little prospect of counter-revolution, the ty is traded off against the prospects of a future ANC was able to articulate a vision which was Utopia’.23 unfettered by the need to conciliate minorities. Although ‘transformation’ dominated ANC This received its clearest expression via the rhetoric after Mafikeng, party leaders refrained adoption by the Conference of a document, from defining the word, preferring to keep it as Strategy and Tactics,18 which presents a a vague and desirable moral end. Yet over time Manichean vision of a South African society two meanings of the word have emerged. In divided between the ‘motive forces of transfor- public statements, the ANC leadership have mation’ and the ‘forces against change.’ The generally referred to transformation, either ‘main motive forces of change’ are the African explicitly or implicitly, in racial terms. In terms majority, and the members of the minorities of the policy of ‘demographic representivity’ who support the ANC.19 Opposing transforma- all institutions in society, at all levels, must be tion are the ‘forces which benefited from the ‘transformed’ until they reflect the precise system of apartheid,’ constituted by the former racial composition of the society as a whole. white rulers and their ‘black appendages.’ The The ANC argues that as a product of apartheid ‘overriding aim’ of the white minority, the doc- and colonialism the existing racial imbalances ument argues, is to ‘derail or reverse change so are immoral. It therefore sees itself as justified as to end up with a system in which the social in taking all necessary steps, including reintro- privileges of apartheid are retained in a some- ducing race classification and racial discrimina- what modified form.’20 tion, to achieve an equality of outcomes. Strategy and Tactics states that on coming to Achieving this end justifies the reintroduction power, the ANC was faced with a situation of a whole panoply of racial laws and differen- where ‘the majority of public servants, espe- tial privileges. cially at senior level, the captains of industry, Transformation of the personnel structure of and editorial rooms in most of the media shared both the public and private sectors (in the latter the perspectives of the former government or case in companies with more than 50 employ- its white opposition ... all of them strategically ees) is a truly radical project. The white minori-

41 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer ty in South Africa never anticipated something all controversy over the ruling party’s actions, that would threaten their career prospects so even as it shifted away from non-racism and drastically. In major respects the legislation liberal democracy. Furthermore, when the ANC contains qualifications in deference to skills- began labelling critics as ‘racist’ or as racially availability that soften it. Because of the lever- disloyal they largely succeeded in silencing dis- age of state contracts, however, the private sec- sent and narrowing the boundaries of debate. tor will be at pains to be seen to be implement- ing its provisions as generously as possible. It 4. PLACING ISSUES ABOVE PUBLIC DEBATE appears to be modelled on affirmative action Alexis De Tocqueville wrote that in a democra- legislation in both the US and Malaysia, yet cy ‘the majority possesses a power which is with the difference that the legislation is being physical and moral at the same time; it acts introduced in South Africa in a shrinking job upon the will as well as upon the actions of market. Although the constitution outlaws men, and it represses not only all contest but all racial discrimination, protection against ‘unfair controversy’.26 discrimination’ is withheld from whites until The ANC has largely succeeded in placing the correct proportions have been achieved. ‘transformation’ outside the boundaries of ‘White privilege’ is defined as the ‘over repre- acceptable political debate. By doing so, it has sentation’ of whites in the professions and managed to suppress controversy over the higher reaches of the civil service, economy extension of party control, while its push to and the media’.24 What this overlooks is the transform the state is justified, disguised, and fact that representivity bears no relation to lev- facilitated by, racial transformation. Without els of educational achievement, vocational the abolition of merit as the overriding criteria skills and experience. in state appointments, the ANC would be Meanwhile, the other goal of transformation unable to appoint party members (whenever is the extension of party control. One ANC they wished) to key positions. document stated that: By arguing that ‘mainly white’ institutions ‘transformation of the state entails, first and are products of apartheid and motivated by foremost, extending the power of the racism, the ANC is therefore able to undermine National Liberation Movement (NLM) over the legitimacy of institutions that provide a all levers of power: the army, the police, the check on its power. bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the Yet why has the ANC embarked on such a judiciary, parastatals, and agencies such as radical and exclusionary project? The answer regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, lies more within the party and its Leninist and the central bank and so on.’25 liberation movement heritage than in electoral There is undoubtedly a confluence between dynamics. The fact that there was, following these two definitions in that in order to achieve 1994, little prospect of the ANC losing power ‘transformation’, the ANC argues its need to exaggerated the importance of internal party strengthen its grip on the levers of power. interests and undermined its accountability to Racial criteria have therefore facilitated – and the voters. Furthermore, as the electorate could are viewed as providing legitimacy for – the be taken for granted, the party now elected a appointment of ANC members to key positions leader who was best able to advance their cor- in the state. Implementing ‘representivity’ is porate interests; and subsequently, the ANC therefore not only a yardstick for measuring nomenclature and the elite networks around the transformation, but also a way of reducing the party have been the main beneficiaries of affir- dominance of institutions by a white minority mative action and black empowerment. seen as hostile and opposed to change. Such policies allow the party leadership to In 1994 the authority of the state and the place loyalists in key positions, and at the same authority of the majority were united for the time compensate those who have lost out in first time. As the party that had come to sym- internal power struggles, through redeployment bolise the anti-apartheid struggle and with a to comfortable but less strategic posts. Mean- massive democratic mandate, the ANC pos- while, the ANC’s shift towards an Africanist sessed a formidable moral power. This sapped discourse has facilitated rapprochement with the will of civil society and suppressed almost the IFP, and enabled it to co-opt (through racial

42 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer patronage) the emergent black (upper) middle that can be mobilised, but only racial privileges class. and racist beliefs. Thus opposition within the The more it strengthens its hold on the levers existing constitutional framework is regarded of power, so its reasoning goes, the more it as being illegitimate. An ANC document enti- should be able to effect transformation. Yet as tled Accelerating the Pace of Change states that the white minority loses its power, the ANC opposition by the ‘forces who benefited from has begun reinventing racial oppression and apartheid’ to transformation took such forms claiming that the white minority is conspiring as: the mobilisation of ‘mainly white’ civil to hold back black advancement. Since 1997 society; ‘sabotage of programmes within the the ANC has repeatedly made the claim that civil service’; the withholding of funds by busi- critics of the government and of affirmative ness for housing projects; ‘painting a gloomy action are motivated by a belief in black inferi- picture of the country’; and attempts by ‘their ority. political parties’ to ‘block or delay legislation This argument received its most extreme for- and policies in parliament’.29 mulation in a recent ANC submission to the Underlying this approach is the ANC’s deep Human Rights Commission on Racism in the belief in its own virtue. Accelerating the Pace Media. The ANC claimed that ‘white South of Change states boldly that the ANC ‘remains African society’ continues to believe in racist the most important moral voice on almost any stereotypes. The statement claimed that criti- question facing the country’.30 The ANC is also cism of the ANC, and of Mbeki in particular, the only party able to correctly discern and was motivated by unashamed racism. advance the interests of the black majority. ‘Regardless of everything we have done to Mbeki has described the ANC as the ‘only discourage the propagation of falsehoods political instrument that the masses of our peo- about our leadership, the media has pro- ple have in their hands’.31 Although the ANC ceeded “full steam ahead” to do its best, makes much of the illegitimacy of minority- relying on outright lies, to project the repul- based opposition, any successful attempt to win sive and terrifying stereotype of the African over majority black votes would be seen as barbarian.’ counter-revolutionary. Strategy and Tactics The ANC also asserted that black journalists states that if the ‘counter-revolutionary’ forces who are critical of the government have succeed in disorganising, weakening and ‘absorbed into their consciousness the white destroying the ANC, then ‘the masses of the stereotype of the black savage’.27 Even if South people [would] be left leaderless and rudder- African history has understandably produced a less, and thus open to manipulation against high degree of racial sensitivity on the part of their own interests’.32 African elites, the effect of such statements on the courage of newspaper editors to exercise 5. ELIMINATING INTRA-PARTY OPPOSITION AND their press freedom could be devastating. BLURRING THE PARTY–STATE DIVIDE Similar reasoning was employed by the then The ANC aims not only at delegitimising the Minister of Justice, , in the debate white opposition, but also at eliminating any in parliament around the report of the TRC. concentrations of power within the party that The ‘white political parties’, he argued, should may challenge the leadership. Strategy and be ‘grateful’ that they were permitted to partici- Tactics stated that the ANC should ‘continu- pate in the new democratic order ‘without ously improve its capacity and skill to wield recriminations’, despite the fact that their hands and transform the instruments of power’. In had for decades ‘been dripping with the blood order to do so, the ANC needed a ‘cadre policy and tears of millions of victims’.28 Within the ensuring that it plays a leading role in all cen- debate, the ANC drew no distinction between tres of power.’ ANC members should be bound the apartheid government and the liberal oppo- by the doctrine of democratic centralism: the sition, or between those parties then and now. party leadership should ‘exercise maximum They were all collectively guilty. discipline among its members, and ensure that, The bottom line is that the ANC does not after ideas have been exchanged and decisions regard opposition parties and opposition voters taken, all its structures and members pursue the as having legitimate interests and grievances same goal’. All ANC members would remain

43 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer under the direction of the central party struc- the listing of ANC cadres, their relevant skills, tures ‘irrespective of the many and varied sec- and the positions available for deployment tors in which cadres are deployed’. within the state and parastatals.36 The National Conference reaffirmed democ- This centralisation of power has allowed the ratic centralism as a guiding principle and ANC to effectively close down dissent within altered the party constitution to place all ANC the party. Indeed, the main reason why the structures ‘including national, provincial and ANC’s alliance partner, the Congress of South local government caucuses’ under the supervi- African Trade Unions (Cosatu), is still able to sion and direction of the National Executive challenge government is that its senior office Committee. The National Working Committee bearers are not appointed by the party leader- (NWC) was given the power to ensure that ship, cannot be re-deployed, and are able to ‘provinces, regions, branches and all other mobilise a powerful constituency. However, the ANC structures such as parliamentary caucuses policy has effectively marginalised parliament. carry out the decisions of the ANC’.33 The The ANC caucus in parliament has very little Conference also passed a resolution on Cadre autonomy, it does not appoint its own office Policy, mandating the party leadership to: iden- bearers, and is obliged to implement the deci- tify ‘key centres of power’ for deployment; sions of the party leadership. Following the draw up a comprehensive deployment policy 1999 election the ANC NWC appointed all and strategy; establish committees at national, speakers of parliament, heads of committees provincial and local government level to over- and ANC whips.37 see the deployment process and ensure that In terms of the principle of democratic cen- party members remained accountable after tralism once the party leadership has issued a deployment.34 directive, ANC members of parliament (MPs) Meanwhile, following Mafikeng, the ANC are obliged to defend and implement that deci- leadership has also set out to extend party con- sion. They therefore cannot exercise their con- trol over the state, thereby blurring the distinc- stitutional obligation to hold the executive to tion between the two, and effectively emascu- account. lating parliament’s ability to hold the executive Meanwhile, any constitutional devolution of to account. powers to the second and third tiers of govern- In well functioning democracies opposition ment have been effectively reversed by the fact parties rely heavily on an impartial and profes- that the ANC leadership appoints the premiers sional civil service as well as on a clear distinc- of each ANC controlled province, and will tion between ruling party and state. Although appoint each executive mayor following the the ANC started making party political appoint- local government elections this year. ments to the civil service from 1994, following The blurring of party and state further Mafikeng the ANC began extending the scope entrenches ANC dominance. The massive dis- of these to independent statutory bodies and parity in election funds between the ruling local government administration. Senior ANC party and the opposition and party control of politicians were deployed to head most state the public broadcaster makes it far more diffi- institutions including the Reserve Bank, the cult for opposition parties to put their message prosecution service, the government informa- across. By the time the voters turn against the tion service, the revenue service, and so on. In ANC, a ‘new class’ will have been established terms of the ANC constitution, and the princi- in the upper echelons of the state, whose privi- ple of democratic centralism, these appointees lege, position and immunity from prosecution would continue to be informed by and account- are all dependent on the ruling party remaining able to the party leadership.35 in power. The means by which the party leadership The ANC policies of democratic centralism ensures discipline is precisely by controlling and cadre deployment have created what appointments to positions within the party, pub- Hannah Arendt described as a dual authority:38 lic service, parastatals and statutory bodies. Ostensible, authority resides in the constitution, Deployment Committees have been established parliament and cabinet, but real authority re- at all levels of government, whilst a Cadre sides in the party. Real decision making occurs Policy and Deployment Strategy provides for outside of formal constitutional structures such

44 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer as parliament and is instead conducted behind vation and sense of effectiveness of minorities the closed doors of party forums. lies in the possibility of opposition gains in What is most striking about the ANC’s policy elections. This aspect has already been covered of eliminating the distinction between party and in respect of the accountability of the governing state is how little controversy it has provoked party, but it is also relevant to the potential for and how ineffectual constitutional constraints the alienation and demotivation of minority have proven. Although evidence of a formal voters. ANC policy of extending control over the levers There is an assumption among prominent of power only emerged after the 1999 election, members of the governing party that any claims the press were generally indifferent to (or sup- by the white minority to equal status participa- portive of) the appointment of senior ANC tion in the society are nullified by the history of politicians to state institutions. Out of a fear of apartheid. But this assumption is found not only being labelled racist, white guilt, or a sense of in the ANC. The prominent sociologist, Heribert racial solidarity, many commentators supported Adam, in concert with many other less well- these appointments and accepted the ANC’s grounded commentators, has also argued that bland assurances of impartiality at face value. given the sentiments of the African electorate at Hence the ANC has wielded its formidable large, it is remarkable that whites have not been moral power derived from both racial restitu- victimised and that the present outcome is fairly tion and the democratic mandate to sap the will benign and a tribute to the reconciliatory spirit of civil society. As De Tocqueville writes: of the new political elite. Adam’s argument is ‘Within these barriers (of moral imperial- that it is the ‘ANC’s “historical role” both to ism) an author may write whatever he represent and control the poor black majority’. pleases, but he will repent it if he ever steps According to this perspective, South Africa’s beyond them. Not that he is exposed to the stability and the interests of minorities are terrors of an auto-de-fe, but he is tormented threatened more by the potential of dissatisfied by the slights and persecutions of daily masses of poor black voters than by ANC domi- obloquy. His political career is closed for nance.40 This argument comes down to the view ever, since he has offended the only authori- that the ANC is the best protector the minorities ty which is able to promote his success. He can wish for. It amounts to saying that the loss yields at length, oppressed by the daily of political status of whites is a trade-off for efforts he has been making, and he subsides their own security. into silence, as if he was tormented by As evidence, the fact is cited that the govern- remorse for having spoken the truth.’39 ment has gone against popular sentiment in for- mulating its macroeconomic policy, that the 6. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE PARTY SYSTEM extent of affirmative action and state-supported AND MINORITY ALIENATION restitution is still remarkably mild, and that the One of the most fundamental principles of white-dominated private sector has been democracy is that it should attempt to represent remarkably well accommodated. everybody, and therefore the principle of The question arises, however, as to whether majority preference must always be accompa- ANC protection of capitalist interests has not nied, as far as possible, by the principle of been necessary for the promotion of the inter- minority inclusion. This is one of the central ests of the new black elite. In contrast, the dilemmas in all democracies and is always effects of the massive racial manipulation of problematic. the labour market will only be tested once all It has been indicated previously that many the affirmative action legislation is implement- of the general value systems with which lobbies ed over time, and it seems inherently unlikely can associate their interests (e.g. ‘merit’ or the that members of the white minority will feel right to full expression of talents, etc.) have to a protected by the ANC in longer term. Some large extent been usurped, dislodged or reduced will even argue that, in view of what has hap- in their scope by the principle of racial transfor- pened in Zimbabwe, it will rather be the black mation. Hence lobbies are most effective if they poor that will ultimately protect minority inter- are compatible with a transformatory ethic. ests, not the ANC party elite and the black Nonetheless, the most salient basis for the moti- bourgeoisie.41

45 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer

The main question, however, is whether the Table 2: Most important reasons for support- ANC-led government has actually ‘held-off’ ing a political party in the previous elections. popular expectations in order to provide reas- National results, February 2000 surance to minorities. In a national opinion sur- vey in February 2000,42 the authors posed ques- Reasons Africans Whites tions about motivations for party support. In (n1343) (n418) response to an open-ended question on two General party appeal: main reasons for supporting any party in elec- size, popularity tions, African and white respondents replied as approval and follows: identification 20% 13% Better life for all 19% 6% Table 1: Two main reasons for supporting a Party leadership 10% 10% political party in elections. National results, Rights and non-discrimination 8% 5% February 2000 Exercise power, influence 4% 4% Services/infrastructure 4% – Reasons Africans Whites ‘Freedom’ 3% – (n1343) (n418) Effective opposition, express disapproval of govt. 3% 18% Job creation 57% 27% Moral values 2% 6% Crime and corruption 35% 49% Peace and reconciliation 1% 1% Economic development 22% 33% Language, culture, ethnic Services and facilities 16% 11% interests 1% 2% Educational standards 13% 9% Party helped with ID docs 4% 3% Nation building and unity 12% 16% Other diverse 5% 1% Ethnic self determination, Did not vote 13% 33% rights or protection 11% 12% Lower taxes 9% 10% Equality, non-discrimination 9% 7% whether or not they want forced racial redistrib- Effectiveness of government 5% 10% ution, another answer may be obtained, but Moral standards 4% 11% when they are allowed to express their voting Environment 3% 2% motivations spontaneously there is little evi- To unite opposition – 1% dence of pent-up demands for redistribution or DK 3% 4% for the punishment of whites. The suggestion that the ANC is holding back a tide of anger or Note: The two answers are summed, hence per- demand for retribution is a construction of the centages exceed 100%. Results are provided only for Africans and whites in order to provide media and perhaps of political leaders them- the maximum contrast, but the results for selves. ‘coloureds’ and Indians are available on Nonetheless, the results do point to one less inspection. ‘constructive’ aspect of current politics, this being the indication from Table 2 that a high To these findings we may add the results of a proportion of whites appear to be withdrawing similar question in the same survey on why the from politics (33% as compared with 13% respondents voted for the party they did in the among Africans) – a consequence, perhaps, of 1999 elections. (See Table 2.) the alienation under discussion. Review of these results suggests a remark- One of the more salient suggestions put for- ably similar motivational pattern among ward by observers is that opposition parties Africans and whites. The differences between (notably the DP) which take a tough stand on them are significant and understandable but the issues of governance are fundamentally moti- differences do not override a basic convergence vated by either racism or a refusal to accept the in terms of motivations. The main conclusion assumed inevitabilities of majority rule. For that needs to be highlighted, however, is the instance, Steven Friedman has recently claimed lack – in their spontaneous answers – of any that whites, other racial minorities and African urgent demand for retribution, redistribution or supporters of the DP see the latter’s strenuous penalisation of whites among African voters. If opposition as an ‘assault on post-apartheid Africans are asked in a structured question South Africa’.43

46 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer

In so doing he is confirming and perhaps of the African voters, and rather more whites, even endorsing limits of political correctness to attach a racial tag to the opposition. Even if the opposition politics: six per cent that suggested more interaction ‘The eclipse of the black opposition and the with poor communities and the 12% mention- confinement of its white counterpart to a ing campaigning in black areas were added, racial ghetto largely of its own making have there is still no majority which could be aligned in this view created a wide consensus on with the notion of opposition as a racial ghetto. what needs to be done; it is now the task of These results add to the earlier discussion the ANC to do it ... to “deliver” by central- about the principle of electoral uncertainty. ising government authority and func- While it is necessary to be very circumspect tions.’44 when predicting how voting patterns in the Even if not intended, this type of analysis future will develop, the survey results indicate endorses the baleful strategies adopted by the that there will not be a large swing to the oppo- ANC at its 1997 conference. sition by black voters in the near future. Firstly, Yet what does the African electorate really quite aside from constructions it places on its think? In the national survey referred to above, supporters’ motivations in order to make whites the voters were asked open questions as to why nervous and marginalise the opposition, the they thought the DP had increased its strength. ANC has correctly assessed the sentiments of The results are given in Table 3. its supporters. The slogan it used in the last If the overwhelming view of the African elections ‘A better life for all’ was mentioned electorate was that the DP had adopted racist by nearly 20% of African voters in the results policies in order to consolidate the white vote, in Table 2, and it even crept into opposition then here was an opportunity to say it. voter terminology. The ANC is more than like- Ironically, rather more white voters thought this ly to be able to capture the sentiments of voters than African voters. Only three per cent of for a good few elections yet. Voters are moti- African voters offer this explanation (although vated by hope as well as expectations, and the rather more, 7–8%, among the emerging elite ANC certainly covers the aspect of hope. living in white suburbs or holding white collar There is yet another reason why dramatic jobs, who read political comment). shifts seem unlikely to occur. This is the phe- Respondents were also asked for their spon- taneous suggestions as to what the current Table 4: Voter suggestions as to how the opposition parties should do to attract more opposition parties should attract more support. The results appear in Table 4. African support Here again we see that only some six per cent Suggestions Africans Whites Table 3: Spontaneous reasons given as to why (n1343) (n418) the DP had improved its performance in the 1999 elections Less white/less racist 6% 9% Interact poor communities 6% 3% Reasons Africans Whites Keep promises of delivery/ (n1343) (n418) performance 16% 13% Canvass black areas 12% 8% Good organisation Solutions to problems 7% 7% and communication 22% 34% Unite opposition parties 4% 17% Non-discrimination/ Address crime 3% 3% non racial platform 17% 8% Stronger opposition 3% 4% Policy proposals: general 11% 22% Display expertise 3% 4% Addresses supporters needs 6% 3% Attention to jobs 2% 2% Protest regarding standards of Better leadership 1% 1% governance 4% 6% Address ethnic concerns – 1% Policies on employment 1% – Other 1% 1% Modern and up to date 1% 1% Task is hopeless 3% 1% Racist or white bias 3% 4% Don’t know, not interested Don’t know/not thought 33% 22% in politics 22% 28%

47 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer nomenon of ‘bonding’ between voters and their to resolve, or to integrate class conflict, party. It is not necessarily more significant even in political systems that are not partic- among Africans than it is among whites or ularly wealthy. But the problems derived other minorities, but some signs of this can be from ethnic, linguistic, cultural and reli- seen in the results in Table 2, in which 20% of gious heterogeneity are different and we Africans and 13% of whites say that they sup- have to turn to modifying the majority in ported their party because of generalised identi- ways that are, from a democratic point of fication and approval. All this suggests that it view, very dubious.’45 may take a long time for one-party dominance Perhaps the advisors to the negotiators of South of South African politics to be tempered. Africa’s new democracy should have given Yet there is one factor, which may lengthen more serious consideration to balancing the that time even more than this analysis suggests. numerical principle with more substantial pro- This is the racial factor. The ANC, whether by visions for the incorporation of minority inter- design or a happy coincidence of features, has ests than they did. perfected a code in responding to the issue of Because the negotiations occurred within a race. It starts off from the position of non- loose and uneasy consensus that the racial cate- racism, and it then qualifies this with a commit- gorisations of apartheid were an illegitimate ment to closing racial gaps in order to achieve a basis for constitutional provisions, the ‘modifi- legitimate basis for non-racism, and from there cation’ of the majoritarian principle by way of it proposes a range of race-based affirmative consociational provisions (i.e. the representa- and empowerment policies to give effect to tion and incorporation of ethnic or racial groups this. In the latter aspect it is able to assure its as such) was effectively ruled out. Perhaps African or black supporters that, while non- other ways of building in checks and balances racial, it is ‘on their side’. This image is further should have been explored by minority negotia- reinforced by the symbolism of what Thabo tors. These, for example, may have included a Mbeki has referred to as the African Renais- second chamber approximating to the US sance and the regular (and justified) references Senate, with senators elected within districts to the pernicious effects of colonialism. Among defined to give adequate voice or influence to Africans in particular, the party is seen as a minority interests. It is not necessary to identify vehicle for the restoration of dignity and self races or ethnic groups as such, as for instance it worth. This too is likely to reinforce party loy- might have been possible to allow for a judi- alty even where ‘delivery’ is lacking. cious over-representation of highly heteroge- What is suggested by all this, therefore, is neous urban areas and of regions of atypical that the quality of South Africa’s democracy, as composition but low population density (like tested against the ideal of bounded uncertainty, the Northern Cape). is likely to be rather limited for a long time to The inclusion in the senate of institutional come. Furthermore, the fact that rather few representatives (business, labour, civil society black voters are likely to gravitate to the oppo- organisations and religious institutions) might sition, will incorrectly, but plausibly, also sup- also have been considered. Such provisions port the ANC’s rationalisations for the margin- would have had the effect of countering the alisation and demotivation of minority voters. centralism and the dangers of minority alien- ation in the present dispensation to some extent, CONCLUSION thereby enhancing the countervailing leverage It has to be concluded that apartheid, in its col- of opposition in general without entrenching lapse, spawned the democracy it deserved. The racial polarisation. democratic process in the new South Africa has The possibility of any form of minority over- achieved majority legitimacy but at the cost of representation in South Africa immediately minority alienation, and with it a drain of skills raises the legitimate concern that the voters and capital that has an adverse impact on whose poverty justifies the greatest possible investor confidence. political influence – the black majority – would After a review of the effectiveness of democ- be at a relative disadvantage. At the same time, racy in eight nations, Juan Linz concluded that: however, a system that achieves a reasonable ‘Democracy serves very well to paper over, balance in the articulation and exercise of inter-

48 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer ests would be better positioned to improve ly turned out to be the promotion of a new mid- investor confidence and economic growth. It dle class and political elite. If income inequality cannot simply be assumed without justification continues to deepen, the ability of the ANC to that the poor black majority is best served by govern on its own may eventually be at issue. majoritarian hegemony. Between 1991 and Perhaps a time will come, therefore, when 1996 the household incomes of the poorest South Africans will be able to revisit their con- 40% of Africans fell in real terms by some 17% stitution. while those of the richest 10% rose to almost Political scientists and constitutional lawyers the same extent. 46 would do well to anticipate the challenges that Substantially because of the impact of the this will present to their disciplines and take the policies debated above on the economy, the lessons to be learnt in South Africa’s current new dispensation in South Africa has effective- phase very seriously.

ENDNOTES

1) C.W. de Kiewiet, The Anatomy of South Council of Provinces, (Cape Town: African Misery, (London: Oxford Government Printers, 1998), Col. 2892. University Press, 1956) p. 65. 10) African National Congress, Statement of 2) Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal the ANC at the Human Rights Commis- Democracy, Foreign Affairs, 76. 1997, sion Hearings on Racism in the Media: 5 pp.22-43. See also the contributions by April 2000, p. 16. Larry Diamond and Richard Joseph in 11) James Madison, The Federalist, p. 358. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner eds., 12) R.W. Johnson, The South African Democratisation in Africa (Baltimore: Electorate at Mid-Term, Focus Letter Johns Hopkins University Press), 1999. No.6 February 1997, p. 9. 3) James Madison, 51. Checks and Balances, 13) Lawrence Schlemmer, Where the parties The Federalist, (Cambridge, Massachu- stand now, Focus 10 April 1998, p. 27. setts: Press), 1961 pp. 14) Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, 357-358 (London: Penguin, 1995) pp. 14-16. 4) Ibid. 15) Hermann Giliomee, Surrender without 5) Tom Lodge, Consolidating Democracy: defeat, South African Institute of Race South Africa’s Second Popular Election, Relations Spotlight, 2/97. November 1997. (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of South 16) Die Burger, 31 May 2000, Mbeki kom Africa and Witwatersrand University belofte oor taalregte nie na. Press, 1999), p.210. 17) State versus Raymond Pienaar, Northern 6) R.W. Johnson and L. Schlemmer, Cape Supreme Court, Hersieningsaak, Launching Democracy, (London: Yale 77/00. University Press) chapter 4. 18) Strategy and Tactics: As amended at the 7) R.W. Johnson, How to use that huge 50th National Conference, December majority, Focus 16 November 1999, p. 34. 1997, (Johannesburg: www.anc.org.za). 8) Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in 19) Ibid. America Vol II, (London: Saunders and 120 Ibid. Otley, 1838), p. 80. 21) Ibid. 9) South Africa, Debates in the National 22) Nelson Mandela, Report by the President

49 Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer

of the ANC to the 50th National ument, All Power to the Party: The ANC’s Conference of the African National programme to eliminate the distinction Congress, 16 December 1997. between party and state and extend its 23) David Christianson, Ready to govern, hegemony over civil society, March 2000. Focus, 9 January 1998. 36) Umrabulo No. 6 Third Quarter 1999. 24) Nelson Mandela, Report by the President 37) ANC Annual Report 1999 (Johannesburg: of the ANC to the 50th National www.anc.org.za) see section on National Conference of the African National Working Committee. Congress. 38) Hannah Arendt, On Totalitarianism, 25) The State, Property Relations and Social (London: Secker & Warburg, 1951) p. 395 Transformation, Umrabulo No.5, 3rd 39) Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in Quarter 1998. America Vol II, (London: Saunders and 26) Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in Otley, 1838) pp. 89-93. America Vol II, p. 90 40) Heribert Adam, Corporatism as minority 27) Statement of the ANC at the Human veto under ANC hegemony in South Rights Commission Hearings on Racism Africa, in Hermann Giliomee and Charles in the Media: 5 April 2000, pp. 11-13 Simkins (Eds), The Awkward Embrace: 28) South Africa, Joint Sittings of Both One-Party Domination and Democracy, Houses of Parliament, (Cape Town: (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1999) p. 27. Government Printers, 1999), Col. 63-64, 41) See the articles by R.W. Johnson and other 25 February 1999. contributors in Focus 18, June 2000. 29) Accelerating the pace of change: 42) Fieldwork by MarkData, personal inter- Assessing the balance of forces in 1999, views in respondents’ home languages Umrabulo No.7 3rd Quarter 1999, p. 5. among a stratified probability sample of 30) Ibid, p. 10. 2230 adult South Africans. 31) Thabo Mbeki January 8th Statement of the 43) Steven Friedman, South Africa: Entering ANC National Executive Committee, 8 the Post-Mandela Era, Journal of January 1999. Democracy Volume 10, Number 4 32) Strategy & Tactics, 1997. October 1999 p. 7. 33) African National Congress Constitution, 44) Ibid, p. 15. As amended by and adopted at the 50th 45) Comment by Juan Linz, in Robert National Conference, December 1997 see Goldwin, Art Kaufman and William clauses 11.2 (c) and 12.6 (b). Schambra, Forging Unity Out of 34) Cadre Policy, Resolutions from the ANC Diversity: the Approaches of Eight 50th National Conference, Mafikeng, 16- Nations, (Washington: American 20 December 1997. Enterprise Institute, 1989) p. 432. 35) The policy is reprinted in Umrabulo No. 6 46) Andrew Whiteford and Dirk van Seventer, Third Quarter 1999. For a more detailed Winners and Losers: South Africa’s exposition of the adoption and implemen- Income Distribution in the 1990s (Pretor- tation of the Cadre Policy see the DP doc- ia: WEFA Southern Africa, 1999.)

50 Political Alliances and Parliamentary Opposition in Post-Apartheid South Africa1

Adam Habib & Rupert Taylor

INTRODUCTION African democracy. Released from the condi- South Africa’s second democratic election in tioning effects of these pacting tendencies, 1999 sparked a public debate on the necessity opposition parties, and in particular the DP, for a viable parliamentary opposition. This has adopted an increasingly adversarial stance recently shifted into higher gear as a result of towards the ruling party. The effect of this on the decision by the Democratic Party (DP) and the process of democratic consolidation clearly New National Party (NNP) to merge prior to needs to be investigated. the 2004 elections, and to campaign under a Second, there is a popular perception that the single banner as the Democratic Alliance (DA) ANC has failed to deliver on its electoral in the local government elections to be held in promises. The euphoric honeymoon phase of November 2000. The African National the South African transition is now coming to Congress (ANC), in response, has interpreted an end, resulting in increased tensions among this as a ganging up of white parties, and has racial groups and between the citizenry and the even suggested that perhaps black parties government. Large sections of the white, should think of doing the same.2 This racial coloured, and Indian populations feel alienated polarisation of the debate is unfortunate for it as a result of affirmative action and redistribu- prevents a measured consideration of what the tion. Significant sections of the black popula- nature of opposition should best be, for the pur- tion believe that reconciliation has gone too far pose of consolidating democracy. and is occurring at the expense of economic Yet such a sober analysis is made necessary transformation.3 Furthermore, as a result of by a number of developments since the first intra-party tensions within the ‘Tripartite democratic election in 1994. First, the structure Alliance’, which links the Congress of South of the political system was dramatically African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South changed in 1996 when parliament, acting as a African Communist Party (SACP) to the ruling Constituent Assembly in terms of the ‘interim’ party, the leadership of the ANC is centralis- constitution of 1994, resolved not to extend ing power and bypassing party and state struc- transitional power-sharing provisions which tures in the formulation of policy.4 These had seen the formerly-ruling National Party developments suggest that the government’s (NP) participating in government, alongside the failures of delivery are translating into a weak- Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) as junior partners ening of the democratic order itself. However, of the majority ANC in a Government of democratic theory suggests that the existence National Unity (GNU). While the IFP opted to of a parliamentary opposition will ensure that remain in government and continues to be rep- citizen dissatisfaction is not directed at the sys- resented in Mbeki’s post-1999 cabinet, the NP tem as such, but rather at the governing party. (which subsequently renamed itself the NNP) Why is this not the case in South Africa? What decided to withdraw and thereby undermine the does this indicate about the viability of South elite pact which had initially shaped South Africa’s existing parliamentary opposition?

51 Habib & Taylor

These questions are subsets of the three sepa- government. Parliamentary parties are per- rate research questions. First, is a parliamentary ceived as institutional sites where ‘counter opposition necessary for the consolidation of political elites ... (can) organise and inform democracy? Second, are existing opposition themselves so as to be able to contest for parties functioning in a way that increases their power’.10 Should such institutional sites not viability and facilitates the establishment of a exist, ‘crises for the government are corre- democratic political order? Finally, if this is not spondingly more likely to become crises for the the case, what are the obstacles to the emer- democratic regime’.11 This then underlines gence of a viable opposition in South Africa? their second argument, that a parliamentary opposition ensures that a citizenry’s unhappi- 1. PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION AND ness with the government is not automatically DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION translated into a delegitimation of the democra- Conventional wisdom suggests that parliamen- tic order. tary opposition parties are necessary institu- Viable opposition parties provide institution- tions if political towards the consoli- al outlets for critics of the government to dation of democracy are to succeed.5 In South express their dissent and keep alive the possi- Africa, the mainstream media has been at the bility that they could become the governing forefront of popularising this ‘wisdom’ and elite at some future date. This permits ‘the ebb stressing the indispensable role of opposition and flow of competitive party politics that parties in protecting the interests and rights of democracies require’.12 citizens, monitoring government, and consoli- Finally, Jung and Shapiro insist that a viable dating democracy.6 Academia has also rein- parliamentary opposition facilitates institutional forced this conventional wisdom.7 Mainstream arrangements that enable the performance of a democratic theorists, from South Africa and variety of public interest functions. The coher- elsewhere, insist that both the constitutional ence of public policy can only be guaranteed if right to form a opposition and the reality of a the political environment permits debate and viable electoral alternative must exist for the competition over ideas. Parliamentary opposi- successful consolidation of democracy. Some tions have an interest in sustaining such an analysts even recommended the abandonment environment because engaging in debate over of power-sharing institutions and their associat- political issues and public policy enables them ed political pacts in the hope that this would to be perceived by the citizenry as viable alter- facilitate greater opportunities for the emer- natives to the ruling party. Opposition parties gence of parliamentary opposition politics.8 also have an interest in discrediting the ruling There is much merit in this conventional wis- party, and this prompts them to monitor gov- dom. The point that has to be underscored, ernment performance and expose corruption. however, is that the formal existence of politi- Thus oppositional institutions which ‘have an cal parties does not necessarily mean that they interest in asking awkward questions, shining will fulfil the functions usually attributed to light in dark places, and exposing abuses in them in a democratic polity. Parties must not power’ serve as a check on ‘governments who only exist in a legal or organisational sense, but have an incentive to camouflage mistakes or they must also be mechanisms that enable rep- controversial decisions that might threaten their resentation and express the social interests of popularity’.13 significant constituencies in society. Most com- Particularly relevant for South Africa, mentaries on the South African situation clearly however, is an additional factor. Democratic recognise this and argue that a parliamentary consolidation in South Africa, as elsewhere in opposition is only ‘worth its salt’ if it is per- the developing world, is dependent on the gov- ceived as a potential alternative in govern- ernment’s ability to address the widespread ment.9 poverty and economic inequalities within the Yet why is a viable parliamentary opposition society. Yet the new government, (partly be- deemed necessary for democracy? Courtney cause its policy choices are constrained by an Jung and Ian Shapiro identify three reasons. unfavourable set of power relations between it, First, they maintain that opposition parties are international financial agencies and domestic necessary to facilitate a peaceful alternation in and foreign capital), has implemented a neo-

52 Habib & Taylor liberal economic policy that is unlikely to constituencies in the party or social partners in address these problems.14 corporatist institutions. Another example is the More people-centred policy outcomes are ANC National Working Committee’s (NWC’s) unlikely to be forthcoming unless this decision in 1999 to appoint regional premiers unfavourable set of power relations is chal- rather than allow them to be elected through lenged. This requires the development of insti- party structures. Even erstwhile supporters of tutional mechanisms, of which a viable parlia- the ANC have recognised that since 1994 there mentary opposition is one component, that will has been a significant centralisation of power at ensure that citizens’ electoral votes are consid- the apex of South Africa’s political system.17 ered as important a variable in determining This centralisation of power in both the party power relations as are the financial resources of and state is not unique to South Africa. foreign investors and international financial Guillermo O’Donnell in his analysis of Latin agencies. As long as government is guaranteed American democracies has observed a similar that citizens will not vote for any opposition phenomenon, and has categorised the political party, they have no incentive to take citizens’ systems in these societies where representative interests into account. Should they fear that citi- structures are weakened and power is cen- zens would vote for an opposition party, they tralised, as delegative democracies.18 are more likely to deal with this electoral chal- This shift towards a delegative form of lenge by enhancing delivery and at least democracy in South Africa suggests that inter- attempting to satisfy the interests of the majori- nal party structures and corporatist mechanisms ty.15 are unlikely to become the instruments that will A viable parliamentary opposition is thus entrench political pluralism and hold state elites necessary for the consolidation of democracy. accountable to the citizenry. A viable parlia- Not all analysts share this view. Some political mentary opposition is a necessary precondition commentators, from both mainstream and radi- for arresting this trend. cal circles, argue that the lack of a viable parlia- mentary opposition need not undermine democ- 2. IDENTIFICATION AND VOTING ratic prospects. In their assessments, internal PATTERNS AFTER 1994 political pluralism within the ruling party Mainstream opinion suggests that it is impossi- and/or corporatist mechanisms are more impor- ble to establish a viable parliamentary opposi- tant or can make up for the lack of a viable par- tion because of the racialised structure of South liamentary opposition.16 These analyses are African politics. This view holds that the politi- premised on the hope that the internal struc- cal activities and electoral preferences of South tures of the ANC and/or corporatist mecha- Africans are primarily determined by their nisms will enable the political leadership to be ‘racial’ location in the society. As long as there held accountable, and will allow for the full is no split in the ANC, black citizens will not participation of all social groups and a negotiat- vote for the parliamentary opposition. Hermann ed resolution of the policy differences between Giliomee and Charles Simkins, in a recent them. articulation of this view, maintain that this situ- However, this view is both idealistic and ation is likely to continue because the post- decontextualised from an understanding of cur- apartheid regime favours black South Africans. rent political realities. The political leadership ‘Ethnic patronage [exists] in the form of of the ANC is perfectly aware of the fact that favouritism in bureaucratic appointments and its policies are not very popular amongst either state contracts awarded to business’, and this its own membership or alliance partners. They ‘produces a state-sponsored (black) middle are thus unlikely to allow representative struc- class whose commitment to the dominant party tures of the party or corporatist mechanisms to outweighs that to a neutral state or the need for be used as platforms to derail their policies. opposition politics’.19 Electoral outcomes are Evidence abounds in support of this. The thus ‘likely to continue to resemble a racial government’s latest macroeconomic pro- census’.20 gramme, the Growth, Employment, and Two problems exist with this argument. First, Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, was adopted Giliomee and Simkins suggest that a parliamen- by the cabinet without any consultation with tary opposition would only be viable if the mid-

53 Habib & Taylor dle class serves as its primary social base. This, This is not simply a normative judgement. In in one form, is a rearticulation of the old mod- February 1998 the Institute for Democracy in ernisation thesis that associates democracy and South Africa (Idasa) released its first Public competitive parliamentary politics with the rise Opinion Service (POS) Report which suggested of the middle class.21 There is a substantial that the South African electorate might not be body of intellectual work, however, that has as rigid and stagnant as is conventionally demonstrated that the middle class is as prone assumed. Arguing that the mainstream assump- to support authoritarian regimes as it is to tion ‘is partly based on the fact that most sur- favour democratic ones.22 Moreover, this argu- veys only focus on voting intentions’,26 the ment does not explicitly provide a rationale for POS report distinguished between this and par- why opposition politics has to be located in the tisan identification, and investigated both in middle class. The development of an opposition three surveys conducted in 1994, 1995, and in both Western Europe in the aftermath of the 1997. Subsequently, as part of a consortium Second World War and in the democratic tran- with the South African Broadcasting sitions in Latin America in the 1980s occurred Corporation (SABC) and Markinor (Pty) Ltd, with organised workers serving as its primary Idasa continued its investigations in a series of social base.23 Granted, the electoral success of opinion polls for the 1999 general elections. these parties was partially dependent on them The overall results of the seven surveys, reflect- broadening their support base to incorporate ed in Table 1, indicate that the proportion of the elements of other classes. But any party, what- electorate that strongly identifies with a party ever its primary social base, is obliged to fell from 88% in 1994 to 43% in October/Nov- broaden its appeal to other classes if it aspires ember 1998, and then climbed to 55% in April to govern. There is thus no logical reason to 1999. The number of independents increased predicate the establishment of a viable parlia- from 12% in 1994 to 58% in October/Novem- mentary opposition on the narrow social base ber 1998, but then fell back to 45% in April of the black middle class. 1999. As of April 1999, 35% of African voters, Second, Giliomee and Simkins assume that 76% of white voters, 63% of coloured voters the establishment of a viable parliamentary and 83% of Indian voters saw themselves as opposition is impossible because they view independents. These figures were markedly South African society from the prism of a down on those registered six months earlier, racialised politics. ‘Race’ is treated as an inde- particularly in the case of African voters, when pendent variable that explains how the majority some 50% saw themselves as independent.27 of the electorate would vote. However, this (See Table 1.) assumption needs to be contested, particularly The results also indicated (Table 2) that the since it takes race as objectively given.24 The proportion of the electorate that strongly identi- result is that lines of causality are presumed to fied with the ANC decreased from 58% in 1994 exist between racial categories and voting pat- to 34% in October/November 1998, but then terns by simply demonstrating a strong degree climbed to 44% in April 1999. The NNP’s sup- of correlation between the two. But even if one port in the corresponding period decreased accepts that there is a strong degree of correla- from 15% to 3%. On the other hand, the decline tion between racial categories and voting pat- in the figures for voting intentions was less dra- terns, and this is by no means conclusively matic. As Table 3 indicates, the proportion of proven, such correlation cannot be simply inter- the electorate that intended to vote for the ANC preted as causation. As is well known, South was down from 61% in September/October African society exhibits strong overlaps 1994 to 60% in April 1999. When the calcula- between racial and class categories. Why then tions were restricted to only registered voters, should race be prioritised as the explanatory the ANC’s electoral support increased to 65%. variable accounting for electoral outcomes? Voting intentions for the NNP in the corre- Could it not be class, or perhaps some intricate sponding period was down from 16% to 7%, mix of racial and class categories?25 This sug- while that of the DP increased from 1 to 7%. gests that one should treat with caution the Overall, these calculations were largely in line mainstream assumption that electoral support is with the national election results of 1999 when rigidly defined in racial terms. the ANC received 66.36% of the vote, while

54 Habib & Taylor

Table 1: Party identification28

Sept-Oct Sept-Oct June-July Sept Oct-Nov Feb-March April 1994 1995 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999

Yes 88 58 58 45 43 50 55 No 12 37 37 53 55 46 41 Don’t Know 4 4 3 3 3 3

Source: Helen Taylor, Robert Mattes & Cherrel Africa, ‘Party Support and Voting Intention (1V)’, Press Release, 24 May 1999, in http://www.idasa.org.za. the DP, which replaced the NNP as the official whites declaring themselves independent by opposition, received 9.55%. The only party April 1999.33 This fact, together with the mild whose support base was significantly underesti- drop in voting intentions for the ANC between mated by the Opinion 1999 surveys was the 1994 and 1999, suggests that even though the IFP, which received 8.59% of the national electorate might identify less with the ANC, it vote.29 currently sees no serious alternative to the rul- What is the significance of the discrepancies ing party. between the electorate’s partisan identifications Thus, as Idasa’s Public Opinion Service and voting intentions? The significant reduction report concludes, the stability in voting inten- in partisan identification with the ANC and tions is likely to continue in the short term, but NNP between 1994 and 1999 suggests that the increase in the numbers of ‘leaners’ and these parties electoral support is not as rigidly ‘independents’ creates the potential for signifi- defined as was previously assumed. Support for cant electoral shifts in the future.34 the ANC among Africans declined from 75% in Why have the parliamentary opposition par- 1994 to 45% in October/November 1998, and ties not been able to capitalise on this situation? then subsequently climbed to 58% by April Mainstream opinion suggests they are unable to 1999.31 The NNP’s support among whites do so because the electorate’s partisan identifi- decreased even more dramatically, from 48% in cation is rigidly defined in racial terms. But the 1994 to 5% in April 1999.32 The largest shift in data from these surveys suggests that this is not voting patterns in both the African and white the case. In fact, the data indicates that there is communities was towards the independent cate- a great potential for opposition parties to win gory with some 35% of Africans and 76% of over significant sections of the electorate. Why,

Table 2: Party identification over time30

Sept-Oct Sept-Nov June-July Sept Oct-Nov Feb-March April 1994 1995 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999 % %%% % % %

ANC 58 37 40 35 34 40 44 NNP 15 9 6 3 3 3 3 IFP 5 5 4 2 2 2 2 FF 2 1 1 <1 <1 <1 1 DP 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 PAC 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 UDM NA NA 1* 1 1 1 1 Other 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 Won’t Say/ 3 2 2 <1 <1 1 <1 Confidential Independent 12 42 42 56 58 50 45

Source: Helen Taylor, Robert Mattes & Cherrel Africa, ‘Party Support and Voting Intention (1V)’, Press Release, 24 May 1999, in http://www.idasa.org.za. * 1997 UDM figures refer to the combination of the scores for its predecessor National Consultative Forum and the Process for a .

55 Habib & Taylor

Table 3: Voting intention

Sept- May Nov May- Nov May- Nov Mar July Sept Oct- Feb- April Oct June June June Nov Mar 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996 1997 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1999 1999 %% % % %%%%%%%%%

ANC 61 64 64 63 61 62 58 54 57 51 54 59 60 NNP 16 15 14 13 13 15 12 10 9 10 9 8 7 DP12 2 2 2 3 35 67567 IFP52 3 5 6 4 55 54543 PAC21 2 2 2 2 23 22111 UDM NA NA NA NA NA NA 4 5 5 2 3 2 2 FF22 3 2 2 2 22 11111 FA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 UCDP <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 >1 1 <1 1 ACDP <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 1 1 1 Azapo <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 CP <1 2 1 1 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 0 Other <1 1 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 1 1 Don’t know 12 10 8 11 11 12 12 16 14 21 19 17 15

Source: Helen Taylor, Robert Mattes & Cherrel Africa, ‘Party Support and Voting Intention (1V)’, Press Release, 24 May 1999, in http://www.idasa.org.za. then, has this not happened? The simple answer hamstrung by its inability to think outside of a is that the electorate does not see current oppo- racial prism. sition parties as representing their interests. Second, the existing parliamentary opposition There are two reasons for this. First, the parties remain unviable because they do not major opposition parties, because of their his- offer policies that would enable them to attract torical legacy and current positioning, are seen a significant electoral constituency. The policy as articulating the interests of particular racial choices that are currently offered by the parlia- and ethnic groups. Instead of these parties mentary opposition only appeal to sections of weaving a programme that attracts the support the white, coloured and Indian communities. of diverse communities, they have developed Yet, as was indicated earlier, a parliamentary strategies that appeal to narrow sections of the opposition would only be viable if it is able to electorate. The IFP, for instance, has projected weave a policy programme capable of attract- itself as the defender and representative of the ing the support of a diverse set of constituen- Zulu people. By so doing, it reduced its appeal cies, and in particular the growing community for non-Zulu independents. The NNP and of independent African voters. To do this, an Democratic Party (DP), historically seen as opposition would have to offer a set of socio- serving the interests of Afrikaner and English economic policies that would attract the support whites respectively, developed electoral strate- of the lower middle class, working class, poor gies that targeted white, coloured and Indian and unemployed of all racial groups. This sections of the electorate. Again, by doing so, would entail advocating a socio-economic pro- they denied themselves the opportunity to gramme similar to the Reconstruction and appeal to African voters who constitute, by far, Development Programme (RDP) advanced by the largest segment of the independent voter the ANC prior to its ascension to office. It category. The failure to develop a viable parlia- would require offering a substantive policy mentary opposition, then, is not as is commonly choice to the electorate on macroeconomic pol- perceived, the fault of an electorate voting in icy. Yet, to date, there has been a large degree racial terms, but rather is the responsibility of a of consensus among parties in parliament on parliamentary opposition leadership that is macroeconomic policy. The result is that there

56 Habib & Taylor is no incentive for the growing section of the 3. THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE AND THE FUTURE electorate that feels unrepresented to vote for OF PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION any of the existing parliamentary opposition How can such a political force be developed? A parties. parliamentary opposition in South Africa would The existing opposition parties, then, by only be viable if its primary social base is the locating themselves in minority racial groups organised African working class. This does not and by not offering substantive policy choice in mean that it has to only represent the interests terms of macroeconomic policy, undermine of organised workers. Like social democratic their own viability. The fluidity and shifts in parties in Western Europe in earlier decades electoral support that were registered in the and the current Partido dos Trabalhadores in opinion and electoral polls in 1998 and 1999 Brazil, such a party must articulate a set of poli- will not fundamentally alter this situation. cies that advances the cause of not only the These indicate that the DP was the primary organised working class, but also of the unem- beneficiary of the NNP’s demise. They also ployed, the lower middle class, and the rural suggest that some of the electoral loss of the poor. ANC was picked up by the United Democratic There is a prevailing mainstream opinion that Movement (UDM).35 Yet neither the UDM nor the interests of organised workers are diametri- the newly established DA is likely to dramati- cally opposed to those of the unemployed. This cally enhance the electoral prospects of the par- view, used cynically by business to weaken liamentary opposition. The essential reason is support for labour legislation, suggests that the that the DA, given the history of its constituent high level of unemployment is the result of a components and leadership, is likely to contin- rigid labour market and the high cost of labour. ue to fish in the shallow voting pool of minority Its solution is to weaken labour legislation in racial groups. While the UDM was established the hope that the deregulation and lowered in 1997 – by (a rebel from the NP) wages costs would prompt business – in partic- and (who had been expelled ular small and medium enterprises – to expand from the ANC) – to break the racial divide, it their workforces. The stumbling block is organ- was, and still is, prone to criticisms of not ised workers who in the form of Cosatu and offering any coherent policy alternatives. The other bodies, are opposed to the weakening of organisation was of course an amalgamation of labour legislation.37 This view also neatly two very different political traditions; pragmat- dovetails with one in the labour movement ic Nationalists, and disaffected ANC elements. which suggests that the unions should eschew This political alliance, however, seems to have any political ambitions, and evolve into econo- broken down with the result that the UDM’s mistic institutions that simply represent and support base has been continually eroding since advance the interests of their direct member- 1999.36 ship.38 Once again, the underlying assumption In sum, then, the establishment of a viable is that the unions should represent organised opposition is not as impossible as is conven- workers and leave other social institutions to tionally assumed. However, it is unlikely to be take care of the unorganised and unemployed. realised from the remnants of the existing There is some evidence to support this pro- opposition parties because these continue to posal. The stratification and differentiation of locate themselves in minority racial groups, and the African workforce has continued unabated do not offer substantive policy choices that since the late 1970s.39 But the emergence of would enable them to attract the growing cate- specific interests within the African workforce gory of independent voters. need not automatically lead to the disaggrega- A substantial chunk of these independent vot- tion of a common interest. It is an irony that the ers are, for the foreseeable future, either likely commentators who most often suggest that the to vote for the ANC or opt out of the political conflict between capital and labour need not be system. This situation will deteriorate unless a zero-sum are the ones who are at the forefront political force develops that is capable of serv- of suggesting that the differentiation within the ing as an electoral pole that can attract disen- working class has to lead to a zero-sum out- chanted citizens and thereby establish a com- come. This need not be the case. Indeed, recog- petitive democratic order. nition of the differentiation within the work-

57 Habib & Taylor force may facilitate the development of a politi- location of respondents, it is fair to assume that cal programme that marries both the specific a significant proportion of the independent and and common interests of different segments of dissatisfied African voters are from the working the African working class. Such a programme class, lower middle class, and the unemployed would be most easily developed by a political categories. party whose success depends on the evolution Why, then, have these sectors of the elec- of such an orientation. And, as has occurred so torate not become a social motor for the emer- often before, such a party can be established by, gence of a parliamentary opposition? As indi- and have, an alliance with a union movement cated earlier, the existing parliamentary opposi- with the political maturity to recognise the need tion parties do not have the political will to for a relative autonomy of that party. offer a home to poorer South Africans. The But why should the success of a parliamen- PAC, which does have such an orientation, is tary opposition in South Africa be singularly shackled by its racist image and is publicly per- dependent on the support of the organised ceived as being too disorganised to serve as a African working class? Simply because this is viable opposition.42 The only other political the only constituency with the will to serve as force with the will to represent this sector, and such an opposition. Minority racial groups can- the capacity to serve as a viable parliamentary not serve as that social constituency because opposition, is Cosatu and the SACP, both of they do not have the electoral numbers that which are excluded from doing so by their would allow for an opposition to be perceived strategic alliance with the ANC. The Tripartite as an electoral threat. Moreover, locating par- Alliance has thus become the principal obstacle liamentary opposition in minority racial groups, to the emergence of a viable opposition and the as is currently occurring, will needlessly establishment of truly competitive politics in polarise society in racial terms and thereby South Africa. undermine the consolidation of democracy. The Tripartite Alliance, although only for- Neither are the new African elite, and manager- malised in the early 1990s, dates back to the ial and professional middle classes a serious establishment of Cosatu in December 1985, contender for the role of opposition, if only having been preceded by an alliance between because they are well taken care of by the the ANC, SACP and SACTU that dates back to ANC. They are the primary beneficiaries of the the 1950s.43 In any case, the emergence of ANC’s current approaches to affirmative action Cosatu witnessed the amalgamation of two tra- and black economic empowerment which have ditions of unionism that emerged in the post- realised ‘a dramatic growth in the income, 1973 era, a community unionism aligned to the wealth and asset base of a tiny group of black ANC that was typical of the 1950s, and a shop businessmen ...’40 floor unionism that stressed the importance of Furthermore, the organised African working unions retaining their independence from the class is the only constituency with capacity to national liberation movement.44 The compro- serve as a social base for opposition. It is the mise struck in Cosatu was that the federation most organised sector within the African popu- would participate in the political struggle on lation. It has, through different union federa- terms favourable to the working class. In effect tions, a significant amount of infrastructural this meant that Cosatu entered into a strategic and financial resources at its disposal. alliance with the ANC, ultimately replacing Moreover, as indicated earlier, Africans consti- SACTU as component of the tute the largest block within the independent . voter category. The earlier Opinion ’99 surveys The Tripartite Alliance had two fundamental indicated that these voters were increasingly objectives. First, it was intended to maximise dissatisfied with the government’s perfor- opposition against the apartheid regime. mance.41 Although the ANC’s campaign Second, it was to ensure that a working class enabled the party to claw back some lost bias prevailed in the policies of the national lib- ground in the months prior to the elections, the eration movement. In terms of its first objective surveys indicate that the ANC can no longer it was spectacularly successful. The Tripartite take the African voter for granted. Also, Alliance ensured that when the political struc- although most surveys do not detail the class tures of the popular movement were forced on

58 Habib & Taylor the defensive in the 1987–88 wave of repres- context on the emergence of a viable opposi- sion, the union movement, and in particular tion. As long as this does not exist, the ANC Cosatu, took up the cudgels of resistance. government can take the electorate’s votes for Cosatu thereby forced the state to a realisation granted, and need not take their concerns as that instability would not simply disappear with seriously as it does those of foreign investors bannings and repression. This in no small mea- and the business community. Given the fact sure contributed to the latter’s decisions to that no other opposition party is capable of ful- unban black political organisations, release filling this role, the responsibility therefore falls their leaders, and enter into negotiations about a on the shoulders of Cosatu and the SACP. A democratic dispensation.45 contradiction has thus emerged between the In terms of its second objective, the Tripartite goals of Cosatu and the SACP and their strate- Alliance was singularly unsuccessful. Instead gic orientation. Or, to put it another way, con- of influencing the programmes of the ANC, the tinued participation in the alliance leads not to a opposite in fact occurred. Since the late 1980s, struggle for the ‘heart and soul of the ANC’,49 Cosatu, whilst retaining its radical rhetoric, has but rather to a hostage scenario where Cosatu consistently moderated its policies. For a short and the SACP ultimately have to abandon their period prior to and after the 1994 elections, social democratic commitments. Cosatu influence seems to have prevailed with- There is of course a body of progressive in the ANC, in particular because of the latter’s scholars who would vigorously contest this adoption of the developmentalist RDP. But conclusion. In a recent exchange, Roger soon after the ANC’s ascension to power, it Southall and Geoffrey Wood accused Rupert became apparent that the RDP existed only in Taylor and myself of advancing ‘artificial, dan- name. If there were any doubts about this gerous and premature ...’50 recommendations, assessment, they were soon put to rest when the and defended the Tripartite Alliance on the ANC adopted a new macroeconomic pro- grounds that it enabled Cosatu to influence gramme in June 1996 (GEAR), whose policies government policy and was supported by a bore striking resemblance to those called for by majority of the federation’s members. A the NNP and the business community.46 The detailed response to Southall and Wood’s cri- government’s adoption of GEAR provoked tique is provided elsewhere.51 However, it serious discontent and created enormous would be useful here to at least reiterate two strains. Cosatu and the SACP openly opposed points. First, the post-apartheid labour-friendly GEAR and were publicly chastised by both legislative framework can no longer serve as Mandela and Mbeki.47 These public spats evidence of Cosatu’s influence over govern- swung the spotlight on the Tripartite Alliance ment policy because it is being reviewed and is and provoked a debate on its future. likely to be watered down. Indeed, cabinet min- In response to the almost cynical predictions isters’ recent adversarial polemics against the of a split by mainstream commentators, alliance union federations, and government’s increas- leaders and activists have retreated into a laager ingly stringent stance against public sector mentality vowing to strengthen their ties. unions in wage negotiations, is evidence of However, a measured and distanced review of Cosatu’s waning influence on the ANC.52 the alliance is long overdue, especially for Second, Cosatu members’ support of the Cosatu and the SACP, for its raison d’être has Tripartite Alliance is based on the erroneous clearly expired.48 The apartheid regime was belief that the RDP constitutes the core of ANC defeated and a new non-racial democratic polit- economic policy, and takes ANC rhetoric at ical system has been established. Moreover, the face-value.53 Moreover, the same survey Tripartite Alliance has not enabled Cosatu and referred to by Southall and Wood also indicates the SACP to imprint a developmentalist politi- that 70% of respondents would vote for an cal economy on the post-apartheid ANC gov- alternative party in the event of the ANC failing ernment. They should therefore now consider to deliver.54 There is thus a significant amount establishing an independent political force of support within Cosatu for abandoning the capable of advancing such a goal. alliance in the event of the ANC ignoring the The realisation of a more people-centred interests of workers and the poor. But even if political economy is dependent in the current this weren’t the case, progressive scholars

59 Habib & Taylor should not fetishise the majority viewpoint. The tion, Cosatu is the only independent source out- fact that a majority of Cosatu members believe side the business community which has the the Tripartite Alliance is beneficial for their organisational muscle and financial resources interests does not make it so. Majorities have required for the establishment of a viable oppo- been known to be wrong. sition. The major obstacle to Cosatu and the In contrast, the analysis here indicates that SACP playing this oppositional role is their the alliance is undermining the attempts of both membership of the Tripartite Alliance, and they Cosatu and the SACP to achieve their goals and have to come to terms with the fact that the best should be replaced with a nonracial, social- opportunity to realise a social democratic politi- democratic electoral alternative capable of tak- cal economy lies in the establishment of an ing on the ANC. opposition that will force the state to take the interests of working, unemployed, and poor cit- CONCLUSION izens as seriously as it does those of foreign The emergence of a dominant party system in investors and the business community. South Africa, and the relations of power in the What is the likely future of the alliance? Two global and national arenas, has ensured that cit- possibilities are available. On the one hand is izens’ preferences are sacrificed in the interests the leadership and activist layer of Cosatu and of appeasing foreign investors and the domestic the SACP, many of whom wear multiple hats business community. This has manifested itself and move easily within the alliance. Committed in the ANC’s abandonment of the RDP and its to a social democratic political economy, this adoption of a neoliberal economic strategy. The group places its hope in the fact that a struggle likely outcome of such policy choices is can still be waged for the heart and soul of the increasing economic inequality and poverty and ANC.55 On the other hand is a newly ascendant an undermining of democracy. The solution is and recently converted layer of leadership who the establishment of institutional mechanisms argue that the ANC’s role is one of deracialis- that will enable citizens’ preferences to be ing the market economy so that the African taken seriously in the corridors of political bourgeoisie and managerial and professional power. This paper has argued that one such middle classes can have their place in the sun. institutional mechanism must be a viable parlia- For this layer, an alliance with the IFP is more mentary opposition, which is necessary for the important and strategic than one with Cosatu consolidation of democracy in South Africa. and the SACP.56 The paper has demonstrated that existing par- For the short term, however, both Cosatu and liamentary opposition parties are unlikely to the SACP are safe. Should they not want a develop into viable challenges to the dominant break in the alliance, their struggle credentials’ party. This is not the result of the racialised will see them through the hurdles of the first structure of South African politics. On the con- few years of this new millennium. But it will trary, recent surveys show that South Africa’s come at the cost of sacrificing their goal. electorate is open to voting for parties other Already the ANC leadership in the form of than the ANC, yet their reluctance to do so Mandela and Mbeki has made it clear that stems from an accurate assessment that these Cosatu and the SACP need to be more compli- parties are continuing to serve the interests of ant if they want to remain in the alliance. The minority racial and ethnic groups. Moreover, ANC leadership is likely to intensify such these parties are not seen to offer substantial demands, especially after the local government policy choices that can attract a sizeable section elections in November 2000. of the African electorate. Even if Cosatu and the SACP accede to them, The best prospects for the emergence of a it will not enable them to survive permanently viable opposition therefore lies in the ranks of in the alliance. The most probable scenario for Cosatu and the SACP. Cosatu and the SACP the medium- to long-term is the replacement of have a large reservoir of popular support, and the Tripartite Alliance with an ANC-IFP coali- their commitment to a social democratic politi- tion. cal economy ensures that they will articulate The medium term future of Cosatu and the policies that can potentially attract a significant SACP lies in the arena of parliamentary opposi- sector of the South African electorate. In addi- tion politics. The viability of such a politics is

60 Habib & Taylor dependent on how long the Tripartite Alliance ity that the ANC might succeed in converting it survives. Should Cosatu and the SACP contin- to a narrow economic union federation. Should ue in the alliance for longer than a few years, the break happen in the next few years, howev- their legitimacy could be eroded because of er, we may then have the first real possibility their compliance to the ANC. Moreover, their opening up for the development of a viable capacity could be weakened as layers of com- opposition politics. Such a development would mitted and skilled activists peel away from represent South Africa’s best chance for the them to investigate other political alternatives. realisation of a social democratic political econ- In the case of Cosatu, there is even the possibil- omy and the consolidation of democracy.

ENDNOTES

1) An earlier version of this argument was USAID/South Africa Democracy and published with Rupert Taylor as, Parlia- Governance Program, report prepared for mentary Opposition and Democratic Macro International and USAID/South Consolidation in South Africa, Review of Africa by the Centre for Policy Studies, African Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. Johannesburg, South Africa, Feb. 1998, 79 (1999), pp. 109-115. p. 10. 2) Sbu Ndebele, leader of the ANC in 4) See Adam Habib, South Africa – The KwaZulu-Natal, made this call on hearing and Prospects for of the merger between the DP and NNP. Consolidating Democracy, African 3) See Joel Barkan, Steven Friedman, Claude Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 2 Kabemba, Chris Landsberg, Khehla (1997), pp. 15-37; Roger Southall, The Shubane, Sector Assessment: Centralisation and Fragmentation of South

61 Habib & Taylor

Africa’s Dominant Party System, African Edward Webster and Glenn Adler, Affairs, No. 97 (1998), pp. 443-469; and Toward a Class Compromise in South Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins Africa’s ‘Double Transition’: Bargained (eds), The Awkward Embrace: One Party Liberalisation and the Consolidation of Domination and Democracy, (Cape Town: Democracy, Politics & Society, Vol. 27, Tafelberg, 1999). No. 3 (1999), pp. 347-385. 5) See Robert Dahl (ed), Political Opposition 17) See Southall, The Centralisation and in Western Democracies (New Haven: Fragmentation of South Africa’s Yale University Press, 1966); Leon Dominant Party System. Epstein, Political Parties in Western 18) Guillermo O’Donnell, On the State, Democracies, (New York: Praeger, 1967); Democratisation, and Some Conceptual Barrington Moore, Jr, Liberal Prospects Problems: A Latin American View with Under Soviet : A Comparative Some Glances at Some Post-Communist Historical Perspective (New York: Societies, World Development, Vol. 21, Averell Harriman Institute, 1989); Samuel No. 8 (1993), pp. 1355-1369; and Huntington, The Third Wave: Democra- Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative tisation in the Late Twentieth Century Democracy, Journal of Democracy, No. 5 (Norman: University of Oaklahoma Press, (1994), pp. 55-69. 1991); and Ian Shapiro, Three Ways to be 19) Giliomee and Simkins, The Awkward a Democrat, Political Theory, 22 (Feb. Embrace, p. 346. 1994). 20) Ibid. 6) See Mail & Guardian, 28 February–4 21) The classic work in this regard is March 1999, and 28 May–3 June 1999. Barrington Moore, Jr, The Social Origins 7) See Giliomee and Simkins, The Awkward of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Embrace; and Adam Habib and Rupert Peasant in the Making of the Modern Taylor, Parliamentary Opposition and World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). Democratic Consolidation in South Africa. 22) See, for instance, Fernando Henrique 8) See Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro, South Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency Africa’s Negotiated Transition: and Development in Latin America Democracy, Opposition and the New (Berkeley: University of California Press, Constitutional Order, Politics and Society, 1979); and Guillermo O’Donnell, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1995), pp. 269-308. Modernisation and Bureaucratic- 9) Howard Barrell, The Race for the Real Authoritarianism (Berkeley: University of Second Place, Mail & Guardian, 28 California Press, 1973). February-4 March 1999. 23) Note, for example, the rise of social demo- 10) Ibid, p. 272. cratic parties in Western Europe and the 11) Ibid. emergence of the Partido dos Trabalha- 12) Ibid. dores (Workers Party) in Brazil. 13) Ibid, p. 273. 24) For similar criticisms of this assumption in 14) See Habib and Padayachee, pp. 253-55. the mainstream social sciences, see Rupert 15) Adam Habib, South Africa Needs New Taylor and Mark Orkin, The Racialisation Left Opposition, Mail & Guardian, 12-18 of Social Scientific Research in South June 1998. Africa, South African Sociological 16) See Heribert Adam, Frederick Van Zyl Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, (1995), pp. 43-59. Slabbert, Kogila Moodley, Comrades in 25) See my study with Sanusha Naidu of the Business: Post-Liberation Politics in ‘coloured’ and ‘Indian’ vote in the 1999 South Africa (Cape Town: Tafelberg elections demonstrates that class variables Publishers Ltd, 1997); Joel Barkan et al, played as crucial a role as racial ones in Sector Assessment: USAID/South Africa electoral outcomes. The ‘coloured’ and Democracy and Governance Programme, ‘Indian’ middle and upper middle classes Feb. 1998; Steven Friedman, ANC is were prone to vote for the ANC, while Long Term Guardian of Democracy, those on the lower end of the economic Business Day, 23 March 1998; and hierarchy supported the minority opposi-

62 Habib & Taylor

tion parties. See Adam Habib and Sanusha 38) See Geoff Schreiner, Restructuring the Naidu, Election ’99: Was There a Labour Movement After Apartheid, South ‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’ Vote, Politikon, African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 2, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 189-199. (1994), p. 48. 26) Robert Mattes, Cherrel Africa and Sean 39) See Owen Crankshaw, On the Doorstep of Jacobs, POS Reports: The Evolution of Management, South African Sociological Party Support since 1994, No. 1 (February Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, (1993). 1998), p. 3. 40) Bill Freund and Vishnu Padayachee, Post- 27) Helen Taylor, Robert Mattes & Cherrel Apartheid South Africa: The Key Patterns Africa, Party Support and Voting Intention Emerge, Economic and Political Weekly, (1V), Press Release, 24 May 1999, in 16 May 1998, p. 1175. http://www.idasa.org.za, p. 7. 41) In September 1998, a majority of Africans 28) The question asked in 1994: ‘Regardless expected the economy would not improve of how you voted on Election Day (in in the next 12 months. The Opinion ’99 April) was there one particular political surveys indicated that the proportion of party which you felt especially close to?’ African South Africans who expected the The question asked in subsequent surveys: economy to improve in the next 12 months ‘Do you usually think of yourself as close dropped from 53% in 1997 to 41% by to any particular political party/ies?’ September 1998. See ‘Opinion ’99 29) This underestimation of the IFP’s electoral Economic Evaluations’, Press Release, 12 support is largely a result of the reluctance November 1998, in http://www.idasa. of voters in KwaZulu-Natal’s rural areas org.za, p.3. to declare their political allegiances, espe- 42) Robert Mattes, Cherrel Africa and Sean cially in the run-up to an election. For a Jacobs, POS Reports: The Evolution of detailed set of the 1999 election results, Party Support since 1994, p. 3. see the Independent Electoral Commis- 43) Steven Friedman, Building Tomorrow sions web page: www.elections.org.za. Today: African Workers in Trade Unions 30) The question: ‘If there were elections 1970-1984, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, tomorrow, which political party or organi- 1987), pp. 26-33. sation would you vote for?’ Also, note that 44) Martin Murray, The Revolution Deferred: the symbol <1 means the proportion is The Painful Birth of Post-Apartheid South between 0.1 and 0.4%. Africa, (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 143 - 31) Helen Taylor, Robert Mattes & Cherrel 146. Africa, Party Support and Voting Intention 45) For a detailed assessment of Cosatu’s (1V), p. 9. impact on the democratic transition, see 32) Ibid. Glen Adler and Eddie Webster, Challeng- 33) Ibid, p. 7. ing Transition Theory: The Labour Move- 34) Robert Mattes, Helen Taylor and Cherrel ment, Radical Reform, and Transition to Africa, Party Support and Voting Intention Democracy in South Africa, Politics & (11), Press Release, 8 December 1998, in Society, Vol. 23, No. 1, (I 995), pp. 75- http://www.idasa.org.za, p. 5. 106. 35) Markinor, Media Release, 8 September 46) Adam Habib and Vishnu Padayachee, 1998. Economic Policy and Power Relations in 36) Roelf Meyer, the co-founder of the UDM South Africa’s Transition to Democracy, and one of the most respected ex-Nat lead- pp. 248-252. ers in the black community, left the party 47) The public showdown took place at the to join the Rhema Church in 1999. Since SACP’s National Congress in 1998. his departure the UDM has experienced a 48) For a counter view, see Hein Marais, spate of defections to both the ANC and South Africa- Limits to Change: The DP. Political Economy of Transformation, 37) See South Africa Foundation, Growth for (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1998), pp. 250- All: An Economic Strategy for South 253, 262-268; and Roger Southall and Africa, (1996). Geoffrey Wood, Cosatu, the ANC and the

63 Habib & Taylor

Election: Whither the Alliance?, Trans- 52) Adam Habib and Rupert Taylor, Daring to formation, No. 38, (1999), pp. 68-81. Question the Tripartite Alliance, p. 114. 49) Hein Marais, South Africa - Limits to 53) Ibid, pp. 116-117. Change, p. 263. 54) See Table 4 in Christine Psoulis, Cosatu 50) Roger Southall and Geoffrey Wood, Members: Attitudes Towards the 1999 Cosatu, the ANC and the Election: Elections, South African Labour Bulletin, Whither the Alliance?, p. 80. Vol. 23, No. 2, (1999), p. 29. 51) Adam Habib and Rupert Taylor, Daring to 55) This view is most coherently reflected in Question the Tripartite Alliance: A SACP, Let Us Not Lose Sight of Our Response to Southall and Wood, Strategic Priorities, Secretariat discussion Transformation, No. 40, (1999), pp. 112- document, October 1996. 20. For their reply, see Roger Southall and 56) Peter Mokaba first publicly mooted this Geoff Wood, Taking the Alliance idea in the run-up to the ANC’s national Seriously: Replying to Habib and Taylor, conference in December 1997. Thabo Transformation, No. 40, (1999), pp. 121- Mbeki is also known to be partial to this 125. view.

64 Democracy, Power and Patronage: Debate and Opposition within the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance since 1994

Dale McKinley

It is the African National Congress (ANC) that nation of outright political intimidation, ideo- has now become the standard-bearer of liberal logical mysticism and the co-option of ANC democracy in South Africa. Since coming to dissidents and Cosatu and SACP leaders into power in 1994 with the help of its partners, the government. In the process, critical question- South African Communist Party (SACP) and ing of the substance behind political rhetoric the Congress of South African Trade Unions and policy formulation is being suppressed, (Cosatu), in the ‘Tripartite Alliance’, the ANC and the right to challenge the new political and has followed the liberal democratic formula of economic orthodoxies denied. institutionalising the combination of individual rights and capitalist market economics. Now 1. WHAT KIND OF DEMOCRACY HAS BEEN integrated with the global offensive of interna- WON? tionalised corporate and finance capital, liber- ‘The device by which content is replaced al democracy has taken on the mantle of a nec- by form and ideas by phrases has produced essary and natural political product of an a host of declamatory priests whose last equally necessary and natural economic order. offshoots had of course to lead to democra- However, the ANC’s embrace of what is a very cy.’ – Karl Marx1 minimalist conception of democracy has, since Although the idea and practice of democracy 1994, given rise to serious ideological opposi- has gone through numerous reformulations tion and class confrontation within its own since the days of Marx and Engels, it would ranks and those of its alliance partners. appear that most of its contemporary intellectu- While the intervening years have seen the al and political cheerleaders are as priestly as ebb and flow of such debate, the leadership of ever. No more so than the proponents of the the ANC – headed by President Thabo Mbeki – now dominant creed, liberal democracy. In alongside many of their SACP and Cosatu South Africa, the leading members of this tri- colleagues, have proved capable of containing umphal order come from a wide cross-section and suppressing dissent. Those who have open- of political parties, institutions of corporate and ly expressed their opposition have been subject finance capital and civil society, including the to discipline and steadily marginalised from largest and most powerful political player of the respective centres of decision making and all, the ANC. power. What has made these developments all Claims of opposition parties such as the the more dangerous for organisational democ- Democratic Party (DP) notwithstanding, it is racy and political principle has been the lead- the ANC that has now become the standard- ership’s insistence that democratic debate and bearer of liberal democracy in South Africa. opposition within the ANC and the Alliance is Since coming to power in 1994, the ANC has as healthy as ever. dutifully followed the liberal democratic for- The apparent unity of the ANC and the mula of institutionalising – through a constitu- Alliance has been fashioned through a combi- tional dispensation – a combination of individ-

65 McKinley ual rights and capitalist market economics. Just als, conceptualised arguments for a seizure of as in the past, when the ‘liberal state sought to power in narrowly statist terms. As a result, the overcome (the) partisanship of predecessors to (autonomous) state is given the status of the achieve neutrality by virtue of the generality of struggle ‘throne’, leaving revolutionary (purpo- its purposes’, so too has the ANC sought to sive) struggle cast in terms of a fight for a spe- make itself appear as though ‘it serves all and cific form (structure) of power rather than its comes from all’.2 Indeed, the ANC has effec- foundation. Unfortunately for many in the tively utilised the legitimating argument of lib- SACP and Cosatu, the ANC leadership adopted eral democracy, that ‘its link to society is held such an approach, both theoretically and practi- to be that it operates at the level of the general cally, once it had become clear that a deal could interest’.3 Now combined with the more recent be made with its former enemies. global offensive of internationalised corporate From this perspective, political democratisa- and finance capital (‘neo-liberalism’), liberal tion was achieved through capturing control of democracy has taken on the mantle of a neces- the state in the elections of 1994 at the con- sary and natural political product of an equally scious expense of a corresponding transforma- necessary and natural economic order. Under tion of the economic sphere. This ‘historic such a scenario, democracy itself becomes syn- compromise’ (as it was widely called at the onymous with the capitalist ‘free market’ and time) flew directly in the face of the dominant everything else is merely about degrees and viewpoint that had held sway for so long emphases.4 amongst the ANC’s alliance partners – that It is this kind of minimalist conception and there is nothing implicitly statist in any struggle practice of democracy, that the ANC has now for revolutionary change, but that there must be embraced, even if somewhat awkwardly. This a fundamental attack on the entrenched eco- has happened despite the ANC’s long history of nomic and political interests of capital (in what- association with more radical notions of mass ever form) in order for there to be meaningful participatory and non-capitalist democracy, liberation. As the ANC’s Strategy and Tactics such as those espoused by the SACP and document had put this quite clearly: Cosatu, its partners in the Tripartite Alliance.5 ‘It is therefore a fundamental feature of our It is this choice by the ANC that has provided strategy that victory must embrace more the starting point for much of the opposition than formal political democracy. To allow and debate that has taken place in the Tripartite the existing economic forces to retain their Alliance since 1994. interests intact is to feed the root of racial For three decades the dominant theoretical supremacy and does not represent even a thrust of the ANC’s liberation struggle was shadow of liberation.’7 centred around the necessity for the revolution- However, in contrast, the cumulative effect of ary seizure of power. Whether applied to the the strategic and tactical programme of the smashing of apartheid and the attainment of ANC (both inside and outside government) majority rule (ANC), or presented as a spring- since 1994 has been to embrace a truncated board for a transition to socialism (SACP), the democracy that has gradually demobilised and revolutionary seizure of power was presented disempowered the very constituency capable of as a necessary pre-condition for movement leading and carrying through a more complete towards a fully democratic society. SACP theo- democratic revolution – that class of South retician had put it this way: Africa’s workers and poor who have provided ‘Thus there is a distinction between the the party its democratic mandate. As Patrick creation of the new state form and the build- Bond has correctly proposed, this has engen- ing of a new socialist economic formation. dered an ‘elite transition’ where democratic The former is made possible by a revolu- processes become increasingly circumscribed tionary seizure of power; the latter, through as the preserve of political and economic the exercise of that political power by a power-holders, and the boundaries of opposi- class whose interests are unconditionally tion and debate (particularly within the served by a socialist order.’6 alliance) progressively narrowed.8 Historically, many liberal and neo-Marxist aca- From a peculiarly romanticised attachment to demics, as well as numerous alliance intellectu- classic guerrilla warfare, to a rhetorically heavy

66 McKinley notion of insurrectionary people’s power, to have the space to create, to sing, to laugh, to social and political contracts with capital, the criticise. We were wrong. We now realise strategic thrust of the ANC’s struggle for that space can never be assumed; it must be national liberation, consummated in the post- fought for. Of course, some of us will yield 1994 period, has consistently underestimated to the temptations you offer, many will con- and seriously undermined the potential and form to the new status quo (already self- actual struggle of the people themselves. censorship and fear of criticising the ANC Because of this, processes such as democratisa- is rife), some will go into exile and a few tion have taken on a narrow petit-bourgeois, will say “Nyet”.’12 nationalist and predominantly political meaning As insurance against such concerns about the and context. This perspective is thus left with ANC’s trajectory, SACP and Cosatu initiated no other option than to see socio-economic the drawing up of a Reconstruction and change as secondary to the necessarily parallel Development Programme (RDP). Ostensibly, struggle for political change. In other words, it the RDP was designed to secure a political and privileges the capitalist status quo.9 Indeed, as programmatic commitment by the ANC gov- Neville Alexander has cogently argued, such a ernment to meeting the basic social and eco- liberal, free-market approach is unlikely to sat- nomic needs of workers and the poor. After isfy the material needs of the oppressed and numerous intra-alliance workshops and meet- impoverished majorities in places like South ings with ‘civil society’, the RDP emerged pub- Africa, ‘even though the gains in political space licly in early 1994. It was hailed by the alliance and in (individual) freedoms and rights are by leadership as the new ‘people’s programme’ no means unimportant’.10 South Africa’s expe- and rapidly achieved the status of an electoral rience since 1994 bears this out. But not sur- manifesto on which the ANC subsequently rode prisingly, the ANC’s pursuit of an elite-led, lib- to victory.13 eral democratic and deracialised capitalism has It was not surprising then, that after the over- precipitated serious ideological opposition, whelming ANC victory at the polls a lengthy class confrontation, and more general political period of alliance harmony set in. And yet, debate and dissent within its own ranks and while all seemed quiet on the public front, a those of its alliance partners. hugely important and instructive internal ANC document had been drawn up by then ANC 2. SETTING THE BOUNDARIES Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, in preparation Along with the more radical sections of the for the ANC’s 49th National Conference ANC, the SACP and Cosatu accepted the ‘his- (December 1994). Entitled From Resistance to toric compromise’ that had emerged from nego- Reconstruction: Tasks of the ANC in the New tiations. However, indications of political and Epoch of the Democratic Transformation – organisational restlessness within the alliance Unmandated Reflections, the lengthy document spurred a cautious approach. Such signs includ- provides a comprehensive look into the views ed the 1993 call by the National Union of of the future leader of the ANC and the coun- Mineworkers to break the alliance after the try, on the character of political opposition and 1994 elections, and the highly publicised ‘disci- the content of democratic debate (both within plining’ of an ANC/SACP stalwart, Harry and outside the alliance).14 Under the heading Gwala, for condemning the compromises made ‘Strategic Objectives of the Opposition’ Mbeki and public utterances by Cosatu’s leadership had this to say: reminding the ANC that it would ‘not be told ‘Some of these objectives that these forces what to do’.11 Similarly, in reaction to early will pursue will be: To destroy the ANC indications that the ANC leadership was devel- from within (and) to create contradictions oping an intolerance for divergent perspectives and conflict between the ANC and other from within its ranks, long-time ANC cultural formations in the democratic movement. activist, Mike van Graan, voiced what many The offensive against the ANC will concen- others in the alliance felt when he publicly trate on a number of issues, among others: declared that: Splitting the organisation and fomenting an ‘Those of us who fought alongside you internal struggle on the basis that the ANC against apartheid thought that now we will is made up of three component parts (in

67 McKinley

government, in parliament and at the grass- government” on the basis that the latter is roots) – the ANC in government will be likely to act in a manner intended to portrayed as having betrayed the interests of appease the domestic and international busi- the masses, the ANC in parliament which ness world and multilateral financial institu- will present itself as the ‘revolutionary tions.’ watchdog’ over the treacherous ANC in the Given such a conspiratorial approach to impor- executive, and the ANC outside government tant questions of political opposition and which will be projected as the true represen- debate, it is not surprising that Mbeki would tative of the soul of the movement with a argue that ‘it is vital that we secure the unity of historic task to be the “revolution watch- the ANC, the Tripartite Alliance and broad dogs”; Splitting the ANC around the issue democratic movement around a common strate- of leadership, with various comrades within gic and tactical approach’. Similarly, it the movement being set up against one becomes clearer why Mbeki should view those another on the basis that they represent dif- within the alliance, that might hold and express ferent competing tendencies within the opposing ideological perspectives as potential movement ...’ enemies of the new state (and ANC) and thus Mbeki goes on to argue that such opposition argue that: forces will attempt to break the alliance by: ‘It would also help to contain those forces ‘Encouraging the SACP to publicly project among our ranks which, having draped itself as the “left conscience” which would themselves in the cloak of radicalism, fight for the loyalty of the ANC in the cause objectively act to discredit and weaken the of the working people, against an ANC government. We must understand that the leadership which is inclined to over-com- new democracy cannot allow for hostile promise with the forces of bourgeois surveillance of the democratic process and reformism; Inciting the SACP to use its the participants in this process. Change also independent structures as a Party to carry demands that the ANC and the democratic out such a campaign while also encouraging movement as a whole should be able to the members of the SACP within the ANC shed some of its “members” regardless of to form themselves into an organised fac- how this might be exploited by our oppo- tion to pursue the same objective; nents to discredit the movement.’ [My Encouraging the constitution of an ultra-left emphasis.] political formation which would, itself, If such a document had been made accessible to challenge the policies and revolutionary the broad membership of the alliance partners, credentials of the SACP, to force the latter it would no doubt have created a substantial to intensify its offensive to “rectify the line” wave of vigorous and potentially hostile debate within the ANC; Encouraging Cosatu and and commentary. Mbeki’s dangerous tendency its affiliates to project the pursuit of politi- to prejudge potential organisational opposition cal and socio-economic objectives different and dissenting political viewpoints within the from those that the ANC has set itself as a alliance as inherently negative and undermining governing party; Encouraging Cosatu to of the ‘movement’ would have, at the very exploit the fact of the democratic transition least, received a corrective roasting from within and the place of the ANC in government to the SACP and Cosatu. Similarly, a wider expo- interpret this to mean that the ANC has an sure of Mbeki’s explicit arguments for narrow- obligation to “its electorate”, namely the ing the boundaries of intra-alliance debate on African working class, to support it in all its key political and economic issues might have demands or face denunciation as a traitor; had the effect of creating a more tolerant and On these bases, to encourage the launching sustained atmosphere of expressive freedom of a major and sustained mass campaign, (both within the alliance and broader society). which, while addressing various legitimate Unfortunately, the document remained the priv- worker demands would, at the same time, ileged possession of a select group of ANC pose the spectre of ungovernability; And leaders. When several of the scenarios it dealt otherwise, encouraging the unions to be with began to actually take place in later years, suspicious of the intentions of the “ANC in not as the result of conspiratorial prodding but

68 McKinley in response to many of the policies adopted by South Africa. Nonetheless, there were worrying the ANC leadership, its arguments as to how to signs of intolerance for political opposition and deal with them were readily employed by that freedom of expression from within the ANC’s same leadership. own ranks, as well as from its left alliance While it is impossible to gauge the extent to allies. There were also clear signals that the which Mbeki’s ‘unmandated reflections’ influ- ANC leadership was fast moving away from enced the character and content of the ANC’s agreed-upon alliance positions that had been 49th National Conference, the two main out- arrived at through vibrant and open democratic comes were consistent with his perspectives debate and ideological contestation. If the and push for power. Not only did the Congress SACP and Cosatu had paid close attention to succeed in unifying the alliance behind strate- the short-lived, but symbolically important, gic pledges to fulfill the promises of the RDP, National Growth and Development Strategy but it also signaled the ascendance of Mbeki to document issued by the ANC government in the apex of power within the ANC (and by early 1996 (a document whose main thrust was association, the alliance). Potential rivals, such to ride roughshod over the RDP’s basic princi- as former ANC Secretary General, Cyril ples), they might have been able to foresee the Ramaphosa and the long-time ANC intellectu- turbulent times that lay just around the corner. al, , were pushed aside in the lead- ership stakes, although both retained their base 3. MOVING INTO ANOTHER GEAR of popularity with the membership. There was Ironically, it was just prior to the 75th little debate, and certainly no open opposition Anniversary of the SACP in July 1996, that the from within the ranks of the alliance, although ANC government unveiled publicly its new one radical academic with ties to the ANC was macroeconomic policy entitled, the Growth, brave enough to warn that ‘(ANC) policy mak- Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) pro- ing is being made in spite of and outside the gramme. If previous ANC economic road signs context of the RDP (which) is potentially sub- had pointed in the direction of moving away ject to a process of marginalisation’.15 For the from the RDP’s more radical redistributive ori- next year-and-a-half, alliance partners put most entation, GEAR served to provide confirmation of their organisational energies and intellectual of the shift to a liberal capitalist, growth-first efforts into tackling the new challenges of tak- framework. Much like the political economy ing over a contested state apparatus and grap- underlying the convergence of liberal democra- pling with the necessities of legislative reform. cy and capitalism, GEAR forthrightly commit- Outside of these governmental demands, ted the ANC government (and all the SACP alliance politics revolved predominately around and Cosatu politicians and bureaucrats in it) to tactically distinct, but strategically reinforcing a strict monetarist regime, market-led growth pronouncements of fealty to the RDP. For strategies and a South African version of example, the SACP’s 9th Congress (6–8 April trickle-down economics.18 Finance Minister 1995) emerged with a Strategic Perspectives declared that GEAR was ‘non- document that was dominated by references to negotiable’ and a stream of ANC leaders were ‘implementing’ and ‘hegemonising’ the RDP,16 quick to argue publicly that the new policy was and an SACP discussion document emanating only intended as the means to implement the from the first post-election Alliance Summit RDP. Even the Central Committee of the held in September 1995, called for ‘an effective SACP, most probably swayed by influential ANC-led political centre to ensure effective members of the Cabinet in its ranks, issued a implementation of the RDP’17 (a call that was press statement soon thereafter ‘welcoming’ to be repeated several times over the next few GEAR and stating that they ‘fully backed the years). objectives of this strategy’.19 In a somewhat The RDP euphoria and the provincial/local ironic twist, months prior to the announcement government elections of November 1995, of GEAR, the RDP ‘Ministry’, led by former which the ANC won comfortably in most parts Cosatu General Secretary, , had of the country, undoubtedly provided extra been unceremoniously shut down, despite political glue for a generally united alliance muted protests from the SACP and Cosatu. during the first two years of post-apartheid Naidoo himself, a former socialist militant, was

69 McKinley shunted to the Post and Telecommunications Secretary, Jeremy Cronin (also a member of the Ministry, eventually being pushed right off the ANC’s National Executive Committee, like political stage. several other SACP and Cosatu leaders), began However, it was not long before grassroots to publicly lambast the ANC for embracing members of all three alliance partners began to such GEAR ‘non-negotiables’ as privatisation, question seriously the process by which GEAR sparking media reports that ANC President had been adopted and its clear departure from Mandela had threatened to ‘resign’ if Cronin the economic proposals as contained in the was not ‘fired’ from the ANC’s National RDP. Even so, this debate took place predomi- Executive Committee.23 The SACP’s Central nately outside of the public realm, being effec- Committee also made a strategic intervention, tively contained for several months within the raising some critical questions about the politi- structures of the ‘movement’. Within the ANC, cal direction of the alliance.24 At about the reports began to emerge that there was a con- same time, the ANC released a discussion doc- certed attempt by the leadership to crack down ument, The State and Social Transformation, on any dissent, particularly within the ranks of that controversially argued for a ‘neutral’ state parliament.20 Angry ANC members of parlia- and a more technocratic approach to gover- ment (MPs) were quoted as saying that there nance. Cronin, and then SACP Deputy was now a ‘climate of fear’ in which ‘internal Chairperson , vigorously democracy gets crushed’ and where ‘you don’t attacked the document, although they were think about sticking your neck out for fear of careful to present their response as part of a getting your head chopped off’.21 Echoes of ‘broad and necessary debate’.25 Mbeki’s earlier perspectives on dealing with For its part, Cosatu had remained relatively dissent and opposition were clearly being heard silent following the introduction of GEAR, but within the ANC and it was becoming clear that it was not long before it responded by issuing a those who stepped out of ‘line’ would be sub- lengthy discussion paper entitled, A Draft ject to intense pressure to conform coupled to Programme for the Alliance. Clearly directing the threat of political and/or material marginali- its critical comments at the process by which sation. the ANC had adopted GEAR, Cosatu stated While the initially muted character of the that the organisations within the alliance had, GEAR debate was testimony to the political ‘agreed to cooperate, consult and take joint and organisational management strengths of the decisions on collective action for the emancipa- ANC leadership and other alliance heavy- tion of our people’. weights, they could only contain what was In a stinging polemic, Cosatu argued that due rapidly becoming a fundamental debate about to the absence of ‘proper mandate and consen- political choices and economic policy for so sus the lack of leadership from the democratic long. As one SACP internal critique of GEAR movement has begun to lead to disillusionment, had argued: depoliticisation and alienation from politics ‘(we) reject the government’s macroeco- amongst ordinary people’. Going on to argue nomic strategy. It is indicative of a right- that the alliance must return to the RDP with ward shift by the ANC government. As a concrete measures for implementation (includ- framework it places capitalist accumulation ing job creation), it ended with a clear rejection at the centre of growth and development, as of the ANC’s GEAR policy and a reminder to opposed to the prioritisation of basic needs the ANC of the political importance of the and redistribution in the RDP.’22 alliance: By late 1996, the debate had burst out into the ‘If the existing macroeconomic framework open. For the first time since the 1994 elec- is unable to accommodate the most basic tions, SACP and Cosatu leaders were publicly elements of the Alliance agenda, it would criticising their ANC counterparts, spurred on need to be re-worked to bring it in line with by intense pressure from lower structures and the programme adopted by the Alliance.’26 the serious contradictions emerging between Even so, despite the obvious need for debate ANC political assurances and actual policy and opposition around GEAR within the ANC implementation. Backing off the earlier and alliance to go beyond the confines of writ- endorsement of GEAR, SACP Deputy General ten documents and into the heart of the respec-

70 McKinley tive organisations, there once again descended leadership engaged in various theoretical a period of political and organisational quies- debates, the SACP always being the most cence. There were certainly ongoing discus- garrulous, stroked each others egos and gave sions amongst the various levels of alliance long speeches about the need for greater unity. leadership as to how best to bridge the gaps that President Mandela declared confidently that had opened up as a result of the adoption of ‘notwithstanding differences, the alliance is GEAR. Nonetheless, the most crucial thing to united’, and Thabo Mbeki adopted a conciliato- emerge was the ability of the ANC leadership, ry tone in telling his colleagues that ‘the alongside many of their SACP and Cosatu col- alliance officials are convinced that we will leagues, to contain and suppress truly open emerge out of this meeting with greater unity of debate within base organisational structures and the alliance and we accept that we have been at to let the mass membership shape its outcome. fault as the leadership of the alliance at this The bottom line was that those who attempt- level’.29 The summit ended with the ANC giv- ed to engage in such debate and who openly ing verbal assurances to the SACP and Cosatu expressed their opposition were told to ‘toe the that the RDP was still alive, that ‘macroeco- line’, threatened with ‘disciplinary measures’ or nomic policy is not cast in stone’, and a gradually marginalised from the respective cen- reminder to their allies that the severe ‘con- tres of decision-making and power.27 One of straints’ they faced in government would the results of this was that base structures of all require patience and political maturity.30 three alliance organisations were severely Leadership summits are one thing, but the weakened, as disillusioned and critically mind- coming together of several thousand worker ed cadres left, while others remained silent. For delegates tends to change the script, and this is those who were more politically susceptible to exactly what happened a few days later at the the bullying and cajoling, a career in govern- sixth Cosatu Congress. Obviously feeling the ment awaited. What made these developments need for the ‘line’ on GEAR to be clearly all the more dangerous for the general health of understood (and taken to heart), the ANC organisational democracy (not to mention polit- unleashed Mandela on the assembled delegates. ical principle), was that the alliance leadership He promptly informed them that although continued to act as though none of this was the aspects of GEAR were negotiable, Cosatu was case and that, indeed, democratic debate and being too ‘sectoral’ in its opposition and that opposition within the ANC and alliance was as the ANC government could not be held back by healthy as ever. one sector of the populace due to their ‘self- interest’. In response, Cosatu President John 4. THE HEAVY HAND OF ENFORCED UNITY Gomomo, took Mandela to task for being mis- ‘Love of power is the chief danger of the informed about agreements on labour legisla- educator, as of the politician’ – Bertrand tion and defiantly called the government’s Russell28 macroeconomic policy ‘reverse GEAR’.31 After three years of holding the political reins These harsh exchanges of words were, no of power, the leadership of the ANC and its doubt, designed to shore up the leaders respec- alliance partners had begun to establish what tive credentials with the constituencies that they was to become a familiar pattern to deal with were out to please. potentially explosive and divisive differences For Mandela and the ANC leadership it was amongst the ranks – hold an alliance summit. international and domestic corporate/finance Not only were such summits a means to ‘talk capital, for Gomomo – the workers who would things through’ but could also be tightly con- soon re-elect him. Speaking to the press after trolled by the selected leadership invited to the day’s proceedings, Cosatu General attend. By mid-1997, despite their energetic Secretary, Sam Shilowa, was quick to take up efforts to dampen the spontaneity and militancy the double-speak word games. On the one of the debate around GEAR and the increasing- hand, he accused unnamed government minis- ly negative responses to its practical effects, the ters of ‘treating the alliance with contempt’ and alliance leadership felt the need to convene of policies being ‘driven by technocrats, the another summit. Like the previous one (and like bureaucracy and ministries’, and on the other, those that were to come after), the alliance he profusely praised the ‘strength and rele-

71 McKinley vance’ of the alliance.32 The pattern was taking between alliance partners.37 Newly elected effect. ANC President Mbeki, quickly followed him, The same pattern also began to emerge in and in a clearly calculated move to appease dis- relation to the character of the SACP leader- senters within the ANC and the alliance, confi- ship’s approach to its relationship with the dently asserted that the ANC ‘wants members ANC. While maintaining a socialist-inspired who are critical and not afraid to speak out’.38 opposition to GEAR (that was not without con- While Mbeki probably did not expect his ‘invi- testation amongst the SACP’s Central tation’ to be taken up so forcefully, nor so Committee),33 the ‘line’ remained that such promptly, the quick-fire release of the SACP’s socialist positions were ‘consistent’ with the discussion documents in preparation for its ‘common commitment’ of the ANC and the upcoming 10th Congress indicated that there SACP to an ‘ongoing National Democratic still existed an intense opposition, among the Revolution’. Indeed, GEAR and other areas of ranks of the SACP (and Cosatu), to GEAR and (what were, in reality) fundamental ideological the way in which the ANC had dealt with sub- chasms were presented as ‘secondary differ- sequent debate. Covering everything from ences’.34 macroeconomic policy to gender equality, the The ANC’s 50th National Conference (16–20 SACP documents laid out a sustained critique December 1997) served to confirm the ANC of the character and content of the ANC gov- leadership’s mastery of the art of (heavy hand- ernment’s political and economic policies and ed) political management. While allowing for the ensuing effects on the ‘movement’s’ organi- much pre-Congress discussion and debate on its sational effectiveness.39 An emboldened Cronin still controversial GEAR policies, the Congress went further, publicly stating that ‘the ANC is itself was run like a corporate stockholders its own worst enemy at the moment, with its annual meeting. Taking a cue from the likes of fear of dissenting voices it needs to listen to the the United States Democratic Party, Congress fears and concerns of people. Mugabe epito- proceedings were designed to ensure a mini- mises where we could end up (with) swings mum of ideological and leadership contestation, between demagoguery and managerialism’.40 mixed in with a heavy dose of public shows of Even if the SACP documents and Cronin’s unity. However, the real source of the ANC’s public comments had as much to do with politi- ability to appear united, derived from the lead- cal jockeying ahead of an important Congress ership’s ability to manage the contradictions as with fundamental ideological and policy between pre-Congress discussions and the prac- divergences, they gave some credence to the tical implementation of ANC (governmental) feeling among many cadres that the outcome of policy, guided by Congress resolutions. The this latest intra-alliance flare-up would be cru- fact that ideological battles around key issues cial to the future of open/meaningful debate of ANC economic and political strategy were and opposition within the alliance and possibly, not reflected in Congress resolutions, only the alliance itself. served to confirm the ‘success’ of the leader- It did not take long for Mbeki and the ANC ships’ political management capabilities.35 leadership to nail their colours to the mast. Echoing the (by now) common mantra of the Within the space of a few days at the end of leadership, all ANC cadres were directed to June 1998, a double-barrelled attack was ‘build and strengthen the Alliance at all levels, unleashed in an effort to silence (or, at least through a coordinated political programme’ quieten down) those who, in the eyes of the (which had never existed), and potentially ANC, were stepping out of line with their criti- recalcitrant alliance partners were directed to cal and public dissent. Mbeki publicly lashed ‘accept the obligation to resort to processes out at alliance activists who had been cam- internal to the alliance to resolve differences’.36 paigning for the release (from a As if on cue, newly elected ANC General gaol) of well-known and outspoken ANC mem- Secretary, Kgalema Montlanthe – the former ber and government official, Robert McBride, head of the National Union of Mineworkers for ‘compromising the work of the government’ who had been an outspoken opponent of GEAR and showing ‘disrespect’.41 ANC leaders were – indicated publicly that his main task would be also deployed to the Special Cosatu Congress, to bridge the gap on macroeconomic policy where they proceeded to issue veiled threats of

72 McKinley serious trouble if the trade union federation did cations, telling lies, claiming easy victories, not change tact in its heavy criticisms of GEAR fake revolutionary posturing’ and joining and government plans for the ‘restructuring’ of ‘defenders of reaction to sustain an offensive the public sector.42 And then came the SACP’s against our movement’. 10th Congress. As if those charges were not enough, Mbeki The timing of the SACP Congress was strate- then resorted to proclaiming that the alliance gically important for both the SACP and ANC was objectively unquestionable: (especially in government). Inside the SACP ‘The struggle for the genuine emancipation there had been a long-running, but intense, of the masses of our people is not over and debate about the relative allegiance of commu- will not be over for a long period of time. nists to the ANC, against the backdrop of This objective reality means that the basis GEAR and increasing conflict between the two does not exist for the partners in the organisations at the grassroots level. Questions Alliance fundamentally to redefine the rela- of leadership loyalties and ideological direction tionship among themselves, including the were also high on the agenda. The ANC on the way they handle their differences and con- other hand was beginning its build-up to the all tradictions.’ [My emphasis.] important 1999 general elections, and was con- In essence, Mbeki was commanding the SACP fronted with a rapidly declining currency and to stop thinking and acting as if it was an inde- was under serious pressure from domestic and pendent organisation that had its own political international capital to make a categorical com- voice and could make its own strategic choices, mitment to GEAR. The recent surge in public if it wanted to stay in the alliance. Concluding, critique of its policies and unmistakeable signs he unilaterally declared that the ‘death of the of political restlessness in the alliance only ANC, which will not happen, would also mean added to the charged atmosphere. the death of the rest of the progressive move- With South Africa, and much of the world ment in our country’. Simply translated, he was watching,43 first Mandela, and then Mbeki pro- telling the SACP that it was nothing, and could ceeded to launch virulent attacks against the be nothing, without the ANC. SACP. A finger wagging Mandela told the pre- The immediate response by the assembled dominately youthful delegates that neither the SACP delegates to the speeches was to join in government nor the ANC would deviate from an unprecedented, albeit muted, rounds of boo- GEAR, no matter how much the SACP (or ing and hissing. There was no doubt that a Cosatu) wished it otherwise. He then proceeded majority felt both shocked and insulted and to inform the SACP that the character and con- were ready and willing to consider radical mea- tent of its criticism of GEAR (and by inference, sures as part of a more sustained response. But, the ANC government) was ‘not acceptable’.44 such pregnant possibilities for a serious rupture The implicit message was clear – open dissent in the alliance were not about to be entertained and opposition within the alliance would not be by the leadership. While Cronin and SACP tolerated by the ANC leadership. Central Committee member Thenjiwe Mtintso The next day, Mbeki, speaking in his capaci- responded with light jibes, the SACP leadership ty as ANC President, embarked on an hour- was quick to publicly state that ‘we are more long assault on the political integrity and organ- than ever committed to the alliance and to isational raison d’etre of the SACP.45 Consis- transformation’, and that the differences and tent with past pre-emptive tactics, he prefaced issues raised could best be addressed ‘properly his speech by reminding delegates that there at the senior leadership level’.46 Echoing the would be those that would interpret what he commands of Mbeki, the Congress Declaration was about to say as an indication of an immi- stated that the SACP had ‘a deep commitment nent split in the alliance, and that they ‘will be to the alliance, a commitment that is, above all, proved false, the mere wishes of those whose a strategic imperative’.47 It was clear that agendas are opposed to ours’ [my emphasis]. SACP leaders had effectively internalised the Claiming that the Congress discussion docu- ‘line’ contained in the overtly crude, anti- ments inferred ‘that the ANC no longer repre- democratic and authoritarian messages deliv- sents the interests of the masses of the people’, ered by the two most powerful political figures Mbeki accused the SACP of ‘spreading falsifi- in South Africa. Just like the elite-led, levelling

73 McKinley approach of neoliberalism, the leaders would structure rather than fundamental ideological take care of the details and everything else differences and organisational independence. would merely be about degrees and emphases. While there would still be much talk about Indeed, the significance of what had transpired ‘honest’ and ‘frank’ debate and principled went well beyond the confines of the SACP and opposition within the alliance, it was precisely the alliance, with one South African newspaper the most controversial focal area of debate and correctly posing a fundamental (if self limiting) opposition (i.e. the existence of the alliance question: ‘If communists can’t criticise, who itself) that was effectively being proscribed. can?’48 Indeed, when a provincial leader of Cosatu cir- The effects of these events were confirmed in culated a discussion document arguing for the the months after the Congress. Newly elected alliance to be broken, and for the establishment SACP General Secretary, Blade Nzimande, of a new Workers’ Party, he was brought in quickly returned to the well-worn approach that front of a disciplinary hearing and severely cen- had been used since 1994 (and before) to deal sured.50 What made such an approach all the with fundamental questions of debate and more contradictory was the continued expres- opposition within the ANC and alliance: sions by the SACP (and Cosatu) leadership of ‘It is our belief that a break in the Alliance the need to avoid ‘suppressing difference and at this point in time would unleash anti- debate’.51 The old adage of ‘do as we say, not democratic and reactionary forces ... (it as we do’ had been turned on its head. It was would) be tantamount to handing over our now a case of ‘do as we do, not as we say’. victory back to the apartheid and neo- apartheid forces. It is for this reason that 5. MANAGING CONTRADICTIONS (the SACP) does not believe in the ultra-left ‘Collisions proceeding from the very condi- approach of thinking that the only way to tions of bourgeois society must be fought strengthen socialist and working class out to the end; they cannot be conjured out forces in our country is for the SACP and of existence.’ – Frederick Engels52 Cosatu to break away from the ANC ... The events of 1998, and their aftermath, con- (the) relationship between the NDR and solidated the power of the Mbeki-led ANC socialism ... has always and continues to leadership within both the ANC and the inform the relationship between the SACP, alliance, a development that spelled danger for the ANC and the progressive trade union a vibrant and participatory ‘movement’ democ- movement. It is also this relationship which racy. As the ANC organisational machinery is the foundation of the Alliance itself was revved-up for the 1999 elections, Mbeki (because) the ANC itself has long under- was more determined than ever to ensure con- stood and affirmed the working class is the formity to his ‘line’, although, this time, he did main motive force of the South African rev- not face a great deal of intra-alliance opposi- olution, the crux of the problem, as far as tion. Both Cosatu and the SACP dutifully the SACP is concerned, is a lack of viable marched to the set beat and cranked up their and efficient Alliance structures for effec- own organisational machines to support the tive consultations and discussion on key ANC’s electoral campaign. With what appeared strategic questions facing the movement.’49 to be a very short memory and a taste for the In other words, the approach was to defend the absurd, Cosatu leaders unashamedly told their alliance at all costs, isolate those in the move- members that the ANC’s election Manifesto ment who have other ideas, concentrate deci- ‘strongly reasserts the RDP as the basis for sion-making and political management firmly government policy’ and that workers should in the hands of the respective alliance leaders accept, at face value, the ANC’s promises to and keep pleading for the establishment of ‘elaborate a detailed programme with its ‘proper’ structures to do more talking. Under allies’.53 Going even further, the SACP leader- such a strategic rubric, it was thus easier for the ship ‘celebrated the Manifesto’s reaffirmation SACP leadership to blunt continued criticism of the RDP’ and argued that the ANC was now and opposition within the SACP’s own ranks ‘emphasising anti-neoliberal perspectives’.54 over the alliance and argue that the main prob- Mbeki must have been smiling, knowing full lems in the alliance were ones of process and well that any thought of translating the partici-

74 McKinley pation of his erstwhile leftist allies in drawing was that any substantive threat to the ANC’s up the Manifesto (just as they had done with hold on political power would most probably the RDP) into any fundamental change of ANC only come when its mass, left flank departed economic policy was only resident in the realm from the alliance. of dreams. Hammering home its post electoral advan- To bolster what was fast becoming a highly tage, the ANC government adopted a tough effective strategy and tactics of organisational ‘new’ attitude in public sector wage talks with co-option and ideological amnesia, key leaders unions. Refusing to bow to the demands of the in Cosatu and the SACP who had been particu- unions for an inflation-related increase, ANC larly troublesome, were pulled onto the ANC Minister (and senior SACP leader) Geraldine electoral lists. A few weeks before the elec- Fraser-Moleketi told the public sector workers tions, Cosatu’s Sam Shilowa had been ‘re- that they were being ‘infantile’, even going so deployed’ to become Premier of the far as to quote Lenin to justify the govern- Province (where the ANC and alliance had ment’s stance.56 Feeling under attack and been experiencing serious divisions), prompt- recognising the need to marshal its forces to ing the former union ‘trouble-maker’ to pub- present a united front on the public sector wage licly proclaim that he would now become disputes, Cosatu called another Special Mbeki’s ‘yes-man’.55 The SACP’s most out- Congress during late August. As had always spoken leader and intellectual, Jeremy Cronin been the case, Cosatu invited both ANC accepted a position on the ANC national parlia- President Mbeki and SACP General Secretary mentary list, as did former Cosatu President Nzimande, to address the Congress. If the and ‘reverse-GEAR’ proponent, John union federation had been expecting a more Gomomo. And, SACP National Chairperson, conciliatory approach from its ANC ally, it , was drafted into Mbeki’s received a rude wake-up call when Mbeki sent Presidential office as the new parliamentary ANC National Chairperson (and new Minister liaison officer. Given the fact that all of these of Defence), ‘Terror’ Lekota, as the ANC rep- men had, over the past several years, been at resentative to the Congress with a clear instruc- the forefront of much of the debate and opposi- tion to give the workers the ‘line’. Lekota, who tion emanating from the ANC’s ‘junior’ had previously been considered a ‘radical’ and alliance partners, such moves were all the more whose candidacy had been supported by Cosatu significant. Each of them knew that he would and the SACP at the ANC Congress, proceeded now have to toe the ANC ‘line’, a situation that to tell Cosatu that there was an ‘art of manag- was particularly important in the cases of ing contradictions’ and thus, ‘only consensus Cronin and Nqakula since they continued to positions must be fed to the public’ (again, maintain their positions as SACP office bear- echoing Mbeki’s earlier, personal ‘reflections’ ers. on how to deal with internal alliance debate and The ‘unity’ of the alliance was taking on a opposition). Mimicking Mandela’s finger wag- different meaning and one that Mbeki, in par- ging antics at the SACP Congress, he sternly ticular, must have looked upon with a sense of warned Cosatu that throwing ‘raw opinions’ to achievement and satisfaction. Through a com- the public would only ‘cause confusion and bination of outright political intimidation, ideo- anarchy’ and was ‘unacceptable’ since this logical mysticism and the co-option (or as those would ‘derail the revolution’.57 Much like what in the alliance like to call it, ‘redeployment’) of had happened at the 1998 SACP Congress, del- key ANC ‘trouble-makers’ and Cosatu/SACP egates expressed anger but eventually resolu- leaders into his governmental inner-circle, tions were passed simultaneously expressing Mbeki had largely succeeded in quashing gen- opposition to the ANC government’s position uine opposition and controlling the boundaries and policies while professing continued loyalty of debate. In the event, the ANC resoundingly to the alliance. won the (June) 1999 elections, proving, once It thus came as no surprise when, a few again, the powerful effect of the ‘unity’ of the weeks later, the ANC government unilaterally political elite within the alliance. What was implemented its public sector wage offer (in made clear (if this had not already been the effect, undermining Cosatu’s cornerstone prin- case for many cadres in the SACP and Cosatu), ciple of collective wage bargaining). All Cosatu

75 McKinley could muster was to ‘express the hope that gov- alliance summit. So it was, that yet another ernment would reopen negotiations’ and pledge summit was held in December, and just like to embark on a programme of mass action over previous ones, consisted of lots of talking several months.58 As if to rub salt into Cosatu around pre-prepared discussion documents and wounds, the ANC previously announced that public proclamations of enhanced ‘unity’ and ‘radical’ SACP Central Committee member ‘commitments’ to the alliance. The agreement – (and former ANC MP), Phillip Dexter, would five years after it had initially been proposed – be taking over the reins of the National for the setting up of an alliance ‘political cen- Economic Development and Labour Council tre’ to better manage inter-alliance relations, (Nedlac), a move widely seen as a way to keep was hailed by all three organisations as a means even further ‘tabs’ on Cosatu and another to ‘diffuse tension’ and ensure that all partners SACP leader prone to speak his mind.59 In the ‘can influence government policy’.61 And yet, midst of these ANC manoeuvres to further con- not more than a month later, SACP General solidate the ever-narrowing ‘management of Secretary Nzimande, publicly warned of a ‘lack contradictions’, the ANC controlled Greater of open debate’ within the alliance, that ‘could Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC) result in the creation of patronage and the per- was busy implementing a neoliberal plan for petuation of careerism’.62 It was as if the pro- the city (Igoli2002), that would see most public nouncements of the summit had already dissi- entities and operations being either privatised pated into the thin air of repetitive alliance or corporatised. While making spurious claims rhetoric. He soon followed this with an article of inter-alliance consultation and genuine nego- in a national newspaper, calling for ‘a review of tiations with workers, the GJMC had ridden government’s economic policy’.63 This was an roughshod over sustained opposition from the appeal that had been made over and over again South African Municipal Workers Union by the SACP and Cosatu for the past four years, (Samwu, a leading Cosatu affiliate) and the and which the newly set-up alliance political SACP’s somewhat maverick Johannesburg centre was designed precisely to facilitate. Central Branch. Knowing full well that the Chilean poet and exile, Ariel Dorfman, was Igoli2002 plan would be the model for all other right: ‘History does repeat itself: first as major urban centres, and thus pose a serious tragedy and then as farce’. threat to the interests of municipal workers, If this was not sufficient evidence to symbol- Samwu President, Petrus Mashishi, publicly ise the impotency that has now come to accused the Council’s ANC leadership of being characterise the nature of debate and opposition a ‘small elite’ that had made an art out of within the alliance, then surely the events of the ‘telling lies’.60 None of this deterred the ANC past several months have provided confirma- from its unilateral approach to deciding what tion. The character and content of Cosatu’s was debatable in its own structures and within recent mass action campaign against job losses, the alliance. When Trevor Ngwane, a popular a continuation of its late-1999 skirmish with ANC councillor in , publicly opposed government over the public sector dispute, has the Igoli2002 plan (citing the RDP as his major clearly shown that as long as the ANC leader- reference point), he was promptly brought in ship’s embracement of an elite-led, neoliberal front of an ANC disciplinary hearing and sus- democracy is not challenged fundamentally pended from the organisation for two years. from within, or alternatively outside of, the Tellingly, both Cosatu and the SACP leader- ‘movement’, there will be little chance for ship remained ominously silent, sticking to meaningful debate and opposition in South their increasingly irrelevant calls for more Africa. The strategy and tactics adopted by ‘talks’ within the alliance on Igoli2002. Cosatu and the SACP, as well as those within If there was one thing that had begun to hap- the ANC who do not approve of the present pen with increasing regularity amongst alliance political and economic path, continues to partners, it was talking. Indeed, every time over revolve around seeking to win concessions the past two to three years that there had been a from the leadership of the ANC within a frame- flare-up of opposition and/or debate around key work that consistently waters-down the issues and policies, the ANC had agreed (albeit demands being made (for example, the bases grudgingly) to Cosatu/SACP requests for an for job creation, resource redistribution, sociali-

76 McKinley sation of basic services and democratic debate). stant propagation of the need for ‘unity’ within This approach is ostensibly designed to ensure the ANC and alliance. This is counter-posed to an acceptable degree of ideological and organi- the dangers of an independent, workers move- sational continuity with the ANC leadership ment and/or political organisation that will running the country, so as to maintain a break such ‘unity’ and thus weaken the ‘libera- ‘National Democratic Alliance’ that is seen as tion movement’. The reality, as this essay has the only viable political/organisational vehicle tried to reveal, is far different. The kind of to meet the needs of the majority (i.e., the unity that ANC elites, led by Mbeki, have fash- workers and the poor). The reality, however, is ioned is one that revolves around a mass of rad- that while bringing some very moderate relief ical-sounding rhetoric about ‘transformation, a to that majority, the most tangible result has progressive National Democratic Revolution, been to preserve and advance the personal deepening democracy, a developmental state, careers and political futures of leaders across workers’ interests and the national interest’. All the alliance spectrum. While making radical the while, however, the political and organisa- sounding statements on worker-related and tional space created has been used to progres- political economy issues, combined with limit- sively narrow the boundaries of debate and ed mass action designed to extract concessions opposition to the chosen ‘line’. In the process, and remind capital of mass power, the leader- the cornerstones of any real democracy have ship of Cosatu and the SACP have been unwill- been, and continue to be, actively attacked ing to make the connection between the neolib- within the ANC and alliance – the critical ques- eral democracy pursued by the ANC elites and tioning of the substance behind such the parallel organisational and class lessons in rhetoric/policy and mobilisation to challenge relation to the alliance. and change the political and economic status The binding message that has held this entire quo. It is no cliché to say that the struggle will edifice together since 1994 has been the con- continue.

ENDNOTES 1) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora and Richard Collected Works, Vol.7 (Moscow: Wilson (eds) Low Intensity Democracy: Progress Publishers, 1977). Political Power in the New World Order, 2) Michael Levin, Marx, Engels and Liberal (London, Pluto Press, 1993), pp. 59-79. Democracy, (New York, St. Martin”s 5) See SACP, Path to Power: Programme of Press, 1989), p. 140. the SACP – 8th Congress, (Inkululeko 3) Op. cit, Levin. Publications, 1989); Cosatu, Social Equity 4) See Samir Amin, The Issue of Democracy and Job Creation, (1993). in the Contemporary Third World, in 6) Joe Slovo, South Africa – No Middle

77 McKinley

Road, in Basil Davidson, David Wilkinson 18) For a left critique of GEAR, see Dale T. and Joe Slovo (eds) Southern Africa: The McKinley, Langa Zita and Vishwas Satgar New Politics of Revolution, (Harmonds- (SACP National Political Education worth, Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 146-147. Secretariat), Critique of Government’s 7) ANC, Strategy and Tactics of the African Macroeconomic Strategy: Growth National Congress: adopted by the Third Employment and Redistribution, (June Consultative Conference of the African 1996). National Congress in April 1969 at 19) SACP Central Committee, Press Release Morogoro, Sechaba, 3 July on Government’s New Macro-Economic 1969. Policy, (June 1996). 8) See Patrick Bond, Elite Transition: From 20) Mondli Makhanya, Death of dissent with- Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South in the ANC , Star, 12 August 1996. Africa, (London, Pluto Press, 2000). 21) Gaye Davis, Authoritarian leadership 9) See Dale T. McKinley, The ANC and the alarms ANC politicians , Mail and Liberation Struggle: A Critical Political Guardian, 4–10 October 1996. Biography, (London: Pluto Press, 1997). 22) McKinley, Zita and Satgar, Critique, p.1. 10) Neville Alexander, Some Are More Equal 23) Justice Malala, Mandela threatened to Than Others: Essays on the transition in leave the ANC, Star, 25 October 1996. South Africa, (Cape Town, Buchu Books, 24) See SACP, Let us not lose sight of our 1993), p. 83. strategic priorities, The African 11) See Strike: Cosatu flexes muscles in Communist, First Quarter (1997), pp.4-20. alliance. Weekly Mail, 22-28 October 25) Blade Nzimande and Jeremy Cronin, We 1993. need transformation not a balancing act – 12) Mike Van Graan. We want culture, not looking critically at the ANC Discussion commisars, Weekly Mail, 7-13 May 1993. Document, Op. cit, pp. 62-70. 13) There were a few minority voices emanat- 26) Cosatu, Discussion Paper – A Draft ing from the ranks of Cosatu that attacked Programme for the Alliance, (November the RDP as a step backward for workers 1996). and the poor. See, for example Roger 27) The author personally experienced such Etkind and Sue Harvey, The workers tactics, following the circulation of a dis- cease fire, South African Labour Bulletin, cussion document within alliance struc- Vol.17, No.5 (1993), pp.84-87. tures entitled ‘GEAR and Class Struggle’ 14) All subsequent references taken from that attacked the content of GEAR and Thabo Mbeki, From Resistance to criticised the left in the alliance for not Reconstruction: Tasks of the ANC in the struggling and organising against its New Epoch of the Democratic Trans- implementation. See also: Dale T. formation – Unmandated Reflections, McKinley. Sounding the Retreat: The Left unpublished mimeo, (9 August 1994). and the Macroeconomic Battle in South 15) Ben Fine, Politics and Economics in ANC Africa, LINKS, No.8. (July-October 1997), Economic Policy – An Alternative pp. 115- 125. Assessment, Transformation, No. 25. 28) Bertrand Russell, Power, (London: (1994), p.30. George Allen & Unwin, 1962), p. 206. 16) SACP, Strategic Perspectives, Document 29) Taken from transcript of Alliance Summit from the 9th Congress, 6-8th April 1995. (31 August–1 September, 1997 at 17) SACP, The Need for an Effective ANC- Gallagher Estate), unpublished mimeo. led Political Centre, A Tripartite Alliance 30) Salvaging the Alliance, Editorial, Business Summit Discussion Document, The Day, 3 September 1997. The call for African Communist, Third Quarter, ‘maturity’ was set against what was to be (1995), pp. 7-16. See also: SACP, considered as ‘infantile’ opposition and Defending and deepening a clear left debate, a word that was to be used several strategic perspective of the RDP, The times to refer to those who voiced serious, African Communist, Third Quarter, vigorous and sustained opposition to the (1995), pp. 29-37. policies of the leadership.

78 McKinley

31) Renee Grawitzky, Mandela put on defen- Congress, (5 July 1998), unpublished sive by Cosatu, Business Day, 17 mimeo. September 1997. 48) If communists can’t criticise, who can?, 32) Vuyo Mvoko, Cosatu not considering Editorial, Mail and Guardian, 1–6 July quitting the alliance, Op. cit. 1998. 33) There were several Central Committee 49) Blade Nzimande, The Role of the SACP members who were, by now, at the centre in the Alliance – Our Vision of Socialism, of government power broking including The African Communist, Third Quarter, , , (1998), pp. 3-9. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, Ronnie 50) See John Appolis, It is Time for a New Kasrils, and Jeff Political Party, (1998), unpublished Radebe. mimeo. Appolis, a senior leader in the 34) SACP, Now more than ever – build the Chemical Workers’ Industrial Union Alliance, The African Communist, Fourth remained in his position but was told that Quarter, (1997), pp. 1-3. any such other would result in 35) See Dale T. McKinley, The ANC’s 50th his firing. Conference: Power to Whom?, Southern 51) SACP, Handling differences within the Africa Report, Vol. 13, No.2, (March people’s camp, Discussion document, 1998), pp. 10-11. (January 1999). 36) ANC, Resolution on the Tripartite 52) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Alliance, ANC 50th National Conference Collected Works, Vol. 7, p.149. (December 1997). 53) Why Workers should vote ANC: Message 37) Wally Mbhele, From unionist to ANC from Cosatu CEC, (April–May 1999), boss, Electronic Mail & Guardian, 25 booklet. February 1998. 54) SACP, June 2 Elections – A platform for 38) Renee Grawitzky, Mbeki wants ANC accelerated transformation, The African members to be critical, Business Day, 30 Communist, Second Quarter (1999). March 1998. 55) Jimmy Seepe. Shilowa: Mbeki’s yes-man, 39) See, The African Communist, Second Sowetan, 5 May 1999. Quarter, (1998). 56) This happened during an interview with 40) Charlene Smith, Watch out, we could end Fraser-Moleketi on national radio during up with a Mugabe, warns SACP, Saturday the wage negotiations with the unions. Star, 22 May 1998. 57) Statement by ANC National Chairperson 41) Stephen Laufer, Mbeki castigates activists Lekota to Cosatu Special Congress, (18 campaigning for release of McBride, August 1999). Business Day, 26 June 1998. 58) Irene Louw, Cosatu backs down as Mbeki 42) Lukanyo Mnyanda and William Mervin slams door on negotiations, Sunday World, Gumede, ANC tells Cosatu to jump in a 19 October 1999. lake, Sunday Independent, 29 June 1998. 59) Estelle Randall, Dexter to shed his militant 43) On the first two days of the Congress there past, Saturday Star, 18 September 1999. were scores of newspaper and TV journal- 60) Petrus Mashishi, Opposition grows to ists from all over the world. Igoli2002, Sunday Business Report, 10 44) Statement of President Mandela at SACP October 1999. 10th Congress, (1 July 1998), unpublished 61) Renee Grawitzky, ANC Forum set up to mimeo. oil Alliance, Business Day, 13 December 45) All subsequent references from: Statement 1999. of ANC President Mbeki at SACP 10th 62) Blade Nzimande, Speech to Memorial Congress, (2 July 1998), unpublished Service on the Anniversary of Joe Slovo’s mimeo. death, (30 January 2000), unpublished 46) Sechaba ka’Nkosi and Rehad Desai, mimeo. Moment of Truth for SACP, Mail and 63) Blade Nzimande, Towards a Socialist Guardian, 1-6 July 1998. South Africa, Mail and Guardian, 18–24 47) SACP, Declaration of the 10th SACP February 2000.

79 The Alliance Under Stress: Governing in a Globalising World

Eddie Webster

Organised labour in South Africa is said to in the peculiarities of South Africa’s colonial face a dilemma in the era of neo-liberal global- history: a national liberation struggle taking isation; it either accepts the economic policy place in an African country with a high level of reversal of its ally, the ruling African National industrialisation. In this respect it is unlike Congress (ANC), and faces marginalisation, or other African countries in that it has led to the else it actively opposes government. However, emergence of a large and independent trade drawing on historical and contemporary union movement. This restricts the options fac- research, this paper suggests that South Africa ing the new government making the subordina- opens up the possibility of an alternative: that tion of labour less likely. the degree of autonomy acquired by the The paper draws on these two sets of experi- Congress of South African Trade Unions ences: countries that have elected social demo- (Cosatu) during the struggle for democracy cratic governments and now find themselves in enables it to emerge as a ‘left pressure group’ conflict with the labour movements which inside the Tripartite Alliance pushing for redis- elected them; and union–party relationships in tributive policies. However, such a path post-colonial Africa, and Zimbabwe in particu- requires a high degree of political tolerance by lar. Importantly these comparative experiences government; a tolerance that the post-colonial are located in the historical context of an ongo- experience in Africa suggests is unlikely. The ing debate in South Africa on the relationship paper concludes that if labour were to be mar- between organised labour and the ruling ANC. ginalised it would therefore put at risk both the The analysis is divided into three parts. First, consolidation of democracy and economic three different political traditions within the reconstruction. labour movement which structure the differing perspectives on its relationship to the national INTRODUCTION liberation struggle are identified. The strategic There is a widespread view that South Africa is compromise that emerged in the 1980s is then unique, that its apartheid past means that it can- examined and the strains in the alliance in the not be compared with any other country. This 1990s described. Second, other countries which notion of South African exceptionalism has led are experiencing tensions in the relationship to an intellectual and political parochialism that between government and labour are identified, restricts our understanding of both the speci- and attempts are made to explain the variation ficity and the commonality of South Africa’s in responses. The results of two surveys are democratisation process in the era of globalisa- reproduced which suggest that in spite of ten- tion. The commonality resides in our experi- sions, the Tripartite Alliance between the ANC, ence of a labour-backed government coming to the South African Communist Party (SACP) power and implementing neo-liberal economic and Cosatu is likely to continue. Third, it is and social policies that are at variance with suggested that the persistence of the alliance labour’s historic goals. The specificity resides can best be explained if South Africa is located

81 Webster in a broader African context and the bonds cre- sympathetic whites, aiming to establish a ated by the national liberation movement iden- ‘national democracy’. tified. However, the fragile nature of democra- Supporters of this view differed over whether cy makes the institutionalised opposition of it was necessary to pass through a national labour difficult. The paper concludes by sug- democratic stage before a socialist stage (the gesting the possibility of labour pressing from two-stage notion of revolution), or whether the the left within the alliance and nudging the gov- national and class struggle could take place ernment toward redistributive policies. coterminously. Most now argue the second position, stressing that the struggle for national 1. UNIONS AND POLITICS: THREE POLITICAL liberation is part of the struggle for socialism. TRADITIONS However, during the 1970s an alternative It is possible to identify three different political political tradition developed in the union move- traditions within the South African labour ment. The ‘shop-floor’ unions that first movement which have historically shaped the emerged in 1973 eschewed political action out- different perspectives on its relationship with side production. They believed it was important the national liberation struggle. The first, and to avoid the path taken by Sactu in the 1960s. most powerful, is the national democratic polit- Rejecting the ‘community unions’ as ‘populist’, ical tradition. the shop-floor unions developed a cautious pol- During the 1950s the ANC, in alliance with icy towards involvement in broader political the South African Congress of Trade Unions struggles. These unions (particularly those (Sactu), established its leadership among the which were to affiliate to the Federation of oppressed classes. This was achieved through South African Trade Unions, which was mobilising the oppressed – across class lines – formed in 1979) emphasised instead the build- around the demands of the . ing of democratic shop-floor structures around Sactu’s participation in the Congress Alliance the principle of worker control, accountability facilitated the rapid growth of trade unions in and the mandating of worker representatives. certain regions.1 However, it also brought Sactu This they saw as the basis for developing a into direct conflict with the apartheid state and working-class leadership in the factories. These the organisation felt the full force of repression unions argued that this strategy involved the in the 1960s. By 1964 it had ceased public best means of survival in the face of state activities in South Africa and departed for repression, and of building strong industrial exile. unions democratically controlled by workers. In the late 1970s this ‘national democratic’ Some within this political tradition supported tradition re-emerged in the labour movement the creation of a mass-based working-class with the advent of general unions, particularly party as an alternative to the SACP. in the shape of the South African Allied The picture of unions and politics in South Workers Union (Saawu), which followed in the Africa has often been incomplete through tradition of Sactu. Such ‘community unions’ neglect of a third political tradition, that of argued that the workers’ struggle in factories black consciousness. Its origins lie partly in the and townships was indivisible, and that unions Africanist ideology articulated by the Pan- had an obligation to take up community issues. Africanist Congress (PAC), which broke away In contrast, it was ‘economism’ and ‘work- from the ANC in 1959 principally because of erism’ for unions to restrict activities to factory the latter’s ‘multi-racial’ definition of the struggles. nation, (although the American black power This ‘national democratic tradition’ involved movement was also highly influential in forg- a view that South Africa could not be under- ing this political tradition in South Africa). stood in simple class terms. Social reality was Black consciousness has similarities to the based upon a ‘colonialism of a special type’ national democratic position, in that it holds necessitating national democratic rather than that racial oppression is a manifestation of class struggle as the appropriate strategic national oppression. However, its emphasis on response. This meant a multi-class alliance racial structures and identities virtually under the leadership of the ANC, drawing all excludes class relations from its analysis. This the sectors of the oppressed black masses and has often given rise to voluntaristic and roman-

82 Webster tic forms of organisation and mobilisation. ing these diverse political traditions into a Nonetheless, by the late 1970s a class analysis working class political project. This challenge had been introduced into the black conscious- was captured by , general sec- ness discourse, whereby class was defined in retary of NUM, in his opening speech to the racial terms. Associated loosely with the inaugural congress of the federation. Cosatu, he National African Council of Trade Unions said, would take an active role in the national (Nactu), a broadly Africanist grouping, the politics in alliance with other progressive black consciousness tradition was distinguished organisations, but such an alliance would be on from other traditions by its emphasis on ‘black terms favourable to the working class. leadership’ of trade unions and its opposition to ‘non-racialism’ in favour of a policy of ‘anti- 2. A STRATEGIC COMPROMISE racism’. In practice, this meant opposition to Responding to the euphoric mood, a Cosatu white intellectual leadership in the trade union delegation visited in February 1986 to movement. This led to this position’s with- speak to the ANC. A joint communique was drawal and exclusion from the unity talks, issued in which the independence of Cosatu which culminated in the December 1985 forma- was acknowledged while the federation com- tion of Cosatu. mitted itself to the struggle for a non-racial Unions entered into joint action with student South Africa under the leadership of the ANC. and civic organisations in the 1984 November However, this clear identification with the stay away. This was made possible national democratic tradition brought the lega- both by the overlapping membership of these cy of division in the labour movement to the organisations and the irresistible pressure from surface again. union members demanding action in the face of Critics within the shop-floor tradition rising rents, transport costs, Bantu Education believed that the Cosatu leadership had acted and the repressive local government system. without a proper mandate in visiting Lusaka According to Jay Naidoo, general secretary of and should have made it clearer that the federa- Cosatu, the November 1984 stay away: tion would struggle ‘independently under its ‘symbolised in a real way the first political own leadership’ within the broad alliance. By intervention by organised labour on such a implying that Cosatu was ‘operating under the large scale since the militant actions of leadership of the ANC’, critics argued, a spirit workers in the 1950s. It further laid the of hostility might be developed towards alterna- basis for a developing alliance between stu- tive political traditions. Furthermore, they dents, youth and the worker-parents and feared some unions might feel that it was no gave the political leadership of workers the longer necessary to obtain proper mandates confidence to assert the leading role of the resulting in actions such as a failed ‘stay away’ working class in the broader struggle of our called by Cosatu for 14 July 1986. people.’2 Some within the shop-floor tradition went Trade unions’ growing willingness to take soli- further and argued that the national democratic darity action with one another began with the tradition stood in absolute contradiction to stoppage over the death in detention of union working-class politics. Organisational style and organiser Neil Aggett. This – together with political content were such that any involve- joint actions with community groups in the ment of the working class in such politics must aftermath of the stay away – culminated in the lead to the surrendering of trade union indepen- December 1985 launch of Cosatu. dence and with it the abandonment of working- The new federation brought together unions class politics. Alliance politics, which stressed from all three political traditions described the ‘people’ over the working class, failed to above: the well organised industrial unions prepare workers for socialism. Unions which drawn from the shop floor tradition; the general became embroiled in populist campaigns would unions drawn from the national democratic tra- lose their organisational independence because dition; and the National Union of Mineworkers they would be unable to control ‘people’s’ (NUM), having recently broken from the black organisations of national democracy. consciousness tradition. While these tactical, strategic and theoretical Cosatu now faced the difficult task of blend- differences persisted inside Cosatu, they began

83 Webster to narrow in the first half of 1987 as the federa- od helped shape the democratic transition and tion wove together ‘a strategic compromise’.3 the nature of the alliance: One example of this was the political resolution • The combination of mass action with negoti- adopted by the National Union of Metalworkers ation helped break the deadlocks at important of South Africa (Numsa) at its May 1987 foun- moments. dation congress. Rather than challenging sym- • Its involvement in economic policy-making bols of the national democratic tradition, generated new institutions, such as the Numsa endorsed the Freedom Charter as ‘a National Economic Development and Labour good foundation stone on which to start build- Council (Nedlac) and research into new ing our working-class programme’ – thus industrial policies. attempting to imprint on the Freedom Charter • It contributed to the new constitution, includ- the strategy of the shop-floor tradition. ing the right to strike. Even though different meanings were being • It was a central political actor, mobilising attached to the Freedom Charter, Cosatu adopt- support for the ANC during the 1994 elec- ed the charter as ‘a guiding document which tion. reflected the views and aspirations of the • It initiated and advocated the Reconstruction majority of the oppressed and exploited in our and Development Programme (RDP). struggle against national oppression and eco- • The RDP was an accord which was viewed nomic exploitation’. However, this NUM-spon- by labour as tying a newly elected ANC gov- sored resolution also noted that Cosatu saw ernment to a labour-driven development pro- these struggles as ‘complementary to each other gramme. and part of an uninterrupted struggle for total In its final formulation, the RDP envisioned as liberation’.4 a first priority ‘beginning to meet the basic There is, on this argument, no conflict needs of people: jobs, land, housing, water, between the struggles for national liberation electricity, telecommunications, transport, a and socialism. In adopting this approach, the clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health dominant position in Cosatu was rejecting any care and welfare’.6 chronological two-stage theory of change in Nonetheless, the class contradictions men- favour of a view that the struggle for national tioned earlier began to come to the fore as the liberation was part of the struggle for socialism. newly unbanned ANC leadership came under a The political differences that divided Cosatu set of local and international pressures to in its first 18 months of existence narrowed and change its economic thinking. From the 1950s, in some cases were buried in the face of the the ANC had been publicly committed to a state onslaught during 1987 and 1988. state-interventionist redistributive strategy, as The necessity forced a tactical and articulated in its central policy document – the strategic compromise, but it had not removed Freedom Charter’s commitment to nationalisa- the differences underlying the competing politi- tion. This policy was publicly reconfirmed by cal traditions. Implicit in this broad-front con- Nelson Mandela on his release from prison in ception was the view that class contradictions February 1990. If, however, Mandela had are secondary to the national democratic strug- entered prison at a time when nationalisation gle.5 was an article of faith, he was released into a In 1989 the reformist F. W. de Klerk replaced world where monetarism and its obsession with P. W. Botha as President of South Africa, and inflation and the reduction in state expenditure signalled his intention to reform apartheid. In had become the new orthodoxy. From 1990, February 1990 he announced the unbanning of there were a series of economic policy reversals the ANC, PAC and SACP, and freed Nelson through which the ANC leadership came to Mandela. adopt positions increasingly consistent with the Over the next 12 months the ANC, Cosatu neo-liberal orthodoxy. By late 1993, the ANC and the SACP forged a formal alliance that cau- had made a number of concessions on macro- tiously began to distance itself from the armed economic policy which were to culminate in struggle and insurrectionist elements in its the Growth, Employment and Redistribution ranks. (GEAR) strategy.7 GEAR aimed to achieve Five interventions by Cosatu during this peri- growth through fiscal deficit reduction, gradual

84 Webster relaxation of exchange controls, reduction in itself to ‘the strategic relevance of the ANC-led tariffs, tax reductions to encourage the private alliance in the current context of the national sector (and especially foreign direct) invest- democratic revolution’.10 At the same time the ment, and privatisation. South African Municipal Workers’ Union When GEAR was released, the alliance part- (Samwu) resolved at its congress ‘that the ners were angered both by the content (which process of beginning a discussion on an alterna- they now saw for the first time) and because the tive to the alliance should begin’.11 Increasing- government asserted that it was ‘non-nego- ly, the alliance seems to be no more than an tiable’. Cosatu General Secretary Sam Shilowa electoral machine that comes to life at election publically criticised GEAR and indicated that time. Since the adoption of GEAR by the ruling these policies could never have emerged from party Blade Nzimande, General Secretary of the ANC before the 1994 elections. Subse- the SACP, remarked at the Samwu congress, quently, agreement could not be reached inside ‘there has been a reluctance within the alliance Cosatu on how to deal with GEAR: some felt to meet’.12 that the policy should be given a chance and the government should not be attacked during a cri- 3. COALITIONS UNDER STRESS IN A sis; others wanted openly to oppose the policy. GLOBALISING WORLD The issue threatened to be divisive both within The ANC is not alone in experiencing tensions and between the alliance partners and, in the in its relationship with labour: similar strains words of leading alliance figures, the ‘people have been placed on labour-based governing walked away from it’.8 Thus, with painful parties throughout the world in the era of glob- irony, what began as an accord to bind an ANC alisation. Despite this seemingly universal trend government to a left development programme toward a ‘loosening’ of party–labour alliances ended up ensnaring both Cosatu and the SACP there exists, ‘considerable variation across in a neo-liberal–inspired macroeconomic poli- cases with respect to both the extent and the cy. nature of change’.13 In fact, there exist substan- The failure of GEAR to perform anywhere tial differences across cases with respect to the close to its own expectations for growth and job ways in which both party and union leaders creation led to growing tension between the have responded to the challenge of neo-liberal- ANC and Cosatu. In 1998 both President ism (see Table 1). Levitsky and Way argue that, Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki used initially, labour backed governments elicit sig- high profile speeches to Cosatu’s central com- nificant cooperation from labour in economic mittee and the SACP’s congress to rebuke both reform, despite the high costs such policies organisations for questioning the government’s entail for unions. Labour acquiesces initially, economic policy. Mandela accused trade unions of being ‘selfish’ and ‘sectoral’, bent on pro- Table 1 tecting their interests at the expense of the nation.9 Compared to the mass of unemployed Labour Labour Cooperation Defection living below subsistence, workers organised in trade unions were being regarded in certain cir- Party Relative Maintenance cles of government as a privileged labour aris- Commitment Australia, Norway, tocracy. Sweden As the implementation of the new economic policy has begun to impact on Cosatu members, Party Marginalisation Divorce union leaders have become increasingly vocal Neglect Argentina, Mexico, France, in their criticisms of government economic pol- New Zealand Poland, icy. For the first time Cosatu affiliates have Spain publically discussed an alternative to the ANC to lead the alliance. At Numsa’s annual con- Reference: Levitsky and Way, Between a Shock gress in August 2000, a resolution was tabled and a Hard Place: The Dynamics of labour-led Adjustment in Poland and Argentina, for the SACP to replace the ANC as leader of Department of Political Science, University of the alliance. After considerable debate the con- California, Berkeley,1996, p6. gress rejected this resolution and committed

85 Webster they suggest, because of social linkages – the developed between the ANC and Cosatu during shared identities and personal ties built during the anti-apartheid struggle ensured that close the years of cooperation and shared hardship. cooperation continued in the first few years of But these are not always sufficient to sustain the new government. Both the ANC and Cosatu labour–government cooperation over the long seemed committed to the alliance continuing in haul. a cooperative manner. The ANC had embraced As Table 1 illustrates, in some cases party the RDP in its election campaign and began to and union leaders have continued to prioritise pass labour-friendly legislation. The relation- the maintenance of the alliance. Although con- ship seemed to fit the top left quadrant, along sultation and cooperation continue in Norway with similar examples of partnerships between and Sweden, the union–party cooperation in organised labour and labour backed govern- Australia ended in 1996 when the Labour Party ments in the Nordic countries and Australia. was defeated. In other cases – which the However, second, the introduction of GEAR authors categorise as ‘marginalisation’ – unions created sharp conflict and for a period during have largely continued to support the party, but 1996 it looked as if Cosatu would emerge as a their party allies have not invested as heavily in strong opponent within the alliance. This is the alliance. The result is that union influence captured best in the top right quadrant. How- in countries such as Mexico, Argentina and ever, as described above, Cosatu and the SACP New Zealand, has been substantially eroded. In were to withdraw from public criticism, and a third set of cases – which they label ‘divorce’ Cosatu’s influence over social and economic – the level of commitment of both party and policy has declined, suggesting that the rela- union leaders has declined significantly. As a tionship could best be placed in the bottom left result, in countries such as Poland, France and quadrant. Spain, these alliances have largely collapsed Much of the media debate has focused rather under the strain of neo-liberal adjustment.14(See superficially around the question of whether the Table 1.) strains in the alliance will lead to Cosatu’s The authors focus on three variables to withdrawal. ‘Divorce’, captured in the bottom explain the different outcomes. First, compet- left quadrant, is after all the outcome of the ing unions make defection more likely, as conflict that broke out with organised labour unions that must compete for membership find when social democratic governments in Spain it costly to support measures which threaten the and France introduced neo-liberal economic living standards of members. A second factor is policies in the 1980s! This seems unlikely in the strength of the governing party: if it is like- the South African case. The reasons are com- ly to remain in power, union leaders may plex but it is useful to begin such an explana- decide that cooperation with neo-liberal poli- tion by reflecting what Cosatu members at cies is preferable to political isolation. But if it workplace level expect of the new government. fares badly in elections, the coalition becomes With this question in mind, a nation-wide more problematic. The third variable is labour research project (entitled Taking Democracy autonomy from the state. The more dependent Seriously) was embarked upon in 1994. The unions are on material and political resources, results of the first phase of the study – conduct- the more likely they are to remain in the gov- ed two months before the first democratic elec- erning coalition.15 In Poland, for example, the tions among 643 Cosatu members in work- party-labour alliance was vulnerable because of places in Gauteng, Eastern Cape, Western Cape a weak governing party, labour competition, and Kwazulu-Natal – were published in 1995.16 and high union autonomy. The result was In 1998 the same research team conducted the ‘divorce’. In Argentina, a near monopoly on second phase of the study among 646 Cosatu labour organisation and high union dependence members in the same workplaces. on state and party resources produced the oppo- What is striking about the two data sets are site result – marginalisation inside the alliance. the similarities in the results. As Table 2 indi- The implications of these responses for the cates, in both 1994 and 1998, the vast majority nature of union–party relations in South Africa of the respondents supported the alliance would seem to be as follows. First, the strong between the ANC, Cosatu and the SACP. The linkages between activists and the solidarity only significant difference in responses

86 Webster

Table 2: Support for alliance in 1994 and no longer mobilise. But what it does suggest is 1999 elections that mobilisation against a government that has been democratically elected with which labour Party 1998 1994 is in alliance takes on a very different meaning than ‘a clash with the illegitimate apartheid ANC/SACP/ 74% 75% state’.18 The complex tension between support- Cosatu Alliance ing government and continuing to struggle for Azapo 0.2 % 1% better wages and working conditions is cap- DP 0.5% 1% tured in this comment by a shop steward in IFP 0.9% 0% May 1994: NP 4% 5% ‘We must go back to the drawing board and PAC 0.6% 1% come up with a new strategy. We cannot UDM 3% – use the very same strategy we were using Total = 646 against De Klerk’s government. That strate- Missing = 5% gy was aimed at pushing the company and Have not yet decided = 4.5% the government at the same time. Now we Will not vote = 11% have in place our own government there, so we must come up with a strategy that will Source: Taking Democracy Seriously data, 1994 and not give our government a problem, but will 1998 only give the company problems. Strikes will give the government a problem, between the two surveys is the support in the because we will be shaking our economy, 1998 survey for the United Democratic both nationally and internationally. Not to Movement (UDM) (3%) – largely a break- say that we are not going to strike any more away party from the ANC, and the increase in – we will strike when it is necessary, but we the number of respondents who were undecided are going to have to minimise those actions, (4.1%) or did not intend to vote (11%). because we must support this govern- When respondents were asked what they ment.’19 would do if the government did not deliver on In 1994 expectations were high and respon- its promises, most respondents opted for pres- dents were asked to identify these expectations sure on the government such as lobbying for- (see Table 4). In 1998 they were asked to assess mer unionists sent to parliament or mass action whether delivery had taken place. The respons- (see Table 3). Only a third opted for forming an es broadly reflect the government’s perfor- alternative party that would provide benefits for workers. The one significant difference – the Table 3: What action if government fails to drop in support for mass action from 72% in deliver 1994 to 53% in 1998 – is predictable. Action 1994 1998 The mobilising power of labour under apart- heid, especially via successful ‘stay aways’ (or Put pressure on former 66% 70% general strikes), was derived in part from its unionists sent to parliament 17 association with race. The transition to demo- Vote for another 40% 37% cracy is beginning to sever this association. The party in the next election removal of political apartheid has broken the Form an alternative party 29% 33% link between the state and racial despotism in that will provide these the workplace. Importantly, the opportunities benefits to workers for black advancement have opened up career Participate in ongoing 72% 53% trajectories that were unthinkable under mass action to force the apartheid. The increasing significance of occu- government to deliver on pational and income divisions among black its promises Workers will do nothing 4% 0.5% workers means that it no longer makes sense to conceptualise black workers as a homogeneous Source: Taking Democracy Seriously Data: 1994 and group. 1998. Of course this does not mean that labour will

87 Webster

it was the best we could do to ensure creation Table 4: Expectations of Cosatu members in 21 1994 and assessment of delivery in 1998 of jobs in a sea of unemployment in the area’. This pragmatic approach was rejected by an Issue 1994 1998 older generation of workers, known as Indlu expectations assessments Yeengwevu (the house of elders), who felt that of delivery their militant tradition was under threat and that the leadership – with the support of the ANC in Service 1994 1998 1998 the region – was capitulating to the employers. Yes Yes No The dispute led to a three-week strike ending in Better housing 91% 55% 39.2% the dismissal of the dissident group from Higher wages 79% 41% 49% Volkswagen and from the union, Numsa. Access to land 81% 52% 35% The second variable is the strength of the Clean water 82% 81% 9% Electricity 85% 81% 11% governing party. In the case of the ANC it won Telephones 72% 76% 16% an overwhelming majority in 1994 and Better public transport 79% 54% 32% increased its returns in 1999. It is likely to Enough nutritional food 77% 53% 33% remain in power over the next decade. Union Better health 87% 63% 26% leaders are therefore likely to continue to want Access to education 90% 62% 29% to cooperate with the government in the hope of Safety (cleaner and 86% 64% 25% influencing it, rather than opting for the politi- healthier environment) cal wilderness. The third variable is labour autonomy from Source: Taking Democracy Seriously data, 1994 and the party and the state. Here Cosatu is in a rela- 1998. tively strong position as during the 1980s and early 1990s it developed its own political cul- mance – successful delivery in water, electrici- ture. At the core of this were the shop stewards, ty and telephones, and less successful delivery elected by shop floor workers, usually through in working environment and wages, health, , and directly accountable to their education, housing, transport, food, and access constituents. They operated on the basis of to land. strict mandates from the membership and were The question raised by these survey results, subject to recall. Their independence from and the shift in government policy, is why does employers and the state was a central part of the alliance persist? The variables introduced this culture, underpinned by financial indepen- by Levitsky and Way are a useful starting dence through stop order deductions. Further- point. The first variable is whether competing more, elected worker representatives dominated unions exist to the left of the federation. Cosatu the regional and central executives of these is both the largest trade union federation and unions, including the president and national the one most committed to a socialist agenda. office bearers, who were constitutionally Unions dissatisfied with the leadership of required to be full-time shop floor workers. Cosatu cannot therefore defect to competitors This autonomy was asserted inside the alliance to the left of Cosatu: there are no significant where Cosatu saw itself as an independent and competing left unions outside of Cosatu. equal partner. Indeed during the late 1980s it Instead what has happened on a number of emerged as de facto leader of the anti-apartheid occasions over the past few years is that when movement inside South Africa. However, the criticisms of the alliance have emerged inside transition to democracy has weakened this the organisation, it has led to open confronta- political culture.22 First, Cosatu has lost signifi- tion. The dispute at Volkswagen in January cant layers of leadership to government, politi- 2000 is the clearest example of this phenome- cal office and the corporate sector. Often non.20 Workers at Volkswagen were asked to labelled the ‘brain drain’, this has seriously sacrifice hard won gains in order to secure an diminished the pool of skilled and experienced overseas contract. This divided the workforce, leaders developed over years of struggle. with the union leadership supporting the inten- Secondly, and relatedly, there has been a sification of work arguing that ‘the agreement marked decline in the quality of service provid- was not perfect but in a capitalist environment ed to members and an erosion of the role of

88 Webster mandates and report-backs. Thirdly, a growing role in the independence movement, gap has developed between leadership and the African governments therefore expect base. Fourthly, the unbanning of the ANC has unions to play a dualistic role, first, that of enabled the ANC to assert its hegemony over aiding with overall development, and sec- the alliance. Instead of Cosatu and the SACP ond, the representation of the job interests drawing the ANC into a left project, through of the rank and file members. The argument the transition the ANC has increasingly been for this reversal of the primary role of drawn into a neo-liberal project, thus marginal- unions to be developmental rather than rep- ising both Cosatu and the SACP’s redistributive resentational is based on the government programmes. This hegemony has increased belief that trade unions only represent a tiny massively with the ANC’s assumption of state fraction of the labour force in any of the power: it has access to vast resources and capa- developing countries’.23 bilities provided by a modern state bureaucra- In spite of these pressures from government on cy. unions to subordinate themselves and to act as While Levitsky and Way provide a useful ‘transmission belts’, organised workers retain framework for understanding the relationship ‘certain strengths that continue to animate between organised labour and labour-linked them’.24 Indeed the caricatured picture of party governments, these examples are all drawn ascendancy and union clients is too simple- from countries that have a democratic tradition. minded to explain the variety of union–party In this respect, South Africa is different and relationships in post-colonial Africa. bears comparison with other anti-colonial The range of post-colonial union–party rela- struggles in Africa. tionships has been captured by Cohen. These relationships include those of party control but 4. UNION–PARTY RELATIONSHIPS IN they also encompass relationships of partner- POST-COLONIAL AFRICA ship or a degree of union independence and The literature on party–union relations after also open opposition. As he acknowledges, independence in post-colonial Africa suggests these relationships are in a constant state of flux that unions face a dilemma; the political leaders and should be regarded ‘more accurately as believe trade unions should address themselves ideal types which present the basic range of to the problems of creating new national soci- alternative union–party relationships’.25 eties, while also arguing that the national gov- Table 5 fits the evolution of union–party rela- ernments will determine what form the industri- tionships in Zimbabwe. At independence in al relations system must assume. This dilemma 1980 the trade union movement was weak and is captured by two leading scholars on African divided into five federations, none of which had industrial relations: close links with the ruling party, the Zimbabwe ‘Since the trade union played a prominent African National Union (Zanu). Both the com-

Table 5: Union/Party relations in Africa

Type of Relationship Integration Partnership Independent - Independent allied to opposition non-aligned

Description of Union integrated Some degree of At times unions in Government Relationship into governing union autonomy in conflict tolerance party but close cooperation with government union autonomy

Function of union Increase Union concerned Challenge government Union productivity with welfare issues and – alternative foci concerned with consulted on of power collective development bargaining

Source : Robin Cohen, Labour and Politics in Nigeria: 1945-1971 (London: Heineman, 1974) p254-255.

89 Webster peting Zimbabwe African People’s Union emerging as the most articulate organised critic (Zapu) and Zanu (yet particularly the latter) had of the government’. de-emphasised the role of workers in the libera- Conflict intensified in the 1990s as the gov- tion struggle, stressing instead the guerrilla ernment accelerated its own version of neo-lib- struggle in the rural areas. eralism via Economic Structural Adjustment The wave of strikes immediately after inde- Programmes (ESAPs).29 Opposition to pendence pointed to the weakness of the trade Mugabe’s growing authoritarianism led to the union movement and the inadequacy of existing formation of the Movement for Democratic labour legislation. The government responded Change (MDC) in 1999 and ZCTU’s alliance to the weaknesses of the union movement by with it. The union movement had clearly encouraging workers’ committees, with the aim moved into the third category of Cohen’s table of improving communication and productivity (Table 5), independent and allied to the opposi- between employers and employees. These tion. In the course of 2000, the conflict turned worker committees, however, rapidly came to into open opposition, with the MDC in alliance supplement weak trade unions.26 with the ZCTU, winning a near majority of Yet the problem facing the government was elected seats in the general election. Indeed the more complex. Although Zanu had won the unions had become a challenge to government electoral support of the majority of workers, the and an alternative focus of power.30 full-time officials in control of the unions were What emerged in the 1980s in Zimbabwe is a mostly supporters of the opposition. The gov- form of state corporatism where unions played ernment believed that the role of the union a subordinate role, almost but not quite inte- movement was to support the government. grated into the state. Zanu argued unconvinc- Under the slogan of ‘one country, one federa- ingly that, as a Marxist-Leninist party, they rep- tion’, they set up the Zimbabwean Congress of resented the interests of the workers. From this Trade Unions (ZCTU). As Musarurwa (1990) perspective, the role of a Marxist-Leninist party argues,27 the creation of the ZCTU was the out- in an economically backward country, was to come of manipulation by the minister of labour build a national democracy; to increase national and key associates. Albert Mugabe, the control over foreign capital through an alliance President’s brother, was elected general-secre- between the emerging black capitalist class, the tary and most other key posts went to Zanu-PF middle strata and the workers. In terms of the supporters. national democratic model of transition, the The first four years of the ZCTU was plagued struggle was to create the conditions for the by corruption, embezzlement, maladministra- transition to socialism. As party ideologue tion, nepotism and authoritarianism. The cor- Herbert Ushewokunze expressed it: ruption of the office-bearers was eventually to ‘Tremendous care should be taken ... not to lead to their downfall and a new executive was confuse our efforts to create the conditions elected. for the transition to socialism with socialism This marked the end of the period in which itself.’31 the government intervened openly in ZCTU Clearly there are similarities between the affairs – the period which could be described as approach adopted by Zanu towards the transi- ‘integration’ in Cohen’s table. tion in Zimbabwe and that of the national ZCTU became more independent during the democratic tradition of the ANC that was iden- period 1985–88, but it did not fully escape the tified above. Under this conception of transi- corruption and poor organisation of the period tion, the function of the trade unions becomes of ‘integration’. In 1988, however, a new lead- largely supportive of the government in power: ership emerged which was more sensitive to the to increase productivity and discipline the mood of the rank-and-file and verbal opposition workers. However, as was noted, in South to the government increased. In October 1989 a Africa a strategic compromise emerged in the successor secretary-general of ZCTU was 1980s where of the union move- detained as part of a clampdown on opposition ment was accepted within the broader democra- in Zimbabwe.28 As Musarurwa argued, ‘The tic movement. The level of industrialisation, as government is obviously unhappy that the well as the size of the labour movement, clearly ZCTU whose creation it sponsored, is now makes South Africa a special case in Southern

90 Webster

Africa. Above all, the triumph of neo-liberal very distinct culture of ‘us and them’ develops, policies has undermined the capacity of new whereby people are accepted as ‘one of us’ – a democracies to build a national capitalist class. comrade – on the basis of their commitment to The rights won by labour during the transi- national liberation.33 Those who oppose soli- tion makes the ‘integration’ of the trade union darity become ‘the enemy’ or even ‘counter- movement into the party less likely in South revolutionaries’. In other words, the margins of Africa. But it does not rule it out: what it does tolerance are much lower in such situations as suggest is that the struggle between those who democracy has not yet been consolidated. The would like to ‘integrate’ the union movement result – as the Zimbabwean case illustrates – is into the party more closely, and those who wish not institutionalised opposition, but open and to maintain its autonomy is likely to continue in violent confrontation, with a union-aligned the years to come. But the South African case opposition becoming the focus of an organised opens up the possibility of an independent trade challenge to the state. union movement representing the interests of South Africa, it has been suggested, has a its members. The possibility of this option will more powerful and autonomous union move- be addressed in the conclusion below. ment. This opens up the possibility of political exchanges in the form of social pacts between CONCLUSION Cosatu and the ANC. What unions can offer the Labour, in the era of neo-liberal globalisation, government, and what they can demand in finds itself in a dilemma when its ally is in gov- return for cooperating in the management of the ernment: either they accept the economic policy nation’s response to globalisation, is a matter reversal by their ally, cooperate and face mar- for negotiation. It has been argued elsewhere ginalisation, or else they actively oppose ‘their’ that South Africa opens up the possibility of government. Active opposition increases the ‘bargained liberalisation’, where the economy likelihood of the policies failing and a govern- is opened to international competition but ment coming to power that is less friendly agreements are reached between the main towards labour. Levitsky and Way describe the actors in civil society.34 Whether such an dilemma as a ‘hostage situation’ – virtually a option emerges will depend whether all the par- no-win situation.32 ties in the alliance are willing to recognise the According to this latter scenario Cosatu could stalemate and make compromises that shift face increasing marginalisation as the ANC from their current positions. continues to implement its neo-liberal econom- During the present phase in the consolidation ic and social policies. However, the federa- of democracy in South Africa, labour is at risk tion’s degree of autonomy does open up the of becoming marginalised while remaining a possibility of an alternative; that Cosatu force that can play a spoiling role. The conclu- emerges as a ‘left pressure group’ inside the sions of this paper are equivocal in judging the alliance, pushing for redistributive policies. outcome. Such a possibility would require a high degree If labour were to be marginalised, however, it of political tolerance by government; a toler- would put at risk both the consolidation of ance that the post-colonial experience in Africa democracy and economic reconstruction. In this suggests is unlikely. sense , the outcome of the debates on the nature Unlike the established democracies discussed and future of the alliance that are taking place above, post-colonial African countries are inside the alliance are more significant for the engaged in the complex task of nation-building future of democracy in South Africa than those and economic reconstruction . As a result, a taking place in parliament.

91 Webster

ENDNOTES

1) Robert Lambert, Political Unionism in Democracy Seriously: Worker South Africa: the South African Congress Expectations and Parliamentary of Trade Unions, 1955-1965, PhD, Democracy in South Africa, (Durban: University of the Witwatersrand, 1988. Indicator Press, 1995). Johannesburg. 17) Eddie Webster, Manufacturing 2) Jay Naidoo, Building People’s Power, The Compromise: the Dynamics of Race and Crisis: Speeches by Cosatu Office Class among South African Shop Bearers, (Johannesburg: Cosatu, 1986). Stewards in the Nineties, in Charles 3) Jon Lewis, Politics and Trade Unions, The Koeber, Richard Baldoz and Philip Kraft Independent Trade Union Guide, (Durban: (eds) The Critical Study of Work, (Ohio: No Publisher, 1988). Templeton University Press, in press). 4) Yunis Carrim, Cosatu: Towards 18) Ran Greenstein, From Class Analysis to Disciplined Alliances, Work in Progress, the Analysis of Race, paper presented to 49, 1987, pp.35. symposium Work, Class and Culture, 5) Eddie Webster and Alan Fine, University of the Witwatersrand, Transcending Traditions: Trade Unions Johannesburg, 1993. and Political Unity, in Glenn Moss and 19) Karl Von Holdt, From Resistance to Ingrid Obery (eds), South African Review Reconstruction: A Case -study of Trade 5, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989), Unions in the Workplace and the pp.258-268. Community, 1980-1996, 2000, p.315. 6) African National Congress, The 20) Drew Forrest, What Happened at VW?, Reconstruction and Development South African Labour Bulletin, 24, 2, Programme, (Johannesburg: Umanyano 2000, pp.14-20. Publications, 1994). 21) Ibid p.14. 7) Eddie Webster and Glenn Adler, Towards 22) Webster and Adler, Towards a Class a Class Compromise in South Africa’s Compromise pp.14-15 Double Transition: Bargained 23) Ukandi Damachi and Tayo Fashoyin, Liberalisation and the Consolidation of Labour Relations and African Democracy, Politics and Society. 27, 3, Development, International Industrial 1999, pp.363-371. Relations Association, 7th World 8) Ibid, p.368. Congress, Hamburg, Germany, 4th -6th 9) Nirode Bramdaw and Irene Louw, ANC August, 1986. Alliance has Troubled Meeting, Business 24) William Freund, The African Worker, Day, 28 August 2000. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 10) Ibid. 1988). 11) William Mervin, Gumede, Pockets of tur- 25) Robin Cohen, Labour and Politics in bulence on flight to the polls, Financial Nigeria: 1947-1971, (London: Heineman, Mail, 1 September 2000. p.24. 1974). 12) Bramdaw and Louw, ANC Alliance. 26) Mark Shadur, Workers’ Committees sup- 13) Steven Levitsky and Lucien Way, plement weak trade unions in Zimbabwe: Between a Shock and a Hard Place: The The Case of the Dairy Marketing Board, Dynamics of Labour-led Adjustment in South African Labour Bulletin, 12, 6-7, Poland and Argentina, Department of 1987, pp.92-103. Political Science, University of California, 27) Albert Musarurwa, Trade Unionism and Berkeley. (Mimeo), p.1. the State, Conference on Zimbabwe’s First 14) Ibid, p.12. Decade of Political Independence: Lessons 15) Ibid, p.21. for Namibia and South Africa, , 30 16) David Ginsburg, Eddie Webster, Roger August- 2 September, 1990, p.35. Southall, Geoff Wood, Sakhekla Buhlun- 28) Mike Hall, Zimbabwe: The Gulf Widens, gu, Johann Maree, Janet Cherry, Richard South African Labour Bulletin, 14, 7, Heynes and Gilton Klerck, Taking 1990, p.30.

92 Webster

29) L.Van Der Walt, Trade Unions in Zim- 32) Levitsky and Way, Between a Shock and a babwe: For Democracy, Against Neo- Hard Place, p.23. Liberalism, Capital and Class, 66, 1998, 33) Sakhela Buhlungu and Christine Psoulis, p.22. Enduring Solidarities: Accounting for the 30) David Moore, Opposition in Zimbabwe: Continuity of Support for the Alliance Lessons for South Africa, Conference on among Cosatu Members, Society in Opposition in South Africa’s New Demo- Transition, 30, 2, 1999, pp.120-130. cracy, Department of Political Studies, 33) Webster and Adler, Towards a Class Rhodes University, 28-30 June 2000. Compromise, p.351. 31) Business Day (Johannesburg) 2 September 1987.

93 ‘White’ Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in South Africa

Eddy Maloka

This paper interrogates the debate about democratisation was simultaneous with the democratic consolidation in South Africa with process of decolonisation.2 Consequently, particular reference to the role of ‘white’ while comparisons are often made with other opposition parties. It is informed, first, by a transitions elsewhere, little is being done to view that considers the dominant parliamen- examine the implications of the decolonisation tary opposition in South Africa to be represent- dimension of the South African case. Nor, ing white minority interests; secondly, by a indeed, is the African debate on democratisa- view that sees the South African transition as a tion being adequately considered.3 simultaneous transition from both authoritari- This paper is an attempt to interrogate the an rule and settler colonialism; thirdly, by the debate on democratic consolidation in South argument that ‘the criteria by which the “con- Africa with particular reference to the role of solidation” of democracy is to be assessed are ‘white’ opposition parties. The paper is inherently judgemental’; and finally, by David informed, first, by the view that the major Beetham’s comprehensive definition that ‘a opposition political parties represent the inter- democracy can best be said to be consolidated ests of the white minority; secondly, by when we have good reason to believe that it is Osaghae’s notion of the dual character of the capable of withstanding pressures or shocks South African transition; thirdly, by without abandoning the electoral process or Christopher Clapham’s and John Wiseman’s the political freedoms on which it depends, argument that ‘the criteria by which the “con- including those of dissent and opposition’. The solidation” of democracy is to be assessed are argument is that the dominant parliamentary inherently judgemental’;4 and finally, by David opposition to the ruling African National Beetham’s comprehensive definition that ‘a Congress (ANC) is rooted in traditional, white democracy can best be said to be consolidated electoral politics, and is, in essence, a political when we have good reason to believe that it is expression of the tendency in African post-set- capable of withstanding pressures or shocks tler transitions for whites to see themselves an without abandoning the electoral process or the undifferentiated and endangered interest political freedoms on which it depends, includ- group. ing those of dissent and opposition’.5 More fundamental, however, is that, as INTRODUCTION Clapham and Wiseman argue, ‘in assessing the The South African debate on ‘democratic con- prospects for the consolidation of democracy in solidation’ has raised the question of the need Africa, it is necessary to take an unromantic for a viable parliamentary opposition to the and pragmatic view as to what type of system ANC as a necessary condition.1 However, as might be consolidated, how widespread a Eghosa Osaghae has argued, the problem with phenomenon this might be, and the degree of existing literature is its failure to address the ‘permanence’ which consolidation might fact that the South African transition was that imply’.6

95 Maloka

1. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION level of development of civil society are major The democratic consolidation phase is the most facilitating factors: a democracy is most likely difficult part of the transition process, especial- to be consolidated if democratic principles are ly when, as in the case of South Africa, this actively supported by the country’s ‘national also involves ridding the country of the legacy psyche’. of settler colonialism. There are a number of Fourth, the role of civil society, important as dimensions that condition the consolidation of it is, will need to be supported by constitutional democracy. First, there is the mode of the tran- and institutional arrangements supporting the sition itself. The dynamics of the transition democracy. In South Africa, political institu- impact on the pace, duration and direction of tions had to be deracialised and reoriented to the consolidation phase, whether the transition serve not just a settler minority, but all sectors resulted in continuity or rupture with the past, of society. or whether the new political elite is drawn from Finally, a democratic state will be difficult to the previous regime or the opposition, are all sustain if surrounded by hostile, authoritarian among factors that may stagnate, reverse or neighbours. accelerate the consolidation phase. The nature Given the above, it is clear that political par- of the previous regime is equally a factor, and ties and, inevitably, elections are important this, additionally, depends on the length of the vehicles for democratic consolidation, even if it preceding dictatorship and the level of its is necessary to go beyond minimalist interpreta- impact on the political institutions of the coun- tions which regard their existence as the defin- try. How intra- and inter-party relations are ing (sufficient) condition of democratisation. In managed during the transition is also important, particular, it will be argued here that it is the especially with regard to competition among failure to manage inter-party relations that con- parties, a competition that may result in stitutes one of the principal factors stalling alliances, coalitions and, not infrequently, civil democratisation in Africa today. war. Similarly, the relationship between civil society and political parties has implications for 2. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN the consolidation phase, not least because polit- SOUTH AFRICA ical parties themselves can be a vehicle for Africa experienced a democratisation wave delegitimising and stalling or accelerating the from 1989, but this has since suffered setbacks new democracy. Political parties can also act as in a number of countries. Some transitions took agents for reconciliation or divisions within place via multiparty elections (e.g. Zambia); society. Furthermore, in the case of transitions others via ‘conferences’ of all stakeholders from settler colonialism, as in South Africa, such as in Benin; some were ‘co-opted’ transi- ‘race’ plays a dominant role in mediating the tions that returned the incumbent to power with impact of these variables on the mode of transi- little change (e.g. Ivory Coast); while others tion. were cases of ‘guided democratisation’ such as Second, the probabilities of successful con- in Ghana. There was initially optimism in the solidation are invariably linked to the country’s wake of the first ‘founding’ elections, but the level of economic development. The existence situation began to change with later such elec- of abject poverty, massive shortages in basic tions that took place around 1994, as well as social necessities, and unemployment, among with problems attendant upon post-democrati- others, are all among factors that will not only sation ‘second’ elections in such countries as hamper democratisation but will also contribute Zambia. Furthermore, by 1997, coups were to social and economic instability. This factor back on Africa’s political landscape, from becomes even more complicated under condi- Gambia and Sierra Leone to Burundi, Congo tions of decolonisation as historically oppressed and, subsequently, Ivory Coast. communities expect the post-colonial regime to What makes democratic consolidation so dif- ‘deliver’ and address their plight, while on the ficult in some African countries is not only the other hand, the historically privileged white weakness of the state and the difficult econom- minority live in fear of changes that may affect ic conditions, but also the fusion of the state their social position. and party and the failure of the political elite to Third, the country’s political culture and the manage intra- and inter-party relations as well

96 Maloka as relations between the state and society. and the two British colonies ( and South Africa’s was among the later ‘founding’ Natal). Over 20 ‘white’ elections and referenda elections, the contest in 1994 providing the took place between 1910 and 1990, charac- basis for subsequent consolidation. However, terised by vigorous contestation between com- as argued already, the South African transition peting political parties.7 was not simply about the eradication of authori- The development of South Africa’s white tarian rule, but also constituted an anti-colonial, electoral politics did not follow the trends in liberation struggle for the black majority. In Europe (where parties largely developed along this sense, the transition was more than just class lines). Instead, four issues dominated democratisation, for it also entailed nation white electoral politics which followed from building, the deracialisation of the state and the country’s status as a settler colony. First, economy, and a redistribution and reallocation there was the ‘Anglo-Boer’ conflict that dates of resources as well as the eradication of the back to the second British occupation of the legacy of apartheid in all spheres of society. It Cape in 1806; a conflict that resulted in two is scarcely surprising, given this context, that wars and a protracted struggle over questions of the form and content of political parties has language (Afrikaans vs. English) and culture. been shaped by South Africa’s past. As a result, The outcome was that the political parties were the principal opposition to the ANC as the rul- largely divided between those that were aligned ing party is posed by parties that essentially to the English interest (the South African Party represent white minority interests. Consequent- [SAP], the United Party [1933-39], Unionist ly, the current political landscape in South Party, the Progressive Federal Party [PFP] and Africa cannot be fully understood without its predecessor Progressive Party, the New knowing where those parties came from. Republic Party and the Democratic Party [DP]) The South Africa white community has an and those ‘belonging’ to the Afrikaners (the established electoral tradition that dates back National Party [NP], and the from even before 1910, the year when the Conservative Party). Up to the 1961 elections country was created out of the two Boer the base of the NP was almost exclusively republics (Transvaal and the ) Afrikaner. By the 1966 elections, however,

Parties and Opposition in South Africa, 1910-1989

Government Principal Opposition

South African Party 1910-1920 + National Party (founded 1914) Unionist Party 1910

South African Party + Unionists National Party 1920-24 Labour Party

National Party + Labour Party 1924-29 South African Party

National Party 1929-33 South African Party

United Party (‘fusion' of National Party ‘Purified’ National Party and South African Party over the gold crisis) 1933-48

National Party 1948-94 United Party 1948-77 Progressive Federal Party 1977-89 New Republic Party 1977-87 Conservative Party 1987-94 Democratic Party 1989-94.

African National Congress + National Democratic Party Party + Inkatha Freedom Party 1994-96

97 Maloka more and more of the English began to cast of the demise of apartheid. It is in this context their vote for the NP as it began to successfully that the ‘consociational’ or ‘power-sharing’ project itself as the party representing white debate emerged among white intellectuals.8 interests in conditions of increasing isolation Consociationalism was an option advocated and insecurity. by liberals concentrated within the ranks of the The second issue was the ‘status’ question; PFP (which merged with other organisations to that is, South Africa’s relationship with the form the DP in 1989) and among a certain stra- British Empire. Naturally, the Afrikaner parties ta of Afrikaner intellectuals. As David Welsh were not only anti-British, but also republican put it: in outlook, as opposed to the English who con- ‘the core of the (consociational) argument sidered themselves part of the Empire. This ... was that “simple” or “unfettered” majori- issue was resolved when (following victory in a ty rule was likely to have an undemocratic ) the NP declared South Africa a outcome in as divided a society as South republic and withdrew from the Common- Africa.’ wealth in 1961. It was contended, with much comparative data, The third issue dominating white politics was that for divided societies to sustain democratic ‘security’. This gained major prominence in the forms of government, the ‘winner-takes-all’ wake of the in 1960, sub- principle would have to be abandoned in favour sequently gaining massive impetus in the wake of a more consensual mode of government of the liberation of Mozambique and Angola in from which minorities (however constituted) the mid-1970s and Zimbabwe in 1980, a did not feel permanently excluded.9 Similarly, process that was accompanied by the intensifi- in 1987 Hermann Giliomee argued for a ‘third cation of black popular uprising domestically. way’ option that was to be informed by the Fundamental to all these issues was the colo- principles of ‘bicommunalism’, or a recognition nial question, or, as some put it, ‘race’. This of ‘group rights and group representation’, issue not only haunted the white minority and because, according to this perspective, South made the enjoyment of its privileges a bitter pill African politics comprised “two power blocs”: to swallow, but also exacerbated the English– one based on the ethno-nationalism of the Afrikaner divide. The English parties, influ- Africans, and the other on the larger white enced as they were by a tradition of (attenuat- community.10 Lawrence Schlemmer elaborated ed) liberalism emanating from the old Cape on this by arguing that ‘bi-communalism’ Colony, preferred a ‘milder’ form of colonial involves an acceptance on both sides of the oppression as opposed to their Afrikaner coun- inescapable reality of the opposing force. The terparts, who opted for apartheid. With the deep entrenchment of the opposing power bloc NP’s ascent to power, the English parties grad- requires resolution akin to an international set- ually lost ground and found themselves increas- tlement, probably taking the form of an agree- ingly marginalised as an opposition. In 1958, ment to share power, a ‘pact’, hammered out in this resulted in a minority breakaway from the negotiations.11 Yet Michael Connors appears to United Party by a liberal faction (the Progres- have had a point: consociationalism was not a sives) which sought to come to terms with the model for moderating political conflict of a fact that the black majority could not be exclud- plural society at all, but a manner of suppress- ed from power forever by advocating the (re-) ing it, displacing it, and turning it inward. introduction of a qualified franchise for blacks. In this sense the question of the viability of Not surprisingly, and unlike in the West, the consociationalism’s capacity to stabilise state of the economy never featured as a major conflict was ill conceived. In accepting the electoral issue, except in isolated moments such existence of immutable ethnic segments, conso- as during the 1930s depression (when the origi- ciationalism was part of a larger discourse per- nal NP opted to bury the hatchet with the SAP petuating the constructs of ethnicity that had by ‘fusing’ to form the United Party). The sur- been wrought by settler colonialism in South vival of white settler colonialism was invari- Africa.12 Indeed, the beginning of the transition ably regarded as much more important. in 1990 imposed new challenge on white par- However, by the early 1980s many ordinary ties and their intellectual think-tank. The NP, as whites were coming to accept the inevitability part of a painstaking process of redefining

98 Maloka itself, abandoned its power-sharing route, and this all-embracing sense.14 In this context, con- accepted the inevitability of democratic rule. tinues Friedman: However, the outcome of the transition made ‘opposition parties are presented with provision for some form of that options ... they do need to ensure that they made it possible for the NP to control the represent constituencies whose cooperation Western ; a Government of the governing party needs. Racial cleavages National Unity that accommodated the NP at in South Africa may constrain some democ- the executive level of the new government (an ratic options by dooming some parties to arrangement that lasted until 1996); and a pro- permanent minority status, but they guaran- portional representation electoral system that tee that significant constituencies will guaranteed representation in parliament even to remain outside the governing party’s orbit. small parties. If they are effectively captured and retained Furthermore, as the NP redefined itself as by minority parties, the governing party ‘New’ (NNP), its former parliamentary opposi- may need to cooperate with those parties ... tion, the DP, also came to terms with the the NP’s failure to be seen as a credible changing conditions, not least because almost gatekeeper to key minority constituencies all issues around which it built its opposition to has sharply constrained its options: to the NP were resolved and some even imple- remain effective, opposition parties will mented in the new dispensation. need to consolidate their support among key While the NP grappled with its ‘new’ image, minority constituencies.’15 the DP repositioned itself by opting for a route This is exactly what the DP did in the 1999 that led to the abandonment of its liberal ideol- general elections: it positioned itself as an ogy and to project itself as a representative of effective mouthpiece and custodian of white white minority interests. After a dismal perfor- minority interests. Meanwhile, the dominant mance in the 1994 elections, the DP opted in party thesis informed the NP’s 1999 election the 1999 elections for an aggressive, ‘Fight around themes such as ‘Mugabe has a Two- Back’ strategy that saw it displace the NP as Third [Majority]!’ Indeed, the ‘white’ opposi- the official opposition and winning – for the tion’s strategy now involves preventing the first time since the days of the SAP – a signifi- ANC from exercising its dominance in the for- cant segment of the Afrikaner vote. Yet the cri- mation of government and the determination of sis for white political parties is far from over. public policy and agenda. These they do by, Not only did the ANC win almost two-thirds of among others: the seats in parliament, but demographic pro- • utilising some provinces and local authorities jections suggest that the percentage of the white as their power-base electorate as part of the total will drop by some • exercising oversight functions of parliament three per cent to about six per cent by the next and statutory watch-dogs election. • making direct and indirect use of some non- On the intellectual front, as the ‘power-shar- governmental organisations and policy cen- ing’ option collapsed, a new, ‘dominant party’ tres as well as institutions of learning to run debate emerged among the same group of white ‘certificate’ courses on matters of policy or to intellectuals,13 especially as the ANC’s election provide consultancy to government depart- campaigned centred around winning an ‘over- ments in drafting legislation and white papers whelming victory’. A dominant party system • using their power over some media houses to involves: influence public perceptions of and attitudes • an electoral dominance by one party for an towards government, and subject certain key uninterrupted and protracted period members of government to a barrage of criti- • the dominance by this party in the formation cism. of government Whilst these activities are legitimate, their prin- • the dominance by this party in the determina- cipal theme is precisely that the ANC is using tion of public policy and agenda. its dominance to short-circuit the constitution As Steven Friedman argues, the challenge then and to entrench its power regardless of the became to prevent the ANC from monopolising rights of minorities.16 the government agenda and political arena in Nor did these parties hesitate to stall the

99 Maloka democratisation phase. These attempts included of South Africa’s colonial and racially unequal dismissing the Independent Electoral past. Commission as a lackey of the ANC, and tak- ing it to court on a number of issues. After the CONCLUSION 1999 elections, these parties even engaged the ‘White’ opposition parties are a threat to the services of an accounting firm to inspect and consolidation of democracy in South Africa verify the election results. because of their continued reliance on ‘race’ as While all these attempts did indeed fail, the a base. Their power is, however, minimised by DP made a call for a summit of opposition par- their relative numerical insignificance in parlia- ties to map out strategies for developing a joint ment, even though they have avenues which front against the ANC, and this process culmi- they utilise to constrain the ANC’s use of its nated in the recent merger of the DP and the NP dominant position. Their failure to break into to form a new party, the Democratic Alliance the African electorate is one factor that will (DA). continue to act as a check on their political Arguably, this new formation brings to an strength. end the fragmentation of ‘white’ opposition. It The ANC, for its part, has demonstrated that is clear, therefore, that the existence of a viable it can be a vehicle for reconciliation and demo- parliamentary opposition may be an important cratic consolidation, thanks, for example, to factor for the consolidation of South Africa’s such processes undertaken by the Truth and new democracy. However, it is equally impor- Reconciliation Commission, and the organisa- tant that the type of such an opposition be inter- tion’s strong adherence to non-racialism. rogated. Unlike the ‘white’ parties, the ANC relies less For any parliamentary opposition in South on race and ethnicity and puts more emphasis Africa to accelerate the consolidation of the upon on its liberation struggle heritage. The new democracy, it must also address the dual challenge to South Africa is that it must trans- character of the country’s transition – it must form sufficiently comprehensively over the help rid the country of the legacies of authori- coming decades to avoid the fate of contempo- tarian rule and apartheid. Yet this is what the rary Zimbabwe, where 20 years of indepen- white opposition parties are, in effect, failing to dence have not managed to remove ‘race’ from do – by resisting efforts to overcome the effects the centre of the political landscape.

ENDNOTES 1) On the South African transition and the (: University of Natal debate on democratic consolidation, see press, 2000). Also, Konrad Adenauer Patrick Bond, Elite Transition: From Stiftung Seminar Report, Consolidating Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa Democracy in South Africa, August 1999;

100 Maloka

and Jeremy Seekings, From the Ballot Box enfranchised in 1930 and income and prop- to the Bookshelf: Studies of the 1994 South erty qualifications only finally removed for African General Election, Journal of white male voters in the Cape in 1931. For Contemporary African Studies, Vol.15, No. a review of the tortuous history of the fran- 2, 1997, pp.287-310; Adam Habib, Devan chise, see Colin Tatz, Shadow and Pillay and Ashwin Desai, South Africa and Substance in South Africa: A Study in Land the Global Order: The Structural and Franchise Policies Affecting Africans, Conditioning of a Transition to 1910-1960 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Democracy, Journal of Contemporary Natal Press, 1962). On white voters and African Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1998, elections, see H. Lever, The South African pp.95-116; Hermann Giliomee and Charles Voter: Some Aspects of Voting Behaviour Simkins, The Awkward Embrace: One- with Special Reference to the General Party Domination and Democracy, (Cape Elections of 1966 and 1970, (Cape Town: Town: Tafelberg, 1999); and Adam Habib Juta 1972); and Kenneth Heard, General and Rupert Taylor, Parliamentary Elections in South Africa, 1943-1970, Opposition and Democratic Consolidation (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, in South Africa, Review of African 1974). For a succinct overview, see Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. 80, Anthony Lemon, Apartheid in Transition pp.261-269. (Aldershot: Gower, 1987), Ch. 5. 2) Eghosa Osaghae, The Missing (African) 8) Frederick Van zyl Slabbert and David Link in the Comparative Analysis of South Welsh, South Africa’s Options: Strategies African’s Transition, African Sociological for Sharing Power, (Cape Town: David Review, Vol 1. No.2, 1997, pp.1-21. Philip, 1979). 3) On the African debate, see, for instance, D. 9) David Welsh, The Ideology, Aim, Role and Eyoh, African Perspectives on Democracy Strategy of the PFP and NRP, in D. J. van and the Dilemmas of Postcolonial Vuuren et al (eds) South African Election Intellectuals, Africa Today, Vol. 45, No.3- 1987: Context, Process and Prospect 4, 1998; M. Diouf, Political Liberalisation (Johannesburg: Owen Burgess Publishers, or Democratic Transition: African 1987), p.82. Perspectives, CODESRIA, New Path 10) Hermann Giliomee, The Press Debate, in Series, No. 1, 1998; and Eghosa. Osaghae, Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Schlemmer (eds), Negotiating South Faltering Prospects, New Hopes, Journal Africa’s Future, (: Southern Books of Contemporary African Studies, Vol 17, Publishers, 1989), p.13. No. 1, 1999, pp.5-28. 11) Ibid, p.24. 4) Christopher Clapham and John Wiseman, 12) Michael Connors, The Eclipse of Conclusion: Assessing the Prospects for Consociationalism in South Africa’s the Consolidation of Democracy in Africa, Democratic Transition, Democratisation, in John Wiseman (ed), Democracy and Vol. 3, No 4, 1996, pp.420-434. Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, 13) See, especially, Hermann Giliomee and (London: Routledge, 1995), p.221. Charles Simkins (eds), The Awkward Em- 5) David Beetham, Conditions for Democratic brace: One-party Domination and Demo- Consolidation, Review of African Political cracy, (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1999). Economy, 21, 60, 1994, pp 157-172, quote 14) Steven Friedman, No Easy Stroll to from p.160. Dominance: Party Dominance, Opposition 6) Clapham and Wiseman, Conclusion, p.220. and Civil Society in South Africa, in 7) There were small minorities of African Giliomee and Simkins, (eds) The Awkward voters, (on a separate roll from 1936) until Embrace, p.105. the African vote for parliament was finally 15) Ibid, p.114. extinguished in 1959; and a coloured vote 16) See for instance, the DP’s document, The clung on until 1968. From 1910 on, the Politics of Intolerance: How the ANC overwhelming majority of voters were attempts to delegitimise its opponents. white, although white women were only 1999. Mimeo.

101 Opposition in the New South African Parliament

Lia Nijzink

In order to explore the possibilities for parlia- even though this may have considerable conse- mentary opposition in South Africa’s new quences for serving to prevent conflict and to democracy, this paper first of all classifies the promote political stability. It is clear, however, country in terms of presidential/parliamentary that the pure Westminster model of a fusion of and electoral systems in order to assess the executive and legislative powers is decreasing institutional context. It subsequently looks at in popularity. the role of parties in parliament and argues The Westminster model can be minimally that in the absence of the probability of an defined as the unity of the legislature and exec- alternation of governing parties in the years to utive secured by a disciplined political party or come, opposition parties should adjust their as the combination of legislative and executive strategies to include other important parlia- power in the hands of the governing party. It is mentary functions. Finally, after examining said to have the following advantages: aspects of the function of parliament, the paper • It is conducive to retrospective voting thus disputes the view that the domination of the ensuring clear accountability. African National Congress (ANC) allows no • It encourages strong parties, thus providing meaningful scope for opposition in the new the electorate with an effective way to con- South African parliament. trol their rulers. • It limits the political power of interest 1. PARLIAMENTARISM AND PROPORTIONAL groups, thus preventing ‘iron triangles’ or REPRESENTATION log-rolling to occur in policy making. There is widespread consensus among special- • It increases decisiveness in policy making.2 ists about the need for inclusivity and power In other words, the Westminster model pro- sharing as important characteristics for institu- vides a clear degree of democratic accountabil- tional arrangements in Africa’s emerging ity because it provides the electorate with a sin- democracies. It is therefore often argued that gle mechanism – i.e. disciplined political par- the winner-takes-all electoral systems do not ties – to control their rulers. Such a degree of suit the specific requirements of Africa’s accountability is impossible when powers are democratic experiments as they hold out the shared between different institutions or in danger of furthering ethnic and regional divi- multi-party governments. However, the sions.1 For this reason, an electoral system accountability advantage is dependent on vot- based on proportional representation (PR) is ers being presented with a clear choice between widely regarded as the best choice in Africa. two alternatives. This means that the system in However, analysts are less outspoken and are its pure form cannot cope with ethnic and racial certainly less united about the other key institu- divisions nor accommodate cultural pluralism. tional choice that African countries face – that The Westminster system generates clear win- is, whether they should opt for parliamentary as ners and losers. However, when politics is opposed to presidential systems of government, based on ethnic or racial identities, the winners

103 Nijzink will always be winners and the losers will the executive are members of the legislature always lose, because it is not as easy to tran- and the executive can be forced to resign by the scend race as it is to overcome divisions of legislature: that is, it requires the confidence of class. Thus, the system reinforces pre-existing the legislature. tensions between regions or ethnic groups On the other pole are systems like the presi- because these tend to support different compet- dential one of the United States (US) in which ing parties or blocs. the executive has a separate mandate: that is, it It follows that the Westminster system is not is elected by the people, there is no overlap in only unsuitable as a constitutional model for membership between the executive and the leg- South Africa, but that it is far from helpful as a islature and the executive has a fixed term of model for the style of opposition politics in this office (i.e., it cannot be forced to resign). racially divided country. Given the absence of It is important to note that most parliamen- two main parties or blocs, or more importantly tary systems in Western Europe can be placed the absence of a credible alternative govern- towards the fusion side of the scale. However, ment, the biggest advantage of the Westminster powers are normally less fused than at West- system – clear accountability – is lost. In other minster due to the existence of minority or words, if an opposition keeps defining its role coalition governments or because the overlap in in terms of presenting an alternative govern- membership of the executive and the legislature ment, it does nothing to enhance accountability is less complete. In addition to the presidential- and it is in danger of ignoring alternative strate- parliamentary contrast between fusion and sep- gies of how to do so. Such a style of opposition aration of powers, there is a further important betrays a stubbornness in holding on to West- difference between Westminster’s executive minster notions of democratic accountability dominance and the continental European pat- from which the new institutional framework tern of executive-legislative balance. has clearly moved away. ‘This may be called an informal separation What were the institutional choices that of powers or a constitutional dualism South Africa made for its new democracy? And accepting the independence of legislature what impact do they have on the scope for and executive.’4 opposition? Despite the apparent unsuitability Therefore, non-Westminster parliamentary sys- of the Westminster model, the opposite model tems tend to be positioned towards the middle of a clear separation of powers has never been a of the scale rather than towards the end. The serious alternative.3 Nevertheless, the notion of same is true for the South African case. a separation of powers and thus the distinction South Africa’s system is in essence a parlia- between parliamentary and presidential sys- mentary system because the president does not tems, sheds some light on the complex nature have a separate electoral mandate: the execu- of the relation between the legislature and the tive emerges from the legislature. Furthermore, executive, and this in turn has an important the executive, including the president, can be impact on opposition politics. forced to resign by the legislature. However, Presidential systems are characterised by a although most members of the cabinet are separation of executive and legislative powers members of parliament (MPs), the president with regard to origin, membership and the when elected ceases to be a member of the leg- terms of office, while in parliamentary systems islature and may select a maximum of two min- those powers are more or less fused. This can isters from outside parliament. Additionally, best be illustrated by placing the two systems the fact that not all ministers are members of on a continuum, illustrated by the figure below: the majority party renders the fusion of powers US Western Europe UK less complete than in the Westminster system. Separations Fusion Consequently, it would be expected that the of Powers of Powers South African legislature would be less domi- nated by the executive than its British counter- On one pole are found systems, such as the par- part. liamentary system of the United Kingdom There are other system characteristics – most (UK), in which the executive emerges from or notably the electoral system – that point to the is selected by the legislature, the members of fact that South Africa has moved away from the

104 Nijzink

Westminster majoritarian model. The national Number of seats in the National Assembly per list system, with PR, in which the whole coun- party try is one constituency and in which there is virtually no threshold for party representation, 1994 1999 is one of the most proportional in the world and ensures the appearance of an array of smaller African National Congress 252 266 parties in the legislature. In addition, the system Democratic Party 7 38 of party lists debars MPs from taking a particu- Inkatha Freedom Party 43 34 lar geographical constituency as his or her New National Party 82 28 focus of representation. United Democratic Movement – 14 With this electoral system in place, parties African Christian Democratic Party 2 6 Pan Africanist Congress 5 3 play a very strong role in South Africa’s parlia- Freedom Front 9 3 mentary system. Voters vote for parties instead Freedom Alliance – 2 of individual candidates. Thus, each candidate Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging – 1 relies on his or her party for a place on the list Azanian People’s Organisation – 1 and in parliament. The party leadership can Minority Front – 1 therefore impose strong discipline upon and command strong loyalty from its members, and nation of parliamentarianism and PR does pro- party hierarchy is extremely powerful. vide the opposition with the institutional con- Consequently, each representative is strongly text to play a meaningful role in the democratic inclined to support the party’s mandate and system. Firstly, it ensures that an array of politi- reluctant to question party positions in public, cal interests find representation in parliament. or in the case of government MPs, openly scru- Five new parties entered parliament as a tinise executive decisions. result of the 1999 elections. However, to argue Some have argued that adopting a constituen- that this fragmentation has necessarily weak- cy-based system would counterbalance the con- ened the opposition ignores the fact that in a trol of parties in parliament. MPs elected by situation of an overwhelming majority for the specific geographical constituencies are said to governing party, the value of the opposition lies be more inclined to independent behaviour. in representing a diversity of interests rather However, experience in established constituen- than presenting a credible alternative govern- cy-based systems such as the UK, let alone in ment. neighbouring Zimbabwe, suggests otherwise. Secondly, the chosen institutional framework There too, strong party control is a dominant leaves room for effective strategies of opposi- feature of parliamentary life. It suggests that tion. The relative distance between legislature whether to have a party list or constituency- and executive ensures that the ANC in govern- based system is not such a crucial question as is ment does not dominate its party in parliament the size of the ruling party’s parliamentary to the same extent as the governing party in majority. In a system where the gap in seats Westminster. It gives ANC members consider- between the largest and second largest party is able leeway to accommodate opposition views, relatively small, government MPs are more most notably in meetings of parliamentary inclined to follow party mandates so as not to committees. It thus provides opposition parties endanger their party’s majority. It follows that with good opportunities to articulate the inter- when the majority of the governing party is ests they represent and influence policy making huge, MPs would in theory have more room for accordingly. In addition, the existence of a dissent or criticism. Given the African National coalition government (ANC and Inkatha Congress’ (ANC’s) large majority, therefore, Freedom Party [IFP]) provides more confronta- there would seem to be ample potential for tional avenues for parliamentary opposition. scrutiny by government MPs – even though in Since the unity of legislature and executive is – practice, opposition parties can be demonstrat- at least in theory – mitigated by the presence of ed to have used scrutiny procedures such as the IFP in government, the opposition could use questions and interpellations on a considerably any differences between the governing parties more frequent basis than ANC MPs. to its advantage. Be that as is may, the South African combi- All in all, there seems to be considerable

105 Nijzink institutional scope for opposition in South this Western European notion of decline clearly Africa’s parliamentary system. In fact, when shows in the never ending lamentations about South Africa’s parliamentary system is com- the negative effects of party discipline on par- pared with other parliaments in the Southern liaments all around the world. Parties seem to African region,5 the South African framework be widely regarded as obstacles blocking legis- seems most conducive to developing an influ- latures from performing their democratic func- ential parliamentary opposition. However, any tions rather than as facilitators of parliamentary well-established opposition party will have to performance. They are the main focus of elec- find a fine balance between being vocal and toral studies but still remain under-researched being influential, between cooperation and con- when it comes to the field of parliamentary frontation. research. How then is it possible to look beyond the 2. PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT liberal perspective and gain more insight into Historically, parliaments have been studied the role of parties in parliament? Firstly, it from a liberal perspective defining them as needs to be acknowledged that parliaments are ‘law-making bodies in a spiral of decline’.6 not mono-functional institutions. They perform Ever since Montesquieu introduced the theory a number of functions in a modern democracy, of the separation of powers, law-making has some of which are especially important in the been regarded as the principal task of legisla- context of a consolidating democracy like the tures. As a consequence, a legacy of what has South African one. Studying the Brazilian case been named ‘the two body image’7 is still between 1964 and 1965, Packenham empha- prominent in current legislative studies. sised the importance of a multi-functional Legislatures are mainly studied with regard to approach in legislative studies and argued that their impact on policy making by the executive. legitimation, recruitment, socialisation and The emphasis remains on the relation of one training are as crucial as the decisional or influ- institution to the other. Recent studies using a ence function of legislatures.8 Given the rela- rational choice or neo-institutional approach tive dominance of the executive in initiating have provided a remedy of some sort by legislation and the lack of parliamentary emphasising the behaviour, preferences and resources in the form of researchers and com- attitudes of individual MPs and drawing atten- mittee staff, this seems equally true for most tion to the role parliamentary committees play parliaments in consolidating democracies, in the functioning of a modern day parliament. including South Africa. If anything, the South Such insights are crucial if the way in which African parliament contributes to the new parties nowadays dominate the functioning of democratic system by enhancing representation most parliaments in the world is to be fully and legitimacy rather than exerting power in understood. Only if a comprehensive frame- terms of law-making. This has important conse- work from which to analyse parliaments as quences for the way we think about the role of complex networks of relations between various parliamentary opposition in South Africa. parliamentary actors is employed can the role While the first democratic parliament elected of parties in parliament be adequately compre- in 1994 spent most of its time putting in place a hended. new constitutional and legislative framework to There is a second liberal legacy in legislative replace the old apartheid laws, the situation studies that hinders a full understanding of par- seems to have ‘normalised’ after the election of ties in parliament: the persisting notion that the second parliament in 1999. In other words, ever since parties entered the parliamentary the opportunity for the opposition to influence arena, legislatures are in decline. The golden the law-making process has diminished simply age of parliament was the 19th century, when because the role of parliament changed. Now independent members deliberated free of vested that the phase of democratic consolidation has regional or party interests and the demands of begun, the main challenge is therefore to shift the mass of voters. With the growth of organ- parliament’s focus from law-making to ised parties and the introduction of mass fran- accountability. chise, power shifted away from parliament and However, in contrast with the more estab- its importance diminished. The persistence of lished democracies in the West, the notion of

106 Nijzink accountability does not seem firmly embedded NNP has been less successful in determining its in South African parliamentary politics. Firstly, strategy. During the 1999 election campaign, because of the existence of the constitutional the NNP was in two minds. On the one hand, court and the independent so called ‘Chapter the party emphasised the need for opposition to Nine’ (of the constitution) institutions, there are the ANC. On the other, it campaigned on its alternative ways to hold government account- record of incumbent provincial government. able. Parliament is not the only forum of over- During the government formation process that sight over the executive. Although the constitu- followed the election, the party sent out an tional watchdogs like the Independent Electoral equally mixed message, with some NNP politi- Commission (IEC), the Human Rights cians arguing for an ANC/NNP coalition.10 Commission and the Public Protector are While this may have been a byproduct of the accountable to the National Assembly (section more general disarray in which the party found 181.5 of the Constitution), they provide a dis- itself, it will be interesting to see how the coali- tinct alternative for individuals and groups to tion experience in the Western Cape will express their grievances, give voice to their impact on strategies of the two coalition part- interests and challenge government policy. ners for the next elections. Now that they have Importantly, the Constitutional Court and merged into the Democratic Alliance (DA), the Chapter Nine institutions are also open to oppo- municipal elections in 2000 might very well sition parties, and they may make use of these prove to be crucial for the opposition’s for- alternative extra-parliamentary routes to hold tunes. In any case, the intricacies of the system government accountable. However, doing so, of provincial government and the link between they run the risk of being accused of politicis- the political situation in the province and the ing what is in essence a legal way to safeguard national position of the parties seems to limit constitutional rights. The court case over the extent to which the notion of accountability aspects of voter registration in the run up to the is firmly embedded in opposition politics. It 1999 elections is a case in point. The democrat- seems to make it more difficult for opposition ic Party (DP) and the New National Party parties like the NNP, the DP and now the new (NNP) took the government to court accusing it DA to successfully convince the voters that of promoting disenfranchisement, but it has they can succeed in holding government been argued by some that these parties were in accountable. practice using the court case to seek party polit- ical gains, endangering the independence of the 3. PARLIAMENTARY STRUCTURES AND IEC in the process.9 The example serves to PROCEDURES show that when parliamentary opposition is not King has devised a typology of different modes the sole instrument for holding the government of executive-legislative relations, which has accountable, the alternative constitutional fora subsequently been refined by the present author which are provided should be handled with and Andeweg. This typology identifies a non- great care. After all, parliament, being a nation- party mode in which members of government al political arena, is more suitable for party interact with members of parliament and which political debate than a court case can ever be. conforms to the ‘old’ image of two bodies The specific situation with regard to provin- engaged in constitutional checks and balances. cial government is the second reason why Parliament functions as an institution vis-à-vis opposition parties seem to experience difficul- government. Secondly, an inter-party mode has ties in developing clear strategies to hold gov- been identified in which the main line of con- ernment accountable. This is especially true for flict runs not between institutions but between the NNP. The Western Cape, being the strong- parties. Ministers and MPs from one party hold of the NNP, is the only province in the interact with ministers and MPs (or if it is an country governed only by opposition parties. opposition party only MPs) from another party. (The ANC is formally the junior partner to the Parliament serves as a political arena in which IFP in KwaZulu-Natal.) While the DP seems to the ideological struggle between political par- have been rather comfortable with combining ties is fought out. Finally, there is a cross-party its position of the Official Opposition with its mode, in which ministers and MPs combine to shared government position in the province, the interact on the basis of cross-party interests.

107 Nijzink

The interactions ignore the institutional bound- National Assembly must provide for mecha- aries between parliament and government, but nisms: this time the struggle is not between parties but • to ensure that all executive organs of state in between social interests intersecting party the national sphere of government are boundaries. Parliament serves as a marketplace accountable to it and where social interests are traded in fierce com- • to maintain oversight of the exercise of petition. national executive authority, including the In a comparative study of 18 Western implementation of legislation and any organ European legislatures, Andeweg and Nijzink of state. have tried to find evidence of the existence of The implementation of this constitutional pro- these modes by looking at the institutional vision includes, among other things, several norms and practices structuring those parlia- forms of parliamentary questioning and a sys- ments. In general, the inter-party mode seems tem of parliamentary committees. to have replaced the non-party mode, which can Some of the committees of the National be regarded as the dominant pattern of interac- Assembly, most notably the committees on tion in the time prior to the development of Justice, Education and Constitutional Affairs modern political parties. However, with regard have carved out an important role for them- to the extent to which parliaments control their selves in the policy-making process. Although own agenda, the frequency and success rate of more often than not they deliberate with the private member bills and the frequency of par- department’s legal drafters rather than the liamentary inquiries, Andeweg and Nijzink still Minister present (something which raises found signs of the non-party mode in all 18 par- serious questions around executive-legislative liaments under study. The dominance of the relations in the drafting stage), portfolio com- inter-party mode is further limited by evidence mittees have certainly been influential in law of the cross-party mode in patterns of ministeri- making. But have they also performed well in al recruitment, the existence of specialised par- terms of oversight? liamentary committees and cross-party caucus- The 26 permanent specialised portfolio com- es as well as the degree of specialisation among mittees of the National Assembly have been MPs.11 provided with extensive oversight powers. Although it is far beyond the scope of this Apart from dealing with legislation, a commit- paper to apply King’s framework and its insti- tee must maintain oversight of the exercise tutional indicators to the South African case, within its portfolio of national executive there does not seem to be any reason why the authority, including the implementation of leg- same overall pattern could not emerge in a islation, and, according to rule 52 of the detailed analysis of the South African parlia- Standing Orders, ‘monitor, investigate, enquire mentary procedures and structures. Different into and make recommendations relating to any patterns of interactions between ministers and aspect of the legislative programme, budget, parliamentarians clearly co-exist in Western rationalisation, restructuring, policy formula- European parliaments. To approach the study tion or any other matter it may consider rele- of South African legislative structures and pro- vant, of the government department or depart- cedures from this perspective of coexistence ments falling within the category of affairs might therefore help rethink the notions of assigned to the committee’. accountability and opposition in South African Moreover, for the purposes of performing its parliamentary politics. oversight function, a portfolio committee may For now, however, the paper will limit itself summon any person to appear before it to give to a discussion of two institutional elements evidence. These powers are also enshrined, closely associated with parliament’s task of unusually, in the Constitution itself. According holding the government accountable, parlia- to section 56, a committee of the National mentary questioning and the parliamentary Assembly may: committee system, and assess the extent to • summon any person to appear before it to which the inter-party mode dominates these give evidence on oath or affirmation, or to structures. produce documents Section 55 of the Constitution states that the • require any person or institution to report to it

108 Nijzink

• compel any person or institution to comply party mode would always dominate in commit- with a summons or requirement in terms of tee meetings. paragraph (a) or (b) Parliamentarians and especially opposition • receive petitions, representations or submis- MPs are faced with the challenge of striking a sions from any interested persons or institu- delicate balance between being vocal and being tions. influential. Parliamentary committee meetings However, an internal Report on Parliamentary are at least in theory highly suitable for effec- Oversight and Accountability, recently pre- tive oversight. Parliamentary questioning, on pared for Parliament by specialists in Con- the other hand, is clearly more geared towards stitutional Law, identified several problems the articulation of partisan views. After all, committees have in using their extensive pow- question time is a highly public event, provid- ers.12 Firstly, there is a logistical problem with ing an excellent opportunity to engage in party an overload of reports, and late distribution of political competition. In other words, during reports as well as too little time to prepare question time, parliament is clearly in an inter- responses. Given the current lack of committee party mode. and individual resources for MPs, many reports Apart from the oral questions, presented at a are simply being ignored rather than used to fixed question time on a regular basis, typical hold government accountable. Some committee forms of parliamentary questioning are inter- members apparently rely on the more infre- pellations, aimed at opening a specific form of quent briefings with the department rather than mini-debate, and less important written ques- available written reports to raise matters that tions which are not answered nor debated in are of clear importance. parliamentary sittings. An extensive compara- Secondly, there is a problem with regard to tive research project concentrating on parlia- the wide range of bodies that are accountable to ments in Western Europe13 found that there is a parliament. The report recommends establish- constant process of evolution in the precise ing a separate parliamentary committee to deal terms of the various forms of questioning, and with the constitutional institutions parliament that the detailed institutional set-up of parlia- should oversee. With regard to the other com- mentary questioning significantly influences mittees, the proposed solution is streamlining the way in which the process can serve as an the procedure on receipt of reports. However, it instrument of accountability. Rules with regard is clear that logistics is just one element of the to the number of questioners are a good exam- problem. The lack of staff, expertise and ple. resources is another that needs to be addressed Normally, written and oral questions are an if the committees are to perform their oversight individual right. Many parliaments permit one, tasks effectively. and only one, MP to put a question. In some Finally, there is the more political matter of parliaments, it is possible for more than one attitudes. Even if all the resource and logistical MP, not necessarily from the same party, to problems would be solved, committees would submit a joint question. Obviously, such a joint only be transformed into instruments of over- effort could enhance pressure on the govern- sight if committee chairs are not afraid to occa- ment, especially when a government MP and an sionally antagonise the minister; if the opposi- opposition MP join forces. tion is not set on turning every committee meet- In some countries, a joining of forces is ing into a mini-plenum; if committees would required with regard to interpellations. In succeed in focusing on policy implementation Finland, for example, the minimum number of and if members regard their committees as effi- questioners in the case of an interpellation is 20 cient parliamentary units established to develop MPs. In Germany, five per cent of MPs or one expertise and manage information rather than party group is the minimum required for an extensions of the party political divide. As for interpellation. Such a regulation, however, legislation, the author has observed that com- tends to emphasise party political differences mittees work in a spirit of relaxed party compe- rather than enhance the oversight potential of tition, but can they do so when it comes to an interpellation debate. oversight? It would certainly be less conducive In South Africa, the Standing Orders do not to effective parliamentary oversight if the inter- specify a minimum number of questioners nor

109 Nijzink are there any provisions dealing with joint be introduced. Against this background, a deci- questions, but the example serves to illustrate sion was made to revamp questioning proce- the importance of a more detailed analysis of dures. Interpellations, widely regarded as dull the specific questioning procedures, in terms of and unexciting, have subsequently been abol- formal rules as well as practice. At present, ished and new rules for question time have questions and interpellations are utilised widely been introduced. The first-come-first-serve by opposition parties and seem to constitute the basis for tabling questions has been replaced by more popular means of disputing ANC policy. a proportional allocation, and there are new Most of the socio-economic questions, for arrangements regarding the attendance of min- example, are posed by opposition parties rather isters, including the President, who will answer than ANC members. Only 17% of socio-eco- questions four times a year. nomic questions asked between 1994 and 1999 So far, the changes seem to have increased were asked by ANC members. Research by the liveliness of debate in the National Idasa’s Political Information and Monitoring Assembly. Whether, they have also increased Service (PIMS) also shows the total number of the scope for opposition in parliament remains questions asked by each of the four main par- to be seen. It largely depends on the balance the ties between 1994 and 1998: opposition might be able to find between being NNP = 2739 vocal and being influential. DP = 1679 For now, the effectiveness of the opposition IFP = 687 in terms of oversight or questioning should not ANC = 588 be overestimated. Normally, opposition parties There are several possible explanations for the can help perform the parliamentary function of relative rarity of ANC questioning, despite its oversight. Yet, the opposition structure in the large majority. Firstly, the ANC seems to current parliament hardly seems to be suffi- regard parliament as primarily a venue for pass- ciently powerful to do so, in part because the ing laws initiated by the government and for opposition parties that entered parliament after facilitating policy implementation by the exec- the 1999 elections are still in a learning curve utive. Secondly, the ANC as an organisation and still developing their oppositional skills. In and former struggle movement does not have a addition, the small size of most opposition par- strong history of individualised and indepen- ties manifestly hinders their oversight activities, dent behaviour. A third and more important especially where they fail to prioritise and tar- factor is probably the inexperience of many get specific issues. The Pan African Congress MPs with the workings of parliament, although (PAC) MP is the obvious it might be expected that this factor would have exception here. She seems constantly effective diminished over time. in putting issues on the political agenda and In practice, the ANC has come to acknowl- challenging the ANC. As such she comes close edge that opposition parties have dominated to the old ideal of the independent MP and question time. After the 1999 elections, when shows that effective opposition does not solely the DP replaced the NNP as the largest opposi- lie in numbers. tion party, the ANC warned its members that The DP is equally vocal and seems to be as the effective use of question time might have effective in putting issues on the political agen- contributed to the DP’s electoral success. The da. However, the DP seems to focus on issues DP, being well-versed in media management, that are less important for the majority of vot- led the ANC to expect an even more strategic ers. Furthermore, by choosing a confrontational use of question time by the opposition. style, it is in danger of alienating the ANC Consequently, the latter urged its members to while doing little to enhance accountability. It be proactive – instead of leaving it to the Whips also seems rather unwise in a situation in which Office or the party researchers to compile ques- there is no clear prospect of winning control of tions – and make question time a showcase for government and the potential growth of the the ANC. The DP, on the other hand, accused party is limited by the country’s electoral the President of neglecting parliament, com- demography. If anything, it has resulted in a plained about his lack of attendance and pro- competition between the DP and the NNP for posed that a specific President’s Question Time the position of ‘white opposition’ in the coun-

110 Nijzink try. The recent merger of the two parties can ernment accountable, thus providing intra-par- therefore be regarded as a culmination of party liamentary as well as extra-parliamentary political competition rather than a strengthen- opportunities for parties of opposition. These ing of the opposition. It is hard to see how the arrangements require from the opposition a new DA is anything other than a strategic move constructive commitment to the new democrat- by the DP to win the electoral struggle over a ic order. minority of the electorate. It certainly is not a Given the existing institutional framework, move based on ideology and principles. Be that the opposition has an important role to play in as it may, the new alliance will most probably terms of legitimation, mobilising support for not adopt the strategy of constructive opposi- the system, and in terms of tension release and tion which the NNP used to promote but con- interest articulation. Opposition parties also tinue the confrontational route chosen by the have a role to play in keeping the government DP. Consequently, the DA’s chances of effec- alert, making sure that the issues they raise can- tively making a difference in terms of govern- not be easily dismissed by the ANC in govern- ment policies appear limited. Even so, a con- ment and parliament. It follows that opposition clusion that there is no scope for opposition in parties should not concentrate solely on their the new South African parliament appears far impact on legislation and policy making. too negative. Rather, now that the first phase of democratisa- tion is over and the main legislative and consti- CONCLUSION tutional instruments are in place, the opposition During its negotiated transition towards democ- should focus its energies on strategies to racy, South Africa opted for parliamentarism enhance transparency and interest representa- and a system of PR. From a comparative per- tion. Parliamentary questioning is one of the spective this seems to have been a wise choice. ways to do so, but the committee system also Not only does it avoid the very real danger provides scope for an influential opposition, as majoritarianism poses of reinforcing pre-exist- does the option of introducing private member ing tensions between regions or ethnic groups, bills. but the chosen system is also better suited than A further polarisation along racial lines will the presidential systems of South Africa’s certainly hinder the effectiveness of all these neighbours for giving the opposition a chance parliamentary activities. It may win NNP voters to carve out a meaningful role in the new for the DP, even to the extent of incorporating democratic dispensation. or eliminating the NNP altogether, yet it also Nonetheless, the opposition role should not risks creating the notion of a white opposition be primarily defined in terms of presenting a versus a black government. credible alternative government. Such a strate- Such a division along racial lines will not gy betrays a stubbornness in holding to West- only negate the gains that were made with the minster-style notions of democratic account- democratic transition. It will also tempt the ability from which the new institutional frame- ANC into using its overwhelming majority to work has clearly moved away. The constitution dominate parliamentary politics, thus reducing has created powerful parliamentary committees the role of parliament in South Africa’s new as well as additional fora for holding the gov- democracy.

111 Nijzink

ENDNOTES

1) A. Tekle, Elections and Electoral Systems Musolf (eds.), Legislatures in in Africa: Purposes, Problems, and Developmental Perspective, (Durham: Prospects, in: J. Elklit (ed.), Electoral Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 521-537. Systems for Emerging Democracies: 9) S. Jacobs, and L.Nijzink, Getting The Experiences and Suggestions, (Copen- Balance Right: The Political Independence hagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida, of the South African Electoral 1997), p. 119. Commission, paper presented at the 2) G. Wilson, The Westminster Model in Workshop on Democracy and Electoral Comparative Perspective, in: I. Budge and Administration in Southern Africa, D, McKay (eds), Developing Democracy, University of Stellenbosch, 24-25 March (London: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 2000, 12 pp. (to be published by the 193-195. Norwegian Institute for Human Rights). 3) R. Mattes, Beyond Government and 10) L.Nijzink,. and S. Jacobs, Provincial Opposition: An Independent South African Elections and Government Formation in Legislature, Politikon, 20 (2), 1993, pp. 64- the Western Cape: the Politics of 89. Polarisation, Politikon, 27 (1), 2000, pp. 4) A.Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of 37-49. Majoritarian and Consensus Government 11) R.B.Andeweg, and L. Nijzink, Beyond the in Twenty-One Countries, (New Haven: Two-Body Image: Relations Between Yale University Press, 1984), p. 80. Ministers and MPs, in: H. Doering (ed.) 5) L. Nijzink, and H. Kotzé, Parliaments in Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Southern Africa: a Comparative Analysis Europe, (Frankfurt/ New York: Campus of Constitutional Choices in Consolidating Verlag/St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 152- Democracies, paper presented at the XVIII 178. World Congress of the International 12) Report on Parliamentary Oversight and Political Science Association, Quebec, Accountability, prepared for the Office of , 1-5 August 2000, p. 16 the Speaker by H. Corder et al. Faculty of 6) P. Norton, Parliaments in Western Europe, Law, University of Cape Town, July 1999, (London: Frank Cass, 1990), p. 3. 67 pp. 7) A. King, Modes of Executive-Legislative 13) M. Wiberg, Parliamentary Questioning: Relations: Great Britain, France and West- Control by Communication?, in: H. Germany, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Doering (ed.), Parliaments and Majority 1(1), 1976, pp. 11-32. Rule in Western Europe, (Frankfurt/ New 8) R. Packenham, Legislatures and Political York: Campus Verlag/St. Martin’s Press, Development, in: A. Kornberg and L.D. 1995), pp. 179-222.

112 The Potential Constituency of the DA: What Dowries do the DP and the NNP Bring to the Marriage?

Hennie Kotzé

The fusion of South Africa’s two largest oppo- that they were joining together as the Demo- sition parties, the Democratic Party (DP) and cratic Alliance (DA). For the moment, these the New National Party (NNP) into the two parties will remain as separate entities and Democratic Alliance (DA) has been a marriage the DA will remain a coalition, as the constitu- born out of the desire for a more dynamic par- tion requires that members of parliament (MPs) liamentary opposition rather than ideological who change political parties resign. However, conviction. The union brings together two par- the present intention is that the DA will fight ties which are not only divergent in their the next election as a single party. The DA has philosophies but also in their styles of opposi- therefore emerged as the largest opposition tion. This analysis deals with the potential for challenger to the African National Congress growth that the DA has in the short- to medi- (ANC). This article examines its potential for um-term, focusing specifically on their capacity growth in the short- to medium-term. for developing shared values. The article South Africa’s transition to democracy argues that while the DA is likely to become enhanced the standing of opposition in two the preferred home for the majority of whites, major ways. Firstly, opposition was legitimised coloured and Asian voters, its scope for sup- by the country’s first (1994) democratic consti- port among blacks will be severely limited if tution. The latter stated that there should be the DA takes over the DP’s strategy of adver- representative government, embracing multi- sarial opposition. party democracy, regular elections, , a common voters’ roll, and in general, INTRODUCTION proportional representation (PR). Politically, Elections legitimise power. In a narrow sense the effect was to legitimise as parties the libera- this means that the government of the day is tion movements which had been banned by the legitimate in the eyes of those who have voted. apartheid regime, whilst conversely, similarly More broadly speaking, however, it means that legitimising the role of those non-struggle par- the population also accepts the regime – the ties which had participated in the previously state and the political community. In South undemocratically structured parliament. Africa’s 1994 election – the first inclusively Secondly, democratic elections also create the competitive election – the concept of a ‘politi- opportunity for parties to send a message to the cal party opposition’ within the arena of a voters that criticism and sharp differences democratic system was established for the first should be accepted as part of the political time. The second election of June 1999 rein- process.1 Although such a celebration of diver- forced the concept of opposition parties and sity constitutes a standard dimension of liberal their role in South African politics, a develop- democracy, its reality remains contested in ment which has subsequently been underlined many new democracies, particularly so in a by the announcement by the two largest such system such as South Africa’s which has not parties – the DP and the NNP – in June 2000 only emerged from an oppressive regime but

113 Kotzé where social and economic cleavages are per- 1.1 The New National Party vasive. Thus whereas the first condition clearly The National Party (NP) is firmly rooted in the stipulates the institutional character of opposi- history of the 20th century. Since its establish- tion, the second refers more to the socio-eco- ment in 1914, it has boasted many ideological nomic character of the opposition. adaptations, alliances, breakaways and even a It is a combination of these conditions that name change, only becoming the ‘New’ NP in determines the fortunes of the DP and NNP. On 1998. (See Figure 1 for the party family tree.) the one hand, the institutional outcome of the Traditionally the NP was an all-white party, electoral system – namely that of a party list acting as the architect of apartheid and system of PR – allowed them a far greater rep- . When the party resentation in parliament than they would have announced its intention to scrap the notion of had under a relative majority or absolute major- racial minority protection as a basic pillar of its ity system. On the other hand, the socio-eco- policy framework in the early 1990s, it brought nomic conditions, and particularly the political about its end as a party for ‘whites only’. culture in South Africa, predestine them to Although its parliamentary representation, remain in perpetual opposition, for the only which was almost wholly white, did not reflect chance of new entities such as the newly estab- its support base after the 1994 election it had a lished DA to break the dominance of the now fairly representative constituency in its 20% ruling ANC will be if a split in the latter’s share of the vote. It was estimated that its Tripartite Alliance with the South African almost four million voters consisted of: 49% Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of whites; 30% coloureds; 14% blacks; and 7% South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) should Asians.3 materialise. In the short- to medium-term Today, the NNP has claimed that it has trans- (including the next general elections, which are formed itself by admitting the wrongs of the expected in 2004) it seems that the number of past and ‘revolutionising’ its membership dissatisfied supporters of the ANC is too small requirements. After 1994, it claimed that it was for the opposition to make inroads into the sup- redefining South African politics by bringing port of the governing party. ‘together a majority of all South Africans in a In order to analyse the potential constituency dynamic political movement based on proven of the DA and the possibility of it becoming a core values and Christian-democratic norms real threat to the ANC, this article will: firstly, and standards’.4 As the post-1994 era unfolded, provide a brief overview of the history and however, it rapidly became obvious that 40 policies of the DP and NNP; secondly, analyse years in government had rendered the NNP their present support base; thirdly, consider the incapable of serving as junior partner to the prospects for its enlargement; and finally, dis- ANC in the post-transition Government of cuss the socio-economic conditions that shape National Unity. It also became evident that the the growth potential for all and any opposition party was losing its appeal to many of its sup- in South Africa. porters. The succession to its leadership of Marthinus 1. BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND van Schalkwyk after the resignation of former POLICIES OF THE NNP AND DP2 President F.W. de Klerk in August 1997, also After the formation of the Union of South proved decisive. The party had to market a Africa in 1910, whereby Britain granted effec- package combining a new and comparatively tive autonomy to the settler minority, white pol- inexperienced leader with its new brand of poli- itics was dominated by three themes: race rela- tics to the party faithful. A steady decline in its tions, constitutional issues, and the nature of ratings since the Van Schalkwyk accession sug- the South African nation. It was, however, only gests that it failed in doing so. (See Figure 3.) after the Second World War that racial policies This forced the NNP to explore the idea of a became the all pervasive trademark of South ‘united opposition party’, but this did not mate- African politics. Prior to that, South Africa’s rialise, and in the 1999 election the party constitutional status and the shape it would take slumped to fourth place, losing 13% of its sup- were the main political issues that preoccupied port in the period between the two elections. the established political parties. Compared to the 3.9 million votes it garnered

114 Kotzé in 1994, it polled only 1.098 million or 6.87% policy shift in February 1990. During the early of the votes in 1999. All in all, it appears that it 1990s the party was characterised by internal failed to tailor its programme to its racially differences. Ironically, (who was to mixed support base, and in particular, whereas be elected leader after the party’s disastrous its policy of ‘constructive cooperation’ with the showing in the 1994 elections when it received government may have made sense to its less than two per cent of the vote), proposed in coloured voters, it proved particularly unpopu- April 1992 that the DP disband and merge with lar with its white supporters, who had left in the NP. Tensions then came to a head and a droves for the more robustly oppositionist DP. number of MPs defected to the ANC. Nonethe- less, despite these tensions, the DP continued to 1.2 The Democratic Party use its position as a party of the centre to play In contrast to the NNP, the DP is a much the role of facilitator, as it had so expertly done younger party, which was launched in April in the run-up to and during the multiparty nego- 1989. However, the party’s roots go back to the tiation process which paved the way to the Progressive Party (PP) founded in 1959 which democratic transition. Furthermore, although it for many years had as its sole had just seven representatives in parliament, it representative in parliament. Subsequently, the capitalised on its past experience of being in DP was an amalgamation of the successor to opposition, and established a widely-held per- the (PP), the Progressive Federal Party (led by ception of its being much more effective than Dr Zach de Beer), the Independent Party (led the NP. by Dr Dennis Worrall), the National The DP retains an overwhelmingly white Democratic Movement (led by Wynand middle-class support base, which forced it to Malan), and a so-called ‘fourth force’ of disillu- concentrate on issues close to the heart of these sioned Afrikaners. This amalgamation united voters during the 1999 election campaign. In the entire white parliamentary opposition to the contrast to NP supporters, who indicated in a left of the National Party. (See figure 2 for the poll conducted by the Human Sciences DP ‘family tree’.) Moreover, it highlighted Research Council (HSRC) that fighting crime potentially strong support for liberal values in (40%) and job creation (30%) were their main South African politics even though the DP only priorities, DP supporters indicated that fighting managed to draw 20% of white support in the crime (67%) should be their main priority. Only 1989 (racially restricted) general election. 14% opted for job creation.5 This pattern also The DP was initially jointly led by De Beer, reflects the differences in the racial and class Worrall and Malan before De Beer became the basis of the two parties. The DP’s objective sole leader in October 1990. An important aim was to show that the party would keep on fight- of the party was to form a bridge between par- ing against the ANC-led government. Their liamentary and extra-parliamentary groups, this adoption of a ‘Fight Back’ campaign, criticised was to be achieved by means of negotiation. It by the ANC as racist,6 proved especially popu- was also committed to ‘engagement politics’, lar with white and Asian voters, many of whom meaning it was prepared to talk to everyone, deserted the NNP with its more ‘constructive’ from right wing Afrikaners to the Pan African- approach because they found the aggressive ist Congress (PAC). In practice, however, its opposition style of the DP particularly appeal- weak representation in parliament limited its ing. opportunities to act as a political broker. One of The opinion polls, which predicted the steady the DP’s basic dilemmas – as was the case with decline of the NNP, correctly forecasted the all white dominated liberal parties before it – rise of the DP to the position of official was that it could not deploy its potential multi- Opposition after the 1999 election, when it racial support base to the power centre. Had it polled 9.55% of the vote. (See Figure 3.) decided to attack the fundamental legitimacy of The DP and NNP have no shared historical white control, it would have run the risk of roots, neither did they up till the 1990s share eroding its support among those it needed to common ground ideologically. A deeper under- function effectively in parliamentary politics. standing of their very different values allows a Many of the DP’s initial problems and low better understanding of the type of constituency support levels resulted from the NP’s dramatic that may support the DA.

115 Kotzé

1.3 Contrasting philosophies effect will cancel out this negative aspect in the During the period of transition and after the long-term. 1994 elections it was quite obvious that the In contrast, although the technocratic philosophical approaches of the DP and the approach shares the liberal idea of procedural NNP differed on key aspects. Each had a dis- justice, it sees the community as the primary tinctive vision, which gave direction to their unit in politics. It is assumed that the individu- policy programmes regarding political change als do not make decisions in an autonomous in South Africa. The DP’s vision could be manner but rather as part of some community. described as liberal, while the NNP’s could be The presupposition is that an individual’s party typified as technocratic. support is linked to interests but that these The core of liberalism is anchored in the defi- interests are linked and intertwined with a nition of democracy in terms of the principle of broader social identity. This identity is connect- procedural justice. With such an approach the ed to language, religion, race and other cultural yardstick for democracy is the way in which markers. Contemporary social issues are inter- decisions are taken according to stipulated rules preted and filtered through this net of social and procedures rather than the content of the relationships. For the technocrats, democracy decision. A second point of departure is to thus entails the maintenance of constitutional regard the individual as the primary political rules and procedures which guarantee the rights unit. The assumption is that rights, freedom and and freedoms of individuals, yet which also responsibilities are accorded to individuals. ensures that communities are protected. Against Democratic citizenship, in its broadest sense, is this background they reject majority govern- seen as an individual capacity. The presupposi- ment and insist on constitutional rules that tion is that individuals autonomously decide guarantee power-sharing and minority protec- what is in their best interest. Consequently, tion. party preference is seen as based on interest and Technocrats see the nation as consisting of not on relationships such as race, language, different cultural communities, which together class, religion, etc. form a multi-cultural identity. The nation-build- Majority government is not regarded as a ing process, according to this approach, is threat from the viewpoint of a classical liberal based on proactive state action in the form of approach. Firstly, the majority is regarded as constitutional rules, which create social space only a random and temporary assembly of indi- for cultural communities to build their identi- viduals. The assumption is that such an assem- ties. bly will break up as soon as other political par- The technocrats also pledged allegiance to ties aggregate the interests of these individuals free entrepreneurship and capitalist economic more effectively on new issues. In short, practices. They acknowledge the inequalities majorities are formed around issues. Secondly, resulting from capitalist growth, however, they majorities in control of the government can be believe that the creation of wealth will in the restricted in the arbitrary use of power if the longer-term cancel out these inequalities. necessary checks and balances exist in the Inequalities should be endured and protests political system. based on this should be curtailed with state With the individual as the important political action. unit, it is obvious that a nation is regarded as a collection of individuals. Freedom of associa- 1.4 Values tion is central to the liberal dynamics of nation- Political development in South Africa reflects building and civil society should be an dramatically different patterns of socialisation. autonomous component of the state. The indi- This pattern can be described as the ‘socialisa- vidual again forms the basic unit in the liberal tion of isolation’, because the codification of approach to socio-economic development. It is racial discrimination under apartheid led to the accepted that economic development in a sys- creation of virtually watertight divisions tem of free entrepreneurship, coupled with cor- between socially constructed categories of peo- rect policy, will stimulate economic growth. ple in the country. These groups all experienced Capitalist growth creates inequalities but liberal political and social life quite differently. A gen- thinkers are confident that the trickle down eral assumption in a case like this is that peo-

116 Kotzé

Table 1: Social values index by party support Table 2: Social values index by population group (%) Orientation ANC DP NNP Orientation Black White Coloured Asian Very liberal 0.4 1.0 0.2 Liberal 2.3 8.1 1.0 Very liberal 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 Neither liberal Liberal 2.1 3.0 0.2 1.4 nor conservative 9.6 25.3 8.0 Neither liberal Conservative 21.9 29.8 26.1 nor conservative 10.2 12.3 4.0 6.2 Very conservative 65.9 35.9 64.8 Conservative 20.0 31.0 19.2 24.2 Very conservative 67.5 53.0 64.8 68.1 N= 2935 N= 2935 ple’s values are also influenced by their respec- tive social and political environments. and Asian people are somewhat more conserva- Although the cornerstone of this compartmen- tive than blacks and whites. (See Table 2.) talisation policy, the Population Registration Taking into account that about 16% indicated Act, was scrapped in the late 1980s, the impli- that they were either liberal or leaning towards cations of these racial categories continue to liberalism, it is interesting to note that approxi- permeate the fabric of everyday life in South mately 50% of whites indicated that they had Africa. voted for the DP in the 1999 election (Markinor These variant patterns of socialisation are post election survey). A similar trend was reflected in the values which differentiate the noticeable among coloured (17%) and Asian supporters of political parties. Of particular rel- (38%) voters. They voted for the DP notwith- evance to the concerns of this paper is the set of standing their conservative values. The attrac- value orientations which may be termed ‘social tion of liberal social values can thus be exclud- liberalism’, encouraging us to ask: firstly, what ed as a possible explanation for the increase in is the level of social liberalism among support- DP support. ers of South Africa’s major parties? And, sec- The above pattern suggests firstly, that all ondly, is there a discernible pattern which dis- South Africans are relatively conservative and, tinguishes the historically designated race secondly, as expected, DP supporters are some- groups? One finding which emerges is that what more liberal. It does not, however, give an while, as has been seen, there are significant indication as to why the many conservative vot- differences between the DP and the NNP philo- ers who levered DP support up to almost 10% sophically, there seems to be a smaller gap in the 1999 elections became ‘converted liber- between the value patterns of their supporters. als’ within such a short space of time. In the The South African section of the World next section the present and potential support Values Survey conducted in 1995, contains base of the DP and NNP will be explored in an strong indications that South Africans generally effort to shed more light on where the DP sup- seem to be conservative regarding social issues. porters came from. The following issues were combined in a ‘social values’ index to gauge the reaction of 2. PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CONSTITUENCIES respondents: ‘Homosexuality, prostitution, OF THE DP AND NNP abortion, divorce, suicide and euthanasia’.7 The One of the more interesting debates in the classification represents a continuum from very analysis of electoral politics in South Africa liberal to very conservative. centres around the relationship between race When the attitudes of respondents supporting and voting behaviour.8 This focuses in the main the ANC, DP and NNP are compared, not much on the concept of ‘partisan identification’, difference emerges. (See Table 1.) However, which in turn allows investigation of voting DP supporters come over as slightly more liber- intention to analyse the present and potential al while the ANC and NNP supporters are constituencies of the DP and NNP. equally conservative. In a recent survey by Markdata (February When the different historical group designa- 2000), before the marriage between the DP and tions are compared, it is clear that the coloured the NNP took place, respondents were asked to

117 Kotzé

Table 3: Party support (first choice) by party and by population groups (Markdata: Feb 2000)

Political Party Per cent Support Black support White support Coloured support Asian support

ANC/SACP 57.8 70.9 4.0 37.4 18.9 PAC 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 NNP 5.2 1.6 15.8 17.2 19.3 DP 8.0 1.1 42.8 14.9 20.7 IFP 4.9 6.2 1.6 0.5 1.8 FF 0.5 0.1 3.4 0.0 0.0 CP 0.5 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 ACDP 0.9 0.3 2.6 3.3 1.0 UDM 1.0 1.2 0.5 0.4 0.0 AZAPO 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.3 2.7 Would not vote 6.8 6.6 9.1 6.1 5.4 Uncertain 6.0 5.8 5.4 7.9 6.6 Don't know 2.5 2.1 2.4 3.6 11.6 Refuse 3.9 2.5 7.7 8.5 12.0 Row Total 99.4 76.0 8.9 2.9 7.7 System Missing 0.6 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N= 2666 indicate: ‘If there were an election tomorrow, prepared to ‘switch’ to the other party as their which party would you support?’ This way most favoured alternative. Again, similar pro- their ‘first choice’ party was established. Their portions (12%) of the DP and the NNP are pre- second choice was also asked for. Table 3 pared to opt for the ANC as their second reflects the first choices for the parties. choice. In contrast, very few supporters of No surprising new trends were revealed in either the ANC or the IFP are prepared to con- February 2000, although as might be expected, sider switching to the DP and NNP: only 10% the support for all parties had dropped some- of ANC supporters would consider the parties what since the election. (The margin of error of who now comprise the DA as a second choice. the survey was 3%). Moreover, a substantial This compares with a similar 10% of ANC sup- percentage (nearly 20%) either ‘did not know’, porters who would vote for the PAC as a sec- ‘refused’ or ‘would not vote’. (See Table 3.) To ond choice, and 5% for the United Democratic establish how many NNP supporters indicated Movement (UDM). (Meanwhile, over 50% of that the DP is their second choice and vice UDM supporters indicated the ANC as their versa, a cross tabulation was done between first second choice). It seems that 20% of ANC and and second choice parties for the four largest 12% of IFP supporters would rather abstain parties. (See Table 4.) from voting than vote for other parties, a much From Table 4 it is clear that the supporters of higher proportion than the numbers of NNP and the DP and NNP have much in common, with DP supporters in this category. Indeed, no less about a third of both parties’ faithfuls being than 58% of IFP supporters indicated that their

Table 4: Second choice of voters of four largest parties (%) (Markdata: Feb 2000)

1st Party ANC DP IFP NNP Not vote Uncertain KN/refuse

ANC 33.4 6.7 2.8 4.3 20.5 6.5 5.8 DP 12.5 19.1 3.5 30.2 6.0 9.0 9.6 IFP 12.2 2.1 58.4 2.8 12.5 2.3 7.5 NNP 12.9 37.3 2.8 26.2 3.4 5.5 4.4 N= 2666

118 Kotzé

Table 5: Big four party support by Living of black support for the DP and NNP is notice- Standard Measure (LSM) index (%) able. Quite clearly these parties will have to convince black voters that the newly estab- Party Low-LSM Medium-LSM High-LSM lished DA can be a vehicle for their interests too. Already they have been accused by the ANC 30.8 54.1 15.1 ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama of form- DP 6.0 14.9 79.1 ing the alliance as a ‘last-ditch effort to perpet- NNP 13.8 25.3 60.9 uate minority rule’. He added that ‘the alliance IFP 29.6 57.9 15.1 would bring about racial polarisation’ and char- N= 2666 acterised them as an ‘alliance of hate, which is unprincipled’.11 first choice was also their second choice. This In total 8.8% of black voters indicated that as figure for the ANC was 33%, whereas only a second choice they would be interested in 19% and 26% of the DP and NNP supporters voting for the DP (5.2%) and NNP (3.6%). This respectively indicated that they had such strong is the potential black constituency that the DA loyalties that they would not even consider a should explore – that is, if the assumption holds second choice. that voters who have expressed an interest in The pattern of ‘second choices’ indicates that the separate entities will automatically also there is a much stronger loyalty among the vot- consider as a second choice a combination of ers of the ANC and IFP than among those of these two parties. the DP and NNP. It would be very hard for the At present the DP draws its support mainly DA to lure voters away from these two parties. from those groups in the higher income groups, However, what is not shown in Table 4 is the while support for the NNP is much more evenly large proportion (close to 40%) of Freedom spread among the different classes. Table 5 Front voters that nominated the DP as their sec- gives an indication of this spread by using a ond choice with less than one per cent opting Living Standard Measure (LSM) index.12 for the NNP. This quite clearly confirms that If the LSM profile of the second choice sup- the DP has an attraction for voters from the porters of the DA partners is explored – and white right wing. one should remember that this percentage is It was argued above that the NNP deliberate- very small, for instance only 11% of ANC sup- ly repositioned itself with a policy of ‘construc- porters would consider supporting either the DP tive engagement’ to attract more black voters. or NNP as a second choice – a somewhat dif- In contrast, the campaign of the DP, according ferent pattern emerges. (See Table 6.) Among to some analysts, was geared towards those the blacks that have indicated support for the people in white, coloured and Asian communi- DA partners as second choice, the medium- ties.9 It will clearly be important for the DA to LSM group forms the most likely converts to change this approach if it wants to increase sup- the DA while among the coloureds and Asians port beyond a simple combination of present it is the high-LSM groups that are the most NNP, and DP supporters to make inroads into likely to be converted. the black community. This was recognised by It is quite clear that with the small amount of Leon when he stated at the launch of the DA black support evident in the second choice cate- that: gory, the DA will find it extremely hard to ‘If we do not reach out to a new constituen- attract a large number of black supporters. cy which has not traditionally been associat- ed with opposition politics, then this would 3. PERCEPTIONS OF OPPOSITION POLITICS have been an exercise of temporary dura- Liberals and technocrats have different philo- tion. It is going to basically succeed if we sophical approaches to politics, as was previ- go and engage the main front of South ously explained. Notwithstanding these differ- African politics’.10 ences, the DP managed to make significant From Table 3, which gives the percentages of inroads into the conservative support base of the different population groups in the Markdata the NNP (mainly among whites) following the February 2000 survey that support the ANC, 1994 elections. Liberal values, albeit very DP and NNP respectively, the small percentage underplayed by the DP in its post-election

119 Kotzé

Table 6: LSM-profile of second choice support by population group

Party Low-LSM Medium-LSM High-LSM Black Coloured Asian Black Coloured Asian Black Coloured Asian

DP 26.0 4.1 1.0 51.6 40.4 12.3 7.9 57.4 78.9 NNP 36.2 2.3 0.0 66.1 45.5 21.1 12.2 50.4 86.6 N= 2666 social policy pronouncements, did not deter In Table 7 the majority (90.9%) of the DP NNP supporters from leaving the DP in large supporters are also pro-opposition. In compari- numbers. However, this does not imply that son, the figure for the NNP in this category is they were all drawn by the ‘robust’ opposition 78.8%. IFP supporters also favour a relatively style adopted by the DP, for this appears to strong role for opposition with a majority repel various potential supporters simultaneous- (58.8%). However, the ANC supporters who ly as it attracts others. This may become crucial are favourably disposed to opposition, are less for the newly formed DA. The different atti- then half of the respondents (48.7%). More- tudes that voters have towards the role of oppo- over, the ANC has also the largest group sition will therefore be explored in this section. opposed to opposition (24.1%). In a survey conducted in 1997 by Markinor, a Table 8 clearly shows important differences number of items regarding opposition politics between the population groups. It is clear that were included. After a factor analysis13 was whites (89.2% ‘strongly supportive’ or ‘tend to done on 21 items the first factor with an Eigen be supportive’) and Asians (78%) are the most value of 3.94 and explaining 16.63% of the vigorously in favour of opposition. There are variance was used to form an ‘Opposition also not many respondents in these groups who Index’. The following items were included: are against opposition. • ‘Opposition parties may not criticise the gov- A pre-election survey conducted in Kwa- ernment’ Zulu-Natal by Markinor for the Institute for • ‘We can trust the government to make the Multiparty Democracy during the first half of best decisions’ 1999 revealed a similar pattern. Two dramati- • ‘All this country needs is one political party cally different views of the function of an oppo- to govern the country’ sition were recorded. White and Asian voters • ‘Only supporters of the government may were of the opinion that opposition parties occupy positions/posts in the civil service’ should play the critical role of watchdog, pre- • ‘The government must act strongly against venting the government from acting ‘wrongly”. political parties who question government Black respondents, on the other hand, held the policy’. opinion that opposition parties should assist the Cross tabulating the Opposition Index with the government to govern better. Although the respondents from the four largest parties when opposition should criticise the government, it the survey was conducted and the four popula- should strive towards agreement, enabling a tion groups an interesting pattern emerged. (See greater contribution to the country's develop- Tables 7 and 8.) ment – clearly a preference for ‘consensus Table 7: Opposition Index by voting intention (%)

Direction ANC NNP IFP DP

Strongly against opposition 1.6 0.8 1.1 0.0 Tend to be against 22.5 8.0 13.1 4.3 Neither against nor supportive of 27.1 12.4 30.1 4.9 Tend to be supportive 38.3 40.5 32.8 26.0 Strongly supportive of opposition 10.4 38.3 26.0 64.9 N=3540

120 Kotzé

Table 8: Opposition Index by population group (%)

Direction Black White Coloured Asian

Strongly against opposition 1.6 0.1 1.3 0.0 Tend to be against 21.1 3.5 12.5 6.4 Neither against nor supportive of 7.3 27.8 12.9 14.9 Tend to be supportive 38.1 31.4 46.7 49.1 Strongly supportive of opposition 11.4 57.8 26.6 29.6 N=3540 opposition’ rather than ‘confrontational opposi- the accepted values and principles of the tion’. 14 group. More than 75% of white and 65% of Asian • The ‘consensus’ approach to politics is respondents were of the opinion that the oppo- important to the black populace. sition is there to ‘check’ on the government, • Many black voters feel that political opposi- while only 50% of black respondents shared tion is an indication of division. this view. When asked whether they agreed or Care must be taken in any attempt to gener- disagreed that opposition parties are a negative alise, but it seems that a number of black voters factor in politics, 62% of white respondents and have difficulty in accepting the concept of 54% of Asian respondents disagreed, while opposition politics as conceptualised in only 25% of black respondents disagreed. It is Western liberal democracies. In a recent inter- also interesting to note that a large majority of view, for instance, Dr Malegapura Makgoba black respondents thought that it was not made an interesting remark illustrating this ‘acceptable for non-struggle parties to criticise aspect when he described how South Africans government”. It seems that a fair number of should handle contentious issues: ‘I wish the blacks thus regard the role of opposition parties Opposition could learn this. You don’t criticise as negative and an obstacle to development. an African leader in public. Approach (him) This pattern may help to explain why: through a private discussion first’.15 • such a large number of whites have switched The above patterns illustrating attitudes parties to support the DP towards ‘opposition’ adds credence to the DP’s • despite the liberal social policies of the DP, ‘fight back’ campaign which succeeded in conservative white voters are attracted by the mobilising a large number of uncertain voters aggressive style of opposition politics among the whites and Asians. It was clearly • ANC supporters, in particular, have such an successful in exploiting the frustration with the aversion to the DP. political process among those voters. It may However, this pattern of support for ‘opposi- also explain why white and Asian voters left tion’ does not bode well for a grouping such as the NNP with its more ‘constructive’ approach the DA. It may quite easily find itself in a no- in such large numbers for the aggressive oppo- win situation. If it adopts an aggressive style, it sition of the DP. However, whether this style may attract more supporters from the minorities will be an asset for the DA is debatable. but then may have little attraction for black vot- ers. On the other hand, if it goes the other way, CONCLUSION it moves into uncertain waters. It will certainly The marriage of the DP and the NNP has shed some of its newly won supporters, yet it brought together not only two different philoso- will have no guarantee that black voters will phies but also two different styles of opposition switch parties to join it. politics. Whether the opposition glue will be The following speculative explanations can strong enough to hold the marriage together be offered with regards to these perception pat- will depend to a great extent on how these terns about ‘opposition’: approaches and styles can be integrated. As in • An interesting aspect of the black approach to all functional marriages there will have to be politics is the belief that the individual is part give and take. It is very possible that the DA of the whole, and should be in harmony with will become the political home of the majority

121 Kotzé of the whites, coloureds and Asians. However, sensus opposition’ and ‘confrontational opposi- the above analysis shows that there is limited tion”. If this cannot be done effectively, South scope for growth beyond these minorities if Africa faces becoming confirmed as a dominant they do not scale down what many of their party state, with a number of smaller parties potentially larger constituency regarded as neg- competing in regular, popular elections yet ative opposition politics. Indeed, the DA could never able to attract majority support. easily become marginalised as it may come up The DA may represent a consummation against a demographic ceiling for growth if it devoutly to be wished for for the vitality of cannot attract voters beyond its presently main- South Africa’s democracy. But the present indi- ly white power base. The major challenge will cations are that it is unlikely to be as productive therefore be to strike a balance between ‘con- a union as its partners hope.

122 Kotzé

Figure 1: Family Tree of the NP (Democratic Alliance)

SAP

1914 NP

1934 United Party (Purified) NP

1948 NP

1951 Afrikaner Party

Conservative 1961 Worker's Party

1966 Republic Party

1969 Herstigte Nasionale Party 1970 National Alliance Party

1973 Democratic Party (Gerdener) 1977

1979 National Conservative Party 1980 South African Party

1981 Aksie Eie Toekoms

1982 Conservative Party

1987 Worrall & Malan break away (Independent movement)

1990

June 2000 DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE DP

123 Kotzé

Figure 2: Family Tree of the Democratic Party (Democratic Alliance)

United Party

1959 Progressive Party

1974 Reform Party

1975 Progressive Reform Party

1977 UP disbands Progressive Federal Party DP (Gerdener) NRP

1987 Independent Movement

NDM Independent Party

1988 NP NRP disbands

1989 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NP

2000 DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE

Figure 3: Percentage support for the NNP and DP, 1994–2000 (Markinor Data)

124 Kotzé

ENDNOTES

1) See for instance the seven conditions or see among others, Robert Mattes, Helen factors that Robert A. Dahl, Political Taylor and Cherrel Africa, Judgement and Opposition in Western Democracies (New Choice in the 1999 Election, Politikon, Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, Vol.26 No.2 (1999) pp.235-248; Helen 1966) p.348 identifies that account for dif- Taylor and Theo Hoeane, Interpreting the ferences in the patterns of opposition. South African Election of June 1999, These conditions can quite easily be Politikon, Vol.26 No.2 (1999),P.133-144; reduced to two main categories namely, and Pierre Du Toit, The South African ‘institutional’ and ‘socio-economic’ fac- Voter and the Racial Census, circa 1994, tors as is done in this article. Politeia, March (1999). 2) This section and section three draw heavi- 9) Tom Lodge, Consolidating Democracy: ly on Hennie Kotzé and Anneke Greyling, South Africa’s Second Popular Election, Political Organisations in South Africa, (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University A-Z, (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1994) and Press, 1999) pp.82-84 and pp.129-131 and Hennie Kotzé, The New National Party in David Welsh, The Democratic Party, cited the 1999 election: end of the road or a new in Andrew Reynolds, pp.97-99. beginning?, Politikon, Vol.26 No.2 (1999) 10) Cape Argus, 26 June 2000. pp.167-178. 11) Cape Times, 26 June 2000. 3) Andrew Reynolds (ed), Election 1994 – 12) The index is constructed by asking among South Africa: The campaigns, results and other things, the following: (1) Which of future prospects (Cape Town: David the following items, in working order, Philip, 1994), p192. does your household have?: fridge or 4) Cited in Kotzé, The New National Party, freezer; polisher or vacuum cleaner; TV; p168. hi-fi; microwave oven; washing machine. 5) HSRC, Priorities differ markedly accord- (2) Do you have the following in you ing to party support, Media Release, 5 home?: electricity; hot running water; May 1999. domestic servant; at least one car; flush 6) Susan Booysen, Election 1999 and toilet; TV. (3) Do you personally: Do Scenarios for Opposition Politics in South shopping at supermarkets? (4) Do you per- Africa, Politikon, Vol.26 No.2 (2) (1999) sonally?: Have any insurance policies? p. 53. See also David Welsh, The Telephone or cell phone? Use any finan- Democratic Party, in Andrew Reynolds cial services such as a bank account, ATM (ed), Election 1999: South Africa From card or credit card? Have an account or Mandela to Mbeki (Cape Town: David credit card at a retail store? Buy dishwash- Philip, 1999) for an overview of the DP ing liquid? campaign. 13) Extraction method: Principle component 7) See Hennie Kotzé, Political Change and analysis. Rotation method: Varimax with Shifts in South African Value Kaiser Normalisation. The items were in Orientations, 1990-1995: An Empirical Likert format with answers ranging from Analysis, in Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski (ed), ‘Strongly agree’ to ‘Strongly disagree’. Values and Radical Social Change: The index has a 0.6850 Alpha reliability Comparing Polish and South African coefficient. Experience, (Warsaw: Polish Academy of 14) See www.impd.org.za. Science, 1998) pp.46-48 for a full report 15) Interview with Malegapuru Makgoba, on the methodology of the survey. President of the Medical Research 8) For a discussion of the different viewpoints Council, Focus, June 2000, p.12.

125 A Question of Interest: Women as Opposition

Louise Vincent

This paper looks at the question of opposition mapped out a number of questions with which politics from the standpoint of women. The the debate on political opposition is concerned: paper argues that there are two distinct types questions about the ‘role, functions, legitimacy of representative democratic contexts, and that and capacity of political opposition’.2 Among a different form of representation and partici- the issues with which opposition in South pation is appropriate to each of the contexts. Africa is struggling, Southall lists questions of The first type of representative democracy is how best to oppose, whether to work singly or one where interests are thought to conflict. The in combination, in informal alliance or formal second is one where it is assumed interests are coalition and whether to proceed in a manner held in common. Where interests conflict, the that may be construed as ‘constructive’ or appropriate form of representation is mirror ‘robust’. Many of these questions can usefully representation – the parties whose interests be asked from the standpoint of women. Do are thought to conflict should be represented in women constitute a kind of opposition that is the democratic institution in proportion to their seeking to articulate its interests and influence numbers in the population. Moreover the the policy agenda? If so, what form should the appropriate form of participation in such a articulation of their interests take? Should context is adversarial – the parties ought to be women form their own political party or do prepared to defend their differing interests women constitute an ‘interest group’? Will robustly. Where the fundamental interests of broad alliances of women across party political different representatives are thought to be com- lines be successful and to what end? And the mon, a threshold1 of sufficient numbers of particular focus of the present paper, if women those whose interests significantly conflict is have interests, how ‘constructive’ or ‘robust’ sufficient for the purposes of democracy to be should their participation in defence of those served and the appropriate form of participa- interests be? tion is cooperative rather than adversarial. The For social liberals, women’s enfranchisement paper argues that on some issues at least, the effectively resolved the issue of ‘women and interests of men and women conflict. Women political representation’. In contrast, many who participate in democratic political struc- feminists have argued that women have a dis- tures should therefore be prepared to be adver- tinct identity and set of interests and have sug- sarial when it comes to defending their inter- gested that female representatives should repre- ests and the goal should be one of representa- sent women rather than opinions in general. tion for men and women in proportion to their This view goes hand-in-hand with support for number in the population. the formation of women’s or feminist parties, ministries for women’s affairs, quotas, a INTRODUCTION change in the political culture and the working In his paper, ‘Opposition in South Africa: conditions of politics so that it will attract more Issues and Problems’, Roger Southall has women, consciousness-raising collectives and

127 Vincent women’s groups outside the official decision- has the same interests the more powerful will making bodies.3 The idea that women may protect the interests of the less powerful auto- have interests which are in conflict with men in matically. ‘[M]embers of a group should spend their party is a view specifically contested by their scarce resources on making power more many in the African National Congress (ANC). equal,’ she argues, ‘only when equal power is In interviews conducted in 1999 by ANC most needed – when interests most conflict’.8 Deputy Secretary-General, Thenjiwe Mtintso, Knowing whether the situation is one of con- she found that most of the ANC women and flicting or common interests thus has implica- men she talked to suggested that women’s tions for the form of representation and partici- interests were adequately represented in parlia- pation of members of democratic structures that ment by the ANC and that what was in the is deemed appropriate. In a unitary democratic ANC’s interests was also in women’s interests. context, members are chosen for their ‘good They argued that the ANC represents ‘the poor- judgment’ and there is no need to be mindful of est of the poor, the most marginalised and the numbers or formal powers. They: most oppressed’ and therefore by logical impli- ‘should be drawn, in whatever proportions cation, women.4 It is this view which the pre- make a good working board, from any seg- sent paper seeks to debate. The paper argues ment of the community whose experience that where women wish to defend their inter- can contribute to solving common prob- ests, their style of participation ought, on some lems. These citizens can be purely advisors issues at least, to take the adversarial form without any formal power. They need only associated with opposition in the British model sufficient informal power to foster equal and to eschew notions of ‘cooperative gover- respect for them and their communities, and nance’. to develop in them an understanding of their interests and a sense of responsibility for 1. CONFLICTING VERSUS COMMON INTERESTS others.’9 In Aristotle’s Ethics he tells us that the Greeks However, in contexts of primarily conflicting regarded a kind of solidarity, which they called interests, Mansbridge makes the point that ‘friendship,’ as the necessary basis of state. members must act more like ‘gladiators’, pro- Features of this friendship included equality, tecting the interests of their constituencies. In consensus, face-to-face contact, and common such a context, members would be chosen for interest.5 In a book entitled Beyond Adversary their accountability (to their particular con- Democracy, Jane Mansbridge employs stituency, say, women) and gladiatorial capaci- Aristotle’s idea of friendship as marking the ty; they would represent the segments of the distinction between two types of democratic community whose interests most conflict, in participation. The first, adversary democracy – numbers proportional to the numbers of their the one we are most familiar with in liberal constituents. They should have an equal vote democracies – is decision-making that is appro- and, to the fullest extent possible when interests priate to situations where interests conflict. The most conflict, equal power.10 second – which is more akin to what Aristotle Extrapolating from Mansbridge’s insight, the had in mind – Mansbridge calls ‘unitary’6 form that women’s participation should take in democracy which is decision-making in situa- representative politics turns on the question of tions where it is assumed interests are held in interests. If male and female members of parlia- common.7 ment (MPs) are regarded as having common Based on this distinction, Mansbridge sug- interests, female representatives should in this gests that when democrats defend unequal context act, when it came to ‘women’s issues’, power they are assuming that the situation is as ‘experts’, providing information on, and con- one of common interests. Arguments for equal tributing the insights of, women in the same power, on the other hand, usually assume con- way as members do in Mansbridge’s unitary flicting interests. She concludes that we value democracies. In such a scenario, threshold rep- equal power not as an end in itself, but as a resentation would be sufficient, not only to means to the end of protecting interests equally. guide decision-making and ensure that the When interests do not conflict, equal power is views of a particular segment of the population not necessary for self-protection. If everyone are contributed, but also to provide for two fur-

128 Vincent ther fruits of participation, namely fostering rise of the nation-state, the capitalist system of respect on the part of others for the segment of production and the emergence of new social the community in question (for example, classes who demanded to participate in the defi- women) and positively developing the political nition of what was considered to be in the ‘pub- acumen of the participant herself. On the other lic interest’ or ‘common good’ – the monopoly hand, if it is the case that female participants over which had previously been in the hands of have interests that conflict with their male an elite few. Classical liberalism, the political counterparts, including those men in the same theory that grew out of this social transforma- political party, then their participation should tion, stressed the primacy of the individual’s take a quite different form. Rather than simply interests and the need for combining these inter- advising and articulating, they must be gladia- ests by means of the authority of the state.11 We tors, archly defending the separate, distinct and can thus discern two dimensions in the meaning identifiable interests of other women. This need of the term ‘interest’. One is the demand for not be their exclusive role but when it comes to participation in and control over society’s public articulating and defending women’s interests affairs. Secondly, the result of this participation their participation should take this form. is that the content of those substantive values Further, they would need, in order to do this that politics puts into effect will be more closely effectively, not just a threshold of sufficient related to various groups’ needs, interests or numbers but an equal vote and equal power and demands. Another way of putting this distinc- their numbers would need to be in proportion to tion between the two different aspects of the their percentage of the population. term ‘interest’ is to say that it is about both Seen in the light of Mansbridge’s insight, the agency and the results of agency.12 key question becomes one of deciding whether Interests do not emerge randomly. They arise or not women can be said to have a set of inter- from people’s lived experiences; they are his- ests in common with one another and in con- torically and socially defined. Interests about flict with those of men. Another way of basic processes of social life are divided sys- describing the distinction which Mansbridge tematically between different groups of people proposes is suggested by the contrast between insofar as people’s living conditions are sys- ‘constructive’ and ‘adversarial’ opposition. tematically different.13 However, what South African women have long been called Jònasdòttir14 has referred to as the ‘factory’ of upon – like other sources of potential opposi- politics is also an important initiator and shaper tion to the dominant (largely male) political of views, ideas and interests. In the ideal image elite – to be patriotic in their opposition; not to of representative democracy, citizens have a upset the apple cart; not to go too far in their continuum of needs, socially and politically critique; not to raise too vociferously the ‘divi- articulated wishes or preferences, and finally sive’ issue of women’s interests. At best this politically linked (aggregated) demands on the can be interpreted as a defence of unequal political system. However, the idea of politics power by democrats who are assuming that as a process of mediating these articulated pref- men and women do not have conflicting inter- erences and demands is highly questionable. ests. Those who would have women take a The political process is itself an important man- more adversarial stance and who will settle for ufacturer of issues. This means that the fact that nothing less than equal numbers of men and women vote in elections as much as men do is women in structures of political power must be not sufficient. Their active presence and posi- assuming that while women may have some tions within the ‘factory’ of politics should be interests in common with men, they also have what counts as representation. In other words, it some interests in common with one another is important to retain both the participation which conflict with men’s interests. The dimension of the concept of interest and the defence of the latter view rests on the question dimension which relates to the actual content of of what is meant by ‘interests’ and what, if any- various interests. thing, can be said to be ‘in women’s interests’. 3. DO WOMEN HAVE INTERESTS? 2. WHAT ARE INTERESTS? While the many differences between women The origin of the term ‘interest’ is related to the are now clearly acknowledged, there is a wealth

129 Vincent of empirical data which supports the distinction tics, to be present in and influential over the between men’s and women’s interests or issues processes where decisions are made. in politics. In wide-ranging studies, gender has Some feminists20 have argued that feminist been found to be a central differentiating vari- theory must make a clean break with the able in political behaviour.15 In sum, women assumptions of the interest group framework. tend, to a greater degree than men, and in dif- This view argues that the basis of interest theo- ferent ways, to initiate, pursue and support ry is the rationally choosing, profit maximising issues that have to do with control over, respon- individual (male) agent and that this provides a sibility for, and care of, people, and other natur- partial view which in particular does not incor- al resources.16 Gender differentiated interests porate many of women’s most important values are those that pertain to women and men’s par- such as child nurturing which cannot easily be ticipation in different activities, working with seen in terms of instrumental interests and indi- different things, having different responsibili- vidual gain. Where what is in one’s interest is ties, being involved with other people in differ- understood as that which provides the opportu- ent ways. What they are subjectively interested nity to participate in and control the choices in, what their views are, and how they partici- that affect one’s life, there are many intense pate in other social matters originates in these human experiences where the concept of inter- differentiated practices and can in this sense be est is not relevant. For example, strictly speak- said to be objectively determined. ing, pregnancy and childbirth cannot be said to As Goetz notes, while women’s interests like be in a mother’s interest. It entails considerable men’s vary according to their circumstances diminution of choice and control over her life, and identities of class, race, ethnicity, occupa- is a risk to her health, is financially costly, time tion, life-cycle stage, and so on, the fact that consuming and so on. Yet it remains a value for most women tend to be constrained in their life which women are happy to exchange their self- choice to a range of reproductive functions in interest. the private sphere, and marginal positions in Rather than trying to stretch the theory of public arenas of the economy and politics, sug- interests to view such nurturing activities as gests that gender affects the way other social self-interested, it is more useful to say that what cleavages are experienced and hence generates promotes women’s interests in this context is to specific interests.17 safeguard and maximise choice over whether or It is in terms of the specificity of women’s not women participate in such activities and experience and hence the emergence of some under what conditions. This does not entail common interests that the argument for greater abandonment of the category of interests but women’s representation in legislatures is often rather lays the emphasis on the agency aspect advanced. As South African gender activist of the interest couplet: it is to argue that the Colleen Lowe-Morna puts it, ‘[w]omen are best question of women’s presence in structures of placed to articulate their own needs and con- power and decision-making is central. cerns’ and ‘[t]he specific needs of women in Moreover, if we read this conclusion in con- areas such as health, education and economic junction with Jane Mansbridge’s argument, it activity are more likely to be put on the agenda implies more than a mere presence. It implies by women than by men’.18 This is borne out by also a presence in sufficient numbers and with a report commissioned by the Parliamentary sufficient power to have influence over agenda- Speaker on ‘What the South setting and that the style of women’s participa- African parliament has done to improve the tion on those issues where they have interests quality of life and status of women in South that conflict with those of men should be the Africa’ released on 8 March 1996 which gladiatorial style that Mansbridge identifies as observed that ‘issues affecting women continue appropriate in such contexts. While women’s to be taken up mainly by women MPs’.19 While numbers in a variety of political institutions the actual content of women’s interests is thus from legislatures to trade unions have increased historically contingent, the appropriate form for significantly in South Africa, these further the articulation and representation of interests requirements, firstly, for women to be repre- remains constant: it entails the need for women sented in numbers roughly proportional to the to participate in determining the agenda of poli- number of women in the population, secondly,

130 Vincent for female representatives to have real power politicians must remain popular with (mostly and influence and thirdly, for an adversarial male) party bosses to survive’.26 It is the latter style of participation in defence of women’s who select which women are promoted within interests to be regarded as legitimate, have on party structures, who determine the party’s rep- the whole not been met. resentatives on committees and who allocate speaking time in the house. The list system 3.1 Numbers and quotas ensures women’s quiescence because alle- The number of ’s giance is owed to the political party which national legislature compares very favourably placed one high on its list rather than to the with other national legislatures around the voter. The absence of close links between an world. In June 1999, 120 out of South Africa’s MP and a specific constituency to which the 400 MPs were women (30% compared to a MP is responsible means that women cannot world average of 13% of women in lower hous- claim to have a power base independent of the es or parliament.21 South Africa is placed male dominated party hierarchy. In this system, eighth in the world in terms of percentage of women gain power only through access to men: women MPs in national legislatures.22 In all ‘[c]onnections are the name of the game. And provincial legislatures and in the national par- men are the game, they control the game’.27 liament, the majority of women present are This goes some way to explaining why South from the ruling ANC.23 This is largely due to Africa’s female parliamentarians have not on employment of the party list electoral system the whole succeeded in conceiving of them- along with the ANC’s policy of a one-third selves or acting as a gender interest group. quota of women on its national and provincial Women across party political lines privately electoral lists. However, other political parties report that women’s issues are more often than in the legislature have not followed the ruling not treated within party caucuses ‘with a degree party’s lead in adopting a women’s quota24 and of patronising indulgence’.28 even the ANC’s quota does not meet the In addition, a range of structural factors in requirement for women’s presence in represen- parliament itself have been identified as limit- tative structures to mirror their actual numbers ing female parliamentarian’s ability to focus in the population. Moreover, women’s central effectively on women as a constituency, even role in lobbying for legislation such as the 1998 when they wanted to do so. Many women who passing of the Domestic Violence, Maintenance enter parliament do not have the training, skills and Recognition of Customary Marriages Acts or confidence to play an influential, agenda-set- notwithstanding, the level of participation on ting role. In a study commissioned by the the part of the ANC’s quota of women has not European Union Programme for Reconstruction been in proportion to their numbers. According and Development in South Africa,29 the lack of to the 1996 report to the Speaker, ‘[o]f the few skills of some women MPs was identified as a who do ask questions, the women MPs in the major problem. Women further report that the opposition and minority parties have recorded formality, legalism and officiousness of parlia- more questions as individuals than the women ment is experienced as intimidating (and some- MPs in the majority party’.25 The same report times ridiculous) and that it ‘deflected attention found that women’s participation in vote from the real issues that MPs wanted to grapple debates had declined compared with 1994. with’.30 Lack of resources such as computers, Further, while the ANC’s quota ensures that information, secretarial back-up and access to many women enter parliament, the list system research further undermine women’s ability to has proved to be something of a two-edged defend their interests. It stands to reason that sword when it comes to which women enter those who wish to adopt non-traditional stances parliament and their degree of independence, which question the status quo need these forms power and influence once they are there. of resources in greater measure than those who are simply repeating or reinforcing dominant 3.2 Power and influence views. Yet allocation of resources in parliament The party list electoral system places control tends to be skewed in favour of the already over which women enter parliament in the empowered. hands of the party hierarchy. It ensures that ‘all Networks of power, role models and mentors

131 Vincent who are prepared to guide newcomers are in marginalisation from the mainstream of poli- among the most important resources that tend tics where power and influence is located. to be differentially available to men and Paradoxically, then, women can have access to women. Those with first-hand experience of power, as long as they do not indicate a prefer- parliament report that women MPs rarely per- ence for using it to promote women’s interests sonally mentor other women in parliament.31 in an adversarial manner. This problem appears to be a secondary effect An aspect of this political culture in which of the overall lack of value attached to ‘wom- the expression of women’s issues is regarded as en’s issues’ and the political culture of the irrelevant or divisive or of secondary impor- country. Drude Dahlerup, for example, in her tance to ‘national priorities’ is what may be studies of women MPs in Scandinavia found termed the ‘constructive criticism’ injunction. that women politicians worked to recruit other Many women have bought into the notion of women.32 While Dahlerup imputed the shift in ‘constructive criticism’ and ‘loyalty’ which has perceptions of women politicians to the growth become the dominant party’s line on the form in the numbers of women in Scandinavian which opposition should take. In their 1998 political life, this has so far not been borne out needs assessment of women MPs and members by the South African experience where despite of the provincial legislature (MPLs), Bardill high numbers, participation specifically in and Marks found that party loyalty could pre- defence of women’s interests is muted or vent women from speaking up when they absent. A dimension of South African women would be seen as disagreeing with male mem- MP’s vulnerability in the post-1994 period bers of their party.36 This appears to be an (which is no doubt less acute in the approach which particularly characterises the Scandinavian case) is the fact that many are participation of black women. According to one major breadwinners for their families and in a first-hand account, there remain some things party political context where defence of wom- that black women just ‘cannot do, say or sup- en’s interests is regarded as politically illegiti- port’. While black women offer support in pri- mate, divisive or irrelevant, gender activism is vate for an agenda which aggressively pursues seen as a high-risk activity. women’s interests, ‘when the going gets tough, the black women get going. They remain silent. 3.3 Style of participation Sometimes, rejecting the very issues they pri- A wide body of research shows that women’s vately supported .... The white, Indian and participation in political organisations and coloured women are left exposed, as if it is they processes has a conditional character.33 It is alone who are pursuing the agenda’.37 accepted as long as they do not express them- selves in gendered terms or act to protect gen- 4. HOW CAN WOMEN ACT IN WOMEN’S der-based interests. Women in South Africa’s INTERESTS? first democratic parliament have remarked on For increased numbers of women in representa- the way in which many were afraid to be identi- tive structures to have any point it is necessary fied with gender activism, in a context where that at least some of the time these women act female politicians with a feminist orientation in women’s interests, that is, participate in a were ‘sometimes referred to by men, to much way that influences agendas to reflect those of laughter in party caucuses, as “that lot who their interests that are different to, or in conflict went to Beijing”’.34 Women were also report- with, men’s interests. While there is evidence edly wary of ‘going on about it’ [women’s of some success in this regard in Scandinavian issues] lest party leadership should become countries, in Africa research has shown that ‘irritated’. Far from adopting a gladiatorial women MPs have consistently failed to place stance in the protection of women’s interests, women’s issues on national agendas.38 For ‘survival instincts triumph. Women back off’.35 women to transform their presence in politics The overall impression of the majority of South into an ability to set agendas and influence the Africa’s female MPs participation in parlia- outcome of political processes in such a way ment, is an unwillingness to be overtly identi- that their particular interests at any given fied with the promotion of women’s issues moment are served, requires that women should thanks to the perception that this would result have knowledge of, and an ability to articulate

132 Vincent what is in their interests. Moreover, they need 4.2 Knowledge of women’s concerns to do so in a way that is powerful and influen- As has been pointed out, the specific content of tial and this is possible only if interests are women’s interests is historically contingent. expressed collectively rather than individually. Only rootedness in a women’s movement of Yet, riven by differences of class, ethnicity, genuinely widespread support and authority can sexual preference and so on, the idea of a unit- act as an insurance policy against women MPs ed sisterhood of women is now roundly dis- developing narrow vested interests which they credited. Does this mean that there is no possi- come to protect to the exclusion of women’s bility of women’s interests being aggregated interests more generally. It is only through reg- and defended? ular contact with and participation in organisa- While sisterhood is perhaps too utopian a tions of women that the particular women in vision, there are other possibilities for collec- parliament can legitimately claim to have tive action ranging from solidarity to limited knowledge of what different kinds of women alliances on specific issues of commonality. want. Women are of course free to form women’s parties but, to date, these have not been very 4.3 Fostering of a gender analysis and successful.39 To expect women to vote for a consciousness women’s party is to assume that for women Numbers mean little if women fail to use their their gender is their only or most important position to defend women’s interests. But to do identity. This is not the case. Like everyone so requires that women should develop a con- else women have many facets to their identity sciousness of what their interests are and of the and like most other people will tend to vote for ways in which those interests are threatened by someone who will represent them in an overall existing social relations. As the ANC’s Then- sense. In the absence of women’s parties, jiwe Mtintso points out: women must rely on their general representa- ‘[w]omen who enter the sphere of parlia- tives who are women to defend their interests. ment should also be gender activists and However, in order for this to be possible, the have an understanding of the workings of obstacles to effective, interest representing par- patriarchy, overt and covert, if they are to ticipation must be overcome. The link between make an impact. If they do not commit women MPs and a broader women’s movement themselves to gender transformation in all in civil society is central to this on at least four its diversity, they are likely to be either counts: marginalised or focus only on practical gen- der interests or even be absorbed into the 4.1 An independent power base patriarchal agenda.’40 Firstly such a link would provide women with When interests are not articulated and/or vigor- an alternative power base to those within par- ously defended, it does not necessarily mean liament that are dominated by men and within that they do not exist. In order to make sense of which women’s issues are marginalised. It is why this is so it is necessary to employ the con- only by being rooted in such a movement that troversial concept of ‘real’ interests. If interests women MPs are likely to have the power to are objectively determined in the way that has challenge a political culture in which women’s been suggested above, it is possible to argue issues are regarded as politically inexpedient to that women may not automatically be aware of raise. It is only once women are able to demon- how their interests differ from those of men. In strate the power of a support base that backs Steven Lukes’ authoritative statement of this them specifically as women and that calls them position, they, ‘may themselves be a product of to account for their role as women in parlia- a system which works against their interests’. ment that they are likely to begin to defend In such a case, their interests are seen to be women’s interests in a gladiatorial manner. what they ‘would want and prefer, were they This is particularly important in a non-con- able to make the choice’.41 Following William stituency based electoral system which denies Connolly, Lukes suggests that knowledge of women the opportunity to build a support base one’s interests is related to the existence of both independent of their party and where lines of choice and autonomy. (‘Policy x is more in A’s accountability of individual MPs are blurred. interest than policy y, if A were to experience

133 Vincent the results of both x and y, and choose x as the Alliance, the Abortion Reform Action Group, result he would rather have for himself’.)42 For the Women’s Health Project, Deputy Minister many women, as is well documented, greater of Justice Manto Tshabala Msimang, Mavivi awareness of, and ability to exercise choices Manzini, Deputy Speaker Baleka Kgotsitsile, and the development of personal autonomy are Arnold Stofile, Speaker Frene Ginwala, Pregs first achieved through their involvement in Govender, Chair of the Committee on the women-centred organisations. Quality of Life and Status of Women and oth- ers.44 Those women MPs who have played a 4.4 Making the personal political high profile role as gender activists in parlia- Finally, it needs to be understood that the fight ment have strong links with civil society and to defend women’s interests takes place not women’s organisations outside parliament. As only in the public sphere but also in the private, Chair of the National Women’s Coalition, intimate relationships that are such a central Frene Ginwala lobbied to have women placed feature of our lives. For many women, the pres- on the electoral lists of all parties and to per- ence of a supportive spouse and the availability suade women to make themselves available. of material or other resources to take care of Closely tied to women’s organisations, Ginwala their children are absolutely essential ingredi- has been central to the development of the ents in providing them with the relative autono- ANC’s gender sensitive approach. With the my and freedom of movement and thought that help of non-governmental organisations Pregs they need to take up the cudgels in defence of Govender pioneered the Women’s Budget. women’s interests. Many feminists suggest that -Kgositsile was secretary-general women’s opposition, because of the way in of the ANC Women’s League between 1991 which the most important of women’s interest- and 1993. Veteran Democratic Party MP Dene constituting life experiences originate, must Smuts ‘found a home in the cross-party and take a very far reaching form to incorporate ‘all rainbow National Women’s Coalition to which the various areas and contexts of social life, she gave her whole-hearted support .... Her even within intimate relationships’.43 It is work in the Coalition provided the impetus for through their involvement in women’s organi- Smuts to push for greater female representation sations where experiences are shared and com- in the Democratic Party’.45 Asked what advice pared rather than individualised that women she would give to a new woman MP, the IFP’s have most often been able to make explicit the Ruth Rabinowitz who has spoken of her disillu- link between their private lives and their public sionment and sense of disempowerment in par- selves. liament suggested women should maintain net- On these four counts (and no doubt many works with women from all walks of life.46 others), female representatives are more likely Similarly, the IFP’s ’s experience to be able to articulate, aggregate and defend in parliament led her to conclude that ‘women’s women’s interests, where necessary in a vigor- lobbies have to be strengthened. They need to ous and adversarial manner, if they are rooted give these women diversified support and con- in women’s organisations in civil society. stituencies because once women leaders can There is a good deal of empirical evidence to produce their own visible, articulate, con- support this point. Where there have been stituencies they have power’.47 advances in securing greater autonomy and Unfortunately, this requirement has been choice for women in South Africa post-1994, markedly absent in South Africa, for much of the role of civil society organisations in tandem the post-1994 period when civil society organi- with individual women MPs has been identified sations and formations have floundered rather as pivotal. For example, asked to identify the than flourished. Far from developing impetus groups and individuals that had been most for a strengthening of ties between women MPs influential in the development of a pregnancy and women’s movements and organisations, termination bill, respondents in a 1998 study many women report how their work as legisla- referred to Abe Nkomo, then chair of the tors has actually removed them from their for- Portfolio Committee on Health, the ANC cau- mer organisations: cus, ANC women, then Minister of Health ‘The workload is heavy. You have to do Nkosozana Zuma, the Reproductive Rights constituency work. You have to attend

134 Vincent

meetings at all hours. You have no time to women. However, if the specific content of socialise. People don’t know what you are women’s interests, desires and demands is his- doing and the organisations feel you have torically determined and therefore knowable abandoned them. They then isolate you’.48 only by empirical investigation then it is only According to PAC MP Patricia De Lille, through deep links with a variety of women’s ‘women in parliament have failed other women organisations and formations that women MPs by not keeping up the networks with organisa- can hope to represent and defend more than tions outside, like the Women’s National their own individual interests. Coalition. Women need to build their caucuses, If connections are ‘the name of the game’ strategise more and use the information and then women need to be connected. But rather resources available from non-governmental than attempting to win influence through their organisations’.49 connectivity to a male dominated institutional The ANC Women’s League for its part has hierarchy, women need to seek their connec- been afflicted with internal divisions and finan- tions in alternative spheres, to be connected to cial disarray since its 1993 conference50 and to other women and women’s organisations which date has not had the legitimacy or organisation- can provide them with the resources, personnel, al strength to fulfil its ambition of ‘being at the moral and emotional support that they require centre of gender emancipation’.51 to take the risk of acting as an interest group for women. CONCLUSION Unless South African women build and con- Aside from all their differences, women do tribute to multiple organisations in every locali- have interests that are sometimes different to ty that reflects their lives, interests and con- those of men, of whatever political persuasion. cerns, the much-trumpeted increase in the num- This makes it necessary from time to time for ber of women in the national legislature will be them to represent themselves in politics as of little worth.

135 Vincent

ENDNOTES

1) Threshold representation is contrasted 10) Ibid, p.x. with ‘mirror representation’. It is the idea 11) Anna Jónasdóttir, Why Women Are Op- that there should be sufficient representa- pressed (Philadelphia: Temple University tives for a group’s ideas to be represented Press, 1994), p.152. in politics but not necessarily representa- 12) Ibid, p.155. tive in exactly the same proportion as that 13) Ibid. group forms in society. In other words, the 14) Ibid. representative structure should not neces- 15) Cynthia Fuchs Epstein and Rose Laub- sarily be a mirror of society (Voet, 1998, Coser, Cross-national Studies of Women p.102). and Elites (London: Allen and Unwin, 2) Roger Southall, Opposition in South 1981); William Lafferty, Sex and Political Africa: Issues and Problems, 2000, p.1. Participation: An Exploratory Analysis of 3) Rian Voet, Feminism and Citizenship the Female Culture, European Journal of (London: Sage, 1998), p.104. Political Research, 8, p.323-47; Lester 4) Thenjiwe Mtintso, Women in Politics: a Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago Conceptual Framework, in Commission Illinois: Rand McNally, 1977); Robert on Gender Equality, Redefining Politics: Putnam, The Comparative Study of South African Women and Democracy Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: (Johannesburg: Commission on Gender Prentice-Hall, 1976). Equality, 1999), p.36. 16) Thomas Edsall, The New Politics of 5) Cited in Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Inequality (New York; London: W.W. Adversary Democracy (Chicago: Norton, 1984); Anna Jónasdóttir, Why University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. viii. Women are Oppressed. 6) It should be noted that neither the ‘unitary’ 17) Cited in Debbie Budlender et al, model of democracy, which assumes Participation of Women in the Legislative underlying common interests, nor the Process (Cape Town: European Union ‘adversary’ model, which assumes under- Parliamentary Support Programme, 1999), lying conflict, banishes or excludes con- p.19. Three qualifications must be made: flict in the political process itself. As first, men who engage in these practices Mansbridge points out: ‘[u]nitary democ- can develop a ‘female’ consciousness; sec- racy ... is far from conflict-free. Indeed, ond, women’s activities change over time the unitary model of democracy may pro- and therefore so do their interests; third, duce more overt and angry conflict than the fact that women have interests which adversary democracy, because it is a polit- conflict with those of men does not mean ical problem that has an underlying correct that they have no interests in common solution, and it often pays to argue things with men. through until everyone concerned accepts 18) Colleen Lowe-Morna, Overview, in Rede- this solution as correct. If there is no solu- fining Politics. South African Women and tion that serves everyone’s interest, more Democracy (Johannesburg: Commission debate will not usually produce agree- on Gender Equality, 1999), p.14. ment, and it is often better to cut short a 19) Cited in Lowe-Morna, p.23. potentially bitter debate with a vote. A 20) See for example, I. Diamond and N. pure unitary democracy is likely to be pas- Hartsock, Beyond Interests in Politics, sionate – full of love and hate – while a American Political Science Review 75, 3, pure adversary democracy is designed to 1981; J. S. Jaquette, Women in Politics be emotion-free – an impersonal mecha- (New York: John Wiley, 1974). nism for handling disembodied conflicting 21) Budlender et al, p.32. interests’ (ibid, p.xi). 22) Bob Jones and Julie Ballington, National 7) Ibid, p.ix. and Provincial Election Results (Auckland 8) Ibid. Park: Electoral Institute of South Africa 9) Ibid, p.ix-x. (EISA), 1999), p.46.

136 Vincent

23) Katharine McKenzie (ed.), PIMS 2000 2, 131-44; MBM Change Agents and Guide to Politics in the Provinces (Cape Ruby Marks Associates, Needs Analysis of Town: IDASA, 2000), pp.30-31. (Of 442 Women MPs and MPLs (1998); Jónas- members of the nine provincial legisla- dóttir, Why Women are Oppressed. tures 117 are women (26%). 34) Vos, p.108. 24) Former NNP MP, Pauline Cupido for 35) Ibid., p.109. example reports having been ‘booed’ 36) Cited in Budlender et al, p.37. when she suggested to the party executive 37) Vos, p.110. that it reserve every fifth place on its 1999 38) Shireen Hassim, From Presence to Power: electoral lists for women (Interview with Women’s Citizenship in a New Haffajee cited in Budlender et al, p.34). Democracy, Agenda No.40 (1999), p.13. 25) Cited in Lowe-Morna, p.23. 39) Voet, p.101. 26) Suzanne Vos, Women in Parliament: A 40) Mtintso, p.45. Personal Perspective, in Redefining 41) Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View Politics (Johannesburg: Commission on (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, Gender Equality, 1999), p.108. 1974), p.34. 27) Ibid, p.109. 42) Cited in Lukes, p.34. 28) Ibid. 43) Jònasdòttir, p.173. 29) Adrian et al, 1996, cited in Budlender et 44) Cited in Lowe-Morna, p.28. al, p.15. 45) Smuts interview by Ferial Haffajee in 30) Budlender et al, p.28 citing a report pre- Commission on Gender Equality Redefin- pared for parliament in 1995 by Serote, ing Politics, (Johannesburg: Commission January-Bardill, Liebenberg and Nolte. on Gender Equality, 1999), p.101. 31) See for example, Suzanne Vos, ‘Women 46) Rabinowitz interview by Ferial Haffajee in Parliament’. (1999), p.99. 32) Cited in Joni Lovenduski, and A. Karam, 47) Ibid., p.111. Women in Parliament: Making a Differ- 48) Gauteng MPL Loretta Jacobus cited in ence, in Lovenduski and Karam, Women Budlender et al, p.24. in Parliament. Beyond Numbers (Stock- 49) De Lille interview with Ferial Haffajee holm: International IDEA, 1998), p.2. cited in Budlender et al, p.63. 33) See for example, H. F. Gosnell, 50) ‘Report on ANC Women’s League’, Democracy: The Threshold of Freedom African National Congress 50th National (Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, Conference, Mafikeng, 16 December 1948); K. Honeycutt, Clara Zetkin: A 1997. Socialist Approach to the Problem of 51) African National Congress 1999 Annual Women’s Oppression, Feminism Studies Report: ANC Women’s League.

137 Cynicism at the Grassroots? Political Opposition in Kwazakele Township, Port Elizabeth

Janet Cherry

The experience of political participation since in particular in trade unions and grassroots the advent of democracy in South Africa is civic organisations. If a militant opposition examined from the perspective of the urban from the ‘left’ is anticipated as the ANC moves African community of Kwazakele in the Eastern further to the ‘right’ in its economic policy, and Cape. Through this detailed case study it is thereby fails to meet the expectations of its argued that democracy is healthy in that urban working-class constituency, it is from although there is little support for political within such townships that such an opposition parties other than the African National can be expected to emerge. At the same time, if Congress (ANC), other forms of opposition are highly politicised township dwellers wish to taking place within the Tripartite Alliance. In register their dissatisfaction with the ruling conclusion, it is argued that a false dichotomy party through electoral means, it is here that has been posed between political and civil significant changes in voting patterns and party society. allegiances would be expected.

INTRODUCTION 1. THE EXPERIENCE OF DEMOCRACY AND THE The dismal performance of opposition parties LEGACY OF APARTHEID AND RESISTANCE in elections has been a major feature of com- The consolidation of power in one-party domi- ment since the advent of democracy in South nant states in Africa has been ascribed, among Africa in 1994. For instance, in the province of other things, to the fragility of the state and the the Eastern Cape, where the ruling ANC has consequent elimination of opposition by the historically commanded overwhelming support former liberation movement in power. This is among the majority of the population, no oppo- made possible by the loyalty of citizens to the sition party has been able to put up a convinc- liberation movement and its leadership, which ing display in the successive elections.1 This manipulates ethnic loyalties in order to create a does not mean, however, that there is no oppo- system of patronage to reinforce its dominance. sition to the ANC’s policies or to its style of This patronage system and the loyalty of citi- governance. This can be demonstrated by refer- zens are also linked to the lack of a pluralist ence to developments in the townships of Port political culture and a lack of experience Elizabeth, which provide a particularly good among the electorate as regards multi-party medium for an attempt to elucidate the nature electoral democracy. Thus it has been argued of opposition, both internal and external, to the by Hermann Giliomee and others that the ‘very current government. This is not just because of high loyalty levels’ among ANC voters means the strength of support for the ANC in the that ‘the constraints on the ANC are very province. It owes also to the relative stability weak’.2 These assumptions about the consoli- and homogeneity of the local African popula- dation of power by a single party need to be tion, and the strength of a tradition of left-wing, tested against the real experience of political activist political participation in civil society, participation of African people. In this study,

139 Cherry the experience of political participation of victory. Far from being ignorant about democ- urban South Africans is examined through an racy, a survey of Kwazakele residents conduct- attempt to explore how ‘ordinary residents’ of ed after the election in 1994 showed a remark- the typical urban working-class residential area ably high level of political sophistication.5 of Kwazakele understand democracy. Through They had few problems understanding the pro- this process of asking people about their experi- portional representation list system, and few ences of democracy, some of the above problems understanding the voting for different assumptions and arguments can be challenged. levels of government, national and provincial. It can be argued convincingly that in the The overwhelming majority voted for the ANC, 1980s, the politics of hegemony in townships3 as expected, but this was not due to ignorance such as Kwazakele left little room for tolerance of other alternatives, nor was it due to any form of opposition to the liberation movement. of coercion. Rather, as was expected in a ‘liber- Pluralism and multi-party competition were not ation election’, people voted for the liberation part of the discourse of popular power. How- movement that was seen to have achieved its ever, this discourse of liberation co-existed goal of attaining democratic rights for all South with an older tradition of participation in limit- African citizens. ed electoral systems. Some of the urban African This enthusiasm for democratic processes residents of Port Elizabeth in the early decades was repeated in the first democratic elections of the 20th century had both property rights and for local councils in October 1995.6 Again, a qualified franchise. However, they lost both very high levels of participation in local gov- of these during the apartheid years, when the ernment elections in Kwazakele indicated that residents of the freehold settlement of Korsten the levels of political awareness and the appre- were forcibly moved to the township of ciation of newly won democracy had not yet Kwazakele when it was established (1956–58). begun to fade. Competition for places on the In addition, many of the residents of the older party list for the local elections was hotly con- township of New Brighton had participated in tested within the ANC, and the tensions around advisory board elections in the 1930s and the process resulted in some individuals stand- 1940s. These advisory boards – designed to ing as ‘independent’ candidates. In one ward, give urban Africans a limited say in the admin- the independent candidate received a substan- istration of their segregated residential areas – tial amount of support (33%) standing against held elections which were vigorously contested an official ANC candidate. The ANC candidate in Port Elizabeth by members of the ANC and was seen as someone who was not ‘from the the South African Communist Party (SACP). area’ and residents from a particular part of this Subsequently, during the 1980s, this discourse ward put forward instead a candidate who they of electoral participation was temporarily aban- perceived would represent their interests more doned – but not forgotten – in favour of a strat- effectively. At the same time, expectations of egy of total boycott of elections to the segregat- ‘delivery’ from the newly elected councillors ed black local authorities (BLAs). The boycott were high, and Kwazakele voters were not to and additional forms of mobilisation that result- accept unquestioningly the inevitable failures ed in the destruction of these illegitimate forms by some councillors – as will be seen below. of local government also co-existed with a form In addition to contestation of political issues of direct, although limited, democratic partici- at local and national government level through pation as practiced in the grassroots structures elections, residents of urban townships continue of popular power. Thus residents of Kwazakele to be involved in ‘political civil society’. This referred with pride to their experience of build- non-electoral form of political opposition is ing structures of ‘direct democracy.’ As one seen by some to be especially important in an resident said, ‘No-one can come and teach us environment where there is weak party political how to build democratic structures now, we opposition. Thus Southall observes that civil know that very well.’4 society has a crucial role to play in counter-bal- The advent of multi-party democracy in 1994 ancing government. On the one hand, the was embraced wholeheartedly by the vast ‘vibrancy and weight’ of civil society organisa- majority of residents of Kwazakele, who cele- tions needs to be ‘revived’. On the other, the brated the first democratic election as their own ANC and its alliance partners, including the

140 Cherry

South African National Civic Organisation the transitional politics of the pre-1994 period – (Sanco), need to build ‘internal democratic in particular in applying pressure for non-racial processes ... to bond it to its popular support municipalities with a single tax base – its base.’7 It is difficult to assess the precise extent decline began with the advent of representative to which these processes occurred in the democracy in South Africa. Almost exactly one 1994–1999 period. However, an attempt can be year after the election of a representative gov- made in regard to Kwazakele, looking at both ernment, tensions between the ANC and Sanco local and national elections and at events in came to a head in Port Elizabeth (widely between whereby residents tried to participate referred to as PE). On 20 July 1995, Sanco in decision making and to hold their elected organised a march into the city centre to protest representatives accountable in various ways. against the service charges levied by the ANC- dominated transitional local council (TLC). The 2. OPPOSITION FROM CIVIL SOCIETY: TLC, having successfully negotiated the instal- ‘MARCHING AGAINST OURSELVES’ AND THE lation of electricity and a dramatic improve- ROLE OF SANCO ment in municipal service delivery in At the heart of popular mobilisation at local Kwazakele, was now expecting residents to pay government level in the 1980s were ‘the for such services. After many years of making civics’, a network of township-based organisa- demands of an unresponsive local council, tions which campaigned around local condi- receiving few services and refusing to pay rents tions and services. In addition to boycotting to an illegitimate body, residents found it hard elections to the BLAs, they employed strategies to abandon the ‘culture of non-payment’. such as sit-ins at the BLA offices, rent boycotts, Nceba Faku, ANC chairman of the TLC, was and campaigns of non-payment of service ‘booed and heckled’ by a crowd reported to be charges. These civic organisations are generally between 400 and 1000 Sanco members.8 The considered to constitute the core of ‘political march took place after a lengthy process of civil society’ in South Africa, and since 1992 meetings to find a solution to the problem of have been organised under the Sanco umbrella. payment for services in PE. Far from having been reinvigorated by the This march was significant for a number of advent of democracy since 1994, many local reasons. First, it indicated a healthy tension civic organisations appear to have declined; between state and civil society at local level, while Sanco, the national body, is in deep cri- and showed that civil society, specifically in the sis. It is also clear from a recent survey of resi- form of civic organisation, still had a degree of dents of Kwazakele that they do not see their autonomy as well as the organisational capacity political salvation as coming from this quarter. to mobilise protest action. Sanco recognised the While the local branches of Sanco are active in danger of being subsumed under the state’s Kwazakele, such bodies are seen as performing umbrella, as has sometimes happened after a important, yet very immediate functions. While liberation election where hegemonic political there are local structures in which residents par- parties have controlled the state. Even in South ticipate – such as street committees in many Africa, some other previously independent areas of the township – these deal primarily organs of civil society – such as youth and with parochial concerns such as anti-social women’s associations – were absorbed into the behaviour, domestic squabbles, petty crime and ANC party machinery. Sanco PE, moreover, the like. Consequently, these structures are not seemed intent on proving that it was not a perceived by residents as being in competition ‘toothless watchdog of the community’: execu- with, or in conflict with, the ANC. However, tive member Mike Tofile stated that: the leadership of Sanco had a somewhat ‘We are not dummies or puppets manipulat- grander vision of their role in the new South ed by Mr Faku. That must be clear to the Africa. It was in the period of transition, residents. We are still their watchdogs even between 1990 and 1994, when the ANC was during this transitional period’.9 legalised and began to establish mass-based Second, the march did not receive a great deal branches in the townships, that competition of support, despite the strong tradition of mass between the two organisations became intense. mobilisation in the city, and the success of pre- While Sanco had played an important role in vious marches that had attracted tens of thou-

141 Cherry sands of township residents. It may be imag- ANC may be willing to tolerate opposition ined that with street and area committees still expressed within the parliamentary framework, being in place in townships such as Kwazakele, or from other political parties within the realms thousands of residents might have been of ‘formal’, liberal politics, it is not prepared to mobilised around a common concern at rela- countenance dissent from the more radical tively short notice, yet this did not occur. This informal . While ANC lead- can be interpreted in various ways, as indicat- ers see a role for civil society organisations, ing the ‘demobilisation’ of civic organisations, this is viewed as non-oppositional: in other the ‘depoliticisation’ of civil society, or simply words, that only certain types of civil society the ‘normalisation’ of politics. Third, the ANC mobilisation are seen as acceptable, and mobili- came out strongly against the march, despite sation is only acceptable if done in partnership previous assertions by ANC leadership of the with the ANC. Indeed, there has been little in importance of the role of civil society, the need the way of civic mobilisation in PE since 1995, to maintain mass organisation, and acceptance even on the limited scale described above. of the idea that the ANC could ‘march against However, this does not mean that residents of itself’. These assertions had been made by urban townships like Kwazakele are unques- ANC leadership in recognition of the need for tioningly accepting of the ‘ANC line’. ‘the people’ to maintain pressure on the new government for ‘delivery’ – the implied self- 3. HOLDING ELECTED LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES criticism being that the ANC had the potential ACCOUNTABLE to become a new elite, unresponsive to the Residents are very aware of the responsibilities needs of the poor.10 Yet, when it came to the of different levels of government, and while crunch, the ANC in Port Elizabeth appealed to they are cautiously supportive of the ANC at Sanco to call off the march as being ‘against national government level, they are often very the spirit of the Masakhane campaign’ which critical of those who are meant to ‘deliver’ appealed to township residents to pay for ser- at municipal level. Contestation at local vices. Moreover, members of the Kwazakele government level has taken various forms, from branch of the ANC went around the townships spontaneous angry protests, to voicing dissatis- the night before the march, calling on residents faction within ANC branch structures with not to participate, and appealing to them to be councillors, to putting up ‘independent’ candi- loyal to the ANC.11 dates in opposition to the agreed-upon ANC The criticism of the march by the ANC indi- candidates. cated a growing reluctance, after a year in Kwazakele residents have not been reticent to power, to allow such open dissent to be dis- show their dissatisfaction with elected repre- played by another organisation, albeit one of its sentatives who are considered to have per- allies. Sanco, although it proclaimed itself to be formed poorly. As regards local councillors, representing the interests of all residents and residents are outspoken about who is consid- not just those loyal to the ANC, has a very ered to have ‘performed’ adequately, perfor- close relationship with the ANC historically. mance being measured in terms of desirable Hence it had agreed that it would not put up improvements to the particular ward for which candidates for the November local government the councillor was elected. The second local elections, but that it would support ANC candi- elections have yet to take place in late 2000 dates. Simultaneously, however, it had insisted (the delimitation of wards has just been com- that it would continue to play the role of pleted). But there has been extensive discussion ‘watchdog’ at local level, ensuring that the within ANC branches and more localised struc- newly elected local governments fulfil their tures, and it is clear that some councillors are promises. not going to be unthinkingly replaced on the At the same time, the ANC’s criticism of the party lists. While there is certainly the usually march indicated a reluctance to tolerate dissent political competition within the ANC elite – from any organisation not playing the party which too can result in a shuffling of positions political game; in other words, the beginning of on the list – it is clear that in Kwazakele the a deliberate ‘decompression’ of politicised civil ordinary voters can make their dissatisfaction society. Indeed, it would seem that while the heard within the ANC. This dissatisfaction has

142 Cherry resulted in the national leadership ‘waking up’ direct/participatory democracy (civic struc- to the realisation that they may be in danger of tures). At the same time, it tried to assess losing their mass support base if something is whether structures of ‘political civil society’ are not done to ensure that local representatives are still active in Kwazakele, especially those accountable. Thus at the ANC’s National structures which allow for direct participation General Council, held in PE during July 2000, by ordinary residents, such as street commit- it became clear that councillors who were not tees. Lastly, it attempted to assess whether resi- accountable to their constituencies were going dents’ expectations of democratic government to be removed by the party hierarchy from their have been met over the past five years, and how positions and replaced. Despite this acknowl- residents whose expectations have not been edgement by the ANC of the failures of some met, respond to the system of representative of its councillors, Sanco PE has now decided to democracy. Is it with apathy, with vigorous contest the local government elections as an participation in political parties and electoral independent body.12 processes, or is it in extra-parliamentary oppo- In certain cases, residents have taken direct sition or ‘politicised civil society’, or some action to ensure a response in situations that are combination of these? deemed to be urgent. One example of such The last aim is of particular relevance to the action was the case of a dangerous intersection question of opposition politics: if expectations at the bottom of Njoli Road, where motor vehi- have not been met, do ordinary people see the cle accidents frequently occurred. When a car solution as lying in electoral choices, or in ploughed into a shack and killed a young girl, other forms of political action? the enraged residents surrounded the local However, before the results of the 1999 sur- councillor and demanded to see the mayor. The vey in Kwazakele are examined, a few prelimi- ANC local branch secretary commented that: nary points need to be made. First, fears that ‘people were very angry, and did not even want participation in the election would be signifi- to speak to the councillor. Later they came to cantly reduced – either because of voter apathy the constituency office, and apologised.’ This due to government failure to meet expectations, type of mass action (in this case it was sponta- or because of the logistics problem of establish- neous, but in others it has been more organised) ing a voters’ roll – proved to be unfounded. The is not frowned upon by the ANC locally. Thus survey found, as corroborated by the Indepen- the ANC branch secretary noted that: dent Electoral Commission (IEC) results, a ‘ANC members and supporters should very high percentage of the population did vote demonstrate; it is democracy in practice. in the election. Ten per cent of the survey People should make their voice heard, so respondents did not vote, while 90% did; of the that their grievances are attended to. These 10%, half did not vote because of choice, being are the challenges that keep the ANC alive; consciously apolitical; the other half because of we as the ANC need to respond to such problems with identity documents or registra- issues.’13 tion on the voters’ roll. Only eight per cent of the survey respondents reported problems with 4. ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY FIVE YEARS DOWN the voting process, and the only difficulties THE LINE: THE 1999 GENERAL ELECTION IN they experienced in voting were those caused KWAZAKELE by inadequate IEC logistics – polling stations Now that a second general election has been opening late, long queues, an absence of ink or held, and five years of ANC rule completed, it ballot papers, etc. There was again no confu- is a good time to assess the consolidation of sion about the method of voting, or about the democracy in South Africa at local level. ballot for the provincial and national legisla- Another survey of residents of Kwazakele tures being separate. Indeed, all but one of the was conducted in June 1999, in the month after Kwazakele voters surveyed confirmed that they the second democratic election.14 The survey deliberately voted for the same party at both tried to assess levels of political participation of provincial and national level. The exception residents of Kwazakele, by comparing partici- was one voter who split her vote, voting for pation in structures of representative democra- ANC at national level and the United cy (elections) with participation in structures of Democratic Movement (UDM) at provincial

143 Cherry level, to ‘give the UDM a chance’ at provincial this respect, the survey merely confirmed what government. is widely known in PE and in the Eastern Cape more generally: that the ANC continues to have 4.1 Voting preferences and party opposition overwhelming support among African voters. It Around 97% of the electorate in Kwazakele is therefore interesting to understand why the voted for the ANC, according to calculations few voters who switched their loyalty away made on the basis of IEC election results. The from the ANC, chose the UDM, a rather vague survey results reflected the IEC results for the populist party, rather than the more left-wing various Kwazakele polling stations, and alternatives, Azapo or the PAC. showed that there is small support for the Pan- One possible answer lies in the ties of loyal- Africanist Congress (PAC), UDM and the ty and intolerance based in the politics of hege- Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) which mony of the liberation struggle. Thus Bantu are the ‘real contenders’ for support among Holomisa, the UDM’s leader – who is per- African voters. The IEC results for Kwazakele ceived as having been part of the ANC’s libera- polling stations show that between 92% and tion struggle despite his background as the for- 97% of voters supported the ANC; between 2% mer military leader of the – and 4% the UDM; between 1% and 2% the emerged as the principal alternative, rather than PAC; and less than 1% Azapo, except for two the PAC or Azapo – both of which have longer voting stations where Azapo support was con- ‘struggle credentials’ in Kwazakele, and cer- centrated and which showed a support level of tainly more left-wing policies. The bitter enmi- between 2% and 3%. This pattern reflects the ty between Azapo and UDF in the 1980s is politics of the 1980s, where Africanist-cum- likely to remain in older voters’ memories, and socialist Azapo support became strongly terri- will prevent any large-scale defection from the torially based during conflict between that ANC to Azapo. organisation and the United Democratic Front (UDF – the internal surrogate of the ANC). 5. WHAT DO ‘ORDINARY PEOPLE’ SAY? Other parties, in particular the Inkatha Freedom The 1999 survey showed that ‘ordinary peo- Party (IFP), the New National Party (NNP), the ple’, despite their electoral preference for the Democratic Party (DP) and the African ANC, are not naïve about electoral processes, Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), received nor are they uncritical of the ANC’s policies. no more than a handful of votes; less than 1% Asked whether the government had met their of the vote in total. expectations since the first election, nearly two- As these results indicate, the traditionally thirds of residents answered in the affirmative. ‘white’ parties that are trying to gain support in Yet many of those qualified their answer by the black community – the DP and NNP – have expressing disappointment in the lack of job made no headway at all in Kwazakele. This is creation and the high level of unemployment. borne out by the answer that most of those sur- Thus when asked ‘If the government does not veyed gave to the question of what political meet your expectations, what can you do about parties are active in the area; all said some it?’ the responses indicated clearly an accep- combination of ANC, PAC, Azapo and UDM; tance of multi-party parliamentary democracy other parties were not mentioned or known as the primary means for changing a govern- about. The ANC’s hegemony is really uncon- ment that is unresponsive to the needs of the tested; and what is more interesting is that this urban working class. There was a marked support has remained unchanged since 1994, as decline in the percentage of the population who almost all those who voted for the ANC in looked to various forms of popular mobilisation 1994 continued to vote for the ANC in 1999, or mass action as a means of putting direct despite varying opinions about the performance pressure on the government. Indeed, only one of the government. Indeed, only two survey person responded with a (somewhat humour- respondents changed their vote from support ous) reference to the days of mass mobilisation: for the ANC in 1994; one to the UDM, and one ‘Well I think we’ll just have to toyi-toyi to the PAC. again to get things done ... On a serious note In fact, political loyalties in Kwazakele have I’m not sure what I’ll do.’ remained largely unchanged since the 1980s. In A few residents looked to more creative indi-

144 Cherry vidual solutions to failures of delivery: pressure sation or armed struggle to challenge the state. through contacting the local radio station, or The sole (Azapo supporting) revolutionary contacting government departments or public rather eclectically combined his belief in revo- representatives. One respondent saw the possi- lutionary change with a commitment to elec- bility of taking collective action, although he or toral change: she was not sure what form this would take: ‘What can I do – nothing! But seriously, I ‘I would get together with other people who am confident that revolutionary change will are also disappointed and maybe we would take place eventually and the liberal ANC come up with something to do.’ will be overthrown by Azapo. So I will do About a third of respondents felt that there was what I have done recently, that is I will vote nothing they could do to ensure that the govern- for Azapo again, and ensure that we win ment met their expectations, or simply did not this time.’ know what to do. Another group felt a deep The legitimacy of the state is thus universally sense of cynicism of politicians and party poli- accepted, and opposition takes on forms that tics, and said they would not vote again: are accepted as being primarily within the ‘I will become despondent and lose interest framework of parliamentary democracy. It must in politics therefore I won’t vote again in be remembered, however, that very few resi- the coming election in 2004 should the dents of Kwazakele voted for other parties in ANC not deliver.’ the 1994 and 1999 elections, and while some In contrast to this were those who expressed a threatened to use their vote by voting for other deep loyalty to the current government, and parties, others found it very hard to imagine were committed to waiting patiently for the supporting, or voting for, anyone other than the government to fulfil its mandate. Yet another ANC. This did not mean uncritical support; group, amounting to about one-sixth of the sometimes they expressed themselves with respondents, said they would vote for another remarkable political sophistication when party: explaining their understanding of the need for ‘Though I don’t think that the ANC govern- patience and the reasons for the lack of deliv- ment will not meet my expectations, but if ery: ever it does [not meet my expectations] I ‘I will give them another chance because if think I will join another political party like they do not deliver they will be obviously for instance the UDM or DP who knows?’ trying their best but due to certain factors ‘I cannot do anything that will make them they cannot reach their goals, so I will just perform but I won’t give them my vote be patient and wait. I am confident things again, that is I will just vote for another will change.’ political party like the UDM or NNP.’ ‘I will give them another five years as I will ‘I will definitely change my vote and be unreasonable to expect them to deliver in withdraw my support for the organisation the short time they have governed.’ because what is the use of supporting them ‘I will not worry because our democracy is if they do not deliver to us the people who still at an early stage and also we cannot voted for them?’ expect anything in this short time.’ Those who already supported the PAC or In addition, there were those who said they Azapo retained their belief that they would be would not vote for a different party, but would able to replace the ANC through electoral work within ANC structures to try and make means: ‘I will ensure my party comes to power the governing party more responsive to their in the next election by voting for the PAC’; ‘I needs. will intensify the movement (PAC) and ensure This might involve replacing ‘list’ represen- that by the year 2004, PAC wins the election.’ tatives through ANC party conferences, or lob- Interestingly, those parties that had followed an bying ANC leadership, or raising problems at even more radical revolutionary strategy than ANC branch meetings: the ANC, have embraced parliamentary democ- ‘I would vote for a new government but racy in the same way as the latter. None of the under the ANC, and within ANC structures PAC supporters mentioned the possibility of raise problems I encounter.’ seizure of state power, or of using mass mobili- ‘I would criticise ANC structures, cam-

145 Cherry

paign for change in government structures, tions, it is clear from the survey that most resi- maybe join other political parties.’ dents of Kwazakele still consider themselves to People felt strongly about their democratic right be ANC members. Even though few pay sub- to participate and articulate their dissatisfaction scriptions regularly, and thus would not figure to government, even suggesting means by on a list of paid-up membership, the majority which the government could be held account- still attend branch meetings and take an active able or obtain feedback from the electorate interest in local politics. Yet despite the high between elections: level of support for the ANC – and the high ‘I voted for the government, so I’m going to level of political participation and awareness by see that my demands and expectations are residents – the ANC branch structures have not met – it’s my democratic right.’ really succeeded in mobilising residents around ‘It (the government) can call meetings in all ‘grassroots’ or developmental concerns. They areas and people must discuss what they have tended to mobilise (very effectively) want to be done ... It must on the other hand around elections, and also around high-profile supply us with a questionnaire about what campaigns, in particular the campaigns against we want to be done with the problems we crime and the abuse of women and children. face. I can then voice out my views.’ These campaigns have seen a high level of citi- Another saw local government with its elected zen participation. Thus despite the commitment councillors as being more responsive to resi- of both civic organisations and the ANC to dents’ needs: ‘people-driven’ or participatory development, it ‘Through local government elections, coun- would seem that for most people there is still cillors will make sure that my complaints the expectation of a democratically elected state are communicated to the government. I will that it is primarily responsible for socio-eco- not change my vote to another party.’ nomic ‘delivery’. The understanding that local government is In Kwazakele, as elsewhere in ANC-support- both responsible for service delivery, and is ing townships around South Africa, the ANC more accessible, is borne out in the residents’ was referred to as ‘the Movement’ while ‘the preparedness to voice scathing criticisms of Party’ referred to only one party, the SACP. councillors who do not ‘perform’, and to After 1990, the ANC transformed itself from a express these criticisms in ANC fora so that the broad-based liberation movement into a con- councillors do not retain their seats. In some ventional political party for the purposes of cases, as detailed above, ANC-supporting resi- elections. At the same time, it strove to main- dents have even marched and protested against tain certain ‘movement’ characteristics, notably their own councillors. its broad, multi-class base; its ability to The threat of ‘voting for another party’ in mobilise widely around certain issues; and its future elections, combined with the belief that hegemony in particular communities at ‘grass- they can influence the ANC through its own roots’ level. These characteristics are both structures, is perceived as sufficient in terms of favourable towards democracy (in the sense holding the government accountable to the that they encourage the involvement of ‘ordi- electorate. However, as noted, the overwhelm- nary people’ and create space for internal ing majority of voters in Kwazakele voted for debate and opposition) and unfavourable for the ANC in 1994 and again in 1999. It can be democracy (in that they still hold to the old argued that this was not due to a lack of aware- notion of hegemonic politics, with no space for ness of the shortcomings of the ANC, but rather opposition outside the movement). There have an astute assessment of the greater shortcom- also recently been contradictory indications of a ings of the existing opposition parties. movement towards tighter, more centralised party organisation within the ANC. On the one 6. INTERNAL OPPOSITION hand, this is a response to the perceived corrup- At the time of their formation in 1991, the ANC tion and ambition that has come along with lib- branches in Kwazakele were some of the eral democracy and conventional party politics. largest in the country in terms of membership. It represents an attempt by the ANC leadership While active membership of ANC branches has to assert tighter control over public representa- declined, as has membership of civic organisa- tives, to ensure their accountability at least to

146 Cherry the party that put them in positions of public Redistribution (GEAR) strategy which subse- responsibility. On the other hand, this can also quently replaced it. be seen as a non-democratic tendency to turn The SACP and Cosatu retain their commit- the ANC from a movement-type of structure ment to the Tripartite Alliance, yet as the ANC that can accommodate diversity and internal has been seen to abandon its commitment to opposition, to a ‘democratic centralist’ type of socio-economic transformation in the form of party structure that demands discipline and the RDP, this has inevitably come under strain. crushes dissent. This tendency is reinforced by Many of Cosatu’s affiliates have moved onto the ‘autocratic ethos’ developed by the ANC in the defensive, as integration into the global exile. Saul15 thus notes the importance of inter- economy has resulted in thousands of job losses nal democratic processes within the Tripartite in manufacturing. However, it can be argued Alliance both to counter this ethos and to ‘bond that Sanco should be the more assertive it to its popular support base’. Yet simultane- representative of civil society in mobilising for ously with this move towards greater ‘democra- radical change in the alliance, as structural con- tic centralism’, the ANC leadership recognise ditions would seem more favourable for inter- the need, at least verbally, to ‘entrench and ventions – whether in support of development deepen democracy’ in South Africa. policies initiated by the state, or in opposition This tension is nicely illustrated by the con- to policies which negatively impact on the lives testation of the local elections within the ANC of the poor – by organisations of township resi- in Kwazakele, where suspicions about those dents. from exile were countered by the putting for- Once again, ordinary people are not excluded ward of independent candidates. Although the from this debate. The RDP was widely popu- ANC candidates did win the majority of votes larised at the time of the 1994 election, and its in the particular ward, the exercise was a signif- vision was embraced by most ANC supporters. icant one in indicating the ability of people to While some development goals were met in mobilise in opposition to the ANC ‘line’. Kwazakele in the 1994–99 period, residents do Furthermore, as already noted, there are indica- not see this transformation process as being tions that Sanco will put up independent candi- complete. Some are optimistic that the RDP dates in the forthcoming local government elec- process will continue; others are somewhat tions, which will put further pressure on the sceptical, particularly in the light of the adop- ANC to retain contact with its grassroots sup- tion of the macroeconomic policy. The porters. ‘GEAR–RDP debate’ was aired vigorously Alongside the SACP, the third wing of the within branch structures, at the Sunday after- Tripartite Alliance is the Congress of South noon branch general meetings. A high percent- African Trade Unions (Cosatu), whose mem- age of the residents of Kwazakele surveyed bers have even greater experience of participat- said that they did attend general meetings on ing in democratic organisational structures. occasion. Even those who are not politically Recent surveys of ordinary members of Cosatu- well informed or educated enough to under- affiliated unions showed a continuing commit- stand economic policy seem to have some ment among the organised working class to understanding of the issues. Yet, as shown in democratic practices, including holding elected the residents’ quotes above, dissatisfaction is leadership accountable.16 Yet there is little evi- unlikely to be channelled into militant mass dence among residents of Kwazakele that this action. Most ANC supporters show a remark- has been an important influence on their politi- ably sophisticated awareness of the constraints cal practices. Where it is likely to have had facing the government in terms of socio-eco- impact, is in relation to the debate around nomic delivery, and are not convinced – proba- socio-economic policy. bly correctly – that any other party would be That means in particular the Reconstruction able to perform better than the ANC in this and Development Programme (RDP) – the regard. manifesto with which the ANC ascended into power in 1994 and which was inclined towards CONCLUSION social-democratic and redistributive objectives There are two possible conclusions that can be – and the neo-liberal Growth, Equity and drawn from this analysis of political participa-

147 Cherry tion in Kwazakele. One is that as the ‘normali- eradicate poverty and unemployment. They sation’ of politics occurs, and people become also showed an understanding of the need for demobilised, they accept the separation of tolerance and acceptance of a plurality of politi- political from civil society. ‘Politics’ becomes cal parties in government. equated with representative democracy, exer- It may be that a ‘false dichotomy’ has been cised through regular elections of public repre- posed in South Africa between ‘formal’ politics sentatives. In political life, ordinary citizens of political parties and election campaigns, as have a limited though important role; and this is in Western European liberal democracies, and desirable both for them and for the government. the ‘informal’ politics of civil society. While Street and area committees fulfill essentially general levels of political participation have non-political roles in civil society, while ANC declined, ‘ordinary people’ – in particular the branches become vehicles for communication African urban working class who make up a of party policy or electioneering. significant proportion of the ANC’s constituen- The second, preferred, conclusion is that it is cy – continue to participate enthusiastically in increasingly difficult to draw a distinction electoral politics, at both local and national between political and civil society. This distinc- level. Despite the overwhelming loyalty to the tion in Western political theory does not neatly ANC, there are strong signs that democracy is apply to a community such as Kwazakele. healthy in urban townships such as Kwazakele. Representative and direct forms of democracy Its health is manifest in a variety of forms of are not mutually exclusive, and can be com- opposition to the ANC. This opposition takes bined in various ways. The continued existence place within the ANC branches, within struc- of structures of civil society such as street com- tures of civil society, and to a lesser extent, in mittees demonstrates the need felt by people to the threat of support for opposition parties. have some direct access to decision making Despite the weakness of the opposition parties, over ‘every aspect of their lives’: to participate residents of townships such as Kwazakele in the sense familiar to the 18th century ‘reserve the right’ to vote for an alternative philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau . Such political party, and express tolerance for the structures have no real power over ‘big issues’ existence of other parties. such as job creation or macroeconomic policy; In addition, they are not afraid to challenge and it is right that they do not. Residents of their elected representatives and hold them Kwazakele showed an understanding of this, in accountable, whether through their local branch their acceptance of the time it would take to meetings, or through mobilising direct action to implement development policies that would make their feelings clear.

148 Cherry

ENDNOTES

1) The ANC took 84.4% and 73.8% of the 8) Eastern Province Herald, 21 and 22 July votes in the elections for the Eastern Cape 1995. legislature in the elections of 1994 and 9) Evening Post, 18 July 1995. 1999 respectively. The next best perfor- 10) See, for example, the ANC Strategy and mance was provided by the National Party Tactics document of 1997 on the role of with 9.8% of the vote in 1994, and by the civil society, and Ben Turok’s article, new United Democratic Movement (UDM) What role for civil society organisations in with 13.6% in 1999. For a discussion of the transformation?, in the ANC journal fragility of the UDM’s success, see Roger Umrabulo No 7, 1999. Southall, The Struggle for a Place Called 11) Eastern Province Herald, 21 and 22 July Home: the ANC versus the UDM in the 1995. Eastern Cape, Politikon , Vol. 26, No. 2 12) Evening Post, 18 July 2000. (1999), pp.155-166. 13) Interview with Monwabisi Gomomo, 2) Hermann Giliomee, James Myburgh and Secretary of ANC Kwazakele 1 branch, 28 Lawrence Schlemmer, Dominant Party October 1999. Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in 14) The 1999 survey was of a random sample South Africa, in this volume. of 100 residents of Kwazakele, selected by 3) ‘Township’ is a term used to describe the using a random-number table and identify- urban residential areas designated for ing households by finding coordinates on a Africans under apartheid rule. Separately street map of the township. Interviewers administered during the apartheid era, they were instructed that respondents should be are now integrated into the local munici- over the age of 25, and should be half palities, but are still referred to as town- male, half female, to reflect the overall ships or locations. demographic composition of the township. 4) This quote comes from a survey of resi- 15) In Southall, op.cit., p. 14. dents of Kwazakele in 1993 as part of the 16) The first such survey was conducted in writer’s research for the Albert Einstein 1994, with the results published in David Institute ‘Civics and Civil Society’ project, Ginsburg, Eddie Webster et al., Taking recently published Glen Adler and Jonny Democracy Seriously: Worker Expecta- Steinberg (eds.), From Comrades to tions and Parliamentary Democracy in Citizens, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). South Africa, (Durban: Indicator Press, 5) The second survey of Kwazakele residents 1995). A more recent survey in 1998 was conducted by the writer in May 1994, showed substantial continuity in the inter- in the month following the first democratic nal democratic practices of trade unions election. affiliated to Cosatu. However, there is a 6) A third survey of Kwazakele residents was marked decline in the preparedness of conducted in November 1995, after the workers to use militant forms of action to first democratic local government election. ensure that the government delivers on its 7) Roger Southall, Opposition in South promises. Africa: Issues and Problems, in this vol- ume.

149 The Electoral System and Opposition Parties in South Africa

David Pottie

Prior to 1994, debate about the electoral sys- minimalist, formal interpretations, and pressed tem in a post-apartheid South African frequent- hard for substantive democracy. For example, ly centered on the notion of how best to achieve the ANC argued that the revolutionary project ethnic and racial accommodation through elec- of ‘transformation’ could be pursued within the tions. The adoption of a system of proportional framework of a social-democratic constitution- representation was eventually regarded as one al state. The extent to which institutions could means of encouraging political parties to build at the same time act as both stabilising instru- cross-racial and national appeal. Despite ments and as vehicles for state-led radical African National Congress (ANC) dominance change is therefore a central (though not exclu- in South Africa’s first two democratic elec- sive) consideration in the consolidation of tions, the adoption of proportional representa- democracy in South Africa.1 tion (PR) also appears to have contributed to In South Africa, the effective transfer of numerous and diverse opposition parties. But political authority from the apartheid regime to there are additional signs that opposition poli- a popular government was crucially tied to dis- tics may be equally characterised by a growing cussions about the mechanisms that would racial polarisation despite the arguments that ensure the sustainability of democracy in the favour PR as the best means to encourage longer term. Partly this was a response to the ‘moderation’ and parties with national appeal. realisation of right-wing parties that demands for separate institutions of representation and INTRODUCTION veto powers for minority groupings would not The transition to democracy in South Africa succeed. since 1990 offers a valuable opportunity to In part, though, it was also the realisation by study processes of democratisation in a context the ANC that the long-term legitimacy of the in which political institutions were relatively democratic government among whites, as well well established (despite their racially exclu- as perceptions of local and international sionary nature under apartheid), civil society investors, would lie in a demonstrated commit- was strong, and local technical and legal capac- ment that majority rule would not ‘descend’ ity was highly developed. Institutional and into the ‘African pattern’ of one party rule and political system design was neither imported uncurbed presidential power. Much of the liter- nor entirely top-down, but shaped by local ature on electoral systems in South Africa has actors carrying different ideological histories thus focused on the search for an institutional and different political cultures. The design of response to the ethnic and racial divisions of new political institutions was a matter of inten- apartheid.2 In this sense, elections remain a sive debate during the early 1990s about the ‘racial census’. But this literature is also moti- trade-offs between priorities of different vated by a search for building inclusion and parties, in which democratic demands and ‘moderation’ across the racial and geographic expectations from below mitigated against divides (and, conveniently, moving the ideo-

151 Pottie logical spectrum of politics to the center in the but plunged back into a brutal civil war shortly process). afterwards when the key loser, Jonas Savimbi, The theme of accountability has also domi- leader of the rebel National Union for the Total nated discussions about the strengths and weak- Independence of Angola (Unita), refused to nesses of the South African electoral system. accept the result. Similarly, the losing opposi- Typically, the argument for reform favours the tion parties challenged the outcome of elections introduction of an element of constituency rep- held in Lesotho in 1998, this resulting in resentation as the means to improve individual extended civil unrest and the arrival of the accountability and link members of parliament Southern African Development Community (MPs) to voters. of the Congress (SADC) peacekeeping force to restore order. A of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), for multiparty body known as the Interim Political example, has supported the possibility of a Authority is now negotiating a new electoral combination of PR and a mechanism that pro- system which, according to post-conflict agree- vides for broad constituencies, as in the ment, should be implemented by the govern- German case.3 A secondary argument is that ment. Zimbabwe also engaged in a hotly debat- the introduction of constituency MPs will ed constitutional negotiation process in the run- improve the performance of parliamentarians in up to its elections in 2000. All of these coun- the house when their re-election depends on a tries have faced serious challenges in securing personal profile. an electoral system with sufficient legitimacy to Another element of the discussion turns on moderate competing demands of highly antago- the nature of the emerging party system in nistic interests. South Africa, with the simultaneous prolifera- Electoral system choice is therefore not with- tion of many parties even as the ANC maintains out risks. South Africa, Namibia and a nearly two-thirds share of popular support Mozambique therefore stand apart from their among the electorate. For opposition parties, neighbours in that their choice of electoral sys- therefore, electoral system reform would seem to advance two agendas. The first centres on Table 1: Electoral systems in the SADC the theme of accountability, whereas the second region serves party self-interest since some opposition Angola List PR parties may well have calculated that their rep- Botswana FPTP resentation in parliament would increase with Lesotho FPTP the introduction of some form of constituency Mauritius Block Vote representation. This paper explores these Mozambique List PR dynamics while raising other issues which Namibia List PR impact upon the performance of opposition par- Seychelles Parallel-FPTP ties, such as finance and the consolidation of South Africa List PR the party system since 1994. Swaziland FPTP Tanzania and FPTP 1. MULTIPARTY ELECTORAL POLITICS IN Zambia FPTP SOUTHERN AFRICA Zimbabwe FPTP It is a mistake to treat South Africa as regional- List PR – List proportional representation ly unique in having to confront the politics of Block Vote – a plurality-majority system with multi- electoral system choice. Although civil war in member districts in which electors have as many votes the Democratic Republic of Congo and a ban as there are candidates to be elected. Counting is iden- on political parties and suspension of the con- tical to FPTP with the candidates with the highest vote stitution in Swaziland have meant that elections totals winning the seats. have not taken place in those particular coun- FPTP – First-past-the-post tries since the very early years of independence, Parallel-FPTP – A semi-proportional system in which the majority of countries in Southern Africa PR is used in conjunction with a plurality-majority have staged multiparty elections relatively system but where, unlike a mixed-member proportional recently. However, many of these contests have system, the PR seats do not compensate any dispropor- tionality arising from the elections to the plurality- failed to establish or consolidate political civili- 4 ty. For instance, Angola held elections in 1992, majority seats.

152 Pottie tem has succeeded in stemming conflict where ‘The electoral system is by far the most others have thus far failed. powerful lever of constitutional engineering Nonetheless, experience with multiparty elec- for accommodation and harmony in severe- tions continues to grow in SADC. Five SADC ly divided societies, as indeed it is a power- countries held elections in 1999: South Africa, ful tool for many other purposes.’7 Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique and Namibia. Writing prior to the 1994, Horowitz observed Zimbabwe followed in mid-2000, and elections that most people tended to think the Anglo- were scheduled in Mauritius and Tanzania for American plurality system was suitable and later in the year. Table 1 summarises the diver- only gave casual consideration to the advan- sity of electoral systems in SADC. tages of PR for addressing ethnic and racial Despite this range of electoral systems many inclusivity. Thus, for Horowitz, the adoption of of these elections have resulted in one party PR in South Africa offered the best chance for dominance. Electoral systems clearly can play a various segments and interests in South Africa role in such outcomes. For example, in the case – notably for him, largely defined in ethnic and of Botswana, without any history of formal racial terms – to define and represent them- one-partyism, their FPTP electoral system has selves in the electoral system. In this way the nevertheless consistently returned majorities to electoral system would produce party prolifera- the same party.5 And yet Mozambique, with tion, enhancing multiparty politics and thereby PR, has come to closely resemble a traditional reducing white fears of black majority rule. In two-party system with the opposition party, the turn, such an electoral system would generate Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo – the need to form multiparty coalitions in a post- through an electoral coalition with other small- apartheid parliament. er parties) pushing the ruling party, the Yet for Horowitz the formation of coalitions Mozambican Liberation Front (Frelimo), in a was a necessary but insufficient condition for very tight legislative race in 1999. Renamo’s the promotion of ‘intergroup accommodation’.8 leadership of an opposition coalition improved Stronger incentives were therefore required if its acquisition of seats since it was able to South Africa was to find an electoral path to amass the votes for other opposition parties that ethnic accommodation. Among the options he were unlikely to reach the five per cent thresh- explored, Horowitz advocated the alternative old of the vote had they stood for election on vote (AV) as the best means of generating their own. Other countries (e.g. South Africa intergroup accommodation. With the AV sys- and Namibia) in the region using PR have thus tem, the second and subsequent preferences of far tended to produce a pattern of one party a voter whose first preference is not one of the dominance albeit providing considerable poten- top candidates are reallocated until a candidate tial for reward for smaller parties. attains a majority. Therefore, many elections will turn on second and third preferences, there- 2. DEBATE ABOUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN by rewarding parties that negotiate for second ELECTORAL SYSTEM and third preferences in a bid to pool sufficient Horowitz argues that much of the electoral sys- votes to reach the majority threshold. The prize, tem literature is concerned with the impact of in South Africa’s divided society, is ethnic various electoral systems on the number of accommodation and governments committed to political parties, the proportionality of seats to compromise based not on artificial rewards but votes, the strength of party organisation and the real participation by minorities and interparty relationship (or lack) between representatives cohesion. and constituents.6 In this regard he does not so Reynolds concurs with this aspect of much dismiss the Duverger hypothesis that PR Horowitz’s analysis, and identifies six general favours multipartyism as to argue that there are normative goals in the selection of an electoral more important factors to consider in the study system: representativeness, accessibility, pro- of electoral systems in divided societies. He viding incentives for conciliatory behaviour, also takes exception to this sort of electoral sys- accountability, encouraging cross-cutting par- tem literature and makes a much stronger case ties and stability of government.9 Reynolds for the importance of the choice of electoral reviews arguments that question the practicality system, arguing that: of Horowitz’s advocacy of AV and recognises

153 Pottie that broad-based party lists and PR build inclu- legal entity prepared to work within the struc- sive parties in a plural society.10 Nevertheless tures of state power. The GNU was a forced he does argue that ultimately, an ideal electoral party coalition based on electoral results in system to take advantage of the opportunities which cabinet seats would be divided in pro- posed by cross-cutting cleavages would be to portion to support. Ultimately, the ANC, the introduce some kind of preference voting. National Party (NP) and the Inkatha Freedom An additional argument for the importance of Party (IFP) were the three partners in the electoral system choice is the reduction of GNU.13 Another essential element of the GNU uncertainty. According to Sisk: was a sunset clause that would protect the secu- ‘Choosing an electoral system for rity forces and civil servants from a wholesale postapartheid (sic) South Africa was a criti- purge when the ANC assumed political office. cally important task for South Africa’s par- The ANC therefore acknowledged a balance of ties, precisely because speculation on how power in which the NP retained control of the they would possibly fare under various elec- state apparatus and security forces until the toral systems was rife with uncertainty, and elections, and thereafter, the basic personnel of the outcome was unpredictable.’ those structures would remain unchanged. The Sisk argues that the ANC rejected the first-part- choice of which electoral system would pro- the-post (FPTP) electoral system because it was duce the GNU was itself another matter of concerned about the potential problems of con- debate. stituency delimitation and Initially the ANC favoured a constituency- given the racially inspired past of South Africa. based system and did not endorse PR because it He argues that all of the centrist parties ‘chose’ feared that it would necessitate government PR because it provided the advantage that no coalitions by over-representing minority inter- votes are ‘wasted’ and it maximises the oppor- ests. Friedman observes that everyone assumed tunity for minority parties to obtain parliamen- that the ANC favoured a constituency-based tary representation by providing a direct votes- electoral system on the basis that its wide elec- to-seats ratio.11 This analysis suggests a more toral support would win as the other parties freely structured arena of choice than likely split across the left and right of the political existed for any of the political actors in the pre- spectrum.14 For Friedman, the ANC adopted 1994 political environment in South Africa. PR at least in part as a compromise with the other political parties who favoured it. Mattes 3. NEGOTIATING THE CHOICE OF ELECTORAL argues that when the ANC endorsed PR in SYSTEM October 1990, it was partially on the basis of In South Africa, the effective handing over of opinion poll data that showed they would not political authority from the apartheid regime to be hurt politically by doing so.15 Sisk concurs a popular government was crucially tied to dis- with this ‘choice-based’ assessment of political cussions about the mechanisms that would behaviour.16 It can also be argued that the ensure the sustainability of democracy in the decades-long ideological commitment of the longer term. However, the context of negotia- ANC to non-racialism encouraged it to select tions was much more than a series of rationally PR rather than a constituency-based system. structured bargains. As Marais describes it, ‘A After all, drawing small, non-racial constituen- fitful, convoluted, and often impenetrable cies for a plurality system would have been process of “talks about talks”, “protocol meet- practically impossible against the background ings” and finally, negotiations was unleash- of apartheid geography – and the ANC was ed’.12 The negotiations ultimately led to the extremely concerned that racial and ethnic poli- creation of a framework for a form of transi- tics should be undermined as far as possible tional government that would obtain for five without authoritarian regulations or limits on years. The outcome was a strong institutional party organisation. In 1992, the ANC proposed focus in multiparty negotiations. Rules and pro- a National Assembly elected on the basis of PR cedures clearly did matter. The main product of with a second chamber (the Senate) representa- this compromise – the Government of National tive of the regions of the country. Unity (GNU) – reflected how far the ANC had For the NP and other smaller parties, the PR come on the road to transforming itself into a system was preferred as the best means to

154 Pottie ensure maximum representation in the new pre-1994 era was that majority rule would pro- assembly. In 1990 the President’s Council duce a dominant party state with the ANC at Committee on Constitutional Affairs tabled a the helm. This possibility was often cited by the report that favoured PR.17 In 1991, the NP pro- NP as a motivation for the protection of minori- posed a PR system for the National Assembly ty rights. However, as Giliomee and Simkins with the possibility of including some con- argue, there was no real uncertainty about the stituency representation. From 1990 onwards, outcome of the 1994 election.23 Essentially, smaller parties likewise came to favour PR, even though polls predicted consistently that with for instance the Democratic Party (DP) the ANC would win by a margin of 40%, the proposing a range of electoral system alterna- white vote (presumably for the NP) was guar- tives, each drawing on variations of PR.18 The anteed representation in the cabinet and one DP also favoured some mechanism of vote post of deputy president. The lack of democrat- pooling similar to Horowitz’s advocacy of AV. ic certainty guaranteed success. At its 1991 National Congress, the DP pro- Aside from the NP’s general attempt to gain posed a 400-member National Assembly elect- electoral support by raising fears about the ed on the basis of 100 three-member con- prospects of an ANC majority government, stituencies and an additional 100 from national more specific concerns were also raised. party lists.19 This proposal endures today. Foremost among these was that a two-thirds Similarly, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) majority in the National Assembly for the ANC announced its preference for the list PR system, would enable it to change sections of the inter- arguing that it would mitigate against racially im Constitution without consulting other par- defined constituencies.20 Furthermore, the PAC ties.24 Such an outcome could threaten the pre- advocated a national assembly with 265 seats vious years’ efforts to build a balance of power and an additional 40 seats to be assigned to through a negotiated settlement. In the end such constitutional experts appointed by the parties fears were unrealised, though only just, as the in proportion to their share of the vote. ANC’s 62.5% share of the seats fell short of Against this background, some argued that that mark. As Reynolds notes, even President PR would exacerbate the fragmentation of Mandela expressed relief that the ANC had not interests by encouraging the proliferation of reached the two-thirds majority mark because small parties which potentially mobilised ‘the government of national unity [GNU] around regional or ethnic (and potentially divi- should in no way be an “empty shell” for oppo- sive) bases of support. Others argued that PR sition parties’.25 The 1999 elections, which for- would inhibit accountability, transparency (if mally ended the power-sharing arrangement of premised on a closed party list system) and the the GNU, revealed that fears of a two-thirds role of individual candidates (and by implica- ANC majority continued to be present among tion the operation of voter preference for an white voters, although again the final result individual rather than a party as a whole). The found the ANC just (one seat) short of the parties could have, but did not choose to, build mark.26 Horowitz observes (writing in 1991), a system of constituency representation into the that such concerns are not so ill-founded PR system.21 Meanwhile, the central list system because since 1967 power had never passed gave all parties the ability to control the nomi- from one elected government to another in nation of candidates and ensure their loyalty in Africa, and there were few cases prior to that.27 parliament. In the end, the negotiations opted Where strong opposition parties had formed, for a system of PR with the nation forming a elected governments tended to turn themselves single electoral district for the newly composed into one party regimes. Thus even though the National Assembly. As Faure points out, the NP’s message was both self-serving and conve- eventual adoption of a list system which uses niently ignored during its own 40 year history both national and regional lists conforms to ele- in government, the history of African politics ments of proposals for multi-member electoral did provide some potential concerns about the districts, albeit very large ones since the nine future prospects of opposition parties in South provinces comprise the districts for 200 names Africa. on the party lists.22 The new National Assembly elected in 1994 An additional concern of the NP during the consisted of 400 members elected in terms of

155 Pottie the system of PR set out in Schedule 2 of the However, the Constitution also enables parlia- 1993 interim Constitution. Candidates for the ment to pass legislation, ‘within a reasonable seats were selected from party lists, with 200 period after the new Constitution took effect’ to MPs elected on the basis of regional lists sub- enable a member of the legislature to remain mitted by the parties (thereby bringing regional after leaving the party that originally nominated representation to parliament). The other 200 him or her. seats were allocated to candidates from the During hearings on the certification of the national party lists. Provincial legislatures were draft for the 1996 Constitution, the Constitu- also elected on the basis of PR. Elections for tional Court ruled that retention of the ‘anti- both national and provincial legislatures were defection’ clause in a way contravened the con- held concurrently with separate ballot papers stitutional principles established in the interim for each election. Constitution of 1993.32 The interim Constitu- Following the 1994 elections, the entire tion established 34 principles which were National Assembly and Senate comprised a designed to structure the writing of the final Constitutional Assembly tasked with the writ- Constitution. Two of these principles were ing or a new constitution to replace the 1993 most relevant to the choice of electoral system. interim Constitution. Sisk argues that the most First, principle VIIII provided for representa- unifying demand of the major political actors of tive government, multiparty democracy, regular the liberation struggle was the call for a con- elections, universal suffrage, a common voters’ stituent assembly elected on the basis of party roll and, in general, PR.33 Second, principle list PR.28 The constituent assembly would then XIV called for the provision of participation of be responsible for the negotiation and drafting minority parties in the legislative process.34 of a final constitution. Within the committee The Constitutional Court ruled that the anti- structure designed to divide the work of the defection clause could be reconciled with these overall Constitutional Assembly, a committee requirement for a democratic system of govern- of the constitutional assembly was tasked with ment since it meets the expectation of voters addressing the structure of government and the who gave their support to a particular party and electoral system. Aside from debates about the expect to see their votes translated into seats for separation of powers between national and that party on the basis of PR. Lodge favours provincial government, discussion in the theme this arrangement, for the time being, given past committee also turned on the issue of the future experience in many newly independent African electoral system for South Africa. For example, countries. He argues: committee members had to decide on the size ‘the embargo on floor crossing, a corollary of the parliament, whether or not to retain PR of the list system as well as the subject of a and what, if any, element of constituency repre- provision in the Constitution, is probably sentation should exist at the national and politically beneficial at this stage, in that it provincial level. According to the interim most likely functions to protect opposition Constitution, sitting members were prohibited parties more than the governing party. In from ‘crossing the floor’ owing to the system of one-party dominant systems in which alter- list PR.29 Most party representatives in the nation of government is unlikely, the major Constitutional Assembly agreed that members incentive for crossing the floor will be to should only to be able to cross the floor and win higher political office. Massive floor- join another party if they received a new man- crossing led to the creation of de facto one- date through a by-election (by-elections are party states in several African countries in only permissible at local level).30 the 1960s, well before the formal demise of The prohibition on floor-crossing was agreed their liberal constitutions.’35 to by the Constitutional Assembly and the new In this regard at least, the South African elec- Constitution reads: toral system appears to respond to the concern ‘A person loses membership of a legislature for devising an electoral system that promotes to which this Schedule applies if that person coalitions and multiparty representation of ceases to be a member of the party which diverse interests.36 The prohibition on floor nominated that person as a member of the crossing may therefore be justified on the basis legislature.’31 of enhancing the development of more effective

156 Pottie opposition political parties. The PR electoral ensure that 50% of the candidates on their lists system employed in 1994 was retained in the are women and that men and women are evenly 1996 Constitution, which states that the elec- distributed on the lists.39 toral system shall result ‘in general in propor- Ballington highlights the impact of electoral tional representation.’37 systems for women’s representation. She In the debates around the South African tran- argues there are costs for women’s representa- sition, the focus was not only on the representa- tion in the use of constituency-based electoral tion of majority and minority interests but in systems. She writes: giving effective voice to those interests. A fun- ‘The experience of Commonwealth coun- damental premise of the negotiations was that tries supports the thesis that proportional the future South Africa must have constitution- representation electoral systems are the al guarantees for the protection and promotion most favourable for electing women to par- of participation in human rights, women’s liaments ... Those Commonwealth countries rights, language rights, etc. On this count the that use constituency-based electoral sys- electoral system too was to play a role, as tems have an average 11.1% women. Those Asmal wrote: that use proportional systems have nearly ‘An electoral system for South Africa twice the number of women legislators at should develop national thinking, instill the 21.3%. Furthermore, the three Common- practice of anti-racist behaviour and the wealth countries with the highest number of acquisition of genuinely shared patriotic women – Mozambique, South Africa and consciousness. To encourage these basic New Zealand – use PR electoral systems, values, an electoral system must encourage two of which use party lists. In SADC, the cohesiveness rather than parochialism, [cen- average of those countries using List PR is tripetal] rather than fissiparous tendencies, 25%, which is in stark contrast to those unity over narrowness in behaviour.’38 countries with a constituency-based This is quite a tall, and prescriptive, order for electoral system where the average repre- an electoral system (reminiscent of the desire of sentation of women is 11.7%. Despite the Horowitz, and others, to design an electoral commitment of all SADC countries to 30% system that forces politicians to appeal to inter- representation of women by 2005, those ests that cross the ethnic and racial divides of countries which have a proportional elec- South Africa), smacking of an attempt to engi- toral system, together with political parties’ neer outcomes and behaviour through institu- commitment to gender equality, are closer tional design. to realising this ideal than those countries Another consequence of the acceptance of with constituency-based systems.’40 the PR list system was the room it offered The principal instrument used to improve the women’s organisations to take the demand for representation of women is the implementation the inclusion of women into the new democra- of quota systems. As Ballington argues, quotas cy. However, PR alone was insufficient to guarantee women’s representation and compen- achieve this form of inclusivity. Within the sate for barriers that prevent women from ANC, the Women’s League spearheaded a obtaining seats and in this way women may demand for a quota of women on all party lists. acquire a ‘critical mass’ to enable them to influ- After considerable debate and resistance, a 30% ence policies and legislation.41 It is largely as a quota was accepted for provincial and national result of the ANC’s voluntary commitment to electoral lists, although the demand for a quota 30% women’s representation on its party lists in the ANC’s internal structures was defeated. that South Africa, with 29.6% of its MPs being The outcome was the election of a relatively women, now ranks in the top ten countries in high number of women in both the first and the world for women in parliament.42 However, second democratic elections. At the local level legislated or reserved seats for women may also the electoral system is mixed with ward and list exert little pressure on political parties to PR elections for all metropolitan and some increase the number of women within its party local councils. The Municipal Structures Act of ranks, or to promote women to leadership posi- 1998 reformed the local government electoral tions with the party and government and framework and called for political parties to women who achieve office through the quota

157 Pottie system may be regarded by the other elected design, and in particular, one that can dramati- MPs as second rank MP or tokens. cally enhance inclusivity, political stability and Nevertheless, the most effective means of ethnic accommodation if carefully chosen.45 He improving women’s representation through notes that list PR systems are the most fre- electoral system choice is the party adopted quently used electoral system in the world, with quota of 30–40% representation of women in a most allocating seats on the basis of some list PR electoral system. regional division of districts. Does this mean The introduction of PR also promised to bet- that inclusivity, accountability and accommo- ter equate voter preference and effective repre- dation of minority interests are all equally sentation. Such a goal must be judged not only served by the choice of list PR? Lodge is less against established democracies but against the convinced by this advantage of PR, arguing immediate background of elections (such as that: they were) in apartheid era South Africa. ‘though list proportional representation Whites had long enjoyed the vote, but prior to ensures a spectrum of political diversity in 1994 most South Africans had only experi- parliament, as well as incentives for partici- enced elections conducted in the ethnic home- pation by ethnic and regional parties, it does lands imposed upon blacks under the govern- nothing to encourage cross-racial party ment’s programme of ‘separate development', membership and support.’46 or for the race-based tricameral legislature Friedman argues that while current ANC politi- (which from 1983 provided separate Chambers cal dominance does not necessarily delegit- in parliament for Indians and coloureds as well imise the opposition, the main opponents of the as for whites). Even these elections were highly ANC do suffer from a legitimacy problem limited because the majority of South Africans owing to the country’s racial history.47 Thus rejected these forms of government. Morris and while one set of values might be served by the Zulu demonstrate that the number of voters choice of electoral system, other values, reflect- who turned out for these polls was generally ing a different political agenda and interests low.43 For example, they find that voter partici- may fare less well. pation in the Transkei dropped by 40% between The question arises, therefore, whether 1963 and 1976, experienced a reform of the present electoral system would decline of 60 per cent between 1972 and 1977 provide for a ‘more effective’ opposition. And and had a 23% drop between 1973 and what would constitute such effectiveness? 1978. In KwaZulu’s first election in 1978, only Buntman argues that while the GNU was prob- 37% of the registered voters (fewer than 50% ably a necessary choice for the immediate post- of the eligible population registered to vote) apartheid period given the relative stalemate of participated. Moreover, they also claim that the the balance of forces in South African society homeland electoral process was subject to throughout the negotiations era, ‘there is a sig- police interference, vote rigging and intimida- nificant danger in the cooperation across party tion.44 and partisan lines, namely that the country will The 1994 election therefore stood as a cru- not develop an understanding of a loyal and cial, and bold, test for the legitimacy of the new vibrant opposition as part and parcel of the electoral system and the principles of free and meaning of democracy’.48 Buntman argues that fair elections as the basis of political power. the New National Party (NNP) has been unable The long-running contestation over the terms of to escape a corrupt past, the DP has a strong the transition, the ongoing political violence, record of opposition but lacks mass appeal, the and fears of possible military or right-wing PAC lacks practical proposals to match its attempts to disrupt the electoral process all strong rhetorical appeal and the IFP must grow posed uncertainties about the success of the beyond the shadow of its leader, Mangosutho democratic transition. Buthelezi. Aside from historical baggage and current 4. OPPOSITION POLITICS AND THE ELECTORAL appeal as measures of political effectiveness of SYSTEM opposition parties in contemporary South Reynolds argues that the choice of electoral Africa, the number of represented political par- system is a general principle of constitutional ties is a striking feature of the post-apartheid

158 Pottie legislature. For Lijphart, ‘The most important • the Droop quota be retained for the allocation difference among democratic party systems is of seats from the list elections that between two-party and multi-party sys- • seats in the constituencies be allocated by tems.’49 For example, in a parliamentary gov- plurality. ernment a two-party system makes a one party They maintain that this system would have sev- majority cabinet possible, whereas in a presi- eral advantages, inter alia: voters would be able dential system two results are possible: either to split their votes between parties, proportion- the president will enjoy a majority support from ality would be guaranteed by the use only of the legislature or he or she will be faced by a votes cast for the national party lists to deter- hostile legislature. An additional distinction is mine the proportion of overall party support; the relative size of parties and how to account and citizens would secure a direct representa- for many smaller parties. As discussed below, tive through the constituency vote. They also South Africa has experienced a growth in the argue that MPs elected from constituencies number of represented political parties and is in should be able to retain their seats if they cross a consolidation process with unknown out- the floor to join another party and should have comes. One means of reducing the number of a free mandate to vote their conscience on sen- represented political parties is to introduce or sitive moral issues. With this system the raise an existing threshold of the popular vote authors feel that their foremost criticism of the required to attain an elected seat. The only current system – lack of accountability – threshold in South Africa is the natural thresh- would, among other advantages, be redressed. old – determined by the relationship between Public opinion data indicates that whereas Assembly size (400) and district magnitude South Africans had very high levels of party (one). Thus parties gaining approximately identification in 1994 when 88% indicated that 0.25% of the popular vote will likely win a seat they identified with a party, by 1997 this figure while some parties winning even less may gain had fallen to 58% with firm independents com- a seat on the basis of the Droop quota. This low prising one quarter of the electorate.51 While threshold is very promising for new parties the survey points out that partisan identification seeking to gain access to elected office. and voting intention are different from actual Nevertheless, observers continue to propose voting, the change in public opinion does indi- modifications of the electoral system. Faure cate a greater level of identification with inde- and Venter, for example, have written a pendents than might otherwise be expected in a detailed proposal for electoral reform.50 They PR electoral system. Such indicators may prove essentially agree with DP proposals for the to bolster the prospects for new and existing introduction of a mixed-member, proportional opposition parties hoping to make inroads in system with single member constituencies. For ANC partisan support. them, the current system was an appropriate, In a different survey undertaken in 1996 by but transitional choice for South Africa, and the the Institute for Democracy in South Africa future electoral system ‘requires a higher (Idasa), 31% of respondents reported having degree of accountability by representatives, contact with their MP (based on the National channels for the electorate to express a more Assembly’s adoption of an informal system of sophisticated range of needs and choices’ as ‘assigning’ MPs elected on the basis of PR to well as improved responsiveness by MPs and a ‘constituencies’ as a means of trying to enhance sense of ownership by the electorate. the relationship between legislators and voters) They propose, in compliance with the consti- and 38% felt that MPs did a good job of keep- tutional provision of proportionality, a system ing in touch with the people.52 Depending on as follows: one’s perspectives these figures indicate either • 200 of the 400 seats in the National good or poor experiences by the public of the Assembly be allocated on the basis of single accountability of their MPs in the first years of member constituencies South African multiparty democracy. Yet what- • 200 be allocated on the basis of a closed ever the case, the responses clearly indicate that party list system public perceptions of accountability remain an • two ballots be used, one for constituencies unsettled element of democratic consolidation. and one for PR Writing prior to the 1994 elections, Mattes

159 Pottie argued that a ‘new electoral system should national and provincial parliamentary system’ investigate ways to create more freedom for yet it does not mention electoral system reform candidates to forward their own ideas and stand specifically.56 In contrast, the NNP manifesto on their own accomplishments and integrity, took up the themes of inclusiveness and minori- and be less bound by rigid party doctrine.’53 He ty rights, and called for consideration of ‘a new also noted, however, that the typical means of electoral system combining the proportional list achieving this goal, linking representatives to system and a constituency-based system to geographical constituencies, would possibly bring government closer to its people and there- entrench the demographic and territorial cate- by forcing public representatives to be more gories of apartheid. accountable to voters.’57 Similarly, the United The belief that electoral system design can Democratic Movement (UDM) reiterated the engineer normative political behaviour contin- theme of improved accountability and called ues to feature in discussions about the South for ‘a balanced electoral system that will ensure African electoral system almost four years after greater accountability and representivity’58 and the passage of the 1996 Constitution. For exam- also called for constitutional reform to allow ple, in October 1999 opposition parties called MPs to cross the floor and change their party for the introduction of defined constituencies in affiliation. However, despite these statements, order to improve the performance and account- the issue of electoral reform was in practice not ability of MPs. At a public forum organised by widely promoted nor did public opinion polls Idasa, the Leader of the DP, Tony Leon, insist- indicate that voters considered it to be impor- ed that ‘under the current system of proportion- tant. al representation, based on closed party lists, Apart from the implications of the present elected representatives are accountable to party electoral system for accountability and repre- bosses instead of to the electorate.’54 For Leon, sentativeness, it has been blamed by some for the current PR list system privileges the power producing a low quality of debate in parlia- of the party over the preferences of individual ment. However, Barrell argues that the disap- voters. He continued: pointing state of affairs has less to do with the ‘the system has also promoted a parliament quality of MPs elected than with ‘unimagina- of pliant MPs, the majority of whom do lit- tive procedural rules’.59 He cites both the week- tle more than fill quorums and provide gov- ly session of interpellations (mini debates held ernment with a voting majority.’ on Wednesday afternoons) and questions as As an alternative, Leon proposed reducing the potential opportunities for robust discussions National Assembly to 300 members elected on that instead have become stilted exchanges of the basis of a combination of multi-member statistics and information. As an alternative, he constituencies and PR. NNP leader Marthinus suggests that regular question periods with fol- van Schalkvyk concurred, arguing that the low-up questions would enliven parliament. In addition of geographical constituency-based addition, more attendance by the President and representation would improve the relationship the cabinet would reassure MPs and the South between the citizenry and government. African public that there is real, and visible, However, in contrast, ANC MP Johnny de executive accountability to parliament. Lange defended the current system as the best Meanwhile, another factor that limits the pro- means of ensuring diversity in parliament and file of personal performances in parliament is argued that any moves to introduce constituen- the party-basis of national and provincial elec- cy-based representation would undermine that tions.60 This system makes it difficult for inde- diversity.55 pendent candidates to secure election. In con- Despite this debate, the electoral system issue trast, it is often argued that a mixture of con- played little, if any role in the 1999 election stituency and PR at the local level would make campaigns of those parties which are most independent candidates more electable. closely associated with a reform agenda. The Nevertheless, the prospects for opposition par- DP manifesto promoted the idea that there are ties improve if viable subnational government too many MPs and MPLs, and called for a one- at provincial level is maintained.61 The possi- third reduction in the number of public repre- bility of access to power at provincial level is sentatives to achieve a ‘leaner, more efficient certainly important for the DP, IFP and NP at

160 Pottie present, and gives them continued access to those same seven parties won seats again, and public life and political legitimacy as parties. six additional parties gained entry. These Less attention has been given to the fact that results are suggestive of low barriers to entry the sphere of local government has undergone for new political parties, and given the electoral dramatic changes in South Africa over the system, a fair chance at winning a seat in par- course of the last ten years. In this respect the liament. The 1999 results also suggest that par- electoral system at the local level is far more ties stand a better chance of winning seats on complex than at national or provincial level the national ballot, even if they come from a since it blends forms of representation. Local largely regional or ethnic base of support, government elections are held on the basis of rather than challenging only for provincial mixed member proportional system (MMP). power. Because there is no threshold for repre- For the 2000 elections, South Africans will vote sentation in parliament, parties with just a very for representatives in metropolitan, local and small electoral base of support were able to win district councils depending on where they live. seats. As noted above, in most cases voters will cast Some of the new parties have added contro- one ballot on the basis of FPTP elections and versial figures to the National Assembly. one for PR. For example, voters in metropolitan Former Rugby Union boss (who areas will have a vote for the ward councillor played a prominent role in promoting the for- and a PR vote for the council at large. Voters in mer regime internationally) and his Federal local councils with more than seven councillors Alliance are now in parliament, as is KwaZulu- will have both those ballots as well as a PR Natal-based Amichand Rajbansi, now leader of vote for their district council. In both metropol- the Minority Front (but previously leader of the itan and local councils, members will be elected Indian House of Delegates under the ill-fated on the basis of a 50–50 split between FPTP and tricameral constitution launched by P.W. PR elections. The use of FPTP elections will Botha’s party in 1983.) Furthermore, two for- also enable smaller parties and independent mer homeland leaders have returned to the candidates to contest the elections meaningful- scene to form provincial oppositions. In North ly. But women do not fare so well in MMP West, former Bophuthatswana leader Lucas elections since they mostly get elected on the Mangope and his United Christian Democratic party lists rather than in the constituencies. The Party came second, whereas in the Eastern forthcoming local elections could, therefore, Cape, the UDM – led by former Transkei mili- prove to have long-run constitutional and politi- tary strongman Bantu Holomisa – performed cal implications. strongly enough to secure recognition as the official opposition. 5. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE 1999 ELECTIONS In contrast, the worst performance amongst The following breakdown illustrates the extent the smaller parties in the 1999 elections was of party participation in the 1999 elections: delivered by the PAC, a historical rival of the • 26 parties contested the 1999 elections ANC.62 With just 0.7% of the popular vote, the • 15 parties contested the National Assembly PAC was reduced to three seats in the National and provincial assemblies Assembly. Meanwhile, the Azanian People’s • one party contested the National Assembly Organisation (Azapo), contesting its first only national election, fared even worse with less • 10 parties contested for provincial assembly than 0.2% of the vote, though even this was seats only (each of these contested in one enough to capture one seat in parliament. On province only) the basis of these election results, the Africanist • 13 parties won seats in the National option, for now at least, appears dead. Table 2 Assembly (over page) indicates the National Assembly • 12 of those same parties won seats in provin- election results for 1999 (and 1994). cial assemblies Not only has the South African electoral sys- • none of the parties contesting provincial tem thus far enhanced the representation of assemblies only won any seats. smaller parties, but the party list system has In the 1994 elections seven parties won seats in also augmented the representation of women in the National Assembly. In the 1999 elections, South Africa. For example, as noted above, the

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Table 2: National Assembly election results, 1999 and 1994

Party Vote (% of national total) Seats 1994 result in italics 1994 allocation in italics

African Christian Democratic Party 1.43 6 0.45 2 African National Congress 66.35 266 62.65 252 Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging 0.29 1 Azanian People’s Organisation 0.17 1 Democratic Party 9.56 38 1.73 7 Federal Alliance 0.54 2 Inkatha Freedom Party 8.58 34 10.54 43 Minority Front 0.30 1 0.07 New National Party 6.87 28 20.39 82 Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania 0.71 3 1.25 5 United Christian Democratic Party 0.78 3 United Democratic Movement 3.42 14 Vryheidsfront/Freedom Front 0.80 3 2.17 9 Total 100 400

Table adapted from Andrew Reynolds, ed. Election ’94: The Campaign, Results and Future Prospects, (London: James Currey, 1994) and Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, National and Provincial Election Results, South African Elections, June 1999 (Johannesburg: EISA, 1999).

ANC reserved 30% of its national list for ‘To enhance multi-party democracy, nation- women, placed women in electable positions al legislation must provide for the funding and now has 96 women out of its 266 MPs. Of of political parties participating in national the smaller parties, the UDM is the only party and provincial legislatures on an equitable other than the ANC to specify the gender of and proportional basis.’64 candidates on the national list. Moreover, the As a result, legislation was enacted to provide fact that so many smaller parties won a few funding for political parties from a state-admin- seats typically decreases the prospects of elect- istered fund on the following terms: ing more women since with only a few seats to • Only represented political parties may spread around most parties are likely to appoint receive funds. men from their lists. The significant margin of • Funding is weighted in favour of elected rep- victory for the ANC, while perhaps negative in resentation by each political party. terms of building a strong opposition, actually • Parties must account for the funds and the improved the prospects for women candidates. Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in turn reports to parliament.65 6. PARTY FUNDING IN SOUTH AFRICA The allocations from the fund are to be made Financial support for political parties is another and paid out to each of the political parties con- crucial determinant of building successful cerned on the basis of proportionality and equi- opposition politics in South Africa.63 The 1996 ty. Some 90% of the fund is allocated in pro- Constitution recognised that political parties portion to the number of seats held by each require funding in order to effectively partici- party in the National Assembly and the provin- pate in the electoral system. The Constitution cial legislatures jointly. The remaining 10% of reads: the fund is allocated, firstly, among the provin-

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Table 3: Public funding of represented enforcing disclosure. The fact that opposition political parties – 1999 elections66 parties lack the financial and administrative resources of the party in government does little Party Allocation to distinguish South Africa from other coun- tries. ANC R30 608 560 NNP R10 145 260 7. POLARISATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES? IFP R5 694 850 Perhaps of greater concern for academics and FF R1 993 330 DP R1 759 600 advocates of achieving ethnic and intergroup PAC R1 125 190 accommodation via the electoral system, is that ACDP R953 470 the prospects for opposition party support Minority Front R719 740 appear to remain locked into their predominant- ly regional and/or ethnic bases of support. ces in proportion to the number of members in Consider, for example, the following assess- each province and, secondly, is divided equally ment of opposition politics after the 1999 elec- among the participating parties in the legisla- tions: ture of each province. The allocations are paid The IFP continues to draw the bulk of its sup- in four equal installments, each within three port from Zulu speakers in KwaZulu-Natal and months of the previous payment. has not secured any measure of broad-based In 1999 a total amount of R53 million was support outside of the province. The NNP now allocated to the represented parties from public has proportionally more support from its funds, as indicated in Table 3. coloured supporters than from its historically Newly formed political parties objected to white support base, many of whom have now the fact that no new funding was to be extended transferred their allegiance to the DP. Shuffling to them. On 23 March 1999 several of these the cards within the same support base will not parties voiced their objections at a press confer- help any of the opposition parties. Unless they ence outside Johannesburg. The 33 represented can make credible inroads into the constituen- parties gave the government a two-day ultima- cy, they are destined indefinitely to remain tum to redress what they perceived is a basic minority opposition parties.69 inequity in South Africa’s new democracy, else Well, yes and no. Opposition parties will pur- face the wrath of the parties and their support- sue other strategies within the existing electoral ers. The parties called for the implementation system to improve their share of popular sup- of a public funding system to all political par- port. For example, in June 2000 the DP and ties. They were unsuccessful in their campaign NNP announced a formal alliance to be called and failed to make an impact on the election the Democratic Alliance (DA). This venture campaign. may prove to consolidate opposition support in It is noteworthy that despite the absence of ways that further polarise South African poli- public funding, six previously non-represented tics in racial terms. Alternatively, this pooling political parties gained seats in parliament and of resources and electoral support may provide will now qualify for a share of public funding. the base upon which the new party makes Of course, all political parties also rely on pri- inroads into ANC support. vate sources of funding. There are no rules gov- Whatever the outcome, the tactic builds on erning donations to parties in South Africa and the party defections which preceded the 1999 no regulations that require disclosure of either elections and which have continued since that domestic or foreign donations.67 For example, time as candidates and parties jockey for elec- in the run-up to the 1999 elections the ANC toral advantage. Previously the DP announced received $10 million from Saudi Arabia and the it would work with Mangope’s UCDP (October United Arab Emirates respectively after Nelson 1999).70 Mandela solicited funds while he was on offi- While such moves may do little to achieve cial state visits.68 Non-government parties obvi- inroads into ANC support in the medium term, ously lack such opportunities but there was no they can improve the resources at the disposal significant effort to bring attention to these of the DP as well as amalgamate an otherwise fundraising activities or to draft regulations fractured opposition vote during the 2000 local

163 Pottie government elections, even with the present from mass movement to political party. For electoral system intact. the moment there are few viable, national Schlemmer is less optimistic about the alternatives to the ANC. prospects for opposition parties in South • Women in parliament: The number of wo- Africa, arguing that the future of electoral men in parliament is enabled by the ANC’s democracy in South Africa lies with a one- quota system on its party lists. No opposition party dominant system (led by the ANC at pre- parties have adopted this mechanism and sent) or at least with an ‘africanist’ party-domi- play a minimal role in advancing the number nant system.71 For Schlemmer, a ‘cross-racial’ of women represented in legislatures. coalition is most unlikely and minority groups • Weak opposition: With many smaller parties are thus advised to adopt political strategies competing for the opposition vote there has that do not assume electoral growth. Party poli- been a substantial fragmentation of the vote. tics in 2000 may confirm this general thrust, The new alliance between the DP and the with Azapo emerging from its 15th annual con- NNP will, in the short turn at least, consoli- ference with a call for solidarity with the ANC. date opposition on the basis of a minority Despite ongoing tensions between the ANC and base (potentially combining the white and the IFP, the two parties continue to work coloured support base of the two parties). It is together in government. By contrast, relations unclear if the signs of racial polarisation in between the ANC and the DP have been char- electoral politics will undermine other ele- acterised by public sparring between the two ments of the South African political transi- party leaders, with overt racial tones. However, tion or even if it will endure. the PAC continues to stand apart from the ANC • Electoral system reform: Proposals for elec- and other potential allies in an africanist nation- toral system reform from opposition parties al front. are premised on claims for improved accountability, MP’s performance in parlia- CONCLUSION ment and strengthened links between voters For the ANC’s Pallo Jordan, ‘democracy, non- and their elected representatives. Local gov- racialism and non-sexism do not mean that ernment provides the best test case for this every five years Tony Leon [leader of the DP] system but it has yet to be thoroughly exam- and his African domestic worker can stand on ined as an option at national or provincial the same queue in Houghton to vote.’72 It may level. be assumed that such a vision also falls short of • Funding democratisation: The absence of Schlemmer’s ‘cross-racial coalition.’ Instead, legislation requiring disclosure of private Jordan envisages a South Africa where that contributions to parties or to extend funding domestic worker’s daughter has a fair chance of to build capacity among non-represented competing equally with Tony Leon’s son for a political parties suggests a weak commitment place at university, to become a doctor or to from all political parties to public account- move in next door. For Jordan, democratic and ability. None of the represented political par- economic development presents the only defen- ties has called for disclosure of funding sible course for building pluralism in South sources, nor have any linked party finance to Africa. the electoral system reform debate as a means Jordan speaks to the general issue raised at of enhancing the capacity of opposition par- the outset of this paper that while the institu- ties to better represent the interests of the tional and regulatory aspects of elections do electorate. matter, they are not enough to secure a com- Of course these are only tentative conclusions plete political and economic transformation in about the emerging party and electoral system South Africa. On the basis of this brief survey in South Africa. While the second elections of the emerging party system in South Africa strongly correlate with the procedural require- and the politics of electoral system choice, a ments for democratic consolidation, this paper number of general conclusions can be is cognisant that the successful consolidation of advanced: a multiparty is only one • One party dominance: The ANC has enjoyed feature of democratic development. Indeed, the repeated electoral success in its conversion shifting fortunes of social forums and other

164 Pottie community-based consultative bodies present racial and ethnic mobilisation, race continues to evidence of a significant demobilisation of civil be a factor in South African party politics. The society since 1994. Further research might indi- new DA relies on a core of white support even cate the extent to which opposition parties, or as it is likely to seek to capitalise on the signifi- the ANC, are able to keep these interests within cant coloured and Afrikaans-speaking NNP the fold. While outside the main focus of this support from the Western Cape province. Its paper, it must be noted that the institutionalisa- long-term strategy must surely turn to building tion of popular opinion through political par- inroads into ANC support if it ever hopes to ties, through its very success, can also serve to rise above the current level of 15–20% of popu- undermine the popular interests on whose lar support. Secondly, reconciling this record behalf political parties claim to represent. with the challenges of development and popular Electoral system reform in favour of con- power will remain an ongoing challenge. stituency representation may do little to redress Thirdly, the DP has staked out the terrain of lib- this aspect of South African political life. eral values as the basis of its self-described Despite this important proviso, this paper has attempt to build robust and principled opposi- also argued that South Africa has generated sig- tion in South Africa. It has therefore managed nificant institutional and integrative measures to build a profile around the values of account- to aggregate interests through the electoral and ability, transparency and opportunity. With party system. respect to the electoral system itself, the DP On these procedural grounds then, South and other opposition parties have, for the mean- Africa is on its way to successful democratic time, sought to stake out the terrain of electoral consolidation. But several crucial challenges system reform in the name of improving demo- remain. Firstly, while South Africa’s elections cratic accountability and by implication, the and the emerging party system appear to have quality of democratic life. It remains to be seen successfully avoided the worst case scenario of if this vision will be rewarded at the ballot box.

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ENDNOTES

1) Sisk concurs that wider issues of institu- ing the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. tional design, political values and mobili- The IFP remained up to and beyond the sation strategies play a role in addition to 1999 elections. the electoral system itself: ‘While the elec- 14) Quoted in Sisk, p. 188. toral system is an important aspect of con- 15) Robert B. Mattes, The Myths of Majori- vergence arising out of institutional choic- tarianism: Understanding Democracy in a es, the entire political system as a whole New South Africa, Idasa Occasional establishes a set of rules that will provide Paper, No. 43, February 1992, p.7. incentives for minorities’ views to make a 16) Sisk, p. 190. difference in the context of majority rule.’ 17) Murray Faure, The Electoral Systems Timothy D. Sisk, Democratisation in Issue in South African Politics, South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract, Occasional Paper, Konrad-Adenauer- (Princeton: Press, Stiftung, South Africa, 1999, p. 3. 1995), p. 271. 18) Sisk, p. 183. 2) Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South 19) Faure, p. 3-6. Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a 20) Sisk, p. 186. Divided Society, (Berkeley: University of 21) The only element of constituency repre- California Press, 1991) and Andrew sentation is the provision for a ‘regional to Reynolds, Electoral Systems and national’ component of the party list for Democratisation in Southern Africa, the National Assembly. Of the 400 possi- (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). ble names for the latter, 200 are on a 3) Sisk, p. 170. national list and the other 200 are on a 4) For a full description of electoral systems regional list. The regional list is allocated and case studies of their application see: across the nine provinces and draws International IDEA, Handbook of names suggested by the party branches Electoral System Design, (Stockholm: and officials in those provinces. IDEA, 1997). 22) Faure, p. 6. 5) While the main opposition party's share of 23) Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins, the vote in Botswana increased over the The Dominant Party Regimes of South course of the 1990s, a split in the party Africa, Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia: A dashed the hopes of either faction making Comparative Assessment, in Hermann substantial inroads into the Botswana Giliomee and Charles Simkins, (eds), The Democratic Party which has never secured Awkward Embrace: One Party Domina- less than 67% of the elected seats in the tion and Democracy , (Cape Town: National Assembly or less than 54% of the Tafelberg Press, 1999), p. 9. votes cast (its share in the 1994 elections). 24) Section 62(1) of the interim Constitution Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC states that bills amending the Constitution Countries, Botswana Elections Observer require a two-thirds majority of all mem- Mission Report, (Johannesburg: Electoral bers of both the National Assembly and Institute of Southern Africa, 1999), p. 3. the Senate. Constitution of the Republic of 6) Horowitz, p. 163. South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 7) Ibid. 25) Reynolds, p. 182. 8) Ibid., p. 177. 26) Consider for example, a New National 9) Reynolds, p. 92. Party campaign poster from the 1999 elec- 10) Ibid., p. 104. tion campaign which read, ‘Mugabe has 11) Sisk, p. 168-199. two-thirds’, warning South Africa not to 12) Hein Marais, South Africa: Limits to go the route of Zimbabwe and its powerful Change: The Political Economy of (overly so, for some) Presidency. Transformation, (Cape Town: UCT Press, 27) Horowitz, p. 239. 1998), p.83. 28) Sisk, p. 169. 13) The NP withdrew from the GNU follow- 29) Sec. 43 and Sec. 143 respectively, prohib-

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ited members of the national and provin- Elections Forum, Windhoek, Namibia, cial assemblies from crossing the floor. 11-14 June 2000, p. 3. Constitution (1993). 43) Paulus Zulu and Mike Morris, First 30) Constitutional Talk, Official Newsletter of Experiences of Democratic Elections, in the Constitutional Assembly, Working Lawrence Schlemmer and Ian Hirschfeld, Draft Edition, p. 18. (eds). Founding Democracy and the New 31) Republic of South Africa, Constitution South African Voter, (Pretoria: Human (1996), Sec. 23 A (1). Sciences Research Council, 1994), p. 168. 32) Constitutional Court of South Africa, 44) Ibid., p. 169. Certification of the Constitution of the 45) Reynolds, p. 91. Republic of South Africa, 1996, Case 46) Lodge. CCT, 23/96 47) Steven Friedman, Party Dominance, 33) Constitution (1993), Scedule 4. Opposition and Civil Society in South 34) Ibid. Africa, in Giliomee and Simkins, eds., 35) Tom Lodge, Which Criteria are most p. 109-110. Important in Choosing an Electoral 48) Fran Buntman, South Africa’s First System for Post-1999 South Africa? Paper Democratic Elections and their Political presented to Electoral Systems Context, in John Mukum Mbaku and Roundtable, Electoral Institute of South Julius O. Ihonvbere, (eds)., Multiparty Africa, 14-15 August 1998, Cape Town, Democracy and Political Change: South Africa, p. 5. Constraints to Democratisation in Africa, 36) Lijphart argues that the influence of the (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 265. electoral system on the effective number 49) Lijphart, p.67. of elective parties is especially weak. 50) Murray Faure and Albert Venter, Electoral However he does find a stronger link Systems and Accountability: A Proposal between the electoral system and the num- for Electoral Reform in South Africa, ber of effective parties in parliament. This Paper presented to Workshop on latter finding may be more important for Democracy and Electoral Administration, the purposes of building a party system University of Stellenbosch, 24-25 March, that can produce alternation in govern- 2000. ment. Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems 51) IDASA, Public Opinion Service Report, and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty- No. 1, February 1998. Seven Democracies, 1945–1990, (Oxford: 52) IDASA, Public Opinion Service Report, Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 142. No. 1, February 1996. 37) Constitution (1996), Sec. 46(1)(d). 53) Mattes, p. 5. 38) Quoted in Sisk, p. 270. Reynolds describes 54) Business Day, (Johannesburg) 22 October, Asmal as the prime mover behind the 1999. ANC decision to adopt PR. Reynolds, p. 55) Katharine Mckenzie, Voting Distorted in 184. UK, says MP, Idasa, Provincial Whip, 11 39) Municipal Structures Act, No 117 of 1998, November 1999. Schedule 2, Sec. 17 (5). 56) Democratic Party, Fight Back for a Better 40) Julie Ballington, Electoral Systems, Future: The Democratic Party’s Plan for Electoral Processes and Gender Equality, South Africa, 1999, p. 12. Paper presented to Regional Election 57) New National Party, Let’s Get South Management Training Programme for Africa Working, 1999, p. 14. Commonwealth Countries, Mauritius, 58) United Democratic Movement, The Better 9 May 2000. Future Plan, 1999, p. 28. 41) Ibid. 59) Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), 7-13 42) See Athaliah Molokomme, Building January, 2000. Inclusiveness in SADC’s Democratic 60) The Financial Mail (Johannesburg)l, 10 Systems: The Case of Women’s March 2000. Representation in Leadership Positions, 61) Friedman concurs, p. 113. Paper presented to Southern Africa 62) The PAC was formed in 1959 following

167 Pottie

growing discontent within the Congress 70) The opposition parties frequently vote in Alliance. The PAC thus represented an unison against the government. For exam- Africanist branch of the liberation move- ple, in the debate on the proposed Open ment. Democracy Bill that regulates the individ- 63) For an overview see: Roger Southall and ual’s constitutional right to access to infor- Geoffrey Wood, Political Party Funding in mation, the DP, NNP, FF, UCDP and Southern Africa, in Peter Burnell and Alan ACDP made a show of unity by schedul- Ware, (eds), Funding Democratisation, ing a joint press conference to present (Manchester; Manchester University their concerns with the Bill. The Sowetan, Press, 1988). (Johannesburg), 19 January 2000. 64) Constitution (1996), Section 236. 71) Lawrence Schlemmer, The Future of 65) Public Funding of Represented Political Political Pluralism in South Africa, in Parties Act, Act No. 103 of 1997. Giliomee and Simkins, p. 300. 66) Notice 2920 of 1998, Government 72) Pallo Jordan, The National Question in Gazette, 3 December 1998. Post-1994 South Africa: A discussion 67) By contrast the ANC has drafted a Code paper in preparation for the ANC's 50th of Conduct for Parliamentarians which National Conference, 1997, p. 14. requires all members of the National 73) According to DP, and new DA leader, Assembly to declare publicly all their Tony Leon, the new party will not make financial interests. its ‘cause the insular protection of minori- 68) The Sunday Times, (Johannesburg) 24 ty rights and interests.’ Instead, the DA May 1999. aims ‘to build an opposition that becomes 69) Human Rights Committee, Post-Election an alternative government that forces Focus 1999: A Detailed Guide to the 1999 the ANC below 50% of the vote.’ The Election Results, (Johannesburg: Human Sunday Independent (Johannesburg) , Rights Committee, 1999), p. 35 9 July 2000.

168 The Politics of Adaptation and Equivocation: Race, Class and Opposition in 20th Century South Africa

Paul Maylam

This paper is concerned centrally with the opposition to white supremacist regimes was ways in which extra-parliamentary opposition obviously a very different ball-game to opposi- movements in 20th century South Africa (pre- tion in the post-apartheid era. The strategic 1990) tried to resolve the tensions and dilem- issues and debates that preoccupied those at the mas, theoretical and political, emanating from forefront of the liberation struggle do not seem the race-class conundrum. There were two to have much salience now. Moreover the fast- main dimensions to the problem: first, what changing global context has drastically altered should be the prime target of opposition – the terms on which the post-apartheid order has racial oppression or class exploitation? been constructed, apparently rendering obso- Second, what would be the most effective lete some of the earlier visions of what that means of opposition – racial mobilisation or society might look like. So a search for conti- class struggle? Movements that opted for a nuities between the pre-1990 decades and the race-based strategy, directed at racial oppres- post-apartheid era might seem futile. Further- sion, achieved some short-term gains, but were more, there are the common pitfalls that go ultimately compelled to modify their approach with any endeavour to draw upon the past to and make concessions to class analysis. illuminate the present. There is, for instance, Similarly organisations geared towards class the ‘history-as-bondage syndrome’ – the idea struggle could never escape the realities of that the present is bound by the past, that the racial division and oppression, and were possibilities for change in the future are severe- forced to compromise their principles and ly constrained by the legacies of the past. This strategies. Throughout its history the African can easily taper into ‘history-as-excuse’. There National Congress (ANC) avoided taking firm is, too, the danger of ‘history-as-teleology’ – stances one way or the other. It mastered the the course of events unfolding inexorably politics of equivocation and compromise, oper- towards an outcome predetermined by history ating as a ‘broad church’, accommodating a itself. variety of political tendencies. This was both a Notwithstanding these pitfalls – which beset strength and a weakness, enabling the organi- any attempt to link the past and present – there sation to enjoy wide support but also creating is one theme that runs through the history of the potential for internal division – a danger extra-parliamentary opposition in South Africa still faced by the Tripartite Alliance today. for most of the 20th century, and that has car- ried over into the politics of the post-apartheid INTRODUCTION era. That theme centres on the contradictions, Can the history of opposition in 20th century dilemmas and uncertainties that arose from the South Africa throw any light on the current sit- tension, theoretical and political, between race uation of political parties and organisations, or and class. These might now seem to be two on possible changing political alignments? rather tired categories, the preoccupation of a Surely not? After all, extra-parliamentary particular intellectual generation,1 but they

169 Maylam remain salient and central in any analysis of white labour could form the most likely work- South African politics. The race-class tension ing-class vanguard.2 Then, in 1928 the CPSA afflicted opposition in South Africa, particular- adopted the ‘Native Republic’ thesis, prioritis- ly from about 1920. The issues of the time are ing the national democratic revolution ahead of well-known: should racial oppression or class the struggle for socialism, only to change direc- exploitation be the prime target for opposition? tion again when the apparent collapse of capi- What would bring the most effective form of talism seemed to revive the short-term opposition and offer the best prospect for liber- prospects of socialism. So, during the great ation: racial mobilisation or class struggle? depression the CPSA tried to organise workers These questions in some cases induced hard- across the colour line, but came up against the line posturing around one pole or the other, but reluctance of white workers to participate in more often they gave rise to vacillation, incon- interracial working-class action. For a while, sistency, and equivocation. Moreover, move- during the mid-1930s, the view that white ments and organisations with particular tenden- labour had revolutionary potential – reasserted cies – towards either a class-based or a race- within the party by members like Solly Sachs based politics – became compelled to adapt, and Bill Andrews – again received serious con- accommodate and compromise. This process of sideration. But white workers continued to adaptation forms the main subject of this essay, reject interracial cooperation, unwilling to which will examine various extra-parliamentary sacrifice their relatively privileged position as a opposition movements or bodies: the labour aristocracy.3 Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) Although some internal debate continued, the which re-formed itself as the South African CPSA was from the 1930s increasingly forced Communist Party (SACP) after it was banned to follow directives from Moscow. In the early by the government in 1950; the Africanists, the 1940s the prospects for black labour organisa- early African National Congress Youth League tion and action in South Africa were good, as (CYL), and the Pan-Africanist Congress the country experienced both war-time industri- (PAC); the Black Consciousness Movement al growth and a skilled labour shortage brought (BCM); and the African National Congress on by the enlistment of many white workers for (ANC). Each of these engaged in political and military service. But the CPSA’s ability to ideological manoeuvring to find a way round mobilise black workers at this time was com- the race-class dilemma. It was the ANC that promised by Moscow’s insistence that the party proved most adept in transcending, bridging do nothing to endanger the allied war effort (perhaps evading?) the tension between the two which was so vital to the survival of the Soviet tendencies. Union. The history of the CPSA from 1921 till its 1. THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEFT formal dissolution in 1950 suggests that the The history of the CPSA and SACP over a peri- potential for pursuing a genuine non-racial od of almost 80 years, from its inception to the working-class struggle was extremely limited, present, is characterised by constant vacillation given the realities of the South African racial and compromise, underlining the enormous dif- order. The way out of this predicament seemed ficulty in pursuing a ‘pure’ class politics in a to be to defer the quest for socialism by subor- racially oppressive society divided along colour dinating it to the struggle for national libera- lines. The CPSA was founded in 1921 with the tion. This had been the essential thinking firm aim of building non-racial working-class behind the ‘Native Republic’ thesis, and it solidarity, but it immediately came up against would continue to inform the strategy and poli- the reality of a racially divided working-class. cy of the party when it reconstituted itself as The party placed itself in an awkward position the SACP after 1953. It was an approach that by supporting the 1922 white miners’ strike required not only adaptation – compromising which had strong racist overtones (‘Workers of fundamental principles – but also alliance with the World Unite and Fight for White South organisations that would normally be dismissed Africa’ was one slogan). In the mid-1920s the as bourgeois and reformist. party shifted its focus to black labour organisa- The pragmatists gained the upper hand in the tion, as it continued to debate whether black or underground SACP during the early 1950s. A

170 Maylam huge theoretical gulf separated the ultra-nation- tively low. It did not put out a message that car- alist, anti-communist Africanists, who were ried mass appeal, and it was too inclined to prominent in the CYL from the mid-1940s, indulge in abstract theorising. The party was from communists committed to the class strug- further constrained by directives from Moscow. gle. Yet by the early 1950s there was some- But most of all it could not successfully bridge thing of a rapprochement between the two ten- or transcend the theoretical and practical dencies. A section of the SACP, based mainly dimensions of the race-class divide. Non-racial in the Transvaal, favoured closer relations with working-class struggle never got off the the African . This necessi- ground: it was well-nigh impossible in the tated a theoretical compromise – manifested in South African context. This failure forced a the ‘Colonialism of a Special Type’ (CST) the- reassessment of principles and strategy, leading sis and the associated two-stage strategy which to departures from the party of members who prioritised the national democratic revolution maintained their faith in a commitment to non- and deferred the struggle for socialism to a later racialism as an article of faith. Constant stage. This was a compromise. It was an reassessment, in turn, resulted in vacillation. As attempt to resolve the theoretical race-class Allison Drew has put it, ‘aside from its long- dilemma, and to build a rapport with former term emphasis on trade union work, the Party Youth Leaguers, like Mandela and Sisulu, who has hardly been characterised by continuity of were gaining influence within the ANC. It was policy or methods, which have swung back and also premised on the assumption that the work- forth in response to the zigzags of international ing-class would take control of the national communist politics and domestic political pres- struggle, given that the black middle-class, sures’.7 To gain any political leverage the party stunted by racial oppression, was so small.4 ultimately had to piggy-back on to the national- Through the rest of the century the SACP ist movement, and to accept the ideological maintained its politics of alliance and compro- compromises that this involved. mise. It continued to work closely with the Other movements which have attempted to ANC , and indeed, some say that it exercised pursue a non-racial, class-oriented politics in undue influence over the latter.5 Whatever, South Africa have generally been confined to SACP theorists made a crucial input into the the sidelines, much more so than the Commun- strategic planning of the alliance, continuing to ist Party. This has been the case particularly stress the primacy of the national democratic with Trotskyist organisations, whose marginali- struggle. Overlapping membership at the top sation was exacerbated by their own internal echelons of the two organisations became more conflicts and factionalism. The first Trotskyist evident. Before the 1990s, ideological tensions organisation to be established in South Africa within the alliance were kept in check by the was the Lenin Club, founded in Cape Town in shared objective of overthrowing the apartheid 1933, but soon to divide into factions the fol- regime. In the post-apartheid era these tensions lowing year. The thrust of the Trotskyist posi- have been less easily contained. tion at this time was to reject the CPSA’s A few years ago Joe Slovo claimed that the ‘Native Republic’ thesis on the grounds that it Communist Party had been ‘the undisputed pio- subordinated the class struggle to the national neers of genuine non-racial political organisa- struggle and excluded the possibility of united, tion’ in South Africa, as well as ‘pioneers of a non-racial, working-class action.8 vision of non-racial democracy’, having The Non-European Unity Movement demanded majority rule as far back as 1929, (NEUM), founded in 1943, has often been long before the ANC was to make such a referred to as a Trotskyist organisation, but in demand.6 It may well be that the party can be fact it was not so. The NEUM maintained a credited with such a foresighted vision. firm commitment to the principle of non-racial- However the claim does not stand up to an ism, rejecting the notion of race as an artificial examination of the practical realities that con- construct. In practice, though, its membership stantly constrained and undermined non-racial was largely coloured. It also insisted on the political action. The party’s commitment to principle of non-collaboration – non-participa- non-racialism never won it any mass support, tion in any government-created structure or and its membership level always remained rela- institution. This was a recipe for inaction.

171 Maylam

Furthermore, while the NEUM stressed the role impact and legacy was considerable. He came of the working-class, the movement itself large- to the fore at a time when the ANC itself was in ly comprised members of the coloured elite. It the doldrums, and both he and fellow Youth never involved itself in working-class organisa- Leaguers injected a new energy and militancy tion; and its Ten-Point Programme prioritised into the nationalist movement. This gained liberal democratic demands over any kind of expression in campaigns of passive resistance socialist agenda.9 against the imposition of apartheid by the National Party government in the 1950s. 2. THE AFRICANISTS AND BLACK However, Lembede’s ‘pure’, uncompromising CONSCIOUSNESS ORGANISATIONS brand of would not be sus- A ‘purist politics’, premised on the principle of tained. Lembede’s successor as leader of the non-racialism and/or class analysis, seems to CYL, A.P. Mda, was less intransigent in his have made little headway for much of the 20th nationalism and more open to socialist thought. century. What, then, can be said about the He argued that socialism should be a goal of record of movements that mobilised explicitly the nationalist movement; and he saw that the on racial lines, building racial solidarity, reject- growing African working-class would have to ing both interracial cooperation and the politics be a primary constituency for mobilisation.11 of class? Three organisations/movements Moreover in the late 1940s there was a thaw require consideration here: the CYL, PAC and in the cool relationship between the CYL and BCM. It will be argued that these political ten- the communists. When J.B. Marks, a Com- dencies which rested on race-based analysis munist Party member, was elected president of and racial mobilisation did, indeed, have a sig- the Transvaal ANC in 1950 he was supported nificant appeal at certain moments. However, by the CYL, largely because he was adopting a the impact tended to be short term, and a more militant political stance. Mandela also racialised oppositional politics proved to be dif- softened his initially hostile attitude towards ficult to sustain. Just as the Communist Party communists, realising there was scope for adapted its class strategy to accommodate the cooperation and an exchange of ideas between realities of racial oppression, so did these the two tendencies.12 However, this apparent movements have to adjust their race-based rapprochement did not remove all tension approach to account for class oppression. between the Africanists, the ANC, and the Anton Lembede was the key figure behind communists. Africanists continued to resent the the early CYL – established by youthful seemingly dominant role of whites in the activists to challenge their elders in the ANC in SACP, and suspected that these whites were 1944 – and its first leader. He ardently champi- beginning to dominate the ANC. Africanists oned an Africanist ideology. This rested on the were also critical of the Freedom Charter, par- assumption that all Africans – defined to ticularly because it failed to state explicitly that exclude those whose ancestors originated from conquered and confiscated land would be outside Africa, especially Europeans and restored to the people.13 Such discontents Asians – comprised a single nationality. Pride prompted the Africanist breakaway from the in this shared nationality would engender ANC and the founding of the PAC in 1959. African unity and solidarity, essential prerequi- The PAC has generally been characterised as sites for effective mass organisation and action. a fiercely Africanist, nationalist organisation Lembede accordingly rejected the politics of that was hostile to foreign influences, both to non-racialism and multi-racialism, both of alien ideologies and to people deemed to be which would dilute racial solidarity and under- outsiders. This, though, is too simple a charac- mine Africans’ capacity for concerted, militant terisation. Although , the first political action. He similarly dismissed PAC leader, recognised African nationalism as Marxism, first because its class analysis divid- being the instrument and engine of liberation, ed rather than united Africans; second, because he saw Africanism only as a means to an end, it was an alien ideology imported from outside for in his thinking the future, liberated South Africa; and third, because its chief exponents in Africa would be a non-racial society. Indeed his South Africa were white.10 views on race were progressive. He believed Lembede died in 1947, at the age of 33. His that there was only one race, the human race,

172 Maylam and thus rejected the multiracialism of the During the years of Steve ’s leadership, Congress Alliance as a kind of democratic from 1969 to 1977, the BCM concentrated its apartheid. Moreover Sobukwe was open to energy on racial mobilisation, striving for black socialist thought, stating, at the launch of the unity. It defined blackness not according to any PAC, his preference for a socialist economy.14 biological notion of race, but in terms of the Sobukwe set a tone, and in the years that fol- common oppression experienced to a greater or lowed the banning of the PAC in 1960 the lesser extent by all people of colour. However, organisation’s hostility to foreign ideologies the aim of this racial mobilisation was to steadily diminished. From 1964 the PAC achieve the short-term goal of building a united looked more and more towards China. This was opposition, for the BCM did not envisage race mainly for material support, but Maoism or colour having the same kind of significance increasingly crept into PAC rhetoric.15 As after liberation. Karis and Gerhart have noted, ‘socialist ideas Biko, like Lembede before him, rejected and Marxism-Leninism with a Maoist gloss class analysis. He criticised those whites who won growing acceptance, given the PAC’s ‘by dragging all sorts of red herrings across our opposition to the Soviet-supported ANC- paths ... tell us that the situation is a class strug- Communist Party alliance, and China’s support gle’.17 The BCM believed that racial oppression for the PAC, especially during its early years in was a more pervasive and destructive force, and exile’.16 a more immediate concern, than the economic It would be a mistake to attach too much sig- exploitation of black people. Fostering class nificance to the PAC’s apparent ideological consciousness could undermine the endeavour shift from a resolute nationalism towards a to build racial solidarity and assertiveness. vaguely formulated socialism. After all, Indeed, Biko and the BCM paid more attention through much of its history the PAC lacked ide- to cultural matters than to economic issues, and ological coherence. The internal quarrels and the movement formulated only a vague eco- factionalism that bedevilled the organisation nomic policy derived from an idealised notion militated against any clear formulation of poli- of precolonial African communalism. cy. However, the history of the Africanist tradi- Furthermore, the BCM’s lack of interest in tion in South Africa does underline how the class mobilisation was manifested in the failure race-class conundrum consistently impinged of its trade union wing, the Black Allied upon extra-parliamentary opposition politics. Workers’ Union (BAWU), to make any head- The ‘pure’ Africanist nationalism of Lembede way. BAWU largely ignored bread-and-butter could not be sustained. The message had appeal worker issues, and was hardly involved at all in and exerted some influence in opposition cir- the growing strike activity of the early 1970s.18 cles. But the countervailing tendency of class After the government banned Black analysis and socialism was too strong to be Consciousness (BC) organisations in 1977, the spurned, especially as the PAC’s main support movement reconstituted itself with the forma- base lay among impoverished, marginalised tion of the Azanian People’s Organisation communities. Once again we see how the race- (Azapo) in 1978. At much the same time the class tension necessitated ideological adapta- single-minded emphasis on race was coming to tion and manoeuvring. be questioned within the BCM. A grouping There are obvious parallels – and differences within the movement argued that the goal of – between the history of Africanism and the psychological empowerment through racial BCM in South Africa. Both stressed the impor- assertiveness had largely been achieved, gain- tance of psychological liberation as the prereq- ing concrete expression in the 1976 uprising. uisite for building racial solidarity and unity, Marxism should therefore be no longer shunned which in turn was deemed to be essential for but rather incorporated into BC thinking. So effective political organisation and action. Azapo’s manifesto contained new elements: the Moreover, the BCM, like the Africanists, assimilation of class analysis, with a stress on would discover that a political and ideological the role of the black working-class; a central approach built purely upon a presumed racial place for the trade union movement; and the identity and consciousness would prove diffi- vision of a socialist future for South Africa. cult to sustain. More and more the BCM’s historic emphasis

173 Maylam on race came to be infused with socialist 3. THE CONGRESS TRADITION rhetoric. Blacks were described as ‘a race of Throughout its history the ANC has studiously workers’; and South Africa’s system of oppres- avoided adopting rigid ideological stances that sion and exploitation was redefined as ‘racial were either race-based or class-oriented. Before capitalism’.19 the 1950s the ANC drew its main support from This coalescence of BC ideology and class the African elite, whose interests the organisa- analysis gained further momentum with the tion was inclined to represent. It largely steered founding of the National Forum in June 1983. clear of working-class struggles. Moreover, This was a loose alliance of BC bodies, headed while in practice the ANC remained an exclu- by Azapo, and radical socialist organisations, sively African organisation at this time, it gen- with the Cape Action League at the forefront. erally eschewed racial mobilisation as a politi- The Forum issued its ‘Azanian Manifesto’, in cal strategy, notwithstanding the Africanism of which socialist principles were more apparent the CYL in the 1940s. than any strong BC influence. The black work- From the 1950s the ANC increasingly operat- ing class was recognised as the driving force of ed as a ‘broad church’, building alliances, the struggle; and a ‘socialist Azania’ was envis- accommodating different political tendencies, aged, ‘where the interests of the workers shall and refraining from a rigid racial exclusivism. be paramount through worker control of the The Congress Alliance of the 1950s reflected means of production, distribution and the ANC’s multi-racialism of the time. The exchange’.20 Freedom Charter was sufficiently vague and However, the struggle would still have to be idealistic, and open to such varied interpreta- pursued on the basis of racial mobilisation and tions, that it could satisfy (and dissatisfy) dif- solidarity, entailing the continued exclusion of ferent ideological groupings. There was grow- whites from participation. ing cooperation between the ANC and SACP; The National Forum represented a merging and the latter’s two-stage theory was the kind of radical nationalist and socialist groupings. It of compromise that served the ANC’s desire to stressed socialist principles and objectives, be an inclusive organisation that would not while continuing to recognise the salience of drive away supporters by defining itself too race as a potentially unifying agency in the pur- rigidly. suit of the struggle. The Forum can be seen as The ANC became more and more preoccu- another attempt to bridge the political and ideo- pied with promoting activism and furthering logical race-class divide through a process of effective resistance than with maintaining ideo- compromise, accommodation and adaptation. logical rectitude. As Anthony Marx has put it, Even so, the Forum was still characterised by ‘The Charterists defined the nation to ideological rigidity, rejecting any alliance with include all South Africans who did or could those who did not adhere fully to its socialist be convinced to oppose apartheid, united by principles and renouncing any negotiation or direct experience of oppression, pervasive compromise with the ruling regime. The Forum images, and symbols, in what Weber gener- thus tended to be exclusivist, failing to build a alised as a ‘specific sentiment of solidarity’. broad following and alienating some potential Rather than aim toward changing ideas supporters who might have provided funds and about being black, the Charterists tried to other resources. mobilise active resistance. Strategy replaced Indeed, the Forum’s impact was very limited, ideology as the main concern.’22 in contrast to that of its competitor, the United This approach was reflected in decisions taken Democratic Front (UDF), which adhered to the at the ANC’s Morogoro Conference in 1969, principles of the Freedom Charter (which had when it was resolved that non-Africans could been drawn up by the ANC and allied congress become members of the ANC (but could not sit organisations in 1956).21 And Azapo came to on its national executive). At the same time the be increasingly sidelined politically during the ANC reaffirmed both its commitment to the 1980s when the ANC/UDF were clearly in the Freedom Charter, and its prioritisation of the forefront. How, then, had the latter political national liberation struggle.23 However, in tendency managed to resolve the race-class accommodating different ideological tenden- dilemma? cies and a racially diverse membership, the

174 Maylam

ANC made itself vulnerable to internal discord sions and organisational failings. The BCM and factionalism. Yet as Luli Callinicos has also faded in the post-Biko era as organisations recently argued, the leadership style of Oliver like Azapo were pushed to the sidelines. The Tambo, President of the ANC from 1967 to Africanists and the BCM came to realise that a 1990, did much to paper over the cracks within purist race-based ideology that ignored or the ANC. Tambo was able to balance different rejected class considerations would have limit- tendencies with some skill. Tambo himself was ed appeal. So both tried eventually to weave a Christian, but he had great respect for com- socialist rhetoric into their ideology, but still munists. He accepted the SACP’s stress on failed to mobilise significant working-class class, but always placed emphasis on the support. Indeed, this was the great failure of national struggle. His own ideological position these movements – their inability to harness was not clearly defined or articulated, and class analysis to the strategy of racial mobilisa- indeed, it has been suggested that it was pre- tion so as to draw mass popular support. cisely his tendency to fudge issues that enabled The history of opposition before 1990 sug- him to hold the ANC together.24 gests, though, that the pursuit of a class-orient- This inclusivity also characterised the politics ed politics also had its pitfalls. This is well of the UDF in the 1980s. The UDF strove for a illustrated in the history of the CPSA/SACP. broad, united opposition, rather than for ideo- The CPSA had soon been forced to abandon its logical coherence. Its emphasis was on mass commitment to non-racial working-class unity mobilisation and action. To this end it built a in the face of racial divisions within the work- multi-class alliance. While the working class ing class, and to accept that class struggle could played a key role in many of its affiliated bod- not take precedence in a society where racial ies, the UDF encouraged sympathetic business oppression was the most urgent political issue. people to lend their support, and its own leader- From the time it adopted the ‘Native Republic’ ship was largely middle-class. As a conse- thesis in 1928, the party thus compromised on quence, the UDF had to avoid class rhetoric its political goals, but continued to abjure racial and the formulating of a clear-cut economic mobilisation as a political strategy. For much of policy as this would have alienated one or other its history the party was confounded by the of its constituencies. The movement sustained race-class dilemma, resulting in vacillation and its fragile unity around the common struggle inconsistency. The party failed to generate sig- against apartheid.25 nificant popular support, and achieved influ- ence only by entering alliances or engaging in a 4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PAST FOR THE more covert politics. PRESENT The divergent imperatives of race and class What conclusions can be drawn from this broad could give rise to hard-line posturing around overview? First, those movements that one pole or the other (the early CYL and BCM espoused an ideology based on race and resort- around race, for instance) but more often led to ed to racial mobilisation achieved some short- fudging or political accommodation. It was the term success but could not sustain their ANC who, more than other groupings, mas- momentum over a longer period. Both the CYL tered the politics of adaptation, equivocation, and the BCM emerged in similar contexts, at and compromise. This was both a strength and times when extra-parliamentary opposition was a weakness for the organisation. On the one either moribund (1930s and early 1940s) or hand, the ANC’s ‘broad church’ style enabled it heavily suppressed (mid-1960s). Each managed to expand its support base, as it could accom- to revitalise opposition, injecting new energy, modate varying political tendencies within its bringing in some fresh ideas, and helping to ranks. On the other hand, this style created the stimulate a more militant mood. However, potential for internal dissension and division. Africanist ideology was never able to win wide Divisions there have been, for instance over the support within the ANC, especially during the Freedom Charter, armed struggle, the role of 1950s when there was a growing rapproche- whites, economic policy, among other things, ment with the SACP. And the PAC, the eventu- but for the most part these have been transcend- al embodiment of Africanism, made little head- ed, contained or suppressed. way, largely because of its own internal divi- For much of the 20th century one unifying

175 Maylam factor was the shared hatred of racial domina- present? The central argument of this paper has tion. Surely, therefore, in the post-apartheid era been that the countervailing imperatives of race the internal divisions could be expected to and class afflicted opposition politics for much become more real and pronounced, with the of the 20th century. The legacy of this affliction race-class tension rising to the surface? So far it has not disappeared in the post-apartheid era. seems as though the ANC has managed to hold The ANC has maintained its accommodationist the different tendencies together by continuing political style in an attempt to contain these its political balancing act. As Howard Barrell imperatives and the divisions that arise from has put it: them. This is not to say that the present political ‘To the extent that Mbeki has engaged with dispensation is bound by the past (history-as- his party, it has been to tinker, manage, bal- bondage), but rather to stress that there are sig- ance its various factions and, occasionally, nificant continuities between the apartheid and to harangue ... One result of this ... is that post-apartheid eras. I agree wholeheartedly the party continues to be most things to with Roger Southall’s sentiment: ‘that the way most people: capitalist to some, socialist- forward for democracy and opposition in South inclined to others; Africanist to some, a Africa lies in transition to an issue-oriented and paragon of non-racial virtue to others.’26 ideologically based politics in which racial and Thus the ANC’s secretary general, Kgalema ethnic affinities play a backstage role’.28 But I Motlanthe, was recently able to make a vigor- remain doubtful about the prospects of this ous anti-capitalist statement that was thorough- transition occurring in the short term. The key ly out of tune with the party’s own economic issues of social and economic policy which policy.27 should produce an ‘ideologically based politics’ Many of the old debates, divisions and seem at present to be debated mainly within the ambivalence associated with the race-class ten- governing Tripartite Alliance. But the ANC’s sion have continued into the 1990s and beyond, ‘broad church’ style prevents these issues com- albeit in a different post-apartheid, post–Cold ing too much to the fore. It is as though the War, global economic context. But the politics ANC has in effect co-opted its potentially most of race still seems to outweigh the politics of challenging opponents, the SACP and the class. The persistence of racism in post- Congress of South African Trade Unions apartheid South Africa excites more media (Cosatu). Indeed, the main opposition parties – attention and arouses more anger, official and the Democratic Party (DP), the New National popular, than the maldistribution of wealth and Party (NNP), and the Inkatha Freedom Party continuing, worsening poverty. In political dis- (IFP) – are in closer agreement with the ANC course the much-used but ill-defined concept of on its neo-liberal economic policy than are the ‘transformation’ generally means changing the SACP and Cosatu. top personnel rather than transforming the An issue-based politics – and a politics in structures of society. Similarly the term ‘black which there would be a greater correspondence empowerment’ more often seems to mean mid- between parties and class interests – would dle-class advancement rather than upliftment of require a drastic (for the deprived. instance, ANC + DP + NNP + IFP vs SACP + Cosatu + PAC). One does not have to be a CONCLUSION soothsayer to say that this is not going to So what are the implications of all this for the happen.

176 Maylam

ENDNOTES

1) See, for instance, Aletta Norval’s com- 13) Ibid., p. 47; Gerhart, Black Power, p. 165. ment that ‘The race-class debate between 14) Ranuga, The New South Africa, pp. 79-84. liberals and neo-Marxists ... seems anti- 15) Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa quated from the point of view of theoreti- since 1945, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, cal developments in the 1980s and 1990s 1983), pp. 309-10; Tom Lodge, The Pan associated with the rubrics of post-struc- Africanist Congress, 1959-1990, in Lieb- turalism, deconstruction and post-colonial- enberg et al (eds.), The Long March, p. ity’. Aletta J. Norval, Deconstructing 118. Apartheid Discourse (London: Verso, 16) T. Karis and G. Gerhart (eds.), From 1996), p. 59. Protest to Challenge: vol. 5: Nadir and 2) Allison Drew, Events were breaking Resistance, 1964-79, (Pretoria: Unisa above their heads: Socialism in South Press, 1997), p. 294. Africa, 1921-1950, Social Dynamics, 17) David Hirschmann, The Black Conscious- Vol.17, No.1 (1991), p.57. ness Movement in South Africa, Journal 3) Ibid., pp. 59-60. of Modern African Studies, Vol. 28, No.1 4) David Everatt, Alliance Politics of a (1990), p. 7. Special Type: The Roots of the 18) Anthony W. Marx, Lessons of Struggle, ANC/SACP Alliance, 1950-1954, Journal (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, of Southern African Studies, Vol.18, No.1 1992), pp. 42-8, 58. (1992), pp. 20-7, 32-9; Thomas K. 19) Ibid., pp. 74,87; Hirschmann, Black Ranuga, The New South Africa and the Consciousness Movement, pp. 11-13. Socialist Vision, (New Jersey: Humanities 20) Marx, Lessons of Struggle, p. 278. Press International, 1996), p. 42. 21) Ibid., pp. 117-20, 129; Neville Alexander, 5) See, for instance, Stephen Ellis and Tsepo The National Forum, in Liebenberg et al Sechaba, Comrades Against Apartheid (eds.), The Long March, pp. 199-204. (London: James Currey, 1992). 22) Marx, Lessons of Struggle, pp. 238-9. 6) Joe Slovo, Beyond the stereotype: the 23) Ranuga, The New South Africa, pp. 57-9. SACP in the past, present and future, in 24) Luli Callinicos, and the Ian Liebenberg, Fiona Lortan, Bobby Nel, Politics of Class, Race and Ethnicity in the Gert Van der Westhuizen (eds.), The Long African National Congress of South March, (Pretoria: Haum, 1994). Africa, African Sociological Review, 7) Drew, Socialism in South Africa, pp. 51-2. Vol.3, No.1 (1999), pp. 143-8. 8) Robert Fine & Dennis Davis, Beyond 25) Marx, Lessons of Struggle, pp. 14-15, 120- Apartheid, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 7; Keith Gottschalk, United Democratic 1990), p. 62. Front, 1983-1991: rise, impact and conse- 9) Ibid., pp. 68-73. See also Bill Nasson, The quences, in Liebenberg et al (eds.), The Unity Movement Tradition: Its Legacy in Long March, pp. 190-2. Historical Consciousness, in Joshua 26) Howard Barrell, Year of lost chances for Brown, Patrick Manning, Karin Shapiro, Mbeki, Mail and Guardian, 2-8 June Jon Wiener (eds.), History from South 2000, p. 4. Africa, (Philadelphia: Temple University 27) At a May Day rally Motlanthe called on Press, 1991), pp. 147-9. union members to ‘intensely hate capital- 10) Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South ism and engage in a struggle against it’. Africa, (: University of Mail and Guardian, 12-18 May 2000. California Press, 1978), pp. 51-67, and 28) Roger Southall, Opposition in South Robert R. Edgar and Luyanda ka Msumza Africa: Issues and Problems (paper pre- (eds.), Freedom in our Lifetime, (Athens: sented at conference on ‘Opposition in Ohio University Press), 1996, pp. 21-9. South Africa’s New Democracy’, June 11) Gerhart, Black Power, pp. 130-2. 2000), p. 15. 12) Ranuga, The New South Africa, p. 42.

177 Race, Democracy and Opposition in South African Politics: As Other a Way as Possible

Gerhard Maré

Race, as racism and as racialism, has unsur- racial and non-sexist democracy, through a prisingly continued to plague South African ‘national democratic revolution’. political life. At the same time a commitment to The theorists Ernesto Laclau and Ronald non-racialism has been given little content. In Aronson, both of whom have commented on the absence of a clear policy directed towards democracy in South Africa, are useful referents such a desirable state of affairs, accusations of in this context. Laclau argues for the central racism and pervasive race thinking stand in the importance of democracy in providing direc- way of full democracy and effective opposition. tion to social change in any society. He also In addition, it allows the way for race populism introduces the issue of social identity and in political mobilisation. allows us, specifically through his protégée There is the familiar tale of a peasant who is Aletta Norval, to introduce ‘race’ into this dis- stopped by a traveller in a large car and asked cussion. the way to the capital. ‘Well,’ she replies, after In comments during a discussion on the pos- pondering the matter for a while, ‘if I were sibility of the achievement of socialism in you, I wouldn’t start from here.’1 South Africa, Laclau argued: ‘How do you think we should approach the ‘The democratic revolution is more funda- topic of race in this country (the United mental, it is a larger programme than States)? Clearly in some other way – in as socialism, which is one of its moments. I other a way as possible – because if ever see an arch of democratic revolution that there was an example of something not starts 200 years ago with the French working, this is surely it.’2 Revolution and expands, pushing the prin- ciples of equality and democracy into wider 1. DEMOCRACY and wider social relations. Socialism was How do we begin to address the central issues the attempt to expand the principle of of contemporary South African society (and do equality to the economic sphere – which is we agree on what these are)? How do we why I call it an internal moment of the assess what implications these have for democ- wider democratic revolution. With the new racy and opposition, once we have agreed upon social movements of our time, we see the them – especially in a society such as South principle of equality spread to other areas Africa, which is confronted by widespread of society – to the relations between sexes, poverty, massive inequality and unemploy- between races, between people with differ- ment, and what can broadly be described as ent sexual orientations and so on.’3 ‘multi-culturalism’ (or issues of social identity, Laclau argues that socialism can no longer be centrally that of ‘race’)? This writer believes thought of as the sole prerogative of the work- that we do have to start with democracy, for ing class, nor can democracy. Society is much that is, after all, what the struggle in South more complex than the progressive simplifica- Africa was about: the establishment of a non- tion into two fundamental social categories and

179 Maré groups of social agents expected by some contemporary societies) do not come together marxists. Within this complexity it can no in a social entity called class’.7 While these longer be just for the working class and an antagonisms are not resolved through parlia- intelligentsia or state-socialist bureaucracy to mentary politics, such formal processes are speak on behalf of ‘society’ and of ‘progress’. essential for the existence of democracy. It is as Instead we should recognise a multitude of sub- symbol of the centrality of democratic political ject positions such as ethnic groups, women, processes, as guardian of fair allocation of religious groups and so on, each with their own, resources, as restraint on the powerful, as inter- at times incompatible, demands and calls on rogator of what might otherwise be hidden social rights and for participation. processes, that parliamentary politics and a The problem that Laclau addresses elsewhere legitimate state play a central role. Such a state is what is to hold these ‘subject positions’ also ensures that the ‘rules of the game’ of together?4 What is to be the new universal that democracy, even in minimal form, are repro- does not suffer the same fate or carry the same duced to enable competition amongst groups.8 dangerous tendencies as previous mobilising The task of defending such a wider notion of and justificatory ‘meta-narratives’ such as a democracy – for instance one attached to ver- ‘civilising function’, ‘modernisation’, ‘the his- sions of socialism – is even more difficult than torical duty of the working class’ (and of those the constitutional guarantee of elections, as it who assumed the role of speaking for the work- relates to a pervasive ethos of the elements of ing class!), and anti-communism? ‘Democracy’ democracy, and not just to the electoral process is a strong contender as a universal, to provide that so easily sheds the disabled, the poor, illit- hegemony for particular struggles, a ‘sense of erate, the unorganised, rural and so on. belonging to a community larger than each of A similar expanded position on democracy, the particular groups in question’. Without such also starting with questions around and a com- an organising principle extreme particularism mitment to a project called socialism, is taken becomes the ‘universal’, or a ‘self-apartheid’ by Ron Aronson, who is an American political exists, and the potential for ‘paralysing political philosopher.9 He argues that the basic elements effects’ increases. The role for democracy within what is sometimes derogatorily exists, paradoxically, only because it is never described as ‘bourgeois liberal democracy’, are fully achievable. As Laclau claims: the essential minimum which has to be estab- ‘If democracy is possible, it is because the lished and safeguarded within any democratic universal has no necessary body and no society. However, in addition, the struggle necessary content; different groups, instead should be for what he calls democratic social- compete among themselves to temporarily ism, deliberately undefined (for reasons in large give their particularisms a function of part due to the collapse of ‘communist’ projects universal representation. ... It is this final in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but failure of society to constitute itself as also because this is a project that has to involve society – which is the same as the failure of people at all levels and in a multitude of situa- constituting difference as difference – tions). He chooses this approach for the stress it which makes the distance between the uni- places on democracy as an essential element in versal and the particular unbridgeable and, any project of social transformation, and on as a result, burdens concrete social agents socialism for ‘the very fact that no one [any with that impossible task which makes longer] knows exactly what it means’, demand- democratic interaction achievable.’5 ing that it ‘be debated, created, described and While abstract, the value of this approach lies explored, in theory and practice’.10 It is not in the inclusion of spheres other than the politi- possible to speak for socialism unproblemati- cal. They are integrated (but also allowed to cally. exist separately)6 through a wider concept of There are different ways in which this wider democracy than that allowed by the privileging project of democratisation can be sabotaged. of either the market or the working class as There are direct exclusions from participation, exclusive driving agents of social change, and such as that engineered by apartheid, with its certainly wider than parliamentary politics. As fragmented citizenship, justified through ‘sepa- Laclau puts it, ‘these (new) antagonisms (in rate development’, its gross misallocation of

180 Maré resources, and abuse of power; or through the homogeneity ... a vision of universality’. As crude suspension of democratic rights (coups, such, Norval concludes that insofar ‘as non- dictatorship, military rule, and so on). Or there racialism is engaged with continually, as a can be indirect exclusions or limitations: such finite political project, it offers a space of iden- as through illiteracy, poverty, some of the tification in which we can live in the tension effects of globalisation, economic restructuring, between the universal and the particular. This is but also through social discrimination and the space proper to a radically democratic and essentialisms, such as sexism, ‘traditional’ plural post-apartheid South Africa’.15 A stirring practices and values, and racism/racialism. This call, and apparently in line with the ‘unbreak- last mentioned aspect of contemporary South able thread’ within the struggle against African society is the main concern here. apartheid,16 and, therefore, apparently eminent- A point of entry is provided by Aletta ly achievable, located as it is in the constitution Norval’s study of apartheid11 and its implica- as well. tions for a post-apartheid South Africa.12 She The constitution that was inaugurated in 1996 writes that social identities are located, not in established a liberal democracy, with equality any essentialism but in the distinction of ‘us’ of citizenship, an enormous achievement after from an ‘other’ or from ‘others’.13 Such an centuries of colonialism, segregation and approach rejects primordialism or economistic apartheid. It affirms in the preamble ‘that South arguments for the class determination of ethnic- Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in ity, the social identity she deals with. This argu- our diversity’, and states as a founding provi- ment could also be extended to discount the sion the value of ‘non-racialism and non-sex- perception of racism and race thinking as hav- ism’. In the Bill of Rights it is written that nei- ing no existence, except as the ideological ther the state nor any person may ‘unfairly dis- reflection or in the service of class power. criminate directly or indirectly’ on grounds These boundaries of distinction, located within such as race, colour, gender, sex, ‘unless it is historical moments, are, therefore, of great established that the discrimination is fair’. In importance in understanding ethnic (and racial) addition, freedom of expression is curtailed identities. What would subvert the rigid and expressly in the case of ‘advocacy of hatred socially extensive boundaries of apartheid that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or reli- would be an insistence on ‘non-racialism’, gion, and that constitutes incitement to cause allowing the political space within which the harm’. particular struggles within the democratic uni- However, the practical realisation of the versal could take place: ANC’s decades-long commitment to non- ‘... the discourse of non-racialism has the racialism – also now a goal of the new society potential of acting as ... a new imaginary in as contained in the constitution – cannot be which the valourisation of closure and puri- achieved through statement or claim. It needs ty of identity characteristic of apartheid can coherent, concerted and coordinated policy and be countered without simply supplanting it practice. This is where the writer has previously with a new homogenising unity. This is so argued that both the inadequacy of the notion of for two reasons. The notion of non-racial- non-racialism in the history of struggle (as ism, first, contains at least potentially a articulated by activists and contained in theory) questioning of purity as the basis of identifi- and in present political practice, deny the prob- cation ... It stresses not the givenness and ability of such a project as that proposed by naturalness of forms of identification, but Norval.17 The failure of such a deliberately exe- their openness and fluidity ... Second, non- cuted project in the past, contradictory practices racialism also provides a horizon of identifi- and discourses, and the effective peripheralisa- cation which moves beyond divisions, tion into the obviousness (the common sense) towards a universalising discourse on of largely rhetorical claims, still stands in the unity.’14 [Emphases added.] way of addressing the issue now. It effectively As with Laclau’s argument on the non-attain- maintains the boundaries of apartheid, but now ability of democracy, so too non-racialism, if as mirror image, with the appearance of the the first notion is taken seriously, ‘will not be opposite, of satisfactory resolution. In addition, able to transform itself into a discourse of even in the field of apartheid’s ethnic policy it

181 Maré could be argued that the apparent defusing of even if these are not appropriate to the situa- the most important ethnic mobilisations (those tion. For example, blaming media coverage of of Afrikaners and some Zulu) is more a ques- corruption involving people who happen to tion of buying off a leadership than the result of have black skins as being due to subliminal deliberate policies. racism; immediately attributing the failure to secure a job to affirmative action policies; 2. NON-RACIALISM: NOT STRONG ENOUGH attributing driving behaviour to the colour of So what is ‘in as other a way as possible’? the driver. Sometimes it is necessary to restate the obvi- Racialisation is often the first refuge, not ous, to remind ourselves that the past lives on unexpectedly in a society such as South in more than the simplistic ways in which it is Africa’s, in order to address the need for mak- usually utilised and reconstructed. Sometimes a ing sense of everyday experiences. Racism is reminder of where we wished to be is also nec- racialisation of people and attributing negative essary to deal with the present and where we and/or inferior qualities to people, creating an are now heading. Memory is shaped by power, extreme hierarchy of values of ‘us’ and of the and the present is never without manipulation ‘other’. Racial domination/discrimination and of the past. Yet those memories are what we the like would then refer to practices, policies are. The obvious, then. or systems that employ notions of racially dis- South Africa was a racist, but also a racialist tinct groups to explain or justify those prac- society. That distinction is important to the tices. argument. Addressing racism is not to address It should be clear from this brief clarification the basis on which racism rests, namely racial- that racialism (and even racism) does not refer ism. And racialisation is not the same as to something that any particular set of people is racism. When I use the term race it will be to incapable of. In other words, the practices that refer to the outcome of what Miles describes as flow from racism may well relate directly to the process of ‘signification’.18 It involves two power imbalances in society, but this does not selections: first, ‘of biological or somatic char- exclude the powerless from holding notions acteristics in general as a means of classifica- that could be called racist (such as in the case tion and categorisation’; and, second, selecting of xenophobia, or as exhibited in the dehumani- specific bodily characteristics ‘as signifying a sation of the other in cases of ‘ethnic cleans- supposed difference between human beings’. A ing’). Powerlessness could well be an explana- third attribution could be added, that of attach- tory factor in certain cases of racism, even if it ing specific cultural traits or abilities or inabili- is much more difficult for the less powerful to ties to the races previously signified. Appiah’s act on racist ideas. notion of racialism then applies: namely racial- Numerous examples can be given of the lack ism is a term for the belief and acceptance: of content given to non-racialism during the hat there are heritable characteristics, pos- apartheid years, and even more of the racialisa- sessed by members of our species, which tion of the struggle against white oppression, allow us to divide them into small sets of and not just of the obviousness of racist (or races, in such a way that all the members of racialist) domination itself. This is the case these races share certain traits and tenden- whether we refer to the ‘thesis of colonialism of cies with each other that they do not share a special type’ (which inter alia advocated lib- with members of any other race ...’19 eration of black people from colonialism and its Within this perspective, non-racialism should effects prior to the establishment of a non-racial mean the rejection of racialism, of the existence society), debates on ‘the national question’, or of races as socially meaningful categories, and on ‘the national democratic revolution’. The not just non-racism or multi-racialism as it is overall effect, however, as advocated by then actually used just about all the time.20 It is in African National Congress (ANC) President the form of racialism that race thinking oper- Oliver Tambo directly, was the mobilisation of ates most extensively. Racialisation arises out black nationalism, a ‘black consciousness’, of the prior existence of racialism, as the against the ‘dominance of all white class-frac- process of interpreting events, actions, motiva- tions’.21 In this (understandable) perspective, tions, and so on, in common sense race terms, non-racialism was at best multi-racialism, or

182 Maré the acceptance of races as the fundamental the elite, now including new racialised role building blocks of society, the four spokes of models, that co-exists with calls for poverty the wheel of an existing and of a new society. alleviation.24 The notion of two ‘race’ wealth- Non-racialism, or the active denial of the exis- nations alluded to by President Mbeki, the pre- tence of objective categories called ‘races’, was sentation of black economic empowerment as mostly very far from perceptions of the nature alleviating poverty, all give the picture that the of society during the struggle against apartheid, race wrongs of the past are being acknowl- and is now equally far from being achieved. As edged, and implies that the class wrongs are Appiah writes, ‘its (the notion of race) absence being addressed simultaneously. It is here that, simply threatens to leave too vast a discursive for example, left criticisms of the government’s void’.22 An everyday life without the simplify- economic policy, Hein Marais’ discussion of ing (and, therefore, comfortable) common the limits to change, and Patrick Bond’s argu- sense of the existence of races is beyond easy ments around ‘elite transition’, become relevant grasp, and therein lies the power, the reality, of in claiming the right to opposition in the race. How much will we not have to shed, and democratisation of the economy.25 Within a to explain in alternative ways, if we reject the racialised political discourse it becomes possi- seeming obviousness of the existence of races ble for the economically and socially disadvan- and the tremendous ‘explanatory’ power that taged within race categories to be ignored, that implies! On the other hand, the acceptance whether deliberately or not. In effect, racialisa- of racialism, even while addressing some of the tion of the political arena and public discourse gross manifestations in racism (or, rather, in affects the wider democratisation of society. It racist practices), leaves democracy in perma- tends to close off demands and debate, and not nent potential crisis. This would, of course, be only on economic policy. the case with all essentialist and rigid notions of social identity, whether religious, ethnic or 3. RACE AND RACIALISED OPPOSITION whatever. There are other instances where racialisation That is why, when the struggle against plays a role in democratic practice; there major apartheid was said to have been consistently aspects can be considered here. First, and most informed by notions of non-racialism, the race obvious, is the racialised opposition, speaking card is still so available to politicians, and why for racialised or cultural minorities, such as people still largely make racialised choices. through the (Afrikaner) Freedom Front (FF), This is so for at least three reasons: the first is but also the (‘Indian’) Minority Front (MF), the obvious relationship between race and and those speaking for racialised groups, as has class, even though the growth of a black capi- been the case with ‘coloured politics’ in the talist and of a middle class is one of the most Western and Northern Cape. Second, there is significant deliberate social processes in con- racialisation of opposition, both formal and temporary South Africa. informal; and, third, racialisation of politics, The second reason is the predominance of deliberately or through the interpretations given race thinking by all citizens, located as all were to such moves by supporters. within the common sense ideological universe First, then, there are the parties that deliber- of apartheid;23 and the third is the undoubted ately continued with the fragmentation that extensive continuation of elements of racist characterised politics under apartheid, aiming thinking and practice, reflecting and reflecting for support from racialised constituencies and back on racialism. offering to protect their specific ‘rights’, from The terms within which the struggle over separation to simply representing difference. power takes place in South Africa, the terms of These parties fared badly during the 1999 elec- debate in society, the political ‘shaping’ of tions, losing considerable numbers of voters identity, have to be taken seriously in order to from those attracted during the 1994 vote. The advance democracy in all areas. In South Africa FF of General Constand Viljoen lost six of its the levelling of society is being unquestioningly nine seats in parliament, and the Afrikaner presented in race terms, removing much of the Eenheidsbeweging (AEB) returned only a sin- focus on the increasing inequalities, such as on gle Member of Parliament. Furthermore, the consumerism that continues to distinguish despite attempts at a wider appeal and much

183 Maré money, Louis Luyt’s Federal Alliance secured in less imaginative ways. The MF, on the other just two seats. hand, led by Amichand Rajbansi, has taken The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), a direct refuge with the ANC in one of several unprinci- continuation of the -based Inkatha pled moves in national politics since 1994. No movement and still overwhelmingly supported wonder that the MF came in for criticism from by isiZulu-speakers located in KwaZulu-Natal, people who were caught off guard when the seems to be a spent force within the electoral party they voted for against the ANC should process. Its effect is to be felt largely in its odd gleefully join it, and be as joyfully accepted ‘coalition’ with the ANC at national and into the latter’s very broad church! As with the provincial levels, its continued participation in IFP, the reception for the MF has exceeded the the government, and the ability to disrupt local bounds of necessity. Both these moves by the level political activity in that province through ANC reflected, in the only interpretation possi- on-going conflict with the ANC. Cultural poli- ble, race thinking as overriding political princi- tics continue through mobilisation of the ples. amakhosi (the chiefs), such as around munici- For the present, the organised politics of pal demarcation. But here too the lines between racialised fragmentation should decline in ANC and IFP are blurred. Indeed, the problem importance, at least as measured through slow- for the IFP (as well as the Pan-Africanist ly changing support for the largest parties in the Congress – PAC) is that the ANC has long formal political process. Reynolds has com- absorbed whatever they have had to offer as mented that ‘one of the positive signs of distinguishing features: African nationalism democratisation in South Africa is that the and race politics; seeing the development of a largest parties are slowly becoming more ethni- black (read African) bourgeoisie as a central cally integrated and inclusive at the voter brick in the wall of liberation;26 foreign invest- level’.28 It is ironic, then, that the other factors ment as the solution to growth and to the unem- of the frequent and widespread racialisation of ployment crisis; acceptance of Zulu nationhood society should show little sign of abating. On under a king, to mention just a few. the contrary, it seems to be on the increase, and Probably the most telling moment of very in many spheres such as sport, education, public crude racist politics since 1994 was industrial relations, and the recording of data at when, before the 1999 elections, the editor of every level of society. The wider support the IFP-owned newspaper Ilanga, Amos (reflecting the ‘demographics of society’) Maphumulo, accused whites and Indians of comes not from a steadily non-racialising soci- exploiting black South Africans in the land of ety, but from deliberately racialised political their birth, which ironically lost the IFP support campaigning and appeals – multiracialism, in from conservative . The effect. For instance, countless bureaucratic strongest condemnation was, however, reserved forms or documents (and not just those asked for Indians, with Maphumulo wishing for ‘a for by Employment Equity and Affirmative blessed woman who would give birth to Idi Action redress requirements) demand ‘race’, or Amin’ to solve the problem. Of course, every- euphemisms for race, to be indicated. Each of one in the political establishment distanced these confirm difference, rather than question themselves from his statements, and he apolo- or allow flexibility in social identification. gised. What was less expected was the confir- Second, there is the racialisation of existing mation by a range of people, including promi- parties in order to discredit them through nent clergy, of the general prevalence of such labelling. It is probably accurate, within the sentiments, and the warning that they should be conceptualisation of racialism suggested above, addressed.27 that such race thinking is a pervasive presence The PAC, which enjoys only a minimal par- in South Africa, and that, therefore, our actions liamentary presence, has featured in public not are frequently informed by such an organising for racialised politics but for its innovative principle of our cognitive universe. In this case highlighting of issues (such as corruption, it is more accurate to speak of mental pre-cog- social welfare and medical support for nition, or a cognitive schema, with racialism HIV/Aids sufferers) that are usually swept embedded in language itself, structured into our under the carpet by larger parties or dealt with ways of thinking of the world. An ideology of

184 Maré racialism, as story of what exists, what is desir- denied social engineering based on race, and able and what is possible, permeates the soci- accepted responsibility for a ‘targeted redress ety.29 Hence, it is probably accurate to racialise, of racial imbalances’, with Tony Leon counter- with a degree of relevance, many actions within ing that ‘it is immoral and impractical to ... the social, political and economic spheres of (take) steps that will again entrench race as the society in the sense of attributing a relevant central determinant of life chances in South motive of racialism (and maybe even racism) to Africa’.32 What is striking is the way in which such actions, suggestions, criticisms. However, Macozoma racialised Leon’s replies, by citing deliberate and continuous racialisation pre- the DP’s ‘opposition to a non-racial democra- cludes the possibility of non-racialism, as it is cy’ – although, to be fair, both parties toned based, in the first instance, on racialism. down their accusations as the interchange later Furthermore, it certainly serves to silence oppo- developed. sition rather than to advance the cause of non- More strident have been the accusations, racialism, especially as such cause remains emanating vigorously, but certainly not exclu- under-developed and certainly under- or even sively, from KwaZulu-Natal ANC spokesper- un-theorised. son Dumisani Makhaye, that the DP is a neo- The problem faced by the official opposition, Nazi party. It was then quickly taken up by the Democratic Party (DP), as well as the New ‘political science lecturer at the University of National Party (NNP), is that they carry with Zululand’, Jabu Mziliya, and then in quite rapid them a perceived double burden: first of ‘white- succession, at least in the KwaZulu-Natal ness’ in terms of support; and, second, of conti- papers, by Makhaye and, more coherently, by nuity, through previous participation, with the editor Kaizer Nyatsumba.33 political structures of the apartheid order. In the Mziliya mentioned the ‘neo-Nazi characteris- case of a significant proportion membership tics emerging within the DP’, Leon’s ‘zeal in and support, that promises to remain an accu- racial bigotry’, ‘scapegoating’ by the DP in a rate description (which is exactly where lay the way employed by Adolf Hitler against the efficacy of the thesis of colonialism of a special Jews (in Leon’s case the scapegoats were said type), for some time to come. But it begs the to range from the NNP’s Marthinus van question, each time that it is used, what the Schalkwyk to Amichand Rajbansi to Winnie implications of such labelling are, and what is Madikizela-Mandela). Mziliya also had criti- meant by it. In the case of participation, this cism for ‘Indian Muslims’, apparently for sup- shows a racialised selective application in porting the DP. Leon replied by calling itself, as the comments above on the IFP and Mziliya’s contribution ‘hate-speech, pure and the MF indicate. In these latter cases the politi- simple’. Makhaye accused the DP of fighting cians, and their supporters have simply been ‘a rearguard action to try and preserve the exonerated from the sins of past participation in essentials of apartheid’, ‘true to its racialistic apartheid institutions due to a shared race iden- vision’ and then asked rhetorically, ‘Whether tity (specific or ‘generic’, in the language of the fascism will not arise in South Africa because new South Africa), whatever their past scur- of the DP or in spite of it is open to debate’ rilous behaviour. (sic). Finally, we may note Makhaye’s use, in There are a large number of examples of the provincial legislature, of a ‘play’ to draw racialised assault on the DP in terms that disal- attention to Leon’s Jewishness. It is not clear low it any role in effective parliamentary oppo- how this fits with accusations of neo-Nazism, sition, and even existence within the political except that it appears that the purpose of terrain.30 I will mention only two: the accusa- labelling over-rides any need for logical consis- tion of neo-Nazism, and the synonymity of ‘lib- tency. eralism’ and ‘racism’. One followed publica- Use of another couplet-label is similarly rele- tion of a DP document ‘The corruption of trans- vant. For example, in an interview with Hanlie formation’, which accused the government of Retief in Rapport, Enoch Sithole, then head of crudely racialising affirmative action policies the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s and in addition advancing largely well-off mid- (SABC) radio and television news, played the dle class people connected to the ANC.31 In race card against ‘white liberals’ in the media response, the ANC’s Saki Macozoma both alleging that Govin Reddy (an ‘Indian’), being

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‘closer to white than to black’, was their choice consists of ‘the principle of articulation of its as SABC group executive as he had ‘longer constituent interpellations’.36 So nationalism, hair’ than an African candidate! , for example, is not simply a bourgeois mobilis- ANC chief whip, employed similarly crude ing strategy, but has to be analysed within the labelling: ‘Tony Leon’s brand of right-wing lib- full articulation with other elements, such as eralism is a clever way of protecting white priv- class and gender. Laclau utilises the notion of ilege and racism ...’; ‘The new South African populism as being located in the ‘people/power racist therefore does not wear an (AWB) uni- bloc contradiction’, an approach subsequently form ... No, they can come in baggy Italian adapted by John Saul for the African context. suits and upper-middle-class English Saul argues that the blocs, in colonial situa- accents’.34 Readers are also reminded of a heat- tions, are presented within a ‘center-periphery ed debate between Human Rights Commission contradiction’, within which mobilisations as chair Barney Pityana and Professor Dennis nation or as ethnic group are possible, deliber- Davis in 1996 which, through its very public ately denying the validity of class interests and and relatively long duration, served to make divisions.37 available the ‘liberal’ label as racist, conserva- In South Africa, it could be argued, the daily tive, and nostalgic for apartheid. reality of apartheid as well as the rather more Third, we need to note the mostly unques- descriptive than analytical ‘theory’ of ‘colonial- tioning racialisation of politics by parties which ism of a special type’ (‘internal colonialism’), would otherwise claim non-racialism: both the and the more nationalistic version of the NNP and the ANC, especially in their electoral ‘national democratic revolution’, have inter- assault on coloured voters in the Western Cape; nalised (to the social formation) and inextrica- all parties in trying to attract Indian South bly racialised the contradictions noted by African voters in KwaZulu-Natal; and in some Laclau and Saul. The failure to give content to appeals to white voters.35 This seems to go a commitment to non-racialism, especially beyond using such an approach as a deliberate, within the ‘race-class’ debate, has left the delib- albeit cynical, tactic, but rather to reflect racial- erate employment of racialised mobilisation ism/race thinking as ‘common sense’. A proper during the years of struggle available to politi- study of the ‘banal’ racialisation of potential cians.38 This means that a race populism supporters, and of all citizens (especially of remains a real possibility in contemporary ‘Indian’ South Africans), in everyday life, South Africa, even a probability as one would reveal the absence of any real under- response to growing resentment at the inability standing of ‘diversity’ with its implied recogni- to fulfil demands for redress and social devel- tion of the fluidity of social identities. What opment. this means is that those racialist social cate- A democratic society has to tread the fine gories remain easily available as political cate- line between ‘diversity’ (diversification) and gories for the purposes of mobilisation. ‘difference’ (differentiation).39 In South Africa Mbeki racialised class (TV news SABC 3, we have, to date, been much more successful in May 1, 2000) when he observed, ‘there are two reinforcing difference than in creating a flexi- nations in South Africa, one black and poor, bility of identification, including those of and the other white and relatively well-off’. shared values and commitments. We have for- While this may be true as a rough description, it mally acknowledged diversity but peripher- avoids addressing the government’s failure to alised it as policy, and certainly never given it tackle this issue, and certainly avoids the the public conceptual clarity to distinguish it increasing gap within South Africa between the from difference, with the latter confirming par- black rich and the poor, as well as the growing allel communities (of race, ethnicity, religion immiseration of the poor. What it silences for and so on). The way to a society, within which the listener and the reader is complexity, democracy provides the always-unattainable, process, and class dynamics. What it confirms yet nonetheless cohesion-providing, universal, is race populism. remains dangerously elusive unless non-racial- Laclau argued some years ago that the ‘class ism is properly addressed. If, however, we are character of an ideology is given by its form to remain a multi-racial society, then we have and not by its content’. The form of an ideology to find ways of regulating race relations, away

186 Maré from the extremes of apartheid, the previous ranging from Afrikaner and Zulu, to Hutu and policy based on such a representation. As Steve Serb ethnicities and nationalism, not to have to Fenton notes: labour this point. The coherence offered by ‘The demise of the sociological idea of common sense thinking on ‘shared human ‘race relations’ has been slow but certain. experience’ does not question ‘the alleged As a phrase in popular discourse it retains a toughness of the boundary that has been drawn meaning as signifying the better or worse between ourselves and others’. What is state – the presence or absence of ill-feeling required is an approach that ‘may prompt us to – of relations between people perceived as doubt that boundary’s natural preordained char- different. But it founders on the analytic acter’.43 ambiguity of the term ‘race’ implying as it The heavy hand of the past obviously, lives does people who are inescapably different on. It would be truly a miracle if it did not. and between whom relations are essentially What is of concern then to social scientists and problematic.’40 those concerned with democracy in South That remains the on-going legacy of racialism. Africa are the deliberate and unquestioning, That legacy (still) largely informs politics in and not the unintended, continuities with social South Africa as we enter the twenty-first centu- identities of the past, and the failure to devise ry. policies that move beyond structural adaptation to address racialism and not remain with just CONCLUSION: RACIALISED POPULISM? ad hoc concern with racism. Racism stands in the way of democracy, The class/race debate lives on, even though it because it denies the equality of citizens, and is hardly addressed as such since 1994. A start- demeans fellow human beings. I would go fur- ing point might be the statement by Mbeki that ther, though, and argue that racialism also South Africa consists of ‘two nations’, the one makes democracy impossible, unless in an poor and black, and the other rich and nearly all increasingly regulated society, for it works with white. What was he saying, other than the obvi- notions that society is composed of fundamen- ous, and against what background could (or tal biological building blocks, with attendant maybe even should) this statement be read? characteristics of unique cultures and even abil- Within such a simplifying racialised world that ities. This is not to argue that non-racialism will ignores class and other differences (such as of ever be achieved, but that, as in the case of the gender), only the word of the strong will be unattainable democracy, it should be a deliber- heard. Rather than addressing the inequalities ate societal goal. Laclau, in his perception of of society, class will speak on behalf of race. what is necessary to counter the dangerous uni- Steven Friedman pointed out recently that versals of the past, argues for fluidity in soci- ‘tackling poverty is too important to be left to ety. He finds that fluidity in the notion of smart politicians and managers who, without a democracy, which both he and Aronson extend strong democracy are likely to hear only beyond parliamentary politics to the economy whatever the best organised groups among (or democratic socialism). Racialism, as Norval apartheid’s victims want them to hear. Poverty proposes, prevents that fluidity. Worse, it will gain the attention it deserves only when allows populist mobilisation around apparently our democracy is deep enough to hear the ‘clear cut social identities’, describing ‘the poor’.44 world in a coherent way’.41 Such simplifying I would suggest that the context of the con- identity need not be offered only by populism, tinued racialisation of South African society but also by religion, for example. Laclau cannot but be the continuation provided by the warned against the assertion of difference by explicit or implicit utilisation of the notion of various groups (referring specifically to ethnic ‘colonialism of a special type’, with its clear, and cultural groups) as the ‘route to self- and hence unproblematic, divide into white set- apartheid’.42 The more ‘coherent’ (within its tlers and the black indigenous population. The own internal logic of primordialism or biology) race epithet in the two nations classification is, the group identity is that is being defined , the therefore, descriptively, quite correct, but ana- easier it is to find ‘traitors’ to the cause. There lytically static and inadequate to the demands are many studies of how this is accomplished, of understanding the dynamics of a South

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African society that has to place itself within gle..., a new “language” of unity and deference rampant international capitalism, and growing was needed, one that resonated among the dif- internal divisions between rich and poor, also ferent layers and interest groups that constitute black rich and all poor. Within this perspective, the ANC’s constituencies. ... (Mbeki’s) the continued enrichment of the black middle and updating of the African nationalist dis- class and bourgeoisie does not serve as a con- course of the late 1940s and early 1950s ring tradiction to the two-nations theory, as black loudly in a racist and unequal society’.46 Such a people, of whatever class position, have already ‘language’ stands in the way of oppositional been homogeneously defined as ‘the poor’.45 politics (as it does in a wider democratic and The project of race populism has continued. critical context), as well as obstructing an Hein Marais has noted that with the fading of analysis necessary for the reconstruction of the the ‘unifying impetus of anti-apartheid strug- dynamics of South African society.

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ENDNOTES

1) Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s 13) There is no Zuluness without an aware- House: Africa in the Philosophy of ness of those who are not Zulu. See Culture (New York and Oxford: Oxford Gerhard Maré, Brothers Born of Warrior University Press, 1992), p.26. Blood (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1992), p.20. 2) US comedian Fran Lebowitz in an inter- 14) Norval, Thinking Identities, p.68. view, published in Vanity Fair, October 15) Norval, Thinking Identities, pp.68-69. 1997. 16) Julie Frederikse, The Unbreakable 3) Ernesto Laclau Socialism Goes Off the Thread: non-racialism in South Africa Beaten Track, in Work in Progress, 90 (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1990). (1993), p.34. 17) Gerhard Maré, Race thinking and thinking 4) Ernesto Laclau, Universalism, about race, paper presented to conference Particularism and the Question of Identity, on New African Perspectives: Africa, in Edwin N Wilmsen and Patrick McAllis- Australia and the wider world, Perth. ter (eds.), The Politics of Difference: 1999. Ethnic Premises in a World of Power 18) Robert Miles, Racism (London: Rout- (Chicago, Ill. and London: University of ledge, 1989), pp.69-73. And see Stuart Chicago Press. 1996), p.49. Hall’s .The Work of Representation, in 5) Laclau, Universalism, pp.58-59. Stuart Hall (ed.), Representation: Cultural 6) See also Jo Beall’s, Valuing Difference Representations and Signifying Practices and Working with Diversity, in Jo Beall (London: Sage, 1997). (ed.), A City for All: Valuing Difference 19) Appiah, In My Father’s House, p.13. and Working with Diversity (London: Zed 20) Of course, it could validly be argued that Press). non-racialism is impossible for as long as 7) Laclau, Socialism Goes Off the Beaten past and present discrimination based on Track, p.36. racialised policies holds. However, if we 8) See, for example, Norberto Bobbio, The do not examine alternative ways of Future of Democracy, translated by Roger addressing inequality and/or if we do not Griffin (London: Polity Press, 1987), simultaneously find the deliberate means pp.24-26. of subverting race thinking, then non- 9) Ronald Aronson, Is Socialism on the racialism remains a rhetorical device. Agenda? a Letter to the South African 21) Van Diepen, The National Question, p.9. Left, Transformation, 14 (19910, pp.1-23. Also see Tambo quoted in Luli Callinicos, 10) Aronson’s ‘letter’ warns against the possi- Oliver Tambo and the politics of class, ble legacies of the ANC’s and internal race and ethnicity in the African National movements’ necessary political practices Congress of South Africa, African under apartheid repression: ‘in-group loy- Sociological Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1999), alty and coherence’, suspicion of dissent, pp.130-151. both internally and publicly expressed, 22) Kwame Anthony Appiah , The Conser- and decision-making by leadership, with vation of ‘Race’, in Black American the inviting prospect of continuing as Literature Forum, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1989), ‘cadre organisations with a passive mass pp.37-60. base of support’. 23) See, recently, Deborah Posel, Race, ‘com- 11) Aletta Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid mon sense’ and a new form of state: racial Discourse (London: Verso, 1996). classification in apartheid South Africa, 12) Aletta Norval, ‘Thinking Identities: paper presented to conference on New against a Theory of Identity’, in Edwin N. African Perspectives: Africa, Australia Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (eds.), and the wider world, Perth, 1999. The Politics of Difference: Ethnic 24) The call by Constitutional Court judge Premises in a World of Power (Chicago, Arthur Chaskalson for the implementation Ill. and London: University of Chicago of the constitutional commitment to rights Press, 1996). such as those to housing, confronts square-

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ly not only the allocation of state funds, Engendering Democracy (London: Polity, but also the processes of decision-making 1991). and questions about control of power 33) Daily News, 23 July 1999; 26 July 1999; (Sunday Independent, 21 May 2000). 25 August 1999, respectively. 25) Hein Marais, South Africa: Limits to 34) Rapport, 23 May 1999. Yengeni, The Change (London: Zed Press; Cape Town: rightward shift of the liberals, in Mail & University of Cape Town Press, 1998); Guardian, 30 April-6 May 1999. Patrick Bond, Elite Transition: from 35) See, for example, Tom Lodge, The Apartheid to Neo-liberalism in South African National Congress, in Andrew Africa (London: Pluto Press; Scottsville: Reynolds (ed.), Election ’99 South Africa: University of Natal Press). from Mandela to Mbeki, pp.77, 81. 26) It cannot but remind of Buthelezi’s ‘wall 36) Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in of black nationalism’ appeal, within which Marxist Theory: Capitalism Fascism he squarely placed the bricks of achieve- Populism (London: Books, ments of black business in the KwaZulu 1977), pp.159, 160. bantustan. 37) John Saul , The Dialectic of Class and 27) Gerhard Maré, The Inkatha Freedom Tribe, in his The State and Revolution in Party, in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), Election Eastern Africa (New York: Monthly ’99 South Africa: from Mandela to Mbeki Review Press, 1979), p.401. (Cape Town: David Philip; London: James 38) For a discussion of the ‘national question’ Currey; New York: St Martin’s Press, see, for example, Maria van Diepen (ed.), 1999). Out of this incident rose the The National Question in South Africa ‘Indian-African conference’ held to (London: Zed, 1988), where we find a address ‘race relations’ in the province, in clear acknowledgement of the two race 2000. blocs of colonialism of a special type – see 28) Andrew Reynolds, The Results, in his Van Diepen’s introduction, p.9. edited Election ’99 South Africa: from 39) See Beall, Valuing Difference. Mandela to Mbeki, p.181. 40) Steve Fenton, Ethnicity: Racism, Class 29) See Göran Therborn, The Ideology of and Culture (London: Macmillan, 1999), Power and the Power of Ideology p.ix. (London: Verso, 1980), p.18. Also Patrick 41) Ernesto Laclau, Socialism’s Identity Wright, On Living in Old Country: the Crisis, Work in Progress, 91 (1993), p.36. National Past in Contemporary Britain 42) Laclau, Universalism, p.35. (London: Verso, 1985). 43) Zygmunt Bauman, Thinking sociological- 30) The June 2000 decision of the NNP and ly, in Anthony Giddens (ed.), Sociology: the DP to amalgamate into the Democratic Introductory Readings (London: Polity, Alliance drew virulent race-based accusa- 1997), p.18. tions, especially from the ANC and MF. 44) Steven Friedman, SA’s Poor lack effective 31) Financial Mail, 26 February 1999. voice, in Mail & Guardian, 2 June 2000. 32) Of course this debate is not confined to 45) See Sunday Independent (4 June 2000), in issues of race. For a more thoughtful con- which David Attwell argues very much tribution on the difficulties of any process the same point. of redress than that which is usually the 46) Sunday Independent, 4 June 2000. case in South Africa, Anne Phillips

190 Reflections on the Politics of Minorities, Race and Opposition in Contemporary South Africa

Ivor Sarakinsky

This discussion on the politics of minorities, past to their service, borrowing from them race and opposition suggests that there is a names, battle slogans, and costumes in fault-line that cuts through attempts to con- order to present this new scene in world struct a South African nationalism in the post- history in time-honoured disguise and bor- transition period. Minorities are not defined in rowed language.’ terms of race. Instead culture, tradition, reli- Karl Marx gion and language are used to identify different groups in the society who all have equal status. INTRODUCTION This conflicts with the conception of minorities It is no longer fashionable to introduce a dis- in the realm of politics where electorally deter- cussion of matters political with a citation from mined smaller parties do not have the same Marx. However, there is wisdom in his writ- status as the majority party. More importantly, ings that is relevant to societies that have expe- democratic minorities are excluded from par- rienced the process of change from an authori- ticipating in the governing of the country there- tarian regime to a democratic polity. In his by preventing minority interests from impact- Introduction to The Eighteenth Brumaire of ing upon national policy. It is possible – using Napoleon Bonaparte, Marx alerts us to the conceptual ideas present in Hegel’s political emergence of radical and innovative approach- philosophy and the theory of rational choice – es to the reorganisation of social life while the to reconcile the politics of ‘cultural’ and ‘polit- old system is both decaying and being tran- ical’ minorities. This means that opposition in scended. Yet, Marx goes on to show, despair- the context of South Africa should not take an ingly, that just as societies are on the brink of adversarial form. Instead, both the majority transforming themselves, they hanker after old and minority parties can benefit by adopting a habits and resuscitate them with a fervour that cooperative rather than a conflictual mode of obstructs true change. It is almost as if Marx is political conduct. saying that when societies transform them- ‘Men make their own history, but they do selves, they generate new ideas on how things not make it as they please; they do not should be but retreat at the last minute from make it under self-selected circumstances, being truly revolutionary, perhaps out of fear of but under circumstances existing already, the unknown, and instead embrace the past and given and transmitted from the past. The its familiarity. In an important respect, this is tradition of all dead generations weighs what has happened in South Africa in the post- like an Alp on the brains of the living. And transitional period. It is precisely on the man- just as they seem to be occupied with revo- ner in which parties conduct themselves that a lutionising themselves and things, creating return to old modes of political action is evi- something that did not exist before, precise- dent. To bring about democracy, parties had to ly in such epochs of revolutionary crisis change the way they interacted with each other, they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the realising that no matter how strong or weak

191 Sarakinsky they were, they depended on each other. This understood within the realm of politics as citi- resulted in a form of political conduct that was zens support parties who they believe will best multi-dimensional; it was both conflictual and redress past inequalities or protect them from cooperative. Now that the transition is almost punitive action based on their past advantage. over, conflict predominates and it appears as At the same time, voters make choices based on though the parties now take each other and their ethical as well as utilitarian criteria, thereby mutual achievements for granted. As a result, supporting or opposing parties that defend or politics in South Africa now is more about object to the principle of distributive justice. In combating opponents and less about accommo- an important sense, political allegiance in South dating those with different interests and values. Africa is determined by the legacy of the past and the concomitant hope of betterment or the 1. THE FAULT LINE IN SOUTH AFRICAN fear of redistribution. For this reason, race is an NATIONALISM integral part of political discourse in South This change in political culture, from inter- Africa in that party interests and voter choices dependence to realpolitik, also exposes a fault are connected to past categories and their con- line in the organisation of political life in South sequences. Clearly, race in this sense can be Africa. At the level of culture, religion and eth- used and abused: it is just to use race as a crite- nicity South Africans are, in Archbishop ria for redressing past injustice;2 it is not just to ’s felicitous phrase, the accuse opponents of being racists in order to ‘Rainbow Nation’. They are a single social deflect criticism;3 and it is disingenuous to hint organism with diverse components that are at fears that some races might have in order to equal in status. Any community, no matter how muster support.4 small, has the right to practice its culture, tradi- In a significant way, the politicisation of race tions and religion as a member of the South illuminates another level of life in South Africa African nation. At this level, the idea of the – the realm of the political. Alas, at this level, interdependence of diverse identities and values the value of interdependence, painfully con- has survived the transition and is reinforced in a structed during the years of transition, has been recently unveiled new national Coat-of-Arms jettisoned in favour of competition and the with the motto written in an extinct San lan- belief that by stressing the differences between guage meaning ‘people who are different join groups and parties is the only successful way to together’. Moreover, the new national symbol win and hold popular support. In the realm of consolidates themes in the final Constitution politics, conflict and insularity have replaced and its Bill of Rights that make it possible for cooperation and interdependence as the domi- individuals to protect and preserve their tradi- nant values with the implication that, unlike in tional ways of life within the ambit of the plural the spheres of culture, religion, language, eth- and diverse South African nation. In respect of nicity and tradition, size counts and it counts ‘cultural’ (for want of a better term) diversity, absolutely. Parties that hold a simple majority South Africa’s constitution goes beyond classi- have the power to speak on behalf of the cal constitutions such as the United States of ‘Rainbow Nation’. Moreover, such parties also America’s as it protects minorities that are not constitute the government and govern on behalf the product of a democratic process. In this of all even though they only have a mandate to regard, South Africa’s new dispensation is sim- do so from many, not the whole. If the principle ilar to Canada’s.1 of ‘those who are different join together’ is But this definition of the South African applied in the realm of politics, then minorities nation precludes race as culture, tradition, reli- would not be relegated to the sidelines, to being gion and language transcend the old criteria of an opposition, but they would be an integral skin colour and physical appearance. This does part of the nation’s body politic, participating in not mean that race is not a factor in the fabric government and ensuring minority representa- of the South African nation. As life opportuni- tion at the most important executive level. ties in the old system were distributed on the Instead of government being the majority party, basis of statutory racial categories, so do the it would be a complex union of political forces, patterns of advantage and disadvantage contin- opinion and interests. If this were to happen, ue in the new. For this reason, race is best then there would be no fault line running

192 Sarakinsky through South Africa’s attempt to articulate a majoritarianism, culminates in a government new nationalism. The tension, then, that charac- that represents a faction of the nation, not the terises South African national life might be whole of the nation. As minorities are excluded stated thus: ‘We are all equal and interdepen- from being part of the government, the domi- dent, except in the “kingdom of politics”’. nant faction rules on their behalf even though it has neither their support nor their consent. As a 2. MINORITIES AND DEMOCRACY result of this, the government violates the Immediately, the schism between the two organic complexity of the national fabric and is dimensions of South African nationalism – the therefore doomed to endless cycles of violence. cultural and political respectively – conflict This critique of representative democracy with the very meaning of democracy. At its informs Hegel’s understanding of the Jacobin most basic meaning, democracy is about testing ‘Terror’ where all forms of diversity were elim- the will of citizens who select candidates who inated in post-revolutionary France.8 represent their interests in public institutions.5 In criticising representative democracy in this As a result of this basic decision-rule, parties, way, Hegel is alerting us to the danger of after an election, cannot be equal. However, Rousseau’s political philosophy based on the this does not mean that there is a clash with the idea of a ‘general will’.9 How is such a ‘Will’ principle of democracy if smaller parties were, established, and on what basis might individual in accordance with a set rule rather than a or political parties claim to embody such a majority party’s discretion, to be included in will? For Hegel, government is not about an government. In this regard, there is a major absolute national consensus, but about objecti- shift from the 1994 negotiated interim Constitu- fying diversity at the constitutional and institu- tion (Sections 84, 88, 89, 95)6 where minorities, tional levels of the state so that an issue-based determined by the democratic process, had a consensus can be forged. For him, all classes constitutional right to be represented propor- have statutory rights to representation in the tionally in the executive, to the 1996 final state through delegates and can participate in Constitution where such parties may be invited discussing and deciding matters of national into a coalition at the discretion of the majority importance. This approach to representation party (Section 91).7 In an important sense, this institutionalises diversity in a static, statutory change in the ratification of the final Constitu- way without violating the principle of democra- tion marked a shift in expectation and a desire cy. The important point here is that different for an adversarial, as opposed to cooperative, interests are brought together statutorily on the mode of political conduct. However, theoreti- bases of cooperation and conflict in a way cally, it is possible to demonstrate that a coop- whereby no group is excluded from being part erative and inclusive political system based on of the government. Delegates are mandated by statutory coalitions – irrespective of the size of classes to represent their interests at the heart of the parties – is not incompatible with democra- the state and they deliberate amongst each other cy. More importantly, it will also be shown that on pressing issues and, through reasoned argu- such a mode of conduct is not only in the best ment and clashes of interest, formulate policy interests of the South African nation, it is also that reflects the interests of the nation as a in the best individual interests of the cooperat- whole. ing parties. This ‘corporatist’ theory of democratic inclu- The problem of either justifying the exclu- sion cannot be defended in modern society sion from or inclusion of minority parties in where the value and practice of elections with government within the parameters of democra- representatives being accountable to their elec- cy is not-so-incontrovertible in the annals of tors is entrenched in contemporary democratic political theory. The most powerful critic of culture. However, the idea of statutorily includ- representative democracy, G.W.F. Hegel, ing diverse parties into a government represen- developed his attack and alternative just after tative of the nation as a whole does not chal- the birth of modern representative democratic lenge accepted democratic values so long as systems in the early part of the 19th century. such inclusion is based upon the principle of Essentially, Hegel argued that representative proportionality. Moreover, minority parties democracy, premised on the principle of cannot have entrenched veto powers over the

193 Sarakinsky majority as is the case in consociational consti- and more importantly, the parties that negotiat- tutional theory10 as this obstructs the core prin- ed the interim and final Constitutions appear ciple of modern democracy. This does not not to have fully grasped the value of the coop- mean that minority parties are powerless in the erative government as set out in the former. If government as will be shown shortly. Thus, this is made explicit, then a defence of the prin- political parties are incorporated into the gov- ciple of joint rule might lead to a rethink of the ernment in terms of a constitutional right rather role of opposition in South Africa. than at the discretion of a majority party on the The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a model of level of support that they receive from the elec- political behaviour in South Africa torate. Crucial to this conception of democracy is the acceptance of the importance of elections PLAYER X as a mechanism for periodically testing the will of the people. However, it goes further than Cooperate Defect conventional constitutional theory that argues for the protection of losers – minorities – in an Cooperate ongoing and regulated political contest.11 In this alternative model, political minorities are (3;3) (-5;5) not relegated to the sidelines of the political system attempting to play a critical, opposition-

al role. Instead, they are part of the government PLAYER Y and thereby have the ability to influence deci- (5;-5) (1;1) sions at the executive and departmental levels. This makes it possible for the government to Defect reflect the complexity of the nation that it gov- erns. This is precisely the model of democracy The best way to illustrate this principle is that was set out in the 1994 interim Constitu- through a discussion of the Prisoners’ Dilemma tion that made a Government of National Unity (PD) (as set out in the diagram above), an (GNU) possible for two years after the first heuristic device designed to illustrate the possi- fully democratic election in South Africa. More ble collective outcomes of numerous actors’ importantly, such a model of democracy mir- individual, strategic choices.12 No single actor rored the ‘cultural’ conception of the South determines the outcome of an interaction with African nation in that it entrenched the princi- others, and the outcome is the combined effect ple of an organic unity of diversity in the realm of all the choices. Instead of discussing this of politics. device in detail, a few simple points need to be In 1996, the GNU collapsed when the for- made. First, we assume that actors are rational merly ruling National Party (NP) chose to with- in the sense that they make choices to maximise draw and pursue a more adversarial approach in their self-interest. The model does not assume an attempt to bolster its support base. At the altruism, but accepts that actors will make same time, the final Constitution, ratified in strategic choices, based on available rather than 1996, abolished the clauses allowing for statu- perfect information, to get the most they can tory multi-party representation in government. out of a given situation. Second, the PD identi- In this context, it is fair to ask the question: fies specific conditions under which it is advan- ‘Why defend or even discuss political ideas that tageous for the actors to act egoistically or self- have been sublated in practice?’ The first ishly. Essentially, it is better to defect on anoth- response is that the final Constitution allows er’s cooperation in a one-off interaction where the majority party to invite parties to govern the parties will not meet again. Now, what the with it. Thus, a coalition government is possi- PD shows in this situation is that when both ble on the basis of political pragmatism. parties act rationally, they simultaneously try to However, such a coalition ought to be based on defect on the other’s cooperation. This leads to statutory right if the principle of ‘unity in cul- the worst possible outcome in terms of the par- tural diversity’ is to become compatible with ties’ attempts to maximise their utility. This political diversity as a means of defining and kind of situation is referred to as a ‘zero-sum’ objectifying a South African nation. Secondly, or ‘mini-max/maxi-min’ interaction. What the

194 Sarakinsky one gains the other loses, while the one party’s action that is multi-dimensional based on inter- best outcome is the other party’s worst and vice dependence, conflict as well as cooperation, versa. The key point to come out of this is that will be mutually advantageous in contrast to adversarial conflict – strategic choices aimed at zero-sum conflict where both actors tend to conquering opponents – more often than not, bring about their worst outcome. Second, in leads to unintended outcomes where both par- ongoing interactions, members of parties build ties are worse off than before. In adversarial relations with each other based on trust. As contexts, conflict is zero-sum in that the parties people get to know each other, they institute see no room for compromise and each thinks conventions that stabilise their mutual expecta- that it can gain an advantage at the other’s tions of each other and this reinforces coopera- expense. tion.16 If actors know that concessions will be The third issue that emerges from this discus- reciprocated, then more concessions will be sion of the PD is of crucial importance to the made making mutual benefit possible in the defence of cooperative government as already short-, medium- and long-term. The longer the set out. The PD identifies the specific condi- interaction, the more trust that is built between tions under which cooperation is the best possi- actors and this results in even more intense ble strategy for each self-interested actor as cooperation for mutual benefit.17 The establish- well as the community that they together con- ment of conventions in this context are stitute. Cooperation here means that actors will extremely important in that informal rules grad- be better off individually and collectively if ually become entrenched whereby actors they rationally (in terms of self-interest) decide engage each other in socially accepted ways to cooperate with each other. The condition based on mutual recognition and respect.18 On under which this claim holds is a situation this foundation, actors from very different where actors repeatedly interact with each other political parties are able to reach compromises and neither knows when their interactions will and consensus on pertinent issues in ways that end.13 Now, this cooperation is not based on have little relation to the size of their party or spontaneous consensus. It is a special kind of the amount of support that they have. So long conflict called ‘mixed-motive’ conflict.14 In as there is mutual recognition and trust, actors terms of their repeated interactions, actors are will make empathetic rather than adversarial aware of their mutual interdependence even choices based on personal relationships. though they do not necessarily like or agree The main point of this theoretical digression with each other. The key issue here is that par- is to show that a multi-party government is pos- ties cooperate within the parameters of conflict sible and defensible at a number of levels. First, and bargain down or negotiate their differences all the parties, irrespective of size, will be better so that they systematically obtain most of what off. Second, the government will reflect the they want over an extended period of time. The diversity of political interests that make up the individual and collective cumulative effect of nation. Third, this inclusivity will contribute cooperation in this context results in each actor enormously to the objectification of a South being significantly better off than if they had African nation. Fourth, citizens will be better adopted an adversarial, zero-sum strategy. The off as the benefits of multi-party deliberation theory is clear on this: both parties secure more and compromise at the highest decision-making out of cooperation. This conclusion is demon- levels culminates in sound policy. Instead of strated in computer simulations, historical political minorities being excluded from gov- examples, instances of genetic evolution and ernment where their impact as an opposition is mathematical analysis by Robert Axelrod in his minimal, they could maximise their interests by path-breaking study of the individual and col- being part of decision making. On the other lective benefits of cooperation.15 hand, the majority party would also benefit, From this identification of different types of from potential improvements in policy as well conflict, a number of points need to be made as political stability flowing from inclusivity, that impact directly on the argument of this legitimacy and consent. This is especially paper, which is that minority and majority par- important as minorities, who tend to be from ties will be better off through cooperation the higher income brackets, will be less likely rather than adversarial conflict. First, political to conceal their income to avoid tax if they feel

195 Sarakinsky that they are a meaningful part of the nation. win over as many discontented voters as possi- Now, if the benefits of cooperation can be so ble. This strategy increasingly appears to clearly demonstrated, the question needs to be revolve around playing on minority fears in asked: ‘Why don’t all the political parties in order to draw voters into a unified Westmin- South Africa follow this strategy?’ ster-style opposition force that vigilantly and tenaciously watches the majority party and 3. OPPOSITION BEHAVIOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA attacks its performance as government at every Before answering this question, it remains to opportunity. These objectives are justified by demonstrate how South Africans and their the smaller parties in terms of the importance of political parties marked a major break with the ‘opposition’ in keeping democracy alive. This zero-sum politics characteristic of the years of means that the smaller parties claim to have a apartheid only to return to this form of political responsibility to keep a tight check on the conduct, without the use of violence, in more power of the majority party to prevent abuses recent times. In coming to the realisation that of power. At the same time, it is claimed that neither side would be able to force the other to democracy can only survive if voters have submit, the main political parties embarked numerous parties from which to choose in upon a process of learning how to both cooper- expressing their political preferences. ate and be in conflict with one another at the This defence of a return to a zero-sum poli- same time. Without this shift to ‘mixed-motive’ tics is based on certain assumptions that are not conflict, the miracle of the democratic transi- as certain as they might initially appear. First, it tion would not have taken place. Between 1989 may be correct that voters require parties with and 1993, there were outbreaks of both conflict clear identities if they are to express their pref- and cooperation that culminated in the estab- erences. However, ‘mixed-motive’ conflict lishment of conventions and mutual trust which does not imply in any sense that cooperating were then sedimented during the negotiation parties dilute or lose their identity. What it process. Without such relations between key states quite strongly is that parties mobilise personalities, the negotiated resolution to the support on the basis of clear policy manifestos country’s conflict would have taken so much that reflect values and interests. On this founda- longer if it happened at all.19 During this nego- tion, they contest elections to test their support tiation phase, smaller parties – based on the and establish the will of citizens. This is based credibility of their leaders – were able to influ- on adversarial conflict in the sense that it is a ence aspects of the constitutional agreement in contest to win more support than other compet- ways incommensurate with their size and actu- ing parties. However, this contest should still al political power. This was possible as a cul- be framed by the realisation of mutual inter- ture of cooperation entrenched itself among the dependence. In competing for votes, parties participating parties and then continued after cannot and should not gratuitously attack and the first democratic election for two years until criticise their opponents. Instead of conducting minority parties chose to return to a zero-sum, negative campaigns, parties need to present the adversarial style of political action. citizenry with positive statements of their poli- There are many reasons why minority parties cies and intentions so that voters can make chose to end their cooperative stance and pur- rational, informed decisions about their prefer- sue an adversarial, zero-sum strategy in relation ences. This is what a vibrant democracy is to the majority party. It is worth noting that about. Hostile, negative campaigns threaten and such decisions were not without opponents devalue the rationality of democracy as they within the smaller parties who correctly per- appeal to the fears and baser instincts of people. ceived the advantages of cooperative rule.20 Also, a muscular opposition is not necessarily Nonetheless, smaller parties believed that they the best guarantor of democracy in South were losing their political identity in that there Africa. If anything, the more vocal the opposi- was no clear separation between them and the tion, the less impact it has in shaping policy majority party as members of the government. outcomes. This is illustrated in the way the On the other hand, minority parties clearly per- majority party has used its power to prevent the ceived their interests to lie in presenting a hos- official opposition from chairing key portfolio tile response to the party in power in order to committees in the House of Assembly.

196 Sarakinsky

Moreover, democracy does not depend on the CONCLUSION size and strength of the opposition in South Opposition parties in South Africa have as Africa. Instead, following Aristotle, democracy much a responsibility as the majority party to depends on the habituation of constitutional contribute to national reconciliation. By pursu- rule.21 When citizens live out the values of the ing an adversarial strategy, the opposition par- constitution – a document that embodies the ties benefit by garnering support based on a aspirations of the nation as a whole – then fear of the majority which, in the context of democracy will become secure.22 In this regard, South Africa’s past, has racial connotations. the institutions of the Public Protector; Human However, this short-term benefit of increased Rights Commission; Commission for the support is counter-balanced by the medium- Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and long-term cost of alienating and antagonis- and Linguistic Communities; Commission for ing future potential supporters. Gender Equality; Auditor General; and The fact of the matter is that no political Electoral Commission as set out in Chapter party in South Africa can survive without win- Nine of the final Constitution are of far more ning over large numbers of black voters. By import. It is the capacity of these institutions, attacking the majority party now, the opposi- coupled to the judiciary, upon which the future tion is not just challenging its performance as a of South Africa’s democracy depends. Political government, it is also bringing into question the minorities, instead of pursuing an adversarial, symbolism of the majority party as a major oppositional role can play a crucial role in gov- force that brought about liberation. Even if vot- erning and contributing to the habituation of the ers question the performance of the majority constitution by constructively engaging the party, they are not likely in the foreseeable majority party. A key variable in democratic future to switch allegiance to an opposition that consolidation, according to Valenzeula, is the is similar in racial makeup to the previous era’s responsible conduct of political parties who do political establishment. not act to intensify conflict when the ground To win over such voters in the future means rules of the political system have not yet grown acting now to establish credibility based on a strong roots.23 Thus, a hostile opposition in constructive and effective contribution to the South Africa not only results in it losing influ- formation of a South African nation. This can ence, it also threatens the survival of democra- only be achieved through minority parties cy by polarising into hostile camps the commu- cooperating with the majority party for their nities that comprise the South African nation . mutual benefit.

197 Sarakinsky

ENDNOTES

1) W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship : A Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (New University Press, 1988), pp. 195-240. York: Clarendon Press, 1995); W. 12) R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990); T. Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 1995). (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 2) C. Taylor, Philosophical Arguments Press), 1970. (Cambridge, : Harvard 13) R. Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: University Press, 1995). Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). 3) This is a tactic sometimes used in parlia- 14) T. Schelling , The Strategy of Conflict. mentary and public discourse by the major- 15) R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. ity party to discredit the views of speakers 16) R. Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to who hold different views from or who criti- Norms, American Political Science cise certain decisions and actions taken by Review, vol. 80 no. 4, (1986), pp. 1095- the government. 1111. 4) This is illustrated in recent attempts by 17) R. Hardin, Collective Action. some opposition parties to suggest that the 18) A. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition government’s silence on the seizure of (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). white-owned farms in Zimbabwe might 19) See S. Friedman (ed.), The Long Journey cause the same to happen in South Africa. (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993); S. 5) J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, Friedman and D. Atkinson (eds.) The Small Democracy (London: Unwin, 1987). Miracle (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 6) South Africa’s Interim Constitution at: 1994). http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legisla- 20) In the National Party, Roelf Meyer, a key tion/1993/constitutO.html negotiator of the interim Constitution, was 7) South Africa’s final Constitution at: against the decision to withdraw while at http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/constitu- least one Democratic Party member of par- tion/saconst.html liament resigned from the party over its 8) G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right turn to adversarial politics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 21) Aristotle, The Politics (Harmondsworth: The Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Penguin, 1970). Oxford University Press, 1977). 22) D. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: 9) J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, The Toward a Dynamic Model, Comparative Social Contract and Discourses (London: Politics vol. 2 no. 3, (1970), pp. 337-363. Dent, 1973). 23) S. Valenzuela, Democratic Consolidation 10) See A. Lijphardt, Democracy in Plural in Post-Transitional Settings: Notions, Societies: A Comparative Exploration Process and Facilitating Conditions, S. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Mainwaring, G. O’Donnell, and S. Press, 1977). Valenzuela (eds.) Issues in Democratic 11) S. Holmes, 1988. Pre-commitment and the Consolidation (Indiana: University of Paradox of Democracy, A. Przeworski and Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 57-104. R. Slagstad (eds.) Constitutionalism and

198 Conclusion: Emergent Perspectives on Opposition in South Africa

Roger Southall

INTRODUCTION ernment itself and the political parties which The introduction to this collection raised a define themselves as ‘in opposition’. series of questions around the project of politi- cal opposition in South Africa in light of the 1. OPPOSITION AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM challenges posed by consolidating democracy, Beyond that, opposition has been promoted as given the emergence of the African National a product of both structure and agency. At the Congress (ANC) as a ‘dominant party’. In most basic level, the particular shape of, and many ways, the different contributors may be constraints upon, the parliamentary opposition interpreted as having grappled with the issue of have been projected as in significant part an how South Africa’s new democracy is coping outcome of the party list proportional represen- with the twin dilemmas of representation and tation (PR) electoral system – itself a key accountability. Who and what groups of citi- mechanism of the transition agreement that zens are to be represented and how? How brought South Africa to democracy. The result, should representation be translated into behav- according to most popular wisdom, is that PR iour that simultaneously extends political par- has provided for the ANC’s electoral hegemo- ticipation by all South Africa’s people without ny and the fragmentation of contending politi- threatening the very existence of still fragile cal parties because of the demographic weight democratic structures? How is the government of Africans as a large majority of the elec- to be rendered accountable to the people if the torate. David Pottie has not disagreed, suggest- ANC is not sufficiently responsive to the ing indeed that efforts by opposition parties to demands of various ‘racial’ or other minorities, overcome fragmentation, as most notably who feel excluded or alienated by the new expressed by the formation of the Democratic political arrangements, or to major constituen- Alliance (DA), may further racial polarisation cies within its own ranks who feel adversely and ‘ethnic’ representation. Importantly, how- affected by the policies it is pursuing? These ever, he stresses that while electoral arrange- questions are all so central to the vitality, quali- ments may ‘engineer’ normative political ty and functioning of South African democracy behaviour (hence rendering the pursuit of elec- that it is scarcely surprising that the concept of toral reform productive if existing arrange- opposition has been interpreted extremely gen- ments are found to be lacking democratically), erously. Well established concepts such as the present electoral system has done much to ‘constitutional’ and ‘responsible’ opposition institutionalise the party system (and hence still hold up well and relevantly, even if there is opposition) and to aggregate interests. Lia contestation about what those terms mean in Nijzink concurs. Whilst the new electoral sys- the South African context. But opposition as tem and parliament should not be interpreted as behaviour has been portrayed as extensive, providing for alternative government, they operative within the ruling party and through- have provided significant opportunities for out wider society as well as between the gov- interest articulation and for the legitimation of

199 Southall opposition as such, and for the democratic sys- Second, race thinking allows political parties tem more generally. (justly or otherwise) to be labelled as racist and hence delegitimised – a practice which Maré 2. THE GENDER ELEMENT sees the ANC employing with increasing fre- These themes have been taken up by Louise quency to the particular detriment of the Vincent, who has injected an important gender Democratic Party (DP). Third, ‘race thinking’ element which deserves to make an impact encourages parties which claim to be non-racial upon the conceptualisation of opposition more to target particular ‘race groups’ – whites or generally. Her conceptualisation of ‘women as coloureds – in order to increase their share of opposition’ presents an immediate challenge to the vote. Racialist categories remain easily the conventional attempt to portray opposition available as political categories for purposes of in party-based, liberal-democratic terms. Where mobilisation. Maré acknowledges that it would male and female members of the polity have be surprising if the ‘heavy hand’ of the past did interests in common, they can act collectively not live on, yet he is concerned by parties’ (along party and ideological lines). But where unquestioning utilisation of the identities of the the interests of female citizens and male citi- past. Especially in the context of a rampant zens conflict, even if the latter are within the international capitalism which encourages same political party, then the former should notions of South Africa as a country of ‘two become ‘gladiatorial’, unconstrained by patri- nations’ of black and white (despite the rapid archially weighted party disciplines. However, growth a black middle class), the ‘language’ of while discussing in her contribution how the race stands in the way of a more productive electoral system and the ANC’s adoption of a oppositional politics which would contribute to one-third quota of women on its party lists has the reconstruction of South African society. provided for major advances in women’s repre- Paul Maylam concurs, arguing that the politics sentation, her study depicts how party (particu- of race still seems to outweigh the politics of larly ANC) disciplines and patriarchal attitudes class, even though the ANC has proved adept at among (again, especially ANC) members of accommodating a very ‘broad church’. History parliament (MPs) have inhibited the gladitorial- should not be conceived as bondage, yet the ism she sees as vital to promoting women’s weight of the past is such that the emergence of interests in parliament. Given such major politi- a class-based and issue-based politics appears cal constraints, the adequate and urgent repre- inherently unlikely, at least in the short term. sentation of women’s interests requires that women’s political representatives need to be 4. THE DA AND ROBUST OPPOSITION directly supported by women’s networks from Maré’s and Maylam’s pessimism would seem outside the forums concerned. Proportional rep- to be largely confirmed by Hennie Kotzé’s resentation of women within political parties, analysis of the potential constituencies for the of both government and of opposition, is sim- DA, which he sees as a marriage of two differ- ply not enough. ent philosophies and styles of opposition. Although the New National Party’s (NNP’s) 3. NON-RACIALISM strategy of ‘constructive opposition’ may have The inadequacy of structures to guarantee reali- appealed to its coloured voters, it was viewed sation of the explicit goals of South African negatively by its white support base, which democracy is taken up by Gerry Maré. Most increasingly gravitated to the more ‘robust’ notably, the aims of non-racialism (the ANC’s anti-government stance of the DP. This decades long objective) cannot be realised explains the markedly improved performance without coherent, concerted and coordinated of the DP in the general election of 1999, and policy and practice. Otherwise, given demo- the absorption of the NNP into the DA on graphics and the legacies of the past, apartheid largely the DP’s terms. The DA now stands to is likely to reappear, but this time as a mirror- become the home of the majority of whites, image. The implications for opposition are coloureds and Indians, yet Kotzé’s analysis of threefold. First, racialised opposition (speaking political attitudes amongst different groups sug- for racialised or cultural minorities) simply gests that the newly merged combination is replicates differences interpreted as racial. unlikely to attract support from beyond these

200 Southall minorities – among Africans – unless it tones state and society. Meanwhile it is drawing upon down what this potentially larger constituency its experience in exile to use a Leninist strategy sees as the DP’s record of ‘negative’ opposition of democratic centralism to close down internal politics. Yet Tony Leon would claim, very rea- debate amongst its own ranks, while increas- sonably, to have been a highly successful ingly inhibiting the political opposition by leader. The DP increased its vote five-fold in manipulating the rules of parliament and other the election in 1999, and it seems unlikely that arenas in its own favour. The inevitable effect he is going to change a strategy which has both is that opposition voters are being marginalised identified his party as a winner and which has and becoming demotivated, as the ANC, by collapsed its major rival amongst the opposi- implication, marches South Africa along the tion. Similarly, Leon would also likely chal- road to African despotism. lenge those – like Robert Schrire and Ivor McKinlay hitches a not dissimilar argument Sarakinsky – who fear that robust opposition is to an analysis which sees the ANC as having likely to endanger democracy itself, not least allied itself with international capital upon the because it is likely to encourage racial polarisa- basis of the pacted, liberal-democratic transi- tion. For the DP, constitutional checks and bal- tion arrangements of 1994. This ‘historic com- ances upon the ANC are not likely to be promise’ has flown in the face of the dominant enough to render the government accountable, view which obtained among the mass of sup- to expose mounting corruption or to halt a slide porters of the ANC and its alliance partners that to future tyranny. Only a robust, fearless and the capture of political power needed to be vocal opposition will prevent a re-enactment of linked to a fundamental attack on the entrench- what is happening currently in Zimbabwe in ed economic and political interests of capital, in South Africa at some point in the future. order for there to be a meaningful liberation. Instead, what has happened is that the ANC and 5. THE ‘DOMINANT PARTY’ THESIS South African Communist Party (SACP) lead- It is this sort of line which is pursued most ership abandoned the more revolutionary strongly by Hermann Giliomee, James aspects of their parties’ programmes from the Myburgh and Lawrence Schlemmer, and para- start. Although the ANC adopted the redistribu- doxically, by Dale McKinley and Adam Habib tionist Reconstruction and Development with Rupert Taylor. Both sets of scholars come Programme (RDP) to mobilise popular support up with what might be termed ‘hard’ interpreta- in 1994, this was replaced by the neo-liberal, tions of the ANC as a dominant party. But pro-capitalist Growth, Employment and whereas the prior trio come up with a conserva- Redistribution (GEAR) programme once the tive version of that thesis, the latter elaborate a ANC’s hold on power was secure. Spearheaded radical thesis which suggests markedly differ- by Thabo Mbeki even before he became ent implications for opposition politics. President, this was matched by an increasingly Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer propose disciplinarian and conspiratorial approach to that the ANC is misusing its status as a democ- alliance politics which has increasingly sup- ratically elected government to extend its total pressed dissent. Internal democracy has been domination over state and society. Given the increasingly crushed, and the alliance is now legacies of the past, there is no real uncertainty subject to an enforced unity employed to pre- of electoral outcome in South Africa, and in vent debate about ideological and strategic any case the ANC is encouraging a racial con- alternatives. ANC elites continue to fashion a solidation of the vote. Because it is being sys- radical sounding rhetoric of ‘transformation’, tematically delegitimised as ‘racist’, the opposi- yet the reality is that that is only obscuring the tion is increasingly unable to protect vital inter- defence of the status quo, and the interests of an ests, while simultaneously, constitutional emergent African bourgeoisie tied to it. defences of minority interests are being weak- The answer that Habib and Taylor provide ened. The ANC is using the slogans of ‘demo- for countering this development is for the graphic representivity’ and ‘affirmative action’ SACP and Congress of South African Trade to empower a black elite, and it is pursuing the Unions (Cosatu) to break away from the projects of ‘transformation’ and ‘deployment’ Tripartite Alliance to provide the foundation for to capture control of all major institutions in a labour-based opposition. They suggest that

201 Southall the centralisation of power by the ANC, togeth- the ANC as a ‘strong’ dominant party have er with its failures of delivery, are translating much to contribute in illuminating aspects of into a weakening of the democratic order itself. contemporary South African politics. Most Opposition to these trends is vital for the con- notably, of course, they point to the emergence solidation of democracy, yet the existing parlia- of worryingly authoritarian tendencies within mentary opposition parties are unable to per- the ruling party; how this is attempting to nar- form this function adequately. This is not row the space for open debate within parlia- because voting patterns are determined by eth- ment; within the alliance and in society more nicity or race, as so much popular analysis sug- widely; and how the result is potentially alien- gests, but rather because the majority of the ating of various important segments of the elec- electorate do not see the existing opposition as torate. Yet there is a strong case for arguing defending their interests. The DP and NNP are that both interpretations of the ‘dominant party seen as articulating the interests of whites and state’ argument are one-dimensional. coloureds, and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) For a start, Eddie Maloka would argue that as defending Zulus, and so on. The failure of the ‘dominant party thesis’ is the latest line of the existing opposition parties to develop a attack by mainly white intellectuals upon the viable parliamentary opposition is therefore not notion of ‘majority rule’ as a basis for South the fault of the electorate voting in racial terms, African democracy. His position would suggest but the failure of parties’ leadership to offer that whereas conservative and liberal intellectu- policies which would enable them to attract a als are primarily concerned to protect the rights significant electoral constituency. of racial minorities, the radicals resent the loss Habib and Taylor argue that the only way in of power they once enjoyed within the libera- which a viable parliamentary opposition will tion movement (a theme which touches upon come about is if it has its primary social base in historic tensions between Africanists and white the African working class, and which will artic- socialist and communist intellectuals). Yet this ulate policies that will advance the cause of the interpretation of opposition as defence of wider segments of the population, such as the minority interests would appear no less unidi- unemployed, lower middle class and rural poor, mensional than the positions and political prac- who are currently excluded from power and tices it is attacking. influence by the government’s espousal of neo- In contrast, it is argued here that the adoption liberalism. Hitherto, the interests of these of a ‘weak’ version of the dominant party thesis groups have supposedly been served by the is much more productive and multidimensional Tripartite Alliance, but while this formation than either of the conservative or radical cri- was successful in maximising opposition tiques. Such an interpretation takes on board against the apartheid regime, it has proved sin- much that both rival commentaries are saying: gularly unsuccessful in placing a bias in favour that the ANC, for historical reasons, enjoys a of the poor and working class at the centre of ‘natural’ majority among the electorate, that – the government’s programme. Assuming that it notably under Mbeki – it has embarked upon a can take the bulk of the electorate’s votes for project of centralising power, that it has blurred granted, the ANC now pays greater attention to boundaries between the party and the state, that the whims and wishes of foreign investors and it is at times employing racial rhetoric which the business community. Yet Habib and aims at delegitimising opposition, and so on. Taylor’s interpretation of psephological surveys Nonetheless, this alternative interpretation argues that support for the ANC is less rooted would argue that while some of the implica- than that party believes it to be, and there is a tions of these tendencies for democratic consol- sound basis for believing that there would be idation are worrying, they are balanced by a sufficiently wide support to sustain the forma- large number of other factors. These include: tion of an independent, labour-based opposi- acknowledgement that the government’s drive tion. Only when the ANC’s electoral domina- to centralise authority flows in part from an tion is challenged will the voices of the poor be understandable desire to impose fiscal disci- heard in the corridors of power in Pretoria and pline upon the provinces and to curb corrup- Cape Town. tion; and recognition of ‘rationality’ rather than Both the conservative and radical versions of ‘race’ as the basis for voters’ electoral choice

202 Southall

(hence allowing for an erosion of the extent of nant party thesis allow for. This is the fact that the ANC’s support while doubting that it is they both overstate the capacity of the ANC to likely to deprive it of majority status in the impose itself upon society. It might attempt to foreseeable future). However, there are two extend its control, but intention does not imply other aspects of this interpretation which are the ability to restructure society as it would even more important. wish. Even under apartheid, South Africa was First, the ‘weak’ version of the ‘dominant not totalitarian. Apart from the fact that the party thesis’ would stress that the multi-racial, then government was seeking to impose diver- multi-class nature of the ANC as a ‘broad sity rather than allow homogeneity, it simply church’ determines that it is a site of struggle could not contain the momentum for freedom, between a variety of ideological persuasions of mass protest, from below. A similar situation and political practices. In particular, the ANC is obtains today. Try as it might, the government the historical embodiment of twin legacies. On is faced with a series of uphill battles to contain the one hand, its traditions of discipline draw crime and violence, curb corruption, control upon the experiences of exile, when the perils immigration of job-seekers from the rest of of its organisation outside South Africa urged Africa, prevent the uncontrolled expansion of hierarchy and secrecy, both of which were squatting and informal settlements, encourage translated into a Leninist-style ‘democratic cen- residents of townships to pay taxes in return for tralism’ which was borrowed from its alliance services, and so on. Both conservatives and with the SACP and the material support and radicals imply that the ANC is much more in diplomatic sustenance it obtained from the control of society than, in practice, it is. Para- Soviet Union. On the other hand, the ANC was doxically, its efforts to curb dissent may be simultaneously a movement of the people and interpreted as much an indication of its weak- the leader of an alliance of the organisations of ness as its strength. the oppressed, an aspect which found its ulti- mate expression in the mass struggles inside 6. ‘THE ANC’S UNCERTAIN CONTROL’ South Africa in the 1980s which did so much to Such objections to the strong version of the undermine apartheid. Often inchoate, this tradi- dominant party thesis are recorded by the final tion was nonetheless centred around a philoso- two papers in the collection. Significantly, phy and practice of participatory democracy Janet Cherry explicitly argues that assumptions which found its foremost expression in the about the consolidation of political power by a strands of trade unionism which culminated in single party need to be tested against the real the formation of Cosatu in 1985. What this experience of political participation by African approach would argue, therefore, is that these people on the ground. Most importantly, for our contrasting (yet interlocking, for the rhetoric of purposes, her study of political opposition in authoritarianism is almost unfailingly populist) the African township of Kwazakele in Port traditions are at perpetual odds with each other Elizabeth demonstrates how a tradition of polit- within the ANC, even if one may be dominant ical intolerance of opposition to the ANC co- at a particular time. For instance, although exists with a tradition of direct democracy, McKinley scrupulously details the central lead- which, during 1995, saw members of the South erships’ efforts at control, what his perspective African National Civics Organisation – which does not adequately allow for is examples of is formally closely allied to the ANC – protest- effective rebellion from below, as occurred at ing against alleged failures of delivery of ser- the most recent Cosatu Congress in September vices by the ANC local council. African voters 2000, where President Mbeki was subjected to remain overwhelmingly loyal to the ANC and a major vocal attacks by leading trade unionists distrustful of other parties, yet they are far from because of GEAR and for his controversial uncritical of the ANC and are demanding of position on Aids, and where government minis- their local representatives. Despite what she ters were subjected to open demonstrations of sees as a decline in civic mobilisation, she con- dissent.* cludes that democracy is remarkably healthy in This fits in with the second aspect of the con- Kwazakele and is manifested in a variety of temporary situation which neither the conserva- forms of opposition to the ANC: within local tive nor radical ‘strong’ versions of the domi- branches, within civil society and, albeit to a

203 Southall much lesser extent, the threat of support for argues, would be based upon a ‘bargained liber- other political parties. alisation’ whereby the government would make Cherry’s suggestion of the ANC’s uncertain concessions to the unions (and other civil soci- control is endorsed by Eddie Webster’s version ety actors) in exchange for acceptance of its of the politics of the Tripartite Alliance, and in project of opening up the economy to interna- particular his comparative take on a labour- tional competition. Alongside the radicals, he backed government in South Africa coming to proposes that the marginalisation of labour con- power in the form of the ANC. He joins the stitutes a major threat to the consolidation of radicals in noting the severe strains which have democracy; but where he differs from them is developed between Cosatu and the government that, along with Schrire and Sarakinsky, he sees in the wake of the latter’s adoption of GEAR. too robust an opposition as a threat to democra- However, rather than arguing that this presages cy as it exists in post-apartheid society. Further, a political rupture of the alliance, he suggests he sees the present situation as fluid enough to that Cosatu is having instead to come to terms allow for a significant degree of internal with its increasing marginalisation. The autono- democracy, however imperfect. my it used to enjoy as a partner within the alliance has in democratic South Africa been CONCLUSION eroded by a drain of leadership and ability to It is appropriate that this collection ends on a other sectors of society; its own internal tradi- note of internal debate. What its divergent per- tions of service delivery and accountability of spectives indicate is that there is no unanimity its unions to their members have been eroded; among South Africa’s academics as to how and it has become increasingly subjected to contemporary South Africa is to be interpreted, ANC hegemony based on the latter’s access to or how ‘opposition’ is to be best conceived or state patronage and bureaucratic power. All this operationalised. Significantly, however, each makes the South African case redolent of and every paper embodies a critique of political union–party relationships in the rest of post- practice as it exists in South Africa today, and a colonial Africa, where (although the situation conviction that the institutionalised expression varies) unions have very often been subordinat- of political opposition – of alternative views to ed to government. Nonetheless, Webster insists those that predominate among the country’s that Cosatu retains a degree of strength and a rulers – is essential to the advancement of set of democratic traditions which indicates that democracy. ‘Political Opposition’ in South it is likely to retain significant autonomy. This Africa does not yet realistically embody the could provide for the breaking of the alliance idea of ‘alternative government’. However, and the emergence of Cosatu as an independent there are clearly ample grounds for believing labour movement (although Webster is shy of that the varied and actual practice of opposition saying that it could provide the basis for a polit- constitutes an aspect of democratic participa- ical opposition). Yet he also proposes an alter- tion in South Africa which no wise government native scenario, that Cosatu could emerge as a would seek to curb or delegitimate. And if it ‘left pressure group’ within the alliance that did, there is reasonable doubt that it would be would push for redistributive policies. This, he able to do so.

ENDNOTE *Business Day, (Johannesburg), 22 Septem- ber 2000.

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