1 State-Building in Borderlands: Some “Equatorian” Responses to the SPLM/A Directed Order in Southern Sudan Aleksi Ylönen U

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

1 State-Building in Borderlands: Some “Equatorian” Responses to the SPLM/A Directed Order in Southern Sudan Aleksi Ylönen U State-Building in Borderlands: Some “Equatorian” Responses to the SPLM/A Directed Order in Southern Sudan Aleksi Ylönen University of Bayreuth Draft Paper for Sudanese Borderlands Workshop Durham University 18-20 April 2011 1. Introduction In January 2005 the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brought the conflict in southern Sudan to its formal conclusion. The ending of the rebellion marked a new era for the region that had long been marginalized by the central governments in Khartoum. According to the CPA, southern Sudan was granted a semi-autonomous position under the regional Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) along with a possibility to exercise the right of self-determination in the final year of a six-year interim period (2005-2011). However, although the CPA treats southern Sudan homogeneously as one region, its cultural, ethnic, and geographic diversity hardly adhere to such assumption. The southernmost part of southern Sudan, bordering Central and East African states, is historically the home of a number of ethnic groups generally referred to as “Equatorians”. These peoples not only share a long and complex relationship with each other but also with their counterparts from other areas of southern Sudan, which involves different views on political regionalism and self- determination. The GoSS was formed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) which was the main rebel movement during the war in southern Sudan in 1983-2005. However it being an organization largely based on the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups, created an uneasy situation among many “Equatorians”, many of whom had fought the SPLM/A, stayed in government held areas, or fled during the rebellion. Since the beginning of the CPA implementation, this has posed a challenge to the longevity of the SPLM/A orchestrated 1 political order as “Equatorians” have devised a variety of resistance and accommodation strategies to respond to its state-building project in southern Sudan. This paper highlights the SPLM/A oriented state-building project in Sudan’s southern borderlands since 2005 and some “Equatorian” responses and strategies to it. It argues that the type of state-building pursued in southern Sudan suffers from severe future shortcomings which can be highlighted through such “Equatorian” strategies. Drawing largely from field research conducted in 2010 in Central and Eastern Equatoria, the paper points out that the current political order promoted in the in the southern Sudanese borderlands unstable and requires significant changes if South Sudan is to emerge as a peaceful state after July 2011. The next section provides reflections based on current agendas and dynamics of state-building and how these relate to the experience in southern Sudan. After that the paper offers a brief background to the politics and ethnic relations in southern Sudan from “Equatorian” perspective. Fourth section analyzes state-building during the CPA implementation period, emphasizing a selection of Equatorian strategies in response to the SPLM/A-GoSS state order. Fifth section of the paper concludes. 2. State-building and Southern Sudan Development and Challenges in State-Building Due to a number of wars in the so called “failing” and “collapsing” states in the aftermath of the Cold War in the 1990s, the importance of the state in the process of peace-building in post-conflict societies became emphasized. This led to its merging with an approach that emphasizes state-building and (re)construction of state in post-conflict societies.1 After the Cold War, the United States (US) as the main remaining global superpower assumed the principal role in shaping the post-1990 state-building agenda. In this context the focus on state-building shifted from “ . building loyal and politically stable subordinate states” to “ . building legitimate states [based on] broad-based popular support for nascent states by creating democratic institutions and spearheading economic reforms” (Lake, 2010: 257). 1 Although Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1985) and others had already emphasized the importance of the state for development and as the protagonist involved in, or dealing with, conflicts, this was not featured in the peace-building agenda until the 1990s. 2 From then on more focus was put on the importance of building state institutions and elevating state capacity to promote political order for sustainable peace. Through this re-focusing an attempt has been made towards more holistic approach to peace. This emphasizes concepts, such as “good governance” and “social contract” to promote political participation and the provision for essential needs, such as security and basic services, by offering a “populist” approach to security2 that has intertwined realms of security and development (Duffield, 2001). It also seeks to address origins of conflicts, including poverty and inequality, and promote the main pillars of liberal peace, such as human rights, good democratic governance, rule of law, sustainable development, equal access to resources, and environmental security (Barnett & Zürchner, 2009). The current focus on elevating the institutional capacity of the state to ensure long-term peace stems mainly from the Western approach to state-building. It assumes that sustainable peace, reconstruction, development, and security (both internal and external) are inseparable from the capacity of the state. This convergence of peace-building with state-building within the liberal peace paradigm has to an extent sought to reconcile with the society oriented bottom- up and formal-institutional top-down approaches to external involvement in post-conflict societies. However, the currently dominant liberal state-building’s emphasis in post-conflict states was built on a number of questionable assumptions drawing from the Western experience. For instance, it includes a premise that ensuring the conduct of democratic elections as soon as possible after a peace agreement, and shift towards free market economy, would bring long- lasting peace (Rocha Menocal, 2010). According to Paris (2004) and Paris and Sisk (2009), the expectation that these foundations of the liberal agenda would ensure sustainable long- term peace is illusionary.3 Moreover, the liberal state-building approach experiences contradictions because of its very focus on the state and the particular emphasis on the importance to elevate state’s capacity 2 Hyden (1997) defines the “populist” school as one that “ . accepts that the security concept needs to be expanded to include non-military aspects. Like the liberal school, it also recognizes that developmentalism today must be tempered with a definite dose of environmentalism. It differs from the former, however, in that it recognizes not only states and markets as important actors, but also people”. 3 Indeed, one of the main cases discrediting this approach has been Rwanda where peace-building through short- term political liberalization without clear institutional guidelines and checks was one of the major factors behind the escalation of violence to genocidal intensity (see i.e. Paris and Sisk, 2007, 2009). 3 and legitimacy to achieve peace. However, this ignores the question of what kind of state is promoted and the case specific contradictions between the society and the state, especially in the previous areas of conflict where the state tends to enjoy lower level of authority and legitimacy. This largely ignores the importance of local strategies to the centrally (and internationally) imposed political order and governance, particularly in the case of marginal areas, peripheries, and borderlands where state’s influence tends to be more limited. These local responses may often take forms that are not easily detected but are of high importance when analyzing the reach, influence, and legitimacy of the state’s imposed political organization. Thus, they are highly relevant for avoiding possible threats to political instability in post-conflict societies by helping to indicate shortcomings in state-building. Background to State-Building in Southern Sudan A state encompassing most of contemporary Sudan came first into being after the Turco- Egyptian invasion in the 19th century. It was then overtaken by the state order imposed by the Mahdists which succumbed to the Anglo-Egyptian conquest and the establishment of colonial Anglo-Egyptian condominium. As a borderland, Southern Sudan’s role in this continuous process state formation and state-building has been considered marginal. It was a periphery where the state’s reach, legitimacy, and authority were contested by various local groups at least until the 1930s, and it was subjected to local indirect rule through native chiefs’ administration answerable to the colonial government in Khartoum. During the process of de-colonization southern Sudan became structurally marginalized in the independent Sudanese state. The political power was concentrated on narrow sections of the northern elites which claimed to represent the nation that they defined as Arab and Muslim. In this context, sections of southern elites rejected such definition, at least its application to southern Sudan that adheres to neither of these markers portrayed as the source of national identity, and began calling for self-determination through implementation of a federal system. Promises of full consideration of a federal system were never respected, which was an important factor in the making of the first insurgency in southern Sudan during which armed
Recommended publications
  • South Sudan Conflict Insight | Aug 2018 | Vol
    ABOUT THE REPORT South Sudan Conflict The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations to assist the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Member States and Development Partners in decision-making Insight and in the implementation of peace and security- related instruments. CONTRIBUTORS Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael (Editor in Chief) Mr. Alagaw Ababu Kifle Ms. Alem Kidane Ms. Mahlet Fitiwi Ms. Tsion Belay Ms. Zaharau S. Shariff Situation analysis The area that is today’s South Sudan was once a marginalized region in the EDITING, DESIGN & LAYOUT Republic of Sudan administered by tribal chiefs during the British colonial Ms. Michelle Mendi Muita period (1899-1955). In the 1950s, marginalization gave rise to the Anyanya Mr. Mikias Yitbarek I rebellion, spearheaded by southern Sudanese separatists and resulting in Ms. Siphokazi Mnguni the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972). The war ended after the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, only for another civil war to break out in 1983 instigated by the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), one of the longest civil wars on © 2018 Institute for Peace and Security Studies, record, officially ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Addis Ababa University. All rights reserved. Peace Agreement (CPA) by the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan. In 2011, six years after the end of the civil war, South Sudan gained August 2018 | Vol. 2 independence from the Republic of Sudan. South Sudan is home to more than 60 ethnic groups, with the Dinka and CONTENTS the Nuer constituting the largest numbers.
    [Show full text]
  • South Sudan's
    Untapped and Unprepared Dirty Deals Threaten South Sudan’s Mining Sector April 2020 Table of Contents Executive Summary 1 Invitation to Exploitation 4 Beneath the Battlefield: Mineral Development During Conflict 12 Indications of Possible Money Laundering 19 Recommendations 20 We are grateful for the support we receive from our donors who have helped make our work possible. To learn more about The Sentry’s funders, please visit The Sentry website at www.thesentry.org/about/. UNTAPPED AND UNPREPARED: DIRTY DEALS THREATEN SOUTH SUDAN’S MINING SECTOR TheSentry.org Executive Summary South Sudan’s mining sector has seen rapid development in recent years, and preliminary reports suggest that the industry could become an engine for major economic growth. However, ineffective accountability mechanisms, an opaque corporate landscape, and inadequate due diligence have exposed the sector to abuse by bad actors within South Sudan’s ruling clique. The Sentry has found that existing laws have proven insufficient bulwarks against abuse, raising concerns that the country’s mineral wealth could do little more than spur the kind of violent competition that has ravaged the oil sector. Although South Sudan took welcome steps to reform the mining sector in 2012, some government officials, their relatives, and their close associates have fostered a weak regulatory environment susceptible to exploitation. In one example of how the privileged few have apparently exploited kleptocratic arrangements, President Salva Kiir’s daughter partly owns a company with three active licenses, while another company with three licenses lists former Vice President James Wani Igga’s son as a shareholder. Ashraf Seed Ahmed Hussein Ali, a businessman commonly known as Al-Cardinal who was placed under Global Magnitsky sanctions in October 2019, reportedly owns the company currently holding the greatest number of licenses.1 In the gold-rich region of Kapoeta, state government officials have begun issuing licenses independently of the central government.
    [Show full text]
  • Conflict and Crisis in South Sudan's Equatoria
    SPECIAL REPORT NO. 493 | APRIL 2021 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org Conflict and Crisis in South Sudan’s Equatoria By Alan Boswell Contents Introduction ...................................3 Descent into War ..........................4 Key Actors and Interests ............ 9 Conclusion and Recommendations ...................... 16 Thomas Cirillo, leader of the Equatoria-based National Salvation Front militia, addresses the media in Rome on November 2, 2019. (Photo by Andrew Medichini/AP) Summary • In 2016, South Sudan’s war expand- Equatorians—a collection of diverse South Sudan’s transitional period. ed explosively into the country’s minority ethnic groups—are fighting • On a national level, conflict resolu- southern region, Equatoria, trig- for more autonomy, local or regional, tion should pursue shared sover- gering a major refugee crisis. Even and a remedy to what is perceived eignty among South Sudan’s con- after the 2018 peace deal, parts of as (primarily) Dinka hegemony. stituencies and regions, beyond Equatoria continue to be active hot • Equatorian elites lack the external power sharing among elites. To spots for national conflict. support to viably pursue their ob- resolve underlying grievances, the • The war in Equatoria does not fit jectives through violence. The gov- political process should be expand- neatly into the simplified narratives ernment in Juba, meanwhile, lacks ed to include consultations with of South Sudan’s war as a power the capacity and local legitimacy to local community leaders. The con- struggle for the center; nor will it be definitively stamp out the rebellion. stitutional reform process of South addressed by peacebuilding strate- Both sides should pursue a nego- Sudan’s current transitional period gies built off those precepts.
    [Show full text]
  • South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War”
    South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War” Africa Report N°221 | 22 December 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Jonglei’s Conflicts Before the Civil War ........................................................................... 3 A. Perpetual Armed Rebellion ....................................................................................... 3 B. The Politics of Inter-Communal Conflict .................................................................. 4 1. The communal is political .................................................................................... 4 2. Mixed messages: Government response to intercommunal violence ................. 7 3. Ethnically-targeted civilian disarmament ........................................................... 8 C. Region over Ethnicity? Shifting Alliances between the Bahr el Ghazal Dinka, Greater Bor Dinka and Nuer ...................................................................................... 9 III. South Sudan’s Civil War in Jonglei .................................................................................. 12 A. Armed Factions in Jonglei ........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013
    Government of the Republic of South Sudan South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013 Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all Juba, August 2011 0 Contents 0.1 Table of abbreviations and acronyms v 0.2 Foreword xi 0.3 Acknowledgments xii 0.4 Executive summary xiii 0.4.1 Context: conflict, poverty and economic vulnerability xiii 0.4.2 The development challenge xiii 0.4.3 Development objectives xiv 0.4.4 Governance – institutional strengthening and improving transparency and accountability xvi 0.4.5 Economic development – rural development supported by infrastructure improvements xvii 0.4.6 Social and human development – investing in people xviii 0.4.7 Conflict prevention and security – deepening peace and improving security xix 0.4.8 Cross-cutting issues xx 0.4.9 Government resources and their allocation to support development priorities xx 0.4.10 Donor resources xxi 0.4.11 Implementation xxii 0.4.12 Monitoring and Evaluation xxiii 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE SOUTH SUDAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1 1.1 Purpose of the South Sudan Development Plan 1 1.2 The development planning process and approach 1 1.3 Coverage of the South Sudan Development Plan 2 1.4 Cross-cutting issues integral to the national development priorities 3 2 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 4 2.1 Historical context 4 2.2 Analysis of conflict 6 2.2.1 Causes of conflict 6 2.2.2 Consequences of conflict 8 2.2.3 Peace-building in South Sudan 8 2.2.4 Recommendations for SSDP 11 2.3 Poverty and human development 12 2.3.1 Demographic context 13 2.3.2 Vulnerability 16 2.3.3 Social
    [Show full text]
  • SS 080906 Peace and Reconciliation Conference in Kit
    General James most of that day, Lt. and delegates come back. For by the Eastern Equatoria State governors and aided arbitration between the two helped to Wani made consultative The said committee Peace and Rcconciliation. order Parliamentary Committee on day. This was done in of the meeting the following of prepare the ground for the start the dispute. At the end success of the settlement of to develop the framework for the Reconciliation took chargc and Committce for Peace and the day, the Asscmbly Standing day at 9.00 am. announced the adjournment of the conference ror the following SPEAKER OF CLOSING REMARKS BY HE. JAMES WANJ IGGA, THE 06.09.2008. SOUTHERN SUDAN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ON Legislative Assembly At 6:00 pm, H.E.James Wani lgga, Speaker of the Southern Sudan two governors for made the closing remarks, conveying congratulatory messagcs to the drawn from the two their successful endeavor to mobilize such a huge mass of people as truly contesting counties of Juba and Magwi. He defined the nature of the dispute arbitration. interstate boarder conflict that required good atmosphere of negotiation and He said that any interstate boarder dispute in Southern Sudan is the direct responsibility of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, which has in place a Specialized Committee headed by Honorable Mary Nyaulang. He went on to express that this Committee was comprised of members who were not a party to the conflict. He said Hon. Mary Nyaulang and Hon. Kundi were both from Western Bahr El Ghazal State; and Hon, Barakat Alfred from Western Equatoria State.
    [Show full text]
  • (UNMISS) Media & Spokesperson Unit Communications & Public Information Office MEDIA MONITORING REPORT
    United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Media & Spokesperson Unit Communications & Public Information Office MEDIA MONITORING REPORT THURSDAY, 04 JULY 2013 SOUTH SUDAN • Parliament summons security bosses on harassement and detention (Gurtong) • UJoSS delegation forms branch in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (Gurtong) • Abductees arrive in Aweil from Sudan following community dialogue forum (Gurtong) • Illegal tax collectors arrested in Aweil (Gurtong) • Western Equatoria State vows no long speeches for independence celebrations • Western Equatoria receives independence celebration money (Anisa Radio) OTHER HIGHLIGHTS • UN USG for peacekeeping to hold a press staekout in Khartoum (African Press Organisation) • UNISFA suspends flights after rebel attack on Kadugli airport – report (Sudantribune.com) • Sudan reacts uneasily to ouster of Egypt’s Morsi from presidency (Sudantribune.com) COMMENTS/ STATEMENTS • Joint Sudan, South Sudan statement on current crisis (Sudan Vision) LINKS TO STORIES FROM THE MORNING MEDIA MONITOR • Five heads of state confirmed for South Sudan’s 2nd independence anniversary (Sudantribune.com) • MPs summon one governor, five ministers over harassments (Catholic Radio Network) • MPs pass Oil Revenue Bill to third reading (Catholic Radio Network) • South Sudan suspends radio station for criticizing government (Reuters) • Media, rights entities protest closue of Lakes state radio (Sudantribune.com) • Allowances for South Sudan police to increase in 2014 (Sudantribune.com) • Warrap government sets up a prosecution-immune anti-cattle force (Eye Radio) • Jonglei Ministry of Local Government launches strategic plan (Gurtong) • Over 1,000 leave Komou Boma over hunger threat (Emmanuel Radio) NOTE: Reproduction here does not mean that the UNMISS Communications & Public Information Office can vouch for the accuracy or veracity of the contents, nor does this report reflect the views of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.
    [Show full text]
  • 05 September
    5 Sept 2010 Media Monitoring Report www.unmissions.unmis.org United Nations Mission in Sudan/ Public Information Office Referendum Watch • Southern MPs submit petition to Kiir protesting demarcation report (Al-Rai Al-Aam) • SPLM, NCP at crossroads over North South border issue – ICG (ST) • NCP, southern parties stress need for free and fair referendum (Al-Ayyam) • Referendum commission nominates Al-Nujoomi Secretary General (Khartoum Monitor) • Referendum Commission prepares voter registration (Sudan Vision) • Referendum budget well above $380 million – Machar (The Citizen) • SSRA set up referendum committee, MPs want official secession drive (the Citizen) • LRA activity will affect referendum – Riek Machar (Sudan Vision) • UNMIS establishes Referendum Base in Western Equatoria state (ST) Other Headlines • VP Taha to lead Sudan’s delegation to UN General Assembly meetings (ST) • Public Order law will remain in force –Khartoum state Government (Al-Sahafa) • Six people killed in fresh attacks on another camp in Darfur – IDPs (ST) • UN pledges $ 15 million for Eastern Equatoria (Al-Sahafa) • NCP downplays ICC move to press Sudan to hand over wanted officials (Al-Ayyam) • SPLM purchased 10 helicopters, SAF says in the know (Ajras Al-Hurriya) • UNMIS Helicopter to transport resolution committee to Acholi-Madi areas (The Citizen) • Machar hits back at Akhir Lahza newspaper (Khartoum Monitor) NOTE: Reproduction here does not mean that the UNMIS PIO can vouch for the accuracy or veracity of the contents, nor does this report reflect the views of the United Nations Mission in Sudan. Furthermore, international copyright exists on some materials and this summary should not be disseminated beyond the intended list of recipients.
    [Show full text]
  • Dual Realities: Peace and War in the Sudan – an Update on the Implementation of the CPA
    Institute for Security Studies Situation Report Date Issued: 16 May 2007 Author: M riam Bibi Jooma1 a Distribution: General Contact: [email protected] Dual realities: Peace and war in the Sudan – An update on the implementation of the CPA Global news headlines continue to report the political impasse and consequent Introduction loss of civilian life in Sudan’s western state of Darfur, but there is decidedly less attention on what is essentially a fragile peace between the former warring factions of Northern and Southern Sudan. Indeed, almost 30 months after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 there is little confidence that any significant change will occur in what remains of the Interim Period. Certainly the precariousness of the CPA impacts, and will continue to impact, upon both the Darfur Peace Agreement and the Eastern Peace Agreement as it acts as a basic document upon which the legitimacy of the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan are based. As the incoming Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon suggested in his opening report on Sudan in January this year, Of central concern, the principles of the Agreement related to political inclusion and “making unity attractive” have yet to be fully upheld, and much remains to be done if the parties are to achieve their ambitious goals set out in the Machakos Protocol and in subsequent Protocols (UN 2007a). This situation report highlights some of the most pressing challenges to the implementation of the CPA from the perspective of the political incumbents, international observers, and sectors of civil society including the Sudanese media.
    [Show full text]
  • Full List of the Historical SPLM/SPLA Commanders, 1983-2005
    The historical list of the SPLA commanders after 1991 split and merging of the two SPLA (SPLA –Torit and SPLA Nasir factions): S/n Rank Name in full Date of Remarks promotion 1. Cdr Dr. John Garang De Mabior 15/5/1983 2. Cdr Salva Kiir Mayardit 15/5/1983 3. Cdr Dr. Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon 4. Cdr James Wani Igga 1/1/1986 5. Cdr Daniel Awet Akot 1/1/1986 6. Cdr Kuol Manyang Juuk 1/1/1986 7. Cdr Lual Diing Wol 1/1/1989 8. Cdr Stephen Duol Chuol 1/1/1988 9. Cdr Pagan Amum Okiech 16/5/1991 10. Cdr Deng Alor Kuol 16/5/1991 11. Cdr John Kong Nyuon 16/5/1991 12. Cdr Abdel; Aziz Adam El Hilu 16/5/1991 13. Cdr Samuel Abujohn Kabashi 16/5/1991 14. Cdr Nhial Deng Nhial 16/5/1991 15. Cdr Malik Agar Eyre 16/5/1991 16. Cdr Stephen Madut Baak 1/11/1991 17. Cdr Bona Bang Dhol 1/11/1991 18. Cdr Elijah Malok Aleng 1/11/1991 19. Cdr Cagai Atem Biar 1/11/1991 20. Cdr Mark Machiec Magok 1/11/1991 21. Cdr Kuot Deng Kuot 1/11/1991 22. Cdr Anthony Bol Madut 1/11/1991 23. Cdr Akec Koc Acieu 1/11/1991 24. Cdr Peter Wal Athieu 1/11/1991 25. Cdr Oyai Deng Ajak 1/11/1991 26. Cdr Dominic Dim Deng 1/11/1991 27. Cdr Salva Mathok Geng 1/11/1991 28. Cdr Bior Ajang Duot 1/11/1991 29.
    [Show full text]
  • Advance Version Distr.: Restricted 10 March 2016
    A/HRC/31/CRP.6 Advance version Distr.: Restricted 10 March 2016 English only Human Rights Council Thirty-first session Agenda item 2 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Assessment mission by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to improve human rights, accountability, reconciliation and capacity in South Sudan: detailed findings* Summary This present document contains the detailed findings of the comprehensive assessment conducted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) into allegations of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in South Sudan since the outbreak of violence in December 2013. It should be read in conjunction with the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the assessment mission to South Sudan submitted to the Human Rights Council at its thirty-first session (A/HRC/31/49). * Reproduced as received. A/HRC/31/CRP.6 Contents Page Part 1 Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 6 I. Establishment of the OHCHR Assessment Mission to South Sudan ............................................... 8 A. Mandate ................................................................................................................................... 8 B. Methodology ...........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • (UNMISS) Media & Spokesperson Unit Communications & Public Information Office MEDIA MONITORING REPORT
    United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Media & Spokesperson Unit Communications & Public Information Office MEDIA MONITORING REPORT MONDAY, 08 JULY 2013 SOUTH SUDAN South Sudan’s 2nd birthday (Al-Jazeera News) Friends of S. Sudan’ go public with call for "significant changes and reform" (Sudantribune.com) Dr. Tedros Receives South Sudan's Foreign Minister (AllAfrica.com) South Sudan not a failed state: British Envoy (Gurtong.net) O3b’s new satellite constellation to provide high speed connectivity to S. Sudan (Business Wire) Youth want leader to step down for abuse of office (Gurtong.net) Japan boosts Ministry of Health with USD 4 million by Anthony Wani (Theniles.org) South Sudanese students in Egypt meet government delegation (Gurtong.net) CARE International assists vulnerable communities in Unity state (Sudantribune.com) Organization distributes treated mosquito nets to curb malaria spread (Gurtong.net) SOUTH SUDAN, SUDAN FM to represent Sudan in S. Sudan national day celebrations (Sudanvisiondaily.com) Sudan MiG-29s said to conduct air strikes on South (Worldtribune.com) SAF denies Juba accusations of fresh attacks on border areas (Sudantribune.com) Now is the time for Arab Unity; Nafie (Sudanvisiondaily.com) Eritrea’s leader says comprehensive strategy key to resolve Sudans disputes (Sudantribune.com) South Sudan’s FM briefs Ethiopian PM about recent talks with Khartoum (Sudantribune.com) Juba says Khartoum wants to buy 4,500 barrels of oil for Kosti power plant (Sudantriibune.com) Sudan will not shut oil
    [Show full text]