State-Building in Borderlands: Some “Equatorian” Responses to the SPLM/A Directed Order in Southern Sudan

Aleksi Ylönen

University of Bayreuth

Draft Paper for Sudanese Borderlands Workshop

Durham University 18-20 April 2011

1. Introduction

In January 2005 the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brought the conflict in southern Sudan to its formal conclusion. The ending of the rebellion marked a new era for the region that had long been marginalized by the central governments in Khartoum. According to the CPA, southern Sudan was granted a semi-autonomous position under the regional Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) along with a possibility to exercise the right of self-determination in the final year of a six-year interim period (2005-2011).

However, although the CPA treats southern Sudan homogeneously as one region, its cultural, ethnic, and geographic diversity hardly adhere to such assumption. The southernmost part of southern Sudan, bordering Central and East African states, is historically the home of a number of ethnic groups generally referred to as “Equatorians”. These peoples not only share a long and complex relationship with each other but also with their counterparts from other areas of southern Sudan, which involves different views on political regionalism and self- determination.

The GoSS was formed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) which was the main rebel movement during the war in southern Sudan in 1983-2005. However it being an organization largely based on the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups, created an uneasy situation among many “Equatorians”, many of whom had fought the SPLM/A, stayed in government held areas, or fled during the rebellion. Since the beginning of the CPA implementation, this has posed a challenge to the longevity of the SPLM/A orchestrated

1 political order as “Equatorians” have devised a variety of resistance and accommodation strategies to respond to its state-building project in southern Sudan.

This paper highlights the SPLM/A oriented state-building project in Sudan’s southern borderlands since 2005 and some “Equatorian” responses and strategies to it. It argues that the type of state-building pursued in southern Sudan suffers from severe future shortcomings which can be highlighted through such “Equatorian” strategies. Drawing largely from field research conducted in 2010 in Central and , the paper points out that the current political order promoted in the in the southern Sudanese borderlands unstable and requires significant changes if is to emerge as a peaceful state after July 2011.

The next section provides reflections based on current agendas and dynamics of state-building and how these relate to the experience in southern Sudan. After that the paper offers a brief background to the politics and ethnic relations in southern Sudan from “Equatorian” perspective. Fourth section analyzes state-building during the CPA implementation period, emphasizing a selection of Equatorian strategies in response to the SPLM/A-GoSS state order. Fifth section of the paper concludes.

2. State-building and Southern Sudan

Development and Challenges in State-Building

Due to a number of wars in the so called “failing” and “collapsing” states in the aftermath of the Cold War in the 1990s, the importance of the state in the process of peace-building in post-conflict societies became emphasized. This led to its merging with an approach that emphasizes state-building and (re)construction of state in post-conflict societies.1 After the Cold War, the United States (US) as the main remaining global superpower assumed the principal role in shaping the post-1990 state-building agenda. In this context the focus on state-building shifted from “ . . . building loyal and politically stable subordinate states” to “ . . . building legitimate states [based on] broad-based popular support for nascent states by creating democratic institutions and spearheading economic reforms” (Lake, 2010: 257).

1 Although Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1985) and others had already emphasized the importance of the state for development and as the protagonist involved in, or dealing with, conflicts, this was not featured in the peace-building agenda until the 1990s. 2 From then on more focus was put on the importance of building state institutions and elevating state capacity to promote political order for sustainable peace.

Through this re-focusing an attempt has been made towards more holistic approach to peace. This emphasizes concepts, such as “good governance” and “social contract” to promote political participation and the provision for essential needs, such as security and basic services, by offering a “populist” approach to security2 that has intertwined realms of security and development (Duffield, 2001). It also seeks to address origins of conflicts, including poverty and inequality, and promote the main pillars of liberal peace, such as human rights, good democratic governance, rule of law, sustainable development, equal access to resources, and environmental security (Barnett & Zürchner, 2009).

The current focus on elevating the institutional capacity of the state to ensure long-term peace stems mainly from the Western approach to state-building. It assumes that sustainable peace, reconstruction, development, and security (both internal and external) are inseparable from the capacity of the state. This convergence of peace-building with state-building within the liberal peace paradigm has to an extent sought to reconcile with the society oriented bottom- up and formal-institutional top-down approaches to external involvement in post-conflict societies.

However, the currently dominant liberal state-building’s emphasis in post-conflict states was built on a number of questionable assumptions drawing from the Western experience. For instance, it includes a premise that ensuring the conduct of democratic elections as soon as possible after a peace agreement, and shift towards free market economy, would bring long- lasting peace (Rocha Menocal, 2010). According to Paris (2004) and Paris and Sisk (2009), the expectation that these foundations of the liberal agenda would ensure sustainable long- term peace is illusionary.3

Moreover, the liberal state-building approach experiences contradictions because of its very focus on the state and the particular emphasis on the importance to elevate state’s capacity

2 Hyden (1997) defines the “populist” school as one that “ . . . accepts that the security concept needs to be expanded to include non-military aspects. Like the liberal school, it also recognizes that developmentalism today must be tempered with a definite dose of environmentalism. It differs from the former, however, in that it recognizes not only states and markets as important actors, but also people”. 3 Indeed, one of the main cases discrediting this approach has been Rwanda where peace-building through short- term political liberalization without clear institutional guidelines and checks was one of the major factors behind the escalation of violence to genocidal intensity (see i.e. Paris and Sisk, 2007, 2009). 3 and legitimacy to achieve peace. However, this ignores the question of what kind of state is promoted and the case specific contradictions between the society and the state, especially in the previous areas of conflict where the state tends to enjoy lower level of authority and legitimacy.

This largely ignores the importance of local strategies to the centrally (and internationally) imposed political order and governance, particularly in the case of marginal areas, peripheries, and borderlands where state’s influence tends to be more limited. These local responses may often take forms that are not easily detected but are of high importance when analyzing the reach, influence, and legitimacy of the state’s imposed political organization. Thus, they are highly relevant for avoiding possible threats to political instability in post-conflict societies by helping to indicate shortcomings in state-building.

Background to State-Building in Southern Sudan

A state encompassing most of contemporary Sudan came first into being after the Turco- Egyptian invasion in the 19th century. It was then overtaken by the state order imposed by the Mahdists which succumbed to the Anglo-Egyptian conquest and the establishment of colonial Anglo-Egyptian condominium. As a borderland, Southern Sudan’s role in this continuous process state formation and state-building has been considered marginal. It was a periphery where the state’s reach, legitimacy, and authority were contested by various local groups at least until the 1930s, and it was subjected to local indirect rule through native chiefs’ administration answerable to the colonial government in Khartoum.

During the process of de-colonization southern Sudan became structurally marginalized in the independent Sudanese state. The political power was concentrated on narrow sections of the northern elites which claimed to represent the nation that they defined as Arab and Muslim. In this context, sections of southern elites rejected such definition, at least its application to southern Sudan that adheres to neither of these markers portrayed as the source of national identity, and began calling for self-determination through implementation of a federal system. Promises of full consideration of a federal system were never respected, which was an important factor in the making of the first insurgency in southern Sudan during which armed opposition culminated in demands for secession among some within the southern leadership.

4 During the first insurgency, various opposition elements gained control over most of the rural South. Initially a number of armed groups established local governments until in the late 1960s they were brought together under Joseph Lagu’s South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (popularly known as Anya Nya), during which time the rebel administration in the region began to perform more extensive state functions. Apart from providing security, it established a civil service, administration, and a legal system, and provided rudimentary education and medical services, while also performing tax collection (Eprile, 1974).

The 1972 Addis Ababa Peace agreement which ended the first southern insurgency, also dictated the establishment of a regional self-government southern Sudan. It was based on a limited autonomy with heavy financial reliance on the central government. Although the political climate within southern Sudan allowed more democratic political environment as was permitted at the national level, the southern politics remained heavily influenced by national president Jaafar Nimeiri. At the local level, the administration continued to be based on the indirect rule by chiefs, the autonomous regional government’s role in local governance being very limited at best.

In 1983, Nimeiri announced the dissolution of the southern region and divided it into its three original provinces.4 The justification for this came through an implementation of a plan of decentralization, which was used to diminish the bankrupt and weakening national regime’s obligations at the local level in the peripheries. This, among other factors, gave rise to the second insurgency in southern Sudan led by officers many of whom had been active in the Anya Nya during the previous rebellion.

As in the case of the earlier insurgency, rebel organizations again gained control over most of the rural South. This time, rebel administration concentrated largely on the military under the Civil/Military Administration, which was extended in the rebel-held areas until after the stabilization of the SPLM/A control. It was to an extent based on manipulation of chiefs’ leadership position to assert legitimacy and authority among local groups (Leonardi, 2007), and was often able to assert coercive authority, administering justice, taxing the population, and using forced recruitment and displaced civilians for supplying itself with relief goods, while international Non-Governmental Organizations provided most services (Rolandsen, 2005). In, SPLM/A held a 1994 National Convention that gave rise to an increasing focus on

4 These were Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and . 5 civilian governance under the Civil Authority of New Sudan (Branch and Mampilly, 2005). However, participating in the civilian administration required SPLM party membership, which converted the areas controlled by the movement in practice as SPLM/A one-party state (Rolandsen, 2005).

The SPLM/A orchestrated state-building in southern Sudan during the late wartime was increasingly oriented towards acquiring legitimacy through the addressing local ethnic grievances. These grievances in Equatoria and elsewhere, drew in part from the experience of SPLM/A occupation (that some particularly in Equatoria perceived as Dinka occupation) and from political and economic marginalization of non-SPLM/A populations or those remotely connected to it. As a result, the CANS aimed towards de-centralization of local government to allow political voice and encourage economic development (Branch and Mampilly, 2005). This is when the contradicting SPLM/A policy, between the highly centralized movement controlling political power and resources and the pursuit of decentralization of local administration, surfaced. In practice, this meant continuing tension, but little devolution of power and resources to local administrations.

The prolonged peace negotiations endorsed by Western actors under the mediation of Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) also influenced the approach to state- building. The peace through state-building approach adopted and promoted by the interested Western actors and headed by the United States, had a profound effect on the SPLM/A leadership. For instance, in this context the movement adopted the position to promote peace and development by embracing the Western concepts of “good governance” and “participatory democracy”, which were seen to complement its own agenda of fighting for a democratic New Sudan. As a result, the movement’s influential memorandum Peace through Development originally published in 2000 states that “ . . . participatory democracy and good governance rely on the establishment of a broad-based civil authority, such as the CANS, which derives its legitimacy from people's Congresses and Liberation Councils (PLCs) at the Boma, Payam, County, Regional, and National levels” (SPLM Today, 2007).

Thus, as shown above, the experience of two prolonged wars, the related peace processes, and the period of self-government deeply affected state-building in southern Sudan since the 1950s. It is against this background that the current state-building in the region needs to be analyzed.

6 3. Brief Background to Southern Ethnic Relations from “Equatorian” Perspective

Ethnically and linguistically extremely diverse, the southern Sudan is one of the most heterogeneous regions in Africa. Historically, the relations between local ethnic groups and sub-groups have fluctuated between collaboration and hostility and involved external actors and forces particularly after the increasing foreign influences from the 19th century onwards.

Equatoria, the southernmost territory of southern Sudan, borders the Central and East African neighboring states. Today, the sub-region is called Greater Equatoria and divided into Western, Central, and Eastern Equatoria each consisting of a number of counties divided into smaller administrative units called Bomas and Payams. Although the administrative division is in principle based on the organization in 1956 when Sudan achieved its independence, many borders of smaller administrative units have not been demarcated and have at times generated disputes between local groups.

Equatoria is inhabited by a number of groups collectively referred to as “Equatorians”.5 Although recently brought increasingly together by their collective grievances against the perceived privileges of particularly the Dinka as a majority group, “Equatorians” are historically diverse harbor fluctuating inter-group relations (Nyombe, 2007). The small size of “Equatorian” population relative to the dominant Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk, which traditionally inhabit areas north of Equatoria, has at times been historically contentious. Particularly the Dinka have been seen among many “Equatorians” to dominate the greater southern Sudan.

During the process of de-colonization, sections of “Equatorians” emerged as the most educated in the region. Some members of the “Equatorian” intelligentsia took charge of the early southern political movement (Howell, 1973, 1978), and spearheaded the demands for federalism and a degree of self-determination for the South. After the broken promise of full consideration of a federal solution for southern Sudan, politically active “Equatorians” were also involved in the organization of political resistance and the mutiny in 1955, which led to the Anya Nya insurgency.

5 Groups in Eastern Equatoria are Latuka, Lokoya, Toposa, Nyangathong, Jiye, Boya, Lopit, Pari, Didinga, Madi, Acholi, Lulubo, Lango, and Logir, while Bari, Mundari, Kakwa, Lokoya, Kuku, Pajulu, and Makaraka are among the major groups in . In , the Azande are the biggest group ahead of Moru, Balanda, Baka, Avukaya, and Jurbel. But Equatoria as a whole has experienced an influx of other ethnic populations during the war and its aftermath. 7

Even today sections of “Equatorians” continue to take pride in having been the ones who organized the early southern struggle against northern domination. This is largely why the GoSS has found it important to recognize the “Equatorian” symbols and figures of the early opposition in its attempt to consolidate legitimacy among the “Equatorian” population particularly in Eastern Equatoria.6 This has been relatively easy for the GoSS to do because there tends to be less inter-ethnic antagonism related to the Anya Nya insurgency than in the case of the later SPLM/A struggle. It owes in part to the timing of the rebellions but also to the highly decentralized character of the earlier movement, which seems to have granted more autonomy for its territorial, ethnically and regionally distinct, fighting forces than in the case of the later SPLM/A insurgency (Eprile, 1974; Nyaba, 2000).

In the course of the 1970s and early 1980s, the regional political competition within autonomous southern Sudan became characterized by the construction of antagonistic “Equatorian”-Dinka relations. It culminated in the competition for regional presidency and political power principally between the former Anya Nya leader Joseph Lagu (“Equatorian” Madi) and a prominent Southern Front politician Abel Alier (Dinka Bor) crystallizing “Equatorian” opinion behind Dinka animosity. These sentiments were related to the Sudanese president Jaafar Nimeiri’s attempts to manipulate southern regional politics, while also seeking to escape regime collapse by promoting decentralization, which contributed to the “Equatorian” demands, Kokora,7 for a region of their own to escape the perceived political domination of the Dinka majority within the political institutions of the greater southern Sudan. Although originating from a minority within the greater southern Sudan, the “Equatorian” demands gave Nimeiri a justification for the dissolution of southern autonomous region into its three constituent parts.

The SPLM/A rebellion emerged in the context of the abolishment of the southern autonomy in 1983. In part having been motivated by the end of southern self-government,8 the SPLM/A leadership consisted largely of Dinka and Nuer elements of the former Anya Nya rebel movement which could be seen to have sought to maintain the southern inter-ethnic status

6 For instance one such occasion was the building of a memorial and the burial ceremony for Fr. Saturnino Lohure in early 2009 in Torit. The GoSS has also honored other early leaders of the Anya Nya. 7 Kokora comes from Bari word kokore, which means “take your share”(divide) and “something that will remain mine”(division). 8 These officers saw an opportunity for mobilization for an insurgency in the sentiment of protest against the abolishment of the southern autonomy, the perpetuating uneven development between the North and the South, and the re-intensification of the latter’s political marginalization. See i.e. Johnson (2003). 8 quo (Branch and Mampilly, 2005). This generated antagonism among “Equatorians” against what was viewed as Dinka-dominated organization, but did not prevent thousands particularly from Sudanese government held areas in Equatoria to join the movement (Nyaba, 2000).

By 1991, the SPLM/A had extended its control to most parts of Equatoria with exception of government held towns of and Yei. However, this had come with a terrible human toll and countless violent incidences and mistakes, involving treatment of local civilians and SPLM/A recruits, which led to infighting, defections, formation of militias against the movement (Nyaba, 2000), as well as thousands of internally displaced and refugees crossing over to the neighboring states. In fact, many Equatorians disappointed by being marginalized in the SPLM/A structures or treatment by the movement joined the SPLM/A-Nasir faction after 1991 or withdrew from fighting altogether, but the war between the two SPLM/A factions brought displaced from Bor, Kongor, and elsewhere to the region followed by the SPLM/A-Nasir forces seeking to engage the SPLM/A-Torit there. This brought another wave of destruction to the area and culminated in the formation of the Equatoria Defense Forces (EDF) in 1995 composed of ethnically diverse selection of Equatorian elements,9 active around Juba and Torit, aligned with and supplied by the Government of Sudan. The EDF sought local self-determination and signed the 1997 Khartoum peace agreement.

From the mid-1990s SPLM/A imposed the Civil Administration of New Sudan to replace the earlier military/civil administration of the movement. However, although the pledged attempt was to decentralize local governance, little change came about to this extent as the movement continued to impose their preferred leadership locally and the local groups were expected to continue to supply the rebel group (Leonardi, 2007). From the relationship between Equatorians and the SPLM/A, in which the latter sought to establish itself as a legitimately hegemonic force, emerged the criticism of the movement viewed as imposed and the perception that Equatorians did not support, or were absent during, the liberation struggle, latter of which being an important argument in claims to land in the region during the CPA interim period.

In the broader context of the final negotiations for the CPA, the EDF leadership signed a formal declaration in which it put aside its differences with the SPLM/A. This Nairobi Declaration on between the SPLM/A and EDF (2004) called for immediate integration

9 Principally Latuka and Lokoya, but also Acholi, Mahdi, Loluba, Bari, and Zande. 9 of the EDF into the SPLM/A structures, emphasized the importance of right to self- determination, democratization, and decentralization for good governance, transparency and accountability, while it sought to push for a fair distribution of power and wealth, improve security for resettlement, and support civil society particularly in southern Sudan, along with promoting democratic constitution and harmonize SPLM/A’s political, military, and administrative structures. Through the agreement the EDF committed to the integration of its forces into the SPLM/A and an immediate end of hostilities oriented towards the movement, while highlighting the importance of political and administrative integration, reconciliation, and the reform of the humanitarian wing of both organizations (EDF-SPLM/A, 2004). The Nairobi Declaration marked the formal end of hostilities between the main Equatorian military organization and the SPLM/A.

4. Aspects to State-Building since the CPA and Some Equatorian Responses

Aspects of State-Building since the CPA

The signing of the CPA in January 2005 marked the beginning of the formation of the GoSS and the building of autonomous state structures in southern Sudan. This process was orchestrated by the SPLM/A that had to a large extent converted into the GoSS and continued to dominate the local political scene in southern Sudan similarly as during the war. The establishment of the SPLM/A authority in the areas that had remained under government control during the war was met with hopeful weariness. However, the first years of the GoSS in Equatoria were characterized by incidents of harassment, violence, and asset and land grabbing, often involving members of the SPLM/A security apparatus, along with highly visible nepotism in the political institutions and corruption by some SPLM/A leaders which has often been attributed to their so-called enduring “bush mentality”.

In July 2011 the six-year CPA interim period is to culminate in South Sudan’s declaration of independence. However, despite external support for state-building and oil financing, the GoSS continues to suffer from many of the same shortcomings it has since the signing of CPA. It has been unable to match the high development expectations of “Equatorians” and sections of the population since 2005, and continues to suffer from nepotism and corruption, oil dependent economy, land and internal border disputes, inability to provide protection, and transformation of the security apparatus into a body able to widely endorse human rights, while maintaining highly centralized and exclusive political structure and climate centered on

10 the SPLM/A. Marginalization of SPLM/A leaders since April 2010 elections has generated large-scale violence, as have forcible disarmament campaigns, cattle rustling, and ethnic tensions. Moreover, the bloated public service (including the security apparatus) has been used to accommodate constituencies and co-opt possible armed challengers to the extent that its salaries have become increasingly difficult to sustain and it continues to suffer from lack of institutional and human resources capacity.

Critics have pointed out that instead of pushing the pledged decentralization, the SPLM/A has sought to consolidate its position with a pretext of ensuring transparent elections and securing the January 2011 referendum. The SPLM/A’s position as the NCP’s junior partner and as the CPA negotiation partner of the GoS, may have been deliberately used to postpone elections and post-referendum negotiations and this way ensure the continuing SPLM/A hegemony of the GoSS. The access to oil receipts, foreign aid, and investment have backed the strengthening of the SPLM/A behind the GoSS and has to an extent prevented the opening of the political space.

The South-South reconciliation has lacked a comprehensive strategy. It has consisted of a number of violent disarmament campaigns, with a more focused effort for demobilization and reintegration having started only in 2009. In addition, as a two-way power- and wealth- sharing deal the CPA is intentionally silent about the atrocities and injustices committed during the war, which has been met by almost equal absence of public debate about transitional justice to address these issues. Finally, since 2005 it has been habitual for the GoSS officials to repeat that “we have to get to know each other” in southern Sudan and that cattle-rustling and “tribalism” will disappear through modernization. Despite a number of challenges faced by the current SPLM/A orchestrated state-building project, the GoSS and its external partners have sought to promote a perception of successful (re)construction similarly to what has been the case in Sierra Leone.

Some “Equatorian” Strategies towards SPLM/A Imposed Order

The above political and economic dynamics in post-war southern Sudan have led to a number of grievances in Equatoria which the locals have sought to confront through a number of strategies.

11 First, Equatorians have sought to capitalize on SPLM/A’s pledged commitment to decentralization. From the 2001 Equatorian Conference onwards, the Equatorian leaders have sought to push for decentralization of local government from inside the movement. Some of them have pressured for a legal framework to protect Equatorians locally against the SPLA excesses. This has been somewhat successful as the local institutions have been to a large extent handed to locals. However, while this has devolved some decision-making power from the GoSS to the local level, it has not remedied the concentration of resources for the SPLM/A and the GoSS and continues to deprive local administrations in this sense. Those local leaders who have had more access to resources are the ones who continue to maintain strong SPLM/A affiliations and are part of the GoSS or at the highest levels of governments of the regions.

Second, faced with harassment or violent incidents by former rebels or members of of the security apparatus, “Equatorians” particularly in Juba have often resorted to silent protest. This appears being motivated in many cases by cultural behavioral norms along with education (which drastically differ from Dinka and Nuer patterns of behavior) and also a certain sentiment of powerlessness against physical violence from the dominant actors some of who continue to carry weapons. Although many “Equatorians” in Juba and elsewhere have suffered from land grabbing, and have previously been defiant about resorting to the courts to reinforce their property rights, the situation has improved in this regard. There is an increasing amount of stories of court decisions that have endorsed the property rights of the rightful owner in land disputes. This has elevated legitimacy of the GoSS justice institutions among some “Equatorians”.

Third, the GoSS is experiencing a severe shortage of qualified personnel capable of running functioning ministries, commissions, the parliament, and other public administrations. This has allowed some space for “Equatorians” in the state apparatus, because they continue to enjoy a higher percentage of educated population than their southern counterparts due to having been educated in diaspora in great numbers. However, despite their qualifications Equatorians continue to be represented as a minority, as many find nepotism and favoritism in hiring “tribal” and unfair, not only leaving out “Equatorians” but sections of the Dinka, the Nuer, and others. Also, those “Equatorians” occupying higher echelons in the political institutions are often controlled by their Nilotic inferiors and continuously need to remind an external observer that they are an example of equitable representation of “Equatorians”. Yet,

12 the key GoSS and SPLM/A positions have not been open to “Equatorians” as they have been carefully distributed. The response to corruption and nepotism largely by “Equatorians” has been periodically present in the local media, particularly during the 2006-8 period when corruption was highly visible, but it has faded after 2008 possibly in part due to the more sophisticated strategies of offenders and the security apparatus pressure on the local media.

Fourth, many Equatorians were taken back by the April 2011 elections. Although many had subscribed to the process despite it being mainly as an expression of the alignment of SPLM/A strongmen’s constituencies, they were disappointed because the SPLM/A supported candidate became the Governor of Central Equatoria against more popular Alfred Ladu Gore who had not been endorsed by SPLM as its official candidate. Similar dynamics led to the election of in Eastern Equatoria, but the SPLM/A was unable to prevent the election of Bangasi in Western Equatoria as the only successful independent candidate. This appears to a large extent have been facilitated by intensive awareness campaign, media coverage, and extensive local support for Bakosoro, which the SPLM/A that is not strong in Western Equatoria was unable to overcome. Many “Equatorians” have pointed to fraud and intimidation by the security apparatus in the elections, which has eroded the legitimacy of the GoSS along with local political institutions and has discouraged direct contact with the government except when necessary. However, public demands for development, such as infrastructure and services, improved food, disaster, physical security, continue, and these have been joined by the voices of some of the hundreds of thousands of Equatorian returnees who have resettled in the region after the CPA. Although the establishment of the GoSS has led to enormous growth in Juba, many parts of the Greater Equatoria region remain almost untouched since 2005.

Fifth, there appears to be a wide consensus among “Equatorians” that the momentum for armed struggle has passed. Many feel that despite the long “Equatorian” tradition of fighting against externally imposed centralized authority for local self-determination, armed opposition is not an option anymore as the local population consists of ever larger sections of returnees who did not participate in war and because the SPLM/A orchestrated political order has become relatively stable particularly in the central areas of Equatoria. Although some see the SPLM/A as having turned tables from an approach promoting unity to claim secession as its paramount objective, many Equatorians feel that the current SPLM/A-GoSS order can only be transformed peacefully from within through political demands and reforms. Also, despite

13 the large majority of Equatorians having adopted a stand for an independent South, it is difficult to assess to what extent this has to do with the Anya Nya legacy or with the SPLM/A-GoSS as a dominant political force pushing for independence. To an extent, it appears that in many cases voting for secession was not only a personal choice but influenced by the political environment in which the attempt by the dominant forces was to exert a sentiment of secession as the only possible expression of patriotism in the cause of the South.

Finally, the frustrations related to the current SPLM/A directed political order canalize to an extent as a sentiment for “Equatorian” unity. Fed by the war and the interim period experience, this widespread feeling has been expressed in political rhetoric, particularly by opinion pieces and cartoons in electronic media (to a less extent in the printed media due to political sensitivity), often voicing accusations of “tribal” domination (LA Times, 2007; Appendix).

It has also been articulated through sentiments of Equatorian nationalism and its moderate form has surfaced in an attempt to improve the position of “Equatorians” within southern Sudan. For instance, while pledging loyalty to the GoSS, the governors of three Equatorian areas came together on 23-5 February 2011 for a Greater Equatoria Conference in Yambio to discuss security, development and good governance in the future of Equatoria as part of the independent South Sudan. In this context, governor Bakosoro did not fail to emphasize that the three leaders “. . . tackled discussions on the future of greater Equatoria after the referendum and the position of Equatorians in the new nation that have been granted”, and governor Konga added that “this [conference] is the beginning of fighting the marginalization of Equatorian . . . [as] . . . I am optimistic that Equatoria region will participate fully in the new nation”.10 While another Greater Equatoria Conference was planned in Juba in the end of March 2011 to build on these declarations, they show that the increasing coming together of “Equatorians” is a strategy that draws from common grievances and aims to promote the position of “Equatorians” relative to other groups within the process of state-building for the new state of South Sudan.

10 Quoted in Sudan Tribune (2011a) and Sudan Tribune (2011b). 14 5. Conclusion

This paper has sought to highlight issues related to state-building in the southern borderlands of Sudan. It has focused on the challenges to the SPLM/A orchestrated state-building project and related local grievances in Equatoria, which may become sources of instability if they remain unaddressed. State-building in the region that was devastated by two long periods of war is not an easy task, but the failure to meet the expectations of the local population has led to antagonism towards the SPLM/A controlled GoSS.

This paper has shown the relevance of the historical continuities of governance in the southern Sudanese borderlands for the current state-building endeavor. It has argued that there is a need to open up the political space and extending development particularly against the historical dynamics of marginalization and exclusion, which is highly relevant in the recent past in Equatoria.

The paper has also highlighted some coping strategies by “Equatorians” when faced by the SPLM/A directed state-building. It has been demonstrated how grievances play into these strategies, which in themselves underline the importance of (re)constructing a state that takes into account these grievances. Otherwise, these dynamics may become a source of political instability.

Although Equatorians hardly pose an armed threat to the government, their demands for democratization, good governance, and development need to be respected if more politically pluralistic and stable political order is to be advanced in the newly independent South Sudan.

15 6. Appendix

Source: South Sudan Nation online edition

16 7. References

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