THE FIRST CAMPAIGNS IN .

by

Mary Elizabeth Kerr

B.A., University of Britisn Columbia, 1966.

A Thesis Submitted.in Partial Fulfilment of

The Requirements for the degree of,

Master of, Arts

in the Department

of

Classics

We accept this thesis as conforming to the I j required" standard.

The University of British Columbia

May, 1969. In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and Study.

I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thes,is for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of

The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada ABSTRACT

This thesis considers one theatre of the

for a limited number of years. The period of the Spanish

theatre extends from the beginning of 's career in 221 B.C. until the deaths of Gnaeus and Publius Scipio in 211 B.C.

The following chronology is adopted:

237 - Hamilcar begins the reconquest of Spain.

231 - A Roman embassy visits Hamilcar; an agreement is reached

between Saguntum and Rome.

229 - Hamilcar dies; Hasdrubal acclaimed commander.

226 - The Ebro treaty.

222/221- Hasdrubal murdered; Hannibal new leader in Spain.

220 - Roman political intervention at Saguntum.

219 - Hannibal attacks and captures Saguntum.

218 - War declared between Rome and .

218 - Hannibal marches overland from New Carthage to northern .

Publius to Spain to meet Hannibal; turns back at Rhone River;

sends Gnaeus and troops to Spain.

217 - Romans victorious at sea off mouth of Ebro.

Publius1 command in Spain extended;

Romans obtain hostage's from Saguntum.

216 - Hasdrubal occupied in south; minor Roman advances south of Ebr

215 - Siege of Ibera.

214 - Romans recover Saguntum.

213-211- Gradual Roman advance into Carthaginian territory.

211 - Death of Scipios; retreat of Remans to Ebro River. -ii-

TABLE OP C ONTENTS

CBAPTER ONE THE STAGE IS RESET •

CHAPTER TWO THE PRE-WAR YEARS 221 to 218

CHAPTER THREE THE SCIPIOS IN SPAIN

CHAPTER FOUR THE LAST CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER FIVE THE OBJECTIVES -ii'i-

LIST OP MAPS

ILLYRIA - FACING PAGE 5.

NORTHERN ITALY - FACING PAGE 7.

SPAIN AND - FACING PAGE 11. \ -iv-

ACKN OWLED GMENT

I am greatly Indebted to PROFESSOR

W.J. DUSING for his help, patience and

understanding in writing this thesis. I am

also indebted to PROFESSOR M.F. McGREGOR

for his encouragement and help. (1)

CHAPTER I

Humiliated by their defeat by the Romans and exhausted by

a savage war with their own allies and mercenaries, the Cartha• ginians, in 237, B.C., had to look beyond the coast of North

Africa to restore their fallen fortunes.1 Asa in the Barcid

family came to the fore to lead the people. With the approval

of the home government, Hamilcar led the remnants of the army back to the former possessions in Spain. But rather than guiding his people away from their late antagonists, Hamilcar only suc• ceeded in bringing the two nations back into mortal conflict. This

study proposes to look at only a small section of the second and greater ocnfliot. Tho particular theatre ia Spain in the ysara

221-211 - the years of Hannibal's rise and Rome's early campaigns

outside Italy against the Carthaginian. Before we begin the story

of Hannibal, the stage in Spain must be set and a look must be

taken at certain Roman relations on the international scene.

When Hamilcar set out for Spain he was not facing a great unknown. Spain had once been the most lucrative possession of the

Carthaginian empire. Tradition has it that Carthage itself was 2 founded by a princess of the Phoenicians in 814. Then in the

eighth, or perhaps the seventh century, the Phoenicians estab•

lished a colony at Gades, on the southwest coast of Spain. The

island of Gades was the perfect trading post - well-protected, with good harbour, and at the estuary of a large river coming

from the wealthy interior. In an age of metals, Spain, with her

silver, gold, copper, and iron deposits as well as her access to

1. All dates, unless otherwise noted, are B.C. 2. See Warmingtcn, Carthage, p. 22. (2)

the tin of Britain, was a trader's paradise. The Phoenicians

were not the only adventurers from the east in this western area.

The Greeks from the mainland and Asia Minor were quickly moving

in. By 600 the Phocaeans had settlements at Himeroscopium and

Mainake as woll as a large town at Massilia. About 600 Carthage

began to rise to a position of power and preeminence in the west

and assumed the leadership of the Phoenician territories when Tyre

fell to Nebuchadnezzar in 573.

The most prosperous area of Spain at the time was the king- 4 dom of Tartessus. For a time Tartessus flourished - for approx•

imately 80 years, between 620 and 540 - and supplied the wants of

the Phoenicians at Gades, A.bdera and Sexi as well as the Phocaeans at Himerosc opium and Mainake. But about 540 the Phoenicians des• troyed Tartessus and with it Mainake. The Phocaeans soon found themselves driven north of Cape Palos on the east coast of Spain.

Not to be beaten they developed overland routes to the tin trade but were never quite successful.

In 535 the Phocaeans found themselves faced, outside the harbour of Alalia, by the combined Carthaginian and Etruscan fleets. Although the Phocaeans won the battle, they lost the day and were forced to give up Alalia. The Carthaginians took Sar• dinia and the Etruscans Corsica. For the next two centuries the

Phocaeans contented themselves with developing settlements and trading posts along the north and west shores of the Tyrrhenian

Sea.

Etruria's days as a partner of the Carthaginians against the

Greeks were numbered. By 509 the Carthaginians were making com-

3. See Y/armington, op. cit., p. 21. 4. Whether Tartessus'was a city, state, kingdom, or the name of a tribal chieftain remains an unsettled question. For the purpose of this paper it was a tribe of people living along the Baetis river. • Their rich mines and tin routes attracted traders. (3) mercial treaties with a small settlement on the Tiber, a set• tlement, which was slowly to engulf Etruria.^ In 472, the Etrus• cans were overcome by the Cymearis at sea. In the commercial field only Carthaginians and the Sicilian Greeks, were left. • Once they came to the leadership of the old Phoenician ter• ritories in the west, the Carthaginians gradually closed off the far west from intruders, notably the Greeks. On her own Carthage spread over the north coast of Africa, to the straits, whence it was a short day's travel to Gades. Por many years there had been posts on the Balearic Islands and the island.of Ebusus belonged to the empire. After Alalia there was Sardinia to add to the chain of stepping stones. Greeks and Carthaginians had for some• time managed to co-exist and even trade on Sicily, but after Himera (480) this was impossible. These boundaries - the straits of Gibraltar, Balearic islands, western Sicily and Carthage itself, enabled the African Phoenicians to keep all others from the extreme west. The quarantined area was rigidly guarded until just before the outbreak of the first Punic War. During the years of the war itself interest in and upkeep of Spain were forgotten in the face of more pressing problems.

With this past history in mind, Hamilcar sailed to Spain in 237 to reconquer what had belonged to Carthage since her founding. But it was not only wealth in a monetary sense that he was after; Spain was the home of numerous mountain tribes who were often wil• ling to volunteer for military service. Within the old Cartha• ginian sphere there were countless subject people who could be

5. The problem of dating is still undecided. See Walbank, Commentary on ; p. 337-345 and H. Last, Cambridge • Ancient History, VII, p. 859.-862. 6. Polybius, III, 10, 5. (4)

drafted. Great sources of money to hire mercenaries would come from other areas. And, too, in a rather unobtrusive manner, the Carthaginian commander hoped to weld together a great army trained 7 in some of the most rugged territory available. Landing at Gades, Hamilcar proceeded to reorganize the old Spanish territory, which at its height extended from in the west to Cape Nao in the east, from the southern coast to the Sierra Morena Mountains in the north. The oldest of Phoenician areas - Gades, Sexi, Abdera - came back to the Carthaginian al• legiance with no hesitation. Neither Polybius nor allotted o much space to the Spanish exploits of Hamilcar. He operated in Spain from hisx crossing in 237 to his death in 229 - ten years before the beginning of the Second Punic War. Polybius said: In this country he spent about nine years during which he reduced many Iberian tribes -to obedience either by force of arms or by diplo• macy, and finally met with an end worthy of his high achievements, dying bravely In a battle against one of the most warlike and powerful tribes, after freely exposing his person to q danger on the field. Livy placed Hamilcar»s death at Castrum Album, Alicante, and Diodorus suggested Alicante as the limit of Hamilcar's advance.^® Prom the subsequent exploits of Hasdrubal and Hannibal, Hamilcar's conquests appear to have been confined to the older province, per• haps not as far into the interior as formerly. Hasdrubal had gone to Spain as Hamilcar's. chief officer and 7. See Polybius III, 10, and Warming.t on, OP . cit., p. 205. 8. Polybius II, 1, 7; Livv, XXI, 1. 9. Polybius II, 1, 7. 10. Livy, XXIV, 41; Diodorus, XXV, 10, 3.

(5)

son-in-law. When Hamilcar died, his election was apparently ac•

claimed by the military and approved by the home government.^

He advanced up the east coast, establishing new headquarters at

New Carthage. This site offered better access to the unconquered areas of Spain and was cn a sea route to Carthage. Unlike his father-in-law, Hasdrubal preferred to use diplomacy rather than force. His eight years of rule were brought to a sudden end by an 12 assassin's knife in 221.

When Hasdrubal took up the Carthaginian command in Spain, the 13

Romans were involved in a war with the Illyrians. In 230, two

Roman legates had been sent to Illyria to Queen Teuta to protest the attacks Illyrian pirates were making on Italian shipping.

The queen took the charges lightly, saying that private affairs were no concern of Illyrian royalty. One of the legates, unable to hold his temper, told the queen that Rome would not let the in- justices continue unpunished. On the return voyage to Rome, the 14 ambassadorial ship was overtaken and the outspoken legate killed.

Next spring, 229, the two consuls, Gnaeus Pulvius and Aulus

Postumius, left for Illyria, one by sea from Rome, the other ac•

ross to Brundisium by land then by ship to Illyria. The consuls were successful in relieving the Illyrian siege of Greek towns along the Adriatic seaboard. Such towns and others came under 15 the Roman "friendship" and protection. By the end of the sea• son the Romans had set up a ruler, Demetrius, in Pharcs, had driven Teuta as far north as Rhison and, on returning to Epi- damnus, had divided their troops, leaving Postumius with a small 11. Polybius, II, 1. 12. Polybius, II, 36. 13. Polybius, II, 2. 14. Polybius, II, 8, 15. Polybius', II, 11. (6)

force at Epidamnus for the winter, while the othe.r consul re• turned home with a greater portion of the army. The following spring, 228, Teuta sent to the Romans of• fering to come to terms. At last the dread of the seas, the II- lyrians, had been overcome and confined. The terms of surrender were that Illyrians would not sail beyond Lissus with more than two unarmed vessels. Por the time being the Romans were a great comfort to the Greeks. Rome was no longer a little village on the Tiber. Her al• lies in the south of Italy had just involved her in her first 17 direct affair with the Greeks. Now her northern neighbours were calling. The attention of all was drawn first to the , who were again menacing Italy, and, .second, to Massilia, who was complaining of the encroaching power of Carthage. Rather than let the two situations come to a head at the same time,'the Rom• ans decided to visit the new Carthaginian commander first, and deal with the Gauls later. ° When Hamilcar died in 229, he was more than likely campaign- 19 ing In the neighbourhood of Alicante. Presumably, as the fight• ing seemed to be fierce, he had not yet consolidated this area. By the time the Romans visited Hasdrubal he had managed to move his headquarters as far north as New Carthage. The area he would then be operating in would be completely new to the Carthaginians. Massilia would have become excited about this Carthaginian advance for two reasons. First, even in the days of the grea-t Cartha• ginian empire in Spain, Massilia had ports of trade along the .. northern coast and had established a few colonies of her. own, 16. Polybius, II, 12. 17. Polybius, II, 12, 7. 18. Polybius, II, 13, 6. 19. Diodorus, XXV, 10, 3. 1 (7)

particularly Rhode, and Emporium. Secondly, when the Cartha•

ginian influence in Spain had declined before the first war with

Rome, Massiiiot traders had taken the opportunity to move south

again little by little. Observing the rate at which Hasdrubal 20

seemed to be coming north, they had reason to be concerned.

With the Massilian entreaties in their minds, the envoys

approached Hasdrubal. Quite amicably they decided that a bound•

ary should be chosen, one that "the Carthaginians engaged not to

cress in arms."2-1- This boundary, the Ebro river, would guarantee

the security of Massilia's main colonies. At the same time, it

provided Hasdrubal with a large area of unconquered territory.

All parties appeared satisfied for the moment, Rome, with the

safety of the west secured and assured of no interference from

the Carthaginians, turned her full attention to the Gauls.

Por many years the Gauls had been threatening Rome. The

cause of the outbreak in 225 was the division of the lands of 22

Picenum in 232. The Gauls became alarmed at this action and

decided to unite against the Romans. The main tribes involved

v/ere the Boii, Insubres and Gaesatae. Por some seven years the

Gauls busied themselves with preparations, causing the Romans so

much alarm that they regularly sent detachments up to the front•

iers. Polybius, speaking of the furor evoked by Gauls, said:

This movement of the Gauls contributed in no

small measure to the rapid and unimpeded sub•

jugation of Spain by the Carthaginians; for

the Romans, as I stated above, regarded this

matter as of more urgency, since the danger 20. See Kramer, American Journal of Philology, LXDC (1948) p. 1-26, for the importance of Massilia". 21. Polybius, II, 13; Livy, XXI, 27, "ut finis utriusque imperii esset amnis Hiberus..." 22. Polybius.II. 21.8. SRA «I «« w«. i*«.nv OD. cit.. o. 192. (8)

was on their flank, and were ,c ompelled to ne•

glect the affairs of Spain until they had dealt

with the Gauls. They therefore secured them•

selves against the Carthaginians by the treaty

with Hasdrubal, the terms of which I stated

above, and threw their whole effort into the

struggle with their enemies in Italy, con•

sidering it their main interest to bring this 23

to decisive conclusion.

In 225 the Gauls came in through Etruria. The Romans fielded two armies in Italy: Lucius Aemilius, the consul, had his army \ \

.at Ariminum, a praetor commanded another in Etruria; and the other consul, Gaius Atilius, was in Sardinia. The first skirmish v/as fought outside Faesulae, where the Romans would have been worsted but for the timely arrival of Lucius Aemilius. The Gauls then decided to retreat to their own territory, unburden themselves of their booty, and then perhaps return. They retreated through

Etruria with Lucius and the two Italian armies closely behind them. In the meantime Gaius Atilius had landed his- forces at Pisa and was headed south along the same road. Near the town of Tela- mon the three armies met in what Polybius called a "spectacle

strange and marvellous."24 jn one bloody slaughter the Gauls were massacred; only the Gallic cavalry escaped. The Romans suffered many losses, including the consul Gaius Atilius. The,'other consul then overran the territory of the Boii before returning in triumph 25 t o R ome . Por the next three seasons, 224-222, the Romans continued

23. Polybius, II, 22. 24. Polybius, II, 29. 25. Polybius, II, 31. (9)

campaigns against the Gauls in the Po Valley. In. 224 Quintus

Fulvius and Titus Manlius overpowered the Boii. Publius Furius

and Gaius Flaminius, in 223, attacked the Insubres, with little

success at the start, but achieved a final victory before the

season finished. ' in 222, the offered to accept any terms, 28 but the consuls advised against peace. Again the Roman armies

invaded the territory of the Insubres. No major battle took place; most of the fighting consisted of sieges and attempts to raise sieges. Finally, the leaders of the Insubres, with no alternative left them, surrendered. In four years the Remans had managed to put down their most fearsome enemy.

In Spain, in the meantime, Hasdrubal had continued tho conquest

of that province by means of diplomacy rather than force of arms.2® In 221,he was killed by a Celt who had a personal grudge against 30 the leader. *His successor, chosen by the army, was the young

Hannibal, son of the great Hamilcar, and more than just the image of his father. But before we meet Hannibal, we must note one more international event that helps to form the backdrop for the impend• ing drama.

In the year 219, the actions of Demetrius of Pharos drew the attention of Rome to Greece again.^1 in the spring of the year the Romans sent a force to reduce Demetrius, who had been set up as ruler of Pharos by the Romans during the first Illyrian war.

He had been attacking those cities freed from the Illyrians in 229.

Again piracy was flourishing on the Adriatic. The Remans felt it necessary to secure their rear before they could deal adequately 251 Polybius, II, 31, 8. : 27. Polybius, II, 32, 1. 28. Polyuius, II, 34. 29. Polybius, II, 36, 2. 30. Polybius, II, 36. 1; Livy, XXI, 2. 31. Polybius, III, 16, 1. 32. Polybius, II, 11, 17. (10) with the situation in Spain. The consuls attacke.d and in seven days took Dimale, where Demetrius had a large garrison; they then turned their attention to Demetrius at Pharos. ^ Using a trick, the consuls gained the city and forced Demetrius to flee towards Macedon, where he sought refuge.^ Late in the summer the consuls returned to Rome', satisfied that the eastern area v/as secure.. Having hastily sketched the main concerns of the Romans and Carthaginians between the two wars, we now move on to the fortunes of Spain between the debut of Hannibal in 221 and the death of the two elder Scipios in 211. . .

33. Polybius, III, 18, 5. 34. Polybius, III, 19. 35. Polybius, III, 19, 12. — - . - -~r Tf^^~l:^V;7^r^W^?^:(X^Jf!^

^7

MASSILIAt tf4 If

Alalia)

M)lbia Hi

^^^^

C./Voo (11)

CHAPTER II

With the death of Hasdrubal in 221, the command of the

Carthaginian army in Spain fell to Hannibal, son of Hamilcar

Barca.1 In 238 Hannibal, then nine years old,2 had accompanied

his father to Spain. Through his diligence and energy in even

subordinate duties, Hannibal won the respect and admiration of

not only the common soldiers but the officers as well. Livy's

tribute to the commander has far overshadowed his condemnation

and has kept the greatness of the general alive for some twenty-

one hundred years. So when Hasdrubal died, the army voted the

energetic young son of Hamilcar into command. The choice of the

soldiers was unanimously approved by the Carthaginian assembly.4

Then the army proclaimed Hannibal, who, al•

though still very young, was greatly beloved

of the soldiers, their general, and the Carth•

aginian Senate confirmed the appointment.

Hannibal followed in the footsteps of his father, subduing

the natives by foroe of arms. However, like Hasdrubal, he bound himself and the peoples of Spain by a political marriage.5 None•

theless, in 221, he felt it necessary to resort to arms to main•

tain what he had inherited; he attacked the , a tribe

living on the upper reaches of the Anas,6 storming and taking

their capital, Althaea or Carteia. Satisfied with his success,

Hannibal returned to his winter quarters in New Carthage for the winter 221-220.

1. Livy, XXI, 3. 2. Polybius, II, 1, 6. 3. Livy, XXI, 4. 4. Polybius, III, 13, 4. 5. Livy, XXIV, 41 6. Polybius III, 13, 5-14, 8; Wa'lbank, ad loo. 7. Polybius III, 13, 5; Livy, XXI, 5. (12)

In 220, the Carthaginian set out to subjugate the central

area of southern Spain, overpowering the at Hermandica

and Arbocala.® As he was returning to New Carthage, he was at•

tacked on the Tagus river by the , who had been incited

by fugitives of the Vaccaei and Olcades.9 Because of his ele•

phants and cavalry, he easily overcame the unorganized army of

the Carpetani. Thus Hannibal returned to New Carthage at the end

of his second campaign (220), the master of southern Spain, save

for the city of Saguntum.^0

When Hannibal assumed command of the Spanish forces there

was one limit on the extent of this power. The treaty, made in

the time of Hasdrubal, which set the Ebro river as the boundary

to Carthaginian expansion, would have been binding on Hannibal.11

At some time during the command of Hasdrubal, 229-221, an

agreement had peen made between that commander and Rome. Polybius

recorded its contents:

6uo7iep ana xtj) diaTtpeapeuaduevot rcpbs tbv

'Aa6pouj3av Tioir)aaa^ai auv$T}Hag, ev at? TT)V

nev aXX.Tiv 'iBnpiav Tiapecaoamjov, xbv 6e

naXouuevov "iSnpa uotanbv oux e6eu KapxT}-

6ovCou

e£T}v£Y*<*v xbv Ttpbs TOUS xaxa Tt)v 'ixaXiav

Ke\xou? TioXenov.

12.

8. Hermandica and Arbocala probably on the mid-waters of the Douro. river, modern Salamanca and Toro. Walbank, op. cit. p. 317 9. Livy, XXI, 5. 1 0. Livy, XXI, 5. 1 1. Polybius, III, 21, 1, has the Carthaginians denying the validity of the Ebro treaty as Hasdrubal had not ratified it with the home government. 1 2. Polybius, II, .13, 7. (13)

Livy, of the same event, said:

Cum hoc Hasdrubale, quia mirae artis in

sollicitandis gentibus imperioque suo

iungendis fuerat, foedus renouauerat

populus Romanus ut finis utriusque imperii

esset amnis Hiberus Saguntinisque mediis

inter Imperia duorum populorum libertas

seruaretur.-^

And Appian,

thereupon the Saguntines and other Greeks who

were settled in Spain had recourse to the

Romans, and a boundary was fixed to the

Carthaginian possessions in that country,

namely, that they should not cross the river

Ebro, and a clause to this effect was in•

serted in the treaty between the Romans and the

Carthaginians

And elsewhere,

The Saguntines ... and all the other Greeks

who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Emporia© and

in other parts of Spain, having apprehensions

for their safety, sent ambassadors to Rome.

The Senate, who were unwilling to see the Cartha•

ginian power augmented, sent an embassy to

Carthage. It was agreed between them that the

limit of the Carthaginian power in Spain should

be the river Ebro; that beyond that river the

13. Livy, XXI, 2, 7. 14. Appian, Harm. 2; in the time of Hamilcar. The Saguntines were rather than Greeks. Per commentary on Livy, XXI, 7, see C.A.H., VII, p. 790. (14)

Romans should not carry war against the

subjects of Carthage, nor should the Cartha•

ginians cross it in arms; and that the Sagun•

tines and the other Greeks in Spain should

remain free and autonomous. And these agree•

ments were added to the treaties between 15

Rome and Carthage.

Both Polybius and Appian agreed that the Carthaginians were not to cross the river ETU UOXEUIP . Although the three authors dated the treaty to the time of Hasdrubal, with the exception of

Appian in Hann.2, Appian alone claimed the arrangements were made between the two states, Rome and Carthage. Polybius and Livy recorded that Hasdrubal made the treaty. Appian included other.

Greek cities as well a3 Saguntum in the group that appealed to

Rome. Polybius1 treaty made no mention of the rest of Spain.

Livy placed the Saguntines between Roman and Carthaginian inter• ests.

It is accepted generally that a treaty known as the Ebro treaty was agreed to in the time of Hasdrubal. This commander assumed control of affairs in Spain In 229. As mentioned earlier, the Romans were occupied by the Gauls betv/een 225 and 222.

Polybius' records the treaty just before the war with the Gauls;

for the present they did not venture to

impose orders on Carthage, or to go to war

with her, because the threat of a Celtic

invasion was hanging over"them, the attack

15. Appian, Hisp. 7. during the time of Hasdrubal. 16. However Appian places Saguntum north of the river Ebro/ between that river and the Pyrenees. (15)

being indeed expected from day to day.

They decided, then, to smooth down and

conciliate Hasdrubal in the first place,

and then to attack the Celts...^ 18

Livy simply dates it to the career of Hasdrubal.

If the Romans were involved with a Gallic war between 225 and 222, they would have little time for Spain. It is unlikely

that they would make such an agreement between the end of the

Gallic war and the death of Hasdrubal in 221 either. Therefore it is probable, as indeed Polybius claimed, that it pre-dated the Gallic War of 225. The generally accepted date is 226, the year just before the war.

The reasons for the treaty, according to Polybius, were the growing power of Carthage and the threat of a Gallic invasion.

Hasdrubal had not yet reached the Ebro river. He had consoli• dated the coastal fringes but not the central area, as Hannibal's campaigns of 221 and 220 show. w The boundary of his advances was set at the Ebro, perhaps because it was the first natural boundary that would offer protection to Massilia's ports, of

Rhode and Emporium nor tn of the Ebro. The Ebro boundary also prevented Hasdrubal from coming into direct contact with any of the Gallic tribes on the north side of the Pyrenees.21 The treaty would appear then to have set a limit to the Carthaginian advance at a time when Rome was. unable to give her full at• tention to the problem because of a threatened invasion.

The terms of the treaty can not be established with cer-. tainty. Polybius said that the Carthaginians undertook not to go 17. Polybius, II, 13, 5. 18. Livy, XXI, 2, 7. 19. Polybius, II, 13, 5. 20. Livy, XXI, 5. 21. See C.A.H., VII. o. 808. (16)

beyond the river. Livy and Appian felt that the terms of

agreement bound both sides. That Rome would try to pressure

OA

Carthage on the eve of an invasion seems rather unlikely.

Polybius himself said that Rome conciliated Hasdrubal because

she could not now afford to go to war with Carthage. V/hen the

Roman delegation met with Hasdrubal, they must have made some

promise of equal weight.. P.M. Heichelheim suggests, on linguistic

grounds, that there were two copies of the Ebro treaty, one in

Latin and one in Phoenician:

the ,version of the Ebro treaty only

provided against moves of the Carthaginians

and Romans beyond the Ebro with warlike

intentions. The Punic version, cn the other

hand, cculd, In addition, be interpreted as

to exclude Roman inimical interference in civil and legal strife to the south of the 25

river.

In other words, the Latin version said armed, military interfer•

ence but the Punic version or translation used a word that meant

armed interference which at the same time could mean or imply

political interference.

Thus this treaty, by which both powers agreed not to interfere militarily in the territory of the other, was to keep Hannibal to

the south of the Ebro river. However, there was but one impor•

tant town in southern Spain that he had not conquered. This was

the city of Saguntum. 22. Polybius, II, 13, 7. 23. Livy, XXI, 2, 7; Appian, Hisp. 7. 24. On the eve of the Gallic invasion of Italy. Por the importance of and magnitude of the Gallic invasion see Polybius, II, 22-24. 25. Heichelheim, Historia, III, (1954), pp. 211-219. His argument is based on linguistic grounds and the possible Semitic root- word for the known Latin. (IV)

Saguntum was situated on the east coast of Spain between

New Carthage and the Ebro river. Some time in the year 221,

the people of Saguntum called on Rome to act as a negotiator in 2 6

an internal dispute. The reason, given by Polybius, for the

intervention of the Romans was a long standing relationship be•

tween Saguntum and Rome:

it is an acknowledged fact that the Saguntines,

a good many years before the time of Hannibal,

placed themselves under the protection of Rome.

The surest proof of this, and the one accepted

by the Carthaginians themselves, is that when

a civil disturbance broke out at Saguntum they

did not call in the mediation of the Cartha•

ginians, although they were close at hand and

already concerning themselves with Spanish

matters, but that of the Romans, and with their 27 help set right the affairs of the state. The disturbance was between the pro-Roman and pro-Carthaginians 28 within the city. The Roman intervention cost some of the pro-

Carthaginians their lives. The presence of Rome in Carthaginian territory did not please Hannibal, nor did the deaths of his partisans in Saguntum. Per the moment, however, other matters

occupied his attention.

Again in the following year, 220, the Saguntines called on

Rome. This time, however, the situation was more serious and

of an external nature. Hannibal was trying to make a case 29 against Saguntum. He had stirred up neighbours of the 26. Polybius, III, 30, 2. 27. Polybius, III, 30, 1. 28. Polybius, III, 15, 7. 29. Polybius, III, 15, 8; Livy, XXI, 6; Appian, H|s., VI, 10 (is)

Saguntines against them and then made himself champion of these

peoples. When the Saguntines realized that they v/ere helpless, they sent to Rome for aid. 30 ^ delegation was sent from Italy which, making no headway with Hannibal, proceeded to Carthage 31

to lodge a complaint against Hannibal. War with Carthage now seemed possible.

The most perplexing problem of the Second Punic War is the position of Saguntum in relation to the Ebro treaty. Clearly the city was witoLn the boundaries of the Carthaginian domain.

Polybius reports that an agreement had been made between Rome and Saguntum "a good many years before the time of Hannibal."52

The treaty, whatever its nature, between Rome and Saguntum was then earlier than 221. It is unlikely that Italian affairs would have allowed Rome to intervene in Spanish affairs in the years between 225 and 222. When Rome was trying to conciliate and satisfy Hasdrubal with the Ebro treaty, she would hardly risk his anger by making a separate agreement with a city within the Carthaginian area. Therefore the arrangements must pre-date the Ebro treaty and perhaps even Hasdrubal. The Romans must therefore have been interested in Spain prior to 229 B.C.

To a later Roman charge that Saguntum, as an ally of Rome, was covered by the treaty of 241 which ended the First Punic War, the Carthaginians replied that Saguntum was no ally of Rome in

241 and therefore not covered by that treaty.33 The arrangements between Rome and Saguntum must then date to the period of Hamil• car. It is known, from a fragment of Dio, that the Roman's sent 30. Polybius, III, 15, lj Livy, XXI, 6. 31. Polybius, III, 15, 2-13. 32. Polybius, III, 30, 1. 33. Polybius, III, 21, 4. (19)

an embassy to Hamilcar in 231 to ascertain what he was doing in

Spain. 5^ This would seem an appropriate time for the Romans to

visit Saguntum.

The Romans, for a great many years had been on friendly

terms with Massilia situated just east of the Rhone river.35

This Phocaean settlement had since its founding been at cress-

purposes with Carthage. The growing power of the Barcids caused

much distress at Massilia. Through this city Rome was informed

of and reminded of the situation in Spain. In 231 the Romans no

doubt approached Hamilcar on the insistence of Massilia. Massilia

received her Information from Saguntum which along with Massilia

profited from Spanish trade.

The dating of the agreement between Rome and Saguntum ap•

pears as a minor problem when faced with the content of the agree•

ment. Rome, had interfered in Saguntum's internal problems only when asked. Now when Saguntum was to be swallowed up by Han• nibal, Rome was asked to come to her rescue. If a formal foedus' had been agreed to in 231, Rome would have had a military com• mitment to the Saguntines if the Spanish peoples ever found them•

selves attacked.

It does not seem probable that in 231 the Saguntines would have had any reason for surrendering themselves and their city to the protection of Rome in the manner of dediticli. Hannibal was still much to the south of them.

Whatever the nature of the agreement it was valid for the

34. Dio, fgm. 48, Loeb Edition, V. II, p. 29. 35. Strabo, IV, 1,-5; Diod, XIV, 93, 5. The Romans deposited a golden bowl in the Massllian Treasury at Delphi in 396. .Livy, XXI, 20, 8, calls the Massilians . 36. Polybius, III, 30, 2. (20)

Saguntines and Romans. Possibly it didv not fit into the well

defined treaties of later generations but it did imply certain

responsibilities for the Romans.

When the embassy sent to Hannibal in 220 returned having had little success, the Senate decided that in 219 affairs in

Illyria must again be settled before any action could be taken against Hannibal:

the Senate, adapting their measures to this

. supposition, decided to secure their position

in Illyria, as they foresaw that the war would

be serious and long and the scene of it far \ 37 away from home.

So, in the spring of 219:

the Romans, now moved by these considerations

dispatched a force under Lucius Aemilius just

before summer in the first year of the 140th

Olympiad to operate in Illyria. Hannibal at

the same time quitted New Carthage with his 38

army and advanced towards Saguntum.

Within a matter of weeks news must have arrived at Rome, via Massilia, of the situation at Saguntum. With the two consuls in Illyria no definite stand was taken. On the one hand, Hannibal had not broken the Ebro treaty but Rome would if she sent military aid. On the other hand, the Senators must have been conscious of a moral obligation to Saguntum. Rome alone was powerful en.cugh to help her. And there was some sort of agreement between the. two cities. While the Senate debated and the consuls settled

37. Polybius, III, 16, 1. 38. Polybius, III, 16, 7.-17, 1. (21) affairs in Illyria the Saguntines tried to hold off Hannibal.

At length after eight months of hardship and 39

anxiety he took the city by storm ...

Hannibal then returned to his headquarters in New Carthage, dis• missed his troops and spent the winter preparing for the coming war.40

When the consuls returned in triumph from Illyria in the latter part of 219, the Senate was still debating the issue.*1

Once news of the fall of Saguntum reached Rome, the group within the Senate which advocated the support of Saguntum pressed their point. Despite the fact that the Ebro treaty prohibited armed

Intervention south of the Ebro, Saguntum should have been safe from attack because the city was a friend of #ome. If Rome felt her obligation to a friend did not involve going to her defence, she should not expect other cities to call upon her for alliance and friendship. To those areas of Spain which were pro-Roman through Mass ilia's influence, Rome's lack of action was a sign of poor-faith. In order to redeem her name among these peoples .. she would have to avenge the destruction of Saguntum.

At the. same time Carthage must not be allowed such boldness.

Being told specifically that Saguntum was a friend of Rome and therefore not to be interfered with, Hannibal had none the less gone ahead and assaulted the city. Carthage, rather than repri• manding her general, was actually backing Hannibal in this case.42

39. Polybius, III, 17, 9. 40. Livy, XXI, 21: Polybius, III, 33, 5. 41. Although Polybius, III, 20, 1, would have us believe there was no debate, there would appear to have been a very lengthy discussion of the question. 42. By not giving in to the demands of the Romans, the Carthaginians" accepted responsibility for and expressed support of Hannibal's policy. Polybius III, 33; Livy, XXI, 18. (22)

Finally the Senate agreed that the time had come to put an

end to the Carthaginian advances. A distinguished delegation was sent to Africa with instructions to declare war if the Car• thaginian government accepted responsibility for the actions of

Hannibal. The delegation left Rome perhaps very early in 218, as the consuls of 219 were members of the embassy and Hannibal, before he left New Carthage in the spring knew that war had been 44 declared.

Hannibal now had cause to turn his vengeance and hatred upon the Romans. Bound by an oath taken at the age of nine, he had been brought up with one thought in mind, the destruction of 45

Rome. His goal was no dcubt Rome or else he would not have been prepared to cross the in 218. To attempt the crossing, a person must have considered the difficulties in detail. Hamil• car had restored the old possessions of Spain and replenished the Carthaginian treasury. Hasdrubal had extended the boundaries of his province almost to the limit. Hannibal had inherited from his predecessors a large, loyal and well trained army devoted to him and his family. The only power that could oppose him was

Rome, and Carthage had just accepted the Roman declaration of war.

turn Romanus sinu ex toga facto, 'Hie' inquit,

'vobis bellum et pacem portamus; utrum placet

sumiteSub hanc vocem haud minus ferociter,

daret utrum vellet, succlamatum estj et cum,

is iterum sinu effuso bellumdare dixi s set,-

accipere se omnes responderunt et quibus 46 acciperent animis iisdem se gestures. 43. Livy, XXI, 18. 44. Livy, XXI, 18 and 21. 45. At least this is the annalistic tradition. 46. Livy, XXI, 18. (23)

The year 218 was exceptionally busy for Hannibal as well

as for the Romans. By April a delegation, headed by M. Fabius,

had gene to Carthage to declare war; by May, Hannibal, having

heard the results of the embassy, was moving toward the river

Ebro. Before mid-winter he had crossed the Alps, had descended

Into Italy, and was facing the combined strength of two consular

armies.

While the Romans debated the case of Saguntum during the

winter months of 219-218, Hannibal devoted his energies to

preparing far the coming march and campaigns. Upon retiring

to New Carthage for the winter, he had granted a winter leave 47 to his Iberian forces. To guarantee the stability of his rear,

Hannibal left his brother Hasdrubal a force of more than fifteen 48

thousand. To keep the Iberians ..loyal to the Carthaginians, he arranged for almost sixteen thousand of them to be posted in

Africa. These included Thersitae, Mastini, Oretes, and Olcades as well as Balearians,49 At the same time fifteen thousand troops from Africa were to take up duties in southern Spain.5^

Hasdrubal was left fifty-seven ships, thirty-seven of them man• ned and fitted.51 When the dispatch arrived from Carthage that war had been declared, Hannibal set out for the Ebro with a large army, confident that affairs in southern Spain would be safe.

The journey to the Ebro was easy and uncontested.52

On the north side of the Ebro the situation was different.

According to Livy, the Romans had made seme sort of pact of friendship with a number of coastal tribes.53 The rest, if not ^ Livy, XXI, 21, 6; Polybius, III, 33, 5. 48. Livy, XXI, 22, 1; Polybius, III, 33, 6. 49. Polybius, III, 33, 9, mainly from southern and south-eastern Spain. 50. Polybius, III, 33, 14. 51. Livy, XXII, 22. 52. Polybius, III, 34, 7. 53. Livy, XXI, 60, 3, no doubt through the influence of Massilia and Emporium. (24) actually friends of Rome, were anything but in favour of the advance cf Hannibal. Undaunted, the Carthaginian forced his way along the coast to the Pyrenees. Polybius says he overcame four tribes: the Ilurgetes, the Bargussi, the Aerenosii, and the Andosini.54 Livy names the first two and, in place of the 55

Aerenosii and the Andosini, the and Lacetanians. The

Ilurgetes inhabited the hills behind and Cissa; the Bargusii seem in Livy's account to be south of the river, but perhaps a part of them lived on the north side as well; the Ausetani lived along the river; the lived among the foothills of the

Pyrenees, while the Aerenosii and Andosini are otherwise unknown.

Hannibal left Hanno with ten thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry to maintain the Carthaginian hold on the area north of the Ebro and to keep the passes between Spain and open. Before crossing the Pyrenees, Hannibal lightened his army; all heavy and unnecessary baggage was left with Hanno. The Cartha• ginian commander also dismissed no small number,of natives either because they refused to go farther or because he wished to create good feeling toward himself among the Iberians.

While Hannibal was thus attempting to cross

the Pyrenees ... the Romans, having received

from the envoys they had sent to Carthage

an account of the decision arrived at, and

the speeches made there, and on news reach--

ing them sooner than they had expected that

Hannibal had crossed the Ebro with his army,

54. Polybius, III, 35, 2. 55. Livy, XXI, 23, 2. 56. Livy, XXI, 23, 2. (2,5)

determined to send, with their legions, the

consuls P. Cornelius Scipio to Spain and 57 Ti. Sempronius Longus to Africa.

Before any news had reached Rome subsequent

to the report of the envoys from Massilia

that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro.,..5^

The regions in which the two consuls were

respectively to operate had already been

• fixed as Spain, on the one hand, and Africa

and Sicily on the other. Lots were drawn,

and the former fell to Cornelius, and the

latter to Sempronius. A decree was passed

to raise six legions for the current year,

with as many allied troops as each consul

thought fit, and to mobilize as strong a 59

fleet as possible.

Polybius and Livy present an awkward time-gap. According to

Polybius, as cited above, the Romans mobilized only after it was known that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro. If Hannibal had cros• sed the river in late May or June," the news would have reached

Rome by at least late June. Would the Remans sit idle for the months between their declaration of war and the advance of Han-- nibal? Polybius dates the mobilization of Rome at the same time as Hannibal's crossing of the Pyrenees. This must be later than

June'since the journey from the Ebro to the Pyrenees was rather long and contested. Hannibal was at the Rhone in late August but 57. Polybius, III, 40, 1. 58. Livy, XXI, 25, 1. 59. Livy, XXI, 17, 1. (26) had travelled the distance from the Pyrenees to the Rhone with few incidents, bribing the natives along the way rather than fight•

ing them. Accordingly, then, Polybius believes that the Romans were without positive plans unti.1 late July. From Livy we know that the Massiliots kept the Romans informed of the activities in

Spain. Surely they would have sent urgent messages to Rome as soon as Hannibal crossed the Ebro and more so when he crossed the

Pyrenees.

Livy is under the impression that the division of commands was decided even before war had been declared. If this were the case, why did Scipio, who had his province assigned early in the spring, wait until summer was almost over before he set cut? The alleged reason for the delay was a rising of the Gauls again caused by a distribution of land taken by the Romans between 225 and 222 in the Po Valley. To put down the rising, men were drawn from

Scipio's force of two legions. Polybius says:

When the news reached Rome that the fourth

legion was surrounded by the Boil and be•

sieged, they instantly sent off the legions

destined for Publius under the command of a

praetor to Its assistance, ordering Publius

to enrol other legions from the allies.^°

Livy, on the other hand, says:

In Cisalpine Gaul were stationed two Roman

legions, ten thousand allied infantry, one

thousand allied cavalry, and six hundred Roman

cavalry^all intended far the war with Carthage.

60. Polybius, III, 40, 14. 61. Livy, XXI, 17, 9. (27)

And later:

In Rome the report of this unexpected trouble,

and the knowledge that the Roman government

now had a war with Gaul as well as with- Carth•

age on its hands, called for prompt action.

The Senate ordered fresh troops to be raised,

and instructed the praetor Gaius Atilius to'

march to ManllusJ relief with one Roman legion

and five thousand allied troops.... At the

same time Cornelius Scipio;, having raised a

fresh legion in place of the one which had

been ordered out with the praetor, sailed ftp

fr om R ome ...

There were three legions In the Po Valley, two in Sicily with

Sempronius, and two with Scipio, giving a total of seven legions far a year that Livy says had six legions. But, in the descript• ion of the battle of Trebia, Polybius speaks of the strength of two consular armies, that is, four legions. At the first outbreak of the Boii, Lucius Manlius started for Mutina with a relief party.

Could not this be one of Scipio*s legions? When another force was needed, Scipio*s second legion was sent. Thus Scipio*s legions are the two that go to the Po, one at a time. There were no other legions there. These two unite with Sempronius* two at Trebia to make four. Scipio had to enrol two new legions thus achieving a total of six for the year.

Those people who planned to settle on the Gaulish lands set cut for the Po in the late spring. The first of Scipio's legions

62. Livy, XXI, 26, 1. (28)

went with Manlius in the early summer. This was the fourth

legion of Polybius that was surrounded by the Boii. By mid•

summer Gaius Atilius had to go to Manlius' relief with Scipiofs

second legion. By this time Scipio would have replaced the first

legion and would now have to recruit another. It was not until

mid-August that he was able to set sail for Massilia.

What of Sempronius during this time? In chapter forty-one,

Polybius says:

the two Roman consuls, having made all

preparations for their respective enter•

prises, set sail early in the summer to

takexin hand the operations determined on,

PuHLius bound for Iberia with sixty ships

and Tiberius Sempronius for Africa with a

hundred and sixty quinqueremes. With these

he threatened such a redoubtable expedition

and made such vast preparations at Lily-

baeum, collecting all kinds of forces from

everywhere, that it seemed as if he expected

to sail up to Carthage and at once lay siege

to it.63

Livy places all the activity in Sicily before the arrival cf 64

Sempronius. Since, therefore, Sempronius saw so little active service in Sicily,_,Livy concludes that he did not arrive there until late In the year and was almost immediately recalled. How• ever, in Polybius' version, the fact that Sempronius had made such extensive plans for an invasion of Africa suggests that per• haps he set out for his province earlier in the year than did his 63. Polybius, III, 41, 2. 64. Livy, XXI, 49, 1. (29)

65 colleague. As well, that it was Scipio's legion that was sent

with Atilius suggests that Scipio was the consul still in the

city, and that Sempronius had already left Rome. That Polybius

mentions the two consuls in the same clause does not necessarily

mean that they left on the same day.

Although existing accounts are somewhat contradictory it

appears that :

a) the Roman Senate declared war on Carthage in

the early spring;

b) the consuls were allotted their provinces early

in the year;

c) Scipio had difficulty in getting his forces

from Italy because of the rising of the Gauls; and

d) , there were finally six legions far the year 218:

two with the consul Sempronius; two in northern

Italy; two intended for Spain.66

What were Rome's plans when she declared war on Carthage? 67

Hannibal had not yet crossed the Ebro. Sempronius, with the

larger army, was to command in the main theatre of war. His mis•

sion was to be ready to invade Africa and conquer Carthage at the

first opportunity. This opportunity would arise when Scipio,

with a smaller force, had contained and occupied Hannibal in Spain.

In this way each would engage half of the divided forces of Car•

thage. Never had the Romans considered the possibility of war

in Italy. It was to take place abroad. Sicily was to be the base

for operations in Africa; Spain, between the Ebro and Massilia,

65. Polybius III, 41, 3. 66. See C .A ,H ., VIII, facing p. 104. 67. If the cause of the war was Hannibal's choosing the Ebro, then war could not be declared until he had done so. As stated earlier, Hannibal knew before he set out in 218 that war had been declared. (30) was to be the base for the campaigns against Hannibal. Scipio, when he discovered that Hannibal was beyond reach through Spain, sent his two legions to that area with his brother. Then he returned to Northern Italy and the two legions stationed there.

By doing so he hoped to overpower Hannibal and at the same time to isolate Spain, which was a primary source of Carthaginian forces and supplies. If he were successful, Sempronius could proceed as planned. Such seems to have been Rome's strategy.

The plans to invade Africa, however, had to be put aside for some fourteen years.

Having finally raised two legions, Publius proceeded via -

Pisa to Massilia. When he arrived at the eastern mouth of the

Rhone river, he disembarked his troops. Learning that Hannibal had not only crossed the Pyrenees but was in the neighbourhood of'the river,.he sent cut a party of three hundred cavalry to reconnoitre. This group soon met head on with a detachment of five hundred Numidians sent out for the same purpose. The

Romans eventually succeeded in driving the Numidians back to their camp. Having surveyed the Carthaginian camp, they re• ported back to Publius. The Roman commander immediately marched up the bank of the river in the hope of meeting the Carthagin• ians. Three days later he entered the deserted camp. Because

Hannibal was too far ahead and the inclinations of the tribes in the area were uncertain, Publius returned to the coast at full speed, sent troops to Spain with his brother Gnaeus, and returned himself to Italy. War in Italy was now inevitable. (31)

CHAPTER III While Publius hastened back to Italy, his brother Gnaeus sailed to Spain with the consular army."'" Putting out from Mas• silia, he coasted along the shore until he reached Emporium. Using this town as a base, he proceeded to win over the tribes living between the Pyrenees and the Ebro by persuasion, or , if necessary, by force of arms Polybius reports that Gnaeus proceeded from Emporium by sea: starting from there (Emporium) he made a-series of landings, reducing by siege the towns on the coast as far as the-Ebro, which refused his advances, but bestowing favours on those which accepted them and taking all possible precautions for their safety.3 Livy's account is somewhat different: where (Emporium) he disembarked his troops and pro• ceeded, partly by renewing former treaties of friend• ship, partly by negotiating new ones, to extend the Roman influence from the Laeetani right down the 4 coast as far as the Ebro.... Gnaeus' purpose was to gain a strong base in the northern area of Spain, which was still anti-Carthaginian. But by now the seas on of 218 was almost over and would not allow extensive campaigning. Emporium possessed a good harbour and was friendly to the Romans. Why then should Gnaeus move his fleet up and down the coast raiding villages? His second purpose was to gain, a road along the coast at least to the Ebro. 1. Livy, XXI, 60. 2. Livy, XXI, 60; Polybius III, 76, 2. 3. Polybius, III, 76, 2. 4. Livy, XXI, 60. (32)

This could be accomplished much better by land than sea, by send• ing parties to each community along the coast to determine their feelings and the lie of the land. With Carthaginians in the hinterland, the land still strange, and winter coming on, Gnaeus could net afford to become involved In sieges or blockades. With• in a short time, the Iberians of the area had been persuaded that more was to be gained under the Roman standards. In the neighbourhood of Cissa, Gnaeus met Hanno. This Carthaginian had been left in command of a force of 10,000 by Hannibal. Hanno's purpose was to keep the region north of the Ebro for Carthage and see to it that the passes of the Pyrenees were open at all times. Hanno wished to halt the Roman advance as scon as poss Hale. So for this reason he was eager to under• take a battle. The two forces met in pitched battle; Hanno was defeated and captured. By his victory, Gnaeus gained not only the loyalty of the tribes in the area, the capture of the Carth• aginian commander and of a local chieftain Andobales, but, as well, all the Carthaginian baggage which had been left behind by Hannibal. Gnaeus had succeeded in destroying the Carthaginian hold on northern Spain. No sooner had the Romans been victoricus than crossed the Ebro and attacked wandering marines in the neighbourhood of Tarraco.6 Although too late to be of assistance to Hanno, Hasdrubal was nonetheless pleased with his raid. How• ever, fearful lest G-naeus come up on his flank, he immediately withdrew to New Carthage for the winter. Gnaeus, arriving in Tarraco from Cissa, punished the negligent marines.

5. Livy XXI, 60; Polybius . Ill, 76, 5. 6. Livy XXI, 61. (33)

Since it was now very late in the-year and the fleet had moved along the coast as the army moved overland,' Gnaeus saw 7 little point in returning to Emporium, as Livy said. And there

were good reasons for this. First, the fleet as well as the (

army was now at Tarraco. Second, the main objective was Carth- "'

aginian Spain and Tarraco was much closer to it than Emporium.

The tribes in the immediate vicinity of the river Ebro seem to

have been restless. Livy wrote that, after Gnaeus retired to

Emporium for the winter, a rising of natives along the river

banks caused him to return to the area to settle the situation.

He then, said Livy, took up winter quarters in Tarraco. Per• haps Gnaeus felt that his presence in the area would bring sane amount of stability to the area of the river banks. He did not have to worry about the coastal area to the north, where Emporium and Mass iliaspecial friends of Rome, had sufficient influence

to settle any disturbance. Gnaeus and his army settled in at

Tarraco for their first winter in Spain, 218-217. At the beginning of summer, that is, early in the campaign• ing season of, 217, Hasdrubal Barca set out from New Carthage by q land and sea. His army, augmented by Iberian mercenaries, took

the coast road north to the Ebro while his fleet of forty vessels sailed slowly along the shore, keeping the army in sight. Having reached the Ebro he pitched a camp and beached the fleet. When

Gnaeus heard that Hasdrubal had left New Carthage, he brought the army from winter quarters and prepared the same kind of two• fold expedition. But when he learned that Hasdrubal's army was 7. Livy, XXI, 61. 8. Livy, XXI, 61. 9. Livy, 'XXII, 19. (34) exceedingly strong, the Roman commander decided to face the Carthaginians on the sea alone.^® Setting out from Tarraco with 35 ships and the pick of his marines he v/as within 10 miles (80 stades) of the Ebro on the second day. Sending ahead tv/o Massilisn reconnaisance vessels and learning that the Cartha• ginians were ill-prepared ..for an attack, he sailed ahead in battle formation to the Ebro.1"1" Polybius recounts the battle: Hasdrubal, to whom his lookout men had given early notice of the approach of the enemy, drew up his land forces on the beach and ordered his crew to embark. The Romans being now close at hand, he gave the signal for battle, having decided on a naval action. The Carthaginians on meeting the enemy contested the victory only for a short time and then began to give way.. Por the covering military force on the beach did 'not benefit them so much by the confidence it inspired as it damaged them by ensuring an easy and safe retreat. After losing two ships with all their crews and the oars and marines .of four . others, they fell back on the shore. On the Romans pursuing them vigorously, they ran their ships aground and leaping out of them took refuge with the troops. The Romans very boldly approached the shore, and taking in tow such ships as were in a condition to float, sailed off in high spirits, having beaten the enemy at the

10. Polybius,'in, 95, 6. -11.. Polybius. Ill, 96. (35)

first onslaught, establishing their supremacy at sea and possessed themselves of five and twenty 1 p of the enemy's ships. With his fleet beaten, Hasdrubal was helpless to stop the Romans, prom the Ebro, the Romans in their ships proceeded south along the coast on a raiding mission: the finest result of this success was, even so, the fact that by one unimportant battle they had made themselves masters of the sea along that whole coast. They now sailed for Onusa, where they stormed and ransacked the town, and then proceeded to New Carthage. They.devastated all the neighbouring countryside, set fire to buildings contiguous with the walls and gates, and sailed on, heavily loaded with plunder, to Longuntica, where they found a quantity of esparto grass collected there by Hasdrubal for the use of the fleet... in addition to coasting past the various headlands they also crossed to the island of Ebusus, where they attempted to take the chief town... from Ebusus the fleet turned back and made for the more northerly part of the Spanish coast.... u The amazing fact in this.particular passage is the audacity of Gnaeus' to raid deep into the heart of Carthaginian Spain: New Carthage is 240 airline miles south of the mouth of the Ebro. The destruction of the Punic fleet, "one unimportant," 12. Polybius III,- 96, 1-7. 13. Livy, XXII, 20. (36) would hardly have sent the Roman fleet off on a raiding mission while the consular army was left near Tarraco to face the strength of Hasdrubal. The Carthaginian, although lacking a fleet, still had his army intact. Perhaps Gnaeus did send the fleet on a raiding mission. If so, it would be surprising if he sailed more than a day's journey from the Ebro. While Hasdrubal was reorganizing, Gnaeus could take a look at southern Spain for himself. It is doubtful that these raids brought 120 tribes to the Roman side.14 The Span• iards had too much to lose at this point. If they changed sides they jeopardized the lives of their men serving either with Hannibal in Italy or with the Carthaginians in Africa. Their children, taken as hostages by the Carthaginians and held in Saguntum, would also be. endangered. The Romans had not yet proved themselves the greater power nor had the Carthaginians sufficiently lost their control for the small native tribes to subject themselves, to the Romans. Livy continues: more than 120 Spanish tribes formally subjected

themselves to the authority and dominion of Rome, and gave hostages. This gave Scipio confidence in his military, as well as his naval, strength, and .Induced him to advance as far as the pass of

Castulo. Hasdrubal withdrew westward into Lusitania. is a town on a tributary of the Baetis river, well .inland among the mountains. Prom Tarraco to Castulo is about 350' miles as the crow flies. Por an army on the march, loaded down with baggage, the distance would be much greater. Castulo was well

14. Livy, XXII, 20' 15. Livy, XXII, 20. (37) within the heart cf the oldest Carthaginian districts of Spain. The Romans' influence and strength were not so powerful that Gnaeus could venture into this area with Nev/ Carthage on one flank, the mountain tribes on the other, no protection for his rear, no series of camps to fall back upon in dire straits. No general would lead his army 400 miles into enemy territory with• out some knowledge of the area. Never would he expose his flanks or rear to the traps that mountainous areas offer to mountain people. No general would march his entire army into hostile ter• ritory and make no provisions for escape. Gnaeus could not have gone to Castulo at this' time.

Equally remarkable is. the next statement that Hasdrubal v/ent to Lusitania, the most southwestern area of Spain.Just after his defeat at the Ebro Hasdrubal had no reason to flee to the west and Lusitania. He had been defeated on the sea, but he' still had his powerful army, accustomed to the terrain of Spain and the type of fighting needed to overcome that terrain. It is highly probable that Hasdrubal retreated up the Ebro after his defeat and that, while he v/as moving, the'Romans did raid some coastal villages but nothing such as Livy suggests.-

Immediately following the departure of Scipio and Hasdrubal for the interior, Livy recounts the rise, of two Spanish chief• tains, Mandonius and Indibilis:

These two men (Mandonius and Indibilis), when the Romans left Castulo for the coast, roused their countrymen and raided the~peaceful territories of Rome's allies. An officer with a force of light

16. Livy, XXII, 20. (38)

auxiliaries was sent against them "by Scipio and had no difficulty in breaking them up, as they were little more than an ill-organized crowd: some were killed or captured, and most of them disarmed. None the less this very minor action

was enough to stop Hasdrubal1s withdrawal to• wards the Atlantic and to bring him back to protect his friends north of the Ebro. He had established himself amongst" the , and Scipio was at Nova Classis, when unexpected intelligence diverted the campaign elsewhere. The' , who had sent their leading men as envoys to Scipio and given hostages to guar• antee their loyalty, suddenly, on receipt of a message from Scipio, invaded Carthaginian Spain with a strong force and took three towns by storm. While marching inland for the purpose cf reorganizing, Hasdrubal encouraged the Ilergetes .to cause as much trouble to the Romans 18 as possible. But these people of the hills were too poorly organized to resist the Romans, and Hasdrubal was forced to come back to their assistance. While Hasdrubal helped the Ilergetes, Gnaeus encouraged the Celtiber lans, who had sent envoys to the_ Romans, to descend from the mid-interior on the allies of the Carthaginians.-^ Thus we have the Romans centered ar.ound the mouth of the Ebro being attacked by but overwhelming•the Ilergetes. Hasdrubal then had to turn and come down the Ebro to defend the Ilergetes but was diverted by the Celtiberians, who had descended 17. Livy, XXII, 21. 18. These Ilergetes probably inhabited the area of the river bank a little upstream from the coast. 19. Livy, XXII, 21.* (39)

from the highlands. When the details of the two chapters are sorted out Gnaeus" trip to Castulo proves to be unrealistic. With Hasdrubal headed up the Ebro, presumably to get behind the Romans from the north, Gnaeus would not march off in a south westerly direction leaving his right flank exposed to Hasdrubal.

While Gnaeus was intriguing in Spain during spring and summer of 217, his brother Publius had his command•extended for 217 by the Senate.^0 After gathering reinforcements and sup• plies, Publius sailed for Spain. Arriving at Tarraco in the late summer, he immediately joined his 8,000 troops to his brother's army, giving them almost four legions. Polybius says of the arrival of Publius: Treating this war, then, also as of great moment they dispatched. Publius with his fleet, and on reaching Iberia and joining his brother he rendered great service in their joint operations .21 Then, he continues:

For the Romans, who had never before dared to cross the Ebro, but had been content with the friendship and alliance of the peoples on its north bank, now crossed it, and for the first time ventured to aim at acquiring dominion on the other side, chance also greatly contributing to advance their prospects in the following manner. When after overawing the Iberian tribes dwelling near the crossing of op the Ebro they reached Saguntum....

20. Livy, XXII , 22. 21. Polybius III, 97, 4. 22. Polybius III, 97, 5. (40)

This is the account closer to reality. Only after Gnaeus had been reinforced and strengthened by his brother's arrival did he venture to cross the Ebro. As H. H. Scullard says: It was absolutely necessary to secure the coast road and to secure an adequate base. Further, the command of the sea was an in• valuable asset, as otherwise the communi• cation lines could be cut in an Invading army's rear. Gnaeus had established an adequate base at Tarraco in the winter of 218/217 and had gained access to the Ebro, and gained command of the sea early in the year 217. Through diplomac5'' during the winter he had gained the loyalty of the northern section of Spain. Now, and only now, could the Romans venture into the Carthaginian territory, not in the spring as Livy wants us to believe.

The season was well advanced when Publius and Gnaeus led

PA their armies across the Ebro. Again it was a two-fold advance, 25 by land and by sea. Hasdrubal did not oppose them for he was still dealing with the Celtiberians far In the interior. When after overawing the Iberian tribes dwelling near the crossing of the Ebro they reached Saguntum, they encamped at a distance of about five miles from the town near the temple of Venus, choosing a place well situated as regards both security from the enemy and facility for obtaining supplies from the sea, since their fleet was coasting a own together with them. It was in Saguntum that Hasdrubal had left the children of 23. H.H. Scullard, in the Second Punic War (Cambridge, University Press, 1930), P. 44. ' 24. Livy, XXII, 22. 25. Polybius . in, 97, 6. 26. The site of the. Scipios ' camp has been ou'blighed by A Schulten Jahrbuch des deutschen archaeologischen Instituts (19«J/), pp. _ _ 232-235 (41) tribal chiefs, hostages for their families' loyalty. A.' Spaniard, Abilyx or Abelyx, realizing that there was more to be gained with the Romans, hoodwinked the commander of the garrison at Saguntura into releasing the children to him. Then, rather than return the children to their families as he had premised the unsuspecting Bostar, Abelyx turned the hostages over to the Scipics. The Romans then returned the children • to their families, thus winning the good-will of the Spaniards.

Hasdrubal did not like the Romans encamping before Saguntum.

Yet he did not have to rush to the defence of the city. The natives would, never cross to the Romans because their children . were held as hostages within the walls of Saguntum. His garrison was sufficiently strong to defend the town. So Hasdrubal, while keeping in mind the situation in Saguntum, remained to settle affairs with the Celtiberians before returning to the coast.

Winter was. again approaching and the Romans would, have had little to show for their efforts had not Abelyx come to their - aid. However, the season did not allow them to press the ad• vantage. Hasdrubal would be upon them as soon as news of the 28 exchange of hostages reached him. If the Romans waited for him, they might find themselves trapped south of the Ebro for the winter with neither fortified camp nor supplies. So, the Romans quickly retreated to Tarraco. Hasdrubal, frustrated by the unexpected and unbelievable events, also settled -into winter quarters. With the coming of winter in 217, we reach a lacuna in 27. Livy, XXII, 22; Polyhius, HI, 99. 28. Livy, XXII, 22. (42)

Polybius' account. His narrative resumes with the arrival of the younger Scipio in 210 and the second phase of the war. For the intervening years, the main source is Livy. Livy him• self did admit, and would probably agree today, that there was. something wrong with the chronology of his account. A solution caii be found if we set out the incidents and then regroup in a more or less logical pattern. Elated by their successes the previous year, the Scipios set out from winter quarters in the spring of 216 by land and 29 sea. Hasdrubal, however, felt his strength somewhat insuf• ficient to meet the Romans head on. Plis confidence in his army was strengthened with the arrival of 4,000 foot and 500 cavalry from Africa .30 He then decided to advance toward the Romans. At the same time, his fleet was to patrol the coast and the nearby Islands. But the fleet was not anxious to meet' the Romans again.. The Carthaginian naval captains deserted and took refuge with the Tartessi- perhaps a southern tribe in the province of, the old Tartessians. These people were easily roused to throw off the yoke of Carthaginian oppression. Hasdrubal could not afford a rebellious tribe in his rear; the Romans would have to wait until the Tartessi were brought Into subjection. The Tartessi, under the leadership of Chalbus, were not easily defeated. Skirmishes brought no results. Hasdrubal, al• though the rebels captured his supply depot and controlled the surrounding territory, refused to fight a pitched battle; he bided his time within his fortifications. x Long years of ex• perience in Spain had taught the Carthaginians that, although a 29. Livy, XXIIL, 26. 30. Livy, XXIII, 26. 31. Livy, XXIII, 27. (43) rebellion might he strong and concentrated, the natives would, in time, become disorganized and reckless with success. The tribes of Spain seldom, if ever, did anything in concert for a long period. Finally, Hasdrubal v/as able to pick the time and place with devastating result.^2 By the late summer of 216, affairs with the Tartessi had been settled. Word now arrived from Carthage that Hasdrubal v/as to set out immediately for Italy. ° Rather than do this and leave the area undefended, Hasdrubal demanded that a com• mander and army be sent from Africa. Already tribes were turn• ing to the Romans. Without some garrison the country would be ' in Roman hands. Carthage did not change the orders: Hasdrubal v/as to march for Italy. However, one was sent with a 34 fleet and an army. But^before leaving^Hasdrubal set himself the task of raising funds with which he might obtain mastery of the mountain passes and the services of mercenaries. While Hasdrubal was thus occupied in the south, the Scipios were free to venture along the south bank of the Ebro to test the attitudes of the Spanish tribes. When winter approached, the tv/o forces again returned to winter quarters, Hasdrubal no- doubt to New Carthage, whence he hoped to move towards Italy at the beginning of spring, the Romans to Tarraco, where they had their base and harbour. Little .of consequence happened in 216 . In the spring of 215, the Scipios, convinced that Hasdrubal v/as going to attempt the passage to Italy, decided to join forces 32. Livy, XXIII, 27. 33. Livy, XXIII, 27. ' - 34. Livy, XXIII, 28. Himilco was perhaps an officer in charge of a large contingent. He never again receives mention, so it is unlikely that he was a general in charge of his own army. (44) j rather than operate separately by land and sea, and assume the offensive. Crossing the Ebro in the early spring, they attacked the pro-Carthaginian town of Ibera. Ibera - a little up the river from the sea - was perhaps a good fording point in control cf the read to the coast.1^ Livy, however, places this in the year 216, after the Tartessian affair. Por various reasons It better suits the year 215. The waiting game Hasdrubal had to play with the Tar- tessi could very easily have consumed one campaigning season. If the Tartessi lived In the extreme south of Spain Hasdrubal would, have found it difficult to come to the aid of one cf his north• ernmost charges. The Carthaginian was occupied with raising funds for the anticipated march while at the same time trying to ensure that Spain would be left with an adequate garrison. The Iberan , incident, as well, seems to fit geographically and strategically with the. events cf 215 rather than those of 216. Ibera, on the south bank of the Ebro, was' attacked by the Romans in the spring of 215 and finally surrendered when no aid was forthcoming from New Carthage. Hasdrubal, in his turn, took "

interior.

Publius and Gnaeus sent word of their victory to Rome.3® Por the rest cf this season, they contented, themselves with negotiating with the tribes in the north-eastern section of the Carthaginian domain. Livy's statement,

This battle brought to the -^oman side all the Spanish peoples who still wavered in

their, allegiance ..., 39 is an exaggeration, to say the"least. Hasdrubal still controlled the greater part of Spain. The Remans were sure of the area north of the Ebro; they were just winning the area on the south bank of the Ebro. Between the Scipios and Hasdrubal were many, many tribes of Carthaginian colour.

The account of the year 215 is finished off with the tale of the defeated' the Carthaginians by the Iliturgi and Intibiii."^ Yet in the account of 214 the Iliturgi are again attacked by the Carthaginians:

(215)... the town of the Iliturgi, which had gone over to Rome, was being besieged by Hasdrubal, . Mag o, and Hamilcar the son of Bomilcar. Grain v^as short in the town -•which was now an ally — and the Scipios, bringing, a new supply, forced their way into it between the three armies which beset it, not without hard fighting and heavy losses to their opponents. They then urged the inhabitants to defend themselves with the same

38. Livy, XXIII, .48. 39. Livy, XXIII, 29. 40. Livy, XXIII, 48. (46)

courage with which they had'seen the Roman army fighting on their behalf., and proceeded to the assault of the main enemy position under Hasdrubal. Hasdrubal v/as joined soon by the other tv/o Carthaginian armies, as their commanders realized it was there that the im• mediate issue would be decided. The battle began by a sortie from the camp; and though the Romans cn that day had only 16,000 men in the field against 60,000 of the enemy, undis• puted nature of their victory is evident from the losses they inflicted: the enemy lost in killed more than the total strength of the Roman army; over 3,000 were taken prisoner together with just under 1,000 horses, 59 standards, and 7 elephants - five other elephants having been killed in the fighting. The three camps were also captured

(214)' The Carthaginians tried to take Iliturgi, where there was a Roman garrison ; it seemed likely that the place would be starved into surrender, but Gnaeus Scipio came promptly to its aid. Marching with one.legion, unencumbered by baggage, he passed between the two enemy •camps and entered the town after inflicting heavy casualties, and again on the following

Livy, XXIII, 48. (47)

day made'a sudden sortie with equally suc• cessful results More than 12,000 men were killed in the two engagements,'and over 1,000 taken prisoner together with 36 military standards. 42 In both the above cases, the first attributed to the year 215, the second to 214, the town was Roman and in need of food. Both times the Romans had to force an entrance between the enemy camps, their passage was hotly contested. The battle began by a sortie from the town. In both instances the Cartha• ginians suffered more casualties: It appears that one of the accounts is a duplicate of the other. Each engagement is followed by a subsequent "battle, or, rather, skirmish: (215) After the relief of the Iliturgi, the Carthaginian armies moved to the attack of the IrtLbili, having made good their losses by drawing recruits from a province which was full at that time of likely young men and passionately devoted to war, provided that pay was to be earned or plunder picked up. Here there was a second engagement, and each side fared as before; more than 13,000 of the enemy were killed, over 2,000 taken prisoner, 42 standards captured and nine elephants

(214) The next town to he attacked was Bigerra,

42. Livy, XXIV, 41. 43. Livy, XXIII,48. (48)

which was also within the R'oman alliance;

it was beset by the Carthaginian troops but

relieved without a battle by the arrival of 44

Gnaeus Scipio.

The Carthaginians suffered one outright defeat, perhaps two.

To relate these clashes to the. battle of Ibera is not easy. In the latter, placed by Livy in 216, Hasdrubal was 45

alone. 4 If Himilco and his army existed as a land force, they

did net come to the aid of the senior army. Beaten, with only

the remnant of his original army left, with neither camp ncr

supplies at the end of the campaigning season, Hasdrubal was in no position to meet the Romans again in 215. After his defeat was known in Carthage - and this defeat should be transposed to

the year 215 - Hasdrubal was reinforced by his brother Mago with

12,000 foot and 1,500 horse as well as twenty elephants.46 At the first battle with the Iliturgi there were three generals, 47

Hasdrubal, Mago, and Hamilcar son of Bomilcar. At the second battle of Iliturgi there are only tv/o enemy camps.

The problem of dating for the campaigns in Spain is ham• pered by our lack of geographical knowledge. No one really knows where these places are. Some authorities place the Iliturgi

on the Baetis river, along its upper reaches not far from Castulo.

The Bigerra or Intibili are in the vicinity. But are the Romans likely to have penetrated so far into enemy territory when the only place they had captured was the river town of Ibera? (Sag- 48 untum had not yet been taken. Only the hostages in the city were obtained.) 44. Livy, XXIV, 41. 45. Livy, XXIII, 29. 46. Livy, XXIII, 32. . 47. Livy, XXIII, 49. 48. Saguntum was taken in 214. Livy, XXIV, 42. (49)

Should the affairs of the Iliturgi and Intibili then be transferred from the year 215 to the year 214? It Is a matter of fitting chronology and geography. According to Livy, the .campaigns of 214 centred around Castrum Album, where Hamilcar had been killed, Mount Victory, Castulo, which changed sides of

its own accord, Iliturgi, Bigerra, Munda, Aurinx, Saguntum.4^ Two places are known,' Saguntum and Castulo. Castrum Album, if it is where Hamicar Barca was killed, is perhaps Alicante on the coast south of Nev/ Carthage. Munda is near Corduba about the mid-waters of the Baetis. Scullard suggests that the Iliturgi and Intibili-are to be.found near the Ebro, behind the

coastal cities of Or opesa and Benicarlo.3^ Bigerra was a city near the Iliturgi and perhaps a city of the Intibili. This leaves only Mount Victory and Aurinx unaccounted for. But to return to Livy's account of the year 214: during this year in Spain, too, the war continued with varying success. Mago and Hasdrubal inflicted a heavy defeat on a very large Spanish force before the Romans could cross the Ebro, and all Spain south of the river would have been lost to Rome but for the prompt action of Publius Cornelius Scipio, .who crossed over with all speed and was on the spot while the tribes allied, to Rome were.still hesitating which way to go. The Remans first

encamped at White Fort, famous as the place

49. Livy, XXIV,. 41. 50. H.H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus, p. 42 (map) (50)

where the great Hamilcar was killed irt., action; it was a well fortified stronghold and supplies 51 of grain had previously been stored there .... Wherever C&strum Album was, it was not as far south as Elche,

where Hamilcar died. The Romans,had ventured as far as Saguntum 52 only once. Mago and Hasdrubal were no contemptible force. If the Romans got south cf New Carthage they would find themselves between -^asdrubal and Mago and a new army that had disembarked at New Carthage. At the second Iliturgi we find only two Cartha• ginian camps. The year before, 215, Hasdrubal, to his detriment., had al• lowed Ibera to fall to the Romans. Early in the spring of 214 he and Mago attacked a pro-Roman group, even before the Romans had broken winter camp. Publius crossed over quickly and stationed himself at this town, which was fortified and had been supplied the previous fall. This convinced the hesitating Spaniards that the Romans were willing to fight on their behalf. Somewhere in the neighbourhood of .the Ebro, Publius arrived at Castrum Album to relieve the siege. Finding himself toohar- rassed and in the heart of enemy territory, Publius retreated to a place called Mount Victory, further from the enemy but close to the Ebro and his brother, who was advancing to his aid. The Carthaginians encamped opposite Publius. But when the skirmishes resulted in no success and the Romans would not take the field, the Carthaginians turned their attention, to the Iliturgi. Here one or both of the Scipios overcame the Cartha-

51. Livy, XXIV, 41. 52. To be dated to 216. (51)

giniana . Crushed and beaten, the Carthaginians attacked the near•

by Intibili and were again defeated. They had only one alter•

native - retreat. As the Carthaginians fell back they picked up

mercenaries as well as Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, and his army ' 53 fresh from Africa. The further south the Remans pursued the fleeing Cartha• ginians, the longer became both their supply and communication lines. As well, the further they penetrated Into the Cartha• ginian territory, the greater the chance of being surrounded and cut off from retreat. To remedy the situation the Romans stopped long enough at Saguntum to recover the town. In Saguntum the Scipios would have a base well within the Carthaginian sphere 54 with access to the sea and the coastal road./ The Carthaginians made a stand at Munda (Corduba) but v/ere 55 defeated. Castulo, the city of Hannibal's wife, surrendered to 56 Rome. The Carthaginians engaged the Romans twice again v/ith the same ill-f©rtune. For one year, 214, this is more than enough campaigning. This is the last year before the -death of the Scipios for which Livy has an account. The events that Livy catalogues under 214 should, in fact, be spread over the years 214, 213, and 212. By the winter of 214, the R"omans had gained an adequate base in southern Spain at Saguntum. As one side grew in strength and the other sought refuge in retreat, the Iberians began to wander in• to the Roman camp. By the end of the year 2.12, the.Romans had pursued the Carthaginians south of New Carthage and inland to the source of the Baetis river. 53. Livy, XXIV, 41. 54. Livy, XXIV, 42. 5655. Livy, XXIVXXIV',, 4142. (52)

Livy's account is vexing. He seems to have nc idea of where places were. Here he gives no chronological details. Unlike the years 218 and 23.7, the period from 216 to the death of the Scipios is not extant in Polybius. Livy's chronology 5 has to give way to plausibility, it can not stand inviolate.

07. See Appendix for clarification of the reconstruction. (53)

CHAPTER IV

Livy's next account of activities in Spain is for the

year of the deaths of the Scipios. The campaigns fall in the

consulship of Quintus Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius

Pulcher, that is, the year 212.1 But in Chapter 36 Livy says:

It was in the eighth year after his coming

into Spain that Gnaeus Scipio was killed,

and twenty-nine days after the death of his

brother Publius.2

The eighth year, counting inclusively, is 211, not 212. Livy

thus appears vto date the deaths to two different years.

To solve the problem of the year of the deaths of the

Scipios it is necessary to count backwards from the date of the

fall of New Carthage. It is known that the Scipios died in the

late summer of one year and that Nero was sent out to replaoe

them before winter closed the sea. The following autumn the • young Publius arrived and in the next spring took New Carthage.

Nero had a full season of command in Spain rather than the few weeks of Livy's account. Polybius is, fortunately, extant for

the first campaign of Scipio the younger.5 Describing his plans for New Carthage, he says:

he (Africanus-(Scipio the younger)) was now only in"

his twenty-seventh year ..,6

Earlier he had written:

he (Laelius) told me that the first brilliant

exploit of Publius was when his father fought

_ Livy^ }av^ £~ 2. Livy, XXV, 36. 3. Livy, XXVI, 17, and Broughton, M.R.R. p. 280 4. Livy, XXVI, 17. 5. Polybius, X, 2 ff. 6. Polybius, X, 6. (54)

the cavalry engagement with Hannibal near the

Padus. He was then, as it seems, eighteen 7 '

years old and on his first campaign....

The campaign is that of Ticinus in 218. If the young Publius

was 18 in 218, then he was 27 in 209. It must be to Polybius

and the writers who copied him that Livy refers when, at the end

of his narrative for the year 210, Livy says:

I have followed the authority of many

annalists in placing the fall of New Carthage

in this year, though I am aware that some

writers have stated that it was captured in

the Ny ear following. My reason is that I

feel it is less likely to be true that .Scipio Q

spent a whole year in Spain doing nothing.

At the beginning of the account of the last campaign, Livy

says that for the previous two years nothing of consequence had happened. If the last year was 212, then there is only one year,

213, for which there is no report. But if we date the fall of

New Carthage to 209 instead of 210, the arrival of the younger

Scipio to the autumn of 210, the command of Nero to.211/210 and the death of the two Scipios to 211, then there are two blank years, 213 and 212. This is the best solution.

The two lost years were not as inconsequential as Livy believed. What Livy records for the year 214 can very easily be Q spread over this period. The distance from the Ebro to Castulo, the southern and westernmost point that the Romans reached, was great; more so, when it was through enemy territory. The land 7. Polybius, X, 3. 8. Livy, XXVII, 7. 9. See Chapter III, Page 51 . (55) behind and south of New Carthage had been in the control of the

African nation for many years. Granted, the tribes had not been happy under the Carthaginian rule and would be glad to see their masters driven out; but would they take kindly to a new master?

The Roman army was not like the Carthaginian. The African nation supplied only generals and officers. All the fighting men were sent from subject states in Africa or were hired mercenaries from Spain and Africa. These diverse races tended to be individ• ualistic in their mode of fighting. Whatever conditions the cir• cumstances imposed, the Carthaginian army almost always had a detachment that could meet the situation. Ambushes, skirmishes, guerrilla tactics were their specialties. The Roman army, on the other hand, was more homogeneous in composition and tactics. The allied contingents, mostly Italians, were as used to the Roman formations as were the Romans. The Roman army worked as a unit in set, pitched battles.

In southern Spain the Romans were in hostile territory, hos• tile because it was Carthaginian but as well because it was Spain.

The narrow coastal strip of plain gave the' Romans little room in which to operate. The hills and mountains to the west allowed attackers to sweep down on the right flank at any moment. Publius and Gnaeus realized that before any foothold could be gained in

Spain the tribes would have t o be won over to the Roman cause.

Although they controlled the sea, they could still find themselves trapped unless they could be certain of an unbroken line of com• munication along the coastal road. For these reasons then, it took three to four years after Ibera before they reached the area of New Carthage. It was a period of diplomacy rather than arms. (56)

The Carthaginians, meanwhile, had not retreated to the west

merely out of fear. There they could, surely, find relief from

the steady Roman advance. But, as well, they could recruit in

areas that had not been exposed to Roman propaganda and success.

Then, too, they could use the old Carthaginian city of Gades to

reach home v/hen they v/ere blocked from the Tyrrhenian sea by the

Roman fleet. There were advantages in the retreat to the west

until the Carthaginians were sufficiently strong to face the

Romans again. .

When the campaigning season began in 211 the Scipios decided

.... to include the whole of Spain in their

plan^ of campaign."^

The three Carthaginian armies at the beginning of: the year were

stationed as follows:

Hasdrubal son of Gisgo held in conjunction with

Mago a position some five days march from the

Romans; Hasdrubal son of Hamilcar (the general

who for so long had commanded in Spain) was nearer, 11

at a town called Amtorgis.

In order to attack all armies at once, the Scipios

divided their forces- into two parts, Publius

Scipio taking two-thirds of the total strength

of the Roman and allied troops for action

against Mago and Hasdrubal, and Gnaeus one-

third of the original army together with th.e

Celtiberians for action against Hasdrubal son

of Hamilcar. The two commanders with their 10. Livy, XXV, 32. 11. Livy, XXV, 32. (57)

armies set out together, the Celtiberians

marching at the head of the column, and took

up their position near Amtorgis in sight of

the enemy but separated from him by a river.

There Gnaeus Scipio remained with the force

already mentioned, while his brother Publius

proceeded to his agreed assignment,x2

Scullard puts Gnaeus in the hinterland of New Carthage, making his final stand at Ilorci, and Publius on the upper Baetis 13 perhaps near Castulo. Gnaeus first encountered Hasdrubal son of Hamilcar. The Carthaginian, realizing that the Roman portion of the camp across from him was small, bribed the Celtiberians, apparently some 20,000 of them, to desert the Romans:

As there were numerous Spaniards both in his

army and theirs, there was no language diffi-.

culty, and he succeeded in concluding a bargain

with them at a high price, for the withdrawal of

their troops. This was not, in his view, an •

outrageous thing to do, as there was no question

of the Celtiberians turning their arms against

the Romans; ... most of the rank and file were

only too pleased with the prospect of peace and

returning home to see their families and belong•

ings again.... .The Celtiberians took up their

standards and suddenly departed; and when the

Romans asked why they were" going and besought

them to remain, their only reply was that a war 12. Livy, XXV, 32 13. Scullard, Scipio Africanus, p. 57. (58)

in their own part of the country demanded

their presence.14

Gnaeus, recognising that he was in no position to face Hasdrubal,

retreated toward the sea.

Publius, meanwhile, had fallen in with a Numidian cavalry

detachment led by - later a friend of Rome in Africa 15

(205-202).This adventurous African harassed the Roman foragers and threatened the camp.

Publius, finding that the Suessatani were bringing aid to

the main Carthaginian farce, set out by night in the hope of cut• ting off the relief contingent.16 He left Tiberius Ponteius with a small garrison to hold the camp. But the darkness was not sufficient to hide his departure from Masinissa. Publius met

Indibilis and the Suessatani and had won the upper hand when sud• denly Masinissa appeared on the flanks of the Reman army.1"*

About the same time Mago and Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, appeared in the rear. By dusk it was all over. Publius and the greater, portion of his army had been killed. What few survived escaped under cover of darkness as best they could to Tiberius Ponteius.1®

The Carthaginians set off immediately to join Hasdrubal.19

Gnaeus1 force could hardly resist Hasdrubal, let alone the three Carthaginian armies. Certain that seme disaster had be• fallen his brother Publius, Gnaeus attempted to retreat perhaps to the sea and the fleet.20 The Romans had managed to depart un• observed at night but before the next nightfall the Numidian cavalry had forced them to take a stand on a rather desolate mound 14. Livy, XXV, 33. - - 15. Livy, XXV, 34. 16. Livy, XXV, 34. 17. Livy, XXV, 34. 18. Livy, XXV', 36. 19. Livy, XXV, 35. 20. Livy, XXV, 35. (59)

21 of earth. The Romans, facing three Carthaginian armies, had i no defence works except for baggage, pack-saddles and anything else that v/as not required for personal protection. The hill was neither steep nor rocky. The Romans, banded togetherf'be• hind their baggage, were doomed. Some managed to escape the slaughter and made their way back to Ponteius. Both commanders were killed.22

The last campaigns were a bold attempt to end the conflict in Spain. The Romans could not afford to lengthen the lines of communication any further. Had they attacked Hasdrubal son of

Hamilcar with their united strength they might have been success•

ful. However, a success against him would have perhaps forced

Mago and Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, to retreat further west. Their retreat would of necessity have gone unchallenged. By their double attack and double success, the Scipios would have destroyed the three armies simultaneously, thus avoiding any retreats or a junction of the three armies. Had the Celtiberians stayed with

Gnaeus he might have been able to overpower Hasdrubal and then proceed to assist his brother. ' _

Did the Scipios fail? Yes and No. Yes, they failed to crush the Carthaginian power inSpain', although they did maim it.

No, they managed to hold the Carthaginians in that province, thus cutting off from Hannibal a supply of men .and resources. They had not stopped Hannibal,-,, but the charge was hardly their fault.

He had left for Italy before the Romans mobilized in 218. Had

Rome come to the aid of Saguntum when the city first asked for help in 219, the whole affair might have been different. The

21. Livy, XXV, 36. 22. Livy, XXV, 36. (60)

Scipios strengthened the loyalty of the tribes on the north side

of the Ebro boundary. By their industry and their justioe they

persuaded many tribes to the south of the Ebro that''it was pos•

sible to look forward to something better under new masters.

They gained at least one stronghold - Saguntum - for a base.23

The sea was Roman unopposed. Where they failed to penetrate was

the interior and the old Carthaginian empire in the southeast.

This was not their fault. The few troops, they had (Gnaeus ar•

rived with 24,200 men, Publius with 8,000), 32,200, less those

killed in action, must have been spread thinly when all strategio

points between Tarraco and the Baetis had to be guarded. The

fleet could contribute more, but not many, for the sea was the

escape route. Publius then faced two armies with about 20,000

and Gnaeus had only 10,000 after the CeltIberians had deserted him.

Though the Scipios won over the tribes they failed to come

to grips with the terrain. The further they withdrew from the

sea, the more precarious their position. Spain is a land hostile

to the foot-soldier, who requires a level unbroken area for a battle-field. The interior Is a maze of narrow valleys, rocky

cliffs, and swollen rivers. The Carthaginians possessed some of the finest cavalry known at that time; the Romans had about 2,000

of a rather inferior quality. The Carthaginians had slingers,

javelin men, Africans and Spaniards accustomed to rugged terrain and ambushes; the Romans none. Had the Scipios learned to adapt 24. their resources to the terrain they would have gained more.

23. Livy, XXIV, 42. Placed by Livy in the year 213. Possibly taken as the Romans moved south between 215 and 212. Livy says it had been in Carthaginian hands for seven years, counting inclusively from 219 that would put it in 213 which is perhaps a little late but not much. ^

24. Scullard, Scipio Africanusf p. 94. Scipio Africanus welded to• gether a flexible army to meet the needs of terrain and time. The last attempt strained the Roman resources. There was

little else they could do. Had they waited longer, the Carth• aginians would have either united or retreated westward. No reinforcements could he expected from Italy, where the sit• uation was desperate.25 The Spanish tribes were waiting for a proof; now was the moment.

Despite the disaster of the Scipios, the Iberians did not go whole-heartedly back to the Carthaginians. There were still a few Romans left, overwhelmed but not crushed.

The soldiers in camp with Tiberius Ponteius and the survi- 26 vors from the two disasters made their way back to the Ebro.

Assembling the garrisons left in the north and swelling their numbers with marines, they managed to hold the Ebro boundary.

As soon as Rome recovered from the shock, Gaius Nero was sent as temporary commander with 6,000 Roman infantry, 300 Roman cavalry,

6,000 allied infantry and 800 allied cavalry.2,7 He arrived in the late fall or early winter of 211. Por the year 210 he managed to hold the Ebro and retain the northern area.28 In the fall of 210 young Scipio came from Rome with 10,000 infantry and 1,000 29 cavalry. The extent of the senior Scipios' diplomacy is shown by the first action of Publius Africanus. Early in the spring of

209 he very swiftly marched the distance from the Ebro to New

Carthage unopposed; easily 250 mile3 through enemy territory.30

The next four years were filled with mopping-up operations.

Had Africanus not had the benefit of the groundwork that had taken his father seven and his uncle eight years, he might never 25. By 211, Rome's military forces had been depleted and had hardly time to recover. 26. Livy, XXV, 37. 27. Livy, XXVI, 17. 28. Livy, XXVI, 20. 29. Livy, XXVI, 19. 30. Livy, XXVI, 42; Polybius, X. (62) have taken Nev/ Carthage. His record in Spain should and must be appreciated for what it v/as - the exploits of a brilliant general who could use any situation to advantage. (63)

CHAPTER V ,

When war on Carthage was finally declared and the spheres of command decided, the two Roman generals seemed to have had a policy in mind. Titus Sempronius, with the larger of the two Roman forces, was to prepare for an invasion of Carthage. At the same time

Publius Scipio would attack Hannibal and, if unable to overpower him, at least confine him to Spain. Thus Hannibal would be with•

out support from Carthage and in no position himself to give aid to his city. If the African forces could, be overcome individually, the Romans had some hope of success.

HannibalNnoved from New Carthage tc the Rhone river faster than anyone had anticipated. Scipio, as he left Rome, still hoped that he could confine the enemy to the northern area of

Spain. When he reached the Rhone and learned that Hannibal was on his way to the Alps,, he returned to Italy and the legions sta• tioned there in the hope of destroying Hannibal as he descended from the mountains.

Hannibal had not brought his entire force from Spain: Has• drubal had been left in southern Spain to retain the Carthaginian hold on that province, and Hanno had been left in the north to guard the passage of the Pyrenees. These commanders and their forces would supply Hannibal's army with rel.nf or cements and nev/ divisions. Scipio, realizing this, sent his brother Gnaeus on to Spain with the forces originally intended to be matched against

Hannibal. - .

As the year was well advanced when Gnaeus disembarked his troops at Emporium in 218, little active campaigning was done.

Gnaeus did overcome Hanno and thus removed all resistance to the (64)

Romans in the area north of the Ebro. Even, the arrival of i

Publius in 217 did not give the Romans sufficient strength to

proceed directly against Hasdrubal. Por the time, they had to

win over the native population by means of diplomacy rather than

through force of arms.

By 215 the Roman canmanders were confident enough of the

support of the local tribes that they crossed the Ebro and began

a slow advance southward.' Affairs in Italy offered little hope

for additional troops being sent to Spain. Hasdrubal's army

alone could possibly be dealt with; combined with the armies of

Mago and Hasdrubal s on of Gisgo, it would overpower the Roman

forces. Yet the Scipios could not afford to retreat and^thus lose

the support of the natives. Possibly they felt that if they did

not strike while the Carthaginian armies were separated there

was little hope for success. At least if they struck the two

camps simultaneously the one army could not come to the rescue of

the other. ' So they divided their forces. By doing so they thin•

ned the few Roman forces they had and trusted, perhaps too much,

In', native support. If the plan had been successful, they would

have ended the Carthaginian control of Spain and left Hannibal

completely isolated in Italy,

The failure of the campaigns pf 211 cannot really be charged

to the.Scipios. With the limited forces at their disposal, they

had managed to steadily confine the Carthaginian forces to a

smaller area of southern Spain. The good faith and confidence

that, the Spanish people had in Rome a're; shown by the fact that the

younger Scipio, almost three years later, was back in southern

Spain operating with much success. The Scipios had gone to Spain (65) to overcome and destroy the Carthaginians there a-s quickly and as efficiently as possible. They do not appear interested in empires or fame. Their sole intention was to destroy a potent• ial' source of reinforcement to Hannibal and thus in a way destroy

Hannibal.

\ (66)

APPENDIX A j

A reconstruction of Livy's account'for the years 216-212.

Livy's Account Reconstruetion

216 Rising of Tartessi 216 Rising of Tartessi. Defeat of Hasdrubal at Ibera.

215 (a) Defeat of Hasdrubal 215 Defeat of Hasdrubal by Iliturgi. . at Ibera.

(b) Defeat of Hasdrubal by Intibili and Romans

214 Roman Advance from Ebro. 214 Victory of Ibiliturgi Capture of Saguntum. and Intibili. Roman Victory at Munda . Capture of Saguntum. Surrender of Castulo.

213-212 Gradual Roman advance until they reach Upper Baetis area. (67)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANCIENT SOURCES

Appian, Roman History, translated by Horace White (Loeb Classical Library, London, 1912).

Livy, Ab Urbe Condlta, III and IV, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964!

Livy, The War with Hannibal, translated by Aubrey de Selincourt (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1965).

Polybius, The Histories, translated by W.R. Pat on (Loeb Classical Library, London and New York, 1922).

MODERN SOURCES

Arribas, Antonio, The Iberians (London).

Astin, A.E., "Saguntum and the Origins of the Second Punic

War," Latcmus XXVI (1967), 577-596.

Badian, E•, Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B.C.) (Oxford, 1958).

Boardman, John, The Greeks Overseas (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, T964T Broughton, T. Robert S., The Magistrates of the , I

(New York7 1951).

Carpenter, Rhys, The Greeks in Spain (London, 1925).

Dixon, Piers on, The Iberians In Spain and Their Relations with the Aegean World (London, 1940)• Hackf arth, R ., in The Cambridge Ancient History, IV (Cambridge,

196*77 Chapter XI"

Hammond, N.G.L., A History of Greece to 322 B.C. (Oxford, 1959).

Harden, Donald, The Phoenicians (London, 1962).

Heichelheim, F;M., "New Evidence on the Ebro Treaty," Historia III (1954), 211-219. Kramer, Prank R•, "Massilian Diplomacy Before the Second Punic War," American Journal of Philology LXIX (1948), 1-26. Reid, J.S., "Problems of the Seoond Punic War," Journal of Roman Studies 3 (1913), 175-196. " (68)

BIBLIOGRAPHY CONTINUED

MODERN SOURCES CONT.

Schulten, A., In The Cambridge Ancient Hiatcry, VII (Cambridge, 1964T7 Chapter XXIV.

Schulten, A., in The Cambridge Ancient History. VIII (Cambridge, 1964T7 Chapter II"

Schulten, A., in Jahrbuch des deutschen archaeologischen Instituts (1927), pp. "232-235:

Scullard, H.H., A History of the Reman World 753-146 B.C. (New York, 196677

Scullard, K.K\, Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War (Cambridge, 1930).

Ure, P.N.,- in The Cambridge Ancient Hl3tory,! IV (Cambridge,

196177 Chapter IV" *

Walbank, P.W., A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford, 1957).

Warmingtcn, B.H., Carthage (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1964). Wiseman, P.J., Roman Spain (London, 1956).