In Season and out of Season': 2 Timothy 4:2 Abraham J
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JBL 103/2 (1984) 235-243 IN SEASON AND OUT OF SEASON': 2 TIMOTHY 4:2 ABRAHAM J. MALHERBE Yale Divinity School, New Haven, CT 06510 Insufficient attention has been paid to what turns out to be a remark able admonition to Timothy: ". preach the word, be urgent in season and out of season (epistêthi eukairös akairös), convince, rebuke and exhort, be unfailing in patience and in teaching." Because epistêthi has no object, the relation of the admonition to the rest of the sentence is unclear,1 but it seems natural to take it as pointing to the preceding keryxon.2. Understood thus, Timothy is commanded to have "an attitude of prompt attention that may at any moment pass into action/'3 Eukairös akairös is an oxymoron and is "made still more emphatic by the omission of the copula."4 It has sounded proverbial to some com mentators,5 and C. Spicq has pointed out that eukairia is a rhetor ical term.6 Exegetes have primarily been interested in the person or persons to whom the preaching should be opportune or inopporune. Some have held that the reference is to Timothy,7 others to Timothy's 1 Some commentators do not discuss the relationship to the rest of the sentence or are themselves unclear on how they understand it, e.g., W. Lock, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles (ICC; New York: Scribner, 1924); Ε. K. Simpson, The Pastoral Epistles (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954) 152; J. Jeremías, Die Briefe an Timo- theus und Titus (NTD; Göttingen: Vandenhœck und Ruprecht, 1963) 56; M. Dibelius and H. Conzelmann, A Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: For tress, 1972) 120; C. Spicq, Saint Paul: Les épitres pastorales (EBib; 4th ed.; Paris: Gabalda, 1969) 2. 799. 2 As do C. J. Ellicott (A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles [Andover: Draper, 1882] 167), C. K. Barrett (The Pastoral Epistles in the New English Bible [New Clarendon Bible; Oxford: Clarendon, 1963] 116), J. N. D. Kelly (A Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles [HNTC; New York: Harper, 1963] 205) and, apparently, Β. S. Easton, (The Pastoral Epistles [New York: Scribner, 1947] 68). 3 Ellicott, 167. 4 Ellicott, 167; cf. Spicq, 799; Simpson, 152. 5 Lock, 112-13; Kelly, 205. 6 Spicq, 799. 7 Thus the Greek Fathers: Chrysostom, In epistolam secundam ad Timotheum Com- mentarius, Horn. 9.2 (PG 62.651); Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodori Episcopi Mopsuesteni in Epístolas Β. Pauli Commentarii (ed. Η. Β. Swete; Cambridge: University Press, 1882) 2. 223; Theodoret, Interpretatio Epistolae II ad Timotheum (PG 82.852); cf. 236 Journal of Biblical Literature hearers,8 while some consider that probably both are in view.9 The concern with the appropriate or inappropriate occasion on which to speak and how to speak stretches back to the fourth century B.C., and an awareness of discussions of the subject may help us to place 2 Tim 4:2 in a new light. Spicq is on the right track when he refers to Phaedrus 272A, in which Plato requires that a speaker discern whether certain forms of speech are opportune or inopportune; but Spicq does not follow it up, and the other references that he provides are not quite to the point.10 According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (De comp. verb. 12), the Sophist Gorgias was the first person to write about the necessity for a speaker to adapt his words to the actual circumstances, the kairoi, in which he delivers them.11 His earlier contemporary, Protagoras of Abdera, had been the first, according to Diogenes Laertius (9.52), to emphasize the importance of seizing the right moment (kairos) for deliv ering a speech, but Protagoras did not develop the idea and it has been denied that it was part of the so-called kairos-Lehre or that Gorgias had derived it from Protagoras.12 It has been argued that the doctrine was influenced by the field of medicine: as a physician adapts his treatment to the condition and needs of his patient, so should the orator.13 What ever the original influences may have been, it will be seen that a speaker's consideration of the proper kairos for his speech—especially that brand of speaking described as parresia, frankness, boldness—was later frequently compared to a good physician's discernment of his patient's condition.14 Theophylact, Epistofoe secundae Divi Pauli ad Timotheum expositio (PG 125.128). Among modern commentators the interpretation is held by Ellicott (167), Simpson (152), and Spicq (799). G. H. Whitaker ("In Season, Out of Season," ExpTim 34 [1923] 332-33) attempts to support Chrysostom's interpretation by adducing references which, however, either do not refer to an opportune time for speech (Polybius 5.26.10; Plutarch 1071D) or use eukaireö (Plutarch 223D), which is not precisely the same as speaking eukairös. 8 Easton, 69; Jeremías, 56; Dibelius-Conzelmann, 120. 9 Lock, 111-12; Barrett, 116. 10 Isocrates Antidosis 311 and J. C. G. Ernesti (Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhe- toricae [repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1962] 140), whose references are either wrong or beside the point. 11 See G. A. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) 66-68. With respect to his statement that kairos as a rhetorical term is largely restricted to the classical period, one should note E. Norden (Die Antike Kunstprosa [5th ed.; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1958] 69 η. 1), who refers, among others, to Hermogenes Peri ideön 2.396.12 (Rhetores graeci [ed. Leonhard von Spengel; Leipzig: Teubner, 1853-56; reprint Frankfurt: Minerva, 1966]) and Quintilian 9.3.102. Cf. also W. Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur (Munich: Beck, 1940) I, 3/1, 65. 12 See Schmid, Geschichte, I, 3/1, 24 n. 3. 13 See the bibliography in Schmid, Geschichte, I, 3/1, 24 η. 3; 58 η. 5; 65 η. 3. 14 The following fragment from Democritus, Protagoras's contemporary and fellow- citizen, is of interest: oikeion eleutherias parresia, kindynos de he ton kairou diagnosis (Fr. 226 Diels-Kranz). It is not clear, however, whether diagnosis should be understood in Malherbe: 2 Tim 4:2 237 The use of kairos and its cognates became a commonplace.15 A sam pling from a wide range of material will serve to illustrate the point. According to Aeschylus, "words are physicians of ailing wrath if salve is applied at the proper time (en kairö)"1^ philo of Alexandria, in a discus sion of the correct kairos, claims that untimely bold speech (parrêsia akairos) - is not really bold speech, but the products of diseased minds and emotions.17 Sentences of Sextus 163a is somewhat similar: "An untimely word (logos para fairon) is proof of an evil mind." Athenaeus (620f) accuses Sotades of akairos parrêsia, and Dio Cassius (65.12.1) says that Helvidius Priscus imitated Thrasea's parresia, but sometimes did so ouk en kairö. The anthologist Stobaeus, in his collection of dicta on parrêsia, also records that it should be en kairo.1^ Cicero's compliment to his friend Atticus (Ep. ad Att. 4.7.1), Nihil ςυκαφότςρον epistula tua, "nothing could be more apropos than your letter," reveals the currency that the term had attained by the first century B.C. The philosophical moralists from the first and second centuries of the Empire provide information that is particularly pertinent to our interest. They reflect the general concern for opportune speech as it relates to their own efforts. Thus Musonius Rufus advises that a philosopher, rather than rehearsing a multitude of arguments, should speak kairiös about each.19 Maximus of Tyre, on the other hand, says that there is no kairos appropriate to the philosopher's discourse, but he appears to have in mind the social context peculiarly adapted to receiving philosophical instruction.20 In addition to sharing the interest generally, these philosophers were particularly concerned with the appropriate times for their efforts at moral reformation. Their psychagogy required serious consideration of the emotional and moral conditions of those persons they sought to bene fit. In deliberating on the proper kairos for their instruction, they were careful, as they were in other matters, to distinguish themselves from persons who did not show similar discrimination. This meant, frequently, that they distanced themselves from the Cynics. Thus, in his depiction of the ideal Cynic, Epictetus contrasts him to what was popularly conceived to be a Cynic trait, namely, to revile akairos the people he its medical sense or simply as "discern." We know nothing about Democritus's possible relationship to Protagoras. 15 The Stoics* use of eukairia in their doctrine of eutaxia is here left out of consideration. See Cicero, De finibus 3.14.45; De officiis 1.142. 16 Prometheus 380-82, used by Plutarch (Consol, ad Apol. 102B). 17 De somniis 2.78-92. 18 3.13.61 (3 466,17-476,2 Wachsmuth-Hense); cf. 3.13.59 (3 466,6-13 Wachsmuth- Hense), en hö ehre. 19 Fr. 1 (6,6 Hense). 20 1.3 (4,22-5,8; 6,3-9 Hobein). 238 Journal of Biblical Literature meets.21 And Lucian, who gives a Cynic cast to the satirical comments of Momus, has him accused of inopportune censure (ouk en kairö nyn epitimön).2,2. The serious philosopher, on the other hand, is not indis criminate in his frankness, but only reproves a person when the situation is eukairös.^ Dio Chrysostom (38.4-5) shows that expressing one's fear that one's address might be akairos had become a convention among such philosophers by the end of the century. In determining the proper kairos for their speech, philosophers took into consideration a number of things.