Article／論文 The Dynamics of Nomad- Sedentary Conflict in Afghanistan The Kuchi-Hazara Confrontation in Hazarajat

Abbas FARASOO

Ⅰ . Introduction Ⅱ . Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks of Nomad-Sedentary Conflict Ⅲ . The Story of Nomad-Sedentary Conflict in Afghanistan Ⅳ . Evaluating the Conflict Ⅴ . Conclusion

1 The Dynamics of Nomad-Sedentary Conflict in Afghanistan（Farasoo）

33-1_中東学会.indb 1 2017/08/09 13:13:14 I. Introduction

This article explores the dynamics of conflict between sedentary and nomadic communities in the central part of Afghanistan. The sedentary and nomadic communities belong to Hazara and Pashtun ethnic groups respectively, and these two communities have long historical relations but their interactions were historically shaped

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33-1_中東学会.indb 2 2017/08/09 13:13:14 by processes of state formation and fragmentation in the country. In terms of ethnic differences, the Pashtuns are speaking Pashto language and practicing Sunni branch of Islam. The Hazaras, the most persecuted historically in the county, are practicing Shia branch of Islam and are speaking Persian. The nomad-sedentary conflict historically emerged spontaneously with the state formation process and ethnical domination in Afghanistan during Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan’s Reign in 1880s. Abd al-Rahman Khan lunched a military campaign against the Hazaras in the central parts of the country and the Pashtun nomads played a crucial role. Consequently, the Hazaras were massacred, persecuted, imprisoned and sold to slavery, and their lands and postures were confiscated and awarded for the Pashtun nomads [Mousavi 1998]. The allocation of historically Hazara pastures to Pashtun nomads became a departure point of contentious relation between sedentary Hazara and Pashtun nomads in Afghanistan, which has continued up to the present. The Pashtun nomads historically have been supported through Afghan government which was dominated by Pashtun ethnic group. Since 2001 the conflict over local pastures between the Pashtun nomads and the sedentary Hazaras has assumed significant political dimensions, affecting politics at the national level. The conflict tends to assume strong ethnic dimensions as Hazara and Pashtun, involving Pashtun and Hazara politicians at the national levels. However, the ethnicization of the conflict is not an inev itable outcome. It is conceivable that the conflict could gain more salient dimensions along the life style of its protagonists, or at the very least remain a purely local dispute. This paper begins with the assumption that the conflict could follow a number of different pathways that could result less ethnicized outcome. Consequently, it frames the conflict as a localized nomad-sedentary conflict and then asks how this particular local conflict gains political significance at the national level. To explain how a local conflict affects national politics, the paper discusses the legacies of state formation in Afghanistan and the collective memories as mechanisms connecting local conflicts to national politics and ethnic contention. After the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, disputes over land and other natural resources are increased [Wily 2013; Gaston and Dang 2015] but, violent conflicts that result from such disputes are mostly local with little political consequences. The nomad-sedentary conflict between Hazaras and Pashtuns stands out among similar conflicts by its repeated escalation into organized violent conflict making it one of the highly contentious political iss ues at the national level. Since 2005, in all presidential elections the nomad-sedentary conflict resolution is one of the

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33-1_中東学会.indb 3 2017/08/09 13:13:15 master signifiers of political discourse as it is one of main Hazara ethnic community’s demands in return for their massive vote blocks, which has proven to be decisive in the elections. Moreover, the nomad-sedentary conflict greatly complicated the Pashtun- Hazara relations and became a major source of ethnic tensions through revivals of historical memories. But the government and other actor s have consistently failed to achieve any type of resolution to the conflict and they have failed in defining the nature of the conflict. In order to achieve socio-political stability, it is important to examine the dynamics of the conflict and its political implications. The intensity and intractability of the conflict have attracted the attention of many scholars of Afghanistan who have offered d ifferent explanations for the causes and drivers of the conflicts. Analysts such as Rassul, have divided the causes of the conflict into two general categories: tangible and intangible factors. The tangible factors are pastures, land, and water; and also intangible factor such as “the history of modern Afghanistan” [Rassul 2010: 8]. But he does not explain the interactive mechanisms of these two factors of the conflict. Weijer believes that in the nomad-sedentary conflict in Afghanistan, large areas of grazing and pasture “have become heavily politicized and strongly associated with ethnic identity, there is a high level of conflict over these user’s rights, which have often proven to be inflammable” [Weijer 2007: 9]. Despite that she mostly focused on the resource-based analysis, she also makes an implicit mention of the ethnicization of pastures and its political associations: “Due to socio-political factors that led to a high level of conflict over the pastures, access to certain pasture areas has been reduced, which could theoretically even have led to under-grazing in these areas, whereas pressure on other areas has increased proportionally” [Weijer 2007: 13]. Other experts su ch as Wily and Milich adopted resources-based approaches [Wily 2013; Wily 2015; Milich 2009]. From Milich’s perspective, the nomad-sedentary conflict in the central part of Afghanistan “seems to be a quintessential struggle over access to ecological resources – that is, summer grazing,” and “the roots of the conflict go back much further” [Milich 2009]. For Wily, the escalation of the conflict is because of the weakness of the state in controlling the land and settling the conflict through the enforcement of the rule of law [Wily 2013: 97, 106]. But resources-based analyses and poor governance approach alone cannot explain the collective dynamics of the conflict and attention need to be shifted towards on relational interactions of resource scarcity and historical memories which woven together underpins the contentious processes. This article focuses on the following questions: why in the post-Taliban

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33-1_中東学会.indb 4 2017/08/09 13:13:15 Afghanistan do the organized nomad-sedentary conflicts continue to break out repeatedly in central part of the country? Why and how do the ethnic appeals from both sides, which contribute to the intensification of the conflict, go beyond the local level across the national political spectrum, further sharpening the ethnic cleavages? These are important questions to ask because in the post-2001 period, Afghanistan has had a central government and a judicial system that should address these local issues. This research argues that nomad-sedentary conflict has strong historical and political dimension and it’s not a simple ‘resource-based-conflict.’ It is the shared understanding of historical events, such as collective memory, that affects real life, and plays a significant role in collective interaction processes, and construction of collective identities. Methodologically, this research adopts a historical sociological approach similar to the approach taken by Charles Tilly [Tilly 2003; also McAdam, Torrow and Tilly 2001] to explain the conflict. In nature, it is a qualitative method which is based on the combination o f primary and secondary data. I gathered different primary and secondary data from the local and international media coverage of nomad-sedentary conflict. In the meanwhile, I conducted around twenty interviews during field research in 2012 with politicians, civil society activists from different ethnic groups and MPs representing both the nomadic and sedentary community. This paper will be divided into several parts, including conceptual analysis, theoretical review, case study and theoretical implication.

II. Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks of Nomad-Sedentary Conflict

1. Who are the Nomads and the Sedentary in Afghanistan? In Afghanistan, the common term used for nomads is Kuchi.(1) Kuchi, a Persian term, is used for someone who migrates seasonally, and is derived from kuch, meaning migration [Tapper 2008]. For a long time, the terms have been used in most of the reports, news and academic works to refer to Pashtun nomads. The total nomadic population of the country is not known. Afghanistan has not conducted any national census of the population of the country and consequently all figures are rough estimates or political motivated projections. According to Afghanistan Central Statist ics

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33-1_中東学会.indb 5 2017/08/09 13:13:15 Organization (CSO), the Kuchis are estimated to be about 1.46 million people and constitute five percent of the 29.2 million estimated population of the country [CSO 2016]. Furthermore, although Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks are recognized as the major ethnic groups of the country, there are no reliable figures that can show the total population of each of the main ethnic groups. Mostl y, the Hazaras are estimated as 19% of the whole population in different sources [Sarabi 2005: 30; Fact Rover n.d.]. However, because of politicization of the ethnic identities in Afghanistan, it would be very helpful to define the concept of nomad and sedentary and its combination as nomad-sedentary conflict in this paper. Some scholars have defined nomads “as extensive and mobile pastoralists who either have nothing at all to do with agriculture, or who are occupied with agriculture to a limited degree in the capacity of a secondary and supplementary activity” [Khazanov 1994: 15]. The definition of nomadism is based on the economic characteristics, lifestyle and social habitus. For instance, Khazanov sees pastoral nomadism “as a particular form of food-producing economy” [Khazanov 1994: 16]. In general, pastoral nomads are characterized by “absence of agriculture, even in a supplementary capacity” while semi-nomadic pastoralism is characterized by “extensive pastoralism and the periodic change of pastures during the course of entire, or the activity, there is also agriculture in a secondary and supplementary capacity” [Khazanov 1994: 19]. Historically, the Pashtun tribes adopted both nomadic and sedentary life styles, and nomadism is still a major lifestyle for many Pashtun tribes. In a general sense, it refers to “a mode of living (migratory), a production system (livestock dependent) and a cultural identity” [Weijer 2007: 10]. The inclusion of ‘cultural identity’ as an element of identity of a nomad in Weijer’s definition is important because not all those who are called nomads have pastoral lives. Many nomads settled decades ago but continue to refer to themselves as ‘kuchi’ or nomad. Ironically, these settled nomads claim to represent the interests of the nomads in politics of the country.(2) Weijer divides Pashtun nomads in three categories. The first category is “pastoralists,” the second category is “former pastoralists” and the third category is “settled kuchi ” or settled nomads who have “settled over the last decades but still consider themselves as kuchi (as a cultural identity) and still feel politically represented by kuchi leaders” [Weijer 2007: 11]. But “non-Pashtun nomads,” particularly in the north part of the country, are out of this research because they are not involved in organized violent conflict with sedentary communities in some specif ic region such

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33-1_中東学会.indb 6 2017/08/09 13:13:15 as the central part of the country. These people are better described as semi-sedentary pastoralists because they are different from nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists. The seasonal migrations of these pastoral groups occur within their given society; however, the Pashtun nomads are migrating beyond their given societies. On the other hand, the local people, ethnically belongs to the Hazaras, living in the central part of Afghanistan, who are in a contentious relation with Pashtun nomads, are sedentary. According to Salzman sedentary life is, in contrast to nomadic life. Sedentary life, or sedentism is “the settled, immobile location of the household during the annual round of productive activities” [Salzman 1980: 10]. Therefore , the local community who are in dispute with the Pashtun nomads are defined as sedentary in this paper. Since 2001 the nomad-sedentary conflict annually occurred in central part of Afghanistan such as Wardak and Ghazni provinces. However, there are no concrete terminology of this types of conflict in relevant literatures to apply in case of nomad- sedentary conflict in Afghanistan. Scholars such as Moritz used “herder” instead of nomad and “farmer” instead of sedentary. And Robert Hayden used “pastoral nomad,” and “settled community” or “villager” instead of nomad and sedentary respectively. The scholars have mostly used these terms interchangeably. When Moritz uses the term “farmer-herder conflict,” he mentions that “the term ‘herder’ is often used to mean ‘pastoralist’” [Moritz 2006: 22] – those who keep herd animals and identify themselves as pastoralists, and others also call them pastoralists that have their own particular production and sociocultural system; but farmer denote those “who are live primarily off farming or the person cultivating a particular plot of land” or has a “specific economic activity at a particular time and place” [Moritz 2006: 23]. On other hand, scholars such as Ye’or, Besteman and Golden use the term “nomad-sedentary conflict” [Ye’or 1996: 138; Besteman 1999: 127; Golden 2001: 29] to explain the conflict between these ways of life. Therefore, this research, as it mentioned before, prefers to use the term nomad-sedentary conflict to explain a specific type of organized violent conflict in Afghanistan. It is an organized violent conflict that signifies int eractions between nomadic and sedentary communities that result into intense political contention at national level and assumes significant ethnic dimensions on both sides. But, explaining the dynamics of the conflict requires further reviewing relevant literatures and theoretical depths.

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33-1_中東学会.indb 7 2017/08/09 13:13:15 2. Literatures and Theoretical Perspectives on Nomad-Sedentary Conflicts The current literature on nomad-sedentary conflict mostly defines it as a resource-based dispute. The resource-based analysis of conflicts began with Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons, which provided a theoretical base for environmental studies, resource conflict analysis, and common property. Hardin believes that since population tends to grow “geometrically,” the world is rapidly facing a “population problem” [Hardin 1968: 1243]. Scholars such as Darkoh and Mbaiwa applied the theory of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ to analyze the resource conflict in Botswana in Africa, and used the term “communal areas” to signify the pastures [Darkoh and Mbaiwa 2001: 42]. Later on, institutionalists also used the theory to explain management of common property and scarce resources [Ho 2005: 71]. Opschoor, one of these scholars, argued that institutional failures and resource scarcity generated the conflict between pastoralists and peasants in Africa [Opschoor 2001: 24]. This approach has since dominated the study of nomad-sedentary conflict analysis in Afghanistan as well. Therefore, for providing a better explanation, it is important to critically review the institutionalist and resource-based explanations. In Africa, for instance, Gebre believes that the conflicts among the Karrayu and their neighbors in Africa are “resource-based interethnic conflicts” which were first enforced by scarce grazing land and water and then developed into large-scale interethnic conflicts [Gebre 2001: 81, 95-96]. Kassa, wrote on the Afar of North-East Ethiopia that the scarcity of resources caused the nomad-sedentary conflict: “Shrinking resource base and resource scarcity, intense inter- and intra-group competitions and conflicts among pastoralists, farmers and pastoralist groups” [Kassa 2001: 145]. Similarly, Ahmed defines the nomad-sedentary conflict in Sudan as a contention over resources [Ahmed 2001: 190]. On the other hand, Alao believes that “there is really no direct correlation between natural resources and conflict beyond the structures, processes, and actors associated with the management and control of these resources” [Alao 2007: 278]. He emphasized that scarcity is not the only cause of conflict as it was in Rwanda; sometimes abundance is the cause of conflict as was the case with diamonds in Sierra Leone . According to him, conflict over natural resources comes from institutional weakness and lack of good governance and “absence of credible and fair structures to manage these resources” [Alao 2007: 279]. A critique on the theory of the “tragedy of the commons” by Buck Cox is insightful as it explains how Hardin ignored the social changes and historical dynamics

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33-1_中東学会.indb 8 2017/08/09 13:13:15 of property, ownership and conflict:

What existed in fact was not a “tragedy of the commons” but rather a triumph: that for hundreds of years —and perhaps thousands, although written records do not exist to prove the longer era— land was managed successfully by communities. That the system failed to survive the industrial revolution, agrarian reform, and transfigured farming practices is hardly to be wondered at [Buck-Cox 1985: 60-61].

Moreover, Moritz compared the nomad-sedentary contention across five countries in West Africa (Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Cameroon). Moritz believes that in these five countries, the conflicts are not simply over natural resources; rather “resource-related conflicts escalated and articulated with other religious, ethnic, and political conflicts” and these “low-level farmer-herder conflicts over natural resources will increasingly articulate with other conflicts of interests and lead to intra- and inter-state wars” [Moritz 2006: 2]. According to Moritz, in Africa, in the institutional context of the neo-patrimonial states, it is the logic of power balancing and instrumentaliza tion of disorder by elites that shape conflict between herders and farmers [Moritz 2006: 17]. In the case of these African countries, there is an inefficiency of institutions and state-building processes, mirrored in the case of Afghanistan. The political elites use the lands in a clientelistic manner for their personal enrichment or to support their own clients [Moritz 2006: 20]. But Moritz also focused on the historical dimension of nomad-sedentary conflict in Africa. He explains that the “culture of competition is often rooted in historical events that have shaped the relations between herders and farmers” [Moritz 2006: 11]. According to him:

Wars and enslavement of people across the Sahel have resulted in deep-seated and mutual mistrust between herders and farmers groups. In northern Nigeria and Cameroon, for example, Fulb pastoralists participated in the jihads at the beginning of nineteenth centuries and subjected and enslaved non-Muslim population when they established the Sokoto Caliphate and the Adamawa Empire […] The resentment between these groups remains strong today and conflicts occur the idiom of wars and slavery are often used to describe the other group

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33-1_中東学会.indb 9 2017/08/09 13:13:16 [Moritz 2006: 11].

What has been explained by Moritz is similar with the history of nomad- sedentary conflict in Afghanistan. But institutionalism and resource-based conflict theories alone cannot explain the social boundaries, identity and collective memory in the resources context. Therefore, a more comprehensive analysis that can identify causal mechanisms requires greater attention on socia l and historical mechanisms that shape the dynamics of conflict. Therefore, this article draws on insights of contentious politics literature, which emphasizes relational interaction between different parties, including the government. The relational approach, in terms of ontology, first, claims “social transactions have an efficacious reality that is irreducible to individual mental events.” Second, it explains the interaction among social sites instead of crucial decisions. Third, in terms of epistemology, it explains the “causal chains consisting of mechanisms that reappear in a wide variety of settings but in different sequences and combinations, hence with different collective outcomes” instead of empirical generalizations. Fourth, in terms of historical significance, it focuses on importance of history and its accumulation into the shared understanding, “supposing that the historical and cultural setting in which contention occurs significantly affects its mobilization, actors, trajectories, outcomes, and concatenations of causal mechanisms.” [McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 23-24]. The relational approach relies on the integration of environmental, cognitive and relational mech anisms to explain the contentious events, and the (re)orientation of explanations from events to mechanisms and processes [McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 308]. The cognitive mechanism in this framework can be the collective memory or collectively experienced historical events. According to Halbwachs, collective memory relates to consciousness, and is constructed and maintained on the basis of communication within a specific social collective framework [Halbwachs 1992: 38, 43]. Collective memory in the context of nomad-sedentary conflict in Afghanistan is significant. Radstone and Hodgkin called it the “regime of memory,” which in fact, represents the consciousness and cognition of social groups. They believe that “what is understood as history and as memory is produced by historically specific and contestable systems of knowledge and power and that what history and memory produce as knowledge is also contingent upon the (contestable) systems of knowledge and power that produce them” [Radstone and Hodgkin 2003: 11]. According to Halbwachs, “one

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33-1_中東学会.indb 10 2017/08/09 13:13:16 cannot in fact think about the events of one’s past without discoursing upon them. But to discourse upon something means to connect within a single system of our opinions as well as those of our circle” [Halbwachs 1992: 53]. Therefore, the cognitive mechanism defines the social boundaries and historical experiences and antagonistic claim making processes connecting the past and present. The other concept is a relational mechanism which can explain the dimension of the contentious interactions between nomadic and sedentary groups through threat and opportunity definitions, brokerage operations, coordination and memory mobilization which usually operates in the context of contentious interaction between social groups or politic al actors. Relational mechanism relates to the structural changes in historical process which create thread and opportunities for different actors. Moreover, one should understand the nature of material causes of the claim-making processes, too, which here are referred to as environmental mechanisms, and includes ecological change, population growth, and resource competitions. The environmental me chanism has sharpened the resource competition and that is why nomads and sedentary people have contentious historical claims over resources. Finally, to explain the dynamics of contention requires an analysis of the dynamic relations of all these three causal mechanisms that produced the antagonistic collective memory, the political opportunity/threat (relational mechanism) and contentious claim- making performances. This framework will be used to explain the relational dynamics of the dispute between the actors, including the government. Moreover, analysis of frames of claims in conflict will explain the relation between collective memory/cognition, political opportunities and its material objects because framing is “a collective process of interpretation, attribution, and social construc tion, that mediates between opportunity and action” [McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 41]. Thus, the following sections delineate the episodic account and analysis of framing processes and evaluation of the conflict.

III. The Story of Nomad-Sedentary Conflict in Afghanistan

Understanding the dynamic of nomad-sedentary conflict in Afghanistan requires an examination of the relational dynamics of political opportunities, mobilization structures, framing of claim-making through process of interactive episodes and

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33-1_中東学会.indb 11 2017/08/09 13:13:16 contentious mobilization. Therefore, this section focuses on mobilization and episode analysis of the conflict.

1. Local Level Dimension of Conflict Throughout history, nomads crossed the border between Afghanistan and today’s Pakistan as well as tribal borders within Afghanistan. However, today many nomads have settled and abandoned the nomadic way of life, but still refer to themselves as nom ads. Between 2001, when the Taliban regime fell until 2012, this conflict occurred annually in the central part of the country, developing into organized armed conflict with extensive sociopolitical dimensions. The puzzle presented by this conflict is that while Pashtun nomads travel across many regions of Afghanistan, and may find themselves in conflict with local communities in the course of the ir migration, other such disputes tend to remain local and do not lead to organized conflicts with national political dimensions. During the Taliban rule (1996-2001), the Hazaras experienced massacres and the post-Taliban regime situation provided them with the opportunities to have their own political voice and to actively counter the internal land occupations that had taken place by Pashtun noma ds in the past. On the other hand, the Pashtun nomads also tried to get back the pasturelands in Hazarajat in this era. They have been attempting to enter Hazarajat since 2001 but the clash between the nomads and the sedentary people was not nationally significant until 2003. In 2004, some Hazara were killed as Kuchis attempted to re-enter pastures in Hazarajat; since then, the conflict escalated into organized violence, creating widespread fears among sedentary community with significant national political repercussions. Geographically, the conflict was concentrated in the Behsud districts in Wardak province, which is the main entry point to the Hazarajat region. The Behsud region is a vast area that consist of two separate districts, Behsud I and Behsud II. Other districts affected by th e conflict includes Day Mirdad also in Wardak and Nawur in the neighboring Ghazni province [Wily 2013]. On the 16th May of 2004, when nomads rushed into Behsud a farmer was killed, and another was killed on the 28th of May of the same year and in Nawur many Hazaras killed and several of their villages destructed [Wily 2013: 76]. The fights and armed conflicts in 2006 led to the displacement of a large number of the sedentary people. In 2007, the nomads again rushed into the Hazarajat in a stronger force than the previous years. In this violent interaction, 11

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33-1_中東学会.indb 12 2017/08/09 13:13:16 sedentary farmers were killed, four women were injured and 1,900 families fled their homes and villages, taking refuge in other parts of the county. Also, the sedentary people’s houses were looted and inspected by the nomads [AIHRC 2007: 143-46]. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) called on the Afghan government to send more troops to the conflict zone to stop the fighting and prevent a potential ethnic war [BBC Persian 2007]. Sedentary people lost their crops, harvests to the heavily armed nomads using weapons such as PKM and DSHK machine guns, and rocket propelled grenades. However, the sedentary people were also armed but not as heavily as the nomads were. The local government did not or could not intervene t o stop the armed conflict and nomad’s entrance [AIHRC 2008: 143]. On the 28th of May, 2008, the nomads’ entrance of Hazarajat sparked armed conflict in Behsud I (Hessa-e-Awwal-e Behsud), which quickly expanded into the entire Day Mirdad region in July [AIHRC 2008: 142]. On 17 July, the government dispatched the Afghan National Army (ANA) to Behsud to stop the conflict but the fighting did not cease. President Karzai sent a delegation to the area to help arrange a ceasefire but it was not successful and the armed conflict continued and scores of the sedentary people were killed despite the presence of the National Army in the conflict area, as the nomads gained momentum seizing other areas in the region [AIHRC 2008: 154].(3) As AIHRC repeated in its report in 2010:

[In 2008], the scope of this conflict further expanded and claimed more life and material casualties, twenty four local people were killed and eleven others were wounded. More than six thousand families were forced to leave their homes and their native areas, around eighty-four houses were burnt and people’s belongings and properties were looted, a large number of livestock were lost and agricultural produces were destroyed, schools, mosques and local clinics stopped functioning and heavy damages were inflicted to the local people [AIHRC 2010].

On the 13th of April 2010, the nomads proceeded again towards the border areas of Behsud- I and Behsud- II districts to enter Hazarajat. According to the AIHRC’s report, “after four minor clashes with the local people, finally a severe fight broke out between the two sides which continued until May 18, 2010” [AIHRC 2010]. The report states that the conflict “caused tremendous human and material casualties.” The report states:

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33-1_中東学会.indb 13 2017/08/09 13:13:16 During this year fight, 6 local people were killed and 6 others were wounded, more than 2,791 families from the three districts were displaced and the properties of most families were looted. Around 153 houses consisting of 323 rooms belonging to the local people were completely burnt down, 35 schools were closed as a result of which around 5,450 students were deprived of their right to educa tion and heavy damages were inflected to the local people as a result of their looted houses, loss of their livestock, destruction of their agriculture, closure of schools and clinics [AIHRC 2010].

The annual repetition of the conflict in local level ascended it to the national level with extra ethno-political dynamics. In order to understand the dynamics of nomad- sedentary conflict in Afghanistan it requires to focus beyond the local level which intensified the anger into the national politics.

2. Conflict beyond Local level The scale of casualties and destruction caused by the conflict in the summer of 2008 in Behsud resulted into open ethnic tensions between many Hazaras and Pashtun political elites in Kabul. The Hazara leaders organized mass protests against the government and accused it of what they called kuchi garaye, or tendency to support the nomads. Haji Muhammad Mohaqiq, a Hazara member of parliament(4) and head of Hezb-e Islami Wahadad-e Mardom-e Afghanistan (The People’s Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) went on hunger strike to protest against what has been called the nomad ‘invasion’ and the government’s lack of attention. On July 22, tens of thousands of men and women demonstrated in Kabul against the nomads’ invasion of Hazarajat, accusing the government of supporting the nomads or, at least, not wanting to solve the problem [Reuters 2008]. According to Milich, 50,000 people participated in the demonstration in central Kabul [Milich 2009].(5) The protestors called on president Karzai to resign [Allvioces 2008]. They were holding placards reading “we want article 14 implemented.”(6) Generally, the protesters’ main demands were: evacuation of all nomads who had captured lands and property of the people of Behsud; prosecution of the invading nomads; resettlement of the displaced sedentary and restitution of the damages inflicted on them [BBC 2008; Khabar-gozari-e Fars 2008]. The protest was led by Mohaqiq, and officials of the United Nations Assistance Missio n in Afghanistan (UNAMA) mediated between him and the government (particularly President Karzai)

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33-1_中東学会.indb 14 2017/08/09 13:13:16 to stop the demonstration. In addition, the government warned the protestors against security threats. Finally, on 21 July 2008, President Karzai issued a decree calling on the nomads to leave Behsud. However, the decree failed to solve the problem, and was just an interim response to immediate political pressures. In 2009, there was no invasion of Hazarajat by the nomads because the Hazara leaders and President Karzai had built an alliance for the second presidential election. Therefore, Karzai and Pashtun elites did not allow nomads to attack Hazarajat and according to the Afghan parliament, the government paid 100,000,000 Afghani (1,950,744.84 $ at the time) to the nomads to refrain from going into the Hazarajat [Ibrahimi 2011: 249]. In the summer of 2010, the nomad-sedentary conflict in the central part of the country caused a political uproar in capital Kabul. Mohammad Karim Khalili (born in Behsud), the second vice-president, traveled to Behsud saying: “I am ready to die for the rights of people until kuchis leave Hazarajat.” Khalili asked president Karzai to solve the nomadic problem in the country and help them settle according to the constitution. On May 17, the Hazara members of the National Assembly staged a sit-in inside the parliament, warning that the Hazaras would boycott the administrative system of the state. In their declaration, they accused the government of discriminative ethnic and racial politics [DW-world 2010]. Yet the nomad-backed Alam Gul Kuchi, member of parliament, made a different claim , stating in a parliamentary session that “they [Hazaras] started the dispute and now that they are defeated they are complaining and we will reclaim the [land] as it is a right given by God” [Foschini 2010]. Muhammad Mohaqqiq said that they would continue their protests until the government came up with a resolution to the dispute: “Last year I went on hunger strike, and if necessary, I will again go on hunger strike. We want [the government] to correct its policies and remove the nomads from the areas affected. These are our demands” [Foschini 2010]. The Hazara MPs later walked out of the session in protest against the clashes. The AIHRC warned of ethnic clashes if the Kuchi dispute was not resolved soon. On May 28, president Karzai issued a decree asking the nomads to evacuate the occupied and disputed territories but according to the AIHRC delegation, the nomads stayed in the occupied area for a long time [AIHRC 2010: 4]. A ceasefire was brokered and 454 soldiers, 70 from the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 384 from the Afghan National Police (ANP), were dispatched to the area to maintain the ceasefire [AIHRC 2010: 4]. But the contentious claim-making with ethnic dimensions continued for

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33-1_中東学会.indb 15 2017/08/09 13:13:16 another month at different other levels.

3. The Diaspora’s Reaction to The Conflict The Hazara Diaspora organized a worldwide protest against the nomads’ invasion of Behsud and accused the government of ethnic discrimination by supporting the nomads. The demonstrations waged between May and June in Australia, Canada, Italy, Norway, Sweden, USA and United Kingdom [Hazara 2010; KabulPress 2010].(7) Most of the Hazara diaspora labeled the Kuchis involved in the clashes as “pro-Taliban kuchis” (protestors in Sydney), and “Talibanic nomad attackers” (protestors in Italy), which accentuates the political dimensions of the issue. In London, for example, the protesters staged a sit-in in front of the Afghan embassy. The protesters drew the international community and human rights organizations’ attention to what was going on in Behsud and Day Mirdad. They also called upon the Afghan government to settle the nomads in accordance with Article 14 of the constitution, according to protesters, the actual nomads are parts of Afghan society, but there are “tribal circles” within the government who are complicit with the Taliban in their efforts to destablise the Hazarajat region in the name of nomads [BBC 2010]. Mohammad Hanif Atmar, the interior minister of Afghanistan at that time, reported that some 700-1,000 armed nomads attacked villages in Behsud [Ibrahimi 2011: 251]. The nomadic armed groups in the region carried the white flag, which is known as the Taliban flag. Generally, the Hazaras have often accused the government and the ethnocentric elements within it of supporting the nomads in actions, and not wanting the problem to be solved. On the other hand, the nomads also complain that the government does not support them to use the pasturelands which they have used in the past. Focusing on the Hazara diasporas’ slogans and claims can help us understand more about the nomad-sedentary conflict and its ethno-historic dimensions. In Italy, for example, they used the slogans like “Stop targeting Hazaras,” “Stop killing Hazaras,” “We want peace,” “We want justice,” “US, NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan break your silence,” “Kuchis attack, Taliban support, Karzai watches,” “The Kuchi nomads should be disarmed in the same way as all other citizens.” In all these slogans “We” indicates an ethnic boundary. In Australia they wrote on a big billboard: “nomadism is cruelty and the h eritage of executioner” and “Why UN is Silent” [Hazara 2010]. Usually, in Afghanistan the terms kuchigary or kuchi-garayi (e.t. nomadism and nomadist in English) are perceived by non-Pashtuns, particularly by the Hazaras, to be an ethnic

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33-1_中東学会.indb 16 2017/08/09 13:13:17 strategy and ideology used against non-Pashtuns. By chanting nomadism as heritage of executioner, they referred to the time of Abd al-Rahman Khan (1880-1901). During that year in a mass protest in Bamyan province, the center of Hazarajat, they used the same slogan: “nomadism is cruelty and the heritage of executioner” [Hasht-e-Subh 2010]. It is the central frame of sedentary Hazaras against Pashtun nomads that addresses the historical war between the Pashtuns and the Hazaras in 1890s. The sedentary Hazara deny the nomads’ claims of owning the pasturelands, which means that the nomads’ collective ownership claims are invalid. The Hazaras see this conflict nothing more than the continuation of a historical trend or process. How ever, it may not be right to deal with the massacre perpetrated during Abd al-Rahman’s reign in the context of the recent nomad-sedentary conflict. The conflict reoccurred in Behsud in 2011 and prompted a renewed debate in the Afghan parliament, which asked the government to solve the nomads’ problem in the country [Hasht-e Subh 2011]. But in June 2012, the nomads swept into Kajab in second Behsud , ransacking several villages and burning hundreds of houses. Ewaz, a 55-year-old sedentary villager, said to the media: “In each burnt house, there was a copy of Koran. When the Americans set fire to them in the spring, the whole world cried out, but here, no one’s said anything.(8) Who are we? What have we done? We’re also Muslims, aren’t we?” [Talkvietnam 2012]. Eimal Faizi, the Spokesman of President Karzai, told media that it was the Taliban insurgents who attacked Behsud under the name of Kuchis [Hazara people 2012]. It is, however, difficult to distinguish between Kuchis and Taliban due to their ethnic ties and relationships [The Economist: 2007]. The Kuchis cooperated with the Taliban when they were in power while from early 1990s to 2001 when fighting between the Taliban and Hazaras led to tens of thousands of deaths, particularly on the Hazara side [Talkvietnam 2012]. On the other hand, the Pashtun nomads claim they have right to the pasture of Hazarajat on the basis of decrees issued by King Abd al-Rahman Khan (1880-1891). Furthermore, they argue that in addition to the official decrees they used the pasture since the 1890s. And after the sedentary Hazaras took over their past urelands in recent decades, they began to prevent them from going to the region. Alam Ghul Kuchi who represented the nomads in the Parliament at that time has said: “They [the sedentary Hazaras] start fighting against us and usurped our rights. They are usurpers. It is 32 years that they are usurping our rights to use the pastures. We will fight against them even if it costs thousands of lives still we will fight to take back our rights” [DW-world

17 The Dynamics of Nomad-Sedentary Conflict in Afghanistan（Farasoo）

33-1_中東学会.indb 17 2017/08/09 13:13:17 2010]. According to the nomads, it is the sedentary community that prevents them from using their rightful pastures in Hazarajat. The controversial claims from both side constructed a complicated dynamic. However, in order to explain the dynamics of the conflict, in following sections will evaluate the case according to theoretical implication.

IV. Evaluating the Conflict

The contentiousness of the conflict between Pashtun nomads and sedentary Hazaras point to a number of mechanisms that are central to the relational theory of contentious politics, which has been described before. These include activation of social boundaries, historical perceptions, and claim-making performances by both parties to the conflict as well as the central government of Afghanistan. Both the Hazara (sedentary ) and the Pashtun nomads’ claims are based on historical perceptions, which serve as the cognitive mechanism of the contention. Other relational mechanisms such as ethnic boundaries and ethnic brokerages at both local and national political levels were also involved in the process of conflict mobilization. Therefore, this section, examines the causal mechanism account and the implication of relational theory in the context of nomad-sedentary conflict and its relation to ethnicization of politics. Finally, the government’s role during the contention process will be explained.

1. Historical Experiences and Collective Memory The collective memory of antagonism between sedentary and nomadic people, is related to the historical events that the sedentary Hazara experienced during the reign of Abd al-Rahman Khan (1880-1901). This long history of persecution and ethnic marginalization of the Hazaras played a major role in nomad-sedentary conflict in Afghanistan. According to Mousavi “more than all the other peoples of Afghanistan, the Hazaras were subject of the wrath and hatred of Abd al-Rahman” [Mousavi 1998: 114] because the Hazaras were a real major threat to his rule, and were Shi’a whom Abd al-Rahman considered as ‘godless infidels.’ He called on the Sunni religious leaders to conduct a ‘religious crusade’ against the ‘godless’ Shi’a Hazaras, and “promised those who took part in this crusade against the Hazaras land, wealth, women and children as a reward. An enormous force was put together: some 30,000-40,000 government troops,

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33-1_中東学会.indb 18 2017/08/09 13:13:17 10,000 mounted government troops, and some 100,000 civilian troops” [Mousavi 1998: 126]. During this war, the structure of the Hazaras society was destroyed. It is necessary to understand the nature of this war in order to examine its collective consequences. According to Ibrahimi,

The war aroused extreme anti-Hazara feelings mobilizing tens of thousands of religiously inspired tribesmen from across the country. The level of mobilization was particularly high among the Pashtuns in general and the nomads in particular who were for centuries eyeing for the fertile valleys and summer pasturelands of the Central Highlands [Hazarajat] [Ibrahimi 2012: 3].

This war has constructed an antagonistic memory among the Hazaras who have kept the narrative of those brutalities alive until today. They rely on their historical experiences to interpret the current real dynamics of the conflict. Faiz Mohammad Katib wrote: “Afghan [Pashtun] officers and commanders, headed by Abdul Qodos Khan, married daughters of Hazara leaders by force, each taking more than one wife, and generally spent their time drunk and enjoying themselves” [Mousavi 1998: 123]. According to historical documents, the war was not just to terrorize and torture the Hazaras, but it was also a process to depopulate Hazarajat in order to repopulate it with Pashtun nomads. As Mousavi added:

Those [the Hazaras] had surrendered were either imprisoned or sent into exile in northern or southern Afghanistan. In their place, Pashtun speaking nomads from Eastern Afghanistan were brought into populated the area and given land by government [Mousavi 1998: 122].

Following the conquest of Hazarajat, Abd al-Rahman imposed sixteen different categories of taxes on the Hazaras [Mousavi 1998: 121] and these heavy taxes are central to the Hazara historical experience of ethnic discrimination. Abd al-Rahman’s war against the Hazaras and then the continuity of ethnic discrimination created deep divisions along ethnic and sectarian lines in Afghanistan and “the history of this war is today a central theme of the Hazaras’ collective memory and self- consciousness” [Ibrahimi 2012: 3]. Perhaps it is a turning point in Afghanistan history that politicized ethnic groups began to define their boundaries and relations. Consequently, the nomad-

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33-1_中東学会.indb 19 2017/08/09 13:13:17 sedentary conflict after 2001 is based on the collective memory which served as cognitive mechanism of the conflict. During field research in Afghanistan, the interviewees mostly placed emphasis on historical events and collective antagonistic memory among Pashtun nomads and sedentary Hazaras. During my interviews with Hazara members of parliament and sociopolitical activists in Afghanistan, it was surprising that all of them emphasized history. For example, Abbas Noyan,(9) a former MP said:

A century ago, King Abd al-Rahman Khan sent the Kuchis to the Hazarajat as a form of punishment. The Hazaras had revolted against the King and lost to him. In the course of these 100 years, the various ruling governments did nothing to repeal this decision. They instead continued to use the presence of Kuchis in the Hazarajat to their advantage (author’s interview, 2012).

This is a common claim among the sedentary Hazaras. Accordingly, I found out that when the nomads go to Hazarajat the sedentary communities are still thinking that it is in fact the continuity of Abd al-Rahman policy supported by the government. These, the Hazaras activists and non-Hazaras experts share the notion that the h istory matters. Syed Askar Mousavi (10) says:

The problem of nomadism has more political aspects rather than cultural or nomadism as a way of life, itself. Because the history of the Hazaras and Hazaralogy shows that the nomads have other routes but after the repression of the Hazaras’ resistance in 1890s, the nomads (Kuchi) were used as a tool against the Hazaras ethnic group or as instrument of Pash tun domination (author’s interview, 2012).

This collective memory in the context of nomad-sedentary conflict is very strong. That is why all the Hazara protesters in Afghan cities or even in the Hazara diasporas in Australia, Europe and North America used the same slogan: “Nomadism is cruelty and the heritage of executioner”(11) which construes the nomadic way of life as the ideology and cruel legacy of Abd al-Rahman Khan. They are struggling to stop this “cruelty” and “heritage of executioner” by sedentary resistance against nomads in Behsud or by other collective action such as mass protests beyond the local level of the

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33-1_中東学会.indb 20 2017/08/09 13:13:17 conflict. Even the common narrative among the Hazaras comes from centuries ago when they lost their lands in northern parts of Qandahar, Ghazni and Wardak. Even before Abd al-Rahman Khan (1880-1901), as Ferdinand explained, during Timur Shah Durrani (1772-93) the Pashtuns took over the fertile Hazara lands in Qandahar, then called Zab ol. Many of those Pashtun tribes were nomads. The Pahstuns also took over the Hazara villages in Wardak province, which are still called by their own original Hazara names such as Karim Dad, Sad Mardaf (or /Sadmorda), Aqchi, Pirdad and so on after the Hazaras have left the areas [Ferdinand 2006: 167-68]. Consequently, after Abd al-Rahman’s war, the Hazaras lost their lands, were massacred, lost th eir massive population and were sold as slaves in Afghanistan’s cities [Ferdinand 2006: 183-200). Then, until 1980s the Pashtun nomads supported by government had a dominant position, and the Kuchi came to be perceived by the sedentary people as representative of the King or the authority. The sedentary people believe that the nomdic invasion of Behsud or anywhere else is the same ‘strategy’ that has been pursued in the past. The Hazara leaders believe that the nomads go to Hazarajat for political reasons, not for economic purposes (author’s interview, 2012). It is a claim that was made during my all interviews with Hazaras activists or politicians who emphasized the past and saw Kuchi actions as being politically motivated. I do not intend to prove whether the nomads go there for political reasons or out of real needs, but I do want to emphasize that the antagonistic perception comes from the history. As I mentioned before, the Pashtun nomads also refer their claims to history and to decrees issued by past Afghan rulers, which leads us to conclude that history matters in conflict analysis and peace building. Furthermore, political and structural changes, in a contentious context, perceived as opportunities for parties to mobilize collective memory and performing their claims.

2. Political Opportunity Structure and Mobilization Political opportunity structure is meaningful in the context of a historical process and can alter relational interaction. Political change after the collapse of the Taliban regime perceived as opportunity and threat by both parties, nomads and sedenta ry, spontaneously and it sorted contentious mobilization. As mentioned above, the nomads historically used the pasturelands in Hazarajat, but by the end of 1970s the situation

21 The Dynamics of Nomad-Sedentary Conflict in Afghanistan（Farasoo）

33-1_中東学会.indb 21 2017/08/09 13:13:17 changed and the sedentary Hazaras participated in the anti-Soviet armed resistance, which led to collapse of the government in Hazarajat in 1979. Hazarajat came under the control of Shuray-e Ittefaq (Unanimous Council), a hastily assembled region-wide organization [Ibrahimi 2009: 1] that was as umbrella for several parties. During the 1980s the dominant armed party in the region was Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan (The Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan), which was established in 1989 and has been an important political and military player in Afghanistan. The withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988 from Afghanistan and the collapse of central government opened the window for ethnic conflict and power competition in 1990s. During these three decades – from 1970-2001 – the ethnic power r elation changed, the government collapsed and the country was rendered insecure. The Pashtun nomads also lost their pasturelands in the Hazarajat as the Hazaras armed parties controlled the territories. In 1996, when the Taliban captured Kabul, once again an opportunity was available for the nomads to use the pasturelands of Hazarajat. During these three decades the Pashtun nomads were also involved in conflict, and were particularly favored by the Taliban. The collapse of the central government in Hazarajat in 1979 was perceived as an opportunity by Hazaras to deter the Pashtun nomads. At the same time, the collapse of regime increased the security risk for nomads. The concept of “opportunities and threats” [McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 31-47] in relational context of two opposite social groups explain nomad-sedentary contentious mobilization. The Taliban period, was an opportunity for the nomads and a threat for the sedentary community because of ethno-cultural ties between the nomads and the Taliban. But the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001 was perceived as an opportunity for both sides to make their claims on the pasturelands in accordance with historical events. Accor dingly, the Pashtun nomads tried to access the pastureland in the Hazarajat but the sedentary people in Hazarajat objected. On the other hand, the nomads’ migration to Hazarajat was thus perceived as a threat, according to historical memory. The collapse of the Taliban and the presence of the international community in the country were also perceived by Hazaras as opportunities in which nomads would not be allowed to access their areas. After the fall of the Taliban, from the nomads’ point of view, there was (is) an opportunity for them to access the pasturelands of Hazarajat. From the 1890s to 1979, the Pashtun nomads used the pasturelands in the Hazarajat, which they view as their own properties and thus claim a right to use them again. In this paradoxical perception of threat and opportunity, the nomads organized themselves to enter by force the

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33-1_中東学会.indb 22 2017/08/09 13:13:17 Hazarajat, but the sedentary people started armed resistance. In fact, the threat and opportunity structures are crucial mechanisms in mobilization and collective action that can define the dynamics of nomad-sedentary conflict in Afghanistan. Outside the armed conflict zone, brokers such as political leaders and civic activists play significant role in the reactivation of ethnic boundaries, mobilization and coordination of mass protests in cities like Kabul, Bamyan, even amongst the Hazara diasporas. As such, the conflict was intensified through mechanisms of brokerage, category formation, and certification [McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 142-45] within an ethno-political context. These mechanisms connect social sites and med iate their relations. Thus, brokers are not just political leaders but the social activist and pro- ethnic media are also playing a significant role in mobilization and intensification of the conflict. Moreover, competition between leaders for socio-political certification, in both sides, played crucial role into the conflict. The nomads’ leaders like Mullah Tarakhil and other nomad MPs accused the Hazara leaders and sedentary MPs of preventing the nomads from going to Hazarajat to use their own pasturelands. Mullah Tarakhil, during an interview in parliament emphasized that the government should secure the pastures in Hazarajat and showing their determination to supports nomads to use pastures lands. Therefore, both nomad and sedentary leaders, activated the “us-them” boundaries and playing a significant role in conflict escalation. Based on mechanisms such as brokerage operation and category formation analysis, in the context of political opportunity structure, the Hazara and nomadic leaders, and Pashtun elites play a significant role for political gains [Foschini 2013], which explains parts of the dynamics of nomad-sedentary conflict in Afghanistan. The nomad-sedentary mobilizati on and coordination at and beyond the local level is, in fact, based on the mobilization of collective memory and activation of hostile historical nomad-sedentary relation, which is also the reason for intensification of the contentious collective action at the political level. However, environmental changes, such as resource scarcity and population growth also escalated the nomad- sedentary contention.

3. Environmental Changes and Resources Competition One of the important dynamics of contention is the social impact of environmental changes, which will be referred to as the environmental mechanism, and affects social interactions. The development of villages and the population growth in

23 The Dynamics of Nomad-Sedentary Conflict in Afghanistan（Farasoo）

33-1_中東学会.indb 23 2017/08/09 13:13:18 the sedentary community has impacts on the claim-making processes in the nomad- sedentary conflict due to increased demands of resource scarcity. Moreover, the process of rural-urban migration has been very slow; and around 80 percent of Afghanistan’s population lives in rural area, with agriculture being the source of livelihood [Milich 2009; USAID 2012: 18]. In the last decade, drought has a lso had a deep impact on the irrigated land, pastures, and water resources. Over generations, these factors have first made the natural resources scarce, and then forced the sedentary people to use more lands in order to survive [Wily 2009]. All these factors create the environmental mechanism that in turn affects the social processes. The environmental changes have had a deep negative effect on the nomads’ lives too [AIHRC 2008: 50]. According to Afghanistan Human Development Report (AHDR) in 2011, “nomads rely on a livestock-based economy for their livelihoods. They were hit particularly hard by the 1998-2002 droughts and the dry year of 2004 because they could not water their animals” [AHDR 2011: 69]. As a result, the nomads pay more attention to Hazarajat because it provides an access ible source of better pasture. In the past, the nomads would go to the northern regions such as Badakhshan, Faryab and other places, but due to security problems most of them have been migrating to Hazarajat since 2001, leading to these conflicts. Afghanistan has two livestock production systems such as sedentary mixed farming systems and nomadic systems. But, historically, these two systems have clashed with each other, particularly in the Hazarajat where the nomads, due to the nomad-sedentary contention, destroyed the Hazara’s animal husbandry in Hazarajat [Mousavi 1998: 133] and government supported nomadic system against former’s animal husbandry system in the central parts of the country [Wily 2015: 120]. Furthermore, the development of villages, population growth and drought in recent decades affected the interaction of these two livestock production systems in areas like the Hazarajat and sharpened the resource competition. In fact, the actual nomads––not the settled political nomads––have a hard life and demand permanent settlement. They were affected by environmental changes, security issues and ethnicized contentious politics for decades. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report, many nomads believe that the time has come for them to permanently settle and their traditional way of life has become unsustainable. The report quotes a young nomad, Torak Jan, explaining his wish-list:

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33-1_中東学会.indb 24 2017/08/09 13:13:18 We want land on which to build our houses; we want our children to be educated; we want our patients to be treated in hospitals; we want to have jobs; we want safe drinking-water; we want electricity; and we want a normal life like everybody else in this country [UNHCR 2008].

But the basic needs of nomadic people has forgotten or undermined through political contentions and antagonistic collective memories. Moreover, the region called ‘Hazarajat’ is an ethno-geographic concept signifying the cultural, historic and geographic space occupied by Hazaras, and their relationship to it. This ethnicization of lands and natural resources is based on two important mechanisms: First, historical use of the lands and identity connection to it constructed the sense of ownership and legitimacy. According to the perception of the sedentary people, the priority should be given to the sedentary Hazaras because the land belonged to them and they now need more resources. Second, according to ecological concepts, land is perceived as honor by indigenous people. It is applicable in the case of both the sedentary Hazara and the Pashtun nomads. In this regard, Kolers states that the concept of land means:

First, we live on land – we, our homes, our belongings, and things we build individually and collectively, take up space. Hence the physical extension of terra firma is a good whose distribution matters to everyone. Second, land is composed of resources that we need in order to survive, prosper, and express ourselves; literally, the land constitutes both our physical bodies and virtually every material good we can find or fashion. Hence secure access to good land, land we can use to do the things we care about, is essential to our capacity to make our way in the world. Third, land and its properties––its location, its material composition, who or what lives on it––are essential to a vast array of world systems, such as nitrogen and carbon cycles, water purification and storage, ecosystems, and the production of oxygen, without which we would not exist [Kolers 2009: 8].

It appears that the “defense of land” is part of sedentary people’s collective memory, which serves as reminder of their persecution and loss during the reign of Abd al-Rahman Khan. Furthermore, they continuously lost their lands and now Hazarajat is th ree times smaller than the past [Mousavi 1998: 136]. Therefore, they do not allow

25 The Dynamics of Nomad-Sedentary Conflict in Afghanistan（Farasoo）

33-1_中東学会.indb 25 2017/08/09 13:13:18 the Pashtun nomads to enter their lands on the basis of collective property or ownership claims. Consequently, they refuse to accept the nomads’ collective claims (any collective claim according to specific identity) on their whole pasturelands, but accept claims of nomads in owning individual properties in Hazarajat. During my interviews with the sedentary leaders, they agreed that the individual properties and the lands that the nomads have purchased have to be respected, but the nomads’ collective claims are neither valid nor acceptable. Gholam Hussian Nasiri, an MP from Behsud, said: “the nomads, who have property, are welcomed in Hazarajat, but it is not acceptable to bring hundreds of other nomads with them. But it is not in the case, they have political agenda” (author’s interview, 2012). On other hand, a Kuchi member of the Parliament proclaimed that “only Pashtuns were true Afghans and that Kuchis were the rightful owners of all high pastures” [Wily 2013: 77; Wily 2015: 125] which caused significant reaction among non-Pashtuns. Meanwhile, due to three decades of war, ethnicization of land disputes and government fragility the conflict on resources has never been managed to stabilize the social relations.

4. Governmental Response and Conflict Escalation How can one explain the failure of the central government in Kabul to resolve the nomad-sedentary conflicts? Institutionalists would emphasize institutional weakness as the cause of this conflict, but according to relational theory employed in this article, institutions such as governments, can become the object of the conflict or act as a vested party. This can be particularly the case in divided and war-torn countries such as Afghanistan, where governments are internally divided along ethno- political constituencies. Scholars such as McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly believe that “[g] overnments both prescribe, tolerate, or forbid different claims-making performances and respond differently to various political ac tors.” [McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 60]. In the case of nomad-sedentary conflict in Afghanistan, the government only has not failed to resolve the conflict, but also failed to build trust in sociological level. The Government has played a crucial role in altering the different relational mechanisms of nomad-sedentary conflict from the beginning. Historically, there is continued mistrust again st the Afghan government among the sedentary Hazaras. The role of government can become clearer in evaluating the claims of the two parties to the conflict. The nomads claim that they have decrees (farman) from Afghan rulers such as Abd al-Rahman, and that “the farmans grant

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33-1_中東学会.indb 26 2017/08/09 13:13:18 the right to all descendants of the original families list to use the pastures, and claim that these pastures’ boundaries are being violated by Hazara encroachment, both for rain fed agriculture and for grazing” [Milich 2009]. On the contrary, the sedentary Hazaras counter the nomads’ claim in three ways: First, they claim that the nomads supported by Abd al-Rahman in the 1890s participated in the war against the Hazaras and usurped their lands by force, which Shahrani has called “internal colonialism” in Afghanistan [Shahrani 2002: 719]. Second, according to the sedentary perspective, all those documents or decrees were imposed from the top on the Hazara population many decades ago and are thus invalid [Milich 2009]. Third, since the sedentary population has grown and the drought has had deep negative impacts on their lives and lifestyles, the water and pastures resources are not enough to meet the needs of the sedentary people themselves. According to Milich, the “current Pashtun-dominated government has always favored the Kuchis; the government’s credibility is at rock-bottom in Hazarajat” [Milich 2009]. The govern ment institutions even appear to be involved in the conflict. As Danish Karokhel(12) said:

In nomad-sedentary conflict, the ethnic contention is really noticeable, and not only tribal leaders play roles, but the senior government officials, political parties, civil society organizations including the mass media support their own respective sides and hide the truth from the people. There are severe diffi culties among members of the government to solve the Kuchis [nomad] problem; even some government officials, the judiciary and the legislature are involved in the dispute between the nomads and the Hazaras adding fuel to the conflict (author’s interview, 2011).

What has been said shows that the nomad-sedentary conflict makes sense in the context of ethnicized political contention in which both s tate and non-state actors are involved on a political level. Based on the historical account the nomad-sedentary conflict is a legacy of state formation process which indicate that the state formation process in the Afghanistan failed to stabilize the social relational interaction. In 2010, when the conflict again escalated, criticisms against the government increased, and the verbal clash between the Hazara sedentary groups and Kuchi nomads arose in the Afghan Parliament, President Hamid Karzai sent a high-level delegation headed by Second Vice-President Karim Khalili, Minister of Interior Muhammad Hanif

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33-1_中東学会.indb 27 2017/08/09 13:13:18 Atmar, Chief of Staff Omar Daudzai and a powerful Kuchi leader, former Taliban commander and Guantanamo detainee Haji Naim Kuchi to Behsud. They managed to arrange a cease-fire, asking the nomads to withdraw from the occupied regions. In addition, Karzai set up a special court to solve the nomads’ problem by evaluating their documents, but the special court did not hand down ay verdicts. In t his regard, Mullah Tarakhil(13), one of the nomad’s political leader, criticized the government as below:

If the government be serious, wants to solve the problem, puts some pressure on both sides and the special court also works well, I think that this problem will be solved within just one month. There are some political machinations among both nomads and sedentary ethnic group that sustain the con flict. But the second factor is the government itself. When the nomads go from Nangarhar, Laghman and Khost provinces and arrive in Behsud, then the government asks them to stop and distribute money among them. Take this [for example] 200,000 or 300,000 Afghani but don’t go to Behsud or Hazarajat. Once the nomads take the money, they will then inform the other nomads of the money. If there are two thousand families, for example, this year, there will be five thousand families next year. It is one of the main problems. I asked government several times to please stop distributing money among them. But in fact, the leaders take 50% of the money for themselves and just 50% of it goes to the people (author’s interview, 2012).

Consequently, it is the ethnic networks inside the state institutions that dictate the political decisions. The sedentary Hazara people demand sedentarization of the Kuchi nomads because they believe that the nomadic way of Pashtun, Kuchi life is a political issue rather than a true social difference. However, in this situation the actual poor nomads are forgotten. Contrary to the Hazara demand for sedentarization of nomads, which is also the nomads’ demand, the government has strengthened its policy of supporting the political nomads in recent years because nomadic livelihoods still provide political advantages for the Pashtun elites involved in ethnocentric decisionmaking. The Pashtun nomads have ten seats in Afghanistan parliament (allocated by a presidential decree by President Karzai), which is a significant political advantage. Therefore, the government has been making an effort to reconstruct the nomads as a political phenomenon (author’s interview with Sediqullah Tawhidi, 2012). It is based on this policy that the government has established the Independent

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33-1_中東学会.indb 28 2017/08/09 13:13:18 Department for Coordination of Nomads; allocated 10 seats of parliament to the nomads; set up the National Council of Nomads; created representation for the nomads to Provincial Councils; and specified the whole country as the nomads’ constituency for parliamentary elections. Moreover, the government held a conference called “Strategy of Mobile Livestock” in Kabul in November 2005 in a bid to justify the nomadism at political level [HasanYar 2011]. As Wily explain: “The Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs (nick named ‘the Kuchi Ministry’ and replaced in 2004 by the Department of Kuchi Affairs under the Office of the President) wanted to restore highland pastures to Kuchi control. For all three ministries, the objective was reinforced state ownership and limitation of local access to conditional use rights” [Wily 2015: 120]. As a result, the politicization of the Pashtun nomad constituted political advantage for the Pashtun elite, but it steadily increased negative perception among sedentary and make the real nomads more vulnerable [Foschini: 2013]. It is likely that the nomad-sedentary conflict, which is intertwined with contentious politics, will continue into an uncertain future and there is not any strategy put in place to address it. On the other hand, the sedentarization process is not something easy. It will need a strong strategy, sufficient funds, socio-cultural measures and political will. Abbas Noyan, a former sedentary MP, shares this point: “There is not any short-term solution to this conflict a nd it requires time and efforts to be resolved. The government responds only when a conflict has already erupted out there, and this happens each time” (author’s interview, 2012). There is also a growing concern among the non-Pahstun that the government, based on its historical ethno-demographic policy, tries to settle the Pashtun nomads in the central and northern parts of the country or support them to take over the lands there [Ibrahimi 2011: 245]. Although the government takes only short-term measures, the fact is that the complicated and multi- level dynamics of nomad-sedentary conflict poses a serious threat to sociopolitical stability in Afghanistan as a fragmented country. The government is weak, divided and with strong ethic affiliations, and thus, has repeatedly failed to solve th-e nomad sedentary conflict.

V. Conclusion

The nomad-sedentary conflict in the post-Taliban era in Afghanistan is a

29 The Dynamics of Nomad-Sedentary Conflict in Afghanistan（Farasoo）

33-1_中東学会.indb 29 2017/08/09 13:13:19 unique local dispute that has escalated into organized armed conflict with far-reaching national political dimensions. The nomads entered the central parts of the country on the basis of an identity-based collective ownership claims. In response, the sedentary communities began a scattered resistance against the nomads’ invasion and collective claims. Drawing on the relational approach to contentious politics, I have argued that the Pashtun nomads are historically perceived as a threat to the sedentary people’s lands and their demographic entity. Concurrently, they are a symbol of Pashtun domination in the region, which has become affiliated with the collective memory of the sedentary people. Both the nomads and the sedentary groups make claims against each other on the basis of histori cal events that took place in the past to define their present collective properties claims. The nomads claim that they have pasture rights in Hazarajat granted to them by a King’s decrees in the past, but the sedentary claim that the nomads took their land by force and government’s supports in the past and the decrees are not valid anymore. Such contentious claim making processes have re-activated the social boundaries and collective memories that are deeply rooted in history. There are several causal mechanisms at work in the nomad-sedentary conflict in Hazarajat––such as historical, cognitive, political changes––that are perceived as threat and opportunity on both sides, as well as environmental change and institutional failure. In fact, they all combine to form the dynamics of the co ntention. Other mechanisms such as boundary activation and brokerage operation are also involved in the conflict escalation and intensification. The political leaders and activists, on both sides, play significant role in memory mobilization, boundary activation and brokerage operation for their own political gains among their own political constituencies. In all, these mechanisms shaped the contentious relational interaction of the nomad-sedentary communities. The political opportunity and threat mechanism can be understood in the context of historical experiences, and even, the environmental impacts and resource competitions had been defied through historical antagonism. All these causes and mechanisms define the contention itself and provide a better understanding of the conflict for po licy makers too. Moreover, the Pashtun nomads or Kuchis are politicized and have turned into a political actor and count as Pashtuns in ethnic relations in the country. Consequently, some of my interviewees claimed that “debate on nomadism in Afghanistan is not an anthropological debate rather it is ethnic policy and racial supremacy process” (author’s interview with Mousavi, 2012). The nomad-sedentary conflict has rooted in antagonistic collective memory and historical relational

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33-1_中東学会.indb 30 2017/08/09 13:13:19 processes, but its intensification dynamics beyond the local level is caused through the ethnicized contentious politics in the country. Therefore, contentious performance and claim making processes and its ascent to national politics reveal the fact that the history matters and the conflict are not simply only over resources. Rather, the conflict is indicative of deeper faultlines created as a result of state formation process which continues to challenge the stability of the Afghanistan. In view of the complexity of conflict, it requires a multi-faceted response to get resolved. First, as provided in article 14 of Afghanistan’s constitution the nomads’ own living conditions can be improved through settlement and sedentarizat ion. Sedentrization works only when the nomads issue is depoliticized and treated as a social and economic developmental issue of the country. Secondly, nomad-sedentary conflict resolution requires social trust building and transition from hostile collective memory which is rooted in the past. This will require a greater political will and clear vision in the absence of which such conflicts will continue to undermine nation-state building and social integration process of Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.

Notes

(1) Kuchi is a Persian term, means house on the shoulder (Khana ba dush). (2) There are no reliable figures of the breakdown of Afghanistan’s population along ethnic lines. Estimates of total population of ethnic groups, including that of the Pashtuns, are highly contentious. Many suspect estimates provided by official sources are meant to create a Pashtun political majority. (3) There are several documentaries available online about the nomad’s invasion and displacement of the sedentary people: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fiSfdnNG70. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=64fldRRWihM&index=5&list=PLvBU4JkAQDSKyZm3UT Qqr-dluPilPEvxm. (4) He is currently Second Voice of Chief Executive Officer of Afghanistan, Abdullah Abdullah, in the National Unity Government formed in September 2014. (5) I was in that mass demonstration as a journalist at that time. It was one of the biggest peaceful rallies in the modern history of Kabul. The peaceful demonstration began at 6 AM from Pul-e Khusk, Shahid Mazari Road in the west of Kabul. It followed the route through Kot-e Sangi, Kabul University road, up to Dehmazang square. Protesters were then joined by thousands of other demonstrators from Chindawol and Khair Khana. Here is a report about aviable on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4Io-UDCr-g&list=PLvBU4JkAQDSKyZm3UTQqr-

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33-1_中東学会.indb 31 2017/08/09 13:13:19 dluPilPEvxm. (6) According to the sedentary community the time of nomadism is “over,” and the article 14 requires a sedentarization process. Article 14: “The state, within its financial means, shall design and implement effective programs to develop agriculture and animal husbandry, improve economic, social and living conditions of farmers, herders and settlers as well as the nomads’ livelihood. The state shall adopt necessary measures for provision of housing and distribution of public estates to deserving citizens in accordance with the provisions of law and within financial possibilities.” But the interpretation of this constitutional article is not the same for everyone. (7) Some videos of the Diaspora protests are available on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=JfrgsAjKTEA. (8) On 22 February 2012, there were violent protests over alleged burning of copies of the Quran at the largest American base in Afghanistan in Kabul. There were several demonstrations in a half- dozen provinces that left at least seven dead and many more injured. Members of the sedentary community member questioned why there were no similar reactions when the Kuchi burnt copies of the Quran. (9) A former representative from Kabul province’s to the Wolesi Jirga (Afghanistan Parliament). (10) Mr Mousavi is an Afghan anthropologist, expert on the Hazaras’ history, and an adviser in Ministry of Higher Education. (11) The original form of the common slogan in Persian: (12) The director of Pajhwok News Agency in Kabul. (13) A nomad’s representative to the Wolesi Jirga/lower house of the Afghan parliament.

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33-1_中東学会.indb 36 2017/08/09 13:13:20 ABSTRACT Abbas FARASOO The Dynamics of Nomad-Sedentary Conflict in Afghanistan: The Kuchi-Hazara Confrontation in Hazarajat

In recent years, disputes between mainly Pashtun nomadic tribes and sedentary Hazaras in the provinces of Wardak, Ghazni and Bamyan have escalated into an organized armed conflict with significant national political repercussions. This article seeks to explain why, since 2001, this particular local conflict, originating in the central part of the country, has gained national and political significance. It uses a relational theory to explain dynamics of the conflict and argues that it intensified and gained significant political dimensions as a result of interaction of cognitive, relational and environmental mechanisms, most notably social boundary activation, memory mobilization, brokerage operation, and sharpening claim-making performances over resources. Relational mechanisms explain the dynamics of the violent nomad-sedentary conflict at the local level and its intensification at the national level in the context of political contention based on ethnic appeals. Furthermore, the article shows that nomad- sedentary conflict in Afghanistan is not only a conflict over resources. Rather, it has a complex historical dimension. Consequently, explanation of the conflict requires greater attention to be paid on historical processes of contentious interactions in the country. The historical dimensions of contention show that the nomad-sedentary conflict is rooted in state formation processes and still remains a contentious enigma. Therefore, this article, challenges resource-based analysis, and contends that a broad historical analysis of the conflict shows historical processes of state formation in Afghanistan in which the nomad-sedentary conflict is rooted.

Deputy Ambassador of Afghanistan Embassy to Australia and New Zealand 駐オーストラリア・ニュージーランド、アフガニスタン代理大使

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