NFHS Policy Topic Selection Proposal Russia
Submitted by Alma Nicholson and Greg Malis Isidore Newman School New Orleans, Louisiana
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma August 5-7, 2016
Introduction and Timeliness
Given the daily deluge of news pertaining to Russia and the potentially global effect of any of these situations, it is time for high school policy debaters to focus on that part of the world. The last and only year that Russia was the focus of a policy topic was 1998-1999, where the topic was Resolved: the U.S. should substantially change its foreign policy toward Russia. At that time, the primary concern was the continued path towards democracy and capitalism as well as its effect on the former Soviet states. However, seventeen years later, it is imperative that we return to a discussion that harkens back to the Cold War: the idea of Russia as an enemy to the
West and to the United States.
Recent events have placed Russia in the center of discussion regarding international affairs. The three most significant areas are Russian relations with the European Union, Russian expansion into Ukraine and beyond, and Russian relations with Syria. All three of these areas are potentially rooted in internal aspects of Russian politics and economics.
Current U.S. Policy Toward Russia
Although conservative policy analysts have been critical of the Obama Administration for its
“wait and see” approach towards Russia, concern over the U.S. approach pre-dates the current administration. Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank, issued a special report in
December 2015 which opens with “Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has not had a coherent, comprehensive strategy toward Russia. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrates, the U.S. has paid a price for this failure and, of course, many of Russia’s neighbors have paid far higher prices. At the core of the U.S. failure has been an unwillingness to assess the nature of the Russian regime realistically and to base its policy on that assessment.
Too often, the U.S. has relied on wishful thinking” (Carafano, et al). The report argues that U.S. policy makers and policy analysts assumed that the slow progress towards democracy and a market economy were simply transitional and normal. Even as late in this transition as at the time of the George W. Bush Administration, Vladimir Putin was described as “very straight forward and trustworthy.” However, this report states that Russia has intelligently and systemically developed into a well-functioning tyranny, duping the U.S. and the rest of the world by feigning steps towards a functioning democracy and a market economy. In the mid-1990s, the
U.S. engaged Russia, even welcoming it into international organizations for which it did not meet the wealth requirements. In fact, Russia’s economy and political system is closer to a kleptocracy than a modern democracy (Carafano et al). In the Cold War era, the U.S. succeeded in containing the Soviet Union, limiting its expansion at every opportunity. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. has not maintained any particular ideology when it comes to its Russia policy and has been largely reactionary. In essence, the U.S. needs to play a long game and simply make it far more expensive for Russia to continue on its current international and domestic path
(Carafano et al).
When Russia annexed Crimea, President Obama downplayed any concerns by categorizing
Russia as a “regional power.” However, Walter Russell Mead argues that, although Russia is a
“declining power,” she should still be considered a great power. According to Sumantra Maitra, a doctoral candidate in Russian foreign policy at the University of Nottingham, “a great power is therefore assumed to be a country, which possess [sic] more influence over other countries, and a disproportionate influence on world politics.” Russia’s military is modern enough to wage war and meets political realists’ standard of being a power (Maitra). Sputnik News, a Russian government-owned news agency, has described U.S. policy under the Obama Administration as consisting of constant pressure and confrontation. Further, it quotes John Quigley, professor emeritus at Ohio State University, as stating that all political factions in the U.S. support
President Obama’s approach and it is unlikely to change (“Current U.S. Policy”). Given the length of time the U.S. has maintained its current approach as well as the guarantee of a new
President in January 2017, some suggest the U.S. should make significant changes to its policy by stepping back and re-evaluating how to respond to Mr. Putin and Russia. Specifically, some advocate the U.S. should consider decreasing her confrontational approach and pursue a policy of retrenchment (Maitra).
Responding to some confusion over what the official U.S. policy is towards Russia, the Obama
Administration recently completed a 15-month review of its approach to Russia. Although it has held little public discussion on its policy, the Administration acknowledges that it runs along four themes: (1) counter and deter Russian malign influence, coercion, and aggression; (2) strengthen, build resilience, and reduce the vulnerability of allies and partners; (3) communicate and cooperate with Russia on key global challenges; and (4) preserve the potential for Russia's integration as a responsible global player (Conley and de Galbert).
The largest barrier to a successful U.S. foreign policy with respect to Russia is Vladimir Putin himself. He does not trust the U.S. Shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center,
Mr. Putin offered to help President Bush in Afghanistan. Concerned about the potential of a growing Muslim population in Russia becoming radicalized, he was supportive of American efforts to stop Islamic terrorists. Although Putin’s own political advisors were against Russian assistance, he provided it anyway. Shortly thereafter, however, President Bush advocated for the expansion of NATO and withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Putin and his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, considered both decisions acts of betrayal. It is important for the
U.S. to get Russia to return to a working relationship. Stephen F. Cohen, professor emeritus of
Russian studies, history, and politics at NYU and Princeton, argues that effective cooperation with Russia is essential in solving any regional or international national security problem. He writes, “ There is not a single major regional or issue-related national security problem we can
solve without the full cooperation of whoever sits in the Kremlin, period, end of story” (Smith,
Patrick).
Current EU Policy Toward Russia
Once Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the EU was left with three options: (1) engage and impose sanctions with the desired goal of restoring the “status quo ante,” the state of affairs prior to
Crimean annexation, (2) achieve a new normal with continued sanctions, or (3) heighten resiliency which would dissuade Russia from further acts of aggression. The March 2015
Schuman Report (issued by the Robert Schuman Foundation, the Research and Studies Centre on
Europe) explains that “President Putin has made it abundantly clear that his strategic priority is to re-define the terms imposed on Russia at the end of the Cold War. Russia will no longer be treated as the war's loser, while the United States, with the help of its allies, plays the role of the world's and Europe's hegemon” (Niblett).
Although the economic effect of the sanctions has had a greater impact on Russia than the EU, there is growing concern within the EU over the sustainability of the sanctions. Russia may have inadvertently succeeded in its goal of creating division within Europe as the sanctions themselves are making more Europeans skeptical of the Union itself. For some members such as
France, the goal of the sanctions undermines national interests. On April 28, 2016, the National
Assembly in France passed a non-binding resolution calling for the end of anti-Russian sanctions
(Dugulin).
It will be necessary for the EU to change its approach to Russia. They need to re-evaluate their current set of policies and shift their course of action guided by a few principles. Piotr
Dutkiewicz outlines: “A three-point starter comes to mind to stop the further escalation of a multi-level confrontation. The first is to start “talking about talks” by finding appropriate partners and venues to set the tone, areas, and level of the policy conversation to come. The second is to outline – with all frankness – areas of short- and medium-term common interests
(and incentives) that would appeal both to EU and Russia. Thirdly, it would be helpful to create a
“practical guidelines” with whom to talk, about what, and at what level to be used by advisers to policy makers when the time will come for the re-engagement” (Dutkiewicz).
It is necessary to create a constructive engagement policy that is centered on “Eastern Europe first” while pushing back on Russian aggression. Ulrich Speck writes, “The EU and its member states need to design a new Eastern policy that puts Eastern Europe first instead of Russia first.
That policy should comprise several elements. To start with, the EU must push back against
Russian aggression and stabilize neighbors that are under attack or under threat. But Brussels should also continue to work with Moscow on issues of common interest and keep the door open for Russia to return to a constructive relationship” (Speck).
The ability of the EU to stay together is already in question with Britain’s recent vote. Other states may follow over concerns similar to those expressed by Britain. Further, the Union is potentially threatened by increased nationalism in Austria. Compounding these issues, economic concerns from members like France over the current sanction regime towards Russia could also contribute to the ultimate breakup of the Union itself. Europe’s disunion will have a widespread and significant political and economic effect which would reverberate throughout the world.
Area 1: Russia and the EU
There are two significant sub-areas in the context of Russian relations with the EU: Energy (oil and natural gas) and post-Brexit Europe.
Russia’s economy is dependent on oil and natural gas sales to Europe. In 2013, oil and natural gas accounted for 68% of their export revenues (U.S. Energy Information Administration). Most of these exports went to European nations who are dependent on foreign sources of energy. With knowledge of this dependence, Russia uses its supply of natural gas to reward its friends and punish its enemies (Newnham), so much so that the European Union is lobbying Russia not to use its energy supply as a political tool (Gorshkov and Savochenko). Given how dependent any industrial power is on a reliable and sustainable energy source, there is significant danger if
European countries continue to be worried about energy imports. Additionally, Russia’s ability to supply Europe with natural gas and oil is further undermined by the increase of gas and oil production from the U.S. As the U.S. becomes a more reliable exporting nation, this could further harm the Russian economy if Russia and the U.S. are engaged in a price war for Europe’s business (Cunningham).
Britain’s recent vote to leave the EU affects Russia’s economic and foreign policies. Vladimir
Putin’s strategic goals in the international arena are more achievable with more instability in
Europe. Thus, if Britain withdraws in the next two years, the political and economic upheaval in
Europe that would potentially follow plays right into Putin’s hand (Salinas). Further, in areas of military deployment, the U.S.’s primary European partner has been Britain. In an EU world sans
Britain, the U.S. could potentially have less influence since its ties with remaining member states are not as strong as they are with Britain. Regarding areas where EU and U.S. interests overlap,
Kristen Silverberg, former U.S. ambassador to the EU, states, “what we need on the inside is a determined ally and advocate, and that’s frequently been the UK” (Qtd in LaFranchi). For example, when negotiating the nuclear agreement with Iran, the U.S. experienced some push back from some of the European participants in the talks. However, British negotiators successfully moved their European counterparts to the U.S. point of view (LaFranchi).
Similarly, if the U.S. were to play a role in influencing Russian policy, it is more challenging without Britain as an EU member (De Luce and McLeary).
The region of the world that is most affected by Russian policies and presumably is in the best position to shape Russian policies is Europe. A divided Europe decreases its influence on Russia.
Disruptions in energy supply as well as the political and economic changes in a post-Brexit world could prevent a unified Europe from effective engagement with Russia. From the international perspective, a divided Europe makes addressing global challenges such as refugees, terrorism, and economic integration more difficult.
This area only focuses on these two aspects of Russia and EU relations because Area 3 (Russian expansion) is worthy of its own area of discussion.
Area 2: Russia and Syria
Russia’s support of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad has made American and European efforts to either stop the civil war or eradicate ISIS much more difficult. Whether it’s true or not, American political leaders are convinced that the most immediate threat to national security is increased
ISIS activity throughout the world. Some argue that bringing the fight directly to ISIS forces in
Iraq and Syria is essential. Further, the civil war in Syria itself which predates ISIS adds to the complexity of the region. Russia has been a significant supporter of the Syrian government. Putin himself has stated, “We did indeed withdraw a substantial portion of our forces. But we made sure that after our withdrawal, the Syrian army would be in a fit state to carry out serious offenses itself with our remaining forces’ support” (MacFarquhar). However, some analysts believe that the level of support that remained behind is comparable to the original level of engagement, suggesting commitment to the Syrian government remains strong albeit more secretive (MacFarquhar).
The U.S. strategy has been to lead an international coalition to isolate Assad from the rest of the world. The assumption has been that if Assad is unable to rely on partners to continue the war, he will have no choice but to terminate military activities within Syria. Russia has capitalized on this view, using its support not only to continue the war, but to also undermine American leadership in the region. Specifically, Putin’s support for Syria is perceived as a way to taunt
Turkey and undermine NATO unity. His courtship of Syrian Kurds is aimed to cut ties in the
U.S.’s fight against ISIS. Additionally, Russia is conscientiously perpetuating the civil war, in part because of the flow of Syrian refugees in Europe, thereby, fostering instability and division there. Finally, Russia is flexing its diplomatic muscle to demonstrate that there may be a second world power at the table (Ghitis).
The Syria situation cannot be ignored. In the past few years, the Syrian civil war has been connected to (1) the growth of ISIS and terrorism around the world, (2) a refugee-induced instability in Europe, (3) status of Iran’s nuclear program, and (4) suffering and destruction in the
Middle East. Russia is a potential source of perpetuating these problems, but is also a possible partner in the solutions of these problems.
Area 3: Russian expansion
When Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula in 2014 and further supported rebellious activities in Ukraine, it signaled a resurgence of the Russian “empire.” Countries that were once part of the
Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact now wonder if they are next.
Nadia Savchenko, former Ukrainian fighter pilot and current member of Ukraine’s parliament, states, “… they [Europe and America] need to understand that if they don’t stop Russia on the border of Ukraine, next time it will be on the border with Poland or the border with Germany”
(Qtd in Blair). As a response to this perceived threat, NATO members and other European countries have increased their military activities, which could potentially escalate into a broader conflict. In 2015, Sweden and Finland were interested in joining NATO, but backed down due to
Russian pressure. Recently, Finland has re-entered discussions to join NATO (Dyomkin and
Forsell). Further, NATO has increased its military presence in Poland and the Baltic states by deploying four battalions as a signal that NATO is willing to defend its members. In February
2016, the U.S. Defense Dept. announced that $3.4 billion will be spent on the European
Reassurance Initiative, aimed to protecting allies in the Baltic States, Central Europe, and Poland
(Browne).
Even if Vladimir Putin has no aspirations beyond Ukraine, the dangers in that country alone are significant. Putin has consistently claimed that Russian military presence in Ukraine is merely a humanitarian effort in a civil war between the Ukrainian government and rebel forces in Eastern
Ukraine. However, there is some evidence that the Russian military is doing more than just providing humanitarian assistance. Their support for the rebels is delaying a resolution of the conflict, destabilizing the country, and increasing safety concerns for all Ukrainian residents
(Shinkman).
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has been considered the world’s only superpower. Some have assumed that China is in a position to challenge the U.S. and become a second superpower. However, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has been more of a direct threat to U.S. influence, especially in Europe and the Middle East. Perhaps the greatest threat to American security in the near future is not Islamic extremism or China, but Russia.
Area 4: Russian politics and economics
Twenty-five years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, powerful elements in Russia are still holding on to a Soviet-Communist mentality where the U.S. and Europe are seen as enemies.
Further, that mentality is exacerbated by the continuing problems within Russia relating to their economy and energy policies. Historically, countries who experience significant existential domestic problems have sought to expand their power outside of their borders to gain strength.
Twentieth century examples of this include Germany and Japan. Additionally, even countries that enjoyed some internal strength and stability have used the notion of ideological superiority to justify expansion. The efforts of both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold
War exemplify this thought. In 2016, Russia is in unique position where significant factions within Russia are longing for the “Russia of old” coupled with some significant domestic challenges.
Vladimir Putin has surrounded himself with like-minded advisors with a tendency to adopt nationalist policies, guided by a belief of cultural and political superiority. According to Simon
Smith, writing for Real Clear World, “Decision making in Moscow has become highly consolidated and hostage to the whimsy of Putin and his group think-prone advisors” (Smith,
Simon). Mr. Smith continues to argue that the Soviet Union “lost” the Cold War due to long- term internal economic structural problems more than the U.S. “won” the Cold War. In a quarter century after the Cold War, Russia has not modernized its economy to a significant degree, which suggests that they failed to learn the lesson that others such as China learned (S. Smith).
Although the imposed sanctions after the annexation of Crimea have had an effect, recent economic challenges are due more to Russia’s domestic economic policies along with declining oil prices. Incomes that were rising up, or at least steady until 2014, declined for the first time
(Smith, Simon). As recently as 2015, Russia’s economy has been on the brink of an economic collapse despite continued transition to a market economy. There have been some significant economic shocks, but the market has corrected for them fairly efficiently. However, the rise and fall of the economy has been coupled with crippling inflation rates of 17% in the spring of 2015 as well as 10% decrease in private consumption and a 40% decrease in imports (Aleksashenko).
Russia’s economy is almost solely dependent on its production of oil. Because of recent decreases in global oil prices as well as its contracting economy, Russia is facing a budget crisis, making it difficult for Mr. Putin to achieve any of his objectives. The Finance Ministry has proposed a tax increase on the oil industry, rather than make budget cuts, to make up for their revenue shortfall. Currently, half of Russia’s tax revenue is from the oil industry. The fear is that a tax increase will lead to a further contraction of the Russian economy as well as political consequences. Lauren Goodrich, a senior Eurasia analyst at Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence firm, states, “this [tax] would have decades long effects” (Qtd in Rosenfeld). She continued to argue that Russia needs new investments within the next two years or it will experience a decline in oil production as Soviet-era wells are drying up (Rosenfeld). Because of recent sanctions and changes in the international oil market, Russia depends on domestic production to meet all of their needs. The drawbacks of Russia’s oil dependence are clear; in 2015, Russia’s economy contracted by 3.7%, and the value of the ruble fell by 55% (Rosenfeld).
It would be prudent for Russia to diversify its economy away from its current degree of oil and gas dependency. Using a labor force that could compete in the manufacturing sector, for example, may be the right course of action. However, the labor force in Russia is declining as a result of the post-Soviet Union economy when birth rates plummeted from 2.2 births per woman in 1987 to 1.17 births per woman in 1999 (d’Amora). In February of 2016, Forbes reported that the birthrates have risen slowly to 1.78, and it acknowledges that the estimate is probably on the high side of the actual rate (Adomanis). In the next decade, Russia is expected to lose 6-8% of available workers which amounts to a decreased labor force of 6-7 million people (d’Amora).
The decreased birthrates in addition to the aging population will be another significant barrier to economic growth. Reversing this tide will require immigration reform, improving public health, and raising the retirement age, which is 60 for men, 55 for women. Putin is hesitant to make these reforms because his most significant base of support are pensioners and state employees who are benefitting from the current structure of the Russian economy (d’Amora).
Another barrier to reforming the Russian economy is the long-standing corruption that has taken place since the days of the Soviet Union. Russia can be described as a kleptocracy. When the
Soviet Union broke up, the leaders of many of the state-run businesses and top officials in the
KGB essentially kept the money for themselves. Rather than invest that money in the newly formed Russian Federation, these officials stole the money and moved it out of Russian via organized crime. When these overseas criminal enterprises turned profitable, the money returned to the pockets of the original thieves, who remain in close relationships with top government officials. Today, the government continues to reward its friends with top contracts such as the construction contracts for the Sochi Olympics and the establishment and funding of Bank Rossyia (Rath). The level of corruption is so extreme that it hasn’t been seen in Russia since she was ruled by czars. The estimated cost of bribery alone is $300 billion, equivalent to Denmark’s
GDP and greater than Russia’s budget for health and education (Dawisha).
The U.S. and Western countries contribute to the corruption in Russia as a unwitting participant in the money laundering schemes that take place outside of Russia. The Hoover Institute launched the Kleptocracy Initiative with a focus on how the West’s willingness to do business with kleptocrats gives them access to our institutions and protects them through financial secrecy laws, which threatens national security in the West. By tracing the money flows in and out of
Russia and the Ukraine, KI is hoping to encourage better behavior by Western facilitators
(Orlova). Further, the U.S. directly contributes to the Russian leaders’ wallets as a Roscosmos customer. Roscosmos is a state-owned corporation that manufactures space equipment. The U.S. has purchased over $1 billion in equipment (RD-180 rocket engines) for use by NASA and the military over the last fifteen years, and the U.S. Air Force has contracted to buy 18 more RD-
180s at a cost of over $500 million. Many of the executives in Roscosmos and RD AMROSS (a
Russian owned company that operates in the U.S.) are also high ranking Russian officials who have also been sanctioned by the U.S. government for past misdeeds (Wahid). Putin’s administration is fortunate that Russian citizens have not demanded for less corruption with their voices in protest or at the ballot box. However, if Ukraine becomes more “Europeanized” and less “Russian” in its economic and political structures, then the collective power of the Russian citizenry may pose a significant challenge to the current kleptocratic practices (Gregory).
Russia’s economy is at a crossroads. Its ability to maintain its way of life and achieve domestic and international objectives is in jeopardy. Simon Smith summarizes, “There is no doubt that
Putin seeks to regain what he sees as Russia’s rightful place as a global power, but without addressing Russia’s domestic shortcomings, it will never be a truly great power; and nuclear saber-rattling or personal attacks on foreign leaders will not change that cold, hard fact” (S.
Smith). Russia’s international ambitions are due to a combination of correcting for economic structural problems as well as a belief that projecting Russian strength is the best way to achieve
Russian strength.
Further, Russian politics are set up to maintain power for the majority party. Although there are four different parties represented in the Duma, Putin’s United Russia party (which he literally created) holds 53% of the seats. Despite that ability to get parliamentary support for every initiative, Russian citizens are becoming increasingly wary. They are beginning to demand a more responsive government that is focused on the needs of the citizens, not those in power.
Jeremy Kinsman of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation writes, “But today's partly free
Russians are educated and tech-savvy like few other societies, with more cellphones than citizens, and widespread, unimpeded internet connection. They are more than aware that Western economies are not in such great shape that they can pretend to have great lessons to give. And in any case, it is obvious that what happens in Russia depends on Russians themselves. Russians also now know that democracy takes time to build. But they also realize that its successful construction needs openness, accountability and freedom to dissent and compete. They do see these values in the West, and unlike their president, they increasingly expect them to be their norms as well” (Kinsman). Lastly, when Russian citizens challenge the Russian government and pursue reforms, the government responds by using state media and strict regulations on public assemblies and freedom of expression to limit the reach of these voices. For example, many leaders of NGOs who have ties outside of Russia have been threatened, persecuted, and forced to flee. However, some NGOs that operate in Russia remain committed to opening up the eyes of Russian citizens.
They rely on funds from the West to continue operating, promote democracy within, and eliminate violations of basic civil and human rights (Gershman).
Potential Aff Solvency Mechanisms
Some of the mechanisms below could be stand-alone, but others probably would need to be in concert with others in order to accrue any significant advantage.
A. U.S. could enforce the Magnitsky Act which punishes Russian officials responsible for
the death of Russian lawyer and auditor Sergei Magnitsky, which offers a mechanism for
putting pressure on the abusive Russian elite who support Putin. The U.S. should fully
implement the act and coordinate with its allies in Europe and elsewhere to promote
similar legislation. U.S. could also modify Magnitsky Act and add names to be targeted.
B. The EU could improve the sanctions regime by closing loopholes such as gas.
C. The EU and/or US could support pipeline construction away from Russia.
D. The U.S. could reduce trade barriers with the EU to make American products more
affordable and decrease demand on Russian products.
E. The U.S. could exclude Russia from the international banking communication network
(SWIFT).
F. The U.S. could withdraw from New START (Signed in 2010 and ratified in 2011). G. U.S. could enforce or make it publicly known Russian treaty violations (e.g., Helsinki
Final Act, Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, Chemical Weapons Convention, Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty).
H. U.S. could counter propaganda from Russian state-owned media through international
broadcasting or student and business exchanges, for example.
I. U.S. could seek to expel Russia from the G8; EU could seek to expel Russia from
Council of Europe.
J. U.S. could work with NATO to expand military activities in the Nordic region, the
Baltics, Central Europe, and the Balkans
K. U.S. and/or EU could assist Ukrainian military and support economic and political
reforms that strengthen the government.
L. U.S. could work with NATO to deter Russian militarization of the Arctic Ocean
(Carafano et al)
Negative Arguments
Many of the negative arguments that relate to foreign policy that debaters will hear on the upcoming China topic will certainly apply to the Russia topic. Debaters will be able to discuss hegemony, democracy, capitalism, realism, neorealism, and many other critical and non-critical positions, both on case and off case.
What may separate the Russia topic from other topics that target a particular country is the agent of action counterplan ground. There is a legitimate question as to whether the U.S. has any effective leverage over Russia. Is the U.S. even the correct agent? A small portion of this paper discusses what options the EU has after it imposed sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea and continued involvement in Ukraine. However, Russia simply does not trust the U.S. and perceives any policy as simply a projection of American power. Her faith in the EU is not much greater, as she sees the EU as operating at the behest of the U.S. If the resolution uses the
USFG as the agent, then the negative may not only be able to capitalize on an obvious solvency deficit, but they may be able to present a truly viable and competitive alternative to the Aff plan.
NATO is also an alternative agent that gives the negative counterplan ground. The negative could argue that increased military activity in Europe (e.g., Nordic region, Baltic region, Eastern
Europe, Balkans) is a necessary tool, and NATO is an in ideal position. NATO could expand and allow new members which would encircle (yes, we went there) Russia. NATO could also deploy forces in areas designed to deter Russian aggression. However, the negative will need to find a strong net benefit, since NATO operations and U.S. or EU economic or diplomatic actions are not mutually exclusive. The net benefit could be an economic-, political-, or relations-based disadvantage that is limited to the agent of action in the U.S. (e.g., a typical US-based politics disad that has been common for many years).
Further, Politics disads will be very interesting as we will have inaugurated a new President seven months before the competitive season begins. For example, if the new President takes a more aggressive military posture in combatting ISIS, this could complicate any kind of “Russia- pivot” that the aff plan may entail. This may be a topic where the affirmative team has the harder time coming up with a realistic policy option, despite having the presumed advantage of speaking first and last.
The most interesting type of politics disad may be the politics within Russia itself. They are scheduled to have a presidential election in the spring of 2018. Although it is widely expected that Putin will win re-election to another six year term, it is possible that the aff plan could enable some of the minority parties to be of a greater challenge to Putin. If the aff plan creates more economic pain in Russia, then this could provide fuel to ramp up anti-Putin activities in
Russia. If the aff plan spurs some reaction from Putin, then maybe the reaction is what fans the anti-Putin flames. Admittedly, any real chance of Putin losing in 2018 is small, if a recent poll is accurate. A poll run by the Russian government showed that 74% of Russians are prepared to vote for Putin in 2018 (Pestano).
Finally, Area 4 of this paper addresses many of the barriers to reform in Russia. Corruption, combined with demographic issues, will make genuine change within Russia very difficult. This creates a significant solvency burden for the affirmative. Further, it also sets up strong offense for the negative if they can argue that the plan makes these matters worse, especially if the
Russian oligarchs backlash against the plan, increasing suffering and entrenching the deteriorating economic infrastructure.
In short, for traditional teams and progressive teams, there are a wide variety of case arguments, plan-specific disadvantages, generic disadvantages, counterplans, and kritiks to keep the debaters fully engaged.
Sample Resolutions
1. Resolved: the United States [federal government] should substantially change its foreign
policy toward the Russian Federation.
2. Resolved: the United States [federal government] should substantially increase its
economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the Russian Federation.
3. Resolved: the United States [federal government] should develop a comprehensive strategy
toward the Russian Federation.
4. Resolved: the United States [federal government] should substantially increase economic
and/or diplomatic pressure on the Russian Federation.
5. Resolved: the United States [federal government] should adopt a policy of constructive
engagement with the Russian Federation.
* we acknowledge that the most effective agent of action with regard to influencing Russia’s policies may be the European Union. We would like to consider replacing USFG in any of the resolutions above with European Union.
*Russia’s official name is “the Russian Federation.” The wording could reflect this official name to avoid ambiguity.
Definitions
Russia/Russian Federation
A country of eastern Europe and northern Asia stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean. Formerly, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the largest of the constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. (thefreedictionary.com)
A country in northern Asia and eastern Europe; population 140,041,200 (est. 2009). Official name: Russian Federation (oxforddictionaries.com)
Foreign Policy a policy pursued by a nation in its dealings with other nations, designed to achieve national objectives (Dictionary.com) the policy of a sovereign state in its interaction with other sovereign states (Merriam- Webster.com)
Plan of action adopted by one nation in regards to its diplomatic dealings with other countries. Foreign policies are established as a systematic way to deal with issues that may arise with other countries (BusinessDictionary.com).
Diplomatic Engagement
Definitions that will be used for the 2016-17 China topic will apply to the Russia topic.
Additional definitions: While the details differ, each case of engagement has common elements. Engagement is a process, not a destination. It involves exerting pressure, by raising questions and hypothetical possibilities, and by probing the other country’s assumptions and thinking. Above all, it involves testing how far the other country might be willing to go. Properly understood, the diplomacy of engagement means raising questions that the other country may wish to avoid or be politically unable to answer. It places the ball in the other country’s court. (Chester A. Crocker, op-ed contributor, New York Times, September 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?_r=0, accessed 7/3/16)
Such views miscast the essence of diplomatic engagement . Diplomacy is likely to be a painstaking process and it may not work with every targeted nation. However, the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies, but to seek adjustments in their behavior and ambitions. North Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Iran would be offered a path toward realizing their essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation. (Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Boston Globe, October 7, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/essence-diplomatic- engagement/p20362?breadcrumb=/issue/65/international_peace_and_security , accessed 7/3/16)
Economic Engagement
Definitions that will be used for the 2016-17 China topic will apply to the Russia topic.
Additional definitions:
The West faces a choice between sanctions and economic engagement . Trade sanctions would only strengthen the security elite's hold on the economy and reinforce its dictatorship. It would be wrong to oust Russia from the International Monetary Fund or stop its membership of the World Trade Organization, because open markets and international standards will only expose Mr. Putin and his cronies. Instead, the European Union and the United States should impose ethical and legal standards that make it costly for Russia to misbehave, targeting big state companies and top officials, not private citizens or businessmen. (Anders Aslund, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Financial Times, https://piie.com/commentary/op- eds/west-should-use-economics-rein-russia , accessed 7/3/16)
A Turkey more economically integrated with the transatlantic community will also be more constructive on the difficult issues in its neighborhood. Now is the time to reengage Turkey in the search for order in its neighborhood. If the West starts with economic engagement , the rest is sure to follow. (Kemal Kirisci, Director of the Center on the United States and Europe’s Turkey Project, Brookings Institute, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from- chaos/posts/2015/04/06-turkey-economic-engagement-kirisci, accessed 7/3/16)
Comprehensive of large scope; covering or involving much; inclusive (Dictionary.com) including many, most, or all things (Merrian-Webster.com) covering completely or broadly (Merrian-Webster.com)
Strategy a careful plan or method for achieving a particular goal usually over a long period of time (Merrian-Webster.com)
A plan of action or policy designed to achieve a major or overall aim (OxfordDictionaries.com)
Comprehensive Strategy
We aim not only to defeat terrorists when we find them, but also to diminish the discontent on which they feed. We are pursuing a comprehensive , multifaceted strategy of constitutional governance, social inclusion, security operations, diplomatic outreach, and economic development to accomplish this. We want to work in partnership with the United States on all these efforts, especially as we move forward toward a crucial milestone in Iraq’s progress from dictatorship to democracy — our fourth parliamentary elections since 2003. (Nouri Al-Maliki, former Prime Minister of Iraq, Foreign Policy, February 18, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/18/a-comprehensive-strategy-against-terrorism/, accessed 7/3/16)
A Comprehensive Strategy for Sudan: This morning Secretary Clinton announced the results of this Administration’s Sudan policy review, accompanied by Ambassador Rice and myself. The strategy is the result of months of serious and extensive deliberations and considerations of the complex challenges by the most senior levels of this Administration. It provides the integrated and comprehensive approach that the issues in Sudan require, and it is focused on achieving verifiable progress on the ground. This strategy includes three primary strategic objectives: first, a definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur; second, implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other; and third, ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists. To achieve these objectives, we are committed to using all levers of American influence. Fundamental to our approach is a policy of broad, deep engagement for lasting change on the ground. (Scott Gration, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, October 19, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/A-Comprehensive-Strategy-for-Sudan, accessed 7/3/2016)
Comprehensive strategy is commonly held to be a serious and ongoing effort to relate the means and ends of national policy and—within the limits of the U.S. system—to mobilize all national assets to achieve those ends. Yet it also requires something more fundamental: a sense of where you are. (Dr. James Jay Carafano et al, Vice President of the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, Heritage Foundation Special Report #173 on Russia and Eurasia, December 9, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/12/us-comprehensive-strategy-toward- russia, accessed 7/3/16)
European Union an association of European nations formed in 1993 for the purpose of achieving political and economic integration. Incorporation the European Community, the European Union’s member states are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (Dictionary.com) The European Union (EU) is a group of 27 countries that operates as a cohesive economic and political block. Nineteen of the countries use the euro as their official currency (Investopedia.com) economic, scientific, and political organization consisting of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, & Croatia (www.merian- webster.com)
Constructive Engagement a policy of having political and business relationships with a country, while at the same time supporting political and social change within that country (macmillandictionary.com) an approach to advocacy for social change and transformation that seeks a reciprocal relationship between civil society and institutions in governance based on mutual respect, trust, legitimacy, transparency, and competency (commonwealthfoundation.com) in essence, constructive engagement, is a policy which advocates the maintenance of an economic and diplomatic relationship with an authoritarian state as opposed to imposing sanctions and embargoes on it (www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/LIOB07-CONSTENG.htm)
Economic Pressure Economic pressure occurs when a society or country is facing undesirable economic times. For example, it may occur during a recession, when unemployment rates are higher than usual, or after a period of cost increases. Societies respond to economic pressure in different ways, such as consumers cutting costs, shopping less, or borrowing less money from financial institutions. A period of pressure is often followed by economic reform (http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is- economic-pressure.htm, accessed 7/7/16) a condition in a country’s economy in which economic indicators are unfavorable (http://www.financepractitioner.com/dictionary/economic-pressure, accessed 7/7/16)
To avoid further confusion over the semantics of “economic sanctions,” we propose that a clear division be drawn in references to the policy of economic sanctions (as we have discussed) and the policy instrument chosen to execute that policy in any given situation. We propose that the term “economic sanctions” be reserved for use when referring to the policy instrument (e.g. trade embargo, freezing assets), and to adopt the term “economic pressure” policy, or, alternatively, “economic punishment” policy, to describe the policy that attempts to pressure others to change their ways by inflicting economic losses on them (Askari, Hossein G. Economic Sanctions: Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy . Westport: Greenwood, 2003. 83-84.)
Diplomatic Pressure The American government, primarily through the Department of State, has pursued democracy promotion through diplomatic pressure and support. This has included public and private rhetoric to encourage transitions to democracy or end undemocratic practices, as well as recognition of and meeting with foreign democracy activists (https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/defaul t/files/170214DemocracyPromotion.pdf)
Policymakers have three primary tools: sanctions, targeted incentives, and war to encourage compliance with norms against the spread of unconventional weapons and related delivery systems. The Bush administration has emphasized the use of force and the imposition of coercive sanctions. Earlier administrations, while also imposing sanctions, made more use of positive incentives. Policymakers frequently turn to sanctions as a middle option between diplomacy and military action, as a means of advancing nonproliferation goals without incurring the risks of combat. Occasionally, as demonstrated in Iraq, sanctions have served as a stepping stone to war, a form of coercive action that paves the way for the use of force. Positive incentives are sometimes a more effective means of changing regime behavior and enhancing international security. In Ukraine’s and Kazakhstan’s decisions to give up the nuclear weapons on their soil, South Africa’s disavowal of the bomb, and the nuclear restraint agreements of Argentina and Brazil, inducements and mutual conciliatory gestures were more important than coercive pressures (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/Cortright, accessed 7/7/16)
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