NFHS Policy Topic Selection Proposal Russia Submitted by Alma

NFHS Policy Topic Selection Proposal Russia Submitted by Alma Nicholson and Greg Malis Isidore Newman School New Orleans, Louisiana Oklahoma City, Oklahoma August 5-7, 2016 Introduction and Timeliness Given the daily deluge of news pertaining to Russia and the potentially global effect of any of these situations, it is time for high school policy debaters to focus on that part of the world. The last and only year that Russia was the focus of a policy topic was 1998-1999, where the topic was Resolved: the U.S. should substantially change its foreign policy toward Russia. At that time, the primary concern was the continued path towards democracy and capitalism as well as its effect on the former Soviet states. However, seventeen years later, it is imperative that we return to a discussion that harkens back to the Cold War: the idea of Russia as an enemy to the West and to the United States. Recent events have placed Russia in the center of discussion regarding international affairs. The three most significant areas are Russian relations with the European Union, Russian expansion into Ukraine and beyond, and Russian relations with Syria. All three of these areas are potentially rooted in internal aspects of Russian politics and economics. Current U.S. Policy Toward Russia Although conservative policy analysts have been critical of the Obama Administration for its “wait and see” approach towards Russia, concern over the U.S. approach pre-dates the current administration. Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank, issued a special report in December 2015 which opens with “Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has not had a coherent, comprehensive strategy toward Russia. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrates, the U.S. has paid a price for this failure and, of course, many of Russia’s neighbors have paid far higher prices. At the core of the U.S. failure has been an unwillingness to assess the nature of the Russian regime realistically and to base its policy on that assessment. Too often, the U.S. has relied on wishful thinking” (Carafano, et al). The report argues that U.S. policy makers and policy analysts assumed that the slow progress towards democracy and a market economy were simply transitional and normal. Even as late in this transition as at the time of the George W. Bush Administration, Vladimir Putin was described as “very straight forward and trustworthy.” However, this report states that Russia has intelligently and systemically developed into a well-functioning tyranny, duping the U.S. and the rest of the world by feigning steps towards a functioning democracy and a market economy. In the mid-1990s, the U.S. engaged Russia, even welcoming it into international organizations for which it did not meet the wealth requirements. In fact, Russia’s economy and political system is closer to a kleptocracy than a modern democracy (Carafano et al). In the Cold War era, the U.S. succeeded in containing the Soviet Union, limiting its expansion at every opportunity. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. has not maintained any particular ideology when it comes to its Russia policy and has been largely reactionary. In essence, the U.S. needs to play a long game and simply make it far more expensive for Russia to continue on its current international and domestic path (Carafano et al). When Russia annexed Crimea, President Obama downplayed any concerns by categorizing Russia as a “regional power.” However, Walter Russell Mead argues that, although Russia is a “declining power,” she should still be considered a great power. According to Sumantra Maitra, a doctoral candidate in Russian foreign policy at the University of Nottingham, “a great power is therefore assumed to be a country, which possess [sic] more influence over other countries, and a disproportionate influence on world politics.” Russia’s military is modern enough to wage war and meets political realists’ standard of being a power (Maitra). Sputnik News, a Russian government-owned news agency, has described U.S. policy under the Obama Administration as consisting of constant pressure and confrontation. Further, it quotes John Quigley, professor emeritus at Ohio State University, as stating that all political factions in the U.S. support President Obama’s approach and it is unlikely to change (“Current U.S. Policy”). Given the length of time the U.S. has maintained its current approach as well as the guarantee of a new President in January 2017, some suggest the U.S. should make significant changes to its policy by stepping back and re-evaluating how to respond to Mr. Putin and Russia. Specifically, some advocate the U.S. should consider decreasing her confrontational approach and pursue a policy of retrenchment (Maitra). Responding to some confusion over what the official U.S. policy is towards Russia, the Obama Administration recently completed a 15-month review of its approach to Russia. Although it has held little public discussion on its policy, the Administration acknowledges that it runs along four themes: (1) counter and deter Russian malign influence, coercion, and aggression; (2) strengthen, build resilience, and reduce the vulnerability of allies and partners; (3) communicate and cooperate with Russia on key global challenges; and (4) preserve the potential for Russia's integration as a responsible global player (Conley and de Galbert). The largest barrier to a successful U.S. foreign policy with respect to Russia is Vladimir Putin himself. He does not trust the U.S. Shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Mr. Putin offered to help President Bush in Afghanistan. Concerned about the potential of a growing Muslim population in Russia becoming radicalized, he was supportive of American efforts to stop Islamic terrorists. Although Putin’s own political advisors were against Russian assistance, he provided it anyway. Shortly thereafter, however, President Bush advocated for the expansion of NATO and withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Putin and his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, considered both decisions acts of betrayal. It is important for the U.S. to get Russia to return to a working relationship. Stephen F. Cohen, professor emeritus of Russian studies, history, and politics at NYU and Princeton, argues that effective cooperation with Russia is essential in solving any regional or international national security problem. He writes, “ There is not a single major regional or issue-related national security problem we can solve without the full cooperation of whoever sits in the Kremlin, period, end of story” (Smith, Patrick). Current EU Policy Toward Russia Once Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the EU was left with three options: (1) engage and impose sanctions with the desired goal of restoring the “status quo ante,” the state of affairs prior to Crimean annexation, (2) achieve a new normal with continued sanctions, or (3) heighten resiliency which would dissuade Russia from further acts of aggression. The March 2015 Schuman Report (issued by the Robert Schuman Foundation, the Research and Studies Centre on Europe) explains that “President Putin has made it abundantly clear that his strategic priority is to re-define the terms imposed on Russia at the end of the Cold War. Russia will no longer be treated as the war's loser, while the United States, with the help of its allies, plays the role of the world's and Europe's hegemon” (Niblett). Although the economic effect of the sanctions has had a greater impact on Russia than the EU, there is growing concern within the EU over the sustainability of the sanctions. Russia may have inadvertently succeeded in its goal of creating division within Europe as the sanctions themselves are making more Europeans skeptical of the Union itself. For some members such as France, the goal of the sanctions undermines national interests. On April 28, 2016, the National Assembly in France passed a non-binding resolution calling for the end of anti-Russian sanctions (Dugulin). It will be necessary for the EU to change its approach to Russia. They need to re-evaluate their current set of policies and shift their course of action guided by a few principles. Piotr Dutkiewicz outlines: “A three-point starter comes to mind to stop the further escalation of a multi-level confrontation. The first is to start “talking about talks” by finding appropriate partners and venues to set the tone, areas, and level of the policy conversation to come. The second is to outline – with all frankness – areas of short- and medium-term common interests (and incentives) that would appeal both to EU and Russia. Thirdly, it would be helpful to create a “practical guidelines” with whom to talk, about what, and at what level to be used by advisers to policy makers when the time will come for the re-engagement” (Dutkiewicz). It is necessary to create a constructive engagement policy that is centered on “Eastern Europe first” while pushing back on Russian aggression. Ulrich Speck writes, “The EU and its member states need to design a new Eastern policy that puts Eastern Europe first instead of Russia first. That policy should comprise several elements. To start with, the EU must push back against Russian aggression and stabilize neighbors that are under attack or under threat. But Brussels should also continue to work with Moscow on issues of common interest and keep the door open for Russia to return to a constructive relationship” (Speck). The ability of the EU to stay together is already in question with Britain’s recent vote. Other states may follow over concerns similar to those expressed by Britain. Further, the Union is potentially threatened by increased nationalism in Austria.

Load more