The FRPS Baltic States Section
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The FRPS Baltic States Section British Overt Intelligence from the Baltic States during the Second World War and its effect on British Policy towards the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 Benjamin William Wheatley A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of East Anglia School of History May 2014 This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution. 2 Ben Wheatley 2014 The FRPS Baltic States Section British Overt Intelligence from the Baltic States during the Second World War and its effect on British Policy towards the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 Abstract The prologue introduces the reader to Anglo-Soviet relations prior to the Second World War; this is followed by part one of the study which highlights the restrictions that were placed on SIS and SOE which effectively excluded them from operations in the Baltic states. Part two of the thesis examines how this exclusion elevated the role of overt intelligence as a substitute form of intelligence; ‘the power of the press’ in this context is a very apt term. The enemy and neutral press were acquired, analysed and any relevant intelligence gained was quickly distributed around the various government departments by the FRPS. The key role the FO played in requesting, prioritising, and utilising the information provided by the FRPS Baltic States Section and the FRPS Russian Research Section is also examined. Part two of thesis concludes with a study of the fruits of the FRPS Russian Research Section’s labours and how its work influenced British post-war policy towards the Soviet Union. Finally part three examines the content of this overt intelligence in two case studies concerning German Economic Policy and Population Policy. Britain’s wartime policy towards the Soviet Union is then described in order to set the work of the FRPS in context. The thesis is not an attempt to complete a top-to-bottom study of the German occupation of the Baltic states, but rather to present the contemporary British perspective on this occupation, a perspective which was derived almost entirely from overt intelligence. How worthwhile this form of intelligence was and how far it helped to formulate wartime and post-war policy are the central questions. 3 Contents Acknowledgements 6 Abbreviations 7 Introduction 9 Prologue British Pre-War Policy towards the Soviet Union and the Baltic States, 31 1917 - 1941 PART I The Restricted Services, British Covert Intelligence and Subterfuge in the Baltic States Chapter 1 SIS, SOE and the NKVD 44 Operation Blunderhead 58 PART II The Central Role of British Overt Intelligence in the Baltic States Chapter 2 The Importance of the Foreign Press to British Intelligence 1938 - 1941 67 The Origins of the FRPS Baltic States Section 67 The political climate, Anglo-Soviet relations in the second half of 1941 73 The Foreign Office Builds the FRPS’ Reputation 80 The FRPS Organisation 88 The Relationship between FRPS and the Reconstruction Committee 91 4 Chapter 3 The Stockholm Press Reading Bureau 99 Chapter 4 The Foreign Research and Press Service Baltic States Section 1941 - 1942 110 Monitoring the Ostland 114 The 1942 Anglo-Soviet Treaty Negotiations and their Devastating Consequences 118 for the Baltic States Monitoring continues regardless 125 Chapter 5 The Foreign Office Research Department Baltic States Section 1943 – 1944 132 The Effect of Allied Diplomacy on Ostland Monitoring 140 PART III Case Studies of the FRPS/FORD Baltic States Section’s Intelligence Introduction to the Case Studies 150 Chapter 6 Economic Conditions in the Ostland 152 Planning Economic Control 152 Establishing German Economic Control, the Conflict between Exploitation and Reform 155 The Day of the Hardliners, Göring and Backe Halt Agrarian Reform 165 Infrastructure and Transport 168 Industry 172 Industrial Trade 177 Fiscal and Banking Policy 181 Chapter 7 German Population Policy in the Ostland 185 5 The General Plan Ost and the Ostland 186 Structural Planning for a Baltic March 189 Creating the New Order, Population Transfers in the Ostland 194 The ‘Evacuation’ of the Jews 194 Colonisation Actions 199 The Germanic Brethren 209 Military Collaboration 212 Part IV Post-hostilities Planning Chapter 8 The Foreign Office Research Department and Post-hostilities Planning 224 Conclusion 234 Bibliography 243 6 Acknowledgements During the preparation of the thesis I have received advice and assistance from many sources. Prior to starting my research at Kew, I received welcome suggestions from Dr Louise Atherton whose expert knowledge of the National Archives and British intelligence has proved invaluable. I am also grateful to Professor Peter Waldron for his advice on matters concerning the former Soviet Union. Thanks must be extended to the staffs of: The University of East Anglia’s Library The National Archives, Kew The Avon Archive, University of Birmingham My thanks are extended to my PhD supervisor Ian Farr for his detailed comments on my research as well as the helpful advice that has been offered to me, not just during the course of this project but throughout my time at the University of East Anglia. At this point I must mention the generous financial support and continued encouragement I have received from my sponsor and uncle, The Rt Revd. Peter Wheatley, who has made my postgraduate studies possible. I am indebted to my parents, Kay and Michael, for their unstinting support throughout all of my years of education. I must take the opportunity to thank my wife, Emma, for her support in so many ways, particularly in shaping the environment which made my research possible. This work is dedicated to our son, Joshua. 7 Abbreviations BHO Mining and Smelting Corporation East BOAC British Overseas Airways Corporation COS Chief of Staff FHQ Führer Head Quarters FO Foreign Office FORD Foreign Office Research Department FRPS Foreign Research and Press Service GC and CS Government Code and Cypher School GPO General Plan Ost GVD General Transportation Directorate East HBD Main Railway Division HSSPF Higher SS and Police Leader HMG His Majesty’s Government IWM Imperial War Museum KdS Commander of the Security Police and SD LAF Lithuanian Activist Front LO Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft Ostland mbH MEW Ministry for Economic Warfare MoI Ministry of Information NKPA North Korean Press Agency NKVD People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs NOC Netherlands East company NSDAP National Socialist German Workers’ Party or Nazi Party OKH Army High Command OKW High Command of the Wehrmacht OT Organisation Todt PID Political Intelligence Department PID (EH) Political Intelligence Department Electra House PRO The Public Record Office PWE Political Warfare Executive 8 RKFDV Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germandom RIIA Royal Institute of International Affairs RMO Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories RSHA Reich Security Main Office RuSHA Race and Resettlement Main Office RVD Reich Transportation Division RWM Operating Office East PHPS Post Hostilities Planning Staff PHPS/c Post Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee SA Storm Detachment SD Security Service SIS Secret Intelligence Service SOE Special Operations Executive SPRB Stockholm Press Reading Bureau SS Protection Echelon SSPF SS and Police Leader STS SOE Special Training School USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VoMi Ethnic German Liaison Office Wi Rü Amt War Economy and Armaments Office of the OKW Wi Stab Ost Economic Staff East Wi Fü Stab Ost Economic Command Staff East ZO Central Trade Corporation East 9 Introduction When the term intelligence is mentioned in a modern British historical context the image of covert operations instantly springs to mind: perhaps a shadowy figure lurking on a street corner observing his targets from afar, or an Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) agent obtaining secret documents from contact at a secret rendezvous. In the context of the Second World War, the image is further broadened to include the Bletchley Park code breakers. Although this popular image is an accurate one it, of course, only scratches the surface of genuine covert operations. It is naturally true that governments depend a great deal on covert intelligence, for in many situations it is the only way for top secret information, deemed necessary for state security, to be obtained from foreign states. There have been times, however, when, due to political restrictions placed on the covert intelligence services, overt intelligence has been at the forefront of Britain’s intelligence arsenal. This study focuses on one such occasion, namely the Baltic states during the Second World War. Whereas Britain relied on SIS, and to a certain extent, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to provide its intelligence from the western, northern and southern parts of German occupied Europe, the German occupied regions which fell within the Soviet Union’s 1941 borders were strictly off limits to SIS and SOE. Intelligence would instead be acquired by the ingenious use of overt intelligence, primarily from the enemy and neutral press. Overt intelligence was the only form of intelligence available to the British, due to the Foreign Office (FO) suspension of all covert intelligence gathering from inside the Soviet sphere of influence, which undoubtedly included the Baltic states after their annexation in 1940.1 The British fear of jeopardising the newly formed Anglo-Soviet alliance, on which so much rested, quite simply prohibited any covert intelligence operations in the Soviet sphere being contemplated. 1 Keith Jeffery, MI6, The History of the Secret Intelligence Service (London 2010), p.554, and Dónal O’Sullivan, Dealing with the Devil, Anglo-Soviet Cooperation During the Second World War (New York 2010), pp.27-28 10 The ‘power of the press’ is a term which is often misused in today’s society of shallow tabloid headlines.